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Anxiety and defective decisionmaking: an elaboration of the

groupthink modelJudith Chapman

School of Management, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia

Abstract

Purpose This article sets out to revisit Janis groupthink theory that holds that, when anxiety ispresent for a decision-making group, premature concurrence seeking emerges unless other mitigatingfactors are present. Research from selected segments of the decision making literature are introducedto explain the underlying causes of concurrence seeking. The result is an elaboration of the theory

based on a synthesis of older and newer ideas, supporting Janis core thesis that anxiety triggers thisphenomenon.

Design/methodology/approach The paper is conceptual and draws on literature addressing theimpact of emotions on decision-making behaviour; human responses to anxiety, includingpsychological defence modes and mechanisms; and groupthink research and writing.

Findings The theoretical elaboration of the groupthink model centres on the idea that anxietyassociated with a decision task triggers implicit motivations of anxiety reduction in groups, which areenacted through the activation of common defence mechanisms, thus resulting in the symptoms ofdefective decision making. A table that recasts the symptoms of groupthink as common defencemechanisms is provided.

Research limitations/implications Suggestions are made for broadening the conceptual base ofthe groupthink model, including consideration of the research on negative and positive emotions.

Practical implications The article distinguishes between poor decision making due to

groupthink and other causes. Remedies for the emergence of groupthink include better approachesto recognising and surfacing anxiety and other negative emotions, so they can be managedconstructively. Such remedies complement more conventional methods of improving group decisionmaking.

Originality/value The article focuses on the underlying causes of premature concurrence seeking,an aspect of the groupthink model that is not well understood. It builds on Janis explanation of anxietyas the main cause, by elaborating the linkages between the presence of anxiety, the symptoms ofgroupthink and the signs of defective decision making. In this, the article draws on research into theeffects of negative emotions on decision-making behaviour and related theories. It synthesises severalresearch streams to provide a more comprehensive explanation of concurrence seeking.

Keywords Group thinking, Decision making, Psychology

Paper type Conceptual paper

Concurrence seeking behaviourThe groupthink model was proposed by Janis (1972, 1982) as an explanation for poordecision making processes and outcomes in groups. Using a small number ofwell-known policy making disasters, including the decision to invade Cuba during theCold War, Janis associated certain contextual conditions with a concurrence seekingtendency. The term groupthink is appropriate only when the concurrence seekingemerges prematurely, thus curtailing thinking and discussion, and increasing the

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likelihood of poor decision outcomes (Longley and Pruitt, 1980). This phenomenon isnot inevitable in decision making groups. Indeed, Janis (1972) and Neck and Moorhead(1992) described several cases where policy makers worked closely together to solve acomplex dilemma while displaying few, if any, symptoms. The puzzle then, was this:

why does a groupthink tendency happen in some problem solving situations and not inothers?

For Janis (1972) the answer was to be found in the characteristics of the contextwithin which the decision was made. He theorised that groupthink only emerged whengroup members were faced with a decision task in a provocative situational contextinvolving a moral dilemma or risks of material losses. Such contexts were stressful they made the decision makers anxious and fearful of not coping adequately. Thestress was exacerbated in situations where the group had experienced previous failures(Janis, 1982). From Janiss perspective concurrence seeking was a form of striving formutual support to help group members cope with the emotion, and this was only reallypossible for groups that were highly cohesive. In fact, he thought that cohesivenesswas the most important factor in the emergence of a groupthink tendency. However,cohesiveness was not in itself sufficient to explain why groupthink occurred since notall groups succumbed to it. Apart from the provocative situational context, heproposed an additional set of structural antecedent conditions: a leader activelypromoting his or her own solutions; homogeneity of group members; lack ofmethodical decision-making procedures; and insulation of the group from the opinionsof other qualified associates. Janis did not think that all of these needed to be present.

Over a period of several decades a considerable amount of research and writing hasbeen generated with regard to the groupthink model. However, the results provide onlypartial validation of it (McCauley, 1998; Aldag and Fuller, 1993; McCauley, 1989), andlittle support for the central notion that groups need to be cohesive for prematureconcurrence-seeking to take hold (Aldag and Fuller, 1993; Park, 1990). Theorists and

researchers have responded in two ways to these results. On the one hand, variousmodifications to the chain of causality in the model have been proposed, and some newvariables have been factored in (e.g. Neck and Moorhead, 1995). A different, butcomplementary response is to probe more deeply into, or re-evaluate the underlyingtheory about concurrence seeking, its causes and impact on decision making behaviourin groups. This aspect of the groupthink model is not well understood (Neck andMoorhead, 1995).

This current paper is primarily of the latter kind: it revisits Janis (1972, 1982) theoryof concurrence seeking, and reviews it in the light of selected segments of the decisionmaking literature, including knowledge about the influence of emotion on decisionmaking that was not available until relatively recently. The result is an elaboration of

Janiss theory based on a synthesis of older and newer ideas. This elaboration supports

the core thesis that anxiety triggers premature concurrence seeking, while alsoexplaining why cohesiveness is not a necessary condition for the concurrence seekingto occur. In brief, the explanation of concurrence seeking presented in this paper buildson the work of Janis (1972, 1982) while providing a different explanation for researchresults that on first appearance, weaken the efficacy of the groupthink effect.

The literature used for this elaboration of the groupthink model is from a widerrange of theoretical streams than is usual. This is done deliberately, and in the view ofthe author is necessary to progress groupthink research and related management

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practice. Fuller and Aldag (1998) and Paulus (1998) argued that the conceptual base ofthe model needed to be generally broadened in the light of the research results, whileMcCauley (1998) argued for a broader and more consistent use of research in groupdynamics. In addition, Fuller and Aldag (1998) was concerned that groupthink studies

had lionised the research on group decision making, and that artificial boundaries werebeing drawn between premature concurrence seeking and other causes of poor decisionmaking. This may have, he suggested, hampered progress on decision making ingroups generally, as well as on the groupthink phenomenon itself, through theexclusion of potentially useful ideas from related research domains. Since a special1998 issue of Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes, relatively fewpapers have been published on groupthink, and fresh ideas are needed. This reviewand elaboration of the groupthink model therefore seems timely. The article proceedswith an overview of the existing model and the research results. It then turns toalternative explanations of concurrence seeking, followed by the proposedamendments to the original. The paper concludes with some implications forresearch and suggestions for management practice.

The groupthink modelConcurrence-seeking is a tendency towards convergence and mutual agreement inproblem solving groups. Groupthink is the term used to describe a situation whereconcurrence seeking emerges before a problem or proposed solution has beensufficiently analysed or evaluated. The full groupthink model proposes a causal linkconnecting the structural antecedent conditions, a concurrence-seeking tendency,symptoms of groupthink, indications of defective decision making, and a decisionoutcome marked by low probability of success. The model is depicted in Figure 1. Thesymptoms of groupthink were derived from case study observation undertaken by

Janis himself and include collective rationalisation of information, self-censoring

information that does not fit current positions and placing pressure on group memberswith dissenting points of view. When these symptoms are present, the group is morelikely to exhibit specific defects in the way it searches for and processes informationabout the problem at hand. The likelihood of poor decision outcomes increases inrelation to the prevalence of these defects, summarised by Neck (1996, p. 6) as:

incomplete survey of alternatives; incomplete survey of objectives; failure to examine risks orthe preferred choice; failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives; poor informationsearch, selective bias in processing the information at hand, and failure to work outcontingency plans.

The research and writing on groupthink is summarised in the two sections below. Thefirst looks at research on the variables and the chain of causality in the model, while the

second turns to theories explaining premature concurrence seeking.

Research on model variables and causalityIn testing the model, case study researchers typically look for the presence ofantecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink in real scenarios where defectivedecision making was evident. For example, Kramer (1998) used new evidence to revisitthe Bay of Pigs fiasco; Moorhead et al. (1991) analysed the Challenger disaster; andEaton (2001) looked at two cases from British corporate management, British Airways


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and Marks & Spencer. In general, researchers have found certain of the antecedent

conditions in the presence of groupthink symptoms, but in various combinations.These results provide general support for the model: we can conclude that groupthinkdoes occur from time to time, but the factors that trigger it are unclear or vary in theireffects in different situations.

Laboratory studies have generally tested for the presence and strength of linearrelationships between selected antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink.Overall, the evidence provides only partial support for the model. Neck and Moorhead(1995) noted that most of the studies to that point had focused on the interactive effectsof cohesiveness and the structural faults. Their review, and those of others (Aldag andFuller, 1993; McCauley, 1989) indicated that the best predictors of groupthink wereclosed leadership style (the presence of a strong leader showing early support for aparticular solution to the problem) and lack of methodical processes for making

decisions. For example, Longley and Pruitt (1980) found that the presence of structuralfaults increased the tendency for early development of a norm towards a particularchoice in cohesive groups, possibly explaining the symptoms of defective decisionmaking. Consistent with this, research showed that the existence of norms regardingmethodical procedures reduced the groupthink tendency (Callaway and Esser, 1984).Flowers (1977) and Leana (1985) each found that closed or directive leaders whodiscouraged diverse opinions and promoted their favoured solutions received fewersuggestions from their teams. Most damaging for the original formulation from the

Figure 1.Janiss groupthink model

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accumulated evidence is the lack of support for the link between cohesiveness andsymptoms of groupthink (Aldag and Fuller, 1993; Park, 1990).

The provocative situational context (producing stress and anxiety) has receivedlittle attention from researchers, which is surprising, given its importance in the

original model. Callaway et al. (1985) found support for the hypothesis thatconcurrence-seeking is a stress-reduction process that was not mitigated by thepresence of decision making procedures while Turner (1992 cited in Esser, 1998)manipulated stress and found more rationalisation behaviour in informationprocessing when levels of stress were higher. In other studies, the importance ofstress and anxiety was asserted (e.g. Moorhead et al., 1991), but supporting studieswere not reported. Neck and Moorhead (1992, 1995) were also interested in the idea ofthe provocative situational context, but suggested the inclusion of two additionalvariables: highly consequential decision and pressure due to time constraints. It seemstherefore that stress and anxiety have been overlooked in the research. Hence, a centraltenet of the groupthink model remains largely untested.

Explanations of the causes of premature concurrence seekingAn intriguing aspect of the groupthink debate is the possibility that concurrenceseeking might have more than one cause, arising from different circumstances. Hart(1991) fielded this possibility when he suggested that groupthink can be driven by twovery different forces. Type 1 groupthink is associated with a pessimistic view aboutthe capacity of the group to solve the presenting problem successfully or creatively.Symptoms of groupthink represent collective avoidance, a stress-induced defensivereaction to a potential failure. This is quite similar to the position taken by Janishimself, who pointed to stress and lack of self-esteem due to previous failures. Type 2groupthink (Hart, 1991), on the other hand, is driven by an optimistic view of the

potential of the group to solve the presenting problem. Symptoms of groupthink reflectan overly optimistic attitude on the part of a group that is highly confident in itscapacity to succeed. This view is closer to the position taken by Whyte (1998) andapplied in an organisational setting by Koerber and Neck (2003).

Whyte (1998), who noticed that decisions in the presence of groupthink oftenseemed foolhardy or overly risky, questioned Janiss view of concurrence seeking as aresponse to stress. He proposed that symptoms of groupthink are due tooverconfidence, or an excessive level of collective self-efficacy. This view draws onprospect theory (Kahnman and Tversky, 1979) and decision framing (Tversky andKahnman, 1981). Under experimental conditions, people respond differently toproblems that are framed in terms of perceived losses to those that are framed in termsof perceived gains: they tend to be risk averse in situations involving gains, but risk

seeking when the same situation is described as leading to potential losses. Whyte(1998) thought that framing effects led to risk seeking in groups where perceptions ofcollective efficacy exceeded actual capacity, or in other words, when a strong can doattitude caused people to take excessive risks to avoid the possible loss of attractiveoutcomes. In Whytes (1998) proposed change to the groupthink model, high perceivedcollective efficacy replaces cohesiveness. Since his view was that overconfidenceand high self efficacy reduce or cancel out stress, he saw no need for provocativesituational context to remain in the model.


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A different explanation, based on group dynamics, was provided by McCauley(1998) drawing on Festingers (1950) theory of informal social influence. In accordancewith this theory, group consensus is important for the emergence of meaning andvalue, and the main purpose of persuasion and other forms of social pressure is to

prevent disagreements that might undermine confidence in the groups reason forbeing. Applying this idea, McCauley (1998) hypothesised that prematureconcurrence-seeking is triggered by norms privileging the preservation of friendlyrelations over frank appraisal of ideas and alternatives, and was not due to cohesivegroups seeking an escape from uncertainty (McCauley, 1998, p. 159) as suggested by

Janis.Where does the research leave us in terms of the underlying causes of concurrence

seeking? The explanation for groupthink is undoubtedly complex and severalalternatives have been proposed but none of these has been presented in any depth ofdetail. In relation to Janis theory we have the key insight that while stress and anxietyare experienced within individuals, they can be managed collectively by groups, thusproducing a tendency towards premature concurrence seeking. However, Janis did notfully explain the processes through which the negative emotional states of stress andanxiety actually produce the symptoms of groupthink and the symptoms of defectivedecision making. Since 1972 some important discoveries have been made about the roleof emotion in the decision making process. Some of this research is introduced below toshow that negative emotional states such as stress and anxiety can impair decisionmaking in ways that may shed light on the processes that occur during groupthink.

Decision-making behaviourAnxiety is a stress-induced emotion that figures large in the groupthink model. Itentails an unpleasant emotional state in anticipation of exposure to danger or threat.Although there is no agreed definition (Carlson and Hatfield, 1992) anxiety is often

depicted as a continuous feeling of low intensity, having much in common with fear,but with an orientation to future ills rather than immediate threat of harm (English andEnglish, 1958). Anxiety can affect processes of decision making in several ways thatare discussed below. First, it appears to have a detrimental effect on decision makersby affecting the ways in which they process information: information processing isgenerally poorer under negative affect. Second, anxiety may cause a tendency towardsexcessive risk taking in some situations. Third, it can deflect attention away from theproblem at hand: anxiety reduction operates as an implicit motivator where decisionmakers become more concerned with reducing the feelings of anxiety, than withfinding the best solution to the presenting problem.

Anxiety and information processing

The interplay of reason and emotion has been noted by many researchers (e.g.Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Fineman, 1996; Damasio, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001;Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). The research on negative emotion indicates that beingin this state typically has a detrimental effect on the capacity of decision makers. Mittaland Ross (1998) concluded that people in a negative emotional state processinformation more systematically, while those in a positive state do it morestrategically. Overall, the quality of decision making when in a positive mood state wasbetter. Environmental uncertainty is one factor that stimulates stress and anxiety

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(Garling et al., 1998). Apparently heightened levels of stress interfere with optimalhuman functioning, but how this happens is not entirely clear. It may be that stresscreates an imbalance between environmental demands and an individuals resources tocope. Generally, people seek to reduce or minimise uncertainty and prefer

environments that are more predictable and controllable (Evans and Cohen, 1987).Presumably, efforts to reduce uncertainty interfere in some way with, or limit thecapacity for full cognitive functioning, for example, by increasing errors on cognitivetasks (Leon and Revelle, 1985). Janis and Mann (1977) proposed a decision conflicttheory concerning the effects of stress on information processing. This theorycontends that decision makers under stress resort to hypervigilant strategies forinformation processing, manifested as a frantic search for solutions, a failure toconsider all alternatives, disorganization and rapid shifting among possible solutions.Baradell and Klein (1993) found support for decision conflict theory when theyinvestigated the effects of anxiety on the quality of decision making performance.Exposure to naturally occurring life stressors, such as undesirable life events or dailyhassles, produced autonomic reactions that individuals perceived as anxiety. Thesereactions demand the individuals attention, leaving him or her with less capacity tocope with the task at hand, ultimately resulting in impaired decision making.

Emotion and risk taking behaviourTurning now to the research on risk taking, Mittal and Ross (1998) concluded that moststudies show that people in a positive mood state tend to be risk averse and vice versa.Moreover, they tend to be relatively more risk averse when the decision is framed as apotential gain (e.g. buying a lottery ticket) and the choice situation is personallyrelevant. On the other hand, Mano (1992, 1994) found that people under negative affectare more likely to take risks than those in a neutral state. A theoretical explanation forthe effects of emotion on risk taking in decision making is known as the mood

maintenance hypothesis. This suggests that decision makers are motivated to managetheir mood state (Isen and Patrick, 1983). Those in a positive mood state want to staythat way and are risk-averse, since failure might induce a mood change, while peopleunder negative affect are motivated to feel better and are therefore prepared to takemore risks (Kuvass and Kaufmann, 2004; Mittal and Ross, 1998).

The results for risk taking are not conclusive however: different negative emotionsmay have different consequences and individual variations could be quite significant.Mano elicited physiological arousal in his experiments, but people vary in the degree towhich they are aware of their internal reactions to stress (called private bodyconsciousness or PBC by Miller et al., 1981). Baradell and Klein (1993) found that thisfactor moderated the relationship between naturally occurring stressors and decisionoutcomes the decision making behaviour of people with higher levels of PBC were

more susceptible to the effects of stress. Perrewe and Zellars (1999) also pointed to thedegree of variety in the way that individuals interpret the environment as stressful.People do not necessarily read a situation in the same way, and their emotionalresponses are different.

Implicit motivation and anxiety reductionWhen engaging in group decision making behaviour, those involved may be motivatedby a range of factors. Making a good decision is just one possibility among several


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(McCauley, 1998). Other motivators in group situations include improving membersatisfaction, gaining commitment to the decision, and diffusing responsibility for poordecisions (Aldag and Fuller, 1993). Some of these could complement sound decisionmaking outcomes, but others might not. The literature on the effects of implicit

emotion on decision making has a long history, although it is not always presented assuch. Bion (1968), for example, theorised that the need to reaffirm basic beliefs andassumptions could lead groups away from constructive solutions to their problems,while Asch (1956) demonstrated the influence of a desire to conform. Indeed, decisionmaking situations are full of drama arising from the interplay of overt and covertmotivations, the baggage from past decisions and experiences, and micropoliticalbehaviour (Fuller and Aldag, 1998). The mood maintenance hypothesis (Isen andPatrick, 1983, discussed above) also suggests another way in which negative emotionscan become an implicit source of motivation for risk taking behaviour.

It is also known from the psychoanalytic literature that anxiety elicits a defensiveresponse, although this is often at the cost of considerable self-deception and loss ofcontact with reality (Carlson and Hatfield, 1992, p. 33). According to Rycroft (1968), thedefensive response has three modes: controlling ones feelings or those of others,denying the reality of the threat, and seeking an escape from the situation. Specificdefence mechanisms that work in with one or more of these modes includerationalisation, denial and repression. In relation to decision making situations whereanxiety and stress are present, it could be suggested that decision makers dealsimultaneously with the anxiety and the choice dilemma. It might be deduced that theanxiety reduction process, engaging the protective modes and defence mechanisms, isa distraction that lowers the chances of a sound choice being made. While it mightseem counter intuitive that decision makers tend to be less vigilant when anxious, thereis considerable research evidence to support it.

Concurrence seeking: an elaborationFrom the above discussion, the decision making behaviour of individuals and groups isclearly affected by emotion. When under negative effect, people are less strategic in theway they gather and evaluate information and they are inclined towards riskierdecisions. These tendencies are characterised in the groupthink model as thesymptoms of defective decision making, including incomplete survey of alternatives,selective bias and failure to examine risks. Under negative effect also, decision makersdivide their efforts between making the choice and managing their mood state,increasing the possibility of a poorer outcome. In the groupthink model concurrenceseeking is elicited by stress and anxiety. It is consistent with the research evidence thatthe presence of these emotional states triggers implicit motivation for anxiety and

stress reduction. While the emotion is not directly observable, the implicit motivationsurfaces as the symptoms of groupthink, which are. The groupthink symptoms,including rationalisation, censorship, pressure on dissenters and mindguarding,provide indirect evidence that the anxiety reduction mechanism is in play. We cansummarise the argument so far by suggesting that premature concurrence seekingoccurs when decision makers respond more strongly to the implicit motivation ofanxiety reduction than to motivations regarding full evaluation of information orsearch for alternatives.

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But what is the connection between the concurrence seeking and the symptoms ofgroupthink? In the writers view, if the underlying purpose of concurrence seeking is todefend the group against anxiety, then the symptoms of groupthink are manifestationsof defensive modes and mechanisms that are instrumental in doing this. In other

words, the defence modes and mechanisms are the missing link between the implicitmotivation of anxiety reduction and observable decision making behaviour. Theconnections are illustrated in Table I.

In this table Janiss eight symptoms of groupthink are recast in relation to the threedefensive modes (Rycroft, 1968) of control, denial and escape. The column on the leftcategorises the eight symptoms of groupthink according to each mode. The centralcolumn suggests one or more corresponding defence mechanisms, while the lastcolumn provides a brief explanation of the purpose of each as a defence againstanxiety. A sense of control is obtained through creating an illusion that the group is incommand of the situation, that the facts are known and events are unfolding as theyshould. Denial is evident in self-censorship, pressure on dissenters and mindguarding.Escape is through a belief in the superior morality of the decision making group and inthe stereotyping of outgroups. This spares the group from confronting the morally

Anxiety defence mode andgroupthink symptoms Defence mechanisms Purpose as response to anxiety

ControlIllusion of invulnerability Control compensation Keeping a tight rein on people/events.

Covering weaknesses in one area byattending to areas of greater strength

Collective rationalisation Rationalisation Convenient selection, manipulation andexplanation of the facts to allay fears. Not

seeing what one does not wish to seeIllusion of unanimity Fantasy Mutual reassurance of support and

agreement

DenialSelf-censorship Repression Doubts pushed out of conscious thoughtSelf-appointed mindguards Denial control Feelings of concern or dread not

acknowledged by self; others discouragedfrom expressing them as a means ofprotecting the group

Pressure on dissenters Suppression control Others dissuaded from expressing doubtsthat might upset the status quo

EscapeBelief in morality of the group Regression Inability or refusal to question the moralposition of the group or to acknowledgeother values or positions as a means ofavoiding value conflict

Stereotyping of outgroups Projection displacement Rather than acknowledging own fears orresponsibilities, attributing those to others,often in a derogatory manner that hints ofoutgroup inferiority or weakness

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difficult dilemmas inherent in the situation, and helps to shift primary responsibilityfor them onto a more blameworthy group.

When the defence mechanisms are drawn upon, decision makers begin to lose vitalinformation and the capacity to evaluate their situation effectively. Critical details are

rationalised away or pushed out of consciousness. Those with different points of vieware turned upon or simply decide to keep quiet. The competition is underestimated andan unreal picture of the difficulties ahead emerges. Consistent with Janis (1972, 1982) agreater prevalence of groupthink symptoms is associated with an increase in decisionmaking defects, and a decreased likelihood of quality decision outcomes.

But do groups succumbing to premature concurrence seeking need to be cohesive?According to the empirical research, the answer is no. Apparently, the presence ofanxiety is sufficient in itself to trigger groupthink among people engaged on a commontask, but this issue certainly merits more research. The position taken here is thatconcurrence seeking occurs in decision making contexts that provoke anxiety indecision makers, and are not mitigated by structural factors, in particular, impartialleadership and methodical decision making procedures.

ConclusionsJanis hypothesised that groupthink was caused by anxiety and stress arising from thedecision making issue faced by a management group, but did not elaborate theprocesses through which these states had their effect. This paper has attempted toaddress this by drawing on the research into the impact of emotion and decisionmaking and by drawing on psychoanalytic theory.

Implications for researchA considerable amount of research on the impact of negative emotions on decisionmaking has accumulated over the past thirty years, and in general is consistent with

Janiss view that anxiety is a possible cause of premature concurrence seeking.However, research on the effects of anxiety has involved individual researchparticipants only, and there is a need for research into group patterns. For example,comparisons of groups working on consequential and non-consequential decision taskswould reveal any differences in the emergence of premature concurrence seeking andthe presence of defensive modes or mechanisms. Case study researchers mightconsider investigating for the presence of negative emotions and exploring the linksbetween symptoms of defective decision making and common defence mechanisms.This could be done by revisiting old cases or by exploring new ones.

More generally, future research on decision making in groups should focus onbroadening the conceptual base of both the groupthink model and other theories toinclude the latest findings on the role of both negative and positive emotions. There is

an expanding body of research findings from the social and biological sciences, whichis revolutionising our understanding of human behaviour and decision processes. Asyet, little of this has filtered into the field of management studies.

Management applicationsGroupthink is a term that is not well understood, and is sometimes confused with othercauses of poor decision making. However, as suggested below, it may be morecommonplace than most people think, and have more devastating consequences than

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are normally acknowledged. Managers need to understand the causes andconsequences of concurrence seeking as a key step in reducing the human andeconomic costs of their mistakes.

The causes of poor decision making. There are many reasons why managers

sometimes make poor decisions, and premature concurrence seeking is but one of them.Understanding the underlying causes can be a confusing task, but for managers tolearn from their mistakes, they need to do so. The term groupthink is almostuniversally recognised by managers, and in the view of this writer, is sometimes usedinappropriately or is not well understood. Groupthink, as Janis intended the term,refers to premature concurrence seeking behaviour due to the presence of stress andanxiety. This is a problem because it results in defective information search andevaluation processes. It is also clear from the research that groups do not have to becohesive for groupthink to emerge. More critical are a closed leadership style and lackof methodical decision making procedures.

Confusion occurs because decisions made in bounded rationality (Simon, 1956)can also be marked by symptoms of defective decision making. It is commonplace thatmanagers face the daily incumberances of time pressure, lack of pertinent information,poor knowledge of cause and effect relationships, and so on. The complexities oforganisational life inevitably introduce uncertainty and risk. We could add a host ofother factors including organisational politics and culture. To a large extent thesefactors are different from those contributing to groupthink, but it is likely that atendency towards groupthink would be exacerbated in the presence of some of them. Inreducing the incidence of groupthink it is therefore important, for example, to ensurethat the culture supports employees who wish to express their concerns about safety,or that managers are not punished for sometimes making cautious decisions or cryingwolf.

Improving decision making in groups. Janis (1982) described groupthink as a

temporary derangement that diminishes the capacity of groups to make sounddecisions, and recommended several measures to prevent it from emerging. Thesemeasures included instituting impartial leadership and more systematic ways ofevaluating choice alternatives. Aware managers are now equipped with a range ofdecision making tools and techniques, such as nominal group technique andbrainstorming, to overcome structural barriers to full and open discussion. While thesemeasures may be part of the solution, they do not address the underlying cause of thepremature concurrence seeking, which is the stress and anxiety elicited by the decisiontask. As has been argued in this article, implicit motivation for anxiety reductiontriggers defence mechanisms that potentially blind decision makers to the reality oftheir situation. Unless checked, the tendency to explain away, deny or repress criticalinformation can descend upon all in the group, with devastating effect in some

circumstances. The remedies include the ability to recognise negative emotions inourselves and others, and a preparedness to discuss and deal with these states. In otherwords, managers need a special range of techniques for bringing potentially damagingemotions to the surface where they can be dealt with constructively. This is aninteresting challenge, since management culture and writing tends to emphasise arational approach to decision making (Harrison, 2000), where emotions have little partto play. Nonetheless, unless managers better understand how their emotions influencetheir choice behaviour, potentially avoidable mistakes will continue to be made.


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Janis (1972, 1982) referred to important and visible decisions in high level policysituations. He did not consider lower level operational contexts where the decisionmaking process is less formal, where problems arise unexpectedly, or where key choicepoints are embedded in the everyday flow of workplace activity. Yet these situations

too, are sometimes accompanied by pressures and stresses that can easily heightenlevels of anxiety, and they happen frequently. For example, should the crew continue tofly through bad weather, or should it turn around and return to base? Should the plantbe shut down to investigate an unexplained oil leakage, or should production continueunder pressure of meeting targets? Do contractors leave the building site untilprotective equipment is provided, or do they keep working? Although these dilemmassuggest actual choice points that the players recognise, in real situations they oftenpass without much discussion of the problem, or any definitive decision. In real life,potential choice points can slide into long moments of non-decision making where theopportunity to avert a serious risk is lost.

The elaboration of groupthink theory discussed in this article provides an

explanation for various failures in decision making: not recognising that an actualdecision needs to be made; procrastination and delay; and actual decisions that areoverly risky. The explanation is this: some of the defence mechanisms, e.g. repressionand denial, can blind managers to the existence of a developing problem, while otherdefence mechanisms, e.g. rationalisation and projection, can cause them tounderestimate the dangers or deflect attention elsewhere. Whether by omission orcommission, the result is the same: a crisis that was potentially avoidable. Better groupleadership and methodical decision making procedures are part of the solution. Alsoimportant is developing a capacity for self-knowledge, reflexive management practiceand a rich array of communication skills.

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Bion, W.R. (1968), Experiences in Groups, Tavistock Publications, London.

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Corresponding authorJudith Chapman can be contacted at: [email protected]

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