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SPP/Econ 541 Alan Deardorff Fall Term 2008 Final Exam – Answers Page 1 of 8 Final Exam – Answers December 16, 2008 Answer in blue book. Use the point values as a guide to how extensively you should answer each question, and budget your time accordingly. The exam has a total of 60 points. 1. (8 points) In July of 2008, the Doha Round negotiations broke down. In two paragraphs, describe first the major issues that had divided the countries throughout the negotiations, and second the specific issue on which their failure to agree in July precipitated the breakdown. Throughout the negotiations, the major issues were agricultural protection and subsidies in the US and EU, on the one hand, and high tariffs in developing countries on both agriculture and manufactured goods on the other. Developing countries wanted the US to reduce its agricultural subsidies, and the EU to reduce its agricultural tariffs, both in order to benefit developing-country farmers who suffered from low world prices for their products. In return, the developed countries insisted on greater market access into developing countries for their exports of agricultural and manufactured goods, as well as of services. In July, however, the sticking point was the trigger for “special safeguards in agriculture.” This was a provision that would allow developing countries to raise tariffs on agricultural imports to protect their farmers. The safeguards would be triggered by an increase in imports above a certain percentage, and the disagreement was over that percentage. The US wanted that to be over 40%, which would mean that imports would need to rise by that amount at least before the developing countries could raise tariffs. India and China, on the other hand, insisted that this trigger should be set much lower. 2. (9 points) In the figure below are shown domestic demand and domestic marginal cost in an industry of a small open economy that faces a world price P W of this good. The marginal cost curve may represent that of a perfectly competitive industry with lots of domestic firms, in which case MC is the competitive supply curve. Or, in a different case, MC may be the marginal cost of a single firm, the only firm producing the good in the country. In both cases, initially the country is levying a tariff of t 0 , the domestic price is P W + t 0 which happens to be at the intersection of D and MC, and the country is thus both producing and consuming the quantity Q 0 . Suppose now that the country increases its tariff to the level t 1 shown. Explain what happens, as a result, first (Case 1) under the assumption that there are a large number of competitive domestic firms with supply curve MC, and

Final Exam – Answers December 16, 2008alandear/courses/541/exams/xm2a-f08.pdfFinal Exam – Answers December 16, ... 3. (10 points) Use the monopolistic competition model (reminder:

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SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page1of8

FinalExam–AnswersDecember16,2008

Answerinbluebook.Usethepointvaluesasaguidetohowextensivelyyoushouldanswereachquestion,andbudgetyourtimeaccordingly.Theexamhasatotalof60points.1. (8points)InJulyof2008,theDohaRoundnegotiationsbrokedown.Intwo

paragraphs,describefirstthemajorissuesthathaddividedthecountriesthroughoutthenegotiations,andsecondthespecificissueonwhichtheirfailuretoagreeinJulyprecipitatedthebreakdown.

Throughoutthenegotiations,themajorissueswereagriculturalprotectionandsubsidiesintheUSandEU,ontheonehand,andhightariffsindevelopingcountriesonbothagricultureandmanufacturedgoodsontheother.DevelopingcountrieswantedtheUStoreduceitsagriculturalsubsidies,andtheEUtoreduceitsagriculturaltariffs,bothinordertobenefitdeveloping­countryfarmerswhosufferedfromlowworldpricesfortheirproducts.Inreturn,thedevelopedcountriesinsistedongreatermarketaccessintodevelopingcountriesfortheirexportsofagriculturalandmanufacturedgoods,aswellasofservices.InJuly,however,thestickingpointwasthetriggerfor“specialsafeguardsinagriculture.”Thiswasaprovisionthatwouldallowdevelopingcountriestoraisetariffsonagriculturalimportstoprotecttheirfarmers.Thesafeguardswouldbetriggeredbyanincreaseinimportsaboveacertainpercentage,andthedisagreementwasoverthatpercentage.TheUSwantedthattobeover40%,whichwouldmeanthatimportswouldneedtorisebythatamountatleastbeforethedevelopingcountriescouldraisetariffs.IndiaandChina,ontheotherhand,insistedthatthistriggershouldbesetmuchlower.2. (9points)Inthefigurebelowareshowndomesticdemandanddomestic

marginalcostinanindustryofasmallopeneconomythatfacesaworldprice

PW ofthisgood.Themarginalcostcurvemayrepresentthatofaperfectlycompetitiveindustrywithlotsofdomesticfirms,inwhichcaseMCisthecompetitivesupplycurve.Or,inadifferentcase,MCmaybethemarginalcostofasinglefirm,theonlyfirmproducingthegoodinthecountry.Inbothcases,initiallythecountryislevyingatariffof

t0 ,thedomesticpriceis

PW + t0 whichhappenstobeattheintersectionofDandMC,andthecountryisthusbothproducingandconsumingthequantity

Q0 .Supposenowthatthecountryincreasesitstarifftothelevel

t1shown.Explainwhathappens,asaresult,first(Case1)undertheassumptionthattherearealargenumberofcompetitivedomesticfirmswithsupplycurveMC,and

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page2of8

second(Case2)undertheassumptionthatthereisonlyasingledomesticfirmwithmarginalcostcurveMC.Specifically,saywhathappensto

a. Domesticpriceb. Domesticproductionc. Domesticconsumptiond. Producerwelfaree. Consumerwelfaref. Governmentrevenueg. Welfareofthecountryasawhole

Case1:Herenothinghappens.Importsarealreadyzero,sothefactthat

consumerswouldhavetopayahigherprice,

PW + t1,inordertoimportcan’tdiscouragethemanyfurther.Andthedomesticpricecannotriseabove

PW + t0 ,sinceifitdidthecompetitivefirms,supplyingouttotheirsupplycurveMC,wouldproducemorethanisdemandedandforcepricebackdown.Thusallofthelistedvariablesremainunchanged.

Case2:Herethetariffincreasedoesmakeadifference,sinceitpermitsthesinglesuppliertochargeapriceashighas

PW + t1withoutcompetitionfromimports.Itcannotchargeapricehigherthanthatbecausethenitwouldloseallsalestoimports.AnditdoesnotwanttochargeapricelowerthanthatsinceitisbelowthemonopolypriceshownasderivingfrommarginalrevenueMRandmarginalcost.Therefore,

PW + t1becomesthenewdomesticprice.Thus,domesticpricerises,quantitiesproducedandconsumedbothfallto

Q1 .Demanderslose

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page3of8

areas(a+b+c+d).Thesingleproducergainsrevenueof(a+b+c)whilelosingrevenueof(e+f+g)andgainingfromareductionintotalcostof(f+g).Thusthefirmhasanetgaininprofitof(a+b+c–e).Thereisnochangeingovernmentrevenue,sinceimportscontinuetobezero.Thuswelfareofthecountryasawholechangesby–(a+b+c+d)+(a+b+c–d)=–(d+e).

3. (10points)Usethemonopolisticcompetitionmodel(reminder:it’sthemodel

whosediagramappearsbelow)toshowwhatwillhappen…a. Iftwoidenticalcountriesmovefromautarkytofreetrade

i. Toprice;ii. Tothenumberoffirmsfromwhichconsumerscanbuy;andiii. Tothenumberoffirmsineachcountry.

b. If,startingfromfreetrade,thereisafallinthemarginalcostofproduction(thesameineachfirm)

i. Toprice;ii. Tothenumberoffirms.

TheCCcurveshowsaveragecost

AC = n F /S( ) + c wherenisthenumberoffirms,Fisfixedcostperfirm,Sisthesizeofthemarket,andcismarginalcost.ThustheCCcurvehasverticalinterceptcandslopeF/S.

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page4of8

ThePPcurveshowshowtheprofitmaximizingmarkupovermarginalcost(andhenceprice)fallsasthenumberofcompetitorsincreases:

P = 1/bn( ) + c wherebistheparameterofthedemandfunctionindicatinghowdemandforafirm’sproductvarieswithitspricerelativetotheaveragepriceofallfirms. InitialequilibriumineachoftheidenticalcountriesinautarkyistheintersectionofCCandPP,thuspriceP0andnumberoffirmsn0.Whenthetwocountriesengageinfreetrade,theresultisaworldeconomywithtwicethemarketeachhadbefore,thus2SinsteadofS.ThisleavesthePPcurveunchangedbutrotatestheCCcurvetohavehalftheslopeithadbefore,thereforepassingthroughthepoint(2n0,P0)asshown.ThenewequilibriumintersectionisthereforeatthelowerpriceP1andanumberoffirms,n1,thatishigherthaneachfirmhadinautarky,butlowerthantheircombinedautarkytotal2n1.Thustherearemorefirmsintheworldthaneachcountryhadbefore,andconsumersgettochooseamongthemall.Buteachcountryhasfewerfirmsthanbefore. Ifnowthemarginalcost,c,fallsinallfirms,thisshiftsboththeCCcurveandthePPcurvedownbythesameamount(thechangeinc).Idon’tbothertodrawthat,sinceitclearlyreducestheequilibriumpricebytheamountofthefallinc,whileleavingthenumberoffirmsunchanged.

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page5of84. (9points)Consideradomesticmonopolythatisprotectedbyaveryhightariff

fromcompetitionfromacompetitiveforeignmarket,sothatitcanchargeonepriceinitshomemarketandanotherabroad.Assumethatthefirm’smarginalcostisconstantandthatallsupplyanddemandcurvesarelinear.

a. Showanequilibriuminwhichthefirmengagesindumping.

b. Ifthefirmwerenowconfrontedwithananti‐dumpingstatuteandit

wishedtoavoidbeingsubjectedtoananti‐dumpingduty,howwoulditalteritsbehavior?Besuretoshowacaseinwhichitcontinuestoservebothmarkets.

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page6of85. (24points)SupposeyouaretheUSITCtryingtodecideasafeguardcaseinthe

UnitedStatesbroomindustry.YousomehowknowthatsupplyelasticityoftheUSbroommanufacturers(whoarenumerousandplausiblyperfectlycompetitive)is+2.0,butyouhavebeengiventwodifferentestimatesoftheUSelasticityofdemandforbrooms:–1.0and–3.0.Theworldpriceofbroomshasrecentlyfallenfrom$5.00to$4.00,atwhichpricetheindustryisnowproducing8.0millionbroomsdomesticallyandimporting72.0millionbrooms.Assumethatdomesticandimportedbroomsareidenticaland,exceptwheretoldotherwise,thatthesequantitiesareanegligiblepartoftheworldmarketforbrooms.

Answerthefollowingquestions,givingtwoanswerstoeachiftheydependupontheelasticityofdemand,oneforeachofthetwoelasticitiesabove.(Ifyouhavetroublewithpartsofthequestion,goaheadandanswerotherpartsevenifyouneedtomakeupanswerstoworkwith.Iwillthengradebasedonthosemade‐uporincorrectanswers.)

a. Assumingthatemploymentintheindustryisproportionaltooutput,

bywhatpercentagedidemploymentrecentlydrop?Pricefellby20%.Withasupplyelasticityof2.0,outputandthusemploymentwouldhavedroppedtwicethis,or40%.Thisanswerdoesnotdependonthedemandelasticity.

b. WhatsizeadvaloremtariffshouldtheITCrecommendifitwishestorestoreemploymenttowhatitwasbefore?HowwouldyouranswerdifferifyouthoughtthatUSdemandforbroomswasalargepartoftheworldmarket?Itneedstoraisethepricebackupto$5.00.Ifthesmallcountryassumptionisvalid,thena25%tariffwilladd$1.00tothe$4.00priceofimportsandachievethisresult.Ifinsteadthelargecountryassumptionisneeded,thena25%tariffwillraisethedomesticpricebylessthanthis,asitwillinsteaddrivedowntheworldprice.Thusatarifflargerthan25%wouldbeneeded.Noneofthisdependsonthedemandelasticity.

c. Usingthetariffyouspecifiedinthefirstpartof(b),bywhatpercentagedoesthedemandforbroomsdeclineasaresultofthetariff?Also,bywhatpercentagedoestheUSdemandforimportsofbroomsdeclineasaresultofthetariff?The25%tarifffrompart(b)willcausedemandforbroomstofallby25%ifthedemandelasticityis1.0andby75%ifthedemandelasticityis3.0.Demandatthe$4.00pricewas80.0millionbrooms(domestic

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page7of8

supplyplusimports).Sodemandfallseitherby20.0millionto60.0million,orby60.0millionto20.0million.Atthesametime,withthesupplyelasticityof2.0,supplyisincreasingbytwice25%,from8.0to12.0millionbrooms.Thusimportsfallfrom72.00milliontoeither60–12=48or20–12=8.Thatis,importsfallbyeither(72–48)/72=1/3=33.3%iftheelasticityofdemandforbroomsis1.0orby(72–8)/72=8/9=88.9%

d. Fromyouranswertopart(c),whatistheelasticityofdemandforimports?Howdoesitcomparetotheunderlyingelasticitiesofsupplyanddemand,andwhy?Thedemandelasticityforimportsisthepercentchangeinimportsdividedbythepercentchangeinprice,whichisthereforeeither–.33/.25=–1.33(ifthedemandelasticityforbroomsis1.0)or–.889/.25=–3.56(ifthedemandelasticityforbroomsis3.0).Theelasticityofdemandforimportsinbothcasesislargerthaneithertheelasticityofsupplyortheelasticityofdemand.Thisisnormal,sincedemandforimportsisanexcessdemand.Thusthechangeinquantityislarger,beingthesumofchangesinsupplyanddemand,whiletheinitialquantity(whatitisapercentageof)issmallerthantheinitialquantitydemanded.

e. Againusingthetarifffromthefirstpartof(b),calculatethechangeinconsumersurplusduetothetariff.Explainwhyconsumersarehurtlessinoneelasticitycasethanintheother.Thetariffcausespricetoriseby$1andthequantitydemandedtofallfrom80milliontoeither60or20million.Thelossofconsumersurplusis$1×(80+60)/2=$70millionor$1×(80+20)/2=$50million.Consumersloselesswhentheelasticityishigh,becausetheyavoidmoreofthecostofthetariffbysubstitutingawaytowardothergoods.

f. Whatisthenetwelfarecosttothecountryofusingthistariff?Again,explainwhythecountryishurtlessinoneelasticitycasethanintheother.Thisisthedeadweightlossduetothetariff,whichisthetwousualtriangleswhosebasesarethechangesinsupplyanddemandandwhoseheightisthe$1priceincrease.Thusthedeadweightlossiseither$1×(4+20)/2=$12million(withelasticity1.0)or$1×(4+60)/2=$32million(withelasticity3.0).

SPP/Econ541 AlanDeardorffFallTerm2008 FinalExam–Answers Page8of8

Thelossisgreaterwiththelargerelasticitybecauseitmakesdemandchangemoreandthusincreasesthesizeofthedemanddistortion.

g. Whatpolicy,otherthanatariff,couldachievethesamerestorationofbroom‐industryemploymentbutatlowercosttotheeconomyasawhole?A25%subsidytoproductionwouldcausethesameincreaseinoutputandthusemployment,butwithadeadweightlossofonly$1×4/2=$2million.

h. Discussbrieflytwootherpolicies,bothofwhichappearatleasttosomedegreeinUSlaw,bywhichthisdisruptiontothebroomindustrymightbedealtwith.TradeAdjustmentAssistanceprovidessupplementalunemploymentcompensationandassistancefortrainingandrelocationfortrade­displacedworkers.Wageinsurance(calledAlternativeTradeAdjustmentAssistanceinUSlaw)temporarilygivessometrade­displacedworkersaportionofanydropinwageswhentheytakeanewjob.Bothoftheseareviewedaspreferabletoasafeguardstariff,inthattheyhelpworkerstoadjusttothenewsituationratherthandiscouragingthatadjustment,andtheyavoidthedead­weightlossesfromtheotherpolicies.