Final Technical Report, EU DANEX 2006ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention... · Final Technical Report 7 3. Presentation of the exercise 3.1. The exercise area and incidents

Exercise EU DANEX 2006 - Final Technical Report

Danish Emergency Management Agency

November 2006

Exercise EU DANEX 2006 Managed by Danish Emergency Management Agency For DG Environment The European Commission 07.030601/2005/422850/SUB/A5 Project Owners:

• Anders Nørregaard, Director • Jørgen Holst Hansen, Director

Project Management:

• Michael Elmquist, Senior Adviser This report and its appedices can be found at http://www.brs.dk/ukExercise instructions etc. can be found at www.brs.dk/eudanex till end of 2007

http://www.brs.dk/uk

http://www.brs.dk/eudanex

Final Technical Report

Table of contents 1. Summary.................................................................................................................................1 2. Introduction ............................................................................................................................3

2.1. Main objectives ...............................................................................................................3 2.2. Time schedule of the project from proposal to evaluation ..............................................4 2.3. Institutions involved ........................................................................................................4 2.4. Short description of the scenario .....................................................................................5

3. Presentation of the exercise ....................................................................................................7 3.1. The exercise area and incidents .......................................................................................7 3.2. Time schedule................................................................................................................11 3.3. Teams and means involved............................................................................................11

4. Evaluation workshops ..........................................................................................................15 4.1 Immediate Evaluation Workshop ...................................................................................15 4.2. National evaluation workshop.......................................................................................18 4.2. National evaluation workshop.......................................................................................19

5. Evaluation of the project.......................................................................................................25 5.1. Positive experiences ......................................................................................................25 5.2. Major problems encountered.........................................................................................25 5.3. Lessons identified for improvements ............................................................................25

6. Conclusions including recommendations.............................................................................27 Appendicies Appendix 1: Teams and means involved in EU DANEX 2006 Appendix 2: Agenda, immediate evaluation workshop Appendix 3-11: Presentations during the Immediate Evaluation Workshop Appendix 12-15: EU Danex News nr. 1-4 Appendix 16: EU-representation and observers Abbreviations used: CECIS: Common Emergency Communication and Information System DISTAFF: Directing Staff LEMA: Local Emergency Management Authority MIC: Monitoring and Information Center OSOCC: On-Site Operation Coordination Center



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1. Summary The exercise EU DANEX took place in eastern Denmark and southern Sweden during 17 – 22 September 2006. Approximately 400 persons from 7 member states took part in the exercise. 31 observers from 17 member states and other institutions followed the exercise. The main objective of the exercise was to demonstrate solidarity among the member states in response to a terrorist threat. With this objective in mind, the exercise aimed to train and im-prove existing procedures for alerting, selecting, mobilising and dispatching civil protection assistance intervention teams and to provide training opportunity for all actors involved in civil protection assistance. The exercise was favoured with excellent weather and the objectives were met. Generally, the teams and observers gave a very positive feed-back on the exercise and emphasized the im-portance of international cooperation. The exercise resulted in these main recommendations:

• The European Commission should consider to propose guidelines for the visual mark-ing of team leaders

• The European Commission should consider preparing instruction materials for im-proving the language skills of civil protection personnel

• The European Commission should consider developing standardized and normalized terms for civil protection

• The European Commission should conduct further exercises to keep up and improve the level of training for all member states

• Member States should take advantage of training their experts at exercise-OSOCCs • Host nations should ensure the adequacy of radio communication with intervention

teams

Taking care of the injured at the natural gas incident


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2. Introduction 2.1. Main objectives The overall objective of the EU DANEX 2006 was to train and improve existing procedures for alerting, selecting, mobilising and dispatching civil protection assistance intervention teams within the framework of the European Community Mechanism in the field of civil pro-tection. Furthermore, it was an objective to provide a training opportunity for all actors involved in civil protection assistance within the framework of the European Community Mechanism in the field of civil protection, especially focussing on the lessons learned drawn from exercises conducted in 2004 (in particular EUDREX 2004 and EU ESCEX 2004) and concluded at a meeting 22–23 February 2005 in Brussels. The lessons learned are presented in the box be-low. Special attention was also given to monitor the status of the respective participating member states´ implementation of the EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks (The widened CBRN programme) and monitoring the status of the im-plementation of the Commission initiatives such as a modular based rapid response system. Summary/Conclusion/Recommendations (in summary) from exercise EUDREX 2004:

• The planning process started too late. • Implementation of OSOCC was hampered by leadership discussions in the beginning

of the exercise. • Deficiencies on OSOCC-operations could be observed, e.g. not giving clearly under-

standable taskings to the intervention teams at the beginning of the exercise and visu-alisation of the actual situation on the situation map was not always updated and clear.

• In the beginning of the exercise LEMA did not show sufficient experience in staff work, decision making and were not used to task and to co-operate with an OSOCC.

• It is recommended to stick to the correct planning level setting the exercise, to find common report forms and guidelines practicable for all players and having interna-tional standards and to be aware on the effort conducting such an exercise in right time.

Conclusions including recommendations from exercise EU ESCEX 2004:

• “Visibility of the EU Coordination Head, the Teams and the OSOCC must be better (vests, ID Cards, flags etc.)

• In the missions inside the European Union there should be a liaison officer from the MIC in situ.

• The EU Coordination Head (or the OSOCC Media Officer) can speak on behalf of Commission inside of EU and usually also outside of EU. Team Leaders should be open with media and they can give press releases and interviews on behalf of their teams.

• To avoid confusions between the LEMA, the teams should fill the form of their capa-bilities beforehand and it should be used in the coordination.”


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2.2. Time schedule of the project from proposal to evaluation In December 2005 The European Commission awarded a grant to The Danish Emergency Management Agency. The purpose of the grant was to contribute to the full scale exercise EU DANEX 2006. A Grant Agreement was signed, and the exercise planning started in January 2006, where invitations to participate in the exercise were sent to selected EU-member states. Countries wanting to participate were asked to reply no later than mid February. An initial planning meeting took place in Brussels on 28 February 2006. Preliminary indica-tions of participation from the nations involved were stated at this “kick-off” meeting. A Host Nation Planning Conference took place in Copenhagen at Bernstorff Castle and The Jægersborg Barracks 8 - 10 May 2006. The purpose of this conference was to finalize the de-tailed planning of the exercise and to coordinate the participation of nations involved aiming at making a complete presentation of the exercise to the participants from The European Commission and participating nations at the Final Planning Conference. The Final Planning Conference took place in Denmark and Sweden during 22 – 24 May 2006, where - as part of the conference - the training grounds were visited. The actual exercise EU DANEX 2006 was conducted from 17 - 22 September 2006, ending with the Immediate Evaluation Workshop on 22 September 2006. A National Evaluation Workshop was held on 10 October 2006. This report is based on comments made by team representatives, national and international observers, and on comments received subsequently. 2.3. Institutions involved As of January 2006 The Danish Emergency Management Agency had set up a national pro-ject organisation to design and implement EU DANEX 2006 and to conduct the evaluation phase after the exercise. The Danish Emergency Management Agency was conducting the exercise in close co-operation with The European Commission, The Swedish Rescue Services Agency, municipal fire brigades, prehospital medical care, The Danish Home Guard and The Danish Armed Forces. According to principles set out by The European Commission, The Danish Emergency Man-agement Agency invited several EU member states to participate in the exercise with experts and interventions teams. In response to these requests Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia and Portugal accepted to participate in the exercise. Unfortunately, Portugal had to cancel its participation shortly before the exercise, and the pro-ject organisation was not able to find another participant at such short notice. Thus five coun-tries took part in the exercise in addition to the two host nations. The MIC alerted four trained persons for the OSOCC from Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden.


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In Denmark the exercise involved training grounds in the cities of Korsør, Næstved, Hede-husene and Copenhagen. In Sweden at the Swedish Rescue Services College and the army training grounds in Revinge. Below is shown a map of the places where exercise EU DANEX 2006 took place. -

HEDEHUSENE Residential fire incident

KORSØR Tunnel incident Natural gas incident

NÆSTVED HQ / OSOCC 1 Suspicious handbag incident

Denmark Sweden

REVINGE HQ / OSOCC 2 Base camp Nuclear incident Ammonia accident Chemical warfare agent incident

COPENHAGEN

SLAGELSE Base camp

KASTRUP Airport incident

2.4. Short description of the scenario The overall scenario of EU DANEX 2006 was mostly based on incidents which actually have occurred and, if they ever should occur simultaneously, would call for the need to activate the European Community Mechanism. According to the scenario a severe storm is raging over the territory of Denmark and southern parts of Sweden. An extremist group, which is part of a global terrorist network, has taken advantage of the chaos caused by the storm, and has detonated severeal explosive devices causing severe damage on critical infrastructure. It is suspected that dirty bombs and toxic chemical agents have been used. Initially the capacity of Denmark and Sweden to conduct damage assessments is insufficient, and requests for international assistance are sent to the international community through the MIC making use of CECIS. Immediately hereafter the need for coordination experts as well as intervention teams arises as a result of the national resources being overstretched and a second request is communicated through the MIC. Following the arrival of international intervention teams and experts, additional explosive devices are detonated causing fire and leaks at a natural gas hub as well as a collapsed railroad tunnel. Almost simultaneously an aircraft is taken into quarantine at the international airport


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due to suspicion of release of chemical hazardous material substances on board. Furthermore the capacity of the rescue preparedness is stressed to the limits due to a large number of resi-dential fires and harassment in the form of suspicious devices, e.g. handbags containing un-known chemicals and explosives, placed in the vicinity of various fire stations. As a declared act of sympathy with fellow terrorists in Denmark, another faction of the terror-ist network is spreading fear in Sweden after causing a train, carrying liquefied ammonia, to collide with a bus. Furthermore, a chemical warfare agent has been released in a regional co-ordination centre and unconfirmed reports states that a dirty bomb (although small in size) has been detonated in the southern part of Sweden. It is, therefore, decided to redeploy interven-tion teams from Denmark to Sweden.

Multinational cooperation during incident


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3. Presentation of the exercise 3.1. The exercise area and incidents In Denmark the exercise took place in the cities of Korsør (tunnel and natural gas incidents), Næstved (suspicious handbag incident), Hedehusene (residential fire incident) and Copenha-gen (airport incident). In Sweden the exercise took place in Revinge (nuclear, ammonia and chemical incidents), see map in section 1. The exercise was arranged in such a manner that:

• Priority was given to a scenario, reflecting the consequenses of a terrorist attack • The participation of intervention teams was limited to six participating countries (be-

sides the host nations Denmark and Sweden) with a limitation of 25 participants from each country

• Both the exercise and the documentation were conducted in English, • The duration of the exercise was six days • The project administration took care of all practical arrangements covering attendance

and accommodation of the participants etc. During the planning process, the incidents were adjusted according to the composition of the intervention teams from the participating countries and the possibilities of carrying out the incidents concerned at the Danish and Swedish exercise facilities. Incident 1, Arrival of participants In response to the request sent out by Denmark, international intervention teams arrived in Denmark. They were directed to a youth hostel in order to establish their base camp in cooperation with a host nation support element. Incident 2, Tunnel incident A terrorist attack has caused a collision be-tween a passenger train and a freight train in a railway tunnel, resulting in a number of injured people in the passenger train.

Injured people in the railway tunnel

On the freight train an open carriage with barrels containing corrosive materials has been derailed. A number of barrels have fallen off the carriage and lie scattered on the ground leaking. A tanker containing toxic liquid is damaged and is leaking as well. The liquid is slowly evaporating.


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Incident 3, Natural gas incident A terrorist attack has caused extensive dam-age on a natural gas processing plant. An explosion forced a building to collapse and severely damaged the gas pipelines. There are a number of injured people - some of which are trapped in the collapsed build-ing. Natural gas fire Incident 4, Airport incident

A hi-jacker has forced an airplane to land at Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup. The airplane has been taxied to a remote staging area. The hijacker has an explosive device attached to a toxic substance. During the negotiations the hijacker decides to surrender. As he is descending the stair-case from the airplane and is being taken into custody by the police, the explosive device detonates. Passengers in the vicinity of the device are hit by shrapnel and the toxic substance.

Evacuating passengers from the airplane

Incident 5, Suspicious handbag incident• A handbag containing several bottles with unknown contents, a battery, some wires and what appears to be explosives is found at the barracks of the regional rescue preparedness centre in the city of Næstved, where OSOCC is located as well. There is a need for determining whether the handbag posses any danger or not. Incident 6, Residential fire incident• A residential multi-storey building is on fire. Several persons are believed still to be in the building. The municipal fire brigade has no vacant fire engines and is calling for assistance from the international intervention teams.

• These incidents were added during the exercise to give further employment to two of the teams


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Incident 7, Redeployment In response to a request sent out from Sweden the international intervention teams in Den-mark are redeployed to Sweden. The intervention teams are directed to Revinge via the Øre-sund Link. On arrival in Revinge the intervention teams are directed to an area where they establish their base camp in cooperation with a Swedish host nation support element. Incident 8, Nuclear incident At the premises of the Swedish Rescue Ser-vices College a dirty bomb has been deto-nated. A terrorist group is claiming respon-sibility for the detonation and the subsequent radioactive pollution. This act of terrorism has been carried out to demonstrate their ability to manufacture dirty bombs, and their willingness to use such a device.

Cordoned off area due to radioactive pollu-tion

The task of the intervention teams is to detect, find and mark the places where the radioactive deposits are situated.

Incident 9, Ammonia incident A train carrying liquefied ammonia has col-lided with a small bus, causing a number of injured bus passengers. Furthermore, a tank wagon with ammonia has derailed and is discharging ammonia because of damage to the tank. The municipal rescue services handle the rescue operation, but need assistance to con-trol the discharge of ammonia. Recondensation af ammonia

Incident 10, Chemical warfare agent incident The Swedish County Administration has established its coordination centre in order to handle the consequences of the storm. Suddenly a number of explosions rock the coordination centre building and it is as-sumed that it is a terrorist attack using a chemical warfare agent. Special police units guard the building against further explosions, but assistance is needed to establish whether chemical agents have been used or not and to rescue the in-jured people.

Finding a victim hit by a chemical warfare agent


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Incident 11, Media The severe weather conditions and the acts of terrorism have caused the national and international media to focus their attention on the situation in Denmark and Sweden. The media are continuously approaching the national authorities as well as the interna-tional organisations and intervention teams for information and comments on the situa-tion. Interview with Mr. Gijs de Vries,

EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator

Incident 12, Visits of observers and VIP-personnel During their deployment to Denmark and Sweden the international intervention teams are visited by a number of observers and VIP-personnel from the participating coun-tries and their embassies, who receive a short briefing on the incidents they attend during the exercise. Furthermore, the OSOCC is tested and trained in giving briefings.

Observers

Incident 13, Situation reports During the exercise daily situation reports are sent from the Regional Coordination Centre to the OSOCC. These situation reports contain a description of the general preparedness situa-tion in Denmark and Sweden and a description of the security situation in Denmark and Swe-den. The situation reports enable the OSOCC to draw up consolidated situation reports to the in-ternational intervention teams and the MIC. Likewise the OSOCC is obligated to send situation reports to the Regional Coordination Cen-tre and MIC.


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Incident 14, Departure Upon completion of their tasks the international intervention teams are released from further duties in Sweden. The international intervention teams depart from their base camp in coop-eration with the Swedish host nation support element. 3.2. Time schedule

The duration of the exercise was six days. Sunday, 17 September 2006, the intervention teams were activated through the MIC. Monday 18 September was dedicated for the first incident (arrival in Denmark) and the welcome dinner. The other incidents - apart from departure - took place Tuesday through Thursday ending with the farewell dinner. Friday 22 September was the day of the Im-mediate Evaluation Workshop and the last incident (departure from Sweden).

Farewell dinner

During the exercise a field newspaper “EU DANEX News” was edited and distributed in four issues, which can be found in appendices 12-15. 3.3. Teams and means involved The intervention teams The exercise participants with teams and means involved are shown in appendix 1. The international intervention teams brought their own equipment according to the correspon-dence between The Danish Emergency Management Agency and the participating countries prior to the exercise. OSOCC The OSOCC, which functioned as a plat-form for coordination and information ex-change during the exercise, worked in agreement with the OSOCC Guidelines - drawn up by the UN OCHA. The OSOCC was staffed with only 4 EU-persons during the exercise. The leader of the OSOCC was from Sweden.

The OSOCC The main tasks of the OSOCC were to:

• Receive requests for assistance from host nation authorities • Decide on the assignment of international intervention teams to specific tasks • Monitor the activities of the teams • Report to the EU MIC and the participating nations on the accomplishment of the

tasks


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DISTAFF During the exercise, the DISTAFF carried out the following tasks:

DISTAFF

• Command, control and communica-tion with OSOCC and exercise units

• Host Nation Support to exercise par-ticipants, VIPs and observers and DISTAFF

• Public relations • Documentation and evaluation of the

exercise • Administration • VIP and observer programmes

Host Nation Support During the exercise, Host Nation Support provided the exercise participants, VIPs, observers and DISTAFF with:

• Reception and registration • Food and accommodation • Safety and security • Logistic support

In Denmark the intervention teams were accommodated and catered at the Hostel in Slagelse while observers and DISTAFF waccommodated at Antvorskov Barracks, ain Slagelse.

Host Nation Support’s command, control and communication vehicle

ere lso

In Sweden all the intervention teams, ob-servers and DISTAFF were accommodated and catered at the Swedish Rescue Services College in Revinge. Due to limited capaci-ties of rooms the intervention teams were accommodated in tents. Host Nation Support in Denmark and Swe-den activated around 45 persons.

Observers, VIPs and the EU Commission Appendix 16 contains a list of observers, VIPs and the EU representation. All observers were either national experts from the various EU Members States or authorized representatives from International Organisations such as the European Commission and NATO. They were all provided with the clear mandate to provide unbiased and independent evaluation of the exercise and not to interfere with the functions and activities of the partici-pating teams. The observers were divided into three observer groups, each group guided by a DEMA offi-cer. An Observer Briefing was organised on Monday evening after the Welcome Dinner. At


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the briefing the observers discussed their expected role as observers and received an evalua-tion form. Observers met with local press on several occasions. In addition to accredited observers ac-cess was provided for miscellaneous national, regional and local authorities during the exer-cise. On Wednesday 20 September a special programme was arranged for 2 VIPs:

• Mrs. Pia Bucella, Director, EU Commission, DG Environment • Mr. Gijs de Vries, EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator.

During the entire exercise, the European Commission was represented by Ms. Piroska Balla, Desk Officer, Civil Protection Directorate, DG Environment

Incident 2, Tunnel incident: Collision between a passenger train and a freight train


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Below a table shows which intervention team attended which incident. Almost all the inci-dents were conducted more than once - each time with similar set-up, but with different par-ticipants. Intervention teams

Esto

nia

Ger

man

y

Hun

gary

Lith

uani

a

Slov

enia

Den

mar

k

Swed

en

Tunnel incident I √ √ √

Tunnel incident II √ √ √ √

Natural gas incident I √ √ √

Natural gas incident II √ √ √

Airport incident I √ √ √

Airport incident II √ √

Suspicious handbag incident √

Residential fire incident √

Nuclear incident I √ √

Nuclear incident II √ √

Ammonia incident I √ √

Ammonia incident II √ √

Ammonia incident III √ √ √

Chemical warfare agent incident I √

Inci

dent

s

Chemical warfare agent incident II √ √ √


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4. Evaluation workshops On Friday 22 September an immediate evaluation workshop was held with the participation of the team leaders, the observers, OSOCC, The European Commission, DISTAFF and oth-ers. On Tuesday 10 October a national evaluation workshop was held with the participation of the subgroup leaders of the DISTAFF and the evaluators that were designated to the five inter-vention teams. 4.1 Immediate Evaluation Workshop The agenda for the Immediate Evaluation Workshop can be found at appendix 2. All participants in the workshop were given the opportunity to give a ten minutes evaluation of the exercise. The presentations are at appendices 3-11. Estonian team feedback The teamleader emphasized that the exercise gave excellent opportunities to cooperate with and learn from other teams and it also gave the opportunity to develop in-team cooperation and coordination. Furthermore, the debriefing after each incident was appre-ciated, as was the Host Nation Support, in-cluding the EU DANEX News. The negative reflections embraced the lack of opportunity to test the team staff man-agement, the lack of clear command struc-tures on incident sites and unclear rules of play. Radio communication difficulties had arisen, because the used frequencies inter-fered with others. The team therefore had to use mobile phones, which worked satisfactory during the exercise.

The Slovenian and the Estonian liaison officers at the OSOCC

German team feedback As positive experiences were mentioned very good training opportunities with teams from foreign nations, good and realistic exercise scenarios and a good DISTAFF organisation and cooperation between OSOCC, liaison officers and teams. Also the German team had troubles with radio frequency interference, and they had expected more terrorist aspects during the incidents. It was very valuable to prepare for and to partici-pate in an exercise outside their own country. It was furthermore stated that the pre-exercise dialogue with the DISTAFF could have been better, as could the communication between the MIC and the National Point of Contact. The German team leader concluded that more international exercises are needed.


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Hungarian team feedback Both the exercise in general and the incidents were very well planned, and the cooperation between the teams was mentioned as positive experiences. It was an advantage to divide the Hungarian team into two subteams at some incidents. The level of cooperation with the LEMA incident commander varied, partly due to language and terminology problems. The team leader furthermore mentioned partial lack of information and coordination with the OSOCC. Lithuanian team feedback The good organisation and the variation of incidents with many teams involved simultani-ously were highlighted, as was the multinational cooperation in preparing the exercise and in responding to the incidents. It was a problem that the scale of incidents sometimes exceeded the team capabilities and radio interference problems were mentioned. The team missed the opportunity to observe other parts of the exercise during free time. The team leader emphasized the great experience gained through comparing team structure, equipment and tactics with other teams and the opportunity to test their own team structure and new equipment in situations close to reality. Slovenian team feedback The Slovenian team was very satisfied with the exercise planning, training facilities, Host Nation Support and the instructions in general. At some of the incidents there was a lack of clear instructions and doubts about the rules of play. The team recommended to set up a spe-cial scenario for the media. Using mobile phones for dispatching was not good. The cooperation with OSOCC and the LEMA on-scene commander worked very well. Conclusively the team leader underscored the importance of further training the international guidelines and performing successful exercises within the European Community Mechanism. The team itself gained valuable experience in cooperation with other nations’ teams and was inspired to make some internal modifications. OSOCC feedback The team leader of the OSOCC pointed out that the OSOCC is the platform for facilitating coordination. The teams must adapt to the international concept, must know the system, what is expected and must understand the chain of command. All the teams must designate a liai-son officer as part of the OSOCC with good knowledge of his own team. According to the guidelines of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, the Slovenian team had to function as Reception Point in Sweden for approximately 8 hours until the OSOCC was set up. Observers feedback The spokesman of the observers first focussed on the European Community Mechanism and stated that it is difficult to train the whole Mechanism in one exercise. He further emphasized the importance of the OSOCC-procedures being well known and trained. The observers had


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noticed that some of the LEMA incident commanders had inadequate knowledge of the ca-pacities of the intervention teams. Developing standard terminology and procedures will di-minish this problem. With the focus on saving life and health, the observers recommend that natives should take care of native casualties. The observers found the exercise very well organised in general, and underlined the value of the field newspaper. Finally it was mentioned that the briefings of the observers prior to the various incidents differed.

The European Commission feedback

which made the xercise more realistic.

xcellently and that the deployment of liaison officers to the OSOCC was of great advantage.

g cooperation and mentioned positive examples of improvisation to overcome difficulties.

urthermore, she had noticed some differences in terminologies, which need harmonization.

Handling a leak of ammonia

First of all, The European Commission representative applauded the fact that the participantsmainly were new member states with minor experience in joint EU-missions, e The intervention teams and the OSOCC staff were selected before the exercise, but also acti-vated through the MIC as if it had been a real emergency. It is disappointing to The European Commission that only 4 nominees for the OSOCC were received, taken into account the hun-dreds of experts already having been trained. But it was observed that the OSOCC worked e The European Commission representative underlined the importance of knowing and trainingthe international rules and recommendations and she found the exercise very useful for train-in F


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Evaluators feedback The head of the Danish evaluation team con-cluded that the exercise had shown good results in cooperation and mutual knowledge of organisation, equipment and tactics. Professional colleagues from all over the EU have met, and some language barriers have been identified. Difficulties have been identified in radio communication and in visually identifying leaders.

Evaluation after an incident

Finally, under real circumstances, attention must be paid to the importance of intervention teams being self supporting to the extent possible to diminish the load on the host nation. Overall conclusion of the Immediate Evaluation Workshop

• Excellent exercise, well organized • Good and realistic exercise scenarios • Good training grounds • Good cooperation among the teams and with the OSOCC and LEMA • Knowing and training international procedures are important • Exercises are valuable for the European Community Mechanism and for the participat-

ing countries • Lack of sufficient instructions and information regarding some of the incidents • Use of radio-communication difficult because of interference between frequencies • Use of mobile phones should be avoided • Language needs to be trained and terminology to be harmonized • More OSOCC experts should be nominated for exercises

Giving first aid to a casualty


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4.2. National evaluation workshop At the national evaluation workshop, the DISTAFF had the opportunity to comment further on their written lessons learnt from the exercise, including the planning process. The proceed-ings of the workshop were separated in issues:

a. Alerting b. OSOCC c. Incidents d. Host Nation Support e. Public Relations f. Technical Communication g. Observers h. Evaluation i. Administration and Exercise Management

a. Alerting On Sunday 17 September at 10:02, The Danish Emergency Management Agency sent a situa-tions report and request for international assistance to the MIC. At 10:10 the MIC confirmed receiving the request and at 10:45 sent the situations report and request to the member states. At 10:17 The Danish Emergency Management Agency established situations report and re-quest for international assistance in CECIS. The first reply came from Greece, which was not registered for the exercise, and within an hour replies were received from Estonia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Hungary

• The request was met not only by countries registered for the exercise • CECIS was used by the participating countries

b. OSOCC

• The OSOCC staff arrived on Sunday, which made it possible to establish and start the OSOCC before the actual exercise which contributed to the excellent reception of the intervention teams

• The work in the OSOCC was well organized and the leader of the OSOCC frequently briefed all personnel on the situation and tasks were identified and delegated

• There was a good cooperation with the liaison officers, who contributed very much to the accomplishment of the tasks. Also the cooperation with the LEMA liaison officer worked well. It was very clear that OSOCC and the intervention teams worked for and under the command of the national emergency authority

• The liaison officers reported to the OSOCC-management during the incidents, and they made a summary report on the response after each incident. These reports were used to elaborate situation reports from the OSOCC to the LEMA as well as to the re-gional rescue center and MIC

• The electronic log worked very well • Originally it was decided that mobile phones should not be used as experience shows

that they may not function in a real emergency (e.g. in London, July 2005). However, the radio communication system was insufficient, so the DISTAFF had to allow the use of mobile phones. The use of mobile phones made the telecommunication between the intervention teams and OSOCC work. On the other hand, the use of mobile phones resulted in evaluators, DISTAFF and host nation support units not being able to moni-


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tor the radio communications, and thus sometimes missing vital information on the in-tervention teams’ whereabouts and changing of plans

• It is important to notice that during a real operation, more than five intervention teams must be foreseen and in that case the capacity of the radio communication will be ex-ceeded by submission of the situation reports a.o. The amount of situations reports communicated between the intervention teams and OSOCC during this exercise there-fore probably will be impractical - if not impossible – during a real operation

• The DISTAFF received all the situation reports from the OSOCC as well as receipt of signals, where wanted by the DISTAFF

• Standardized and normalized terms of units and equipment were missing, resulting in doubt of various units’ capabilities

c. Incidents Below is shown the co-ordination and command hierarchy during EU DANEX 2006.

Danish Emergency Management Agency

Intervention team, Germany

Regional Co-ordination Center

OSOCC: • 4 persons appointed from MIC • 1 Communications officer • 5 liaison officers from assisting

teams • 1 liaison officer from LEMA

Intervention team, Slovenia

Intervention team, Hungary

Intervention team, Lithuania

Intervention team, Estonia

Local On Scene Commanding team: • Police, on scene commander • LEMA, on scene commander

Local fire and rescue forces

Monitoring and Information Center

• It was inconvenient that the Danish police was not able to participate in the exercise

due to other activities. This applies to the incident response as well as the traffic guid-ance, which was handled by the Home Guard Police

• On a few occasions the foreign response teams lost their way. The use of GPS guid-ance might have been useful

• The LEMA incident on-site commanders had adequate information about the incidents and, therefore, had the possibility of preparing their intervention with the intervention teams

• The incidents were well planned and carried out despite of different resources and ca-pacity of the different intervention teams

• It is an advantage that the exercise activities took place on exercise areas, where the possibilities are known


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• On several occasions it would have been an advantage if every foreign intervention team had a LEMA liaison officer

• In general, the teams were well-prepared. It is a weakness when newly established teams have not worked together before the exercise

• In general English as exercise-language worked well, though some of the team leaders had inadequate knowledge of English, especially on technical matters

• A general problem was the lack of sufficient visual marking of the team leaders • There were considerable differences regarding the material which was brought along

by the teams, but in general it was well functioning • It is a weakness when the teams have to operate local equipment and not their own

equipment • The handling of injured persons was inadequate - they were often placed on the

ground without blankets and handling personnel d. Host Nation support Including food and accommodation, trans-port, arrival, deployment and departure, registration, ID-cards

The base camp in Sweden

• Host Nation Support had a hard time keeping up with changes in plans. Not all changes were communicated, and some changes were difficult to keep up with. Therefore:

• The Host Nation Support needs updated information on the intervention teams’ where-abouts.

• No problems identified regarding arrival to Denmark and Sweden and cross-border passage

e. Public relations The Grant Agreement specified six media releases, including establishing a home page spe-cifically for the exercise. Main purpose for activities related to Public Relations was to create awareness and understanding of the exercise and its objectives to the press, the public and the participants.

• The effort made to create media awareness of the exercise was highly successful • The homepage www.brs.dk/eudanex was updated with information, press releases,

photos and video from the exercise • Press tours were arranged giving the press access to the exercise and the possibility of

interviewing key persons • Photos and videos from the exercise were made available to the press free of charge • The field newspaper was highly appreciated by the participants (appendices 12-15). It

was distributed in printing every evening and published on the homepage • The main obstacle for Public Relations was technical problems during the exercise in-

cluding difficulties in updating the homepage and transmitting footage to the press • The programme for the press and the observers must be coordinated with the incident

game taking into account that some incidents are more suitable for the press than oth-ers. Furthermore the written press may have other preferences than broadcast media.

http://www.brs.dk/eudanex


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f. Technical Communication The communication between OSOCC and the intervention teams was planned to make use of the The Danish Emergency Management Agency’s integrated telephone and VHF-radio sys-tem. Due to integration problems between the radio network and the public telephone system, mobile telephone were used as means of communication between the intervention teams and their liaison officer in OSOCC.

• If The Danish Emergency Management Agency’s integrated telephone and VHF-radio system had been used, it would have been necessary to designate resources for teach-ing the intervention teams to use it. Therefore:

• The communication should take place by using well known and simple radio-communication systems (e.g. simple VHF-radio) or satellite-phones, which all the par-ticipating teams bring along. Alternatively, Danish mobile phones or SIM-cards could be dispensed, but mobile phones should be avoided in emergency services

• Radio-communication was only used to a very small extent during the exercise. Most communication was face-to-face

• The internet-connection should be tested before exercises are conducted. In Sweden the OSOCC internet-connection broke down, presumably due to a network error at the Swedish Rescue Services College

g. Observers 25 questionnaires were handed in from the observers. Each had nine statements, with the pos-sible answers ”Strongly disagree”, ”Disagree”, ”Agree” or ”Strongly agree”, plus the oppor-tunity to give comments for each question or more generally. The observers were very satisfied, 93% of the answers being “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” to positive statements about the exercise. The questions and the answers can be found in appendix 16. The questionnaires contained the following general remarks:

• The exercise showed a high standard with good and realistic incidents • Several observers express high satisfaction with the guides • All intervention teams should have more than one person mastering the English lan-

guage • The exercise showed the value of a well organized OSOCC • Equipment and visual marking of leaders should be standardized as should training

and organisation • Several observers mention the ammonia incident as the best, due to the excellent brief-

ing of the observers before the incident • The observers should arrive to the incidents in time in order to attend the instructions

h. Evaluation

• It worked well to have an evaluator designated to each of the participating teams. However, it was a problem to keep the evaluators updated with information, especially changes of plans.

• It would have been useful to have a full-time evaluator in the OSOCC. • Sometimes, observers and press entered the incident scene and thus interfered with the

incident response and demotivated the intervention teams.


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i. Administration and project management • The cooperation with the EU before and during the exercise functioned very well with

regard both to the negotiations about Grant Agreement and to the planning of the ex-ercise, e.g. adaption of the budgets as a result of conducting of the detailed planning and the changing of the participating countries

• Excellent facilities made the work easier (large command vehicle in Slagelse and of-fice-facilities in Sweden)

• The cooperation with Swedish Rescue Services Agency worked very well • At the Planning Conference, we successfully encouraged the participating countries to

participate in more incidents. It was inconvenient to the DISTAFF planning that dur-ing the exercise some of the participating teams insisted to participate in more inci-dents than agreed before the exercise. In retrospect, it might have been better not to give the participating countries the opportunity to choose which incidents to attend.

• DISTAFF had to adjust plans because the OSOCC for some incidents did not dedicate response teams according to the DISTAFF expectations

• The German intervention team was not adequately informed before arrival because they did not take part in the Final Planning Conference. This was due to the late deci-sion on sending intervention team besides the experts and observers. Therefore:

• The participating countries must attend the conference, in which the extent of their participation is laid down, and they should inform clearly of the incidents they want to attend and then bring appropriate personnel and material with them for this participa-tion

• Administrative deadlines should be respected in order to facilitate exercise planning and administration

• It is crucial that the necessary personnel resources are allocated for the planning and conducting of the exercise

Discussing the findings during the nuclear incident


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5. Evaluation of the project 5.1. Positive experiences

• In general, the exercise worked very well, with good cooperation between all partici-pants, including the intervention teams from new member states

• The alerting through MIC and CECIS worked very well • The OSOCC worked very well, also with the liaison officers from the intervention

teams • In general, the participants had sufficient knowledge of both the guidelines of the In-

ternational Search and Rescue Advisory Group and the OSOCC Guidelines • The Host Nation Support and the field newspaper was highly appreciated by the par-

ticipants • In general English as exercise-language worked well, though some participants had

inadequate knowledge of English, especially on technical matters 5.2. Major problems encountered a) in the planning and exercise process

• The planning process was hampered by participants and observers not respecting the deadlines

• Lack of interest from member states to nominate experts for the OSOCC • Difficulties in communicating change of plans and participants’ whereabouts to the

exercise organisation (host nation support as well as evaluators and administration) b) with relation to real life incidents

• Radio communication means were insufficient and had to be replaced by mobile tele-phones

• Difficulties have been identified in visually identifying leaders, a problem also identi-fied at previous exercises

• Too little emphasis was laid on the handling of casualties by the intervention teams. • Incident response is difficult for teams that are newly established and for teams that

are not familiar with the equipment • Lack of standardized and normalized fire- and rescue- terms, regarding equipment as

well as organisation and procedures 5.3. Lessons identified for improvements

• Exercise participants and observers should respect deadlines to facilitate planning • Whenever possible native personnel should take care of native casualties • Host nations should consider attaching a LEMA liaison officer to all foreign interven-

tion teams • Host nation must be very careful when selecting and planning press tours in order to

make the incidents interesting to the press


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6. Conclusions including recommendations The objectives of the exercise EU DANEX 2006 were met, namely to train and improve exist-ing procedures for alerting, selecting, mobilising and dispatching civil protection assistance intervention teams and to provide these teams a training opportunity. Generally, the teams and observers gave a very positive feed-back on the exercise and empha-sized the importance of the international cooperation. The exercise resulted in these main recommendations:

• The European Commission should consider to propose guidelines for the visual mark-ing of team leaders

• The European Commission should consider preparing instruction materials for im-proving the language skills of civil protection personnel

• The European Commission should consider developing standardized and normalized terms for civil protection

• The European Commission should conduct further exercises to keep up and improve the level of training for all member states

• Member States should take advantage of training their experts at exercise-OSOCCs • Host nations should ensure the adequacy of radio communication with intervention

teams

Helping each other is the key to success

Documents

Final Technical Report, EU DANEX 2006ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention... · Final Technical Report 7 3. Presentation of the exercise 3.1. The exercise area and incidents