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Self Creation as Existential:

Establishing the Fundamental Nature of Self Creation

Joshua Paul Stephens

PHIL 4300

5 December, 2013

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Section 1: Introduction

In Human Identity and Bioethics , David DeGrazia questions the possibility of self

creation. The term “self creation” is used to describe a person’s ability to consciously change or 1

shape one’s own characteristics. This creation is like a project a person may take on to in order 2

to accomplish some desire or goal that that person aspires to. DeGrazia’s purpose is to help

explain the idea of narrative identity and its connections to personal identity. However, 3

DeGrazia posits that not all people can engage in this project of self creation. Furthermore, he

must debate on whether those that can self­create are only paying attention to the illusion of self

creation while in fact other forces are working such as one’s environment, medication, or genetic

predisposition. DeGrazia argues that while in fact self creation is limited based on the factors of 4

one’s actions, choices, and so on, the possibilities that are available to people still give them the

ability to self­create. Here lies the problem: The fact that major factors can shape one’s life does 5

limit one’s ability to self­create but does not take away the ability that person has to self­create.

DeGrazia believes that while a part of narrative identity is one’s own aspirations and the

ability to see them through, most people, in fact the majority of people throughout the world, are

to economically challenged to engage in self creation. However, if self creation is the shaping of

one’s personality, then does this not mean that all people who have a personality at some level

decided to keep traits they deemed worthy of becoming a part of their narrative identity? My 6

1 DeGrazia p. 89 2 Ibid. DeGrazia defines self creation as “referring to the conscious, deliberate shaping of one’s own personality, character, other significant traits...or life direction.” 3 Ibid, p. 83, Narrative identity refers to the realistic individual described in one’s self narrative or inner story. 4 Ibid, p. 91. 5 Ibid, p. 92. 6 “[A]ll people who have a personality” refers to all human beings that have legally significant mental capacity

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paper will analyze this ability and help determine the extent to which human beings use the

ability to self­create. If this ability is a fundamental existential piece of the human condition then

all humans have it and utilize it in telling their narrative. If this ability is just an illusion then our

narrative is determined by outside factors. In this paper I will first describe the fundamental

nature of self creation, and then examine two views in existentialism, specifically those of

Jean­Paul Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche and the way their views have an effect on the

fundamental nature of self creation. I will do this in order to defend my idea that every human

being that is alive can engage in self creation.

Section 2: DeGrazia on Self Creation and the Objection of Determinism

DeGrazia considers a few objections to self creation. One objection is the idea of causal

determinism. According to this directive, every event is necessitated by previous events along 7

with the laws of nature. This would rule out the idea of free will and self creation in that if every 8

event is predictable and in fact is not up to chance then so long as one knows the preceding

events, one could, in theory, predict the outcomes beforehand. Thus someone’s “self” creation

can be determined beforehand and is not a project specifically linked to that person. For

example, Joan decides to miss class on Monday and is confronted by her professor the following

class. Her professor is disgruntled by the fact Joan decided to miss class for no reason. However,

Joan argues that, while she in fact is responsible for missing class, there is no point in her

professor's disgruntlement because due to her character and motivations she was bound to miss

7 Ibid, p. 90­92. 8 Hoefer

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class and in fact could not have acted differently. Determinism would imply that there is no free 9

will or self creation because if someone examines the prior motivations and events of an event or

motivation they can calculate what will happen. One response to this is “if determinism is true,

then I’m not responsible for anything.” However, DeGrazia explains that one’s decisions and 10

actions can still add to the cause of a future event. This is a view called soft determinism; it

claims that one’s actions can have affect either small or big on the world. This gives us room 11

for the possibility of self creation because, with this view it seems possible that one could have a

type of freedom, however minute, within the world. This freedom would still lead to events that

can be predicted and also stem from events that could have even caused this small freedom.

Thus, one would have free will and also have possibilities or chance. Determinism would rule

out free will and deny the uncertainty of events, as well as claim there is no thing that can not be

determined beforehand, whereas soft determinism would allow for free will and the possibility of

chance. 12

This creates a big problem for the possibilities for self creation and autonomy. However,

DeGrazia points out that in ordinary life we tend to respect an adult’s autonomy and the use of

autonomy is important in peoples’ ordinary lives. In fact, the morality we place on autonomy 13

gives human beings the moral agency that allows human beings the ability to entertain the

possibility of autonomy. This means that in order to establish a type of morality, specifically the

intuitive morality human beings use in ordinary life, the acceptance of human beings having

9 This is similar to DeGrazia’s account on p. 94. 10 DeGrazia p. 93. 11 Ibid. 12 This is the difference between soft determinism and the first instance of determinism also referred to as hard determinism . 13 Ibid, p. 106.

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autonomy is necessary. This view seems to be a nonstarter, although it can be an acceptable

objection to autonomy and self creation. Like DeGrazia, for the sake of argument I will assume

that autonomy is possible.

Section 3: The Existential Response to Self Creation

In order to address the fundamental nature of autonomy and self creation we must address

the questions of “What are we?” and “What shall we do?” These question in existentialism, 14

most prominently, emerge in relation to suffering and anxiety. These seem to be questions of 15

autonomy as well. For example, what actions must a people or person take up to deal with

suffering or slavery, or in this discussion’s place, an economic challenge? When a person makes

an action in response to anxiety they reveal their personal response to this anxiety, or rather the

desire they have toward this anxiety. Their personal opinion or choice is shown by their action.

DeGrazia says, “self creation refers to...life direction”. This person, even in anxiety, 16

demonstrates that he has a will and a desire to change his circumstance. Is this not engaging in

self creation? The will to change one’s circumstance and the ability to change, even minutely,

one’s “destiny” is free will. For example, Joanna, a slave knew she was oppressed and would

possibly never gain freedom. She chose to believe that one day her people would gain freedom

and through this belief she decided to gain as much knowledge of her culture’s traditions and

practices as possible and pass it down to her children. Her desire here is the continuation of her

culture and the hope of a future with less anxiety for her descendants. Comparison with one of

14 Lott and Pittman, p. 34 15 Ibid. 16 DeGrazia, p. 90

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DeGrazia’s example, music competence, Danny’s desire is to become better at music and play it

or understand it more efficiently. Thus, Danny’s self creation project or rather desire here is to

become better at music. Joanna’s desire is the continuation of her culture, so she learns stories

and passes them down to her children along with a desire for them to gain freedom and perhaps

regain aspects of their culture. Although these examples are distinct, what they have in common

is that the person had a desire and they acted upon it in some way to allow it to come into being.

This comparison shows how self creation is something that even people with hard lives utilize in

some aspect of their lives.

Section 4: The Relationship Between Autonomy and Self Creation

Furthermore, the aspect toward future orientation the project of self creation has adds to

the fundamentality of self creation. One has a desire for an aspect of their future, so they act

autonomously toward it by figuring out ways to make it happen or acting upon it. Then one takes

the experiences gained from it and applies them to their overall personality and knowledge. An

objection to this would be directed against the idea of “acting autonomously”. The person who is

oppressed by the government of a harsh dictatorship and grows sugar cane may wish to be

unopposed and walk to another land where he can create a family and home and choose when he

sleeps, wakes up, and works, we will call this action y . Nevertheless, say he is made to cut down

sugar cane at 4 a.m. to 9 p.m. every Monday thru Saturday and is punished if he does not do so

or create a good yield of crops. This man has no desire to cut sugar cane and has a strong desire

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to walk to another land. Furthermore, he is disgusted by sugar cane and dislikes its properties. 17

This example shows preference, influence, and a factor of alienation. Only if, the man here

referred to as M, (a) intentionally performs action x , and (b) has a preference for action x and

prefers to perform it, and, (c) upon careful thought, is not alienated by the influences that cause

M to perform action x , then the action is an autonomous one. M does not intentionally perform 18

action x , he does not have a preference for action x , nor finds that he is influenced to perform

action x in an un­estranged way. His action in cutting down sugar cane is not autonomous.

Furthermore, even if M does intentionally perform action x and/or prefers to perform it, by not

meeting conditions a, b, and c the action M performs is not autonomous, as he prefers action y

and this preference can be referred to as desire. Action y , if M had free will to do so, would be 19

autonomous because it would meet conditions a,b, and c. In contrast, one could argue that, 20

“DeGrazia says, that the economically challenged project of self creation is like a transient blip

that disappears just as their dreams do” These people have no leisure of time to deliberately 21

shape their personalities because they barely have autonomy. However, the point of my analogy

was to show that no matter how small a desire may be, the action of living, hoping, or even more

17 This is an example of Christman’s identification of autonomy and the implications of the conditions in which an action may be considered autonomous in DeGrazia, p. 100­102. 18 Ibid, p. 102. 19 Ibid. 20 It is notable to add an objection that: condition (c) may not be met and one could possibly still act autonomously. One can prefer to perform a certain action and intentionally perform it. However, it seems possible that one may do something “subconsciously” or even moreover, against logic or reason against the fact that the action is alienating because it is meant to harm, demean or undermine the person in question in someway. DeGrazia, (DeGrazia p. 102) in a footnote also refers to brainwashing “Chiang”, racist “Jesse” and the different situational dilemma of “Fritz” as examples of this objection to the necessity of influence on autonomy. However, this influence may not appear to be alienating to the person in question, thus a question remains, “Is the action autonomous?” I will leave this unanswered. However, I will as DeGrazia does, add a supplement that I believe that one’s decisions about one’s autonomy is partly shaped by one’s values, traditions, environment and culture. Because of this there appears to be an intuitive idea that one still acts autonomously even when the influences for a specific action within one’s autonomy is an alienating one. 21 Ibid, p. 90.

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substantial acting directly, to change one’s lot in life is the act of self creation. This is self

creation due to the future orientation and possibility of a change that may arise from one’s

action.

It is important that in this discussion we do not stray too far away from the difference

between free will, autonomy and self creation. Acting upon a desire, motivation, or expressing a

choice are examples of free will. Consequently, autonomy is a term referring to the ability to

have free will. Meaning, the ability to, whenever one chooses, exert one’s free will such as a

choice like: making a decision between going home or visiting a friend or between eating rice or

eating bread. Whereas, the consequences of either may alter one’s future, the final decision may

be decided by the one who can partake in either option. In my view, the project of self creation is

having a desire toward a goal and making a autonomous decision to act toward it and regardless

of the consequences of gaining or not gaining desired circumstances. One gains the experience of

having done so (obtaining or not obtaining a desired outcome) and applies this to their

personality. One self­creates by engaging in a project in which they autonomously decide to act

in a way that will affect one’s future and perhaps may thwart a disadvantage one has currently.

Section 5: Self Creation Applied to Existential Philosophy

Moreover, the possibility of self creation being a fundamental part of humans can have an

effect on the idea of “will”. Friedrich Nietzsche would say that all will is a will to power. 22

22Nietzsche and Kaufmann, p. 143

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Nietzsche is attempting to show how all humans are subject to their own interest and desires.

Every human being wants to engage in constant creation and has an ambition to reach desired

goals. He wants to show how every human wants to express their potential and their interest. 23

However, most humans turn their will to power inwardly and repress their strong will toward

ambition and other manifestations of the will to power by creating, as Nietzsche would claim, the

basis of morality. This basis is one that says, “one should hurt no one; rather, help as much as 24

you can.” Instead of truly creating and overcoming the inevitable obstacles that will always 25

block one’s will, one will conform to the community and find it easy to be lazy and sucumb to

the will to power of the church and democracy, and thus repress their will. This repression 26

leads to Nietzsche’s distinction between the herd, or slave mentality and the Übermensch. This 27

Übermensch is a person who acknowledges their will to power and raises above the moral

systems of others and creates his own values and sets his own standard. Most people, according 28

to Nietzsche, would be apart of this herd mentality that fails to acknowledge their will to power

or engage in self overcoming affairs. However, this is not a rejection of the human beings ability

to overcome obstacles related to their goals and passions, this describes how most people invert

their will toward not overcoming their obstacles. In fact, this shows how human beings always

retain the potential to self overcome or rather conquer obstacles in their life in order to

accomplish goals. One of the obstacles to this, I believe Nietzsche would say, is the person not

only accepting their condition, but also choosing not to express their will. Which in itself is an

23 Ibid, p. 145. 24 Nietzsche and Kaufmann, p. 99 25Ibid. 26 Ibid, This is related to Nietzsche’s idea of self­overcoming and how the herd mentality forms. 27 Ibid, p. 114. 28 For a detailed account on Übermensch (the overman) refer to, Crowell, "Existentialism".

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autonomous decision by the person. Thus, the ability to create oneself anew against the 29

obstacles of one’s life is a reflection of the will to power and the motivation or rather “strongness

of will” a person has toward their goal.

However, how does this relate to our discussion of self creation? If he is right then the

ability to self­create is only imposing our want and need of something on the world. In

connection with the already discussed process of self creation, when one wants to gain

something for their personal project, they act towards it then they apply it to their personality.

However, for Nietzsche the aspect of whether all people utilize this method is different in that:

all people do in fact self­create, even in choosing to not pursue their highest potential, but do it in

order to leave behind their will, or method. For example, David, a person from poverty has a self

creation project to learn how to make more money. He does this to buy food for his family and

himself, but has never had some of his other dreams fulfilled. David acts upon this project, and 30

learns ways to make more money. However, based on this view, he does this not for his family

per se, but for his own happiness in seeing his goal fulfilled and his family happy. I believe that

Nietzsche would have no problem with the idea people utilize this ability because this type of

project within self creation involving David shows how a human being engages in something in

order to gain some future benefit and profit. According to Nietzsche, David did this project to

express his want or rather discharge his strength and gain a fulfilment from it and self­overcome

29 I draw this conclusion of “inherent autonomy” based on: 1. The ability to manifest an example of “will to power” is accessible by all human beings. 2. Obstacles toward one’s will are inevitable parts of any passion one may take up. 3. A manifestation of will to power can be accessed regardless of any obstacle even if that obstacle is not conquered. This will halt the question of whether human beings within Nietzsche's herd mentality are not able to access their will to power. 30 This thought experiment is also meant to meet a few condition for DeGrazia ideas of the type of people who do not engage in self creation, such as when DeGrazia says, “ [M]any people...too economically deprived” DeGrazia p. 90.

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and conquer an obstacle in pursuit of his desire.

Moreover lets take this idea of the fundamentality of self creation and apply it to the idea

of Jean­Paul Sartre. His idea is that all humans are responsible for what humanity. Ergo, 31

existence precedes essence according to Sartre. The view is that no creator exist for the human 32

being. In comparison to a sword that is made by a blacksmith where the blacksmith creates the

sword for a purpose. Thus, the sword has been produced before its existence and for Sartre, if

mankind where the sword and instead did not have a blacksmith who created the sword and

consequently will have no concept to it since no creator, or in this case blacksmith, has produced

this sword or giving it a type of value, thus the sword just exists. Therefore, in this example 33

human beings just exist because they have no creator and must give themselves value or

substantiation and according to Sartre, human being give themselves this substantiation. The

outcome of this is that a human is responsible for their own conditions, and even if the human is

deprived of food, wealth, and to some extent freedom, that human always has the possibility of

changing their circumstances. The human is creating their conditions by choosing their way of

life. If this is true, then the project of self creation is not something that is just future oriented but

is present oriented as well. The action of changing or the action of not changing one’s

circumstances and abilities are both a project of self creation. If one aspires to be able to find

more food, they are engaged in self creation. Moreover, if one aspires to not find more food or

not engage in the activity of finding more food, they are still creating their narrative, their

motive, their personality and thus, they are engaged in self creation. This responsibility leaves no

room for the external forces which DeGrazia believes stops the project of self creation. These

31 Sartre p. 52 32Sartre p. 13. 33 Ibid, p. 13 ­ 14 This is a similar concept to Sartre’s example of a paper­cutter.

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external forces DeGrazia posites will have no bearing on one’s project of self creation because

the mere fact of making a choice or not making a choice will have an affect on the essence of a

human being. This means that all organisms that are human beings, because humans have no

creator, are constantly affecting by what a human being does and in every instance where a

decision is made the human being is not only creating herself but also creating what the rest of

humanity is.

It seems to be that self creation is even a more basic concept of this idea then if applied to

Nietzsche. However, the problem that DeGrazia puts forth, I believe, still has weight, The idea of

not attempting to overcome obstacles in one’s life intuitively seems less like self creation and

more like a lack of it.

Section 6: Conclusion

After examining these views in existentialism, It seems to me that this project of self

creation is necessary for narrative identity. DeGrazia claims that self creation “flows” from

narrative identity and shape the narratives that they are involved in. However, if narrative 34

identity is necessary to allow the possibility of self creation, and self creation is a necessary

condition of the ability to write their narrative identity, how can self creation be some sort of

higher level attribute that only some can utilize as DeGrazia believes? I believe one can say that

every human being that is alive and actively living life, whereas they have even the smallest

amount of freedom, is to some degree engaging in their ability of self creation. An instance of

34 DeGrazia p. 106.

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this is in relation to the other, one has a desire to get to know a friend, a loved one, or lover.

When one acts in a way to create an understanding, friendship, or more generally, a bond with

someone else, they are engaging in a basic social endeavour to learn and gain some experience

from that other and with the other. This experience is one that has the capacity to shape one’s life

or change one’s life direction. This is seen especially between lovers. Suppose one wants to

appear more attractive, fall in love and aspires to have a family and happiness. He goes out to

meet this potential lover, he decorates himself to the best of his ability, knowledge, experiences

and in a way that might attract his potential lover. This ends in marriage and procreation, one of

his desires goals. This social interaction not only has a correlation with an individual's narrative

identity, but the step taken to reach this desired goal of happiness is in itself a self creation

project. The goal of this project is to have some sort of happiness or rather a pursuit of a desired

outcome that affects one’s life, or as the definition of self creation stated earlier says, “ [S]elf

creation as referring to the conscious, deliberate shaping of one’s...life direction.” This pursuit 35

of happiness is a fundamental drive and motivating force for human beings. This discussion has

been about the idea that self creation is a fundamental part of human existence and coincides

with human beings natural understanding of who they are and what they want in life.

35 Ibid, 89.

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