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DRAFT
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A Culture for War: Explaining Military Performance in
Asymmetric Conflicts Involving Mercenary Forces
By Scott Fitzsimmons
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary
Since the end of the Second World War, mercenary groups have played
significant roles in wars throughout the developing world. However, despite being
consistently outnumbered by their opponents, these groups have a highly uneven record
of military performance. Indeed, some modern mercenary groups have managed to defeat
far larger state and insurgent militaries while similar sized groups of private soldiers have
experienced crushing defeats at the hands of more numerous adversaries. Taking this into
account, how can we explain the military performance of modern mercenary groups in
asymmetric conflicts?1
Scarce literature exists on the performance of mercenary groups, and that which
does exist consists largely of descriptive case studies offering an overview of specific
groups or the private military industry. In brief, most of the leading works on mercenary
1Military performance, the dependent variable in this essay, is specifically concerned with winning and losing battles.It is the outcome of battle; it is not what a military does in battle. Military performance is not a characteristic of an
organization but rather the result of an organizations activity. This concept does not equate with military effectiveness,another major variable in this essay meaning the range of military behaviour that a military force is capable ofundertaking. Armed forces may be highly effective yet still be defeated. For example, the German Army was arguablythe most effective fighting force during both the First and Second World Wars yet it ultimately lost numerous battlesand both conflicts. Indeed, the German army is often cited as an example of extraordinary military effectiveness
because it fought so well even when faced with more numerous and better armed foes. Therefore, while militaryeffectiveness and military performance are related concepts, it is important to recognize that they are quite different;
military effectiveness is only one possible determinant of military performance. Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power:German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1983); Allan Millett,
Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," International Security11,no. 1 (Summer 1986).
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DRAFT
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Outcomes force of 250 mercenaries defeat a 4,000-strong insurgent force, called the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).5 In addition, these conflicts include two in which a
group of mercenaries was defeated by a numerically superior opponent: an earlier stage of
the Angolan Civil War, which lasted from January to February 1976, and saw a 2,000
strong force of Cuban and Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola (MPLA) soldiers
defeat a 60-strong force of private soldiers, called Callans Mercenaries,6
5 Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra
Leone," The Journal of Modern African Studies36, no. 2 (June 1998): 207-208 and 226; Ibrahim Abdullah and PatrickMuana, "The Revolutionary United Front: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat," in African Guerillas, ed. Christopher
Clapham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 177 and 187; Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of
the Third World (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 132; Avant, The Market for Force, 89-90; Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 388; Steven Brayton, "Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping,"
Journal of International Affairs55, no. 2 (Spring 2002): , 314; Michael Cheng, "Sierra Leone: The State that CameBack from the Dead," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 149; Clayton, Frontiersmen, 195-197;Christopher Coker, "Outsourcing War," Cambridge Review of International AffairsXIII, no. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1999):197; Sean Creehan, "Soldiers of Fortune 500: International Mercenaries," Harvard International Review 23, no. 4
(Winter 2002): 6; Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 133-134; Andrew Dorman, "The British Experience of Low-IntensityConflict in Sierra Leone," Defense & Security Analysis 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 186; Ian Douglas, "Fighting forDiamonds: Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone," in Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in
War-torn African Societies, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Johannesburg, South Africa: Institute for SecurityStudies, 1999), 182-183; Scott Fitzsimmons,Interview with Cobus Claassens(George, SA: August 22, 2007); David J.
Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?," ThirdWorld Quarterly 20, no. 2 (April 1999): 326-327; Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the
Destruction of Sierra Leone (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2005), 95; Globalsecurity.org, Revolutionary UnitedFront (RUF) (Globalsecurity.org, 2005 [cited); available from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm; Danny Hoffman, "Disagreement: Dissent Politics and theWar in Sierra Leone," Africa Today 52, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 5; Jim Hooper, Bloodsong: An Account of ExecutiveOutcomes in Angola (London, UK: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 262; Howe, Ambiguous Order, 201; HerbertHowe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes," The Journal of Modern
African Studies 36, no. 2 (June 1998): 313 and 315; David Isenberg, "Combat for Sale: The New, Post-Cold WarMercenaries," USA TodayMarch 2000, 14; Jimmy D. Kandeh, "What Does the 'Militariat' Do When it Rules? MilitaryRegimes: The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia," Review of African Political Economy23, no. 69 (September 1996):
390; J. Anyu Ndumbe, "Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone,"Mediterranean Quarterly12, no.4 (Fall 2001): 94-95; Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm of International Relations(New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 210; Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants inSierra Leone," Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 68, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 186; Paul Richards,"Forced Labour & Civil War: Agrarian Underpinnings of the Sierra Leone Conflict," in Violence, Political Culture &
Development in Africa, ed. Preben Kaarsholm (Oxford, UK: James Currey, 2006), 189; Paul Richards, "War as Smokeand Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2, 1994-5, 1995-6," Anthropological Quarterly78, no. 22 (Spring 2005): 395; AdamRoberts, The Wonga Coup (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2006), 12; Fred Rosen, Contract Warriors: How
Mercenaries Changed History and the War on Terrorism(New York, NY: Penguin Books Ltd., 2005), 16; Shearer,Private Armies and Military Intervention, 50; Ken Silverstein, Private Warriors(New York, NY: Verso, 2000), 164-165; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 78 and 112-114; Alex Vines, "Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa,"in Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and PeggyMason (Johannesburg, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 130; Alex Vines, "Mercenaries, Human
Rights and Legality," in Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, ed. Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi(Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 175; A. Zack-Williams and Stephen Riley, "Sierra Leone: The Coup and ItsConsequences,"Review of African Political Economy56 (March 1993): 93-94; Alfred B. Zack-Williams, "The PoliticalEconomy of Civil War, 1991-1998," Third World Quarterly20, no. 1 (February 1999): 147.
and, the First
6Juan del Aguila, "The Changing Character of Cuba's Armed Forces," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. JaimeSuchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 33; Mitchell Bainwoll, "Cuba," in Fighting Armies: Non-
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Congo War, which lasted from October 1996 to May 1997, and saw the crushing defeat
of a group of 200 mercenaries, called the White Legion, at the hands of a 10,000-strong
insurgent force called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire (ADFL).7
Aligned, Third World, and Other Armies, ed. Richard A. Gabriel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 229 and 231;Caribbean Report, "U.S. Admiral Pushes for Neutral Havana," Caribbean Report, March 29, 1985, 4-5; ChrisDempster and Dave Tomkins, Fire Power(London, UK: Transworld Publishers Ltd., 1978), 134; Edward George, The
Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (New York, NY: Frank Cass,2005), 107; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 266 and 338; Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysisof Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (Richmond, UK: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd., 1977),229; Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76," African Affairs77, no. 308: 378; Helmoed-
Romer Heitman, War in Angola: The Final South African Phase(Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Ltd., 1990), 202-305;James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990, 231; Peter Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune: The
Twentieth Century Mercenary(New York, NY: Gallery Books, 1986), 93-94; Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier: TheStory of the Ultimate Professional Soldier in the SAS and Other Forces (London, UK: Cassell, 2003), 82-84, 87, and
111; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 160-161, 163, 165, 172, 174, and 182-183; Piet Nortje, 32 Battalion: The InsideStory of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit (Cape Town, SA: Zebra Press, 2004), 9-10; Kenneth M. Pollack, "TheInfluence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996), 662;Wilfred Burchett and Derek Roebuck, The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today (New York, NY: Penguin Books,
1977), 42; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 67 and 73; Daniel Spikes,Angola and the Politics of Intervention(Jefferson,NC: McFarland and Co. Inc., 1993), 297; Christopher Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola,"African Affairs75, no.299 (April 1976): 144; John Stockwell,In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story(New York, NY: W.W. Norton & CompanyInc., 1978), 216; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 23-24; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 68; Al J.Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," Soldier of FortuneSpring 1976, 21.7John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretation," The Journal of Modern
African Studies39, no. 2 (June 2001): 267-268; Clayton, Frontiersmen, 188-189; Christopher Kinsey, "Private SecurityCompanies: Agents of Democracy or Simply Mercenaries?," in Private Military and Security Companies: Chances,
Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, ed. Thomas Jger and Gerhard Kmmel (Wiesbaden, Germany: Vs Verlag fr
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 97; Mel McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?,"The Journal of Modern African Studies37, no. 1 (March 1999): 53; Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History ofFifty Years of Independence(New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2005), 535-536; Musifiky Mwanasali, "Civil Conflicts andConflict Management in the Great Lakes Region of Africa," in Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories & Cases, ed.
George Klay Keih and Ida Rousseau Mukenge (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 59; MabiengwaEmmanuel Naniuzeyi, "The State of the State in Congo-Zaire: A Survey of the Mobotu Regime," Journal of BlackStudies29, no. 5 (May 1999): 669; Leonce Ndikumana and Kisangani F. Emizet, "The Economics of Civil War: TheCase of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Volume 1: Africa," in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and
Analysis ed. Paul Collier (Herndon, VA: The World Bank, 2005), 75-76; Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Gwinyayi A.Dzinesa, "One Man's Volunteer is Another Man's Mercenary? Mapping the Extent of Mercenarism and Its Impact onHuman Security in Africa," in Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa: A Need for a New Continental Approach, ed.Sabelo Gumedze (Johannesburg, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 83; Francois Ngolet, "African
and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire,"Africa Today47, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 68 and 70; Ola Olsson and HeatherCongdon Fors, "The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research41, no. 3 (May 2004): 324; Khareen Pech, "The
Hand of War: Mercenaries in the Former Zaire 1996-97," in Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, ed. Abdel-
Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 122, 124-127, 133,140, and 145; John Pomfret,"Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo: Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops, Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive," TheWashington Post, July 9, 1997, A1; Johan Pottier,Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the
Late Twentieth Century(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 45; Gerard Prunier, "Rebel Movementsand Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and Congo," African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 374; William Cyrus Reed,
"Guerillas in the Midst," inAfrican Guerillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Indiana University Press, 1998), 134, 141, and150; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 285-288; William G. Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context ofEvolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," The Journal of Conflict StudiesXIX, no.2 (Fall 1999): 10-11 and 20; Denis M. Tull, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Militarized Politics in a 'Failed
State'," inAfrican Guerillas: Raging Against the Machine, ed. Morten Bs and Kevin C. Dunn (London, UK: LynneRienner Publishers, 1998), 115; Venter, War Dog, 261-262 and 271; Koen Vlassenroot, "A Societal View of Violence
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Ultimately, the results of this analysis indicate that the military cultures
maintained by the combatants in this conflict played a critical role in deciding the outcome
of these conflicts. Taking this into account, the normative theory of military performance
appears to offer a convincing explanation of military performance in asymmetric conflicts.
The Normative Theory of Military Performance
The core logic of the normative theory of military performance is that a grossly
outnumbered force must be highly flexible and adaptable if it is to perform the range of
military tasks required to defeat materially superior opponents. Norms encouraging the
pursuit of a wider range of tactical behaviour, such as personal initiative, should,
therefore, increase military effectiveness, which, in turn, should increase a groups
prospects for military success. If the theory is correct, a military forces performance
should be conditioned by the degree to which the members of the force have been
indoctrinated into norms that encourage them to be militarily effective. Specifically, the
theory reasons that military forces that strongly emphasize norms encouraging creative
thinking, decentralized authority, personal initiative, technical proficiency, and group
loyalty, should exhibit greater militarily effectiveness than forces that deemphasize these
norms. Moreover, it reasons that military forces exhibiting greater military effectiveness
should experience greater battlefield military performance than less effective groups, all
else equal.
Taking this into account, the theory predicts that the materially weaker party in an
asymmetric conflict, which the mercenary forces were in these cases, should only be able
and War: Conflict & Militia Formation in Eastern Zaire," in Violence, Political Culture & Development in Africa, ed.Preben Kaarsholm (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press), 49.
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to defeat its materially stronger opponent if the weaker party emphasizes behavioural
norms that encourage it to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour that is, be very
militarily effective and the stronger party does not emphasize these norms because this
should allow the weaker party to exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of the
stronger party and, through this, defeat it. In all other scenarios, the balance of military
effectiveness should prevent the mercenaries from overcoming the material superiority of
their opponents; consequently, in all other scenarios, the mercenaries should be defeated.
With this in mind, the theory correctly predicted that 5 Commando8 and Executive
Outcomes forces in Angola
9
and Sierra Leone
10
8The Simbas did, however, strongly emphasize decentralized authority. Baker, Wild Goose, 173, 175, 179-181, and185; Stephen Clarke, The Congo Mercenary(Johannesburg, ZA: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1968),
73; Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46 and 50-51; Victor Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of theCuban Revolution (New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, 2002), 136-137, 140, and 144-145; Tony Geraghty, Inside theSAS(New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1980), 103; Tony Geraghty, Who Dares Wins: The Story of the SAS - 1950-1980 (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 118; Hans Germani, White Soldiers in Black Africa, trans. E.Lansberg (Capetown, ZA: Nasionale Beekhandel Beperk, 1967), 82; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 150; Piero
Gleijeses, "Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!: The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65,"Diplomatic History18, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 210; Guevara, The African Dream, 14, 18, 25-27, 31, 34, 53, 62, 107, and115; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Pasajes de la Guerra Revolucionaria: Congo(New York, NY: Ocean Press, 2006), 31;Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 20-21, 62, 72-73, 131, 180, 245, and 305-309; Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata: A Congo
Mercenarys Personal Memoir(London, UK: Leo Cooper, 1989), 9-10, 14, 16, and 19; J. Grard-Libois and J. VanLierde, Congo: 1964(Brussels, Belgium: Centre de Recherche et dInformation Sociopolitiques, 1965), 365; Mockler,
The New Mercenaries, 61-63, and 66; Brian Pottinger, Mercenary Commander (Alberton, ZA: Galago Publishing,1986), 192-193; David Reed, Save the Hostages(New York, NY: Bantam, 1988), 10 and 70; Rogers, Someone Elses
War, 19; Wayne Thallon, Cut-Throat: The Vicious World of Rod McLean - Mercenary, Gun-Runner, and InternationalDrug Baron (London, UK: Mainstream Publishing, 2005), 15-16 and 42; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in ModernAfrica, 35-36; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 30; Venter, War Dog, 250; Benoit Verhaegen, "La PremiereRepublique (1960-1965)," inDu Congo au Zaire, 1960-1980, ed. Jacques Vanderlinden (Brussels, Belgium Centre de
Recherche et D'information Socio-politiques, 1984), 126.
should have defeated their materially
9 UNITA did, however, weakly emphasize technical proficiency. Africa Watch,Land Mines in Angola(New York,NY: Africa Watch, 1993), 34-35; Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 16, 20-22, 115, 130-131, 134, 143, 182, 184, 189, 237-238, 250, and 254-255; Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: Left, Right and Wrong," Foreign Policy43 (Summer 1981): 59; Jan
Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32 Battalion, 1975-1993 (Alberton, SA: GalagoPublishing, 2002), 16, 26-29, 70, 135, 149, 131-133, 188-189, 198, 207, 209, 211, and 235; Jan Breytenbach, They Liveby the Sword: 32 'Buffalo' Battalion - South Africa's Foreign Legion(Alberton, South Africa: Lemur, 1990), 12 and 72;
Fred Bridgeland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa(New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 16, 71, 78, 92,221-225, 236-237, 286, and 362; Clayton, Frontiersmen , 142 and 150; Augusta Conchiglia, UNITA: Myth and Reality(London, UK: European Campaign Against South African Aggression on Mozambique and Angola, 1990), 45; ZoeDaniel, "Mercenary Town," (United Kingdom: Journeyman Pictures, 2005); Leon De Costa Dash, Savimbi's 1977Campaign Against the Cubans and MPLA - Observed for 7 1/2 Months, and Covering 2,100 Miles Inside Angola(Pasadena, CA: California Institute of Technology, December 1977), 24; Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 138; Edward Feit,
"South Africa," in Fighting Armies: Non-Aligned, Third World, and Other Armies, ed. Richard A. Gabriel (Westport,CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 214-215; Scott Fitzsimmons, First Interview with Des Burman(Cape Town, SA: August24, 2007); Scott Fitzsimmons,Interview with Johann Anderson(Cape Town, SA: August 23, 2007); Mariyam Hasham,
"Executive Outcomes: An Unconventional Army," British Army Review 132 (Summer 2003): 2; Helmoed-RomerHeitman and Paul Hannon, Modern African Wars 3: South-West Africa(London, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1991),
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superior opponents because, in all of these conflicts, the mercenary force strongly
emphasized the five norms of military effectiveness and their opponents did not. The
theory also correctly predicted that Callans Mercenaries11
and the White Legion12
16-17 and 20-23; Jim Hooper, "Angola," in Flashpoint: At the Front Line of Today's Wars, ed. Anthony Rogers, KenGuest, and Jim Hooper (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 41; Hooper, Bloodsong, 23; Howe,Ambiguous
Order, 197-198; James,A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990, 96-97, 100, 111, 134-135, 137-140,and 255; Jesse Selber and Kebba Jobarteh, "From Enemy to Peacemaker: The Role of Private Military Companies inSub-Saharan Africa," Medicine & Global Survival 7, no. 2 (February 2002): 91; Assis Malaquias, "Angola: How to
Lose a Guerilla War," in African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine, ed. Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 201, 204, and 207-208; Assis Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers:Violence in Post-Colonial Angola(Stockholm, Sweden: Elanders Gotab AB, 2007), 92, 97-98, 100, and 113; John A.Marcum, "Angola: A Quarter Century of War," CSIS Africa Notes #37, 21 December 1984, 5; McAleese, No MeanSoldier, 204, 211, and 357; Minter, Apartheid's Contras, 178; Nortje, 32 Battalion, 69, 70-71, and 73-76; Robert
Young Pelton,Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror(New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 2006), 255 and259; Rosen, Contract Warriors, 11; Jonas Savimbi, "The War against Soviet Colonialism: The Strategy and Tactics of
Anti-Communist Resistance," Policy Review35 (Winter 1985): 19; Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention,357; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 187, 193, and 281; Peter Stiff, The Covert War: Koevoet
Operations Namibia 1979-1989 (Alberton, SA: Galago Publishing, 1999), 50, 58-59, 62, and 88; Al J. Venter,"Privatizing War," (London, UK: 2000), 13; Venter, War Dog, 356, 360-361, 390, 392, 394-395, 413, 415, 418, and438; Robin Wright, "Talking With Angola's Jonas Savimbi,"New Leader, 2 February 1976, 6.
should
10Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction," 207-208 and 226; Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front,"
180 and 188-190; Avant, The Market for Force, 86-87; Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 184, 189, 324, 326, 329, 331,335, 358, 363-365, 384-385; Ishmael Beah,A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier(Vancouver, BC: Douglas &McIntyre Ltd., 2007), 24; Martin Boas, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule,"Third World Quarterly22, no. 5 (October 2001): 714; Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers, 198 and 211; Cheng, "SierraLeone," 149; Clayton, Frontiersmen , 197; Daniel, "Mercenary Town."; Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 138-139;
Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46; Fitzsimmons, First Interview with Des Burman; Fitzsimmons, Interview with CobusClaassens; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Johann Anderson; Scott Fitzsimmons, Second Interview with Des Burman(Cape Town, SA: August 27, 2007); Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 61-62 and 65; Gleijeses, "Flee! The WhiteGiants Are Coming!: The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," 210-211; Globalsecurity.org,
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)([cited); Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 20; Hooper, Bloodsong, 8, 43, 152, 222, 224-225, 228, 231-233, 246, 248-250, and 239; Howe,Ambiguous Order, 197; Howe, "Private Security Forces and AfricanStability," 308; David Keen, Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone(New York, NY: Palgrave, 2005), 42-44; McAleese,
No Mean Soldier, 204 and 211; Glenn McKenzie, "Unruly Militia Defends Sierra Leone," Associated Press, July 5,
2000; William P. Murphy, "Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra LeoneanCivil Wars,"African Studies Review46, no. 2 (September 2003): 64; Nortje, 32 Battalion, 74; Pelton,Licensed to Kill,255; Peters and Richards, "Why We Fight," 186-187 and 204; Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth& Resources in Sierra Leone(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998), 5; Richards, "Forced Labour & Civil War," 190;
Richards, "War as Smoke and Mirrors," 387-389; Steve Riley, Max Sesay, and Max A. Sesay, "Sierra Leone: TheComing Anarchy?," Review of African Political Economy22, no. 63 (March 1995): 122; Roberts, The Wonga Coup,69; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 113; Ian Stewart, Ambushed: A War Reporter's Life on the Line(Chapel Hill, NC:
Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2002), 49; Stiff, The Covert War, 59; Venter, "Privatizing War," 13; Venter, War
Dog, 27, 58, 361, 390, 392, 449-450, 458, 463-464, 467, 474, 500-501, 513, 518-519, 521, and 545-547; Verhaegen,
"La Premiere Republique (1960-1965)," 126; A. B. Zack-Williams, "Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone,"Review of African Political Economy28, no. 87 (March 2001): 80; Zack-Williams, "The Political Economy of Civil
War," 154.11Aguila, "The Changing Character of Cuba's Armed Forces," 35 and 39; Arnold, Mercenaries, 34 and 37; Bainwoll,"Cuba," 231-232 and 234-235; John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents(New York, NY: Reader'sDigest Press and E.P. Dutton Company, Inc., 1974), 148 and 151; Steven L. Canby, The Alliance and Europe. Part IV:
Military Doctrine and Technology, Adelphi Paper 109(London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976),
85; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. III: The Afghanistan andFalklands Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 209; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Handbook on the
Cuban Armed Forces," (Defense Intelligence Agency, April 1979), 2-1; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 74, 77-78, 134,140, 148, 176-177, 200, 206, 209, 216, 251, 268, 279, 296, 311-312, 320, 328, 353, 363, 364, 367-368, and
400; Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane'sPublishing Inc., 1988), 85-86, 181, 211, and 217; Adrian J. English, "The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces," Jane's
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have been defeated by their materially superior opponents because, in the first case,
neither the mercenary group nor its materially superior opponent strongly emphasized the
Defence Weekly, June 30, 1984, 1066; John Erickson, "The Soviet System: Doctrine Technology, and 'Style'," in SovietMilitary Power and Performance, ed. John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1979), , 34; JohnErickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1986), 35, 183, 205, and 217; Rafael Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986
(Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1987), 293, 296, 299, 302, and 306; Raymond L. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War:Soviet Military Doctrine (London, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), 253-262; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins,131; Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Soldier (New York, NY: Crane Russak and Co. Inc, 1975), 9 and 115; Leone
Gour, "Cuban Military Doctrine and Organization," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami,FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 69 and 167; Leone Gour, "Soviet-Cuban Military Relations," in The Cuban
Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 188; John Hemsley, "TheSoviet Ground Forces," in Soviet Military Power and Performance, ed. John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979), 49, 55-60, and 68; Robert S. Leiken, Soviet Strategy in Latin America, The
Washington Papers-93(Washington, DC: Praeger Special Studies, 1982), 51; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 93-95;McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 82, 84, 87-94, and 95-96; Benjamin Miller, "The Development of Soviet Armor, 1926-
1982," (Cornell University, 1984), 265 and 463-464; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 154-155, 160-161, 163, 172,181-183, 186-187, 189-190, and 196-197; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness,"
122, 125, 127, 129-130, 132, 134, 653, 656, and 661; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 42, 62, 81, 84, and 99; Rogers,Someone Elses War, 70, 73-74, 76, and 85; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 260-261, 292, and 298;Stockwell,In Search of Enemies, 225; Stewart Tendler, "British mercenaries 'killed by mine'," The Times, February 5,1976, 7; Stewart Tendler, "Mercenaries puzzle Angola court: Britons knew little of what the war was about," TheTimes, June 14, 1976, 5; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37, 55, 67, and 114; Tickler, The Modern
Mercenary, 68, 70-72, 74-75, 79-80, 87-90, 92, and 173; U.S. Department of State, The Soviet-Cuban Connection inCentral America and the Caribbean(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 6; Venter, "AngolaFlashbacks," 29; Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff
Academy, Vol. 1(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989), 226, 229, 291-295, and 317.12Sean Boyne, "The White Legion: Mercenaries in Zaire," Jane's Intelligence Review9, no. 6 (June 1997): 279-280;Dan Connell and Frank Smyth, "Africa's New Bloc," Foreign Affairs77, no. 2 (March-April 1998): 85; Kisangani N. F.Emizet, "Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil Military Relations in the Congo," Armed Forces &
Society26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 222; Howard W. French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for
Combat," The New York Times, February 12, 1997; Gordana Igric, "Alleged 'Assassins' Were No Strangers to France,"(London, UK: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, November 26, 1999), 2; Edward Katumba-Wamata, "The NationalResistance Army (NRA) as a Guerilla Force," Small Wars & Insurgencies11, no. 3 (Winter 2000): 166; ChristopherKinsey, "Private Security Companies: Agents of Democracy or Simply Mercenaries?," in Private Military and Security
Compnaies: Chances, Problems and Prospects, ed. Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel (Wiesbaden, Germany: VsVerlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 96; Kinsey, "Private Security Companies," 96; Marcus Mabry, "Soldiers ofMisfortune: European Mercenaries Fighting for the Zairean Government," Newsweek, February 24, 1997, 40-41;Matthew McAllester, "Elusive Justice: War Criminals in the U.S.," Chicago Tribune, March 12, 2006; James C.
McKinley, "Rwanda's War Role May Haunt Congolese," The New York Times, July 12, 1997; Elizabeth Neuffer, "TheGhosts of Srebrenica: In Massacre's Aftermath, War Criminals Still Haunt Bosnia," The Boston Globe, May 19, 1996;Pascal Ngoga, "Uganda: The National Resistance Army," inAfrican Guerillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 101; Ngolet, "African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire," 69; Kevin
OBrien, "Private Military Companies and African Security: 1990-98," inMercenaries: An African Security Dilemma,ed. Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 55; Pech, "The Hand of War," 133,
137-138, and 140; Jane Perlez, "Serb Leader Expects to Turn Over Key War Crimes Suspects," The New York Times,
March 13, 1996; Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo," A1; Gerard Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front," inAfrican Guerillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Indiana University Press, 1998), 131 and 133; William Cyrus Reed,"Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 3(September 1996): 486, 488, 491, and 498; Suzana Sasic, "Mladic's Monster Finally Talks," Slobodna Bosna,September 1, 2005; Michael G. Schatzberg, "Beyond Mobutu: Kabila and the Congo," Journal of Democracy8, no. 4
(1997): 80-81; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict inAfrica in the Era of Independence," 19; Venter, War Dog, 271 and 273; Vines, "Mercenaries, Human Rights andLegality," 181; Catherine Watson, "Rwanda: War and Waiting," Africa Report (November/December 1992): 54-55;Colin W. Waugh, Paul Kagame: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (London, UK: McFarland and
Company Inc., 2004), 24-25, 29-30, and 40; Jeremy M. Weinstein,Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 127, 140-142, and 144.
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five norms of military effectiveness and, in the second, case the mercenaries did not
strongly emphasize these norms, save for technical proficiency, and their materially
superior opponent did.
How well did the Normative Theory of Military Performance Predict
the Dynamics of These Conflicts
The normative theory of military performance appears to have done an admirable
job at predicting how the five norms thought to enhance military effectiveness would
influence the behaviour of the military forces discussed in this paper. This section
summarizes my findings. In the interests of brevity, I have included only a handful of
examples from these conflicts to help illustrate general trends.
Tactical Innovation
The normative theory of military performance predicted that military forces that
strongly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and
decentralized authority should demonstrate significant tactical innovation. Tactical units
within these forces should routinely seek tactical advantages over opponents by, for
instance, using maneuver warfare, and not rely exclusively on simple frontal assaults
when attacking or counterattacking.13
This prediction was borne out in these cases.14
13Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 66. The US Armys Field Manual 100-5:Operations defines maneuver warfare as the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positionaladvantage, to gain an advantage over the adversary requires that the commander be able to imagine a situation
different from his present situation, one in which he has an advantage over his enemy derived from a different spatialarrangement. William S. Lind, "Maneuver," in Brasseys Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, ed. FranklinMargiotta (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1997), 662. Contemporary maneuver warfare developed in part out of the
German concept of Aufragstaktik (mission tactics), which emphasizes decentralized decision making authority andpersonal initiative: orders tell the subordinate what is to be accomplished while leaving him maximum latitude in
deciding how to accomplish it. In effect, he is given a goal, and it is left to him to attain it. This is done at all levels of
For
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example, EOs force in Angola frequently deployed groups of infantry around a battle
space so that they could herd, trap, and easily eliminate UNITA fighters.15
This often
involved conducting fake helicopter landings, known as dummy deliveries, which were
intended to trick UNITA into thinking that far more groups of EO infantry were in the
area than was actually the case.16
EOs heliborne mortar attacks on UNITA guerillas and
field camps were especially destructive to the rebels because they not only tended to kill
several rebel troops but, since UNITA could generally not react fast enough to engage
their attackers, they also undermined the rebels will to fight.17
For example, a mortar and
infantry team was deployed to bombard the UNITA-held town of Lubalo with 80 mortar
shells before being extracted by helicopter, which caused, massive casualties, and took
the towns defenders sufficiently off guard that they could not react in time to reach EOs
men before the extraction.18
Moreover, during the First Congo War, the ADFL consciously chose to employ
herding tactics to drive the mercenaries and other forces loyal to Mobutu away from
command. As part of mission orders, the subordinate is expected to show a high level of initiative. Lind, "Maneuver,"
665. Maneuver warfare demands that the commander quickly develop an operation plan that will allow him to place hisforces into the newly imagined, spatially-advantageous position that anticipates the likely reactions of his adversary.Consequently, these forces ought to opt for more complicated flanking and envelopment maneuvers in situations wheresuch maneuvers could be advantageous.14Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 238-239, 249, 255-256, 262-263, 265, 289, 335, 358, 364-365, and 370-371; Clarke,
The Congo Mercenary, 61; Clayton, Frontiersmen, 190; Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 129 and 137; Fitzsimmons,
Interview with Cobus Claassens; Fitzsimmons, Second Interview with Des Burman; Howard W. French, "Major City'sFall Poses Dire Threat to Zaire's Rulers," The New York Times, March 16, 1997; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 85; Mike
Hoare,Mercenary(New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1967), 84; Hooper, Bloodsong, 42, 103, 158, 170, 222-223, 229-232, 243-246, and 248-249; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 74; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 63-64; OBrien,"Private Military Companies and African Security: 1990-98," 52; Pelton,Licensed to Kill, 262-263; Reed, "Guerillas in
the Midst," 147; William Cyrus Reed, "The New International Order: State, Society, and African InternationalRelations,"Africa Insight25, no. 3 (1995): 140-148; Roberts, The Wonga Coup, 10; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 19;Rosen, Contract Warriors, 15; Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 53-54; Singer, Corporate Warriors,113; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the
Era of Independence," 15; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 80; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 33;Venter, War Dog, 262, 272, 428-429, 433-434, 481, 533-534, and 536. 15Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 129.16Venter, War Dog, 433-434.17 Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 211; OBrien, "Private Military Companies and African Security: 1990-98," 52;
Singer, Corporate Warriors, 110.18Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 238-239.
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government-held settlements.19
This primarily involved coordinating a vanguard made up
of multiple 100 to 200-strong groups of infanteers, what Anthony Clayton referred to as
tourniquet groups, in multidirectional assaults that left open an escape route to
encourage their opponents to break and flee in a particular direction.20
For example, on
October 4, 1996, rebel forces seized Lemera, a village north of Uvira, by attacking from
three directions at the same time while leaving an escape route for the government troops
assigned to the defend the settlement.21
This tactic was also employed against the
mercenaries to successfully seize Watsa on February 2, 1997, and the mercenaries main
airbase at Kindu on March 1, 1997.
22
Likewise, in mid-March 1997, the rebels employed
this tactic to assault the village of Babagulu and, soon after, the city of Kisangani from
three directions at the same time.23
The normative theory of military performance also predicted that military forces
emphasizing creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should
have little difficulty adapting to unforeseen developments on the battlefield. This
prediction was also borne out in these conflicts.
24
19Boyne, "The White Legion," 280; Clayton, Frontiersmen , 190; McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire," 75.
For example, 5 Commando were
generally able to respond to Simba ambushes along roadways, which tended to proceed
as follows: Congolese or Rwandan rebels, sometimes supported by Cuban troops, would
spring the ambush by firing wildly from the underbrush at the side of the road, with rifles
20Clayton, Frontiersmen, 190; Howard W. French, "Insurgents Shatter Defense in Capital's Front," The New YorkTimes; McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire," 75; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of EvolvingPatterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," 16-17 and 19.21Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in theEra of Independence," 11.22Boyne, "The White Legion," 280.23Megan Arney, "Rebels Take More Ground in Zaire," Militant, March 24, 1997; McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire,"75; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in theEra of Independence," 16.24Guevara, The African Dream, 88; Hooper,Bloodsong, 249; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Contextof Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," 13; Venter, War Dog, 368-369.
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and rocket launchers, in the general direction of the mercenaries, then charge forward
from the underbrush in a straight line to finish off any survivors.25
On the face of it, this
tactic should have proven generally effective, especially if all of the mercenaries were
immediately killed. However, this rarely happened, and, if even a handful of mercenaries
remained alive and in fighting form after the initial attack, they tended to reverse the
situation by inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing rebels and forcing them to
retreat.26
Similarly, as Singer put it, EOs personnel in Angola were, innovative and
adjusted to changing situations by using ad-hoc tactics not found in the books, options
perhaps less possible in a public military.
27This seems to have paid dividends because,
throughout the conflict, EOs personnel were able to quickly retaliate against unforeseen
moves by UNITA, such as ambushes or large-scale surprise attacks.28
With respect to the
rebels ambushes, very few were successful in the sense that few resulted in the death,
injury, or capture of EO personnel.29
Rather, in the vast majority of incidents, EOs
personnel responded immediately, launched counterattacks, and put the ambushers to
flight. This occurred even in instances where the rebels succeeded in landing the first
blow by, for instance, firing before their presence was known to the mercenaries.30
Likewise, Lafras Luitingh, one of EOs chief executives, argued emphatically that
his personnel in Sierra Leone reacted, with rigor, when they encountered unforeseen
25Guevara, The African Dream, 86.26Guevara, The African Dream, 88; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 28-29.27Singer, Corporate Warriors, 116.28Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 200-201; Hooper,Bloodsong, 86 and 164-165.29Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 287; Venter, War Dog, 381-382.30Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 248, 250-251, and 289.
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developments.31
Venter, similarly, argued that EOs force in Sierra Leone was, an
extremely versatile fighting group because they remained flexible in their approach to
the kind of problems that might arise. Each situation was handled on its own terms.
Nothing was predetermined or fixed.32
Of critical importance, the heliborne infantry of
EOs Fire Force, the attack helicopters of its Air Force, and the BMP-2s and infantry of
its Mobile Force could rapidly support each other if any of them encountered an
unexpected situation, such as a particularly large and well-armed RUF ambush. As a
result, the firm usually dealt with these situations swiftly and decisively.33
The normative theory of military performance also predicted that military forces
emphasizing creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should
have little difficulty developing tactics to counter unexpected weapons or tactics used by
their adversaries.
34 This prediction was also borne out in these cases.
35 For instance,
when 5 Commando was spearheading attacks ahead of a larger force of ANC troops, the
Simbas would sometimes let the mercenaries pass by their concealed ambush positions
and then descend on the unskilled ANC soldiers following behind.36
31Avant, The Market for Force, 87; Al J. Venter, "Sierra Leone's Mercenary War: Battle for the Diamond Fields,"Jane's International Defense Review28 (November 1995).
To counter this, the
mercenaries began driving in small and deceptively vulnerable jeep convoys along
contested roads to invite attack. A reserve column of mercenaries would follow closely
behind and viciously attack the Simbas when they exposed their ambush points and burst
32Venter, War Dog, 478.33Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 335-336; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus Claassens; Hooper, Bloodsong, 246;
Venter, War Dog, 479, 480-482, 494-495, 497, and 502.34Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 66.35 Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 255, 335, 353, 357-358, 363, and 381 ; Boyne, "The White Legion," 281;Fitzsimmons,Interview with Cobus Claassens; Hooper, Bloodsong, 167, 179, 225-227, and 233; Venter, War Dog,
428-429, 433-434, 519-521, 533-534, and 546-547.36Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 57; Reed, Save the Hostages, 144.
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out into the open.37
Likewise, EOs force in Sierra Leone proved highly adept at
countering the RUFs ambush tactics. For instance, to reduce the frequency and
effectiveness of the rebels ambushes, the mercenaries took to launching preemptive
strikes against suspected rebel ambush positions, often by approaching them at night and
through the countrys dense forests.38
At every anticipated ambush position, our men would debus from their
vehicles and sweep ahead on foot, the vehicles ready to race into the area
and provide fire support once contact had been made. This was somethingthe SLA had never done and the RUF had never expected. At each
position, the rebels were taken by surprise.
As Barlow recalled,
39
Finally, the normative theory of military performance also predicted that military
forces emphasizing creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority
should learn quickly from their mistakes. This prediction was borne out as well.40
For
example, during EOs initial assault on Quefiquena, Angola, near Soyo, one squad of
mercenaries decided that carrying their heavy 60 mm mortar and its shells from their
insertion point to within range of the UNITA troops was not worth the effort.41
37Germani, White Soldiers in Black Africa, 87; Thomas,Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 81.
When the
squad later realized that over three hundred rebels were guarding Quefiquena, they were
forced to delay their assault while a mercenary went back to retrieve the equipment.
Although EO did not suffer casualties because of this oversight, the force subsequently
decided that, regardless of the inconvenience, all available equipment must be made
readily available at all times.
38Fitzsimmons,Interview with Cobus Claassens; Hooper,Bloodsong, 225; Venter, War Dog, 515.39Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 357-358.40 Boyne, "The White Legion," 281; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus Claassens; Guevara, The African Dream,
xxxiv-xxxvi; Venter, War Dog, 532-534.41Venter, War Dog, 364-365.
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The normative theory of military performance predicted that military forces that
weakly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and
decentralized authority should demonstrate little tactical innovation. Tactical units within
these forces should generally use very simple tactics, if any, such as full-frontal assaults,
straight at their opponents, when attacking and counterattacking.42
These predictions
were borne out fairly well by these conflicts.43
For instance, although the Simbas exhibited little tactical innovation, they did so
despite strongly emphasizing decentralized authority. It appears in this case that the
rebels near-complete lack of creativity more than compensated for their emphasis on
decentralized authority. Indeed, they were so uncreative that they never developed new
tactics that empowered junior officers could have implemented. As predicted for a force
that deemphasizing creative thinking and personal initiative in favour of their staunch
belief in the protective power of dawa, the Simbas were incapable of any tactical
innovation whatsoever.
44As Dreke put it, they relied on (dawa) to fight, to move.
45
42Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 66.43 Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front," 190; Arney, "Rebels Take More Ground in Zaire.";Bainwoll, "Cuba," 233; Baker, Wild Goose, 190-192; Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 110-111, 329-330, 336, 357-358,and 381; Boyne, "The White Legion," 281; Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers, 123; Bridgeland, Jonas Savimbi, 150;Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354 and 363-367; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus Claassens; Gberie,A
Dirty War in West Africa, 81; Yekutiel Gershoni, "War without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars inLiberia and Sierra Leone," African Studies Review40, no. 3 (December 1997): 68 and 71; Hoare, Congo Mercenary,264; Hooper, Bloodsong, 87-88, 220, and 224-225; Integrated Regional Information Network, "Great Lakes: IRINUpdate 129," (New York, NY: Integrated Regional Information Network, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United
Nations, March 17, 1997), 1; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 97; James C.McKinley, "Serb Who Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror Instead," The New York Times, March 19, 1997;Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197-200; Peters and Richards, "Why We Fight," 186; Richards, "War as Smoke and
Mirrors," 387; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 30 and 86; Sasic, "Mladic's Monster Finally Talks."; Spikes, Angola andthe Politics of Intervention, 305; Stewart Tendler, "'Callan' and nine other Britons face Angola trial," The Times, April2, 1976, 1; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 52, 87-90, and 173; Venter, War Dog, 350-351, 482-483, 519, and 546;
Vines, "Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality," 182.44Dawa refers to a magical medicine that Simba witch doctors claimed would provide invincibility to any rebel
under its protection. In effect, the witch doctors convinced their followers that the mercenaries bullets would transforminto harmless water upon contact with a rebels skin or fly back and hit the shooter. Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46;Geraghty, Who Dares Wins, 118; Gleijeses, "Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!: The United States, the
Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," 210; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 20-21; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 15; Verhaegen,"La Premiere Republique (1960-1965)," 126.45Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo, 137.
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Presuming that they were impervious to bullets, the Simbas employed only the very
simplest tactics walking straight toward the enemy while making no attempt to use
cover or otherwise avoid being fired upon.46
For example, on September 15, 1964, Lieutenant Wilson led 15 members of 5
Commando in an attack against the port town of Lisala, which was guarded by
approximately 400 Simbas.
The results of this behaviour were disastrous
for the rebels.
47Believing themselves to be invincible, the rebels grouped
together in a single mass of troops on a highly exposed hilltop and made no attempt to
take cover while their witch doctors chanted and fanned them with palm branches.
48
In
addition to numerical and magical superiority, the Simbas also fielded superior weapons,
including heavy machine guns and bazookas, while the mercenaries only had rifles.
Although the mercenaries assessed the situation and were prepared to employ creative
tactics to address the threat, the Simbas demonstrable lack of creativity made this
unnecessary. Indeed, how could innovative tactics possibly improve their changes of
hitting a huge cluster of targets that made no attempt to avoid being shot? Wilson later
described the scene, in which 160 Simbas were killed in only a few minutes, as, a
shooting gallery.49
46 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46; Gleijeses, "Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!: The United States, theMercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," 210-211; Verhaegen, "La Premiere Republique (1960-1965)," 126.
The mercenaries only suffered a single slight injury during the
assault. This example is typical of how the mercenaries attacks on Simba-held
settlements played out: what should have been an easy victory for the materially superior
rebels, instead turned into a slaughter at the hands of a tiny force of private soldiers.
47Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 59.48Reed, Save the Hostages, 140.49Reed, Save the Hostages, 140.
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cases.54
For example, when faced with the ADFLs multi-directional combined-arms
assault on Kisangani during the First Congo War, which involved infantry, shooting at
the same time as the armoured column was moving toward the (Kisangani) airport, the
White Legion fell into disarray very quickly because they could not mount a coherent
response to these unexpected tactics and vehicles.55
Finally, the normative theory of military performance also predicted that forces
that deemphasize creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should
experience considerable difficulty developing tactics to counter unexpected weapons or
tactics used by their adversaries. This prediction was borne out as well.
56
For example,
despite facing Callans unchanging ambush/full-frontal assault tactics in six major
engagements, including four times in a single day against the same group of soldiers, the
Cuban-MPLA force did not adapt to these straightforward tactics until the sixth and final
major battle of the conflict, on February 3, when they belatedly launched an effective
counter-attack that killed at least nine mercenaries and drove the rest into the jungle.57
54Arney, "Rebels Take More Ground in Zaire."; Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 250-251; Boyne, "The White Legion,"
281; Clayton, Frontiersmen , 80; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 206 and 363-367; Fitzsimmons, Interview withCobus Claassens; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 63-64; Guevara, The African Dream, 48-49; Hoare, Congo
Mercenary, 21; Hooper,Bloodsong, 208; Integrated Regional Information Network, "Great Lakes: IRIN Update 129,"
1; Malaquias, "Angola," 207; Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 96; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 99; McKinley, "SerbWho Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror Instead."; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-200; Sasic,"Mladic's Monster Finally Talks."; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 20-21 and 88-90; Venter, War Dog, 511, 521, and523-524; Vines, "Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality," 182.
Although this adaptation proved decisive in allowing the Cuban-MPLA force to win the
conflict, their inability to adapt much earlier to the mercenaries tactics is telling of their
general deemphasis on creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority.
55French, "Major City's Fall Poses Dire Threat to Zaire's Rulers."; McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire," 75.56Arney, "Rebels Take More Ground in Zaire."; Boyne, "The White Legion," 281; Integrated Regional Information
Network, "Great Lakes: IRIN Update 129," 1; McKinley, "Serb Who Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and HorrorInstead."; Reed, Save the Hostages, 37-38; Sasic, "Mladic's Monster Finally Talks."; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary,
52; Venter, War Dog, 432; Vines, "Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality," 182.57Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 368; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 199; Pollack, "The Influence of ArabCulture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 749.
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At the same time, the mercenaries, who also deemphasized these norms, failed to develop
any new tactics after February 3. Instead, over the subsequent two weeks, every attempt
by the few surviving mercenaries to launch ambushes and full-frontal assaults failed
miserably as the Cuban-MPLA troops had adapted and were able to quickly eliminate
their attackers in every encounter.58
Similarly, the RUF never developed effective counters to EOs tactics, which
included combined-arms assault, preemptive strikes against ambush positions, counter-
ambush pursuits, and a variety of other behaviours. To a force accustomed to mounting
and facing roadside ambushes followed by quick withdrawals, EOs tactics proved to be
both novel and unassailable.
Taking this into account, the mercenaries complete
inability to develop new tactics helped doom them in the end.
59For example, captured RUF personnel revealed that their
ambush parties had never been counter-attacked and pursued before, and admitted that
these tactics greatly confused them.60
However, even after encountering these tactics
dozens of times, the rebels failed to adapt. As a result, groups of rebel fighters
encountered toward the end of the conflict were just as easy for the mercenaries to defeat
as those encountered at the beginning of the conflict.
Decision-making Patterns
The normative theory of military performance predicted that military forces that
strongly emphasize norms promoting personal initiative and decentralized authority
should maintain decentralized patterns of decision-making. Within these military forces,
58Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 210.59Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 353; Hooper, Bloodsong, 225-227; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 113; Venter, War
Dog, 519-520.60Fitzsimmons,Interview with Cobus Claassens; Venter, War Dog, 482-483.
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tendencies toward demonstrating personal initiative and decentralization of authority
should mutually reinforce each other because junior officers should demonstrate personal
initiative if they have been delegated sufficient authority to permit them to do so, and
senior officers should delegate authority if their subordinates have demonstrated
sufficient personal initiative to warrant it.61
Therefore, most tactical-level decisions in
these forces should be addressed by tactical level commanders (junior officers and senior
enlisted personnel), which should significantly increase the pace at which the tactical
units of these forces are able to act and react against their opponents.62
This prediction was borne out in these conflicts.
63
For instance, 5 Commando was
made up of eight subcommandos, with approximately 30-40 personnel, each of which
could operate separately and independently from each other.64
For example, 53
Commando, commanded by Lieutenants Jack Maidan and George Schroeder, spent much
of the fall of 1964 operating completely apart from Hoare and the rest of the
subcommandos. During this period, Maidans sub-group captured the towns of Kabare
and Uvira near the Congo-Rwandan border, then Lubero and Butembo as it moved
north.65
The subcommandos could also seamlessly recombine into any combination of
new groupings to suit the requirements of the mission.66
61Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 67.
Indeed, following 55, 56, and 57
Commandos successful recapture of Kamina in southern Congo and Kindu in the central
part of the country in the early fall of 1964, they united with 51 Commando at Kindu for
62Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 67.63Baker, Wild Goose, 171 and 173; Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 108-110, 205, 252, 259, 336, 359, and 368-369;Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 137; Fitzsimmons, First Interview with Des Burman; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus
Claassens; Fitzsimmons, Second Interview with Des Burman; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 77-78; Hooper, Bloodsong,233 and 244; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 76; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 20; Venter, War Dog, 372, 378-379,421-422, 431, 477-478, 480, and 546-54764Baker, Wild Goose, 173-174; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 19; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 35.65Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 65.66Baker, Wild Goose, 182.
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a north-westerly advance on the Simba strong-hold of Stanleyville, capturing Punia and
Lubutu as they went.67
At the same time, 52 Commando retook the northern town of
Aketi; 53 Commando captured Lubero, Butembo, and Mambasa in the north-east before
advancing on Stanleyville; and 54 Commando advanced on Stanleyville from the south-
west, capturing the towns Ikela and Opela along the way.68
Following the capture of Stanleyville, the united subcommandos split up again in
November, 1964, and spent several months capturing more towns from the Simbas all
over the Orientale Province, including, among others, Aketi, Buta, Poko, Paulis, which
were captured by 52 Commando; Butembo, Olenga, Beni, Mambasa, and Bunia, which
were captured by 53 Commando; and Wamba, which was captured by 54 Commando.
69
Similarly, the tactical-level commanders in Executive Outcomes force in Sierra
Leone reportedly lead, from the front, not the back.
In the process, they saved thousands of Congolese and foreign civilians from certain
death at the hands of the rebels.
70 Jos Grobler, a Mobile Force
commander, earned a reputation as a particularly, aggressive and uncompromising,
leader who would take it upon himself to figure out how to best implement any general
mission plans handed down from the firms senior officers.71
67Rogers, Someone Elses War, 22.
Cobus Claassens, a Fire
Force commander, was equally adept at taking a set of general orders from a senior
officer and implementing them in a manner that suited the tactical situations he and his
men faced. As Venter put it, when in the field with his unit, Claassens would run the
68Rogers, Someone Elses War, 22-25.69Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 167-170.70Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 138; Venter, War Dog, 476.71Davis, Fortunes Warriors, 138; Venter, War Dog, 476.
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show.72
For example, when ordered to seize Kailahun from the RUF, Claassens decided
to deploy the mortar team and multiple infantry teams around the battlespace to conduct
the assault.73
Similarly, after an SLA unit refused to assist the Fire Force in an operation
intended to herd and trap a group of RUF fighters, the Fire Forces commander quickly
modified the plan to draw exclusively on EOs personnel and launched the operation.74
Likewise, the, well-organized and effectively led, ADFL encouraged their
junior officers to exercise considerable autonomy when making decisions about how and
when to employ the units under their command and to avoid relying on senior
commanders to tell them precisely what to do.
75
The rebels were able to conduct multiple
assaults in different parts of the country at the same time.76
For example, one
contemporary observer wrote in February 1997 that, the rebels were advancing on
several fronts, including the Oso River, east of Kisangani, and the Nia-Nia crossroads
north-east of it.77
Providing greater detail, Thom notes that the rebels opened up three
fronts during the war, a northern front in the province of Haut Zaire, a southern front in
the Fizi-Barak region, and, of greatest importance, a central front that progressed toward
Kisangani and Kinshasa.78
72Venter, War Dog, 542.
Reflecting on this situation, a senior Zairian Army officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Nufuta B. Kosanga, observed in February 1997 that the rebels, seem
73 Venter, War Dog, 536.74Hooper,Bloodsong, 243-244.
75Katumba-Wamata, "The National Resistance Army (NRA) as a Guerilla Force," 166; Eric Margolis, "The GreatRace for Africa Resumes," Foreign Correspondent, March 6, 1997; Ngoga, "The Revolutionary United Front," 101;Reed, "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," 486; Watson, "Rwanda," 54; Waugh, PaulKagame, 25; Weinstein,Inside Rebellion, 127 and 140.76Nicholas Kotch, "Zaire Rebels Advance, Frustrating Army - Sources," Reuters News Service, January 30, 1997;
Pech, "The Hand of War," 144-145; Reuters, "French troops said in Zaire, France denies report," Reuters News,February 7, 1997; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict inAfrica in the Era of Independence," 10.77Pierre Briand, "Rebels Advance as Soldiers and Refugees Flee,"Agence France-Presse, February 6, 1997.78Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in theEra of Independence," 14.
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to be able to push wherever they want to.79
Indeed, being able to make decisions for
themselves allowed rebel junior officers to implement the forces direct attack strategy,
which involved seizing settlements from pro-Mobutu troops, much faster than they could
have had they been grouped together as one large force because the small, centralized
White Legion simply could not engage multiple dispersed rebel units at the same time.80
These examples illustrate how effective these forces could be, as a whole, since
their autonomous constituent sub-units could achieve multiple objectives simultaneously.
This, in turn, almost certainly allowed these forces to defeat their opponents much more
quickly than they would have if they had remained clustered together under their senior
commanders direct command and control.
The normative theory of military performance also predicted that military forces
that emphasize personal initiative and decentralized authority should rarely miss
opportunities to harm their opponents or fail to respond quickly to sudden moves by their
opponents because officers at all levels of command can make tactical-level decisions
without the need for higher approval. This prediction was borne out as well in these
conflicts.81
For instance, within EOs force in Angola, tactical-level commanders
frequently sought out engagements with the rebels without being ordered to by their
superiors.82
79French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat."
For example, while leading a BMP patrol toward a UNITA-held village on
June 23, 1994, Hennie Blaauw, a Mobile Force commander, noticed fresh rebel tracks,
80Kotch, "Zaire Rebels Advance, Frustrating Army."; Pech, "The Hand of War," 144-145; Reuters, "French troops saidin Zaire, France denies report."; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns ofMilitary Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," 10.81Baker, Wild Goose, 176 and 196; Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 332, 357, and 359; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins, 119-120; Gershoni, "War without End and an End to a War," 68; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 156 and 220; Hooper,
Bloodsong, 224, 229-230, 243-244, 247, and 250; Ngolet, "African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire," 68;
Pelton, Licensed to Kill, 262-263; Reed, Save the Hostages, 259-260; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 30; Tickler, The Modern
Mercenary, 46; Venter, War Dog, 271-272, 477-478, 510, 513, 516, 520, and 540.82Venter, War Dog, 388-389.
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which he decided to follow to determine the extent of UNITAs presence in the area and
engage any rebel troops he encountered.83
Likewise, after seizing Cafunfo on July 15,
1994, Blaauw took it upon himself to consolidate the area around the settlement by
launching sweeps for any remaining UNITA personnel.84
This drive to engage the enemy
whenever possible extended down through the ranks as well. For example, Blaauw
recalled that his, small infantry contingent was outstanding and they never hesitated to
debus under fire and close with UNITA to do battle.85
In addition to this, EOs PC-7 and
MiG-23 pilots frequently took it upon themselves to seek out and engage targets of
opportunity, particularly UNITA vehicles, heavy weapons, and troop concentrations, over
and above the targets that senior commanders and the mercenaries ground troops
requested for destruction.86
Conversely, the normative theory of military performance predicted that military
forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting personal initiative and decentralized
authority should maintain centralized patterns of decision-making. Within these military
forces, tendencies toward general passivity and over-centralization of authority should
mutually reinforce each other because junior officers should not demonstrate personal
initiative if they have not been delegated sufficient authority to permit them to do so, and
senior officers should not delegate authority if their subordinates have not demonstrated
sufficient personal initiative to warrant it.
This increased the number of rebel settlements, personnel,
weapons, and vehicles destroyed from the air during the conflict.
87
83Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 245.
Therefore, most tactical-level decisions in
these forces should be referred to senior commanders for resolution, which should
84Hooper,Bloodsong, 136-137.85Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 271.86Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 234 and 265; Hooper,Bloodsong, 172-173 and 178-179.87Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 67.
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significantly decrease the pace at which the tactical units of these forces are able to act
and react against their opponents.88
This prediction was borne out in these conflicts.
89 For instance, most of the
Callans Mercenaries were generally passive and inactive much of the time because all
decisions were deferred up to the highest levels of the chain of command for resolution
and no operations were attempted in the absence of direct authorization and participation
by senior officers.90
Similarly, this prediction certainly played out during the Sierra Leonean Civil
War because RUF field commanders felt they needed to seek Sankohs direct approval
for virtually any tactical actions.
This, in turn, greatly slowed the pace at which the force could
operate because the mercenaries were not able to conduct several strike missions at the
same time. Had they been able to do this, it would certainly have enhanced their capacity
to wear down the main Cuban-MPLA column arrayed against them by allowing them to
strike the column at multiple points at the same time as it slowly advanced toward the
mercenary-held settlements.
91
88Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 67.
This was problematic because radio transmissions
intercepted by the mercenaries suggested that Sankoh had little idea how to respond to
89Catherine Bond, "Zairian Recounts Torture by Serb Mercenaries," CNN.com, March 19, 1997; Bridgeland, Jonas
Savimbi, 285; Clayton, Frontiersmen, 141; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 201, 352-354, and 363-367;Fitzsimmons, First Interview with Des Burman; Guevara, The African Dream, 41, 57, 103-104, and 139-140; Hooper,
Bloodsong, 123; James,A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990, 95-96, 135, 138-140, and 255-256;
Kotch, "Zaire Rebels Advance, Frustrating Army."; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Malaquias, Rebels andRobbers, 105-106; Marcum, "Angola: A Quarter Century of War," 5; Minter, Apartheid's Contras, 126; Mockler, TheNew Mercenaries, 172, 183-184, 187, and 197; Pech, "The Hand of War," 144-145; Reuters, "French troops said inZaire, France denies report."; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 86; Sasic, "Mladic's Monster Finally Talks."; Spikes,
Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 293; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving
Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," 10; Thomas,Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa,
37; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 76, 87-88, 90, 92, and 173; Venter, War Dog, 250 and 417; Wright, "TalkingWith Angola's Jonas Savimbi," 6.90 Other observers characterized their behaviour as highly unmotivated. McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 95; Rogers,
Someone Elses War, 79.91Venter, War Dog, 458.
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EOs actions.92
Moreover, in contrast to the mercenaries, rebel units rarely divided their
field units into several smaller groups, and could, thus, not conduct multiple simultaneous
operations in a given area of the country.93
This tendency to stay bunched together also
made RUF units easier to see and target from the air.94
Finally, the normative theory of military performance also predicted that military
forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting personal initiative and decentralized
authority should frequently miss opportunities to harm their opponents and fail to respond
quickly to sudden moves by their opponents because only senior commanders can make
decisions. This prediction was borne out as well.
95
For example, although Callan
organized killer groups and sought out combat with the Cubans and the MPLA, no junior
members of his force did.96
Rather, virtually all the members of the force who were not
chosen for a mission simply sat around while Callan was away from their base camps,
which further undermined their capacity to engage multiple threats at the same time.97
92Venter, War Dog, 516.
Furthermore, unless junior personnel were specifically ordered to do something by Callan
or one of his senior officers, even tasks that were critical to their survival would not get
93Venter, War Dog, 501.94Venter, War Dog, 501.95Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front," 190; Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 235-237, 329-330, 357-358, 362, and 381; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354 and 365-366; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus
Claassens; Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 81; George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 108;Gershoni, "War without End and an End to a War," 68 and 71; Guevara, The African Dream, 44-45, 51, 87-89, 111,119, 164, 226; Hooper, Bloodsong, 122-128, 220, 224-225, and 234; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 95 and 98;Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 189-190, 197, and 199; Peters and Richards, "Why We Fight," 186; Richards, "War asSmoke and Mirrors," 387; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 80 and 86-87; Spikes,
Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298, 303, and 305; Thomas,Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 35 and 89;Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-90 and 173; Venter, War Dog, 417, 481-483, 515, 519, 546.96Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 81.97As Thomas summarizes, eventually, 141 British and 6 American mercenaries came under Callans control; but,
without any organizational structure the situation floundered quickly. Thomas, Mercenary Troops in ModernAfrica, 37; Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," 29.
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done.98
For example, all of the defensive ambush sites along the approaches to the
mercenaries base camps were usually inadequately manned.99
Likewise, the Serbian mercenaries that made up the vast majority of the White
Legions personnel were indoctrinated into believing that they should not conduct any
combat operations unless they received specific monetary rewards for doing so. Since the
members of the force had been paid salaries of several thousand dollars in advance for
their mere presence in Zaire, they saw no incentive to risk injury or death without
additional monetary rewards.
100 These were not forthcoming, and so the force rarely
conducted any operations away from their main base at Kisangani.
101
Indeed, by early
spring 1997, the East European mercenaries pulled back (to Kisangani)and refused to
fight because of lack of pay.102
A Newsweek article from late February 1997 similarly
argued that, the mercenaries havent helped much. Theyve remained in Kisangani
while the rebels extended their control.103
Although, as discussed below, the
mercenaries were adept at using explosives, their general disinclination to venture far
from Kisangani precluded them from demolishing any of the numerous distant bridges
and ammunition dumps that the rebels eventually used to capture ever-more government
territory.104
98Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97.
Overall, it is clear that the mercenaries were truly soldiers of fortune because
they had effectively stopped fighting within a month of their arrival in the Congo after
99Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 176, 199, 206, 211, and 429.100Jonathan C. Randal, "Serb Troops Paid to Go to War - In Zaire," The Washington Post, March 18, 1997, A13.101Mabry, "Soldiers of Misfortune," 40-41; Pech, "The Hand of War," 138 and 140.102Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in theEra of Independence," 15.103Mabry, "Soldiers of Misfortune," 40.104Clayton, Frontiersmen , 190.
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realizing that they would be paid regardless of whether they risked their lives in
combat.105
Use of Hand-operated Weapons
The normative theory of military performance predicted that, to the extent that the
members of military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting technical
proficiency are willing to familiarize themselves with the functioning of military
technology, these forces should be adept at using hand-operated weaponry, such as rifles,
bazookas, anti-aircraft guns, and dismounted artillery.
106
Specifically, the marksmanship
of the personnel in these forces should be quite good.107
This prediction was borne out in
these conflicts.108
105 Boyne, "The White Legion," 281; Pech, "The Hand of War," 140; Michela Wrong, "The Emperor Mobutu,"
Transitions9, no. 1 and 2 (2000): 108-110.
For instance, several accounts of the Sierra Leonean Civil War refer to
EOs ability to lay down, very accurate, fire during contacts with the rebels, using all
manner of hand-operated weapons. These include accounts of the mercenaries hitting and
killing large numbers of RUF fighters with fire from AK-47s; 7.62 mm light PKM
machine guns and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, which were deployed with the ground
forces and on the firms two Mi-17s; 60, 81, 82, and 120 mm mortars; and 105 mm
106 Timothy Lupfer, "Tactics," in Brasseys Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, ed. Franklin Margiotta
(Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1997), 1022 and 1031; Millett, Murray, and Watman, "The Effectiveness of MilitaryOrganizations," 62.107Kenneth M. Pollack,Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
2002), 564.108Baker, Wild Goose, 184 and 187-188; Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 121, 213, and 238-239; Boyne, "The WhiteLegion," 280; Clayton, Frontiersmen, 80; French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat.";Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 74; Guevara, The African Dream, 43-48 and 102; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 229 and245; Hooper, Bloodsong, 98 and 124; Igric, "Alleged 'Assassins' Were No Strangers to France," 2; Kotch, "Zaire
Rebels Advance, Frustrating Army."; Mabry, "Soldiers of Misfortune," 40; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 67-68;Pech, "The Hand of War," 137-138 and 140; Pottinger, Mercenary Commander; Reed, Save the Hostages, 258-259;
Rosen, Contract Warriors, 15; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 116; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 20-21; Thom, "Congo-Zaire's1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," 11
and 16; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 34; Fred Wagoner, Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1980), 66.
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artillery.109
The firm was particularly adept with mortars: wed hurl a few mortars at
where we thought they (the RUF) might be. Our guys had a lot of experience with this
stuff and they were accurate. Theyd sometimes get them spot on. Then the rebels would
disappear into the jungle and there would be no resistance.110
The firm used these
weapons to hammer groups of fleeing rebels and to besiege rebel camps. For example,
EOs infantry trapped several dozen rebels inside their camp near Gandorhun while the
firms mortar team systematically eliminated them from afar.111
EOs ability to use hand-operated weapons effectively was essential to their
success in Sierra Leone because, in virtually every contact with the rebels, they were
severely outnumbered. In other words, because the mercenaries fielded comparatively
few rifles, they had to ensure that a comparatively high proportion of their shots hit useful
targets. As Claassens summarized,
The world thinks that Executive Outcomes was successful because of the
use of overwhelming technology and superior firepower, which isabsolutely untrue. If you look at the amount of rifles they had as
opposed to our rifles, it was 80 rifles against thousands. The reason why
we were successful is because we were able to utilize it better the guyswho came with me into Executive Outcomes were. very, very good at
what they did and thats the main reason why we did so well.112
Conversely, the normative theory of military performance predicted that, to the
extent that the members of military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting
technical proficiency are unwilling to familiarize themselves with the functioning of
military technology, these forces should not utilize hand-operated weaponry very well.
109 Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 358, 364-365, 384-385; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus Claassens; Hooper,
Bloodsong, 224-225, 228, 231-232, 246, and 248-250; Venter, War Dog, 521 and 545-547.110Venter, War Dog, 521.111Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 364-365; Hooper,Bloodsong, 224-225 and 231-232.112Fitzsimmons,Interview with Cobus Claassens.
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Specifically, the marksmanship of personnel in these forces should be quite poor.113
This
prediction was borne out in these conflicts.114
For instance, due to their general
deemphasis on technical proficiency, the Simbas rarely conducted training to learn how
to use their weapons. For example, in a letter to Comrade Muteba, Guevara argued
plainly that, There is a general lack of the minimum training necessary to handle
firearms, a lack all the graver in the case of weapons requiring special combat
preparations.115
Despite his pleas to start a training program, Guevara never received
authorization to do this. However, it seems likely that, even if he had received
authorization, few rebel foot soldiers would have submitted to training because they too
placed little value on technical proficiency. Contemporary observers on both sides of the
conflict frequently remarked on the near-total lack of technical competency among the
Simbas.116
Front-line observers, like 5 Commandos Hugh van Oppen, recalled that,
despite often fielding far superior equipment than the mercenaries, including artillery
with much greater range than anything in the mercenaries inventory, the rebels inflected
few casualties because they simply could not aim. 117
113Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 73.
The Simbas were equally inept with
small-arms, which they tended to fire far above the heads of the mercenaries. Indeed,
114Thomas K. Adams, "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," Parameters29, no. 2 (Summer 1999);Arnold,Mercenaries, 34; Barlow,Executive Outcomes, 202-203, 215-216, 255-256, 270, 275, 288, 336, 353, and 384-385; Beah,A Long Way Gone, 24; Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers, 46; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 62, 74,77, 135, 149, 171, 176-177, 204-205, 365-366, and 400; Fitzsimmons, Interview with Cobus Claassens; Fitzsimmons,
Second Interview with Des Burman; Lloyd Garrison, "Another Vietnam Feared in the Congo," New York Times,December 13, 1964, E3; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 258, 267, 269, and 317; Guevara, The African Dream, 38, 48,63-64, and 196; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 157 and 307; Hooper, "Angola," 45; Hooper,Bloodsong, 45, 107, 129-130,
142, 159, 168-169, 171, 193, 195, 200-201, 208, 222, 224-225, 228, 246, and 248-250; Macdonald, Soldiers ofFortune, 95; McAleese,No Mean Soldier, 93, 99, and 354; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 183 and 198-199; Pollack,"The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," 660 and 749; Reed, Save the Hostages, 196; Richards,"War as Smoke and Mirrors,", 387 and 390; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 108; Rogers, Someone Elses War, 76 and
86-87; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 224; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Af