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NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS CNATRA P-881 (Rev. 10-20)
FLIGHT TRAINING
INSTRUCTION
INTERMEDIATE MARITIME
COMMAND AND CONTROL (MC2)
NFOTS SENSOR AND LINK
2020
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING 250 LEXINGTON BLVD SUITE 102 CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5041
CNATRA P-881
N712
5 Oct 20
CNATRA P-881 (REV. 10-20)
Subj: FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION, INTERMEDIATE MARITIME COMMAND
AND CONTROL (MC2) NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING SYSTEM (NFOTS)
SENSOR/LINK
1. CNATRA P-881 (Rev. 10-20) PAT, “Flight Training Instruction, Intermediate Maritime
Command and Control (MC2) NFOTS Sensor/Link," is issued for information, standardization
of instruction, and guidance for all flight instructors and student military aviators within the
Naval Air Training Command.
2. This publication will be used as a guide for completion of Intermediate MC2 Training
curricula for all Student Naval Flight Officers.
3. Recommendations for changes shall be submitted via the electronic TCR form located on the
CNATRA website.
4. CNATRA P-881 (Rev 02-20) PAT is hereby cancelled and superseded.
S. E. HNATT
By direction
Releasability and distribution:
This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically via Chief of Naval Air
Training Issuances Website, https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs-pat-pubs.asp.
ii
FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION
FOR
INTERMEDIATE MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL (MC2 NFOTS)
SENSOR AND LINK
P-881
iii
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:
Original.. .0...19 Dec 17
Revision...1...20 Feb 20
Revision...2...05 Oct 20
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS PUBLICATION IS 113 CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING:
Page No. Change No. Page No. Change No.
COVER 0 6-1 – 6-19 0
LETTER 0 6-20 (blank) 0
ii – viii 0 7-1 – 7-7 0
1-1 – 1-9 0 7-8 (blank) 0
1-10 (blank) 0 8-1 – 8-6 0
2-1 – 2-9 0 9-1 – 9-12 0
2-10 (blank) 0 A-1 – A-19 0
3-1 – 3-3 0 A-20 (blank) 0
3-4 (blank) 0
4-1 – 4-8 0
5-1 – 5-6 0
iv
INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY
The following Changes have been previously incorporated in this manual:
CHANGE
NUMBER REMARKS/PURPOSE
The following interim Changes have been incorporated in this Change/Revision:
INTERIM
CHANGE
NUMBER
REMARKS/PURPOSE
ENTERED
BY
DATE
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................................................................. iii INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................................................................................v TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER ONE – FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ........... 1-1 100. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1-1
101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE ................................................................ 1-1 102. WARFARE COMMANDERS ............................................................................... 1-4 103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS ........................................................... 1-5 104. COORDINATORS ................................................................................................. 1-6
105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED CMD STRUCTURE ....... 1-7
CHAPTER TWO – AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY .......................................... 2-1 200. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 2-1
201. RADAR THEORY ................................................................................................. 2-1 202. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ............................................................................ 2-5 203. RADAR HORIZONS ............................................................................................. 2-6
204. LIMITATIONS AND MASKING ......................................................................... 2-6 205. MODES OF OPERATION ..................................................................................... 2-9
CHAPTER THREE – IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYS THEORY ....... 3-1 300. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 3-1
301. IFF OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 3-1
302. IFF CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS ................................................ 3-1 303. IFF LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................ 3-3
CHAPTER FOUR – ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYS THEORY ..... 4-1 400. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 4-1
401. ELECTRONIC WARFARE & THE ELECTROMAGNETIC (EM) SPECTRUM 4-1 402. SUBDIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE ................................................ 4-2
403. ESM COMPONENTS ............................................................................................ 4-6 404. ESM LIBRARIES, PARAMETRICS, AND AMBIGUITIES ............................... 4-7
CHAPTER FIVE – ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY ......... 5-1 500. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 5-1
501. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY ............................ 5-1 502. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED COMPONENTS.................................. 5-5
CHAPTER SIX – ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE ........... 6-1 600. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 6-1 601. CLASSIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS ................ 6-1 602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 6-4 603. SAMS ...................................................................................................................... 6-4
vi
604. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS............................................................ 6-12
605. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS ................................................................. 6-15
CHAPTER SEVEN – DATA LINK OVERVIEW ................................................................. 7-1 700. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 7-1 701. DATA LINK OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... 7-1 702. DATA LINK TYPES .............................................................................................. 7-3 703. LINK 4A ................................................................................................................. 7-3
704. LINK 11 .................................................................................................................. 7-3 705. LINK 16 .................................................................................................................. 7-4
CHAPTER EIGHT – TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY ...................... 8-1 800. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 8-1
801. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES..................................... 8-1 802. BREVITY PROCEDURE WORDS (PROWORDS) ............................................. 8-2
803. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS ................................................................................ 8-2
CHAPTER NINE – DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT .............................................................. 9-1 900. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 9-1
901. DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT .............................................................................. 9-1
APPENDIX A – GLOSSARY .................................................................................................. A-1
vii
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram ............................................................ 1-1 Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders ................................................................... 1-3 Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders ....................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-4 Coordinators ....................................................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command ......................... 1-7
Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands........................................................... 1-9
Figure 2-1 Common Radar Terminology ........................................................................... 2-2 Figure 2-2 Douglas Sea Scale ............................................................................................... 2-5 Figure 2-3 Beam Path Characteristics ................................................................................ 2-6
Figure 2-4 Signal Noise......................................................................................................... 2-7
Figure 2-5 Terrain Masking ................................................................................................ 2-8 Figure 2-6 Radar Jamming .................................................................................................. 2-8
Figure 2-7 Airborne Surface Search Radar System Modes of Operation....................... 2-9
Figure 3-1 ATC Display ....................................................................................................... 3-3
Figure 4-1 Electromagnetic Spectrum ................................................................................ 4-1 Figure 4-2 Electronic Warfare Overview ........................................................................... 4-2
Figure 5-1 Electro-Optical System ...................................................................................... 5-1 Figure 5-2 Infrared System .................................................................................................. 5-2
Figure 5-3 Bands of Interest ................................................................................................ 5-3 Figure 5-4 Field of View ....................................................................................................... 5-3
Figure 5-5 Hand Controller and Turret ............................................................................. 5-4 Figure 5-6 Electro-Optical System Components ............................................................... 5-5
Figure 5-7 Infrared System Components ........................................................................... 5-6
Figure 6-1 Group I Example................................................................................................ 6-1 Figure 6-2 Group II Example .............................................................................................. 6-2 Figure 6-3 Group III Example ............................................................................................ 6-2
Figure 6-4 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS ...................................................... 6-3 Figure 6-5 Corresponding EO Imagery.............................................................................. 6-3 Figure 6-6 SA-2 GUIDELINE ............................................................................................. 6-4
Figure 6-7 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar ............................................................ 6-5 Figure 6-8 SA-3 GOA ........................................................................................................... 6-5
Figure 6-9 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar .................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-10 SA-5 GAMMON................................................................................................. 6-6 Figure 6-11 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-7 Figure 6-12 SA-6 GAINFUL .................................................................................................. 6-7 Figure 6-13 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar .............................................................................. 6-8
Figure 6-14 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar ........................................................ 6-8 Figure 6-15 SA-10 GRUMBLE ............................................................................................. 6-9 Figure 6-16 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar ......................................................................... 6-9
viii
Figure 6-17 SA-20 GARGOYLE ......................................................................................... 6-10
Figure 6-18 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar .............................................................. 6-10
Figure 6-19 MANPADS........................................................................................................ 6-11 Figure 6-20 Houdong ............................................................................................................ 6-12 Figure 6-21 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II) .................................................................. 6-13 Figure 6-22 Vosper MK 5 .................................................................................................... 6-13 Figure 6-23 MK III Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................ 6-14
Figure 6-24 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine ............................................................ 6-14 Figure 6-25 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft .......................................................... 5-15 Figure 6-26 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-27 Komar Missile Boat ......................................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-28 Najin Class Frigate .......................................................................................... 6-17
Figure 6-29 Shantou Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-18
Figure 6-30 Chaho Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................. 6-18 Figure 6-31 Romeo Class SS ................................................................................................ 6-19
Figure 6-32 Sang O Submarine ........................................................................................... 6-19
Figure 7-1 Tactical Data Link Picture ................................................................................ 7-2 Figure 7-2 Multi-TDL Network Integration ...................................................................... 7-2
Figure 7-3 Data Links........................................................................................................... 7-3 Figure 7-4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Frequency Band ................ 7-4
Figure 7-5 Data Link Symbology ........................................................................................ 7-7
Figure 8-1 Standard Check-in Brief ................................................................................... 8-3
Figure 8-2 Surface Contact Report ..................................................................................... 8-4 Figure 8-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format ................................. 8-4
Figure 8-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report) .............................................................. 8-5 Figure 8-5 ACU Turnover Format...................................................................................... 8-6
Figure 9-1 Air Control NPG Uplink and Backlink ........................................................... 9-2
Figure 9-2 Multiple Nets ...................................................................................................... 9-6 Figure 9-3 Stacked Net ......................................................................................................... 9-7 Figure 9-4 OPTASK LINK Example 1 ............................................................................. 9-11
Figure 9-5 OPTASK LINK Example 2 ............................................................................. 9-12
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-1
CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
100. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the basic USN fleet organizational and command structure,
which includes the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), warfare commanders, functional group
commanders, and coordinators.
101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE
The post-Cold War geopolitical world has become increasingly complex and has seen a rapid
growth in the potential air, surface, and subsurface threats facing our naval forces. This
increased threat resulted, in part, from the numerous advanced weapon systems, sensors, and
delivery platforms now available on the open market.
Some of the countries supplying these advanced systems include North Korea, People’s Republic
of China, and the former Soviet Union. With more and more third world countries in possession
of these improved weapon systems, the reaction time available for friendly forces operating in
sensitive areas (e.g., Persian Gulf) decreases. The post-Cold War requires a realignment of
surveillance and reaction responsibilities with a much greater emphasis on decentralized
authority. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (Figure 1-1) provides a more effective means for
using the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) resources for tactical sea control.
Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram
This section summarizes the key roles and terms associated with the Composite Warfare
Doctrine, including OTC responsibilities, composite warfare structure, and Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) responsibilities.
CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
1-2 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) Duties
The OTC is the senior officer with command authority over all forces within a maritime
Operational Area (OA). The OTC is the theater commander and is normally the numbered fleet
commander (e.g., 7th Fleet, 5th Fleet, etc.). Some of the more pertinent duties the OTC must
perform without delegations are:
1. Designate a force-wide CWC and alternate.
2. Direct and monitor operations.
3. Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators)
promulgate policies for the force.
4. Establish C3 guidance; and establish force task organization if not already tasked by higher
authority. Specify chain of command between OTC, CWC, warfare commanders, and
coordinators.
5. Promulgate a force communications plan, including alternate plan; designating circuits and
frequencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.
Composite Warfare Command Structure and Capabilities
The Composite Warfare Command is a three-tiered structure that consists of warfare
commanders, functional group commanders, and resource coordinators. The OTC and CWC
lead the Composite Warfare Command with the CWC assigned by and directly subordinate to
the OTC. At times, the same commander/individual may share these roles. The CWC is
normally the CSG commander. Both of these commanders can assign specialized warfare
commanders based on mission requirements. In deciding the assignments and location of
warfare commanders and coordinators, the CWC should take into account the tactical situation,
size of force, and the capabilities of the available assets to cope with the expected threat.
The specialized warfare commanders (Figure 1-2) within the Composite Warfare Command are
the Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC), Information Operations Warfare Commander
(IWC), Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC),
Sea Combat Commander (SCC), and Strike Warfare Commander (STWC). The CWC structure
enables offensive and defensive combat operations against air, surface, undersea, electronic, and
land-based threats. With respect to a carrier strike group, the CWC can best control combat
operations from the carrier itself. Methodologically speaking, the CWC doctrine provides a
structure around which tactics can be executed.
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-3
Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders
CWC Limitations
The CWC doctrine is designed for macro CSG or task force level operations. Smaller task units
or elements may allow a separate Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to fulfill all sea control
functions him or herself. Tightly structured rules of engagement (ROE) may require the CWC to
maintain even more direct control of assets. Within the CWC doctrine, the multiple tasking of
CSG platforms without clear definition of priorities exists. The CWC and warfare commanders
must understand their responsibilities and how they may change in different tactical situations.
Composite Warfare Commander Responsibilities
The CWC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned all of his/her authority and assigned
functions for the overall direction and control of the force. The OTC retains the power to negate
any particular action taken by the CWC.
CWCs have the following responsibilities:
1. Control the specialized commanders by providing guidelines for operational conduct.
2. Must remain cognizant of the tactical picture in all warfare areas and must be able to
correlate information from external sources that develop locally.
3. Role of the central command authority to designate plan execution to subordinate warfare
commanders for various missions.
CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
1-4 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
102. WARFARE COMMANDERS
This section introduces the responsibilities and functions of the warfare commanders that consist
of the AMDC, IWC, ASWC, SUWC, SCC, and STWC.
Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) Responsibilities and Functions
The Cruiser CO is normally designated AMDC. The AMDC is responsible for the measures
taken to defend a maritime force against attack by airborne weapons. The AMDCs duties
include defense against air and ballistic missile threats unless a separate command has been
designated. The AMDC reports to the CWC and collects, evaluates, and disseminates
surveillance information.
The AMDC carries out the following functions:
1. Recommends air defense warning conditions and weapons control status to the CWC
2. Recommends the air Surveillance Area (SA) to the CWC
3. Develops and implements the air surveillance and defense plan
4. Designates link management units
5. Issues criteria for weapons release and expenditure (using a matrix if applicable)
6. Coordinates and controls air surveillance
Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The IWC is responsible for shaping and assessing the information environment, achieving and
maintaining information superiority, developing and executing information plans, and supporting
other warfare commanders. The IWC is located onboard the carrier and is normally the senior
O-6 Intel Officer on the CSG staff.
Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The ASWC is responsible for denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. The ASWC
collects, evaluates, and disseminates antisubmarine surveillance information to the CWC. The
ASWC is normally the Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) commander.
Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The SUWC is responsible for surface surveillance coordination and war-at-sea operations. The
SUWC’s responsibilities encompass operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval
surface forces and merchant vessels. The SUWC can best perform his/her duties from on board
the carrier due to superior command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-5
and the proximity to surface surveillance coordination (SSC) and war-at-sea (WAS) tactical air
assets. For this reason, the SUWC is normally the CO of the CVN. The SUWC establishes
aircraft alert requirements, and the OTC retains alert launch authorization unless specifically
assigned.
Sea Combat Commander (SSC) Responsibilities and Functions
The responsibilities of the ASWC and the SUWC are combined into the sea combat commander
(SCC) role whenever the level of activity and the complexity of the various mission areas are
deemed manageable. The SCC establishes sea combat guidance and controls assigned assets to
implement the sea combat plan. The tactical DESRON commander normally assumes the role as
SCC.
Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The STWC’s responsibilities are to conduct operations to destroy or neutralize enemy targets
ashore. These actions include attacks against strategic, operational, or tactical targets from
which the enemy is capable of conducting air, surface, or subsurface support operations. The
overall mission of the STWC is typically offensive. The STWC is located on the carrier and is
normally the carrier air wing commander (CAG).
103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS
Warfare commanders may designate temporary or permanent functional groups or components
to conduct a specific activity that supports the overall mission. The establishing authority
determines the command authority of the functional group commanders.
Functional groups are subordinate to the CWC and are usually established to perform duties that
are more limited in scope and duration than those performed by warfare commanders. Their
duties generally span assets normally assigned to one or more warfare commanders. See
Figure 1-3 for the specific functional group commanders.
CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
1-6 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders
104. COORDINATORS
Coordinators are asset and resource managers who carry out policies of the CWC and respond to
specific tasking of either warfare or functional group commanders. Coordinators are highlighted
in Figure 1-4.
Figure 1-4 Coordinators
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-7
Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC): The AREC (call sign “AR”) is a warfare
coordinator who allocates and apportions sea-based, fixed-wing, air assets and CVN-based
helicopters for Original...0...10 Jan 18 guidance, requests from warfare and functional group
commanders, aircraft and CVN helicopter availability, accessibility, maintenance readiness,
configuration, and weapons load out. The goal of AREC allocation is effective aircraft and CVN
helicopter utilization.
Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC): promulgates air and air plans for non-logistical
helicopters to support CSG operations.
Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA): acts as principle advisor to the SCC for
submarine matters when an SSN is assigned in direct support of the CSG.
Force Over-the-horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC): manages and collates all source (organic
and non-organic) contact information and designates contacts of critical concern to the CSG.
105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE
The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code provide the basis for
the establishment of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established the
missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes their
general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR’s) and functions.
The commander of a combatant command that includes a geographic AOR is a “geographic
combatant commander.” The commander of a combatant command with trans-regional
responsibilities is a “functional combatant commander.”
Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command
CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
1-8 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
As of 2013, the UCP contains six geographical and four functional combatant commands:
1. Geographical combatant commands (Figure 1-6):
a. US Central Command
b. US European Command
c. US Northern Command
d. US Pacific Command
e. US Southern Command
f. US African Command
2. Functional combatant commands:
a. US Joint Forces Command
b. US Special Operations Command
c. US Strategic Command
d. US Transportation Command
Within any geographical combatant command, the Naval Component Commander is subordinate
to the combatant commander and may designate a CWC.
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-9
Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands
CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
1-10 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER TWO
AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY 2-1
CHAPTER TWO
AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY
200. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews information previously covered in the basic radar theory lesson and
expands upon airborne radar specifics to include environmental effects on airborne radar, radar
horizons, airborne radar limitations, terrain masking, and airborne radar system modes of
operation. Airborne radar systems have a myriad of uses available to the tactical Naval Flight
Officer (NFO). Some of the more commonly used applications include detecting and tracking
enemy ships, aircraft, and missiles; providing guidance for missiles; navigation assistance
through adverse weather; engaging airborne targets beyond visual range; providing aim-point
information for gunnery systems; and safety of air travel.
201. RADAR THEORY
The acronym radar stands for radio detection and ranging. The purpose of airborne radar is to
detect contacts of interest and determine their location and movement. Depending on how it is
used, a radar system can be classified in one or more of the following categories:
Early Warning Radar
Early Warning Radar is used to detect enemy targets at long range, providing the greatest
possible advanced warning to aid the tactical decision maker. Consequently, this system has a
wider beam width, operates at lower frequencies, and requires large power outputs. Since the
main purpose of this system is early detection, positions reported are slightly less accurate than
systems designed for air search and fire control.
Surface Search Radar
Surface Search Radar is used to scan the Earth’s surface for ships and/or ground targets, operates
at higher frequencies than Early Warning Radar systems, and provides information that is more
accurate. Precise navigation is possible by using Surface Search Radar if suitable reflective
materials (e.g., channel buoys with radar reflective materials) placed in optimal positions.
Air Search Radar
Air Search Radar is used to locate the position of aircraft and can determine bearing, range, and
elevation. This type of radar is used to direct fighter aircraft on an intercept course with enemy
aircraft or to detect low-flying aircraft intruding on airspace (e.g., drug runners in Florida). This
system, which operates at much higher frequencies with a much narrower beam width, has a
shorter range than Early Warning Radar and Surface Search Radar and offers extremely accurate
information about target location. Air Search Radar is sometimes referred to as “3-D radar” due
to its three-dimensional capability.
CHAPTER TWO INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
2-2 AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY
Airborne Search Radar
Airborne Search Radar systems are installed in numerous types of aircraft and, therefore, must
conform to stringent size and weight restrictions. These limitations result in limited range
capabilities while retaining a high degree of accuracy. Airborne Search Radar systems provide
the capability for air-to-air (A/A) search, Surface Search (SS), ground mapping, terrain
avoidance, and radar navigation functions.
Fire Control Radar
Fire Control Radar systems are primarily used to control the guidance of weapons. They must be
capable of a high degree of target resolution, such as distinguishing two or more targets from one
another at close proximity. These radar systems typically operate at frequencies higher than that
of Search Radar systems because of the necessary precision guidance. Pulse Width (PW) is the
primary factor in determining range resolution (RR).
Radar Terminology
Discussions about Radar concepts and operations have common terms that are useful to
understand. The next figure provides definitions of some common Radar terms.
Radar Term Definition
Paint An unmodified (raw) radar return displayed on a scope
Contact A video display of returned radar energy for which the onboard
processor has determined, with a high degree of certainty, to be a
return from an actual entity, such as a ship or aircraft.
Clutter/noise Unwanted echoes displayed on the scope because of ground return,
clouds, chaff, and rain (The latter three do not affect radars with low
bandwidth and high power; however, the ground return will be quite
heavy).
Beam Radar energy focused by an antenna transmitted out into the
atmosphere.
Sidelobe Radar energy not part of the main beam.
Azimuth The angular distance from a reference point (usually the aircraft center
line) in degrees.
Signal-to-Noise
(S/N) ratio
A numeric measurement of contact return compared to clutter return
(The higher the S/N ratio, the easier it is to see the contact in clutter
and to track the contact.)
Boresight The direction of maximum gain of a radar antenna.
Figure 2-1 Common Radar Terminology
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER TWO
AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY 2-3
Radar Fundamentals
Radar energy, like all electromagnetic (EM) energy (to include visible light), travels at the speed
of light, (typically in straight-line paths). With few exceptions, it is reflected by physical objects.
Radar equipment can readily determine the position of objects in space by transmitting EM
energy along a known azimuth and “listening” for its return. If it “hears an echo,” the processor
knows there is something there. By determining the direction of the antenna and time it took for
the signal to “bounce back” and return, a distance, (or range) can be assessed. The accuracy can
depend on how wide the beam is, similar to car lights, flood lights, or pencil beams. Each of
these beams exhibit different properties depending on mission/function. Understanding the
properties of radar requires knowledge of the terms frequency and wavelength, discussed in
detail below.
The term wavelength refers to the spatial period of the wave; the distance the wave covers prior
to repeating. It is determined by measuring the physical distance between consecutive
corresponding points such as crests, troughs, or zero crossings.
The term cycle refers to a single change from up to down to up measured with respect to time.
One cycle (specified event) that is measured one second in time, is equal to one hertz.
As discussed earlier, frequency refers to the periodic oscillations of a radar signal over time or
the number of cycles per unit time. The concept of frequency can be applied to EM waves,
sound waves, or even waves on the beach. A radar’s frequency is determined by counting the
number of cycles that occur over a one second time interval. One cycle per second is known as
one Hertz.
Since EM energy all travels at the same constant speed (the speed of light), frequency, and
wavelength are inversely proportional. As wavelength increases, frequency decreases and vice
versa.
Multiple factors can affect overall radar performance. One important factor is the pulse
characteristics of width and length. Pulse width (PW) is the amount of time the radar takes to
transmit its pulse. Different PWs are used to achieve different radar parameters, including Rmin
and RR. Pulse Length (PL) refers to the physical distance of the transmitted pulse.
Other important radar theory fundamentals include display characteristics, target return potential,
radar return strength, Radar Cross Section (RCS), and topographical features.
A radar display does not show an obvious image of the ground. Instead, it produces various
intensities of radar paint based on the amount of reflected Radio Frequency (RF) energy. Areas
with a high degree of RF energy will display bright, while non-RF areas will appear dark. The
brightness on the display is directly proportional to the amount of reflected RF energy.
The target return potential refers to the ability of an object to reflect RF energy, thereby
producing an echo on the radar display. This potential is dependent on the following
uncontrollable factors: the object’s size, shape, composition, and environment. When taken
CHAPTER TWO INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
2-4 AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY
together with aspect angle, these factors comprise the target’s RCS. RCS is an expression of the
extent to which a target reflects a radar pulse. The larger the RCS, the more readily a radar can
detect a target.
The radar return strength refers to the controllable factors affecting the operator’s ability to
determine targets on the radar scope, such as transmitter power, slant range, run-in heading,
antenna tilt angle, receiver gain, and video gain.
The topographical features found on a Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC), Operational Navigation
Chart (ONC), and Joint Navigation Charts (JNC) provide the information necessary for radar
navigation; however, the aircrew’s ability to predict object presentation potential on a radar
scope is vital to navigation success. The following features shall be considered:
Terrain
Flat terrain is displayed as a light dusting of snow on the scope. This dusting is caused by the
small reflections from the soil, rocks, and trees. Uneven terrain produces “shadow areas.” A
shadow area is caused by an object masking out a radar transmission. Objects in the shadow are
not displayed on the radar scope.
Areas where water meets land cause a brightened echo on the display that represents the
shoreline. This phenomenon is known as “far-shore brightening.”
Weather
A heavy thunderstorm can affect a radar picture. Sometimes precipitation is too light to return
an echo. Other times, it is dense enough to prevent the radar transmission from travelling
through it.
Should a return appear on the scope caused by weather and it has a shadow behind it, then it
means there is too much water in the cloud to fly through it.
Causeways
Causeways are constructed of dirt or rock fill and normally present land-water contrast.
Causeways have many of the same return characteristics as shorelines. They may serve as
excellent radar reference points particularly in coastal cities.
Ice and Snow
There are considerable global areas that are covered by ice and snow during the winter months.
If a land area is covered by snow, the radar beam reflects from the snow rather than the land
beneath it. Very smooth ice or snow does not show on the radar. In most cases, if rivers, lakes,
and harbors are frozen over or snow-covered, they are not visible as water features during the
winter months.
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Sand and Desert
Large sand areas with surface ripples that are wind-blown tend to reflect radar energy similar to
ground return. A seasonal lake in desert terrain may appear as a no-show lake or ground return if
it has dried up. Large expanses of very flat beds, like the Bonneville Salt Flats in Utah, scatter
radar energy the same way as water and may not appear even though there is no water present.
202. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
This section describes how radar is affected by the environment and sea states. A radar system
sometimes experiences interference from echoes due to backscatter/ clutter from receiver noise,
atmospheric noise, other radar systems, or jammers. Backscatter/clutter may also come from the
ground, sea state, rain, chaff, birds, or ground traffic. The Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and
Pulse Doppler (PD) processing use Doppler to reject clutter and enhance detection of moving
targets. Smaller targets require more clutter suppression. MTI separates moving targets from
clutter and uses short waveforms. PD processing separates targets into different velocity regimes
in addition to canceling clutter. It provides accurate estimates of target velocity and uses long
waveforms.
Sea state is the general condition of the free surface on a large body of water, with respect to
wind, waves, and swell, at a certain location and time. As sea state increases, clutter to the radar
environment also increases. Sea states are described in levels, classified by wave heights in the
operating area, using a graduated scale from 0-9 called the Douglas scale. This scale was used in
the development of the radar sweep width tables. Douglas sea states over 3 are not used because
not enough detailed information has been collected under those conditions, and most radar
systems show excessive sea return (clutter) above a sea state of 3.
Figure 2-2 Douglas Sea Scale
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203. RADAR HORIZONS
This section covers the radar horizons equation. It is crucial to know sight limitations of ground
radars and how to factor the radar horizon into the mission planning and execution of an airborne
radar system. The radar horizon equation is as follows:
Distance (in NM) = 1.237 √ height (in feet AGL)
The rule of thumb to remember when using this equation is; at the 15,000 ft. baseline, the radar
horizon is approximately 150 NM, for every 1000 ft., add or subtract 5 NM.
204. LIMITATIONS AND MASKING
This section covers the limitations of radar and how terrain masking affects radar. The beam
path and range of a radar system are sometimes limited. A radar beam follows a linear path in
vacuum, but follows a somewhat curved path in the atmosphere because of the variation of the
refractive index of air. Even when the beam is transmitted parallel to the ground, it rises above
the ground as the Earth’s curvature sinks below the horizon. The signal is attenuated by the
medium it crosses, and the beam disperses. Figure 2-3 defines the characteristics of different
types of beam paths.
Figure 2-3 Beam Path Characteristics
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Signal noise is an internal source of random variations in a signal generated by all electronic
components. Figure 2-4 illustrates the differences in signals with and without noise.
Figure 2-4 Signal Noise
Radar systems must overcome interference (unwanted signals) in order to focus only on the
actual targets of interest. Interference may originate from both internal and external sources.
Interference may include clutter, terrain masking, and jamming.
Clutter refers to RF echoes returned from unwanted contacts to the radar operators. Such
contacts include both natural and man-made objects. Intentional radar countermeasures, such as
chaff, can also cause RF clutter.
Terrain masking is a tactic that takes advantage of the inability of radar to detect contacts of
interest in certain areas due to an obstruction, such as a mountain blocking the radar energy
(Figure 2-5). Tactical aircraft may use terrain masking to their advantage by flying low in hilly
or mountainous terrain to avoid detection by ground-based radars. Airborne radar operators may
be able to minimize terrain masking in an area of interest by altering position or altitude
(if practical).
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Figure 2-5 Terrain Masking
Radar jamming refers to RF signals originating from sources outside the radar system that are
transmitting in the radar system’s frequency, thereby masking targets of interest. The figure
below demonstrates the effects of jamming on radar.
Figure 2-6 Radar Jamming
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AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY 2-9
205. MODES OF OPERATION
This section covers the modes of operation of an airborne radar system. The Airborne SS Radar
system is designed to provide surface search and detection of ships and periscopes. It provides
imaging capability with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
(ISAR). The Airborne SS Radar System also aids in navigation and weather avoidance.
The modes of operation associated with this system are applicable to the Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft. Some of the Airborne Air Search Radar modes include fire
control and the Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI).
The next figure defines the modes of operation of an Airborne SS Radar system.
Mode Function
Periscope Moderately low altitude (3000 ft. or below) periscope search and
detection
Navigate Weather avoidance and coastline mapping
Search
Long-range SS with sea-clutter suppression and target brightness
enhancement
Image
Inverse
Synthetic
Aperture
RADAR
(ISAR)
Image ISAR relies on the motion of the target ship to generate a two-
dimensional image. Processing short aperture times, ISAR generates
continuous images that correspond in real time to target motion. Image
mode generates images of selected targets to help identify the target ship
class without flying over the ship.
Synthetic
Aperture
RADAR
(SAR)
SAR relies on the motion of the aircraft to generate a two-dimensional
image. Processing short aperture times, SAR generates continuous
images. SAR mode generates images of selected ground targets to help
identify the target without flying over the target.
Figure 2-7 Airborne Surface Search Radar System Modes of Operation
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IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY 3-1
CHAPTER THREE
IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY
300. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides information on the capabilities, characteristics, and limitations of the IFF
system. Additionally, this chapter discusses IFF modes and their specific uses.
301. IFF OVERVIEW
IFF is defined as a tool within the broader military action of Combat Identification that is used to
attain an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment to support
an engagement decision. It is an identification and authentication system designed for command
and control. IFF is used in conjunction with radar systems. When activated, an identification
pulse is transmitted to help identify a target. This is known as an interrogation. If the target is
equipped with a transponder, a reply is generated that is sent back to the originating system. IFF
has both military and civilian uses. IFF helps systems to identify aircraft, vehicles, or ships as
friendly or neutral and determines their bearing, range, and altitude from the interrogator.
302. IFF CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS
IFF uses interrogators and transponders. A command and control facility’s interrogator sends
interrogation pulses at 1030 Megahertz (MHz) in order to help identify targets. If the target is
equipped with a transponder, a reply pulse is generated at 1090 MHz and sent back to the
originating system.
IFF is used by the military to help identify friendly and commercial air traffic, help contribute to
the tactical decision-making process, and reduce fratricide. IFF is used by civilian aviation for
discrete aircraft identification, separation, flight following, positive control, and identification of
aircraft in distress.
IFF Modes
Both military and civilian aircraft use IFF, but there are certain modes that are reserved
exclusively for the military.
The following information provides a description of the IFF modes and associated codes:
1. Mode 1 – Two-digit, 5-bit mission code for military use only. The first digit can be 0 to 7.
The second digit can only be a 0, 1, 2, or 3. Mode 1 may be Carrier Air Wing assigned or used
for training purposes. Some examples are: Underway, Air Wings use mode 1 for mission
identification (e.g., Mode 1 of 61 for Mission Tanking) Mode 1 is also used to provide tipper
information to a C2 platform during training events. A Mode 1 of “11” might be used to signify
a live hostile aircraft during an exercise tactical air intercept (TACAIC).
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2. Mode 2 – Four-digit octal unit code for military use only. Mode 2 may be Carrier Air
Wing (CVW) assigned. When assigned by the air wing, the first digit is typically the air wing
number followed by aircraft side number. For example, an E-2 Hawkeye, side number 602
attached to CVW 2, would squawk a Mode 2 code of “2602.”
3. Mode 3/A – Four-digit octal identification code for aircraft. Mode 3/A is used by both
military and civilian aircraft and is the normal air traffic control (ATC) transponder code for all
aircraft. Mode 3 may be ATC assigned, or Carrier Air Wing assigned.
NOTE
Modes 1, 2, and 3/A are collectively known as Selective
Identification Feature (SIF). The brevity proword for the SIF
transponder is “PARROT.” The brevity proword directing the use
of one or more modes of the SIF transponder is “SQUAWK.”
4. Mode C – Uses Mode 3/A four-digit octal code providing the aircraft’s pressure altitude in
thousands of feet displayed to Air Traffic Control (ATC) in a three-digit format rounded to the
nearest hundred feet. For example, a readout of 21.4 stands for twenty-one thousand four
hundred feet. Similarly, a readout of 02.4 stands for two thousand four hundred. (For military
and civilian use)
5. Mode 4 – Provides an encrypted method of positively authenticating a friendly military
entity (surface, air, or land). This reply is either valid or invalid; no numerical code is returned.
Mode 4 is used only by the military. The brevity proword for Mode 4 is “INDIA.”
6. Mode S (Select) – A civil aviation initiative that overcomes the deficiencies associated
with modes 3/A, and C. This mode provides unique aircraft identification, enhanced Mode C
height resolution, and flight details by transmitting Downlinked Air Parameters (DAPs). Mode S
transponders, which replace Mode 3/A, and Mode C transponders, enable the Traffic Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) II. In addition, this mode allows for discrete interrogations and
replies to each aircraft, reducing the congestion of transponder replies on the frequency at the
same time as Mode 3/A. Enhanced altitude resolution and flight-path parameters provide for
more precise ATC tracking while also allowing TCAS II systems to compute collision avoidance
solutions. See Figure 3-1.
7. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) – A surveillance technology (not
dependent on interrogations) that uses a one-way or two-way data link to track aircraft. ADS-B
is a further enhancement to a Mode S transponder or can be used as stand-alone equipment. In
addition to transmitting precise aircraft position and flight-path parameters, aircraft equipped
with an ADS-B receiver and suitable displays can receive traffic, weather, terrain, and other
flight information. The FAA has mandated that all aircraft be equipped with ADS-B in and out
by January 01, 2020.
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Figure 3-1 ATC Display
SIF and Mode 4 De-Lousing
Carrier Strike group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) air control agencies,
“REDCROWN” and “GREENCROWN” will perform SIF and mode 4 checks (Called
“PARROT/INDIA” checks) on aircraft departing from and returning to the carrier/LHD for
de-lousing. A radar contact without these IFF modes could be an adversary-in-trail. They will
also perform these checks on aircraft transiting or operating around the Vital Area (VA) or
Classification, Identification, Engagement Area (CIEA) such as a P-8 supporting the CSG/ESG.
303. IFF LIMITATIONS
IFF requires a cooperative target (i.e., one with the ability to respond to interrogations). IFF can
positively identify and authenticate friendly targets and provide the Mode 3C requirements to
complete a commercial air or civil air profile, but it can’t locate adversaries. If an IFF
interrogation receives no reply or an invalid reply, the object cannot be identified as friendly, nor
can it be positively identified as a foe with 100% certainty. In other words: IFF won’t tell you
who the adversaries are, but it will tell you who they aren’t providing friendlies and
commercial/civilian aircraft all have functioning IFF transponders.
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ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY 4-1
CHAPTER FOUR
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY
400. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a discussion of the fundamentals of Electronic Warfare (EW), its
associated components, an overview of the terms, characteristics, and limitations associated with
EW, as well as the basic components and operation of an airborne electronic support measures
(ESM) system.
401. ELECTRONIC WARFARE & THE ELECTROMAGNETIC (EM) SPECTRUM
EW is defined in Joint Publication 3-13.1 (Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare) as “military
action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy and directed energy (DE) to control the
EMS or to attack the enemy.” EM energy propagates through space via waves, broadly
categorized, for EW purposes, by frequency or wavelength. The range or spectrum of these
frequencies is theoretically infinite. EW exists in a continuum ranging from radio frequencies at
the low end to x-ray and gamma-ray frequencies at the high end, with particular emphasis on the
RF and infrared (IR) portions of the spectrum. Military forces depend on the EM spectrum for
intelligence, communications and data transmission, navigation, sensing and targeting,
Command and Control (C2), and attack. While EW dramatically enhances combat power in
many ways, improper or careless employment of EW can adversely affect friendly forces. As
civilian, adversary, and friendly technology progresses and proliferates, the EMS is an
increasingly congested and contested environment. Figure 4-1 illustrates the EM spectrum.
Figure 4-1 Electromagnetic Spectrum
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402. SUBDIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
EW is comprised of three subsets: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protection (EP), and
Electronic Warfare Support (ES).
Figure 4-2 Electronic Warfare Overview
Electronic Attack (EA):
The EA subdivision of EW involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing,
or destroying the enemy’s combat capability. EA encompasses both offensive and defensive
activities to include countermeasures. While EA can limit enemy access to information and
degrade the enemy’s decision-making process, it requires coordination to ensure friendly access
to the EM spectrum. For example, jamming during an ES mission can be counterproductive if
not properly deconflicted. Various types of friendly electronic attack can also inadvertently
degrade friendly communications or weapons targeting accuracy. At times, this inadvertent
degradation may be deemed a worthwhile trade-off. Tactics and processes exist for mitigation
and conflict resolution.
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Examples of EA:
Some examples of EA include: EM Jamming, EM Deception, directed energy, anti-radiation
weapons, and off-board countermeasures (expendables, e.g., flares and active decoys).
Radar Jamming denies, delays, or degrades the enemy’s ability to track aircraft or weapons via
radar. It can be done using EA-18G aircraft, using the ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming System and
ALQ-99 Tactical Jammer Pods. When an aircraft reaches a certain minimum distance from a
radar, jamming is no longer effective and returns from that aircraft can still be seen on the enemy
operator’s scope. This is called the “burn-through range.” Burn-through range is derived
directly from the radar equation and is the point at which reflected radar energy from the aircraft
is more powerful than jamming.
Communications Jamming denies, delays, or degrades the enemy’s ability to communicate. It is
primarily done by EA-18G or the Air Force’s EC-130 Compass Call aircraft. In the most basic
terms, communications jamming is done by “talking over” someone trying to use that frequency.
Voice or data are not required; it can be accomplished with noise by simply overpowering the
original transmission. Link distance refers to the distance between the original transmitter and
intended receiver and is one of the most important factors in communications jamming
effectiveness. Remember from the radar equation that the distance is squared. So, as the
communicators are closer to the desired recipient, jamming power must be increased
exponentially to have the desired effect. With most EA aircraft operating 3-5 miles above the
earth’s surface, plus any lateral distance from the communicators, it becomes obvious how hard
overcoming the problem can be even if the jammer’s power output is orders of magnitude greater
than the communicators’. This principle is analogous to burn-through range when jamming a
radar signal.
Electronic Protection (EP):
EP involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of
friendly or enemy use of the EM spectrum that degrades, neutralizes, or destroys friendly combat
capability. EP should not be confused with defensive EA. EP protects from the undesired
effects of EA (either friendly or adversary), while defensive EA is used to protect against attacks
by denying the enemy the use of the EM spectrum.
Deconfliction and frequency management are essential in mitigating the adverse effects to
friendly forces.
Examples of EP:
Some examples of EP include Spectrum management, EM hardening, and Emissions Control
(EMCON).
EM hardening is action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or equipment by filtering,
attenuating, grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against undesirable effects of electromagnetic
energy.
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Radar signal processing features such as leading-edge tracking and pulse repetition frequencies
are designed to counter specific EA techniques.
Frequency agile radios and radars can rapidly adjust their operating frequencies to avoid enemy
EA. Frequency agile communications technologies, such as HAVEQUICK, are still susceptible
to enemy intelligence collection but are much more resistant to jamming, either by the enemy, or
inadvertently by friendly forces.
Encryption denies the enemy the ability to collect intelligence on friendly radio transmissions.
The Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is a time and geographic-oriented list of all
frequencies that must not be jammed by friendly forces without proper coordination, such as
Guard frequencies (121.5 and 243.0 MHz, GPS frequencies L1 and L2, friendly communication
frequencies or nets, and enemy frequencies being exploited for intelligence collection. The
JRFL is subdivided into TABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDED lists based on the reason for
inclusion and process for coordination.
Wartime reserve modes (WARM) are parametrics, procedures, and processing features held in
reserve for wartime or emergency use only, as their effectiveness relies upon being unknown to
or misunderstood by the enemy. Information on WARM is generally shared by partner nations
for coordination purposes, and to establish circumstances or severity of conflict at which they
would be activated.
Low observable (LO) technology, commonly referred to as “stealth,” refers to the use of
engineering and design features to minimize an aircraft or vessel’s radar, IR, and other
signatures.
EW Support (ES):
ES is the action taken to detect and intercept sources of EM energy for the purposes of threat
recognition. ES provides near-real-time information to supplement other intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information.
Examples of ES:
Some examples of ES include threat warning, collecting information to support other EW
functions, and direction finding.
ES Purpose:
The purpose of ES is to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of
intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for purposes of recognizing immediate threats,
targeting, planning, conducting future operations, and performing other tactical actions such as
threat avoidance.
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ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY 4-5
ES is the component of EW that results in information and intelligence reports that help analysts
answer the commander’s intelligence requirements. It provides planners with the necessary
information for future operations. ES actions are not under the direct control of an operational
commander because of decisions involving EW and other tactical employment.
Electronic Support Measures (ESM):
ESM gathers intelligence through passive listening of EM radiations having military interest.
ESM can provide initial detection of foreign systems, a library of technical and operational data
related to foreign systems, and tactical combat information utilizing that library.
ES can be broken down into the following phases: Search, Intercept, Locate, Identify, and
Report.
The search phase involves the use of ES systems to search for signals of interest (SOIs) within
the EM spectrum. A simplified ES system is composed of an antenna, receiver, recorder,
direction finder, and analyzer. In the search phase, the antenna detects and captures the signal
and sends it the receiver. The receiver converts the information into a usable format that can be
measured and recorded. Desirable antenna characteristics are a continuous broad area coverage,
broad EM spectrum coverage, and high sensitivity (gain).
ES receivers require a wide spectrum (bandwidth) surveillance capability to allow searches to be
performed through large frequency ranges. Since the distance from an SOI is often unknown,
receivers need a wide dynamic range allowing them to receive and process both very weak and
very strong signals without changing the signals characteristics.
The receiver must have a narrow bypass to be able to discriminate between the tuned frequency
and other unwanted signals near the SOI frequency.
Following detection and acquisition in the search phase, the signal goes from the receiver to the
recorder and analyzer for the intercept phase. Signals are recorded for future analysis and in the
event that the transmission is ended prior to signal parameter evaluation. The signal is also sent
to an analyzer to assist in SOI identification through the evaluation of parameters such as
modulation, pulse width, and sidebands.
The locate phase uses ES system components to obtain the geographic location (geolocation) of
an SOI. There are various methods for geolocation ranging from simple direction finding and
triangulation using steerable antennas to the more complex frequency difference of arrival
(FDOA) and time difference of arrival (TDOA). Whatever the method, geolocation of an SOI,
when used with other tools, assists in the identification of the SOI.
Once the raw data is collected in the search, intercept, and locate phases, a quick analysis is
performed to identify the intelligence information. A preliminary analysis is conducted and the
location of the SOI within a certain probability is calculated. The operator must then use
external tools and knowledge to properly identify the SOI. Orders of battle, intelligence reports
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4-6 ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY
and briefings, and the common operational picture (COP) are used to identify the SOI and help
satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements.
After the analysis to identify the SOI is complete, the information is relayed in the form of a
report (voice or data). The information collected, in this case, the identification and location of
an SOI helps build the commander’s overall operational picture or situational awareness.
Therefore, the information collected needs to be disseminated as quickly as possible.
Dissemination can take place via multiple paths (voice over secure circuits or data link) and
sometimes using both simultaneously. This preliminary reporting is almost always followed by a
detailed message traffic post-mission report.
The phases within ES are not a linear process. The system or operator is continuously searching
for signals and working with multiple SOIs simultaneously. ES can be viewed as a continuous
process. As intelligence requirements are met, new ones are created to maintain situational
awareness and assist in operational planning.
403. ESM COMPONENTS
There are two basic types of ESM: Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic
Intelligence (ELINT). COMINT is the interception of communications whether it be via voice
or data link. ELINT is the interception and analysis of radar emissions from surveillance, fire
control, and missile guidance systems. It is often allied to an ESM system.
Capabilities of each system may vary, but a typical ESM system consists of the following basic
components: antennas, receiver, processor, and a display.
Antennas are strategically located around the aircraft to aid in signal reception. The receiver
takes signals from the antenna and forwards them to the processor. The processor compares
received signals to libraries and matches parametric data to loaded emitters. This allows easy
identification of signals for the operator. The signal flow is antenna to receiver to processor to
display.
The display displays processed information to the operator for action. Displays can vary from
raw data to highly automated systems.
Direction of arrival (DOA):
The antennas around the aircraft are extremely sensitive and are often placed at the “four
corners” of the aircraft, being the nose, tail, and wingtips. The signals amplitude received by
each antenna allows the system to calculate its bearing relative to the aircraft. As the signal
continues through the processor and onto the display, this information is presented to assist the
operator in localization and location of the signal.
The more times a signal is received and processed, the more “lines of bearing” or “DOA cuts”
can be generated to create an AOP and accurately locate the emitter.
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404. ESM LIBRARIES, PARAMETRICS, AND AMBIGUITIES
ESM Libraries:
Receivers and processors do not have the memory capacity to store parametric data on every
single emitter worldwide. Instead, libraries that are focused on emitters in that operating area are
built and loaded for each mission.
A library contains the information on many emitters and allows the processor to compare
received signals to the parametric data stored in the library. If the received signal information
matches an emitter in the library, it is displayed as the library emitter, rather than as an unknown
signal.
Libraries are subject to concept of “garbage in = garbage out” when being built and care must be
taken to include all possible emitters without exceeding the memory capacity of the processor.
In some cases, libraries are built for the operator by an intelligence specialist or outside agencies.
In other cases, aircrews must build their own libraries. To help limit the size of a library,
determine which emitters can be excluded and which should be included. Some discriminating
factors include area of operation, land vs air vs maritime emitters, and mission objectives.
Care must be taken not to exclude friendly emitters simply because they are not threats.
Including them in the library as appropriate will help the processor identify the emitter and avoid
confusion. The general recommendation is to include friendly emitters as appropriate to aid in
identification.
Parametrics:
Signal parametric data includes, but is not limited to, RF, Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)/
Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI), PW, Sweep Rate (SR), and Sweep Type (ST).
RF: The frequency on which the radar transmits its carrier wave, measured in MHz or Gigahertz
(GHz).
PRF: The number of pulses of a repeating signal in a specific time unit normally measured in
pulses per second (PPS) or Hz.
PRI: The inverse of PRF; it is the elapsed time from the beginning of one pulse to the beginning
of the next pulse.
PW: The amount of time the radar takes to transmit one pulse.
SR: The amount of time, in seconds, it takes the radar to make one full sweep of its sector.
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ST: The type of sweep the radar uses to scan its sector. Various types of radars and even radars
of the same type may use differing scans. Some of the more common STs are:
1. Alpha: A full 360-degree horizontal sweep, clockwise or counterclockwise.
2. Bravo: A partial, less than 360-degree horizontal sweep that switches between clockwise
and counterclockwise to scan a small sector.
3. Charlie: Similar to a B scan but vertical to aid in height finding.
4. Raster: Often used in air-to-air radar systems, the antenna remains stationary but uses
bursts to scan in a side-to-side pattern while moving up and down.
Ambiguities:
Ambiguities exist when parametrics overlap between two or more emitters. If two radars both
use the same or similar RF ranges, other means must be used to identify the emitter. This can be
any one or more of the other parametrics previously discussed.
Sometimes, multiple parametrics overlap to extent that the processor cannot fully discriminate
between two or more emitters. In this case, the operator must make the final decision to identify
the emitter. When this happens, the NFO/Mission Commander is earning his or her wings by
being a tactical decision-maker.
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ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY 5-1
CHAPTER FIVE
ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY
500. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss Electro-Optical (EO) and IR system theory and components, as well as
the characteristics and limitations of the EO/IR sensor.
501. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY
Within EO/IR theory, a target exists in the environment along with background clutter. The EM
radiation from the target and the clutter passes through the atmosphere, where it suffer losses due
to water vapor and carbon dioxide molecules in its transmission path.
Electro-Optical and Infrared Systems
The EO System is comprised of a set of optics at the front end of the system. It collects the
radiation and focuses it on the detector. The detector produces an electrical signal based on the
amount of radiation received from the target and the environment. This signal is processed and
displayed to the operator. A diagram of an EO System is displayed in the next figure.
Figure 5-1 Electro-Optical System
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The IR System uses either a photon or thermal type of transducer to detect and convert IR energy
into a measurable parameter. The IR System is similar to an EO System with one exception;
each IR System requires a cooler. IR Systems are cryogenically cooled to reduce the detector
noise temperature thus increasing the detection capability of the sensor. Every time the IR
sensor is turned on, it must go through a cool-down cycle. A diagram of an IR System is
displayed in the next figure.
Figure 5-2 Infrared System
For thermal radiation, the IR sensor collects radiation from the portion of the EM spectrum near
the red region of visible light, hence the name infrared. EO sensors collect radiation from the
visible portion of the EM spectrum.
EO and IR Systems convert photons into electrons, regardless of their wavelength. The EO and
IR Systems focus on the visible and IR spectrums. EO and IR sensors are passive systems.
The IR region of energy contains near-wave, mid-wave, and long-wave regions. These regions
are of primary interest to users. Typical aircraft IR cameras operate in the mid-wave band.
Typical aircraft EO cameras operate in the visible and near-wave bands. The bands of interest
are shown in the figure that follows.
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ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY 5-3
Figure 5-3 Bands of Interest
Field of View
Focal lengths are used to determine Field of View (FOV). Focal lengths are measured in
millimeters (mm), and typically several focal lengths are available to the camera operator
(e.g., 40 mm, 200 mm, 1000 mm, or 3000 mm). FOV is demonstrated in the next figure.
Figure 5-4 Field of View
The optics are the lumped sum of all optics. The F factors on the figure represent the effective
focal lengths of the complete system. For a given detector size, a shorter effective focal length
results in an increased FOV and lower system magnification. Conversely, a longer effective
focal length results in a decreased or smaller FOV and higher system magnification. In addition
to focal lengths designed to enhance target imagery, optical filters are used to reduce certain
environmental disturbances. EO and IR cameras typically have normal condition, haze
penetration, and polarizer optical filters.
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Airborne Electro-Optical and Infrared Camera System
EO and IR cameras are employed to search, detect, identify, and obtain intelligence. The IR
camera, with its shorter effective focal length, is used in the initial search for a target whereas the
EO camera, with its longer effective focal length, is used to obtain the details once the target is
located. The cameras are turrets with 360° azimuth and tracking capabilities. In addition to
imagery, EO and IR cameras provide latitude and longitude positional information for the
associated surface target. EO and IR cameras are controlled by an operator utilizing a video
display with a hand controller and a control panel (Figure 5-5).
Figure 5-5 Hand Controller and Turret
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502. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED COMPONENTS
Electro-Optical System Components and Functions
An EO System uses the basic components of targets, lenses, detectors, electronics processors,
controllers, and video displays. These components are displayed in the figure that follows.
Figure 5-6 Electro-Optical System Components
The primary functions of an EO System are to collect, filter, redirect, concentrate, and focus EM
energy. The lens collects, filters, and focuses EM energy onto the detector. The detector is a
transducer that converts EM energy into a measurable parameter. These parameters are
electronically processed and sent to a video display.
Atmospheric influences may affect EO signals in several ways, depending on the particular
wavelength. The influencing atmospheric factors are absorption, radiation, scattering, and
turbulence.
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5-6 ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY
Infrared System Components and Functions
An IR System uses the basic components of targets, lenses, detectors, coolers, electronics
processors, controllers, and video displays. These components are displayed in the figure that
follows.
Figure 5-7 Infrared System Components
The IR System scans a portion of the terrain along the aircraft’s flight path and displays a
televised image of the IR patterns of the terrain. The primary function is to give the operator an
improved capability to detect, identify, and classify targets.
Weather conditions can limit effectiveness of the IR System. Cloud layers can obscure a clear
IR picture. Losses at lower altitudes are more significant than losses at higher altitudes.
Variations in image contrast resulting from daytime heating and nighttime cooling can also alter
effectiveness. Twice during each 24-hr. period, the temperature conditions are such that a loss of
contrast occurs between two adjacent objects on IR imagery. This phenomenon is termed
“thermal crossover.” A polarity switch inverts the IR image presentation from white hot (black
cold) to black hot (white cold).
ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE 6-1
CHAPTER SIX
ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE
600. INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers how to discern among gross naval vessel classes and appearance groups as
well as how to interpret ISAR imagery in the Multi-Crew Simulator (MCS). Additionally,
various threats to United States naval platforms to include surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and
surface threats found in the CENTCOM and PACOM AORs (Areas of Responsibility) will be
discussed in this chapter.
601. CLASSIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS
Today’s weapon system operators are trained to use specific methodologies to classify ships
using imaging sensors, such as ISAR. The classification process requires highly trained
operators and is platform exposure time intensive.
A two-step approach is taken for target classification. During step one, incoming imagery is
enhanced and "focused" to provide an integrated, multi-frame summed target image, where key
features are extracted from the sensor video imagery. Target features are then compared to
feature sets of known ship types to derive a classification.
Ships are normally classified in a hierarchical fashion using the following levels:
Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level.
During MCS simulator events, ISAR imagery will be used by the operator to determine the
Gross Naval Class of a surface contact to a confidence level of POSS. Examples of Gross
Classes are: Combatant, Minor Combatant, Submarine, Merchant, and Small Craft. Merchant
vessels are further classified into Appearance groups which are determined by the size, shape,
and location of the superstructure.
Appearance Groups
A Group I Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-1) has a superstructure greater than one-third the total
length of the ship. Passenger Ships generally belong in this appearance group.
Figure 6-1 Group I Example
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A Group II Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-2) has a composite superstructure less than one-third of
the total ship length that is located amidships. These ships generally have a small block-like
superstructure with deck spaces devoted to cargo-handling equipment and hatches.
Figure 6-2 Group II Example
A Group III Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-3) has a stack aft. Stack aft means that the ships have
funnels located in the aft third of the ship; however, if should the superstructure exceeds one-
third the overall ship length, the ship will be considered a Group 1 vessel.
Figure 6-3 Group III Example
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MCS ISAR Imagery
When ISAR Imagery of a surface contact is displayed on the MCS Tactical Plot (TACPLOT),
there will be two images (Figure 6-4). The image in the lower left corner is the raw ISAR. The
one in the upper right corner represents the digitized image of the contact that has been
processed, enhanced, and focused to show the vessel’s features with more clarity.
In the MCS, the perpendicular profile aspect of the vessel of interest will provide the best ISAR
imagery. When imaging using ISAR in the real world, a front or rear quartering aspect is
preferred. The following two figures depict an MCS ISAR image compared to its IR camera
image.
Figure 6-4 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS
Figure 6-5 Corresponding EO Imagery
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602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW
Several advances in technology have allowed warship identification to progress significantly
beyond where it was just a few decades ago. We now have thermal imagery, acoustic signatures,
electronic emission analysis, imaging radar, and even wake detection devices.
In spite of these advancements in technology, the classification criteria which must be met before
a weapon can be released at an intended target remain difficult to achieve. The drawback to
technological solutions is that they are seldom 100% reliable. Often, they cannot tell with
absolute certainty that the contact under surveillance is the right target or even a target at all.
At some point during the targeting process, a positive recognition of the target is necessary.
Usually, only an accurate visual recognition (eyes on the target or using an EO/IR system) can
resolve this problem.
603. SAMs
A SAM is a missile designed destroy airborne aircraft or airborne missiles that is launched from
the ground. As airborne weapon system operators, it is important to be able to recognize the
various threat SAMS and their associated emitters represent. Knowledge of each system’s
emitters is helps identify the system using ESM.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
The SA-2 GUIDELINE Missile (Figure 6-6) is a Soviet designed, high-altitude, air defense
system. It is credited with the shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 while he was overflying
the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. The system uses a SPOON REST Early Warning Radar and a
FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar (Figure 6-7).
Figure 6-6 SA-2 GUIDELINE
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Figure 6-7 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar
SA-3 GOA
The SA-3 GOA Missile (Figure 6-8) is a Soviet missile system that has a short effective range
and relatively low engagement altitude. It also flies slower than many other SAM systems.
However, its two-stage design makes it very effective against maneuverable targets. Iraq shot
down an F-16 using this system during Desert Storm in 1991. The SA-6 uses a FLAT FACE or
SQUAT-EYE Target Acquisition Radar and a LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-9).
Figure 6-8 SA-3 GOA
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Figure 6-9 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar
SA-5 GAMMON
The SA-5 GAMMON Missile (Figure 6-10) was designed for the defense of the most important
administrative, industrial, and military instillations from all types of air attack. It is a very
long-range threat. The SA-5 uses a BAR-LOCK Radar for target detection and tracking with
integrated IFF and a SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-11) for target tracking and
illumination.
Figure 6-10 SA-5 GAMMON
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Figure 6-11 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar
SA-6 GAINFUL
The SA-6 GAINFUL Missile (Figure 6-12) is a mobile, low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air
system of Soviet design. It was designed to protect ground forces from air attack. It has a short
range and uses the STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar (Figure 6-13) for target illumination.
Figure 6-12 SA-6 GAINFUL
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Figure 6-13 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar
SA-8 GECKO
The SA-8 GECKO Missile (Figure 6-14) is a highly mobile, short-range system. It is the first
mobile SAM system to incorporate its own engagement Radars on a single vehicle. The LAND
ROLL system is mounted on the front of the vehicle and is a derivative of the naval “POP
GROUP” system.
Figure 6-14 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar
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SA-10 GRUMBLE
The SA-10 GRUMBLE Missile (Figure 6-15) is a Soviet long-range system designed to defend
against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It is regarded as one of the most potent
anti-aircraft missile systems currently in use. It also has the capability of being fitted with a
nuclear warhead. The system uses a TIN SHIELD Surveillance Radar and a FLAP LID Fire
Control Radar system (Figure 6-16).
Figure 6-15 SA-10 GRUMBLE
Figure 6-16 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar
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SA-20 GARGOYLE
The SA-20 GARGOYLE Missile (Figure 6-17) is a variant of the SA-10. It is a newer, larger
missiles with performance improvements such as increased speed and range. It uses the
TOMB STONE Fire Control, Illumination, and Guidance Radar (Figure 6-18).
Figure 6-17 SA-20 GARGOYLE
Figure 6-18 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar
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MANPADS
These systems are primarily shoulder-fired weapons which are light and portable (Figure 6-19).
The missiles are about 5 to 6 feet in length and weigh anywhere from 37 to 40 pounds depending
on the model. Shoulder-fired SAMs generally have a target detection range of about 6 NM and
an engagement range of about 4 NM. Thus, any aircraft flying at an altitude 20,000 ft. or higher
are relatively safe.
Figure 6-19 MANPADS
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604. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS
Houdong
The Houdong (Figure 6-20) is a Chinese missile boat. It is based off of the Huangfen missile
boat, which is itself a copy of the Russian Osa class missile boat. It is armed with a four-round
launcher for the C-802 cruise missile, as well as a turreted twin 30-mm cannon and a crewed
23-mm cannon for self-defense. Emitters associated with the Houdong are the SR-47A, DECCA
RM 1070A (Surface Search), and the Type 341 RICE LAMP Fire Control Radars. Crews may
also be carrying MANPADS.
Figure 6-20 Houdong
Kaman
The Kaman (Mod la Combattante II) class PCG (Patrol Craft Guided Missile) (Figure 6-21)
features a small-bridge superstructure forward of amidships. It has a 35-mm/90 gun mounting
on the bow and a tall lattice mainmast aft of the superstructure. Four surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) launchers are installed aft of the superstructure with the forward two trained forward and
starboard while the aft two are trained forward and port. The Kaman is RGM-84A Harpoon and
C802 capable. Emitters associated with the Kaman are the UPZ-27N, DECCA 1226 surface
search, and the SIGNAAL WM-28 Fire Control Radar which is unique to the vessel.
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Figure 6-21 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II)
Vosper MK 5
The Vosper MK 5 (Figure 6-22) features a long forecastle with 4.5-inch gun mounted forward.
It has a short pyramid mainmast just forward of amidships. It has a low-profile sloping funnel
well aft with distinctive gas turbine air intakes forward of the funnel. Sited on its afterdeck from
forward to aft are a C802 SSM launcher, Limbo A/S mortar and 35-mm/90 twin gun turret
mounting. Emitters associated with the Vosper MK 5 are the AWS-1 Air/Surface search radar,
DECCA 1226 Surface Search, DECCA 629 Navigation, and the SEA HUNTER Fire Control
Radars which is unique to the Vosper MK 5.
Figure 6-22 Vosper MK 5
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MK III Class Patrol Boat (PB)
The MK III Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-23) has as speed of 30 knots and a 500 NM range at
28 knots. It has a 20-mm gun mounted forward. Its emitter is the RCA LN-66 Surface Search
Radar. Its crew likely carries MANPADS.
Figure 6-23 MK III Class Patrol Boat
Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine
The Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine (Figure 6-24) features a blunt, rounded bow and a flat-
topped casing that tapers toward the aft end. It has a long, low fin with vertical leading and after
edges and a flat top. Its hull-mounted diving planes are not visible and its rudder is barely
visible. It has a SNOOP TRAY MRP-25 emitter and is capable of launching Novator SSN-27
SIZZLER anti-ship missiles.
Figure 6-24 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine
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605. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS
Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft
The Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft (Figure 6-25) is a Chinese copy of the popular Soviet
Osa I Class missile boat. Armed with the SS-N-2 Styx SSM, it boasts a low-profile rounded
superstructure. It has a pole mainmast just forward of amidships with a surface search radar
aerial atop. It has four large, distinctive Styx SSM launchers, two outboard of the mainmast, and
two outboard of the fire control director. Its emitters are the SQUARE-TIE Surface Search
Radar, ROUND BALL Fire Control Radar, and SQUARE HEAD/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew is
likely armed with MANPADS.
Figure 6-25 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft
Sariwon Class Patrol Boat
The Sariwon Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-26) has a long aft section with a composite
superstructure sectioned both forward and amidships with a tall lattice mast forward and a large
funnel stack amidships. It has 2 twin 57/80 cannons, 2 twin 37-mm guns, 4 quad 14.5-mm
machine guns, 2 five-tube antisubmarine mortar launchers and 2 rails for depth charges. Its
emitters are the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and SKI POLE IFF. Its crew is likely armed
with MANPADS.
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Figure 6-26 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat
Komar
The Soviet Project 183R Class, more commonly known as the Komar (Meaning mosquito)
(Figure 6-27), is a class of missile boats, the first of its kind, built in the 1950s and 1960s.
Notably, they were the first to sink another ship with anti-ship missiles in 1967. The Komar has
two distinct launchers mounted aft facing forward used to launch either the STYX missile or
CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH missile. It has twin 25-mm/80 or twin 14.5-mm machine guns. Its
surface search radar is the SQUARE TIE and it has SQUARE HEAD IFF.
Figure 6-27 Komar Missile Boat
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Najin Class Frigate
Bearing a striking resemblance to the ex-Soviet Kola Class Frigates, the Najin (Figure 6-28) is
unrelated to any Russian or Chinese design. It is a long composite group II with two distinct
funnels one just forward of amidships and one just aft of amidships. It was originally fitted with
a trainable triple 21-inch torpedo launcher which was replaced in the mid-1980s with fixed
STYX missile launchers which were taken from Osa Class Missile Boats. This redesign is
inherently dangerous and even a minor missile malfunction would result in significant damage to
the ship. The Najin carries SS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH Missiles and its crew likely carries
MANPADS. It has a SQUARE TIE Air Search Radar, a POT HEAD Surface Search Radar, a
POT DRUM Navigation Radar, and a DRUM TILT Fire Control Radar.
Figure 6-28 Najin Class Frigate
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Shantou Class Patrol Boat
The Shantou Class PB (Figure 6-29) has as speed of 45 knots, a 450 NM range at 30 knots, and a
600 NM range at 15 knots. It has two twin 25-mm/80 or two 37-mm or six 14.5-mm guns
(SINPO). All variants except SINPO have two 533-mm torpedo tubes. Its emitters are the SKIN
HEAD Surface Search Radar and the DEAD DUCK/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew likely carries
MANPADS.
Figure 6-29 Shantou Class Patrol Boat
Chaho Class Patrol Boat
The Chaho Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-30) has a speed of 37 knots and a range of 1300 NM at
18 knots. Its armament is one twin 23-mm/87 cannon, one twin 14.5-mm gun, one BM-21
multiple rocket launcher. It uses the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and its crew likely
carries MANPADS.
Figure 6-30 Chaho Class Patrol Boat
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Romeo Class SS
The Romeo Class SS (Figure 6-31) is a class of Soviet Diesel-Electric Submarines built in the
1950s. By today’s standards, they are considered obsolete but are still used by adversary nations
in the PACOM AOR for patrol and surveillance missions. The Romeo’s top speed is 15.2 knots
surfaced, 13 knots submerged, and 10 knots snorkeling. It carries 533-mm torpedoes and has
SNOOP PLATE and SNOOP TRAY Radar.
Figure 6-31 Romeo Class SS
Sang O Submarine
The Sang O (Figure 6-32) is a simple submarine for use in the covert insertion of Special
Operations Forces (SOF), mining, and/or SUW. The submarine comes in two different variants,
one with torpedo tubes, and the other without. Both variants have the capability to lay mines.
The Sang O’s top speed is 7.5 knots on the surface, 8.8 knots submerged, and 7.2 knots
snorkeling. It has a range of 2700 nm at 7 knots. Variant 1 has up to four 533-mm torpedo tubes
and both variants can carry 16 bottom mines. The Sang O has a FURUNO Surface Search
Radar.
Figure 6-32 Sang O Submarine
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DATA LINK OVERVIEW 7-1
CHAPTER SEVEN
DATA LINK OVERVIEW
700. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss data link basics, the terms, characteristics, procedures, and limitations
associated with data links, and how data links fit into the operating picture.
701. DATA LINK OVERVIEW
What is a tactical data link?
A tactical data link (TDL) is a communications system that supports the exchange of near-real-
time tactical data between participants using a variety of free- or fixed-format messages. These
messages are characterized by unique transmission characteristics, protocols, and standardized
message structure. TDLs permit a rapid exchange of information by automatically transferring
data between participating units. TDLs involve transmissions of bit-oriented digital information
that are exchanged via Tactical Digital Information Links (TADIL).
A TADIL is a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved standardized communication link suitable for
transmission of machine-readable digital information. The United States Navy uses the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, Link-XX, when referring to TADIL. Link 16
is synonymous with TADIL J. Similarly, Link-11 is synonymous with TADIL A and Link-4A
with TADIL C.
Why are TDLs necessary?
The development of the ability to conduct warfare with an integrated force led to a requirement
for standardized digital data processing systems with the ability to process large amounts of data
securely and in near real time. TDLs provide several advantages to a fighting force:
1. Force multiplier: TDLs shift the paradigm from a platform centric view to a network
centric force
2. Improve situational awareness
3. Provide for automatic/digital command and control functions
4. Faster decision cycles
5. Reduced voice communications
6. Joint/combined interoperability with other services/coalition forces (Figure 7-1)
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7-2 DATA LINK OVERVIEW
Figure 7-1 Tactical Data Link Picture
Tactical Data Links and the Operating Picture
The different data link types are combined to form the multi-TDL network (Figure 7-2), which is
integrated into the joint data network and augments the recognized air and maritime pictures.
These pictures form the common tactical picture which, when combined with the joint planning
network, forms the common operating picture (COP). The purpose of the COP is to get the right
information to the right people at the right level at the right time.
Figure 7-2 Multi-TDL Network Integration
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DATA LINK OVERVIEW 7-3
702. DATA LINK TYPES
Common data links associated with maritime operations are detailed in the next figure.
Data Link Characteristics and Features
Link 4A (Dolly)
TADIL C
Link 4A is a link to provide vectoring or targeting information to
aircraft, primarily fighters, from an E-2, E-3, or ship. It is a UHF
data link that transmits 5000 bits per second.
Link 11 (Alligator)
TADIL A
Link 11 is an automatic, medium-speed, UHF and HF link used for
the exchange of picture compilations and C2 information between
ships, aircraft, and shore stations. Link 11 is primarily a
surveillance data link. E-2 and E-3 are the primary airborne Link
11 platforms.
Link 16 (Timber)
TADIL J
Link 16 is a real-time, Electronic Countermeasure (ECM)-resistant,
secure, bit-oriented data link that uses Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) technology. It combines the functionality of links
4A and 11 and is used for contact reporting, aircraft control,
weapons coordination, C2, and voice communications.
Figure 7-3 Data Links
703. LINK 4A
Link 4A, (TADIL C), is one of several tactical data links in operation in the United States Armed
Services and NATO forces. Operators use the proword “Dolly” when referring to this data link.
Link 4A provides digital surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air tactical communications. It
is a command-and-response system that uses serial time-division multiplexing to transmit control
and reply messages over a UHF radio frequency. It provides for one- or two-way
communications between the controlling station and aircraft.
Link 4A was designed to replace voice communications for the control of tactical aircraft due to
the increased range (greater than radio voice range). The use of Link 4A has since been
expanded to include communication of digital data between surface and airborne platforms. First
installed in the late 1950s, Link 4A achieved a reputation for being reliable although its
transmissions are neither secure nor jam-resistant. The data link is easy to operate and maintain
without serious or long-term connectivity problems. Link 4A is quickly becoming obsolete with
the introduction of Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) terminals
into fighter/attack aircraft.
704. LINK 11
Link 11 (TADIL A), employs netted communication techniques and a standard message format
for exchanging digital information among airborne as well as land-based and shipboard tactical
data systems. Link 11 data communications must be capable of operation in either the HF or
UHF bands. Operators use the prowords, “Alligator” or “Gator,” when referring to this data link.
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7-4 DATA LINK OVERVIEW
Link 11 provides high-speed computer-to-computer digital radio communications among
Tactical Data System (TDS) equipped ships, aircraft, and shore sites. In addition to the radio
requirements, it uses a data terminal set, a KG-40 crypto device, a data link interface unit, and a
combat data system. Link 11 is a polling system that utilizes a net control station (NCS) that
polls every player in the data link in turn.
Additionally, link 11 positional information is not geodetic. Each unit reports its position
relative to a pre-specified origin known as a data link reference point (DLRP). Link 11 has been
around for many years and is due to be retired soon. Link 16 is its replacement.
705. LINK 16
LINK 16 (TADIL J) is the Department of Defense's primary tactical data link for command,
control, and intelligence, providing critical joint interoperability and situational awareness
information. It is a relatively new tactical data link that is being employed by the United States
Navy, the Joint Services, some NATO nations, and Japan. Link 16 improves on existing tactical
data link communications in two ways—through more complete and more accurate tactical
information and through superior communications technology. Operators use the proword,
“Timber,” when referring to Link 16. The radio transmission and reception components of
Link 16 are known as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System or JTIDS. JTIDS is a
high-capacity, UHF, line of sight, frequency-hopping data communication terminal that provides
secure, jam-resistant voice and digital data exchange. The Multifunctional Information
Distribution System (MIDS) is a smaller, less capable terminal normally installed on fighter
aircraft. A diagram displaying the location of the JTIDS frequency band is shown in the next
figure.
Figure 7-4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Frequency Band
JTIDS Units (JUs) are participants in a TADIL J network that are assigned to Network
Participation Groups (NPGs). JUs are designated as either C2 or non-C2. The C2 JU is a
JTIDS-equipped platform which is capable of directing the activities of other platforms by
exercising C2 authority. The non-C2 JU is a JTIDS-equipped platform with limited capability or
lack of capability to direct the activities of other platforms.
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Time Division Multiple Access
The JTIDS network employs a communications architecture known as Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA). TDMA consists of time slots that are allocated among all TADIL J network
participants for the transmission and reception of data. TDMA eliminates the requirement for an
NCS by providing a nodeless communications network architecture, however, one participant,
normally a C2 unit, must act as a Net Time Reference (NTR) for the network.
Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) is a message used to transmit crypto-
secure location and identification information about a JU. In addition to position and positive
identification, each platform may provide status information such as fuel, weapons inventory,
and mission assignment tasking. This capability is one of the most important benefits of
TADIL J.
NOTE
The capability of all Link 16 participants to frequently provide
comprehensive position, identification, and status information is a
considerable improvement over other data links and has significant
capability to reduce or prevent fratricide (friendly-on-friendly
engagement).
Network Participation Groups
Link 16’s network capacity is apportioned among several “virtual circuits.” Each circuit or
Network Participation Group (NPG) is dedicated to a single function. NPGs are the functional
building blocks of a TADIL J network. Since NPGs are defined by their function, the types of
messages transmitted on them are also defined. NPGs are used or assigned, and each of the
transmit time slots is assigned an NPG that it supports.
Some of the specific functions of NPGs are as follows: NPG 14 is used by the USN for data
forwarding between Link 11 and 16. NPG 7 is used to share surveillance picture data. NPGs 12
and 13 are J voice A and B respectively, NPG 1 is used for initial network entry, NPG 9 is Air
Control, and NPG 19 is fighter to fighter.
Link 16 Relative Navigation
Relative Navigation (RELNAV), an automatic function of the terminal, is used to determine the
distance between platforms by measuring the arrival times of transmissions and correlating them
with reported positions. Terminals on a network need this information to maintain time
synchronization. RELNAV is in constant operation in all terminals, and its data can be used to
improve a unit’s positional accuracy.
If two or more units have independent, accurate knowledge of their geodetic positions, RELNAV
can provide all units in the network with accurate geodetic positions. As a result, the precise
geodetic position of every unit can be maintained constantly by every other unit.
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7-6 DATA LINK OVERVIEW
Anti-Jam
Anti-jam is a method that ensures that transmitted information can be received despite jamming
attempts. The JTIDS terminal utilizes a pseudorandom frequency-hopping pattern, time jitter,
and frequency spreading to create a jammer-unfriendly transmitting environment.
Reed/Solomon (R/S) error coding allows the system to predicatively correct for any missing data
that could result from jammer interference; however, this will not work for voice data since it
does not follow a predictable pattern.
TADIL J has the capability to operate in a hostile EM environment. The TADIL J waveform
was developed in order to provide significant performance enhancements against optimized,
band-matching jammers. It was also made to preclude jamming by a narrow band jammer. To
accomplish this, the transmission frequency of the terminal is changed every 13 microseconds
(approximately 77,000 hops per second) across 51 discrete Lx Band frequencies. The
frequency-hopping pattern is pseudorandom and is determined by the Transmission Security
(TSEC) crypto key.
Link 16 J Voice
TADIL J provides two secure, digitized voice NPGs: J Voice A and B. Each voice NPG has a
data rate of 2.4 or 16 kilobits per second (kbps). When using the 16 kbps data rate, voice clarity
is enhanced, and time slot usage is significantly increased.
Voice circuits remain active when the terminal is set to the data silent mode of operation. J voice
is not currently used by some platforms.
Data Link Symbology
MIL Standard 2525 Data link symbology is detailed in the next figure. Your future platform
may differ slightly.
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DATA LINK OVERVIEW 7-7
Figure 7-5 Data Link Symbology
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TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY 8-1
CHAPTER EIGHT
TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY
800. INTRODUCTION
This chapter includes a discussion of warfare commander call signs, weapon control statuses,
threat warnings, brevity codes, queries, and briefings.
801. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES
Call signs and threat warning/weapon control statuses provide an efficient and timely reference
to the commander in question or to the targeting instructions in the field.
A warfare commander is typically assigned a two-letter call sign associated with his or her
respective assigned duty. The call sign, which provides a clear picture of the command
organization, is a quick and easy reference for a commander to use in cross-warfare area
communications. The first letter (prefix) of each call sign signifies a specific composite warfare
organization. The second letter (suffix) of each call sign signifies a specific commander or
coordinator within a composite warfare organization.
Each warfare commander has a primary commander in charge and a designated alternate
commander. If the primary commander is not able to take control of their particular warfare
area, the alternate commander takes control. The warfare commander, functional commander,
and coordinator have their own call signs the same as a primary commander and an alternate
commander. The prevalent composite warfare commanders/coordinators introduced in chapter
21 and their call signs are as follows:
OTC: The theater commander’s call sign is (AA). Normally the OTC is the numbered fleet
commander (e.g., Commander 5th Fleet) and is usually the rank of, Vice Admiral.
CWC: Delegated authority by the OTC for the overall direction and control of the force. The
CWC is normally the CSG Commander, call sign (AB), and is a Rear Admiral Lower Half
(one-star).
AMDC: Call sign (AW) is normally the CSG Cruiser CO with the rank of Captain (O-6).
IWC: Call sign (AQ) is normally the senior O-6 onboard the CSG staff.
SCC: Call sign (AZ) is normally the DESRON commander with the rank of Captain (O-6).
STWC: Call sign (AP) is normally the Carrier Air Group (CAG) Commander (CAG) with the
rank of Captain (O-6).
FOTC: Call sign (AF) is normally the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), a limited duty
officer (LDO) onboard the CSG staff specializing in multi-tactical data link interface
architecture, planning, and operation.
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Weapon Control Status
The OTC or the relevant warfare commander issues a weapon control status. This weapon
control status provides the commander’s general direction or policy for weapon employment for
all or part of a specific warfare area such as SUW, ASW, and AAW. The weapon control
statuses are: Weapons Free (open fire on any target that is not identified as friendly), Tight (Do
not open fire unless target is identified as hostile), and Safe (Do not open fire except in
self-defense or in response to a formal order). Weapon Control Statuses are general in nature so
as not to override ROE or command by negation.
Threat Warnings
Since threat, warnings are informative, force or individual unit actions are not automatically
linked to the warning. Sometimes, an OTC orders temporary action based on a certain situation;
however, threat warnings are typically issued as a direct result of detections and enemy reports.
The color codes that are applied to threat warnings denote the severity of the evaluated threats.
These color codes are Warning White (attack is unlikely without adequate warning), Yellow
(attack is probable), and Red (attack is imminent or has already begun).
Threat warnings apply to principal warfare areas and include, but are not limited to, AAW,
SUW, and ASW.
802. BREVITY PROCEDURE WORDS (PROWORDS)
Multi-service brevity prowords are used by various military forces and, by design, are a universal
language not tied to any one particular branch of service. Brevity prowords convey complex
information in simplified terms. They are intended to shorten, rather than conceal, the content of
a message. The latest edition of the Common Universal Brevity Code Manual (June 2018) is
available for download at the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Website. The hyperlink
is http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html and CAC login is required. It is highly
recommended that each student downloads and studies the terms found in the ALSA Common
Universal Brevity Code Manual. The ALSA manual refers to these prowords as “codes”,
however, as previously discussed, they offer neither security nor concealment. These terms will
be discussed in the CAI and MIL lessons associated with this chapter and will be utilized
regularly during simulator events. Students are responsible for the knowledge of ALSA brevity
words covered in this chapter’s CAI and MIL presentations.
803. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS
Knowing how to respond to a query challenge (depending on location) is very important within
naval aviation. Knowledge of standardized briefs and reports is also critical to mission success.
Maritime Query Challenge Procedures
Freedom of the high seas includes the right of aircraft of all nations to use the airspace over the
high seas. The sovereignty of a state extends beyond its land area to the outer limit of its
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TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY 8-3
territorial seas. The U.S. recognizes territorial sea claims up to 12 NM from a state’s land
boundaries. When U.S. military aircraft personnel experience different maritime situations,
specific procedures exist as described below.
A U.S. military aircraft that receives a challenge from an international authority while operating
in international airspace should advise the challenging authority that it is a U.S. military aircraft
and continue its planned route of flight. If a U.S. military aircraft is intercepted by foreign
aircraft, established DoD Flight Information Procedures and International Intercept Procedures
should be followed.
If intercepted in the territorial airspace of a foreign country, a U.S. military aircraft should
change course to comply with the foreign authority’s directions to depart territorial airspace or
directions to land (provided a safe landing can be accomplished). If the aircraft lands, the crew
should immediately contact the applicable U.S. embassy for assistance.
Briefs and Reports
Standardized briefs and reports provide useful information regarding assets, capabilities, targets,
actions, and other data. The briefing formats that should be used are the Standard Check-in
Brief, Surface Contact Report, Maritime Air Control (MAC) Comm Format, Checkout Briefing
In-Flight Report (INFLTREP), and ACU turnover Format.
The standard check-in format (Figure 8-1) is used in conjunction with Air Operations in
Maritime Surface Warfare (AOMSW) missions such as armed reconnaissance/strike
coordination and reconnaissance (AR/SCAR) with dynamic targets requiring quick reaction
times.
Figure 8-1 Standard Check-in Brief
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The Surface Contact Report (Figure 8-2) provides standardized information on vessels or tracks
of interest. Do not transmit the line numbers.
Figure 8-2 Surface Contact Report
The baseline air-to-surface communications format for MAC (Figure 8-3) has been aligned to
closely resemble the one used for Tactical Air Intercept Control (TACAIC).
Figure 8-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format
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TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY 8-5
The Checkout Briefing (INFLTREP), shown in Figure 8-4, recaps actions taken during air
operations in maritime surface warfare (AOMSW) missions. Line numbers are not transmitted.
Figure 8-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report)
The off-going ACUs will complete a turnover with oncoming ACUs prior to checking off station
with the SCC. All relevant command and control information should be passed between them.
Figure 8-5 is an example of the ACU turnover format.
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Figure 8-5 ACU Turnover Format
DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-1
CHAPTER NINE
DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT
900. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses employing Link 16 in an operational environment to include network
structuring, operational concepts, and tactical level network planning.
901. DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT
Link 16 Employment Overview
Airborne Link 16 platforms play a vital role in sharing, extending, and augmenting the tactical
information available to ships and to land-based facilities, thereby expanding the overall tactical
picture. These platforms also extend the radio horizon of the JTIDS network by acting as relays.
In order to achieve maximum effectiveness within the data link, a significant amount of network
planning, designing, and promulgation must take place in order to properly define the
participants, their transmit assignments, the hardware configurations they will use, and the link
configuration in which they will operate.
Structuring the Link 16 Network
The focus of this section is on Link 16’s logical structure, which is mission-oriented, and
changes based on fleet requirements. Many different logical structures are possible. These
structures are designed by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s (SPAWAR)
Network Design Facility and are collected into electronic files called JTIDS Network Libraries
(JNL), and Network Description Documents (NDD).
Even though the end user has almost no control over defining the network structure, an
understanding of its design and functionality is helpful when it comes to tactical level planning
and troubleshooting. Additionally, it helps a user understand limitations that are inherent in the
design of a particular network.
As previously discussed, NPGs are the network’s functional building blocks. This functional
structuring allows JUs to participate only on the NPGs necessary for the functions they perform.
Network capacity is assigned first to NPGs then to users participating in that NPG.
In general, networks are designed to support particular operational goals. The following is a
description of some of the NPGs that may be found in a typical Network.
NPG 1 Initial Entry: This NPG supports coarse synchronization and entry into the network. The
JU assigned as NTR periodically transmits net entry messages in this NPG to be used by other
terminals in acquiring system time.
NPG 2 Round Trip Timing: Timing Messages are automatically exchanged among JUs to
support Fine Synchronization.
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NPG 7 Surveillance: Contacts that have been detected, evaluated, classified, and identified are
shared among participants on NPG 7. Air, surface, and subsurface tracks, land-based SAM sites,
reference points, ASW points, and EW bearings and fixes are all exchanged on this NPG.
Primarily, C2 platforms participate in the surveillance function.
NPG 9 Air Control: Command and control JUs can control non C2 JUs on this NPG. It is
configured as a stacked net with two parts, an uplink, and a backlink. Each net is assigned to a
specific controller, either a ship or an E-2, and the fighter aircraft being controlled. The
controlling unit provides the mission assignments, vectors, and target reports to the fighter
aircraft on the uplink. The fighters receive a processed and correlated tactical picture from their
controlling unit on the uplink.
Figure 9-1 Air Control NPG Uplink and Backlink
NPGs 12 and 13 Voice Group A and B: These NPGs provide secure digitized voice capability
for use by all JUs. They are usually configured as stacked nets with 127 possible sub-circuits
each. Depending on network design, these channels can be either 2.4 or 16 kbps non-error
correction coded.
NPG 19 Fighter to Fighter (Dedicated): Non-C2 units, such as fighters, exchange radar sensor
information and status on this NPG. It is usually configured as a stacked net. The maximum
fighter flight size is 8 fighters, but options are provided to allow 2, 4, or 8 fighters per net.
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DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-3
Time Slot Assignments
The amount of network capacity assigned to a given NPG depends on communications priorities,
including:
1. The number and types of participants
2. How often the participant needs access to the NPG
3. The expected volume of data
4. The update rate of the information
5. Relay requirements
The number of time slots that must be allocated within the NPG to each participant depends on
the type of unit and the method of accessing the time slot. There are currently three modes of
access for time slots.
Dedicated Access: The assignment of time slots to a uniquely identified unit for transmission
purposes. Only the assigned JU may transmit during that time slot. If there is no data to
transmit, the time slot goes unused. The advantage of dedicated access is that each JU on an
NPG owns a predetermined portion of the network’s capacity and there will be no transmission
conflicts. A disadvantage is that assets are not interchangeable. For example, one aircraft cannot
simply replace another during an operation.
Contention Access: The assignment of time slots to a group of units as a pool for transmission
purposes. Each unit randomly selects a time slot from the pool during which to transmit. In
contention access, several units may transmit simultaneously. The advantage of contention
access is that each terminal is given the same initialization parameters for the time slot block.
This simplifies network design and reduces network management burden. Assets are
interchangeable with contention access. A disadvantage is that there is no guarantee a
transmission will be received.
Time Slot Reallocation (TSR) Access: The network capacity of an NPG is assigned dynamically
based on the projected needs of the participants. This access method is intended to support a
fluctuating demand from a varying group of users. Each platform reports its transmission needs
over the network, and algorithms within the terminal redistribute the pool of time slots to meet
the need. The advantage of time slot reallocation is that the network capacity is distributed
where it is needed as it is needed. A disadvantage is all users share in the network degradation if
the need exceeds the available capacity.
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Network Roles
Network roles are functions available to a JU through initialization and operator selection. A
network role can support one or more of the following functions: synchronization, navigation,
and multi-link operations. With the exception of Network Manager, all roles may be changed at
the respective terminals during operations. Some of these roles include NTR, Initial Entry JU
(IEJU), Navigation Controller (NC), Position Reference (PR), Primary User (PRU), and
Forwarding JU (FJU). Roles are assigned to various units via the Operational Tasking Data Link
(OPTASK LINK) message. Certain roles have specific requirements that must be adhered to by
the unit assigned the role.
NTR: This is the most essential role when establishing a JTIDS network. A single JU is
assigned this role for a given network. If more than one unit assumes the role as NTR, the result
is known as a split net having virtually no functionality. The NTR must be a C2 unit that will be
present throughout the operation and that will have LOS connectivity with as many other units as
possible. Typically, A Navy surface unit or ground station will be NTR.
PR: The PR must have a geodetic positional accuracy within 50 feet and should be assigned to
well surveyed stationary sites. Never assign the role of PR to a Navy Unit.
NC: The NC is designated only when a relative grid is desired. This unit should be mobile,
present for the duration of the operation, and have good line of sight (LOS) connectivity to as
many units as possible. Should a unit designated as NC becomes stationary, it must relinquish
this role.
IEJU: This role provides system time to units beyond LOS of the NTR. Assign the role of IEJU
to all active units.
PRU: A PRU transmits round trip timing (RTT) to actively maintain synchronization within the
network. This role applies to all JUs except the NTR. Networks designed for use by the U.S.
Navy typically support up to 200 PRUs. If the number of participants exceeds 200, some will
have to be designated as secondary users which must operate passively.
FJU: The FJU translates and forwards data between tactical data links (e.g., Link 16 and
Link 11). In order to function as an FJU, a unit must have a command and control processor
(C2P) onboard. All ships can perform the FJU role but, ideally, only one FJU is assigned for the
entire force. This unit is commonly referred to as the data forwarder.
Net Entry
Net entry is performed by the JTIDS terminal. The process of acquiring system time is called
synchronization. The process begins with an estimate of the current time and can, therefore, be
simplified if the NTR uses coordinated universal time (UT) from the GPS. The first step to
entering a network is to acquire synchronization.
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DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-5
Coarse Synchronization (CS): Using a time estimate, the terminal chooses a time slot it is
certain has not yet occurred and begins listening for a net entry message. Once the message is
received, the terminal uses the message to correct its system time. When the message is
received, the terminal is declared to be in coarse synchronization. After coarse synchronization
is achieved, the terminal can begin to transmit RTT interrogations. This is the only transmission
that the terminal can make in coarse sync.
Fine Synchronization (FS): Once in coarse sync, the terminal uses both the measured time of
arrival of the RTT reply, and the reported time of arrival of the RTT interrogation to further
adjust its system time to remove the error due to propagation time. When the error is removed,
the terminal is declared to be in fine sync. Terminals must be in fine sync to transmit messages
on the network.
Relays
JTIDS is strictly a UHF LOS system. For air-to-air or ship-to–air data transfer, this is
approximately 300 NM. For ship-to–ship data transfer, it is closer to 25 NM. Because of this,
relays are almost always required for the CSG. Relays are established during network design
and time slots are allocated specifically for this purpose.
The network is designed with specific time slots designated as relay pairs and specific JUs
designated to perform the relay function. The designated relay JU must be provided with the
capacity to transmit the relayed message. Messages received in one time slot are relayed in a
later pre-allocated time slot. The original message and the relayed message are referred to as a
relay pair. Paired time slots are assigned as a part of each NPG that requires relay support. The
number of time slots required depends on the number of relay hops required to reach the
destination. The relaying unit must be in fine sync and in the normal range mode. Messages
with uncorrectable errors are not retransmitted. Some of the relay types are described below.
The most basic type of relay technique is called the paired slot relay. With this type of relay, the
transmit slot is paired with the receive slot using a fixed offset called the relay delay; however,
the use of paired slot relays reduces the potential capacity of an NPG by 50%.
The conditional relay depends on geographic coverage. It requires the terminal to selectively
activate or deactivate the relay function based on which JU can provide the most efficient
coverage. The conditional relay becomes active if its geographic coverage is greater than that of
the current relay. Geographic coverage is determined from height and range data derived from
the unit’s PPLI.
In a flood relay, all units act as unconditional multiple relays. This strategy is designed to
improve connectivity to units outside of LOS with each other. It is the principle relay mode for
the U.S. Navy and is used whenever practicable.
A relay assignment in which the relaying unit is unable to decipher the encrypted message
content is known as a blind relay.
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Communications Security
Communications Security (COMSEC) is provided by the KGV-8 Secure Data Unit (SDU). The
KGV-8 attaches directly to the terminal and has memory locations available for 8
cryptovariables (4 today/tomorrow pairs), which are binary keys used to encrypt and decrypt
data. Every day is assigned a crypto period designator (CPD). The current CPD (CCPD) is
established by the date on which the terminal is initialized and designates which crypto pair to
use for today. The other is automatically used for tomorrow. Two layers of COMSEC are
provided. They are TSEC and message security (MSEC). To quickly obtain the current crypto
day, an operator will consult the JANIF table which knows the CCPD based on the Network
Operations start date.
Multi-netting
All users do not need to participate in every function. Therefore, some functions in networks are
mutually exclusive (EW and high update rate PPLI). These mutually exclusive NPGs are “multi-
netted.” The same time slots are used by different platforms for different functions; thus,
network wide throughput increases. The multi-net arrangement differs from stacked nets in that
participants perform different functions and cannot selectively switch from one to the other.
Multi netting can be established simply by specifying different net numbers. In multiple-net
structures, the time slots used on different NPGs may overlap, but different net numbers and/or
TSEC crypto keys prevent interference (Figure 9-2).
Figure 9-2 Multiple Nets
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DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-7
Stacked nets are created by assigning the same group of time slots to the same NPG with the
same TSEC parameter, but with different net numbers. Stacked nets support multiple,
simultaneous transmissions (Figure 9-3). Different nets do not hear each other. Stacked nets are
defined to the terminal with a net number of 127. This indicates “no statement” or no definition
and allows the operator to change net numbers within the NPG like changing channels on a
television. Voice nets and control nets are examples of stacked nets.
Figure 9-3 Stacked Net
Isolation between network users can be achieved by using different MSEC cryptovariables.
These are known as crypto nets. When a group of JUs is isolated from another group of JUs in
this manner, independent “Crypto-nets” are established where only authorized users will be able
to exchange information. If the MSEC cryptovariable is different, unauthorized users can
receive the signal, error correct it, and retransmit it, but cannot decrypt it. This is how the
previously discussed Blind Relay is established.
Multiple networks have a different TSEC and possibly a different MSEC variable. Each network
is independent of the other and each has its own NTR assigned. This complete isolation of
networks allows two different CSG networks to coexist in the same Op Area. Other ways to
achieve multiple separate networks are to use a different network file from the JNL or to offset
the JTIDS system time between the two networks. By offsetting the time, both networks can use
the same JNL file and the exact same crypto which makes dropping out of one network and
synching to the next one quite simple if the time offset is known.
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Link 16 Operations
Link 16 provides a greatly improved friendly force location, identification, and status reporting
capability. It is designed to support the full range of tactical information exchange requirements
necessary in the great majority of operational scenarios. A far greater volume of information can
be exchanged over Link 16 as compared to Link 11. This section discusses Link 16 network
operation subfunctions, network management, data forwarding, and concurrent operations.
Network operation has three subfunctions: link establishment, link maintenance, and
information management. Link establishment is the monitoring, control, and troubleshooting of
JTIDS/MIDS units as they enter the link. Link maintenance consists primarily of
synchronization and navigation maintenance. Data registration and identification depend upon
link maintenance. Poor link maintenance could have serious consequences including causing a
blue-on-blue engagement. Information management is the handling of all information
exchanged across the interface. It is an ongoing process as long as the link is operational. In a
multi-link environment, the Track Data Coordinator (TDC) and Joint Interface Control Officer
(JICO) must coordinate all information management in order to direct multi-link measures to
correct items like dual designations, ID conflicts, and time latency.
Network management of the operating Link 16 network is performed by the JICO. It consists of
those actions needed to dynamically establish, maintain, and terminate Link 16 communications
among net participants. The JICO must be ready to take action to accommodate a changing
operational environment. The JICO must monitor force composition, geometry, proper network
configuration, and multi-link requirements, as well as perform general link administration. His
actions can include assigning network roles to specific units, activating and deactivating relays,
changing various settings, and changing the active or data silent status of a JU.
Data Forwarding is the process of receiving data on one digital data link and outputting the data
onto another digital data link in the proper format. In the process, messages received on one link
are translated to appropriate data fields in the corresponding messages. The term multi-link
operations refers to operations where both Link 11 and Link 16 operate and data is being
forwarded between them. Data forwarding allows as much tactical information as possible to be
shared by all members of a multi-link force. Any ship with a C2P can perform the FJU function.
If perfect connectivity could be maintained at all times, between all units of a multi-link force,
and if the FJUs could always remain fully operational, there would be no need for units to
operate on more than one link at a time. The world is not perfect however, and perfect
connectivity is improbable. The U.S. Navy has planned for this reality and developed the
concept of concurrent operations (CONOPS) in which units may be active on both Link 16 and
Link 11 concurrently, even when they are not acting a data forwarder. A unit that operates on
both links 16 and 11, but is not an FJU, is called a Concurrent Interface Unit (CIU).
A problem associated with CONOPS is data looping which is the forwarding of forwarded data
in an endless circle. To prevent data looping, several rules are established for CIUs and FJUs in
order to ensure that only a direct path is followed (CIUs transmit and receive data directly, not
through a data forwarder).
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Network Planning
This section discusses the Network Management System (NMS), to include the network design
process, network planning, and the OPTASKLINK message. The NMS provides configuration
control for platform loads and a way to define the human activities involved in initializing and
operating the JTIDS/MIDS terminals. The JTIDS/MIDS terminal is programmable. Each
platform requires an initialization load. Coordinated loads are required for interoperability. The
NMS provides configuration control of the multiple platform loads.
The NMS is a four-step process: design, planning, initialization, and operation of the network.
It is heavily front-loaded toward design and planning in order to maintain configuration control,
remove the element of operator error, and minimize operator workload. More than 99% of all
terminal parameters are set during the design, planning, and initialization phases, leaving less
than 1% for the operator to either set or modify during operation.
Network design contains all the programming parameters required to initialize the JTIDS/MIDS
terminals that will participate in the network. Network Design Facilities (NDFs) are responsible
for network design. Two distinct products are generated during the network design stage: a
Network Description Document (NDD) and the network design. The NDD is provided to the
requestor to ensure the design meets their requirements. Network design contains all the
programming parameters required to initialize the JTIDS/MIDS terminals that will participate in
the network.
The second stage of the NMS is network planning or simply planning for short. This includes
both long-term planning and short-term planning.
During long-term planning, planners compare their requirements against all existing networks in
the JTIDS Network Library (JNL) to determine if one of them meets their needs. If there is no
existing network that satisfies the requirements, then requestors fill out a Network Design
Request and submit it to their Service Network Design Facility.
During short-term planning the OPTASK LINK message is generated (Figure 9-4 and 9-5). The
OPTASK LINK message is a set of detailed instructions for all link participants that provides the
guidance for interoperability. The OPTASK LINK contains link duty assignments, capacity
assignments, crypto key material information, plus activation and operating instructions.
The third stage of the NMS is network initialization or initialization for short. This is when the
operators use the products derived from the design and planning stages to set up their platform
for interoperability.
Although initialization procedures vary between platform types, the same basic functions are
performed by all platforms. The users, in order to meet the directions and guidance contained in
the OPTASK LINK message, parse out and modify their specific platform network load files so
that two or more of their platforms can be simultaneously participating in the network without
competing for timeslots.
CHAPTER NINE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
9-10 DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT
For E-2 aircraft, these resulting files are called J load files that units will load into their JTIDS
terminal. Two E-2 aircraft that plan on being airborne at the same time will have to coordinate
ahead of time so they don’t accidentally load the same J Load file.
For fighter aircraft, these files are usually created during mission planning and transferred to the
aircraft on a data storage unit. On other platforms, such as the P-8, they are transferred into the
terminal via a data bus or Ethernet connection from the host system. The resulting network load
contains all the information necessary for the respective terminal to begin operations.
Network operation is the fourth and final stage of the NMS. It begins when the Network Time
Reference starts broadcasting the Initial Entry Messages (IEMs) and incorporates the three
previously discussed subfunctions: link establishment, link maintenance, and information
management.
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER NINE
DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-11
Figure 9-4 OPTASK LINK Example 1
CHAPTER NINE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
9-12 DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT
Figure 9-5 OPTASK LINK Example 2
GLOSSARY A-1
APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
µsec microsecond
3D Three-dimensional
A/A Air-to-Air
A/FD Airport/Facility Directory
A/G Air-to-Ground
A/S Air-to-Surface
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAM Air-to-Air Missile
AAW Anti-Air Warfare
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACC Area Control Center
ACM Airspace Coordinating Measures
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACU Aircraft Control Unit
ADC Air Defense Center
ADF Automatic Direction Finder
ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
Advanced MC2 Advanced Maritime Command and Control
AEA Airborne Electronic Attack
AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AFB Air Force Base
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System
AGL Above Ground Level
AIM Aeronautical Information Manual
AIRMET Airmen’s Meteorological Information
AIS Automatic Identification System
ALCS Airborne Launch Control System
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-2 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
ALR Acceptable Levels of Risk
ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center
AM Amplitude Modulation
AMDC Air Missile Defense Commander
AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
AMTI Airborne Moving Target Indicator
AO Area of Operations
AOMSW Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare
AOP Area of Probability
AOR Area of Responsibility
AP Area Planning
AR Air-Refueling Track
AR/AI/SCAR Armed Reconnaissance/Air Interdiction/Strike
Coordination and Reconnaissance
AREC Air Resource Element Coordinator
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ASM Anti-Ship Missile
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar
ASROC Anti-Submarine Rocket
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASWC Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander
ATA Automatic Target Acquisition
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATFLIR Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWS Aegis Weapon System
BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-3
Acronym Definition
BHA Bomb Hit Assessment
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
BR Bearing Resolution
BRAA Bearing, Range, Altitude, and Aspect
BUNO Bureau Number
BVR Beyond Visual Range
BW Beamwidth
BWE Beamwidth Error
C Central
C Coverage Factor
C/A Coarse Acquisition
C&R Coordination and Reporting
C2
C2P
Command and Control
Command and Control Processor
C3 Command, Control, and Communications
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence
CA Crab Angle
CAG Carrier Air Group
cal caliber
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAS Close Air Support
CB Citizen Band
CCOI Critical Contacts of Interest
CCPD Current Crypto Period Designator
CENTCOM Central Command
CERT
CFF
Certain
Clear Field of Fire
CGRS Common Geographic Reference System
CH Compass Heading
CIEA Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-4 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
CIRVIS Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital
Intelligence Sightings
CIWS Close-In Weapons System
CIU Concurrent Interface Unit
cm centimeters
CNATRA Chief of Naval Air Training
CND Computer Network Defense
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CO Commanding Officer
COI Contacts of Interest
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMNAVAIRFOR Commander, Naval Air Forces
COMSEC Communications Security
CONOPS Concept of Operations/Concurrent Operations
CONUS Continental United States
COP Common Operational Picture
CPD Crypto Period Designator
CPS Cycles Per Second
CRC Cryptologic Resource Coordinator
CRM Crew Resource Management
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CS Coarse Synchronization
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSC Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated
CSG Carrier Strike Group
CSR Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar
CTPM Common Tactical Picture Manager
CTW-6 Commander, Training Air Wing Six
CVIC Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center
CVW Carrier Air Wing
CW Continuous Wave
CWC Composite Warfare Commander
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-5
Acronym Definition
DA Decision Altitude
DA Drift Angle
DAISS Digital Airborne Intercommunications and Switching
System
DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access
DAP Downlinked Air Parameter
DCT direct (code type)
DDP Digital Data Processor
DE Directed Energy
DEWIZ Defense Early Warning Identification Zone
DF Direction Finder
DH Decision Height
DIM Daily Intentions Message
DINS Defense Internet NOTAM Service
DLRP Data Link Reference Point
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DOA Direction of Arrival
DoD Department of Defense
DP Departure Procedure
DP/SID Departure Procedure/Standard Instrument Departure
DPG Digital Processing Group
DR Dead Reckoning
DSN Defense Switched Network
DST Daylight Saving Time
E East (when used with latitude and longitude)
E Eastern
EA Electronic Attack
ECHUM Electronic Chart Updating Manual
ECM Electronic Countermeasures
EET Estimated Elapsed Time
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EM Electromagnetic
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-6 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMCON Emissions Control
EO Electro-Optical
EOB Electronic Order of Battle
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time
EP Electronic Protection
ES Electronic Support
ESA Emergency Safe Altitude
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group
ESM Electronic Support Measures
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
ETE Estimated Time Enroute
EW Electronic Warfare
F2T2EA Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FA Aviation Area Forecast
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)
FACSFAC Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FDC Flight Data Center
FDOA Frequency Difference of Arrival
FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone
FIC Flight Information Center
FIH Flight Information Handbook
FIR Flight Information Region
FIS Flight Information Service
FJU Forwarding JTIDS Unit
FL Flight Level
FLIP Flight Information Publication
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared
FM Frequency Modulation
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-7
Acronym Definition
FMS Flight Management System
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations
FOTC Force Track Coordination
FOV Field of View
fpm feet per minute
FRS Fleet Replacement Squadron
FS Fine Synchronization
FSS Flight Service Station
Ft feet or foot
FTC Force Track Coordinator
FWB Flight Weather Briefer
GARS Global Area Reference System
GEOREF Geographic Reference
GHz Gigahertz
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator
GNC Global Navigation and Planning Chart
GP General Planning
GPS Global Positioning System
GS Groundspeed
HAA Height Above Airport
HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile
HAT Height Above Touchdown
HEC Helicopter Element Coordinator
HF High Frequency
Hr hour or hours
HSI Horizontal Situation Indicator
HWD Horizontal Weather Depiction
Hz hertz
I&W Indications and Warnings
IAF Initial Approach Fix
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-8 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
IAP Instrument Approach Procedure
IAS Indicated Airspeed
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICO Interface Control Officer
ICS Intercommunications System
IDM Improved Data Modem
IEJU Initial Entry JTIDS Unit
IEM Initial Entry Message
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IIR Imaging IR
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
in inch or inches
in Hg inches of mercury
INCSEA Incidents On or Over the High Seas
INFLTREP In-Flight Report
INFOCON Information Operations Condition
INS Inertial Navigation System
IR IFR Military Route
IR Infrared
IRU Inertial Reference Unit
ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IWC Information Operations Warfare Commander
JAFF Jamming and Chaff
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JEZ Joint Engagement Zone
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-9
Acronym Definition
JHMCS Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System
JICO Joint Interface Control Officer
JMPS Joint Mission Planning System
JNC Jet Navigation Chart
JNL JTIDS Network Library
JRFL Joint Restricted Frequency List
JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JU Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Unit
kbps kilobits per second
kg kilogram
kHz kilohertz
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed
K-KILL Catastrophic Kill
km kilometers
kt knot
kts knots
kW kilowatt
LAC Launch Area Coordinator
LAT/LONG Latitude and Longitude
lbs pounds
LKP Last Known Position
LO Low Observable
LOP Line of Position
LOS Line-of-Sight
LSP Launch Sequence Plan
LSRS Littoral Surveillance Radar System
LWR Laser Warning Receiver
M meters
m2 square meters
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-10 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
M Mach
MAC Maritime Air Control or Controller
MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detector or Detection
MAG VAR Magnetic Variation
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal
mb millibars
MC Magnetic Course
MC Mission Commander
MC2 Maritime Command and Control
MCA Minimum Crossing Altitude
MCS Multi-Crew Simulator
MCW Modulated Continuous Wave
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude
MEA Minimum Enroute Clearance
MEZ Missile Engagement Zone
MH Magnetic Heading
MHQ Maritime Headquarters
MHz megahertz
mi mile or miles
MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution System
MILDEC Military Deception
MILSTAR Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
min minute or minutes
MIOC Maritime Interception Operations Commander
MITL Man-In-The-Loop
MIW Mine Warfare
MIWC Mine Warfare Commander
mm millimeters
MN Magnetic North
MOA Military Operations Area
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-11
Acronym Definition
MOCA Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MPR Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance
MPRF Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency
MRA Minimum Reception Altitude
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
ms millisecond
MSA Minimum Safe Altitude
MSA Minimum Sector Altitude
MSEC Message Security
MSL Mean Sea Level
MTI Moving Target Indicator
MTR Military Training
MWWA Military Weather Warning Advisory
MWS Missile Warning System
N north
NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
NAFC Naval Aviation Forecast Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATOPS Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization
NAVAID Navigational Aid
NCCOSC Naval C2 and Ocean Surveillance Center
NC Navigation Controller
NCS Net Control Station
NDB Nondirectional Beacon
NDD Network Description Document
NDF Network Design Facility
NFDC National Flight Data Center
NFO Naval Flight Officer
NFOTS Naval Flight Officer Training System
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-12 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
NMS Network Management System
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
NPG Network Participation Group
NRaD Naval Research and Development Division
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support
NTAP Notices to Airmen Publication
NTR Net Time Reference
NWS National Weather Service
O Immediate (message type)
OA Operational Area
OARS Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.
OJT On-the-Job Training
OMFTS Operational Maneuver From the Sea
ONC Operational Navigation Chart
ONSTA On Station
OPAREAS Operating Areas
OPARS Optimum Path Aircraft Routing System
OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
OPR Other Performance Reports
OPSEC Operations Security
OPTASK Operation Task
OPTASK LINK Operational Tasking Data Links
ORM Operational Risk Management
OROCA Off-Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude
OSC On-Scene Commander
OTC Officer in Tactical Command
OTH Over-the-Horizon
P Precision (code signals only)
P Priority (message type)
PA Public Announcement
PACOM Pacific Command
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-13
Acronym Definition
PAR Precision Approach Radar
PD Pulse Doppler
PD Pulse Duration
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PIC Pilot in Command
PID Positive Identification
PIW Person In Water
PL Pulse Length
PLE Pulse Length Error
PMSV Pilot-to-Metro Service
POB Persons on Board
POD Probability of Detection
POS Protection of Shipping
POSS HIGH Possible-High
POSS LOW Possible-Low
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PPI Planned Position Indicator
PPLI Precise Participant Location and Identification
PPR Preplanned Response
PPS Precise Positioning Service
PR Position Reference
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency
PRI Pulse Repetition Interval
PROB Probable
PRT Pulse Repetition Time
PRU Primary User
PW Pulse Width
QSL Query Station Location
R Routine (message type)
R2 Reporting Responsibility
R/S Reed-Solomon
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-14 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
R/T Receiver/Transmitter
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAC Risk Assessment Code
RADALT Radar Altimeter
RAM Rolling Airframe Missile
RB Relative Bearing
RCC Rescue Coordination Center
RCIED Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RCS Radar Cross Section
RELNAV Relative Navigation
RF Radio Frequency
RM Risk Management
Rmax Maximum Range
Rmin Minimum Range
RMP Recognized Maritime Picture
RNAV Area Nav
RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force
ROE Rules of Engagement
RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RR Range Resolution
RSI Radiation Status Indicator
RTB Return to Base
RTF Return to Force
RTT Round Trip Timing
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
RWR Radar Warning Receiver
RWY Runway
S south
S/N (Ratio) Signal-to-Noise
SA Selective Availability
SA Situational Awareness
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-15
Acronym Definition
SA Surveillance Area
SAG Surface Action Group
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SC Screen Commander
SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (Coordinator)
SCC Sea Combat Commander
SDP Signal Data Processor
SDU Secure Data Unit
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Sec seconds
SEC Submarine Element Coordinator
SID Subscriber Identifier
SID Standard Instrument Departure
SIF Selective Identification Feature
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information
SIPRNet SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP Situation Report
SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile
SLAM-ER Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response
SLMM Submarine Launched Module Mine
sm Statute Mile
SM Standard Missile
SMC SAR Mission Coordinator
SOAD Standoff Outside of Area Defense
SOCA Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority
SOI Signal of Interest
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-16 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
SPINS Special Instructions
SPRAC Special Reporting and Coordinating
SPS Standard Positioning Service
SR Scan Rate
SR Slow Speed Low Altitude Training Route
SRO Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations
SRU SAR Recovery Unit
SS Surface Search
SSC Surface Surveillance Coordination
SSE Spot Size Error
ST Scan Type
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival
STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver
STRW Strike Warfare
STWC Strike Warfare Commander
SUWC Surface Warfare Commander
TACAIC Tactical Air Intercept Control
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
TACC Tactical Air Command Center
TACON Tactical Control
TACPLOT Tactical Plot
TAD Tactical Air Direction
TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link
TAS True Airspeed
TB True Bearing
TC True Course
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCN Terminal Change Notice
TD Transponder
TDC Track Data Coordinator
TDD Target Detection Device
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-17
Acronym Definition
TDL Tactical Data Link
TDS Tactical Data System
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TDOA Time Difference of Arrival
TF Task Force
TG Task Group
TH True Heading
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
T/M/S Type/Model/Series
TN True North
T/O Takeoff
TOC Table of Contents
TOO Targets of Opportunity
TPC Tactical Pilotage Chart
TQ Track Quality
TSCM Tactical Strike Coordination Module
TSEC Transmission Security
TSR Time Slot Reallocation
TST Time Sensitive Target
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TTY Teletype
TVM Track Via Missile
TWA Trailing Wire Antenna
UAS Unmanned Aerial System
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF Ultra-High Frequency
UIR Upper Flight Information Region
UMFO Undergraduate Military Flight Officer
UN United Nations
UNK Unknown
URG CDR Underway Replenishment Group Commander
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-18 GLOSSARY
Acronym Definition
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNO United States Naval Observatory
UT Universal Time
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
V/STOL Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing
VA Vital Area
VERTREP Vertical Replenishment
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
VIP Very Important Person
VLS Vertical Launching System
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VOI Vessels of Interest
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
VORTAC VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range and Tactical Air
Navigation
VPN Voice Production Net
VR VFR Military Training Route
VSI Vertical Speed Indicator
VTUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle
W watt or watts
W West (when used with latitude and longitude)
W Western
WARM War Reserve Mode
WAS War at Sea
WEZ Weapons Engagement Zone
WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984
INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY A-19
Acronym Definition
WPT Waypoint
WSM Waterspace Management
WSO Weapons System Operator
WW Severe Weather Watch Bulletin
yd yard or yards
Z Zulu
Z Flash (message type)
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK
A-20 GLOSSARY
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