CHAPTER 7

COMBAT SUPPORT

"There are five methods of attacking with fire. The first is to bum personnel; thesecond, to bum stores; the third, to bum equipment; the fourth, to bum arsenals,"and the fifth, to use incendiary missiles. "

Sun Tzu11leArtofWar

In all four LIC categories, leaders must modify the TI'Ps of supporting operations. Theymust base the use of combat and CS elements on the political and MElT- T factors. Thischapter provides information for planning and using combat and CS elements. Itemphasizes tactical operations but includes techniques of employment for each category.This chapter also discusses fire support planning, engineer support, Army aviationsupport, MI support, MP support, signal support, PSYOP, CA operations, and NBC

operations.

Section I.FIRE SUPPORT

The main factors in planning fire support are the restrictions on its use. In LICenvironments, restrictions are greater than in conventional conflicts. The commanderintegrates his fire support into his tactical plan lAW those restrictions. This normallylimits the use of fire support. However, the commander ensures fire support for possiblecontingencies.

(3) Identify or establish liaison requirements.To ensure proper planning with accurate informa-tion and expertise, acquire the needed personnelwith the background and experience.

(4) Update the plan continuously. The natureof LIC is one of constant change. Some of the fac-tors include-

.Rules of engagement.

.Change in the threat (change in loyaltiesand political alignment).

.Weather.e Deployment status.

.Personnel changes (enemyand friendly).

.Tactical situation (unit locations, patrol

routes).

7-1. PLANNINGCommanders should apply the fire supportplanning principles listed in PM 6-20, but theyshould also consider the following when planningfor a low-intensity conflict.

a. Plan early and continuously.(1) Obtain commander's guidance. Normally

restrictive in nature, the FSCOORD must trans-late this guidance to determine where, what, andhow fire support can support his guidance. Hostnation rules and political implications greatly in-fluence the commander's guidance and thereforefire support actions.

(2) Identify or request appropriate fire sup-port assets. Based upon the commander'sguidance, compare the capabilities and limitationsof each of the assets to obtain a best solution.

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b. Follow the commander's targeting guid-ance.

(1) Detail guidance. ROE and other restric-tions require detailed and well-disseminatedguidance, The guidance must also be in a simpleformat so that it can be understood at the lowestlevel.

(2) Identify possible high-payoff targets(HPT) for fire support engagement. Tie assets to

possible targets.(3) Place restrictions on certain types of mu-

nitions (FASCAM, WP, smoke, illumination).c. Exploit all available targeting assets.(1) Include all information sources in the fire

support plan (HUMINT, EW, RADAR, RECONFLIGHTS).

(2) Consider the timeliness of the targetingsource especially for the small-size target andfleeting nature of targets associated with LIC.

(3) Consider target location error and reli-ability of the targeting assets.

d. Consider the use of all available fire sup-port means, both lethal and nonlethal.

(1) Understand the commander's intent andguidance. In a LIC environment using the mini-mum-essential force means balancing the expectedeffects with the collateral damage associated withasset. Other considerations include the following:

.Range/deflection probable errors.

.Bursting radius-

.Target location error.

.Target verification.

.Response time.

.Gun-target line.

.Minimum safe distances.

.Political implications of damage (usingWP ,in a dry environment may cause firesthat could burn an entire village or crop).

(2) Consider nonlethal means.e. Use the lowest echelon that can provide ef-

fective support.(1) In a LIC environment, the nonlinear bat-

tlefield requires responsive and seeminglydecentralized fire support execution. However,centralized planning due to ROE and political re-straints, as well as possible clearance procedures,may not support typical decentralized fire support

coordination. For example, guidance that all indi-rect fires may have to be cleared by battalion orbrigade would include 6O-mm mortars at companylevel. However, this type of guidance implies ahigher level of coordination when compared to thelevel of employment.

(2) To provide the fire support umbrella,many of the assets may have to be positionedthroughout the area of operations. This may re-quire decentralized operations as well asdelineating nonstandard missions.

f. Furnish the type of support requested. Dis-semination of the commander's guidance to thelowest level is vital. Otherwise, FSCOORDs mayhave to disapprove or modify the request for a spe-cific fire support asset.

g. Avoid duplication of fire support. TheFSCOORD must ensure duplications of fire sup-port are resolved and that only the minimum forceneeded for the desired effects is used.

h. Consider airspace coordination.(I) Establish a liaison with the A2C2 ele-

ment. Consider civilian aircraft and flight routes.(2) Identify liaison requirements such as the

ANGLICO and Air Force liaison officer.(3) Include restrictions such as flying at night

and the use of informal ACAi. Provide adequate fire support. Advise the

maneuver commander when fire support assets donot meet his guidance. It is imperative that theFSCOORDs recommend other solutions.

j. Provide rapid and effective coordination.(I) Disseminate clearance procedures and

ROE to the lowest level.(2) Monitor and update fire support coordi-

nation measures (FSCM) constantly.(3) Adhere to host nation rules.(4) Inform liaison personnel as to procedures

and ROE.k. Provide for flexibility.(I) Provide mutual support for indirect fires.(2) Provide backup assets for unfavorable

weather conditions.(3) Position indirect assets for a 6400-mil ca-

pability.(4) Consider backup communications proce-

dures.

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(5) Know limitations based upon terraincharacteristics and adapt accordingly (such as ad-justment by sound in the jungle).

I. Provide for safeguarding and survivability offriendly forces and installations.

(I) Consider integrating maneuver and firesupport assets on a fire support base for mutualdefense.

(2) Formulate FSCMs that provide safe-guards (such as no-fire areas and restrictive fireareas).

FA can also plan the use of illumination for de-fense against guerrilla attacks on installations.These installations include airbases, power plants,communications centers, supply points, bridges, orcommunities. Also, planned fires can defend aconvoy or tactical column-

( 4) Psychological operations .FA fires providenonlethal fire support to PSYOP or conventionalunits in all the LIC categories.

b. Concept. Timely and effective FA fire canquickly hinder enemy activity. To provide effec-tive fire support, commanders use FA to obtainmaximum area coverage with available weaponsby placing batteries in each battalion opera-tional base. FA can also provide area firesupport to defend depots, logistic complexes,population centers, and other critical points.With its greater area coverage, some FA can al-ways be within range of an attacking force. Thisoutweighs the need for massing the fires of abattalion or battery against small targets. FAfires can be requested by the supported tacticalforce, self-defense forces, police, security ele-ments, and other support units.

c. Coordination. Commanders must closelycoordinate FA with tactical operations as well aswith civilian activities of the host nation.

(1) The senior FA officer at each echelon ofmaneuver command is designated the FSCOORD.

(2) The FSO from company through brigadeestablishes and maintains the FSE. At battalionand brigade, FSEs are manned by artillery person-nel and may be augmented by TACP orANGLICO personnel if assets are available.

(3) The use of FA may require further aug-mentation to aid coordination in obtainingauthority to fire, based on the ROE.

(4) Lack of time can preclude preparing a for-mal, coordinated, and integrated fire support plan.Therefore, SOPs should provide for all likely con-tingencies. Close liaison and continuous contactbetween the supported commander and theFSCOORDs provide the required coordination.However, in operations involving wide employ-ment of maneuver and support forces,coordination measures must ensure that converg-ing friendly units do not call fire upon oneanother. For this purpose, an RFL may be em-

ployed.

7.2. ARTILLERYUNITSThe application of firepower must always reflectthe principle of minimum-essential force. FAsupport normally provided to light infantrydivisions includes the 105-mm howitzer. FA unitsin the division artillery provide weapons of largercalibers. If the supported unit is not light infantry,its organic assets consist of 155-mm howitzers.Artillery batteries normally operate from thebattalion operational base when widely dispersed.FA missions include DS, reinforcing, OS, and OSreinforcing. Organic artillery is employed either ina DS capacity with a habitually associatedmaneuver unit or in a series of fire bases (OS) tocover an area of operation. The pattern of enemyforces requires quick response. FA provides arapid means of placing accurate, lethal fire onmoving guerrilla forces. Also, FA officers andNCOs can provide training, advice, and assistancein tactics and techniques of employment inmilitary assistance roles.

a. Missions. Along with supporting tacticalmaneuver units, FA fires are effective in accom-plishing or supporting-

(1) Security posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, andpatrols. This is accomplished by fire plans, fire di-rection nets, and use of ground and airborne FOs.Artillery fire can also disrupt enemy routes andprovide fire support near D~ and L~ before,during, and after an assault landing.

(2) Deception plans. This is accomplished byplacing artillery fires in areas other than those inwhich an operation is planned. This can distractenemy forces from the main effort.

(3) Populace and resources controloperations.This is accomplished by providing illumination forpolice-type cordon-and-search operations or raids.

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.7-5. AIR DEFENSE UNITSAir defense combines all active and passivemeasures to counter hostile air operations. In aLIC, the hostile air threat may be none, minimal,or existing.

a. If the threat is none or minimal, the com-mander must co~ider leaving ADA weapons in arear staging area. ADA personnel may be used as asecurity force for the operational base. Also Vulcansmay be used in the direct-fire role for base security,convoy security, and so forth. If this course of actionis selected, commanders must realize that an enemycan always be supported by an outside air threat IfADA personnel are separated from their ADAweapons, a minimal air attack could destroy friendlyforces. Commanders must plan for such an attack byhostile or sympathetic forces.

b. If the enemy force mounts an air attack orwhen an air threat exists, ADA assets must reactquickly. Units must employ ADA as in a conven-tional environment The commander establishesthe priority of protection.

d. COIN Operations. These operations nor-mally dictate-

(1) Greater decentralization of organic, at-tached, and reinforcing fire support.

(2) Reduced ability for brigade-level controland coordination of fires within the operations area.

(3) Added security requirements for firing po-sitions of indirect-fire weapons. This includesplanning of direct fires for defense and coordina-tion of US or host nation military forces toaugment the security of the FA unit.

( 4) A need to fire in all directions.(5) Support to local defensive forces and

static security posts.(6) Use of fire support that avoids friendly

casualties. Such casualties could estrange thepopulace and produce hostility toward the hostgovernment. Close coordination is vital with hostnation military and civilian authorities to locatevillages, population centers, and religious institu-tions.

(7) Close coordination with host country offi-cials in the operations area.

7.3. MORTAR PLATOONS/SECTIONSFiring elements of mortar platoons/sectionsoccupy positions with the battalion/company orwithin operational bases. The mortarplatoon/section provides the most responsiveindirect fire to a battalion/company. It is normallyunder battalion/company control.

7-4. ANTITANK COMPANIES/PLATOONSAntitank units are not normally employed in theirprimary role in LIC. When no armor threat exists,the commander may consider using the antitankelements to destroy hardened targets or mayconsider leaving the TOW missile in a securestaging area, using crews in other roles. Thesepersonnel are best used as part of the securityforce for the battalion operational base. Also,consolidated antitank companies/platoons may beat the brigade level to perform specific missionsfor the brigade commander such as scouts orconvoy security. Many vehicles can carry the.50-caliber machine gun, M60 machine gun, or MK19. Before these weapons systems are attached,crews must be trained in their operation,employment, and ROE.

.

7-6. ATfACK HELICOPTER UNITSAttack helicopters are a highly mobile andimmediate-response maneuver element that canattack targets anywhere on the battlefield by fire.These abilities apply to LIC operations toinclude-

.Overwatch and security for air assaultoperations to include the objective area.

.Overwatch and security for surfaceconvoys to include ground, water, and railmovements.

.Armed reconnaissance and surveillance toinclude target marking and destructionunder certain conditions.

.Augmentation of the firepower ofcommitted forces.

" Use as a psychological impact and show offorce.

7-7. TACTICALAIRSUPPORTThe USAF flies tactical air operations in supportof LIC operations. The USAF ALO at brigadeheadquarters can coordinate and assist in

requesting support.

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fighting forces to exploit hostile weaknesses. As aCS mission, airlifts provide logistic support bytransporting personnel and equipment. In peace-time, airlifts provide military assistance andcivilian relief programs to enhance national objec-tives. Aircraft assets may also be used to dispenseflares and leaflets. They are equipped with speak-ers and spraying apparatus for forest firefighting.Airlifts provide the timely movement, delivery, andrecovery of personnel, equipment, and supplies,and enhance military and national goals. They canbe strategic or tactical. Strategic (intertheater) air-lifts can be employed for any theater under thecentral direction of a higher authority, normally insupport of an overall effort. Tactical (intratheater)airlifts are performed within a theater of opera-tions and support theater objectives.d. Psychological Operations. PSYOP supportnational objectives by changing the attitudesand behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendlygroups. All USAF commands and agenciesconduct or support PSYOP. In planning andexecuting operations, commanders shouldknow the psychological implications andopportunities common to each action. Theymust ensure that the signals transmitted are asintended. Both action and inaction can send amessage to enhance perceptions of abilities orto influence others to support friendlyobjectives. Depending on the means ofcommunications, national objectives, andplanned actions, psychological efforts can bedevised to reinforce operations. These includeplanned communications through electronicmeans or printed matter; a show of force ordemonstrations of superiority; an attack on aspecific target; actions to harass and disrupthostile operations; surprise, shock action, anddeception; or humanitarian operations. Theseefforts must be coordinated with Army PSYOPthrough attached PSYOP personnel.

e. Weather Service. The USAF weather serv-ice provides timely and accurate environmentaldata to support strategic, tactical, and mobility op-erations. It gathers, analyzes, and providesmeteorological data for mission planning. Envi-ronmental data are needed to conduct both air andsurface operations.

a. Close Air Support. CAS supports surfaceoperations by attacking hostile targets nearfriendly surface forces.

(I) CAS can support offensive, counteroffen-sive, and defensive surface force operations withplanned or immediate attacks. All such missionsrequire detailed coordination and integration withthe fire and maneuver plans of friendly surfaceforces. CAS missions require corridors to the bat-tlefield, timely intelligence information, andaccurate weapons delivery.

(2) CAS enhances surface force operations bydelivering a wide range of weapons and massedfirepower at decisive points. It can surprise thehostile force, create opportunities for the maneu-ver or advance of friendly forces, protect the flanksof friendly forces, blunt hostile offensives, and pro-tect the rear of surface forces during rear battlemaneuvers.

b. Air Reconnaissance. Air reconnaissancecollects information from airborne, orbital, andsurface-based sensors. USAF R&S efforts arepart of the national intelligence-gathering effortand observation process. These operations pro-vide much data that are key to developingnational security policy, force postures, planningactions, force employment, and informed re-sponses in times of crises. Surveillanceoperations collect data continuously from theaerospace and from the earth's surface and sub-surface. Reconnaissance operations are directedtoward local or other targets. Through R&Svarious data are collected such as meteorologi-cal, hydrographical, geographical, electronic,and communications characteristics. The prod-ucts of R&S operations apply strategically andtactically in both peace and war. Strategic andtactical R&S provides timely notice of hostile in-tent, and actions and data vital to the NCAs andcombat commanders. These operations help toidentify the composition and determine the abil-ity of hostile forces.

c. Tactical Airlifts. Airlifts deploy, employ,and sustain forces under conditions that rangefrom peace to war. As a combat mission, airliftsprovide combat power through airdrops, extrac-tions, and airlanding of ground forces andsupplies. Through mobility operations, the jointor combined force commander can maneuver

.

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7-8. NAVALGUNFIRESUPPORTShip batteries deliver NGF to support amphibiousoperations and maneuver units operating in coastalareas. When NGF provides support, each ship isassigned the tactical mission of DS or GS. A ship inDS supports a battalion and delivers planned andimmediate fires. A ship in GS supports a brigade anddelivers adjusted fires. NGF may also be assigned ona fire-mission basis to a subordinate maneuver unitThe force commander must be aware that NGF ishigh-velocity, low-trajectory fire and therefore hasinherently large range probable error on flat terrain.

a. In a LIC environment, the use of NGF isgoverned by the same limits and the same princi-pie of "minimum-essential force" as when usingFA. If FA can be used in an insurgency, NGF canalso be used. One advantage is that supportedground units do not need to provide security to the

firing ships.b. A liaison platoon (from USMC) is normally

attached to the brigade. It provides specialists andcommunications to control, coordinate, and recom-mend use ofNGF or naval air.

Section II.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

LIC operations require an increase in engineer support for both psychological andtactical reasons.

7-9. MISSIONSThe LIC area of operations normally has poorlydeveloped road nets. Road systems, installations,and airfields typically must be built toaccomplish tasks. Forces involved in LICoperations require engineer support in bothcombat and sustainment engineering missions.The probable mine/booby trap threat in a LICarea of operations warrants the need for combatengineers. Sustainment engineering develops thelogistics facilities and transportationinfrastructure used by US forces. The engineersprovide support in all engineer battlefieldmission areas in LIC operations.

a. Mobility is geared toward improving themovement of maneuver units and critical supplies.Its aim is to reduce or negate the effects of obsta-cles. Examples of mobility operations includeclearing of L~, construction of combat trails, as-sault bridging, reduction of roadblocks, breachingof obstacles, mine sweeping, removal of boobytraps, and route reconnaissance.

b. Countermobility is geared toward reducingthe enemy's mobility and effectiveness. This isdone by installing obstacles. Some obstacles maydestroy targets; most enhance or complementweapon effectiveness. Examples of conventionalobstacles are minefields, wire entanglements,roadblocks, and barriers. These obstacles are inte-

grated into the maneuver plan and are covered byobservation and fires.

c. Survivability is the development of protec-tive positions, fighting positions, and protectiveobstacles. Examples include building perimeter de-fense positions in operating bases, CPs, L~,medical facilities, shelters, and storage facilities;and building field fortifications.

d. Sustainment engineering missions add tonation assistance. Construction of facilities, sup-port to government or civil agencies, and supportfor the population may become central to the op-eration. While organic engineer elements canprovide sustainment engineering support to theforce, additional engineer units are needed formost of the construction needed. The combat(heavy) units are most important for developinglogistics facilities, roads, and airfields. Examples ofgeneral engineering missions include-

.Road construction and repair.

.Temporary structures for the local

populace-.Fixed bridges-.Aid in civic action..Location of potable water sources and, if

required, water drilling.

e. Topographic engineering provides com-manders with information about the terrain.Topographic operations, in a LIC environment, in-

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volve the functions of terrain analysis and topo-graphic production. All engineers are terrainanalysts and assist others to use the ground effec-tively. .Terrain analysis is the process ofinterpreting natural and man-made features of ageographic area, and the influence of weather andclimate on these features to predict their effect onmilitary operations. Examples of terrain analysisproducts include cross-country movement(wet/dry weather), lines of communication, rivercrossing, and cover and concealment information.Terrain analysis products are usually provided inlimited quantities for staff use: the topographicproduction of map-based graphics, reproductionof these graphics, and the production of topo-graphic survey data. Production capabilitiesproduce such products as operations and intelli-gence overlays and overprints, map substitutes(photomaps), expedient revisions to standardmaps, draft manuscripts of terrain analysis over-lays and graphics, and precise survey and geodetic

positions.

engineer units to be attached. He must coordinatewith other units to provide all CSS.

7.11. SECURI1YEngineer units in support of task force operationsneed increased security. Engineers spend much oftheir time interfacing with the populace duringcivil action projects. Although the engineers cansecure themselves, their full abilities cannot beused if they are conducting security. Commandersshould assign this mission to infantry or militarypolice.

.

7-10. ORGANIZATIONThe commander can expect to be supported byat least a division engineer company. Othercompanies and elements of the division engineerbattalion are normally required. Engineer unitsfrom corps and Army level can be attached tothe engineer battalion or placed in DS. When inan isolated area, the commander can expect the

7-12. ENGINEERS USED AS INFANTRYCombat engineers can be used in the secondaryrole as infantry during combat operations as a lastresort. The authority to employ them as infantryrests with the division commander. They can alsobe used as trainers on basic mobility,countermobility, and survivability skills. Engineerscontribute more toward achieving national goalsas civic action units than as infantry. They can beused as infantry-

.During attacks on the operational base.e When all tactical units are committed and

a threat arises.e As reserves when the threat has caused

the commitment of all available reserves.(See PM 5-100.)

When used as infantry, engineers must beaugmented with fire support.

Section III.

ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT

Army aviation can provide support to US, host country, or transient forces. Theavailability of aviation support affects the tactics of supported units. Army aviationassists maneuver commanders to perform intelligence, mobility, firepower, commandand control, communications, and CSS functions. (The use of attack helicopters wasdiscussed in Section I. ) This section discusses other missions and the organizations ofArmy aviation support.

Aerial CP for command and control ofground maneuver elements.

7-13. MISSIONSTypical support tasks, other than attack helicopteroperations, performed by aviation units includethe following:

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7-14. ORGANIZATIONUS Army aviation resources are normally OPCONto the brigade commander. In LIC, they must bringtheir aviation logistic support with them. Otherthan attack helicopter units, the commander canexpect both CS aviation and aerial surveillanceunits to be OPCON. The number of aircraftdepends on political and METT -T factors.

a. CS aviation units, when in support of thebrigade, provide tactical air movement of person-nel, supplies, and equipment. A CS aviationcompany can-

(1) Provide continuous operations duringgood visibility and limited operations under lowvisibility.

(2) Provide airlift for the assault elements ofone rifle company.

(3) Augment the evacuation ability of medicalair ambulance elements.

b. Aerial surveillance units extend surveil-lance and target acquisition abilities of thebrigade. This is due to the use of sensor equipmentand aerial observers. An aerial surveillance com-pany can-

(1) Conduct sustained surveillance of part ofthe brigade area. This task can be performed bothday and night and in most weather conditions.

(2) Conduct aerial reconnaissance of routesand areas.

(3) Acquire target acquisition information byaerial means.

(4) Collect information for poststrike analysisof air and artillery attacks.

(5) Provide an airfield terminal control fa-cility.

Aerial R&S and target acquisition, toinclude visual reconnaissance and the useof photographic, infrared, and radarsensors, are made available to the brigade

through higher headquarters.Adjustment of artillery fire (aerialobservation).Battlefield illumination.

Air assault operations to include assaultoperations and airlift for reserves.

Augmentation of USAF R&S.

Dissemination of chemical agents andsmoke.

Radio relay.

Message drop and pickup.

Airdrop of personnel.

Convoy security.Mapping and survey.

Emergency medical evacuation.

Liaison.

Command and staff transportation.

Chemical and radiological monitoring.

Column control.

Screening.Delivery of critical personnel, supplies,and material to isolated areas.

Deception.Mine laying.

Electronic warfare (monitor, jam,direction finding, intercept).

..Section IV.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

MI at the tactical level is of prime importance. (The IPB process is discussed inChapter 6.) This section focus on the missions, organization of intelligence assets,categories of information, disciplines used to produce and collect data, andsynchronization of these elements. Also discussed are the principles of IEW and specialenvironmental considerations.

It provides intelligence support to OPSEC,deception, and EW.

7-15. MISSIONSThe tactical MI element collects, processes, anddisseminates combat information and intelligence.

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7-16. ORGANIZATIONThe brigade and battalions normally have an MIstaff section. Due to the decentralized nature ofLIC operations, parts of division and corps assetsmay be attached to brigades. In turn, brigades mayattach elements down to battalion. The tactical MImust be coordinated with existing intelligenceoperations (either host country or US) in the area.The brigade commander should request IEWsupport that provides intelligence, combatinformation, EW, OPSEC, and interrogation,which, in turn, must be responsive to his needs.

7-17. CATEGORIES OF INFORMATIONTwo categories of information that are importantto commanders are combat information and

intelligence.a. Combat information is time sensitive and can

be used for tactical missions. It can be used for fireand maneuver decisions with minimal assessment,validation, or processing (interpretation or integra-tion). Combat information is seldom formed abovebattalion level.

b. Intelligence is information requiring someform of validation, integration, and comparison.This comparison is made before the informationcan be used or fully exploited.

.

c. Imagery Intelligence. IMINT is derivedfrom radar, infrared, and photographic sensors.The data are analyzed through imagery interpreta-tion (II) and can identify and locate enemy bases,concentrations, and activities.

d. Measurement and Signature Intelligence.MASINT is the intelligence derived from themeasurement and signature of threat systems put-ting out electromagnetic energy.

e. Threat Equipment Intelligence. rncINT isthe intelligence derived from captured threatequipment.NOTE: The integration of information from each

of these sources, along with otherintelligence, provides a composite. Itallows the commander to "see" thebattlefield. It provides the time andflexibility to react to contingencies.

f. Counterintelligence. This includes decep-tion operations, OPSEC, and COMSEC.

(I) Deception operations. These are actionsthat deceive the enemy by denying information andmislead the enemy by providing false information.

(2) Operations security. OPSEC deprives theenemy of intelligence needed to create situationsin which the friendly force can be taken by sur-

prise.(3) Communications security. COMSEC ac-

tions deny enemy intelligence from friendlycommunication networks.

7-19. SYNCHRONIZATION OFINTELLIGENCE INFORMATIONIn LIC, HUMINT provides the major part ofavailable intelligence. Technical and electronicassets can provide data to enhance the force'sintelligence means. To disrupt or delay theinsurgent collection process, counterintelligence isused. By taking advantage of collection andcounterintelligence efforts and synchronizingthem, the commander can deceive the enemy.

7-20. INTELLIGENCE AND ELECfRONICW ARF AREJEW principles for AirLand Battle apply to LICHowever, the intelligence indicators for enemyactivityare unique. Development and application of properindicators are key steps in the collection effort.

7-18. DATA DISCIPLINESTo counter the insurgency, a multidisciplineintelligence collection effort must be used. Thismultidiscipline effort includes the use ofHUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, andTECINT. Under the guidance of counter-intelligence, counter-HUMINT is the bestdiscipline that can disrupt or delay the insurgents'HUMINT collection capability/process.

a. Human Intelligence. HUMINT is the cate-gory of intelligence derived from informationcollected and provided by human sources.HUMINT consists of interrogation of EPWs, ex-ploitation of captured documents, LRSU, firesupport teams, scout platoons, aerial scouts andobservers, CI liaison with local populace, and CIlow-level source operations.

b. Signal Intelligence. SIGINT is effectiveonly if the threat has communication equipmentthat can be intercepted and monitored.

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military, paramilitary, and police intelligenceoperations nationwide.

a. Similar entities exist at the subnationallevel. The names of these entities also vary fromcountry to country. For the sake of this discus-sion, we will refer to them as RegionalIntelligence Centers (RICs). RICs are estab-lished in conflictive areas and are organized andfunction in the same manner as the NIC. Boththe NIC and the RIC are under the direction andcontrol of the host country. However, support-ing US MI activities develop close relations withtheir NIC/RIC counterparts. RICs have the fol-lowing missions:

.Coordinate the collection activities of allmilitary and security elements within itsregion.

.Perform all-source analysis of all availableinformation.

.Produce all-source target packages forfriendly combat units-

.Cue CA and PSYOP units to areas ofincreased concern.

b. US Army MI efforts support the missionsassigned to and assumed by the NPCCs and ACCsby-

a. us Army commitment in a LIC can occursuddenly or slowly. The IEW staff or security as-sistance office assists in developing theintelligence part of contingency plans for US as-sistance. US MI support consists of advice,financial and material aid, provisions for profes-siona~ education, and development of anintelligence documentary data base. Most of thiseffort is aimed at the host country national level.However, mobile trainers and advisors may besent throughout the country to subnationallev-els. Some MI advisors may assist paramilitaryand nonmilitary elements in developingHUMINT sources and in exploiting the data

they provide.b. US military involvement in a LIC can shift

quickly from the advisory role to an operationalrole. Those intelligence functions already setwould continue. Other roles that augment the MIeffort include-

.Military assistance at provincial and lowerlevel.

.Civil affairs.

.Psychological operations.

.Population and resource control.

.Tactical operations.

.Combined MI operations with the hostcountry in the form of interrogation,materiel and document exploitation, andimagery interpretation centers.

7.21. INTELUGENCE INTERACnONIn the LIC operational categories ofcounterinsurgency and combatting terrorism (andpossibly in peacetime contingency), successfulintelligence operations require close coordinationand interaction between US and host countryintelligence agencies. Support from US nationallevel agencies is routed by way of the US countryteam to a central host country entity. This entityproduces an all-source intelligence picture for theentire country. The title of this entity varies fromcountry to country. For the purposes of thisdiscussion, we will refer to it as the NationalIntelligence Center (NIC). The NIC is organizedto direct and coordinate the activities of all hostcountry intelligence agencies. This includes

.Determining intelligence objectives.

.Integrating local intelligence programswith host country national programs.

.Evaluating intelligence resources.

.Organizing and training new intelligenceactivities.

.Formulating new intelligence plans.

.Establishing priorities and allocatingresources.

.Conducting an active liaison program.

c. If US tactical forces are committed to ahost country, intelligence personnel of the tacticalforces work with the combined intelligence ele-ments already in place.

d. In LIC, US MI personnel support the hostcountry both in advice and assistance roles and,when required, as a part of military operations.The MI officers of various elements may have tocoordinate requirements in creative ways. Chainsof command and political makeup of the host

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both the human factors and materiel maintenance.The conditions discussed in the following para-graphs also apply to a LIC.

country are defined and used as the basis for set-ting up support channels.

e. The terrain and weather conditions of apossible LIC operational area are important to

Section V.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

Army preparedness is maintained for special environments in which many uniquechallenges exist. This paragraph outlines considerations for adapting core doctrine tospecial operations in jungle, desert, mountain, winter, and urban terrain.

observation and long fields of fire, mandatory useof deception, and lack of key terrain. (SeePM 90-3.)

7-22. JUNGLESThe jungle regions of Asia, Africa, and the westernhemisphere are potential battlefields. Jungles varyfrom tropical rain forests and secondary growthforests to swamps and tropical savannas. Thedominant features of jungle areas are thickvegetation, high and constant temperatures andhumidity, and heavy rainfall. Military operations injungles are affected by two factors-<:limate andvegetation. These factors combine to restrictmovement, observation, fields of fire,communications, and battlefield intelligencecollection operations. Both factors constrain aunit's operational and sustainment abilities. Theydemand unique measures to reduce their effects.(See PM 90-5.)

7-24. MOUNTAINSMountain regions are found throughout the world,from the arctic to the tropics. They have a majorinfluence on military operations. Mountainoperations are characterized by reduced ranges forflat-trajectory fire, increased importance ofindirect fire, mobility canalized along valley floors,decentralized combat, increased collectionoperations from heights higher than lines ofcommunications, and reduced command andcontrol abilities. (See PM 90-6. )

7-25. ARCTIC CONDITIONSThe effects of arctic conditions have a majorinfluence on military operations. Winter ischaracterized by long nights, extreme cold, anddeep snow. This can degrade weaponsperformance due to brittleness, ice or fog overoptic sights, and ice loading on antennas andintake filters. Winter conditions increase the timerequired to perform even simple tasks. They alsohave adverse effects on soldiers' health andmorale. (See PM 31-71.)

7-23. DESERTSMany desert areas of the world are vital to thenational interests of the US and demand Armyreadiness. Deserts may be semiarid or arid.Available water is a prime factor in planning andconducting desert operations. Deserts can haveextremes of cold and heat, good visibility andblinding sandstorms, drought and sudden rains,water shortages and flash floods, and goodtrafficability and interspersed obstacles. Some ofthe many characteristics of desert operationsinclude rapid movement of large units, good

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Section VI.MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

MP unitS can be an effective part of LIC operations by performing their normal duties.They operate along with host country civil and military police. MP unitS can conductcontinuous patrol operations and are a valuable source for intelligence collection. Also,they are organized and equipped to perform battlefield circulation control, area security,EPW operations, and law and order operations. They can also serve as an economy offorce in force protection and security roles.

informant nets. These can produce intelligenceand information.

b. Combatting terrorism to include-

(I) Physical security.(2) Operational security.(3) Personnel security. MP units provide

physical security to personnel and installationsthai may include designated communities.

c. Peacekeeping to include-(I) Show of force.(2) Raids.(3) Noncombatant evacuation operations.(4) Peacekeeping.(5) Rescue and recovery.(6) Support to civil authority.

7-27. ORGANIZATIONA brigade normally has one MP platoon attached.Depending on the situation, more elements of thedivision MP company may be attached. Also, corpsMP assets may be attached. The size andcomposition of the force depends on the following:

.Mission and size of the contingency force.

.Attitude of the local population.

.Number and distribution of lines ofcommunication.

o Quality of MSRs, which may be

channelized, extended, and have manycontrol points.

.Ease of access to critical supplies.

.Number of critical facilities and supply

points needing security.o Type of terrain.

.

7-26. MISSIONSMP units are well suited for a variety of tasks ineach of the operational categories:

a. Counterinsurgency operations to include-(I) Police-type operations.(2) Search operations. MP units conduct

searches in support of cordon-and-search opera-tions by manning or supervising search parties,securing persons or property captured, and evacu-ating prisoners.

(3) Checkpoints and roadblocks.(4) Search ofbuilt-up areas.(5) Civil disturbance and riot control.(6) Raids.(7) Patrols.(8) Ambushes.(9) Base defense.(10) Lines of communication. MP units assist

in securing lines of communication. They do thisby road and aerial patrolling, setting up traffic con-trol points, escorting convoys, and reconnoiteringin their area of responsibility. MP units can com-bat small enemy elements or can act as fIxingelements until combat units arrive.

(II) Populace and resource control. Opera-tions in an insurgency may involve extensive policeactivities. MP units can control the host countrypopulace and materiel resources. This includesscreening, identification, registration, enforcementof curfews, operation of patrols and checkpoints,and investigation of crime.

(12) Prisoners. MP units process, secure, andevacuate captured persons and detainees lA WPM 19-40, DA directives, and host nation agree-ments.

(13) Intelligence operations. Since guerrillaactivities often overlap with criminal activities, po-lice activities can develop informants and

7-28. MILITARY WORKING DOGSMilitary working dogs can support all categories ofLIC. The three different types of dogs are patrol

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dogs, patrol/narcotic detector dogs, andpatrol/explosive detector dogs.

a. Patrol Dogs. Patrol dogs are the most ver-satile of the military police working dogs.Composed and controllable at all times, they canwork near people safely, either on- or off-leash,without loss of effectiveness. Despite their well-so-cialized nature, they can detect and detain criminaloffenders in both physical security and law en-forcement situations. They attack on commandfrom the handler and can be recalled from an at-tack. Patrol dogs are trained to detect and locateunauthorized persons in buildings as well as inopen areas, and some can track criminals fromcrime scenes by following scent trails. All patroldogs and handlers are certified at Lackland AirForce Base, Texas. Handlers are trained in a 6-week course on the care of the patrol dogs.

(1) Training.(a) Basic obedience-to sit, stay, heel, down,

and so on.(b) Drill and ceremony-to perform close or-

der drill with other dogs and handlers.(c) Scouting-to search a field or woods and

alert the handler of the presence of an intruder.(d) Aggression and agitation-to respond to

aggressive acts or threats to include responding tothe handler's command to attack.

(e) Building search-to search a building on-or off-leash to detect and attack once an intruderis located.

(1) Tracking-to follow the scent of a human,at least one hour old, over any type of terrain.

(g) Gunfire-to be adversely affected by gun-fire from either the handler or another person.

(h) Vehicle patrol-to ride quietly and calmlyin a vehicle that the handler is driving and notshow any aggressiveness toward passengers.

(2) Utilization.(a) Patrol-walking or mobile, to respond to

alarms, check high security areas, and so on.(b) Building search-to check for intruders

faster and safer than by MPs.(c) Crowd control-to stay out of sight until

needed, then can be used in direct confrontation.(d) Tracking/scouting-to search for lost, in-

jured, or missing persons, prisoners, or fleeingcriminal offenders.

(e) Public affairs-to demonstrate abilitiesand increase public relations.

(3) Types of alert.(a) Building search-trained to attack, growl,

bark, and so on.(b) Scouting-trained to alert the handler of

an intruder without alerting the intruder.b. Patrol/Narcotic Detector Dogs. Patrol/nar-

cotic detector dogs are highly specialized animalswhose primary mission is to detect possession ortransportation of marijuana, heroin, and relatedsubstances. The patroVnarcotic detector dog isalso valuable in that it is trained first as a patroldog, then as a narcotic detector dog, so it can doall that a patrol dog can do and more. All pa-troVnarcotic detector dogs and handlers arecertified at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Han-dlers are trained in a four-week course on searchpatterns, different drug odors and characteristics,dog alerts, and so on. Although the handler re-ceives intensive training at the school, the dog andhandler must continuously train together to main-tain their proficiency.

(I) Training. The patroVnarcotic detector dogis required to maintain proficiency in all patroldog areas of training, in addition to detecting thefollowing odors:

o Marijuana.o Heroin.

.Cocaine.

.Hashish.

(2) Utilization. The patroVnarcotic dog is pro-ficient in all patrol dog areas of utilization, and itcan detect contraband material on narcotic dogmissions.

(3) Missions.(a) The narcotic mission is scheduled, then it

is given to the patroVnarcotic detector dog han-dlers.

(b) The narcotic detector dog team then goesto the unit for the mission and contacts the com-mander, who receives a briefing.

(c) The narcotic search is then conducted.(d) When the dog alerts on a room, water

fountain, and so on, the commander is notified,and either gives or denies permission to search thealerted area.

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(e) If permission is granted to search thealerted area, the search is then conducted by a per-son designated by the commander.

(f) If permission is denied to search the area,the mission is over.

(4) 7}lpesofalert.(a) Passive response-upon finding an item,

trained to sit at the location and await the handler.(b) Aggressive response-upon finding an

item, trained to scratch and bite at the location.c. Patrol/Explosive Detector Dogs. Patrol/ex-

plosive detector dogs have a particularly acutesense of smell and are trained to discriminate thescent of different explosives. These dogs are spe-cially selected patrol dogs that have receivedspecialized training in this difficult and demandingfield. All patrol/explosive detector dogs and han-dlers are certified as a team at Lackland Air Force

Base, Texas. The patroVexplosive detector dog andhandler must be certified together by maintaininga proficiency of 95 percent or better.

(I) Training. The patroVexplosive detectordog is required to maintain proficiency in all pa-trol dog areas of training in addition to detectingnine different types of explosives.

(2) Utilization. The patroVexplosive detectordog is proficient in all areas of patrol dog utiliza-tion, and it can provide bomb threat responsesupport to both the military police and civiliancommunities. The patroVexplosive detector dogcan also provide YIP security, pay site security,money escorts, and so on.

(3) Type of alert. For obvious reasons, the pa-troVexplosive detector dog is trained for a passiveresponse.

Section VII.PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP support is an integral part of LIC. It is tailored to meet certain needs forpeacekeeping, FID, contingencies, or terrorism counteraction. Thus, leaders mustconsider military and nonmilitary courses of action in terms of their psychologicalimpact. In correcting the main causes that lead to LIC, leaders may lose short-rangetactical advantages to preserve long-range psychological objectives. Understanding andincorporating political, social, and economic policies and goals into military PSYOPplanning are vital for success. Peacekeeping operations can be supported by PSYOP infour ways: information/education programs, peacekeeping training for other nations, aidas advisors to allied peacekeeping efforts, and aid as advisors to other US agencies. (SeeFMs 100-20 and 33-1. )

.

.Assisting the host nation in supportingdefector rehabilitation programs.

o Providing close and continuous PSYOP

support to enhance the effects of CAoperations.

a. A major security assistance role in the con-duct of FID includes us military PSYOP training,advisory assistance, and logistic support. UnitedStates PSYOP assets work to help the host nationimprove its PSYOP programs and abilities.

b. Army PSYOP elements may be tailored tosupport a certain contingency. In most contingencyoperations, PSYOP can help explain why the UStook the action. They can amplify the effects by

7-29. INTEGRAnONIn FID, PSYOP support is integrated into allaspects of the foreign assistance programs. Thisincludes internal development, humanitarian aid,and security assistance. PSYOP in FID aredirected toward-

.Assisting the host nation in gainingpopular support.

.Assisting the host nation in defeating theinsurgents.

.Establishing a favorable US image in thehost nation.

.Favorably influencing neutral groups andthe world community.

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stating the reasons and results to friendly, neutral,and hostile audiences.

c. Terrorism has an immense psychologicalimpact. Terrorism counteraction includesPSYOP directed at target audiences of the ter-rorists, the terrorists themselves, and terroristsupporters. PSYOP reinforce national will to de-ter and attack terrorism.

(7) Provides feedback about the effect of on-

goingPSYOP.(8) Maintains close, continuous coordination

with other US agencies having PSYOP responsi-

bility.(9) Analyzes the enemy psychological situ-

ation to identify weaknesses.b. The supported unit commander-(I) Integrates PSYOP into the military deci-

sion-making process.(2) Assesses the psychological impact of the

military presence, activities, and operations.(3) Provides intelligence support to PSYOP .(4) Ensures that the PSYOP staff element has

access to other staff sections. This aids coordinat-ing PSYOP activities and acquires neededinformation and intelligence.

(5) Reviews OPLANs/OPORDs to ensurethat they support national and military psychologi-cal objectives.

(6) Provides guidance to subordinate com-manders and staff officers concerning PSYOPobjectives and plans.

(7) Integrates PSYOP training with unit in-struction and training programs.

(8) Provides mess, administration, and logisticsupport (less PSYOP-peculiar equipment) to sup-porting PSYOP unit.

7-30. UNIT RESPO NSIBILmESThe PSYOP unit commander and the supportedunit commander have different duties for PSYOP .The execution of these responsibilities, as outlinedbelow, enhances the commander's missionaccomplishment. (See PM 33-1. )

a. The PSYOP unit commander-(1) Determines PSYOP objectives based on

the supported unit's mission.(2) Provides, when required, PSYOP assets to

augment the G3/J3 section of the supported com-mand.

(3) Advises the supported command concern-ing PSYOP abilities and limitations.

(4) Advises, assists, coordinates, and recom-mends plans concerning psychological aspects of

proposed operations.(5) Recommends proper allocation of

PSYOP assets within the supported command.(6) Conducts PSYOP in support of the sup-

ported unit's mission.

Section VIII.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

CA operations are those activities of a command that obtain needed civilian cooperationand support for a military commander. They may also reduce civilian interference toattain his objective. CA operations affect the relationship between the military forcesand civil authorities, and the people of a country or region. They involve theperformance by military forces of some or all of the functions normally performed bycivil govern~ent. (See PM 41-10.)

7-31. CMLAFFAIRS SUPPORTIn LIC operations, CA operations support thecommander and host nation civil administration.

a. CA support to the commander includes-(I) Identifying available local resources, fa-

cilities, and support.

(2) Coordinating US requirements for and as-sisting in obtaining local resources, facilities, and

support.(3) Minimizing civilian interference with US

military operations.(4) Assisting the commander in meeting legal

and moral obligations to the local populace. Thisis done by temporarily providing support of goods

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(3) Establishing a civil administration in oc-cupied enemy territory. This remains effectiveuntil the local authorities can administer a systemthat supports us and allied objectives.

7-32. MISSION ACCOMPUSHMENTCommand priority is given to those major CAactivities that are most closely related toaccomplishing the command mission. The CA staffelement plans and supervises all CA activities of thecommand It provides for maximum command effortin support of this mission. In internal defenseoperations, priority is normally given to militaty civicaction and to military participation in the populaceand resources control program. As important as thesetwo functions are, the commander cannot presumethat they will meet his total CA r~ponsibi1ity.

and services through the host government agenciesto the local populace.

(5) Supplementing the intelligence effort atthe tactical level.

(6) Acting as the staff focal point for culturalconsiderations that affect military operations.

b. CA support to the host nation civil admini-stration includes-

(1) Assisting a host government to meet itspeople's needs and to maintain a stable and viablecivil administration. CA may also assist other USagencies that are providing aid to the host nation.

(2) Establishing a temporary civil administra-tion to maintain lawand order, and to provide lifesustaining services until the host nation can re-sume normal operations. This must be done at therequest of the host nation.

Section IX.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

Nonlethal NBC munitions prove effective where the guerrilla force has blended in withthe local populace. The employment of firepower, such as artillery and air-deliveredordnance, must be avoided. This section focuses on employing smoke and nonlethalagents such as riot-control munitions. (See FMs 3-100, 3-4, 3-11, and 3-101.)

(2) By use of chemical antiplant agents to de-foliate vegetation that restricts observation andfields of fire within or around US bases.

c. Flame field expedients are most effective inCOIN operations. These weapons counter am-bushes, defend fIXed installations, and can be usedas ambush weapons.

d. Riot-control agents provide rapid area cov-erage by heavy concentration. This reduces anunmasked guerrilla's ability to fight. Agents cansubject him to capture or destruction.

e. Riot-control agents are used in offensiveand defensive operations in which guerrillas lackproper eye and breathing protection. They supple-ment or complement firepower; for best results,they must be supported by fire and maneuver.

(I) The agent supports operations in whichthe COIN forces want to deny an area for a shorttime by using nonlethal means. When COIN forcesarmed with the agent are stopped, they must adopta temporary defensive posture. Munitions are em-placed to augment defense of the position or toassist in withdrawal when attacked by a superior

7.33. SMOKE AND RIOT-CONTROLMUNITIONSSmoke is a combat multiplier and can reduce theeffect of weapons that depend on LOS.Riot-control agents are chemicals with militaryapplication. They are not classified as militarychemicals and adhere to different policies thanthose that apply to chemical warfare. The use ofsmoke and riot control munitions must becarefully assessed for collateral effects, bothphysical and moral, then balanced against theadvantages of their use. (See FM 100-20,Appendix B, for the specific limitations. )

a. Smoke can deny guerrilla forces direct visualobservation of COIN troop and equipment assemblyareas. It can also conceal weapons positions, CSS in-stallations, river-crossing sites, objectives, andlandings of air assaul t forces. (See FM 3-50. )

b. Riot-control agents and herbicides may be

employed-(I) To disable for a short time a guerrilla

force that has blended in with friendly civilians. Nopermanent effects occur to civilians.

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control mobs or to reestablish control over rioting

prisoners.Units may employ riot:.control agents to assist

in taking prisoners for interrogation or for obtain-ing documents. Agents are employed whereimmediate disabling of guerrilla personnel willprevent the destruction of documents.

guerrilla force. The agent increases the com-mander's ability and flexibility. It does so byapplying effective combat power in situationswhere death and permanent injury are to be re-duced. For example, in a consolidation operation,the agent can subdue guerrilla forces that haveblended with the civilian populace.

(2) In offensive action against an alert andfleeting guerrilla force, the counterguerrilla unitcan place the agent on the target without beingseen or open to small-arms fire. Thus, the agent isbest used in the defense when the guerrilla moveswithin the range of emplaced weapons.

(3) The employment of the agent is limitedonly by the current policy on employment, theavailability of the agent, the means of delivery(either ground or air), and the imagination of thecommander and his staff. When air-ground com-munications are not adequate, air-droppedriot-control agents can be employed with less in-formation than needed for other munitions.However, the best effect occurs under optimumair-ground coordinated action.

w 7-34. ORGANIZATIONThe divisional chemical company and corpschemical units are the only TOE chemical CSunits. Since there are rarely enough chemical unitsand personnel to meet requirements incounterguerrilla situations, brigade personnelmust manage smoke, flame, and nonlethal agents.

a. Ground Units. Any size ground tactical or-ganization can employ riot-control agents.However, a platoon is considered the minimum-size force that can employ the agent effectively incounterguerrilla tactical operations. For example,a platoon designates one squad as the riot-controlagent squad to cover targets. Larger units (com-pany and battalion) may air-deliver the munitionsagainst more extensive targets. The agent can beemployed in any quantity to gain the desired effecton target.

b. Aviation Units. The agent may be deliveredby rotary-wing or fixed-wing aircraft. The numberof aircraft used depends on the size of the targetand the amount of agent concentration desired.

c. Military Police. Host country (civilian ormilitary) or US MP employ riot-control agents to

7-35. OPERAnONSSmoke generator units are best employed whenguerrilla activities escalate to large-scaleoperations by companies, battalions, or largerunits. In operations conducted against small bandsof elusive guerrilla forces, there is limitedopportunity to employ chemical smoke generatorunits.

a. Tactical Operations. Tactical operationsinvolve the following factors.

(I) Offense. Air and ground delivery of riot-control agents may be planned with preparatoryfires on objectives. The agent may be delivered asthe attacking troops cross the line of departure.Delivery of the agent in the target area shouldcease no earlier than five minutes before friendlyforces arrive. Guerrilla forces in the objective areashould be weakened to offer little resistance.

(a) When riot-control agents are used toforce guerrillas from caves and tunnels, positivepressure should be used in the form of an air

pump.(b) In helicopter-assault operations, air-deliv-

ery of riot-control agents directed on known orsuspected hostile positions near the landing areacan precede armed escort helicopters. If intelli-gence does not produce known guerrilla positions,the munition may be held on call awaiting returnfire by the guerrilla forces. FAC can direct the de-livery of the munitions on positive sighting ofguerrilla positions. Aircraft crews and assaulttroops prepare to wear protective masks duringlanding. Riot-control agents may also be employedin airborne and amphibious operations.

(c) In counterguerrilla force ambush opera-tions, the riot-control agent can produce confusionand weakening. This allows counterguerrilla am-bush forces to move to the killing zone to takeprisoners. In night ambushes, riot-control agentsare best used along with trip flares.

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(3) Retrograde. The agent can be used tobreak contact when a counterguerrilla unit's posi-tion is untenable. Also, isolated units can employthe agent along with other fires. It acts as a meansof route clearance and flank security in open areason the route of withdrawal.

b. Populace and Resources Control Opera-tions. The agent can be used when enforcement ofpopulace control measures is needed.

c. Psychological Operations. The agent is aneffective psychological weapon when used againstpersonnel in countries where superstition and afear of the unknown are common. The reason forits use in populated areas should be explained inPSYOP followup-for example, to protect thepopulation from severe harm if conventional fire-power were used.

7-36. DECONTAMINATIONWith the proliferation of NBC weapons in the world,it is highly probable that commanders will havebiological or chemical agents employed against theirtroops in a LIC environment Therefore, they mustassess the threat and be prepared to decontaminatetheir troops based on the political and MElT -Tfactors. (See Appendix F or PM 3-5 for detailed

information.)

(d) When attacking hard targets, such as for-tified positions, gun positions, and bunkers, theagent can make the positions untenable. It canalso flush the occupants into the open to be cap-tured or destroyed.

(e) Other offensive operations in which theagent may be employed are river crossings, recon-naissance by fire, canalizing and blocking,harassing, attack on guerrilla forces in populatedregions, raids, and antiaircraft fire suppression.

(2) Defense. Air and ground-delivered riot-control agents can be used in hasty and deliberateposition defenses. The agent should be emplacedfar from the position in likely areas of guerrilla ap-proach and rigged with trip wires to serve as awarning of and deterrent to guerrilla attack.

(a) The agent can be integrated into perime-ter defenses of various types of fixed installations(communications centers, airbase/airfield com-plexes, outposts, villages, and support facilities).When there is considerable friendly activityaround these installations, strict command andcontrol measures must be provided. This preventsaccidental discharge of the agent by friendly per-sonnel.

(b) The agent can be used in counterambushsituations if delivered quickly on the guerrilla am-bush force.

~

.

7.18

CHAPTERS

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

"For want of a nai~ the shoe was lost.For want of a shoe, the horse was lost.For want of a horse, a rider was lost.For want of a rider, the battle was lost. II

Benjamin Franklin

This chapter discusses the details of CSS for each LIC category. Sustainment in LICincludes all elements of CSS. It can range from a medical team that provideshumanitarian aid to a supporting brigade TF that conducts tactical operations. Each LICcategory has distinct support procedures that must be tailored for a each operation. Forexample, sustainment for peacetime contingency operations is usually provided throughnormal logistic channels. Sustainment for PKOs is accomplished through a supportorganization established by the force mandate. For further information refer to PM 63-6,Combat Service Support in Low-Intensity Conflict.

Section I.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GUIDELINES

This section provides general guidelines that apply to all categories of LIC. Logistic supportin LIC involves providing material and supplies to US and host nation combat forces. It canalso involve developing logistic systems, infrastructure, and procedures for the host nationand training host nation logistic personnel. In LIC, logistic elements often precede othermilitary forces into the area of operation or may be the only forces deployed Logisticsystems supporting either US or host nation forces must operate within the environmentalconstraints, and the legal and political constraints governing US involvement Therefore,such systems must be flexible to tailor support to the situation.

8.1. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLESOF SUPPORTThe fundamental principles of support applyacross the spectrum of conflict. The CSS unit mustapply and adapt these principles to the LICenvironment, which presents unique challenges.The following are guidelines for establishing andoperating CSS systems in LIC.

a. Maximum economy of resources.b. Flexible task force composition.c. Ability to operate in any theater or coun-

d. Routine use of host nation support to in-clude local services, supplies, facilities, and

transportation.e. Maximum use of existing fixed facilities such

as lines of communication, ports, and airfields.f. Minimum handling of supplies.g. Maximum reliance on CONUS supply ac-

tivities or, when appropriate, existing regionalsupport bases.

h. Provisions for self-protection.i. Active and passive protection measures for

CSS units.try.

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support in LIC. Due to these concerns, logisticsfacilities and stock levels should be kept to aminimum to reduce security requirements. Thislowers the risk of supplies being taken/destroyedby an opposing force. While local resources shouldbe used to the fullest, such use should notadversely affect the local security forces Qrpopulation.

j. Routine use of both strategic and theaterairlift until surface transportation can accommo-date the deployment.

k. Elimination of duplicated facilities andoverlapping of functions.

I. Short duration conflicts (less than 90 days)should be supported by carefully tailored andplanned resupply packages.

8-2. SUPPORT PLANNINGSupport planning for LIC operations is acontinuous process. Inclusion of the CSS unit atthe outset during mission planning and forcedevelopment is vital to the success of anyoperation. Once the concept of operation isdetermined, detailed CSS planning can proceed.Support planning should be as detailed as time willallow. However, since LIC requirements arise withlittle warning and may occur in any theater ofoperation, it is best to be familiar with the LICenvironment and its characteristics.

8-5. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORTTAILORINGThe structure of most css organizations allowsunits to be tailored to the assigned mission andsituation. This flexibility is vital to enable CSSorganizations to meet the wide range ofdeployment situations in LIC. The conventionalechelons of css functions are often not responsiveenough to sustain a LIC force in an austere area ofthe world. Direct contact by units in the area ofoperations with the wholesale logistic communityis vital for responsive support to remote areas.Therefore, procedures must be established early asto how to accomplish such direct contact.Simplicity is vital to CSS. It allows for the requiredflexibility for effective support under demandingand adverse conditions. Combat service supportmust be tailored to the force mixture andconditions ofMETT-T.

a. A preferred method of operation is either alight battalion attached to a heavy brigade or aheavy force OPCON to a light brigade. In LIC, themeaning of OPCON includes the OPCON unitbringing extended support assets on deployment.As the situation develops, the unit could becomeattached and the support assets may be under thecontrol of the higher headquarters.

b. The light brigade focuses on replacingparts, but the heavy unit focuses on repairingequipment. Commanders must be constantlyaware of this throughout the operation.

c. Light units can use transportation assets ofthe heavy force.

8.3. LOGISTICS INTELLIGENCECombat service support intelligence is critical tothe LIC planning effort. It is defined as theoperational and tactical information required bythe CSS manager to develop and execute thelogistic support plan for a specific concept ofoperations. Combat service support intelligenceshould include:

a. Intent to engage in combined operations.b. Extent of CSS to non-DOD agencies, allied

forces, or a combination thereof.c. Available resources in the area of opera-

tions.d. Conditions that alter the usage factors.e. Information on the ability of local facilities to

support deployment and sustainment operations.f. Foreign military logistics structure and na-

tional infrastructure abilities.g. Environmental factors.h. Analysis of lines of communications. .

8-4. SECURI1YOnce units are deployed, the wide dispersal offorces, the need to protect all bases andinstallations, the need to provide security forground and air movement, and the problems ofacquiring local resources can hinder logistic

8-6. REQUIREMENTSTo meet the needs of widely dispersed forces, css

flexibility, foresight, improvisation, rapid response,and full use of local resources are required. Also,greater mobility is needed to reduce or removeexcessive stocks in forward areas, to restrict CSS

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installations to secure areas, and to provide forrapid evacuation of casualties. Air resupplyreduces or excludes the need for escort troops, andreduces targets and supply sources for potentialuse by the enemy. LIC CSS support requires thefollowing:

a. Clearly understood command and controlarrangements.

b. Reliable CSS communications network.c. Secure lines of communications.d. Theater mobility stressing airlift and sup-

port helicopters.e. Means to exploit local resources within the

limits of the political and social context of the con-flict.

L.,

so restrictive as to preclude normal predeploymentcoordination. This heightened security environ-ment may require much tailoring of setmobilization procedures. Therefore, mobilizationsignatures should be the same as day-to-dayoperational signatures. Such requirements mustnot preclude the required CSS planning andcoordination for mission success.

a. Each of the three categories of CSS mustbe considered. Priorities within each category mustbe set based on type of operation and the princi-ples of MElT- T. The three categories of CSS arelogistics support, personnel service support, andhealth service support.

b. Logistics support includes:

.Supply.

.Transportation.

.Maintenance-

.Field services to include gravesregistration, clothing exchange and bath(CEB), salvage, laundry, textile reno-vation, airdrop, and bakery.

c. Personnel service support includes:.Personnel and administration services to

include strength management, personnelaccounting and strength reporting,replacement operations, casualty man-agement, personnel informationmanagement, and personnel databasemanagement.

.Religious support to include conduct ofservices, personal and religiouscounseling, and pastoral care.

.Legal services.

.Finance services.

.Public affairs.

.Postal operations.

.Enemy prisoner of war support.

.Morale welfare, and recreation (MWR).

.d. Health services support includes:

.Treatment and evacuation.

.Medical supply support.

.Preventive medicine.

f. Means to protect CSS installations.g. Automated inventory and movement con-

trol to provide responsive support.h. Resources for construction of camps and

airfields, adaptation of buildings, provision andmaintenance of services to include aid to the civil-ian community.

i. Means of establishing a casualty evacuationand treatment system.

j. A flexible maintenance system to meet re-quired operational availability rates of equipment.

k. Means of collecting, collating, and dissemi-nating CSS intelligence before and duringoperations.

1. Means of supporting isolated forces sepa-rated from main bodies.

m. Financial support to allow for payment ofgoods and services received and the recovery costsfor goods and services provided.

n. Legal support for the interpretation of law,application of ROE, and protection of assignedforces.

0. An available source of language qualifiedpersonnel conversant both with military logisticsand host nation business practices and customs.

p. Mobile logistics training teams and logis-tics training exercises.

8.7. CATEGORIES OF SUPPORTLIC operations often require the ability to executetime-sensitive, discrete deployments. Along withspeed, the system used to mobilize and deploymust function in an environment where OPSEC is

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Section II.SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

This section explains how CSS assets support tactical operations in insurgency and COINoperations. Assets include medical, supply, transportation, maintenance, and personneland administration. CSS assets normally operate from bases that support unit tacticaloperations. Depending on the size of the unit, these assets may be organic or attached.In insurgency and COIN operations, CSS units may have the primary mission, while theinfantry role may be to protect the CSS units. The infantry brigade may function as acombined arms and services unit with minimum fighting strength, while providing C2 forvarious CSS organizations.

8-9. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITSCSS units in counterguerrilla operations, as inconventional operations, provide all classes ofsupplies to units involved in tactical operations.Since the battalion operational base is as small aspossible and provides only a limited logistics base,the supply element at battalion is small. Currentlyprescribed supply systems and procedures cansupport counterguerrilla operations with somechanges.

a. Most combat trains are collocated withfield trains in the brigade support base. Therefore,supply lines to battalions must be maintained.Both aerial and ground resupply operations areconsidered, ensuring a backup system if onemethod is disrupted. Resupplying tactical unitsmust be done by request so as not to set a pattern.

b. &sets from DISCOM provide the brigadewith direct support CSS.

8.8. SUPPORT LEVELSMost CSS assets are located at division or higherlevel. They are DS to brigades as needed. In somecases, the brigade can receive a larger part ofdivision assets than normal.

a. DISCOM support can consist of smallteams for supply, maintenance, ammunition,medical, and transportation support. When aug-mented and directed DISCOM's immediatepurpose is to assist indigenous tactical forces,the long-term goal is to develop a local force toperform these tasks. If local forces fail, thepreparation of the conflict area should supportcontingency plans for employing combat forces.To support Fill, selected CSS elements can beemployed in support of host country nationaldevelopmental efforts. Such elements couldtrain local forces on logistic operations.

b. CSS can operate on two levels. The firstlevel is a small requirement for support of theadvisory team. The second level is for supply ofmateriel to the host country (security assistance)for improving military and civil organizations.The Sl/S4 should coordinate with SS to deter-mine the requirements that can be met by localresources. Local support is used to the greatestextent possible. When planning support forcesrequirements, the commander must carefullyconsider local resources. If the US presence in-creases beyond small teams ( engineeringprojects, medical exercises), the size of the sup-port element (supply and services, maintenancetransportation) increases. This is also true inhost countries having minimal resources to pro-vide support.

8-10. OPERATIONAL BASESOperation bases are usually established bybattalions and are semipermanent in consolidationoperations. They operate only as long as requiredby the unit mission.

a. The main function of the battalion opera-tional base is to support tactical operations. It mayprovide a staging area for operations; a command,control, and communications center; a limited lo-gistic base (battalion combat trains); a fire supportbase; personnel systems support; or a combinationthereof. The specific support functions it providesare determined by availability and need. Thesebases have the minimum personnel needed to op-erate and provide security. All nonessential

.

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action with the civilian populace than tactical op-erations, personnel involved must understand thehost country's culture. This precludes any actionthat might hinder accomplishing the overall na-tional objective.

(5) The CSS assets that normally operatefrom the battalion operational base are medical,maintenance, and supply. These same assets canalso operate from the brigade operational base.The additional assets of transportation, mainte-nance, and personnel support usually operatefrom the brigade operational base. The size of theelement at each base depends on the situation. Anonessential element should not be deployed fromthe home station. Deployed elements should con-sist only of those assets crucial to the tactical oroperational functioning of the unit.

8-11. MAINTENANCEMaintenance involves all actions to keepequipment operational or to restore it to thatstatus. Except for light units, battalionmaintenance elements are located at theoperational base (combat trains) and the brigadesupport base (field trains). Maintenance contactteams from the maintenance unit supporting thebrigade (forward support maintenance company orforward support battalion) are also located withthe operational base. Maintenance doctrine (fix asfat forward as possible) is modified to keep theoperational base small. As a result, mostmaintenance, other than minor repair orreplacement of parts, occurs at the brigade supportbase in a secure area. Maintenance elements in theoperational base should stress replacement ofcomponents (LRUs) and should maximize the useofBDAR teams.

.

8-12. TRANSPORTATION PLANNINGThe S4 plans transportation for CSS movement.He must consider departure and arrival facilities,in-country transportation networks, and hostnation support.

a. Transportation requirements are classifiedas tactical and non tactical. Tactical transportationdeals with repositioning men and materiel. Non-tactical transportation deals with moving men andmateriel in noncombat action.

personnel-those not crucial to the tactical mis-sion-are positioned in the brigade operationalbase.

b. Battalion operational bases provide certainadvantages. These advantages are secondary anddo not take precedence over the main function-to support tactical operations. Some secondaryadvantages are:

(1) Establish a government presence in thearea of operations.

(2) Aid in limiting guerrilla mobility nearby.(3) Provide some security to populated areas

nearby.c. When selecting a location for the opera-

tional base, commanders must consider severalfactors. The location must include an area largeenough to meet the unit's requirements and be ondefensible terrain. Use or construction of protec-tive structures must be considered as well asdefensive positions, obstacles, and minefields. Ifthe unit is going to use the base for fire support,the location must provide maximum coverage forindirect fire weapons.

(1) The operational base is located farenough away from population centers to precludecivilian interference with operations. It must mini-mize the chance of the population centerbecoming a collateral target.

(2) The operational base is located so that ithas two methods for resupply. For example, if themain means for resupply is by air, it should alsohave a secondary means, such as a road, if weatherprecludes the use of aircraft.

(3) The brigade operational base provides de-ployed battalions with command, control, andcommunications facilities; CSS (BSA); personnelsystems support; staging areas; and intelligence ac-tivities. The brigade operational base is usually ina secured area within a government-controlledarea. It is larger than a battalion operational base.The brigade operational base provides essentialtactical and operational support to deployed bat-talions. It also provides a rear location fornondeployed elements of the deployed battalions(battalion field trains).

(4) All CSS elements, whether operatingfrom battalion or brigade bases, ensure that theiractivities support the overall national objective.Since these operations usually involve more inter-

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medical and surgical treatments. In support of theIDAD effort, medical units and personnel canprovide assistance, advice, and training to hostcountry medical personnel. These units may alsoprovide limited medical support to the localpopulace for a short time. However, such supportis conducted under the auspices of the hostcountry and to the credit of that government.

a. Aidmen are at platoon level and give emer-gency medical treatment within their abilities.They also ensure that patients who must be evacu-ated are properly prepared and promptly moved.

b. A physician and or physician's assistantnormally supervises the battalion aid station. Incounterguerrilla situations, the station is withinthe battalion operational base. Aid station func-tions include the following:

(1) Receiving, recording, examining, and sort-ing patients and returning the physically fit to

duty.(2) Providing emergency medical treatment

and preparing patients for evacuation.(3) Providing limited medical support

through military civic action programs.c. Depending on how serious the injury, the

patient can be moved directly to a division clearingstation in the brigade support base or to a corps-level hospital. Evacuation to medical supportfacilities can be by ground. However, the preferredmeans is aeromedical evacuation in counterguer-ilIa operations due to the speed and security ofaerial transport.

d. Any medical facility may be bypassed andthe patient evacuated to a higher level when hiscondition warrants it and the means of evacuationpermit. Evacuation of wounded personnel doesnot take precedence over mission accomplishment.

b. Two major types of transportation meansavailable to counterguerrilla forces are motor andair transport. Less common means of transporta-tion are railroads, watercraft, and pack animals.

c. Tactical transportation by aviation assets ispreferred due to its speed and flexibility. Whenaviation assets are not suitable, motor transporta-tion is used. If motor transportation is required,the logistics task force must be augmented withthe transportation assets. Motor transportation re-quires increased security. Once the unit isrepositioned, soldiers move on foot to accomplishtheir mission. Aviation units are located at divi-sion level and above. Aircraft for brigadeoperations or below are attached or placed in sup-port of the using unit.

d. Nontactical transportation is accomplishedby either aviation or motor transportation assets.Normally, nontactical transportation moves sup-plies and equipment, and supports medicalevacuation. Motor transportation assets may beorganic to units at company level and above. Theuse of motor transport depends on distance, secu-rity, terrain, availability of routes, and so on.

e. Motor transportation requests are madethrough S4 channels, consolidated at brigade S4,and forwarded to the division transportation offi-cer. The division movement control officer assignspriorities and allocates truck assets or requests ad-ditional assets from corps. Also, additionaltransport may be needed to move cargo for civicaction projects.

f. Requests for Army aviation are madethrough S3 channels and forwarded to the assis-tant division aviation officer. The assistant divisionaviation officer assigns priorities and missions tothe division's combat aviation brigade or requestsadditional assets from corps.

g. When planning transportation support incountries where the road infrastructure is not welldeveloped, commanders may depend upon inlandand coastal waterways for transportation. If so,Army watercraft may playa vital role in the sup-port of FID.

4

8-14. PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORTTo remain an effective fighting force, thecounterguerrilla unit requires personnel servicesupport. Most, if not all, of this support functionoccurs in the field trains at the brigade operationalbase. (See FMs 7-20, 71-2, and 12-6.)

a. The adjutant (S1) locates at the battalionoperational base with the supply officer (S4) andfunctions as the combat unit's primary personneloperational base. The S1 's primary role includesmanaging combat-essential information to support

8-13. MEDICALUNITSMedical units conserve the fighting strength of thecounterguerrilla force. They do so by preventivemedical and sanitary measures, and by proper

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the decision-making process and delivering re-placements, mail, and other personnel services.Information essential to the critical functions ofthe personnel systems must be collected and proc-essed timely and accurately to support commanddecisions and combat units at all levels. The HHCcommander locates with the field trains of the bat-talion in the brigade base. This arrangement keepsthe battalion base as small as possible.

b. Personnel support for the commander in-cludes the following:

(I) Replacement operations. This entails thecoordinated support and delivery of replacementsand return-to-duty soldiers on the battlefield. Dur-ing a LIC, depending on the task forceconfiguration and duration of the conflict, indi-viduals may not be replaced. However, whenpossible, replacements may be provided on an in-dividual, team, squad, platoon, or unit leveldepending on the command requirements.

(2) Strength management. This assesses an or-ganization's combat power, plans for futureoperations, and assigns replacements on the bat-tlefield. It predicts the need for replacements.Strength management includes the techniques anddecision-making process used to allocate replace-ments and to assess the combat capabilities ofunits from the personnel perspective. This is acritical function. As part of the task force, units

may have personnel from other branches of serviceor components.

(3) Personnel accounting and strength report-ing. This accounts for soldiers and reports theirduty status as the foundation for critical battlefielddecisions. This function will also be performed atthe home station in a peacetime mode for soldiersthat did not deploy. This function also includes theC2SRS. The C2SRS manages the personnel com-bat power of the tactical force and reconcilesdeliberate personnel accounting and hasty strengthreporting information.

(4) Casualty management. This records, re-ports, and accounts for casualties promptly andefficiently. In a LIC, casualties must be pro-cessed as soon as possible. They could be in aCONUS medical facility before the casualtymanager is aware of the casualty; therefore,casualties must be reported sooner than currentregulations mandate.

(5) Enemy prisoner ofwar and civilian interneeoperations. In a LIC, a reserve military police pris-oner of war processing unit may not be activated.The personnel community may perform EPWprocessing depending on the task force com-mander's desires.

c. Finance support operations and counterin-surgency operations remain flexible to support thesituation.

Section III.

PEACEKEEPING OPERA TIONS

Sustainment operations in a PKO must have the consent of the recently belligerentparties. The PKO force must remain neutral to retain its credibility and acceptability.This can preclude or limit the use of host nation support and contracting. NormalDISCOM support operations should be used to the maximum in PKOs. The supportreflects austere base development and a mixed military/civilian contractor supportstructure.

orientation of the operation, the LOGCAP can beused more than in other types of actions. It shouldnot be confused with HNS agreements orcontracting with local or third party nationals. TheLOGCAP objective includes planning for the useof civilian contractors to perform certain servicesto augment Army forces. It can be an asset ifseveral conditions have been met and the LIC

8-15. LOGISTICAL CML AUGMENTATIONPROGRAMIn the UN's multinational force and observer-typemission, civilian contractors can provide custodialsupport at bases, maintenance of vehicles, andother supply and service functions. Host nationsupport may not be a major factor due to politicalconsiderations derived from the nature of a PKO.Due to the multinational and noncombat

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operation occurs in a country where servicingcontracts exist. (See AR 700-137. )

PKO force, they must consider the type/content ofcertain foods for religious or cultural reasons.

d. Water can be included in an overall custo-dial contract, obtained from local sourceS, orprovided water purification/distribution units.Commanders must coordinate with preventivemedicine personnel to test and approve all waterobtained from both local and US military systems.

e. Services at the base camp for PKO person-nel can be included in the general custodialcontract. The extent to which they are establishedpermanently depends on the length of the opera-tion. Mortuary affairs support is usually reservedfor US force operations. Arrangements for the fol-lowing services must be made in advance so thatthey are contracted or included as part of theforce:

.Showers.

.Laundry.

.Barber.

.Post exchange services.

.Recreation facilities.

.Engineer functions.

.Firefighting.

.Sewer.

.Trash disposal-

.Electrical power.

f. When neutrality is not in question and allparties agree, host nation contractors can performmaintenance for military and commercial equip-ment. Use of host nation contractors assists in thegrowth of their economic base and enhances rela-tions. As host nation contractors' involvementincreases, the need for language-qualified mainte-nance personnel also increases.

g. The brigade may need division and corpsassets to ensure a dedicated transportation capa-bility to provide flexibility and mobility to thesupported force. Host nation or third-party con-tract assets, however, should be used to the fullestto meet transportation needs. If US vehicles areused, the need for vehicle operators to have localor international driver's licenses must be deter-mined. Likewise, the road network must bechecked before arrival in country. Current data onall roads and bridges are required to include themain supply routes that can be used and restric-

8-16. PlANNINGIn PKO planning the S3 and Sl/S4 identify thoseunits requiring CSS and provide the requiredsupport packages. Planning must allow for enoughtransportation assets to provide for the rapidrelocation of peacekeeping forces. If moretransporta~ion assets are required beyond theorganic assets of the peacekeeping force, then suchaugmentation should be planned and requested inadvance.

a. CSS units in support of the peacekeepingforce should establish liaison with the task forcecommander and staff. Timely guidance allows theunit to begin the detailed planning and prepara-tion required for executing assigned tasks. Supportunits of higher headquarters can provide CSS di-rectly to UN peacekeeping forces.

(1) Some of the subjects relative to logisticsupport for the peacekeeping force include-

.Supplies and services.

.Use of indigenous personnel-

.Use of roads, post facilities, airfields, and

railways.

(2) Planning considerations include-.Task-organizing a special CSS unit..Using an intermediate support base near

the deployed force.

b. Supply support for a deployed peacekeep-ing force requires longer order times for surfaceshipments. Due to this, initial supply support mustbe planned in advance. Stockage of repair partsand other supplies must be increased to a levelthat can support a deployed force for a long time.Self-service supply items are required, and theirtype and amount are based on a particular unit.

c. The force may rely heavily on contractorsfor fresh food supplies as well as dining facility op-erations. Therefore, planning and coordination arevital to planning for supplemental rations. Veteri-nary inspection support must be planned tomonitor local purchase activities. Also, the needfor MREs or other combat-ready meals may existfor members of the force on remote patrol. Sincebattalion elements may support all members of the

.

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tions to vehicles-for example, convoy size, weightof vehicle, when roads can be used.

h. Military medical support of PKOs is con-ducted as part of a single health service assistanceprogram. The brigade surgeon has responsibility

for the overall medical planning. All medical sup-port to host country nationals is usually limited toemergency treatment. Strict coordination require-ments preclude an improvised medical activityfrom functioning.

Section IV.PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

As in other operations, the commander determines the sequence of deployment of thetactical force, supporting elements, fillers and replacement personnel, and bulk suppliesin PCOs. The S4 coordinates the deployment of CSS units and recommends changes inthe deployment sequence if a balanced force is not maintained. Usually, DS supply andservice elements, maintenance, repair parts supply, transportation, and ammunition andpetroleum supply are required early in the PCOs. Divisional and corps field service unitsare not normally required at first. However, they must be sequenced early to provide forthe physical needs of the force. The need for such units depends on the nature of theoperation and its duration and environment.

control, the commander must include some ele-ment of brigade support headquarters in earlyincrements. This element can organize smallerele-ments into a composite and can provide acommand and control structure. This arrangementshould be reorganized as priorities and resourcespermit. As the situation develops, temporary com-posite headquarters can revert to its normal role.

c. The SI must establish procedures for re-placements and, in coordination with thebrigade/battalion surgeon, a medical evacuationpolicy. The replacement requirements are basedon estimates on the number of casualties. Thesource of these replacements must be identified toinclude all processing the contingency force mustprovide. This can include where personnel are tobe equipped for the local environment such as areplacement center or the receiving unit.

d. The S4 determines the requirements forsupply, services, and maintenance. He bases theserequirements on the force structure and projectedintensity of conflict. The S4 should provid this in-formation to the planners as they develop theamount of support required and for the loading ofthe supply pipeline.

e. The S4 must examine transportation fromthe departure point to the arrival facility. The S4and SS must coordinate the amount of supportthat can be provided byand to the host nation.

8-17. PlANNINGBrigade CSS units are not flexible enough toprovide needed CSS in contingencies. Additionaldivision and corps CSS elements can be deployedinto a hostile environment along with or soonafter the first forces land. Selected DISCOM unitsshould land soon after combat units. Some CSSelements can arrive in the country or in anadjacent country before the actual deployment.These elements can arrive by air at a commercialairfield and move to the conflict area to operate asan arrival airfield control group.

a. When developing the OPLAN, the S4 de-termines the source of support. The force can beresupplied from CONUS designated OCONUS fa-cilities (another theater) or from a third country. Itrelies on strategic airlift or sealift for rapid deploy-ment and resupply. Due to the uniquerequirements of PCOs, the time-consuming main-tenance activities and management functions maytake place at the CONUS support base with mis-sion-ready equipment returned to the user. If thesituation escalates from LIC to mid-intensity con-flict, the support structure in the area ofoperations would require expansion.

b. During the buildup phase, the Sl/S4 mustknow the number of CSS units in country, sincemany of the mutual support units may be detach-ments, teams, and companies without a parentheadquarters. To execute effective command and

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f. The S4 must determine if any CSS functionthat is normally performed by higher headquartersis required such as water terminal operations. Ifso, it should be included in the force structure.

.

Transportation nets.Site selection for seIVice supportoperating facilities and bivouacs.Facilities for the receipt, storage, andinventory control of material.Transportation movement control.Communications and power.Security for seIVice support.Potable water.Initial personnel support operations.Medical evacuation and initial medicalsupport facilities.Laundry and renovation.Mortuary affairs.

Subsistence.

POL resupply (bulk/packaged).Ammunition resupply.

Repair parts.Public affairs team for command/publicinformation purposes.

8-18 CRITICAL TASKSWhen a friendly host nation requests USassistance in a threatening but inactive combatsituation, CSS elements may precede combatelements in deployment. This provides the neededsupport, units, and materials for combat elementsupon arrival. If the PCO is initiated in a hostilecountry, the first CSS increment is deployed in thecontingency area as soon as initial objectives areseized and an operating base area is secured.Civil-military affairs, transportation, engineers,MP, communications, health services, financialsupport, and personnel systems supportoperations elevate in importance at this stage.Initially, the tasks to be accomplished and

established,include-.Real estate and facilities..Arrangements for unloading aircraft and

ships.

c

.

8-10

APPENDIX A

THE URBAN INSURGENT

Cities and towns are vulnerable to urban insurgent violence because they are the focus ofeconomic and political power. Public utilities and services can often be disrupted. Thus,the government may appear to have lost control of the situation. US forces employed inLIC can expect to conduct operations in an urban environment normally in support ofthe host nation police or military.

A-l. EFFEcrS OF THEENVIRONMENTThe concentration of a large number of people in asmall area provides cover for the insurgentHowever, the insurgent may find support only incertain areas of a town or city. The urban insurgentusually lives in a community that is friendly to him,or the people are too frightened to withhold itssupport or to inform on him. He has a closerelationship with leaders and other insurgents. Hemay have a communication system using women andchildren, who also provide cover for other activities.

a. The urban insurgent can operate moreboldly than his rural counterpart as reflected by histactics. The sniper complements the more conven-tional ambush and often replaces it. Also,explosive devices can be used either as instrumentsagainst the community or more selectively againstindividuals or groups.

b. The availability of a large number of peo-pie ensures that crowds can be assembled anddemonstrations easily manipulated. The presenceof women and children restricts COIN force reac-tions. A thoughtless reaction can ensure a majorincident that provides the insurgent with propa-ganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban areabecause no major incident can be concealed fromthe local population. Terrorist successes can be ex-ploited to discredit the ability of the police, COINforce, and civil government, thus providing protec-tion and controlling the insurgents.

c. The urban insurgent cannot, like his ruralcounterpart, establish bases and recruit large mili-tary units. He is an individual and a member of a

URBAN relatively small group. He relies on the cover af-forded by the people of the city and relies onterror to avoid betrayal. Individuals and smallgroups are effective in an urban environment be-cause it is easier for them to avoid capture.However, if capt~red, the terrorist may be able toexpose only two or three persons to government orCOIN forces.

A-2. INSURGENT TAcrlCSThe urban insurgent works alone or in small cells.His tactics are different from those of his ruralcounterpart to include the following:

a. Disrupting industry and public services bystrikes and sabotage.

b. Generating widespread disturbances de-signed to extend the resources of the COIN force.

c. Creating incidents or massing crowds tolure the COIN force into a trap.

d. Provoking the COIN force into overreact-ing, which would provide hostile propaganda.

e. Provoking interfactional strife.f. Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, sentries,

and individuals.g. Attacking vehicles and buildings with rock-

ets and mortars.h. Planting explosive devices, either against

specific targets or at random, to cause confusionand destruction, and to lower public morale.

i. Ambushing patrols and firing on helicop-ters.A-3. OPERATIONSOperations against urban insurgents may varyfrom a passive policy to active. The passive policy

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curtails terrorist activities so that community lifecan continue (under certain constraints). Theactive policy involves the COIN force seeking outand capturing or killing the enemy. The level ofintensity at which operations are conducted aredetermined by the civil government. Fighting theurban insurgent is a police mission. However, themilitary COIN force commander may be requiredto assist the police in this mission or even assumeit. The techniques used are like those used in ruralareas. Before operations are conducted,information must be obtained about the enemy,his environment, and operations. The techniquesinclude:

.Installation of base defense.

.Roadblocks and checkpoints.

.Crowd dispersal-

.Cordon-and-search operations.

.Patrols.

A-4. MINIMUM FORCEIn an urban environment, the principle ofminimum force becomes vital and is related to theROE. There is greater danger of injuring or killinginnocent civilians in heavily populated centers.Clearing operations must be modified to ensuretheir safety. A grenade tossed into a room beforeentering maybe a violation of the ROE. However,when insurgents are located and isolated, precisionmunitions may be employed to destroy them.These systems minimize collateral damage andreduce the chance of injury to noncombatants.Since large groups of insurgents are seldom foundin cities, there are no base camps-only safehouses. Also, killing or capturing the' urbaninsurgent takes a great deal of time; opportunitiesfor deliberate attacks rarelyoccur.

-4'

.

A-2

APPENDIX B

SMOKE, FLAME, HERBICIDES, AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

This appendix provides guidance on the employment of chemical agents and munitionsin COIN operations.

attention of the enemy away from the intended op-eration.

b. Smoke sources include the following:(1) Mechanical smoke generators (large

screen areas).(2) Smoke grenades (small screens, signaling,

identifying).(3) MI smoke pot, 10-pound (small screen).(4) ABC-M5 smoke pot, 30-pound (small

screen).(5) M4A2 floating smoke pot (small screens,

ground or water base).(6) WP mortar, and WP and HC artillery

rounds (obscuring, signaling, deceiving, identify-

ing, screening).(7) WP tank rounds, 9O-mm and 105-mm

(small screens, obscuring, signaling, identifying).(8) Grenade-launched round by tanks, BFV ,

and M203 grenade launcher (small, individual

screens).(9) Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems,

tanks, and BFV (small, individual screens).(10) Aircraft-delivered smoke ordnance

(large screens).c. Depending on the weather and terrain,

smoke screening may not always be effective. Forexample, the wind could be too strong or be blow-ing from the wrong direction. Signaling,identifying, and obscuring are all good smoke mis-sions in all phases of a COIN operation.

B-l. SMOKESmoke can be employed to identify, signal,obscure, deceive, and screen. It helps identify andsignal targets, supply and evacuation points, andfriendly unit positions. Smoke also provides theCOIN commander with prearranged battlefieldcommunications.

a. Obscuration aids in deceiving the enemy,concealing maneuver, and increasing the potentialforce-on-force ratio when the target cannot seethrough the smoke. Smoke supports LIC opera-tions by creating a feeling of isolation that reducesthe insurgent's will to resist. In counterterrorist ac-tivities, smoke restricts the use of airfields orfacilities, and conceals the movements of coun-terterrorist forces. It also restricts the effectivenessof sophisticated sighting systems used by statesponsored terrorists.

(I) The use of obscurants in counterterroristor counterinsurgency operations requires the sameplanning as in mid- to high-intensity conflicts. Ifproperly planned, obscurants increase survivabilityby concealing friendly forces from enemy observa-tion and from intelligence-gathering operationswithout degrading operational capabilities.

(2) In peacetime contingency operations,units use smoke to protect forces in a show-of-force or demonstration exercise. During an actualextraction or raid, they use obscurants to concealLb and entrances into buildings, and to confusethe enemy as to the size and strength of the force.The use of obscurants can reduce the effect of allcommand and control measures while enhancingmission success. During the exfiltration, smoke cancover routes and can allow the extraction force tobreak contact and escape. Deception smoke opera-tions must be planned and conducted to divert the

B-2. FLAME EXPEDIENTS AND THE M202ROCKET LAUNCHERFlaming fuel and hot shrapnel, exploding over anarea up to 100 meters in diameter, are effectivedefensive weapons. If a target is to be pinpointed,

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then the M202 rocket can be used to flame ahostile position.

a. The flame mine is an omnidirectional expe-dient that can be command-detonated or activatedby a trip wire. It scatters flame and shrapnel overan area 20 to 100 meters in diameter, dependingon the size of the mine.

b. The fougasse (flame/shrapnel) expedient issimilar to the mine except that its explosive force is di-rectional (rather than all-round). A 55-gallon barrel isoften used as a container for fuel and shrapnel. Thebarrel is placed in a V -trench and sandbagged in place,and an explosive charge is placOO behind the barrelWhen exploded, the flaming fuel and pieces of metalare blown out to a distance of200 meters or more (in abroad V-pattem).

c. The M202 rocket launcher contains fourrockets that burst into flame on impact. The aim-ing device on the launcher provides on-targetaccuracy for close combat.

B-4. RIOT-CONTROLAGENTSThe US renounces the first use of RCAs in warexcept defensively to save lives. RCA use is notgoverned by the same policy as chemical agents.Since RCAs are not used to injure or kill and theireffects are short lived, situations arise when RCAuse is more appropriate than conventionalweapons. (See PM 3-100.)

a. RCA containers include hand grenades and40-mm CS cartridge grenades (M203 grenadelauncher). When used, the grenades, whetherthrown or fired, are directed upwind of the targetso the chemical vapor drifts onto the hostile posi-tion.

b. Commonly used RCAs contain chemicalsthat cause lung irritation and watering of the eyes.They are used to force insurgents from tunnels,caves, and buildings in an effort to take them pris-oner. When COIN units probe possible ambushsites, RCAs can be used to flush insurgents andtake prisoners.

c. When COIN units are in defensive posi-tions, canisters of RCA (containing the agent inpowder form) can be detonated by remote control.

B-3. HERBICIDESThe US renounces first use of herbicides in warexcept when used for control of vegetation withinUS bases and installations. Herbicides can also beused around the immediate defensive perimetersto clear observation and fields of fire. They havethe potential to destroy food production and todefoliate large areas. However, the US will not useherbicides in this way, unless they are first usedagainst US forces and the President directs theiruse in retaliation.

d. COIN personnel wear the protective maskand cover exposed skin areas when employingRCAs. Decontamination, after RCA missions, re-quires troops to wash skin areas and brush or washclothing.

8-2

APPENDIX C

OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES

This appendix presents techniques that may be employed when conducting the mostcommon types of tactical COIN operations. Table C-1 presents some of the mostcommon operations and techniques that a COIN force employs. Large-scaleoperations are more suited to the later stages of an insurgency while small-unittactics are more suited to the whole spectrum. (See FMs 7-7, 7-7], 7-8, 7-10, 7-20,7-30, 71-1, 71-2, and 71-3.)

Section I.

OPERATIONS

With minor changes, some operations discussed in FMs 7-10, 7-20, 71-1, and 71-2 can beused for counterguerrilla warfare and COIN. These operations include raids, movementsto contact, hasty attacks, deliberate attacks, reconnaissance in force, exploitations, and

pursuits.

time to block an escape. If occupation at the sametime is not possible, escape routes most likely tobe used are covered first. Initial occupation is themost critical period of an encirclement. If large in-surgent formations become aware of theencirclement, they may react immediately to probefor gaps or to attack weak points to force a gap.

d. Units occupying the encircling positionsprovide strong combat patrols well to their frontto give early warning of attempted breakouts andto block escape routes. Mobile reserves are posi-tioned for immediate movement to counter anythreat of a breakout, and to reinforce difficult ar-eas such as deep ravines or areas containing caveor tunnel complexes.

e. Indirect fire support can cloak an impend-ing encirclement by gaining and maintaining theinsurgent's attention while encircling units moveinto position. Fires, including field artillery,should be planned in detail to support the encir-clement after it is discovered.

C-l. ENCIRCLEMENTEncirclement is designed to cut off all groundroutes for escape and reinforcement of theencircled insurgent force. It offers the bestpossibility for fixing insurgent forces in positionand for achieving decisive results. Battalion andlarger units may conduct encirclements.

a. The company and smaller units normallylack enough men and command and control abilityto conduct encirclements (except against small,concentrated insurgent forces). All units of thebrigade can participate in encirclements conductedby a larger force.

b. Planning, preparation, and execution areaimed at complete encirclement of the insurgentforce. Maximum security and surprise can begained by completing the encirclement duringdarkness.

c. Encircling movements are executed rapidly.Use of air assault and airborne troops can contrib-ute speed and surprise to the early phases of anencirclement. Positions are occupied at the same

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TARGETS**

MODEPURPOSESIZE

~ PLT

REQUIRED *

~ INTELLSUIT

PHASE

OPERATION

INDIVIDUALS CONTROL

I i~~~~i~~~~~ ~~~i~~

1&2 I POPULATION &RESERVE CONTROL

I, II, IIIROADBLOCKS

I, II, 1II 1&2 POPULATION &RESERVE CONTROL

~ PLTCHECKPOINTS

AREAS (URBAN)LOG PERS INFO

POPULATION &RESERVE CONTROL

CORDON & SEARCH ~co

SECURE INFORMATIONI DESTROY ENEMY

IUBERATE PERSONNEL

SPECIFIC TARGETS~ PLTRAID ..

I RECONNOITER COMBAT

DENIAL OF A8~~

AREA UNITS FACILITIESI, II, III &2~ PLT 1 2PATROLLING

I INTERDICTION OF

MOVEMENT1 2 I, 11,111 1&2AMBUSH ~co HARASS

DESTROYINTERDICT

ENEMY UNITSBN 23 IIIMOVEMENT TOCONTACT

RECONNAISNCEIN FORCE

HASTY ATTACK

DELIBERATE ATTACK

EXPLOITATION

PURSUIT

I OPERATIONAL

SUPPORT BASE

PATROL BASES

IMMEDIATEACTION DRILLS

ENCIRCLEMENT

LEGEND:* 1. NO INTELLIGENCE

2. LIMITED INTELLIGENCE

3. COMPREHENSIVE

1. OFFENSIVE

2. DEFENSIVE

Table C.1. Comparison of operations.

terrain, units may be removed from the lineand added to the reserve. Against smallinsurgent forces, the entire encircled areamay be cleared by contraction; however ,against larger insurgent forces, some actionother than further contraction will be

required (Figure C-l).

C-2. REDUcrlON OF ENCIRCLEMENTFollowing the initial encirclement, the captureor destruction of the insurgent force ismethodical and thorough. Fire and maneuverare used together in a controlled contractionof the encirclement. As the line ofentrenchment is contracted, depending on

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MOVEMENT

INCITER

FM 7-98

divided into smaller elements, ei ther red uction ofencirclement or the hammer and anvil method is

used(FigureC-3).

Figure C.1. Reduction of encirclement.

C.3. HAMMER AND ANVIL METHODThe hammer and anvil technique is employed aftersome degree of reduction. It involves employing ablocking force on one or more sides of theperimeter. This is performed while part of theencirclement forces the insurgents against theblocking force by offensive action. Either elementcan accomplish the actual destruction, but it isusually accomplished by the attacking element.This technique is most effective when the blockingforce is located on, or to the rear of, a naturalterrain obstacle. In this method, one or more unitsin the encirclement remain stationary while theothers drive the insurgent unit against it (FigureC-2). This technique can be employed during thereduction of an encirclement or whenever thetactical situation permits. Airborne or air assaultforces can be employed on favorable terrain deepin the enemy rear. This technique is useful indestroying insurgents, because they prefer to fightonly when conditions are favorable to them.

Figure C-2. Hammer and anvIl method.

C-4. WEDGE METHODThis method is used during the reduction of anencirclement. A unit is used to divide theenemy while the encircling elements remain inplace. After the insurgent force has been

Figure C-3. Wedge method.

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Section II.

CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND SEARCHES

While it is preferred to have host country forces control civil disturbances, US forces maybe forced by circumstances to conduct them and be involved in search operations. (Thetype of civil disturbance provides the needed counteraction guidelines; for detailedinformation refer to PM 19-15.)

road) where large vehicles can be searched withoutdelaying the flow of other traffic (which can bedealt with more quickly). Areas are required forsearching female insurgents and detaining personsfor further interrogation. If possible, the personnelmanning a checkpoint should include a member ofthe civil police, an interpreter, and a trained fe-male searcher. When searching a vehicle, alloccupants get out and stand clear of the vehicle.The driver should observe the search of his vehi-cle. The searcher is always covered by an assistant.When searching, politeness and Consideration areshown at all times. The occupants of the vehiclecan be searched at the same time, if enoughsearchers are available (Figure C-4).

~

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~:

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{~

~

C-5. SEARCH TECHNIQUESearches are commonly used in population andresources control operations. They include use ofcheckpoints and roadblocks to control traffic andto reduce the ability of the insurgent to movepersonnel and materiel freely.

a. Special Equipment Required. Specialequipment is required for a checkpoint to achievethe best results. Portable signs in the native lan-guage and in English should be available. Signsshould denote the speed limit of approach, vehiclesearch area, vehicle parking areas, male and fe-male search areas, and dismount point. Lighting isneeded for the search area at night. Communica-tion is required between the various troop unitssupporting the checkpoint operation. Barbed-wireobstacles across the roadand around the searcharea should be provided.Troops must have ade-quate firepower towithstand an attack or tohalt a vehicle attemptingto flee or crash throughthe checkpoint.

b. Method. Thecheckpoint is establishedby placing two parallelobstacles (each with agap) across the road. Thedistance (in meters) be-tween obstacles dependson the amount of trafficthat is held in the searcharea. The blocked sectionof road can be used asthe search area. If possi-ble, there should be aplace (adjacent to the

0~'

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~

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LEGEND:

A. FEMALE SEARCH AREAB .VEHICLE SEARCH AREAC. ROAD BLOCK-BARRIERD -SECURITY FORCE

~

I~

Figure C-4. Area search technique.

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C-6. SEARCH OF INDMDUALSThe searching of individuals involves the followingmethods.

a. Frisk Search. The frisk is a quick search ofan individual for weapons, evidence, or contra-band. It should be conducted in the presence of anassistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, thesearcher stands behind the insurgent. Thesearcher's assistant takes a position from which hecan cover the insurgent with his weapon. The in-surgent is required to raise his arms. The searcherthen slides his hands over the individual's entirebody, crushing the clothing to locate concealed ob-jects.

b. Wall Search. Based on the principle of ren-dering the insurgent harmless by placing him in astrained, awkward position, the wall search affordsthe searcher some safety. It is quite useful whentwo searchers must search several insurgents. Anyupright surface can be used such as a wall, vehicle,or tree.

(1) Position of insurgent. The insurgent mustface the wall (or other object) and lean against it,supporting himself with his upraised hands placedfar apart and fingers spread His feet are placed wellapart, turned out, parallel to the wall, and as far fromthe wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(2) Position of searcher's assistant. Thesearcher's assistant stands on the opposite of theinsurgent (from the searcher) and to the rear. Hecovers the insurgent with his weapon. When thesearcher moves from his original position to theopposite side of the insurgent, the assistant alsochanges position. The searcher walks around hisassistant during this change to avoid coming be-tween his assistant and the insurgent.

(3) Position of searcher. The searcher ap-proaches the insurgent from the right side. Thesearcher's weapon must not be in such a positionthat the insurgent can grab it. When searchingfrom the right side, the searcher places his rightfoot in front of the insurgent's right foot andmakes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. Fromthis position, if the insurgent offers resistance, theinsurgent's right foot can be pushed back from un-der him. When searching from the left side of theinsurgent, the searcher places his left foot in frontof the insurgent's left foot and again maintains an-kle-to-ankle contact.

(4) Initial position. In taking his initial posi-tion, the searcher should be alert to prevent theinsurgent from suddenly trying to disarm or injurehim. The searcher first searches the insurgent'sheadgear. The searcher then checks the insurgent'shands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, insequence. The searcher repeats the procedure insearching the insurgent's left side. He crushes theinsurgent's clothing between his fingers-he doesnot merely pat it. He pays close attention to arm-pits, back, waist, legs, and tops of boots or shoes.Any item found that is not considered a weapon orevidence is replaced in the insurgent's pocket. Ifthe insurgent resists or attempts escape and mustbe thrown down before completing the search, thesearch is restarted from the beginning.

(5) Switch ofmultiple insurgents. When two ormore insurgents are to be searched, they must as-sume a position against the same wall or object butfar enough apart so that they cannot reach eachother. The searcher's assistant takes his position afew paces to the rear of the line with his weaponready. The search is started with the insurgent onthe right of the line. On completing the search ofone insurgent, the searcher moves the insurgent tothe left of the line to resume his position againstthe wall. Thus, in approaching and searching thenext insurgent, the searcher is not between his as-sistant and a insurgent.

c. Strip Search. This type of search is usedwhen the individual is suspected of being an insur-gent leader or important messenger. The searchshould be conducted in an enclosed space such as aroom or tent. The searching technique can be var-ied. One method is to use two unarmed searcherswhile an assistant, who is armed, stands guard. Theinsurgent's clothing and shoes are removed andsearched carefully. A search is then made of hisperson to include his mouth, nose, ears, hair, arm-pits, crotch, and other areas of possibleconcealment.

d. Search or Females. The insurgent forcemakes full use of females for all types of taskswhere search may be a threat. COIN forces mustfully employ female searchers. If female searcherscannot be provided, a doctor or aidman should beused for searching female insurgents. The searchof females is an extremely sensitive matter. Whenmale soldiers must search females, every possible

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measure must be taken to prevent the slightest in-ference of sexual molestation or assault.

C-7. SEARCH OF POPULATED AREASFour fundamentals are employed when conductinga search.

a. Approach. On some operations, mountedmovement may be possible directly into the area tobe searched. However, the situation may dictatedismounted movement. Emphasis is on rapid andcoordinated entrance into the area.

b. Surrounding the Area. During darkness,troops approach silently by as many differentroutes as possible. At first daylight, the area can beoccupied by a chain of OPs with gaps covered bypatrols. Normally, a large area cannot be com-pletely surrounded for a long time due to thenumber of troops required. If needed, troops digin, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbedwire to help maintain their line.

c. Reserves. If there is a chance that hostileelements from outside the area could interfere,measures are taken to prevent them from joiningthe inhabitants of the area under search. Air ob-servers can assist by detecting and giving earlywarning of any large-scale movement toward theoccupied area.

d. Search Parties. The officer in command ofthe operation informs the inhabitants that the areais to be searched, that a house curfew is in force,and that all inhabitants must remain indoors. Or,he may require the inhabitants to gather at a cen-tral point and then have the search party move inand begin the search. Search parties are usuallycomposed of search teams.

(1) When a decision is made to gather inhabi-tants at a central point, the head of the houseshould accompany the search party when his houseis searched. If this is not done, he can deny knowl-edge of anything incriminating that is found, or hecan accuse the troops of theft and looting. In smallsearches, it may be best to ask the head of eachhousehold to sign a certificate stating that nothinghas been illegally removed. However, in a largesearch this may be impractical. To avoid accus-ations of theft, witnesses should be present duringthe search. A prominent member of the commu-nity, should accompany each search team.

(2) Buildings should be searched from top tobottom. Mine detectors are used to search forarms and ammunition. Every effort is made toavoid needless damage. Each house or buildingsearched is marked with a coded designation. Thissame designation can be used to list occupantswho must be accounted for in subsequent searches.The designation helps ensure that no building isoverlooked in the search.

(3) If a house is vacant or if an occupant re-fuses entry, an entry using force may be required. Ifa house containing property is searched while itsoccupants are away, it should be secured to pre-vent looting. Before troops depart, the commandershould arrange to protect such houses with thecommunity until the occupants return.

e. Search Teams. Special teams can beformed for search operations. In searching smallareas (a few buildings), small units can conduct asearch without special teams for each function.Search teams may require-

.Reconnaissance.

.Physical or visual search-

.Control.

.Prisoner detection.

.Riot control agents, flame weapons, anddemolitions.

.Documentation.

and may be augmented by-.Fire support..Mine detection team..Military work dogs..Tunnel reconnaissance team.

.Interrogation team.

.Psychological/civil affairs team.

f. House Search. Each search party assignedto search an occupied building should consist of atleast one local policeman, one protective escort,and one female searcher, if appropriate. Thesearch party must first assemble everyone. Thecivil police may give the required orders and per-form the actual searching. The object of thissearch is to screen for suspected persons. Detainedpersons are evacuated quickly-troops can per-form this task. Escort parties and transportationmust be planned.

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FM 7-98

gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in theirhomes.

(c) Third method: Control head of house-hold. The head of each household is told to remainin front of his house while all others are broughtto a central location. During the search, the headof each household accompanies the search teamthrough his house. Looting is reduced, and thehead of the household can see that the search teamdid not steal properly. This is the best method forcontrolling the population.

(4) Search teams must search thoroughly forinsurgent personnel, equipment, escape tunnels,or caches. Cattle pens, wells, haystacks, gardens,fence lines, and cemeteries should be investigated.Search teams are constantly alert for booby traps.

(5) After the house search is completed, theperimeter and area between the security elementand village is searched. The two methods are:

(a) One-ifthe security element has not beendiscovered, the search element may be formed intosections, each section searching part of the pe-rimeter. If any section flushes an insurgent out ofthe vegetation or tunnel exit, the security elementcaptures the person, or fires at him, if he attemptsto escape.

(b ) Two-if the security element has beendiscovered, it conducts the perimeter search. Partof this element keeps the village isolated, while therest conducts the search. Such a search could takehours if the terrain is extremely dense. Regardlessof the terrain, the search units check possible loca-tions for caches of material or insurgents in hiding.

g. Village Search. Before conducting searchoperations in a village, a reconnaissance patrol issent out to gain infomlation on the village and itsinhabitants. The patrol must avoid detection.

(1) Part of the patrol maintains surveillanceover the village while the rest returns with infor-mation. This detects any changes that may takeplace before the security element assumes posi-tion. Valuable infomlation for the commanderincludes:

o Size and exact location of the village.o Fortifications (mantraps, spike traps).o Warning systems.o Tunnel systems.

.Where the insurgent lives. He could livein the forest at night and inhabit thevillage during the day, or he could stay inthe village both day and night. He couldinhabit one or more huts-

.The number of people that live in thevillage.

(2) The security and search elements use one.of two methods of movement.

(a) If aviation support is available, a quick-strike air assault movement is employed. This typeof operation is characterized by speed.

(b) If the elements conduct a dismountedmovement, they nomlally use designated routes.This type of operation is characterized by secureand rapid movement.

(3) A village may be searched as follows:(a) First method: Assemble inhabitants in a

central location (if they appear to be hostile). Thismethod provides maximum control, facilitates athorough search, denies insurgents an opportunityto conceal evidence, and allows for detailed inter-rogation. It has the disadvantage of taking theinhabitants away from their dwellings, thus en-couraging looting that engenders ill feelings.

(b ) Second method: Restrict inhabitants totheir homes. This method prohibits movement ofcivilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings,and discourages looting. The disadvantages arethat it makes control and interrogation hard and

(6) In areas where tunnels have been re-ported, the search unit must have a tunnelreconnaissance team attached. This team shouldconsist of volunteers trained for this type of opera-tion. They should have special equipment andabilities such as flashlights or miner helmets, pro-tective masks, and communication with thesurface. They should know how to sketch a tunnelsystem. They should also recover all items of intel-ligence interest.

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Section III.

MOVEMENT SECURITY

Movement security can be divided into two categories: security of convoys with strongsecurity detachments, and security of convoys with weak security detachments.

d. A strong attack element is placed at therear of the convoy formation. This allows for maxi-mum flexibility in moving forward to attack forcestrying to ambush the head or center of the convoy.

e. The enemy force may allow the advanceguard to pass the site of the main ambush. Then itblocks the road and attacks the main body and theadvance guard separately. At the first sign of anambush, vehicles try to move out of the kill zone.If they must halt, vehicles stop in place; they donot drive to the roadsides or shoulders, which maybe mined.

f. Specified personnel (following the unitSOP) immediately return fire from inside vehiclesto cover dismounting personnel. They dismountlast under cover of fire by those who dismountedfirst. Upon dismounting, personnel caught in thekill zone open fire. They immediately assault to-ward the ambush force and then establish a base offire. Tanks open fire and maneuver toward the am-bush force or to the closest favorable ground.

g. While the engaged element continues itsaction to protect the convoy, the commander rap-idly surveys the situation. He then issues orders tothe designated attack elements to begin predrilledoffensive maneuvers against the insurgent force.The fire of the engaged security element fixes theambush force and is coordinated with that of theattacking element.

h. After the insurgent force is defeated orneutralized, security details are posted to coverconvoy reorganization. The convoy commander,using the fastest communication available, briefshis commander on the engagement. Captured in-surgent personnel are interrogated as to wherethey planned to reassemble. This information is re-ported immediately to higher headquarters.

i. After an ambush, patrols may be sent to in-terrogate and or detain suspected civilians livingnear or along the routes of approach to the am-bush positions.

C-8. STRONG CONVOY SECURITYSpecial combined-arms teams can be organizedand trained to accompany and protect convoys.The security detachment is organized withadequate combat power to suppress insurgentambushes. Its size and composition depend on thephysical characteristics of the area, the ability ofthe enemy force, and the size and composition ofthe convoy.

a. The security detachment should have thefollowing subordinate elements:

(1) A headquarters element to provide com-mand, control, and communication.

(2) A medical support element.(3) An armored element to provide firepower

and shock effect.(4) A mechanized or motorized infantry ele-

ment.(5) A combat engineer element to make mi-

nor repairs to bridges and roads, and to detect andremove mines and obstacles.

b. For large convoys, the security detachmentshould include field artillery. Ideally, half of the ar-tillery would be placed well forward in the columnand half near the rear of the column. The artillerycommand and control element would move nearthe security detachment headquarters. This ar-rangement is the most flexible for providingartillery fire support to elements of the column ifan ambush occurs.

c. The combined-arms security detachment isusually interspersed throughout the convoy. Thisallows various elements to be employed either as afIxing element or attacking element. The forma-tion of a security detachment and its integrationinto a convoy varies. Therefore, the enemy can beexpected to observe convoy patterns and to pre-pare their ambushes to cope with expectedformations. Tanks lead the convoy to gain maxi-mum advantage from their mobility and firepower.If no tanks are available, a heavy vehicle with sand-bags placed to protect personnel from minesshould lead the convoy.

.

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FM 7-98

b. At the first sign of ambush, leading vehiclesshould increase to the safest maximum speed to tryto break through the ambush area. Troops fromvehicles halted in the ambush area dismount andimmediately return fire. Also, troops from vehiclesbreaking through the ambush dismount and as-sault the flanks of the ambush position. Bothattacking groups must exercise care that they donot fire on each other.

c. If the enemy force allows the main convoyto pass through and then ambushes the rear guard,troops from the main body return and attack theflanks of the ambush position.

C-9. WEAK CONVOY SECURITYThe security detachment accompanying a convoymay be too weak for decisive action against aninsurgent attack or ambush.

a. The following principles apply when weakconvoy security is evident:

(I) Some of the troops are placed well for-ward in the convoy, and the remainder are placed ashort distance to the rear.

(2) Radio contact is maintained between thetwo groups.

(3) Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areaswhere slow speeds are needed are reconnoiteredby foot troops before passage.

Section IV.

SUBSURFACE OPERATIONS

This section explains how insurgents can use natural caves or build undergroundfacilities in the course of their operations. Caves and underground facilities can be usedfor command and control centers, logistics staging areas, hospitals, or fortifications. Thelarger underground facilities can be quite complex. They can be Wired for electricity andcommunications, and can have pumping stations for supplying air to lower levels. Cavescan have many large chambers connected by passageways. Also, tunnel systems can havemany large rooms joined by interconnecting tunnels.

or fill the tunnel with explosives and destroy the

target.b. Tunnels are used for approach and escape,

and for access to caves and underground bunkersfor firing positions and for protection against indi-rect fires. They are also used as a common methodfor storing food and materials in undergroundcaches. If large enough some tunnel complexes canhouse underground hospitals and base camps. (SeePM 90-10-1 for information on urban tunnels.)

C-I0. TUNNEL USESTunnels can be dug with zigzags and sumps toreduce the effects inside them of small-arms fire,explosives, and gas. Some tunnels, rooms,passageways, or chambers can contain concealedexits to allow insurgents to hide or escape if thecomplex or cave is penetrated. While other tunnelscan be booby-trapped to kill intruders. Tunnelsand caves are hard to detect from the air orground. Their construction can make themimpossible to destroy with conventionalammunition. Tunnels can also be dug in thebasement of safe houses for use as escape routes ifa house is compromised. Tunnel entrances arenormally covered by fire from another point on the

complex.a. Insurgents can use tunnels in penetration

operations to gain access to restricted areas. Inbuilt-up areas, they can infiltrate through sewers,or tunnel to their target from the basement of anearby building, subway tunnel, or sewer. Wheninsurgents are below the target, they can eitherbuild an exit and penetrate the target from below

C-l1. TUNNEL DETECTIONThe first step in detecting or locating tunnels is toreduce a large geographical area of interest to asmaller area of probable locations. This can beaccomplished by studying indications of probabletunnel locations.

a. Some indicators that tunnels are being" em-ployed by insurgent forces include-

(1) Movement of insurgents in a specific di-rection after being spotted by aircraft.

(2) Sniper fire occurring from areas wherethere are no obvious avenues of withdrawal.

f.,C-9

FM 7-98

ished the camouflage to escape undetected. Theinsurgent is aware of the danger of setting a pat-tern. However, he must have a location thatprovides him with observation as well as conceal-ment. Soldiers should look for OPs that allow theinsurgent to move into or out of an area unde-tected.

e. Sometimes, the exact location of a tunnelcan be obtained by questioning the local populaceor PWs who may have occupied, or helped dig, thesystem. Due to compartmentation, the individualmay not be able to locate an entrance or exit un-less he has seen or used the completed tunnel.

(3) Vegetable gardens far from places ofhabi-tation.

(4) Operations where insurgents inflict casu-alties at relatively long range and disappearwithout making close contact or being detected byfriendly forces.

(5) The smell of burning wood or food cook-ing in an area lacking habitation.

b. Conventional aerial photography producesresults if the appearance of the surface and vegeta-tion is changed from the normal. This requiresskilled personnel to interpret photographs. In ajungle environment, aerial photography may beprohibited since dense vegetation, such as doubleor triple canopy jungle, obscures the ground.

c. Once determined that a certain area maycontain a tunnel system, several indicators can behelpful in detecting tunnels. Visual inspectionsoften disclose the general area of a tunnel but notits precise location. The key to finding a tunnelsystem is applying common sense to the situation.A platoon or company should be assigned a smallsearch area, never larger than a 1,000-meter gridsquare. These small areas are chosen based on in-telligence reports or on past actions of theinsurgent force. The unit searches every squaremeter of the area. Some visual indicators usuallyfound include-

(1) Worn places on trees that the insurgentuses as handholds.

(2) A small trail, much like a game trail,through brush into a clump of small trees.

(3) Cut trees, not a sure indicator.(4) Limbs tied near the tree top to conceal

the use of a tunnel from aircraft.(5) Slight depression in or around a group of

small trees.(6) Air holes,.--sure indicators.(7) A lone individual, mainly a female, in the

area.(8) Freshly cooked food with no one attend-

ing the site.(9) Fresh human feces in the area.d. These are all good indicators. However,

they can vary depending on the area. The places tolook for indicators are in the corners of hedgerowsand trails and streams. The enemy often hides inthese places so he can see while not being seen.Also, hiding in these places allows those who fin-

C-12. TUNNEL SEARCH OPERATIONSForces entering an area where a tunnel complex islocated requires a methodical approach. Securityto the flanks and rear is imperative. The size of theobjective area of operations determines thestrength of the unit assigned the search mission.The unit, company, or platoon is task-organizedfor tunnel operations.

a. A company is divided into three elements:security, search, and reserve. (The headquarterselement remains with the security element. )

(1) Security-one platoon plus headquarterselement to cordon search area.

(2) Search-one platoon to search the imme-diate area for tunnels. The search element issubdivided into search and security teams.

(3) Reserve-one platoon to assist in cordonand reinforce as needed.

b. A platoon is divided into three elements:security, search, and reserve.

(1) Security-one squad plus headquarterselement to cordon area.

(2) Search-one squad to search the area fortunnels. The search element is subdivided intosearch and security teams.

(3) Reserve-one squad to assist in cordonand reinforce as needed.

c. The techniques of deliberate search arecentered around the rifle squad. Each squad is di-vided into a security and a search team.

d. A slow methodical search is conducted inthe area of operations. Once assigned a searcharea, the squad systematically searches everysquare meter. The security element moves towardthe limits of the search area. Once a hole (tunnel)

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is discovered, the security element surrounds thearea while the search team prepares to destroy orneutralize the hole (tunnel).

(I) Insert grenades (step 3), fragmentary orconcussion, to kill the insurgents. Ensure that thegrenades are cooked-off before throwing them intothe hole or tunnel.

(2) Insert a combination of chemical smoke andchemical gas grenades. This selVes two purposes:chemical smoke can reveal the locations of other en-trances or exits, and chemical gas can force theinsurgents to evacuate the hole or tunnel. Capturedinsurgents are used to find other holes or tunnels.

d. Soldiers then enter to ensure that all weap-ons and documents are recovered and all enemy(dead or wounded) are removed (step 4). The holeor tunnel is searched for small compartments builtto hide weapons and ammunition. If a tunnel com-plex proves to be extensive with bunkers and largerooms, it is cleared systematically. Bunkers are de-stroyed or occupied to prevent the enemy fromreoccupying them through another tunnel. Do notclear more bunkers than friendly forces can hold.

e. Deliberate search techniques emphasizewhere to look for the enemy (locations that pro-vide him with obselVation, cover, concealment,and an escape route). When the soldier learnswhat to look for, any of these indicators are likelyto trigger a mental alert that the enemy is not faraway. After the tunnel is searched, it is destroyedwith explosives.

C-13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENTThe platoon or company may require the followingspecial items to perform tunnel operations:

a. Mine Detector-used to detect ammuni-tion and weapon caches.

b. Grenades-fragmentary, chemical gas,chemical smoke, white phosphorus, and concus-sion types. Grenades should not be used afterfriendly forces have entered a tunnel.

c. Demolitions-used to destroy tunnel sys-terns. Due to the complexity of charges needed todestroy some tunnel complexes, an engineer teamshould support the search unit. Also, the largeamount of demolitions required for some opera-tions can present unique logistics problems,mainly in a jungle environment. (See PM 90-10-1for information on the urban environment.)

d. Air Generator-used to force smoke intotunnel complex.

e. Flashlights-to search tunnels.f. Weapons-Pistols should be used inside

tunnels. The pistol has good stopping power and iseffective at close range.

g. Loudspeaker-used to call the enemy fromtunnels.

C-1S. NEUTRALIZATION-DEMOLmONPROCEDURESNeutralization and clearing of tunnels are slowand deliberate procedures, which can be costly interms of casualties.

a. Tunnels. Since each tunnel system differsin size and construction, different quantities andplacements of explosives are needed for each type.

(1) 1nhe use of block explosives to destroy atunnel system has a disadvantage: all the explosivepower is concentrated at one point. 1nhus, the de-struction is localized, and often portions of thetunnel are unaffected. However, a large (10- to 12-pound) block of explosive tamped against theceiling may cause an entire tunnel to collapse.

(2) ~dvantages of block-type explosives arethe ease of emplacement, ease of procurement,and feasibility of aerial resupply. Also, block orsatchel charges are effective in destroying bunkers,sunken living quarters, underground rooms, and

C-14. FOUR-STEP PROCESSThe destruction of a tunnel is a four-step process,beginning (step I) with a soldier firing one or twomagazines from a rifle into the tunnel entrance.This discourages the enemy from staying close tothe entrance.

a. After gaining the attention of the insurgents,they are told to vacate the hole or tunnel, or bekilled. They may surrender without a fight, savingnot only the efforts of killing but also of excavatingthe hole or tunnel for weapons and documents.

b. If this fails, breaching operations are used(step 2). A grenade is placed on the entrance coverto gain access. The entrance cover is removed inthis manner to reduce the effects of any attachedbooby traps.

c. Once the entrance cover is destroyed, thefollowing measures are used (depending on the

mission):

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throughout the tunnel length (regardless of de-pth). The constant length of explosives throughoutthe tunnel ensures complete destruction. The ban-galore (5 feet long) adapts to the twists and turnsin tunnels. A disadvantage of bangalore torpedoesis the logistics problems arising from their size andweight. Resupply may be a problem if large quanti-ties are used to destroy a tunnel system.

b. Bunkers. Underground living quarters andhideaways, and bunkers can be destroyed by block orsatchel charges placed strategically inside the room.

short tunnels. Cratering charges are also effectivefor underground rooms.

(3) The shaped charge in tunnel destructionis effective in certain circumstances. A shapedcharge placed underground in the middle of a tun-nel complex and aimed downward destroys thearea around and above the charge. Also, a shapedcharge placed in a deep complex and aimed up-ward results in extensive destruction.

(4) Another effective method of tunnel de-struction uses bangalore torpedoes placed

Section V.AMBUSH PATROLS

This section discusses combat patrols with missions to establish and execute ambushes toharass or destroy targets and or capture personnel and equipment. Ambushes reduce theinsurgent's overall combat effectiveness. Destruction is the main purpose of an ambushsince insurgents killed or captured, and equipment or supplies destroyed or captured,critically affect the insurgent force. The secondary purpose of ambushes is harassment,which diverts insurgents from other missions. A series of successful ambushes cause theinsurgent force to be less aggressive and more defensive; to be apprehensive and overlycautious; and to be reluctant to go on patrols and move in convoys or in small groups.(Discussions on ambush planning and fundamentals are omitted from this section. SeePM 90-8 for more information.)

(2) Patrols, convoys, carrying parties, or simi-lar forces establish patterns of size, time, andmovement to permit detailed planning for the am-bush.

b. A unit conducting a combat patrol, beforedeparting, plans and rehearses the ambush of thetype of insurgent force it may encounter. It estab-lishes and executes ambushes as opportunities arise.

C-17. POSmONSA point ambush, whether independent or part ofan area ambush, is positioned along the expectedroute of approach of the insurgent force.Formation is important, because it determineswhether a point ambush can deliver the heavyvolume of highly concentrated fire needed toisolate, trap, and destroy the insurgents.

a. The formation to be used is determined bycarefully considering possible formations and theadvantages and disadvantages of each in relationto terrain; conditions of visibility, forces, weapons,and equipment; ease or difficulty of control; forceto be attacked; and the combat situation.

C-16. 1YPES OF AMBUSHESThe two types of ambushes are point and area. Apoint ambush involves patrol elements deployed tosupport the attack of a single killing zone. An areaambush involves patrol elements deployed asmultiple, related, point ambushes.

a. An ambush can be either hasty or dehDerate.A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill-an ac-tion of a combat patrol with little or no information.When information does not permit detailed plan-ning required for a deliberate ambush, a hastyambush is planned. Then the ambush patrol plansand prepares to attack the first suitable insurgentforCe. A dehDerate ambush is planned as a specificaction against a specific target. Detailed informationof the insurgent force is required: size, nature, or-ganization, armament, equipment, route anddirection of movement, and times the force willreach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberateambushes are planned when-

(1) Reliable information is received on theintended movement of a specific force.

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a. Multiple Point. This area ambush is bestsuited in terrain where movement is restricted totrails. It provides best results when established asa deliberate ambush. When there is no sufficientintelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area am-bush of opportunity may be established. Theoutlying ambushes can attack insurgents ap-proaching the central kill zone if the insurgent issmall. If they are too large for a particular outly-ing ambush, the insurgents are allowed tocontinue in order to be attacked in the central killzone.

b. Baited Trap. This area ambush can be var-ied by using a fixed installation as "bait" to lurerelieving or reinforcing insurgent units into thekill zone of one or more of the outlying ambushes.The installation replaces the central kill zone andis attacked. The attack may intend to overcome theinstallation or may use it as a ruse.

b. Formations are developed for the deploy-ment of point ambushes. The formations areidentified with names that correspond to the gen-eral pattern formed on the ground by deploymentof the attack element. They include:

.Line formation." L-formation.

" Z-formation.

.T -formation.o V -formation.

.Triangle formation.

.Box formation.

(Detailed information on the different pointambush formations, along with advantages and dis-advantages to each, is discussed in PM 90-8. )

C-18. AREA AMBUSH FORMATIONSArea ambush formations consist of two types:multiple point and baited trap. (For moreinformation see PM 90-8. )

C-13

APPENDIX D

RELATED OPERATIONS

This appendix describes the five major operations found in internal defense anddevelopment, and in foreign internal defense besides tactical operations: intelligence,psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and advisoryassistance. While the brigade commander is mainly concerned with tactical operations instrike campaigns, he also recognizes that these five operations exist and support manyactivities in a COIN program. In consolidation campaigns, these operations normallytake precedence, and tactical operations assume a supporting role. While the emphasison any operation may shift in response to the needs of the situation, all of theseoperations occur at the same time and continuously.

Section I.

INTELLIGENCE

When operating in a counterinsurgency environment, the population is considered amajor source of intelligence. Since the conflict revolves around the population, thepopulace usually has a wealth of information that can be exploited.

terinsurgency. This intelligence production fulfillscontingency requirements. Examples of these re-quirements are background biographies, areastudies, and order of battle for insurgent forces inareas likely to become involved in an insurgency.

(2) Advice and assistance. Advice and assis-tance increases the abilities of the host country

intelligence organization.(3) Support of us units. This support fulfills

operational requirements for committed US units.c. Some of the primary objectives of US intel-

ligence organizations in FID include:(1) Determining the indicators of an impend-

ing insurgency.(2) Obtaining or developing enemy intelli-

gence that can be used to launch surgical strikes byUS forces.

(3) Obtaining information about the insur-gent, weather, terrain, and population.

(4) Reducing to a minimum insurgent espio-nage, subversion, and sabotage.

(5) Identifying the main sources of discontentamong the people.

D-l. INFORMATION SOURCESThe internal defense intelligence system consistsof all host country military and civilian intelligencesystems plus all US intelligence resources that arecommitted in-country to assist in preventing ordefeating an insurgency. These agencies arecoordinated and integrated under a singledirectorship in the National Internal DefenseCoordination Center.

a. The intelligence resources of committedCOIN forces are an integral part of this intelli-gence system. National agencies are usuallytargeted toward more strategic demands that re-quire long-term intelligence networks and systems.COIN force intelligence assets are usually targetedtoward tactical battlefield intelligence require-ments and use intelligence gained throughnational systems.

b. In FID, intelligence organization require-ments fall into three areas: preparedness, adviceand assistance, and support of US units.

(1) Preparedness. Intelligence requirementsare produced and filled in anticipation of a coun-

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d. Disseminating and Using. The timely dis-semination of available intelligence and itsimmediate use are vital in COIN operations inFID. Primary, alternate, and special intelligencechannels of communication may be establishedwhen facilities and resources permit.

(6) Identifying the true nature, aims, leader-ship, potential power, and most likely course ofaction of the insurgency.

(7) Identifying and penetrating the insurgentinfrastructure.

D-2. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTIONIntelligence production in COIN operations inFID operations is performed in accordance withthe intelligence cycle. This cycle consists ofdirecting the intelligence effort, collecting rawinformation, processing this information intofinished intelligence, and disseminating theintelligence for use by the commander and hisstaff.

a. Directing. The intelligence officer directsthe intelligence effort. He translates the com-mander's guidance and concept of the operationinto specific, prioritized intelligence requirements.A continuously updated collection plan providesthe intelligence officer with a logical, orderly sys-tem for directing the collection effort. Ideally, itensures that all required information is collectedin time to be of use and that all possible sources ofinformation are exploited by appropriate collec-tion agencies.

b. Collecting. The need to exploit all sourcesof information requires resourceful, flexible, andaggressive direction and coordination of the intel-ligence collection effort. Commanders andintelligence officers must be aware of the abilitiesand limitations of all intelligence resources fortheir best use. Many collection techniques are em-ployed such as the use of SOPs and the use ofexpedients and improvisations as required by localconditions and resources. Another technique is theemployment of specialized intelligence personneland equipment that may be placed in support ofthe brigade.

c. Processing. Processing is the phase of theintelligence cycle whereby information becomesintelligence. Raw (combat) information from allsources is evaluated, correlated, and analyzed toproduce an all-source product. The effort to pro-duce intelligence for support of COIN operationsin FID requires continual and close coordinationwith higher, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, andcooperating civil and military intelligence agenciesand elements.

D-3. CMLIAN POPULAnONExploitation of civilian sources of information inCOIN operations normally requires asophisticated intelligence organization that isresident within the population. However, as theCOIN campaign progresses, the civilian populacemay volunteer more intelligence informationwithin the brigade operational area.

a. Type of Information. Civilian sources or in-formants normally provide the followinginformation:

(I) Details of the local terrain.(2) Ideological motivation and sympathies of

local residents.(3) Logistic support available, or potentially

available, to insurgents operating in the area.(4) Potential insurgent targets or objectives.(5) Identification of covert or part-time mem-

bers of the insurgent force.(6) Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism tech-

niques and activities of the insurgent andunderground support organizations.

(7) Weaknesses of the insurgent force.(8) PSYOP by the insurgent force and the im-

pact on the local population.b. Information Source File. To e~edite the

evaluation of information provided by the civilianpopulace, brigade intelligence personnel may needto establish records that quickly identify localsources of information and their reliability. Whenestablished, this information source file should in-clude such information as-

(I) Name, photograph, and physical descrip-tion of source.

(2) Area in which source(s) can obtain infor-mation.

(3) Factors contributing to source's motiva-tion to cooperate with COIN forces.

(4) Information collection abilities of sourceto include indication of training received.

(5) Method by which source is contacted.

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(6) Record of payments or other remunera-tions, if made to source.

(7) Record of productivity and reliability ofsource.

c. Overt Exploitation or Civilian Sources. Inovert exploitation, a source is contacted openly bythe intelligence officer or one of his recognizableagencies, and information is solicited directly. Thismethod has the advantage of providing for the im-mediate collection of information, but oftenentails significant disadvantages.

(I) The information requirements of the bri-gade or battalion are made apparent to the source,thus entailing a security risk.

(2) The source may not cooperate fully due tolack of motivation or fear of reprisal.

d. Clandestine Exploitation or CivilianSources. Oandestine intelligence techniques are re-quired in COIN operations in FID. They complementovert collection efforts to determine location, strength,and ability of insurgent forces, underground cells, andcivilian supporters. Normally at brigade or battalionlevel it is hard to establish an original clandestine col-lection or informant system during the time thebrigade or battalion is the area of operations. There-fore, the 52 should support reliable informant orclandestine collection operations that are being con-ducted by other US, allied, or host country agencieswithin the brigade or battalion area of interest Intelli-gence collected through clandestine exploitation ofcivilian sources of information is made available toCOIN commanders. This is done through an area con-trol center, joint operations-intelligence center, or asimilar facility established to coordinate internal de-fense and development operations.

u

D-4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCECounterintelligence increases the security of allforces and the probability of attaining surprise inoperations against insurgent forces. Adequatesecurity measures are developed and continuouslyenforced. This helps to prevent penetration of theintelligence operation by hostile elements and todetect hostile elements already within theoperation. Since insurgent forces are usuallynumerically inferior to those of the host country,allied, and US forces opposing them, the insurgentdepends heavily on intelligence for successfuloperations. US brigades, in coordination with host

country authorities, must habitually emphasizecounterintelligence measures.

a. Denial Measures. Denial measures that ap-ply to COIN operations may include-

(I) Removal of compromised informantsources from the area of operations.

(2) Restrictions on movement and communi-cation facilities of the civilian population withinthe area of operations.

(3) Thorough briefing of all US, allied, andattached host country personnel. This should in-clude the intelligence practices and techniquesused by the insurgent and his underground supportorganization, and information on security.

(4) Emphasis on the secure disposal of trashand waste matter.

(5) Employment of silent weapons by patrols.(6) Normal activity while preparing for op-

erations in order to avoid informing the insurgentforce of a change in routine.

(7) Maintenance of strict security concerningcurrent or projected logistic movements and thenature of supplies.

(8) Conduct of major troop movements dur-ing darkness or inclement weather and by the mostrapid means.

b. Detection Measures. Appropriate detec-tion measures in COIN operations may include-

(I) Background investigations and screeningof all civilians employed by, or operating with, USand host country forces, and those in civil posi-tions. Emphasis must be on controlling guides ortrackers who are familiar with the location, dispo-sition, and objectives of the friendly forces.

(2) Surveillance of all known or suspectedmembers of the insurgent force and its infrastruc-ture.

(3) Extensive employment of trip flares andambushes in areas of suspected insurgent recon-naissance activity.

(4) Employment of infantry work dogs in con-junction with other security measures.

(5) Maximum emphasis on visual and elec-tronic observation. Augmentation of organicvisual aids and electronic detection devices is often

required.(6) Monitoring of civil communication media.

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They are compared to determine additions to ordeletions from the population in the interim.

(12) Issuance of closely controlled identifica-tion cards to all residents of the area of operations.In COIN operations, counterintelligence activitiesnormally are complicated by the presence of largenumbers of civilians of unknown reliance. It ishard to distinguish among the friendly, neutral,and hostile elements. All possible security meas-ures that aid identifying these elements are

employed continually.c. Deception Measures. In COIN operations,

units habitually plan and execute small-scale coverand deception.

(7) Employment of women civil police offi-cers for search and interrogation of women andchildren.

(8) Counterintelligence screening of the en-tire population of settlements suspected ofintelligence activities in support of insurgent force.

(9) Wide distribution of photographs ofknown insurgents or key underground personnelto assist in the apprehension.

(10) Rewards for information leading to thecapture of informants or other agents supportingthe insurgent force.

(11) Periodic photographs of all residents ofvillages within the insurgent area of influence.

Section II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP in foreign internal defense include propaganda and other measures to influencethe opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups tosupport the achievement of national objectives. (For further information onpsychological operations, see PM 33-1.)

projects are within reach. Coordination is accom-plished in the local area control center.

D-5. BRIGADE PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONSThe purpose of brigade PSYOP is to enhance theaccomplishment of the brigade's various FIDmissions. This is achieved by employingpsychological principles to lessen or exploit theeffects of tactical or nontactical operations uponthe population or insurgent force.

D-7. ORGANIZATIONThe PSYOP staff officers and units performassigned missions the same as other specializedunits or staff members that are attached to, orplaced in support of, the brigade or battalion.When such support is not available, a member orsection of the unit staff is assigned responsibilityfor incorporating PSYOP considerations intoplans, action, and operations. PSYOP resourcesare provided either from higher headquarters unitsor from TOE resources. The units provide, inaddition to advice, support in the form ofloudspeaker teams, leaflets, and various otheraudiovisual media.

D-8. EMPLOYMENTProperly integrated and employed in the planningand conduct of operations and activities, PSYOPcan aid in accomplishing the brigade's mission.COIN forces must consider employing PSYOP inall missions. Commanders and staff officers mustrealize that all military operations have

D-6. PROGRAM CONCEPTThe overall PSYOP program for a given hostcountry is established at the national level by aUS-host country agency. This program providesguidelines for succeeding lower military andcivilian echelons to use in the quest for popular

support.a. COIN units must ensure that their PSYOP

is consistent with and supports US national objec-tives and the host country national PSYOPprogram. The brigade employs PSYOP to supportits tactical strike and consolidation missions and tosupport intelligence operations, CA operations,and advisory assistance operations.

b. The allegiance of the people must be di-rected toward the host country rather than USbrigade forces, ensuring announced programs and

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e. Five major target groups for PSYOP arethe insurgent, the population supporting the in-surgent, the uncommitted population, governmentpersonnel, and foreign audiences. Themes are tai-lored to each of these groups to gain maximumsupport for the government.

f. When targeting the insurgent, the majorPSYOP objective is to discredit the insurgent andto isolate him from the population. The most im-portant direction of attack is against insurgent unitmorale.

(I) Themes should publicize and exploit dif-ferences between cadre, recruits, supporters, andthe local population. Other themes might stresslack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hard-

ships.(2) Amnesty programs often prove useful in

neutralizing insurgencies. They are most effectivewhen they are sincere, credible, well publicized, di-rected against lower-ranking members of theinsurgency, and offer good reasons and benefits forquitting the insurgent threat.

(3) Amnesty programs have several disadvan-tages. They recognize the insurgents asquasi-Iegitimate; they forgo punishment of anyoneaccepting amnesty; and they increase the image ofthe insurgent threat.

g. When targeting the population supportingthe insurgent, the PSYOP objective is to achievewithdrawal of support for the insurgent and defec-tion in place or person to the legitimate governmentThemes should highlight insurgent shortcomings, ul-timate governmental victory, government successes,and the practical advantages of surrendering or of ac-

cepting amnesty.h. When targeting the unoommitted population,

the major PSYOP mission is to build national morale,unity, and oonfidence in the government. There shouldalso be a major effort to win popular acceptance of thegovernment force. It should include conVincing thepeople that government programs serve their inter-ests, government forres can protect them, ultimategovernment victory is assured, and the people havemajor intelligence and counterintelligence roles to

play.i. When targeting government personnel, the

PSYOP should seek to maintain loyalties and todevelop policies and attitudes. These result ingroup members who realize the importance of

psychological implications. PSYOP officers mustbe included in planning all activities.

a. Establishing support bases and operationalsupport bases requires gaining the support of thepopulace nearby. Propaganda themes stress thepurpose of US support and the military civic ac-tion program, the need for laborers, the effects ofpilferage on the COIN effort, and that people donot discuss US and host country military activities.

b. Within an insurgency context, PSYOP hasfive major objectives:

(1) To assist the government in gaining thesupport of its population.

(2) To assist the government in defeating theinsurgent movement.

(3) To assist the government in providing psy-chological rehabilitation for returnees from thesubversive insurgent movement.

(4) To establish and maintain a favorable im-age in the host country.

(5) To influence neutral groups and the worldcommunity.

c. The major tasks of US PSYOP in an insur-gency (when US combat forces are not yetcommitted) include-

(1) Advising host country PSYOP personnelon how to best exploit government programs.

(2) Recommending techniques for maintain-ing morale of host country forces.

(3) Assisting host country and US informa-tion agencies and activities in coordinating theirefforts.

(4) Assisting host country personnel regard-ing PSYOP programs that will motivate thepeople to actively support their government.

(5) Recommending programs that will ad-versely affect the insurgent.

d. The major tasks of US PSYOP personnelin an insurgency (when US combat forces havebeen committed) include-

(1) Coordinating PSYOP activities with hostcountry units.

(2) Advising US and host country command-ers regarding insurgent activities and effects.

(3) Advising US commanders regarding thepsychological effects of military actions.

(4) Assisting in development of a PSYOPability within host country military forces.

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k. US PSYOP try to establish and maintain afavorable US image. The themes most useful in es-tablishing an image are that the US presence isrequested by host country government, it is legaland necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory.

I. In combat actions, provisions are made forthe safety of the civilian population and, if possi-ble, for their separation from the insurgent forcesso that maximum firepower can be employedagainst the insurgent. The decision to employPSYOP media to accomplish this task is carefullyweighed against compromising surprise and secu-rity.

popular support, promote public welfare and jus-tice, try to eliminate causes of the subversiveinsurgency, and protect the population from thesubversive insurgent.

(I) PSYOP should indoctrinate host countrysecurity and military forces regarding the impor-tance of the civilian population and IDADoperations. Each soldier must understand that hisactions toward the people may be the differencebetween success and failure.

(2) When government personnel interact withneutral and nonhostile elements of the population,the emphasis should be positive and constructive.PSYOP efforts should publicize the tangible andvisible accomplishments of the legitimate govern-ment.

(3) PSYOP should discourage public apathyand activity that helps the insurgent. The peopleshould not be asked to undertake any activity thatis contrary to their own best interests.

j. When targeting foreign audiences, there aretwo major groups to be addressed: neutral nationsand hostile nations. For neutral nations, the pur-pose of PSYOP is to achieve friendly neutrality oractive support for the legitimate government. Forhostile powers, the major PSYOP objective is toinfluence public opinion against involvement insupporting the insurgency.

m. Intelligence operations are aided by em-ploying PSYOP media in telling people to reportinformation pertaining to strangers, suspiciouspersons, unusual activities by neighbors, and insur-gent activities. Posters and leaflets provide clearinstructions as to persons and places that receivethis information. The message indicates if rewardsare available.

n. Captured or defected leaders of the insur-gent force are exploited. Written and broadcastmessages prepared by these personnel and re-viewed by trained PSYOP personnel are used incommunities suspected of supporting insurgentforces, and in tactical operations against insurgentforces.

Section III.CIVIL AFFAIRS

The CA role in FID takes the form of civic assistance and civic action.

lems. Short-range is designed to gain and retainthe loyalty of the population.

b. CA operations are a responsibility of mili-tary commanders at every echelon. They includeany activity of military forces concerned with rela-tionships between the military forces and the civilauthorities and people in the area. Activities mayrange from military civic action projects to the useof authority that normally is the responsibility ofthe local government.

D-9. GOVERNMENT-BUILDINGCivic assistance is defined as providing advice andassistance to indigenous civil and militaryauthorities in the sociological, economical, andpolitical aspects of a civil emergency, disorder, orIDAD. It is commonly referred to asgovernment-building since it is directed toward thestructures of government. Military civic action isdefined as the participation of indigenous militaryforces in short-term projects. These projects areuseful to the local population, and contribute tosocial and economical development.

a. Civic action programs are divided intolong-range and short-range programs. Long-termdeals with resolving social and economical prob-

D-l0. OPERATIONAL SCOPEThe scope of CA operations varies with the type oflocal government. It is influenced by the social,

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plans. A dvil-military operations staff officer mayalso be assigned to such a task force.

b. CA liaison and coordination should be setup between military forces and government agen-des. This can be accomplished throughorganizations designed for this purpose or throughCA staff elements.

c. CA operations require good relationshipswith the population. To establish a good relation-ship, troop discipline, courtesy, and honesty indealing with the people are emphasized. Whererapport has been established between host countryforces and the population, properly administeredCA operations contribute to the attainment ofFID objectives.

economical, and political backgrounds of thecountry and people.

a. Some major CA activities include-.Prevention of civilian interference with

military operations..Support of government functions..Community relations..Military civic action..Assistance for populace and resources

control-.Civil defense.

b. The overall objective of CA in FID is tomobilize and motivate civilians to assist the gov-ernment and military forces. The operations aredirected at eliminating or reducing military, politi-cal, economical, and sociological problems. Closeand continuous PSYOP support is needed to maxi-mize the effect of CA

c. All military units have the ability to con-duct CA, particularly military civic action. Majorroles in military civic action are often assumed byengineer, transportation, medical, and other unitsthat have assets suited to support military civic ac-tion projects.

d. Both civic assistance and civic action aregeared to the phase of insurgency they are involvedin. Several factors should be considered before amilitary unit begins a civic action project:

(1) Is the project needed and wanted?(2) Will military participation compromise ci-

vilian authority and responsibility?(3) Does the project support the unit's politi-

cal-military mission?(4) Does the project comply with the host

country FID plan?(5) Will the project duplicate other efforts?(6) Will the people be involved in the pro-

ject?(7) Will there be continuity of effort?

D-12. FIVE PHASES OF PLANNINGCA responsibilities assigned to a tactical unitcommander may require employing specialized CApersonnel or units. Host country CA plans shouldinclude provisions for CA support for tactical unitcommanders. (For further information on CAorganization, see PM 41-10.)

a. CA planning includes political, economical,social, psychological, and military considerationsto include-

(I) A national development plan that in-volves projects that support developmentprograms that meet the needs and desires of thepeople. Civic action projects conducted for merelysomething to do may be counterproductive.

(2) Military civic action projects conducted bymilitary forces.

(3) CA personnel and units required to sup-port host country agencies at subnationallevels.

(4) CA mobile training team requirementsand resources.

(5) CA training program requirements forhost country and allied forces.

(6) CA requirements to provide governmentadministration in areas of the country.

b. Emphasis on military civic action varieswith the intensity of insurgent activities. Whateverthe level of military civic action, projects areplanned and coordinated with internal develop-ment programs. During Phase I of an insurgency,military civic action concentrates on the develop-ment of the socioeconomic environment. In theabsence of tactical operations, many military re-

D-ll. THE UNITED STATES ROLEThe nomlal role of the US military in civicassistance and civic action is to advise and assisthost nation military forces. US military units rarelyenter into direct civic action programs.

a. Units as small as a battalion task force maybe assigned CA elements to assist in enforcing CA

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.programs, basic hygiene, medical immunizationprograms, and simple irrigation projects.

d. Advice is sought on projects to ensure theyare needed, wanted, and coincide with develop-ment plans for the area. In the advanced stages ofinsurgency, priorities on military operations mayreduce military civic action to such immediatetasks as providing medical aid to civilians. Othertasks are procuring and distributing food and shel-ter for displaced persons.

sources may be devoted to military civic actionprojects that provide both long-range and short-range benefits.

c. During Phases II and 111, military civic ac-tion is concentrated on projects designed toprevent intensifying the insurgency. These projectsproduce noticeable improvements in a relativelyshort time. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational

Section IV.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

P&RC operations are classified as nontactical, police-type operations.

D-13. POPULATION PROTECTIONP&RC is government action to protect thepopulace and its materiel resources and to denythose resources that would further hostileobjectives against the government. The objectiveof P&RC operations is to assist in preserving orreestablishing a state of law and order within anation or area. Four main tasks are involved inreaching this objective:

a. Providing security for the populace.b. Detecting and neutralizing the insurgent

apparatus.c. Severing any relationship between the in-

surgent and the populace.d. The measures employed must be the least

restrictive in accomplishing the purpose. Theirneeds must be explained to the people, and the re-strictions must be lifted as soon as the situation

permits.

a. Control of the populace and resourcesshould be performed by host country agencies.This is a matter of practicality, but there are alsolegal and psychological implications. US militaryshould be used as a last resort and only as augmen-tation to host country units. MP units should beused before combat troops.

b. Populace and resources control measurescan be classified into three categories:

(1) Surveillance of individuals, groups, activi-ties, or locations by overt or covert means.

(2) Restrictions such as curfews; travel per-mits; registration of firearms; national registrationand identification of all persons; and control of se-lected foodstuffs, medical supplies, and

equipment.(3) Enforcement through the use of road-

blocks, checkpoints, rewards, amnesty programs, andselective inspections of homes at night

c. These control measures should be wellplanned and coordinated to ensure rapid and effi-dent operations, with a minimum of delay andinconvenience to the people. P&RC complementsand supports other COIN operations and environ-mental improvements being conducted by themilitary forces. It also contributes to the overall sta-bility of the country or the operational area.

D-14. AVAII.ABLEFORCESThree forces are available to conduct populace andresources control operations.

.The civil police are the first line ofdefense in the battle against an

insurgency.o Paramilitary forces may augment or assist

the civil police..The nation's military forces should be

employed only when civil police andparamilitary units cannot cope with the

insurgent activity.

n-ls. CENTRAL THEMEThe central theme of populace and resourcescontrol is population.

a. PSYOP should convey this theme and bedesigned to accomplish the following:

D.8

FM 7-98

. vision of funds and training of individual insur-gents by an outside power to providing an activesanctuary for combat forces.

c. The most frequent populace and resourcescontrol operations US units may engage in in-clude-

.Border operations.o Cordon and search-

.Augmentation of enforcement operations(roadblocks, checkpoints).

(I) To persuade the people to accept theneeded measures before implementation.

(2) To convince the people that their full sup-port will reduce the inconvenience of themeasures.

(3) To place the blame for any inconveniencesor discomfort on the insurgents.

b. Border operations are taken (as part ofpopulace and resources control) to isolate the in-surgent from his outside support. Outside supportdeals with many activities. It may range from pro-

Section V.

ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

Advisory assistance is advice and assistance us personnel provide to host countryregular, paramilitary, and irregular forces. It is also provided to civilian agencies to helpthem become effective in the performance of their missions.

.

D-16. TACTICAL BACKUPThe activities named above support and, in turn,are supported by tactical operations, intelligenceoperations, PSYOP, P&RC operations, andmilitary civic action. Such assistance is designed-

a. To provide military assistance in conjunc-tion with the Navy and Air Force to the hostcountry.

"b. To participate in joint internal defensetraining and exercises as mutually agreed upon bythe services concerned.

c. To provide mobile training teams, CSS, andCS to advise, train, assist, and support host coun-try forces.

(3) Organizing, equipping, training, and ad-vising host country police organizations.

(4) Advising host country regular armedforces, paramilitary forces, and local governmentsin all aspects of internal defense and development.

b. Brigade advisory assistance to host countrypersonnel and organizations, as differentiatedfrom military civic action, usually is performed toextend security assistance activities. Such activitiesas organizing, equipping, training, and advisinghost country forces may be accomplished while inbase areas. They may also be accomplished duringthe defensive phase of consolidation operations ofCOIN tactical operations.

c. If US military assistance organizations areoperational, advisors usually are provided for thispurpose. However, when US advisors or mobiletraining teams are not available, brigades may berequired to assume this function. Advisory assis-tance is coordinated closely with both the internaldefense and the internal development programsthrough the local area control center.

D-18. BRIGADE ORGANIZATIONAll brigade organizations should be prepared toprovide individuals or teams who can performadvisory assistance. (For further information, seeFMs 100-5 and 100-20.)

D-17. ARMY ASSISTANCEThe main purpose of US Army assistance is toincrease the abilities of host country armed forces.

a. The brigade may be required to organize,train, equip, and advise host country civil and mili-tary personnel and units to perform COINmissions. Tasks include-

(I) Organizing, equipping, training, and ad-vising paramilitary and irregular forces (locallyrecruited) to assume local defense missions fromthe brigade.

(2) Equipping, training, and advising hostcountry regular armed forces on new equipmentprovided by MAPs and FMS.

.

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FM 7-98

"

~

a. Organization for advisory assistance opera-tions may require the tailoring of specific teams toaccomplish specific missions.

(1) MP units, augmented by brigade elements,may be required to train host country MP organi-zations in the area. Also, combined arms teamsmay be required to train local host country artil-lery and armor units in artillery and armor tacticsand techniques.

(2) Training centers may be required to war-rant them if the training load is sufficient.

(3) Teams from brigade units may be organ-ized for on-duty training of host countryspecialists. These specialists are trained in the useof specialized equipment. This equipment is or-ganic to brigades but will be supplied to hostcountry forces at a later date.

(4) Mobile training teams formed by the bri-gade may be dispatched to local host countryforces to conduct training at host country unitbases or training centers.

b. Advisory assistance operations inherentlyinvolve the need to use advisory techniques.Therefore, tact, discretion, language qualification,expertness in the subject, and other qualificationsmust be stressed.

c. A major consideration in organizing for ad-visory assistance is the military rank of theadvisors. In many countries, it is not appropriateto have someone of less rank advising a unit or anelement. To avoid this, commanders may need tofrock or designate acting sergeants in order to givethe impression that personnel of equal or greaterrank performing advisory assistance.

~

D-10

APPENDIX E

COMBINED OPERATIONS

When US forces are deployed to a host country, tactical operations are usually joint innature. US forces normally work with or in support of the military and paramilitaryforces of the host country.

E-3. INTELLIGENCEUS forces establish procedures for-

a. Dissemination of military intelligence anduse of intelligence assets by partners.

b. Coordination of intelligence operations.c. Sharing of high-technology intelligence

abilities.

E-l. NATURE OF COMBINED OPERATIONSCombined operations require written agreementas to authority, jurisdiction, and procedural andorganizational matters. The legal basis forcombined operations is usually a treaty oroperational agreement between the US and thehost country.

a. US forces must plan to coordinate andwork with the military or paramilitary forces.Commanders and staffs must be prepared to estab-lish workable arrangements quickly, onceintroduced into a host country, if not performedbefore deployment. Every situation is unique anddepends on the extent of involvement of US forcesand the nature of the operations.

b. Planning for factors that must be consid-ered benefits combined operations. Chiefconsiderations are:

.Command and control.

.Intelligence.

.Operational procedures.

.Combat service support.

E-4. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURESUS forces establish plans and procedures for-

a. SOPs that ensure effective cooperation.b. Assignment of responsibility for certain op-

erations based on special abilities of the force.c. Determination of difference in tactics, tech-

niques, and procedures.d. Determination of difference in equipment,

radios, and maps.e. Detailed planning and rehearsals.f. Determination of allied unit recognition.g. Rear operations coordination, planning,

and responsibilities.h. Use of combat support assets.

E-S. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORTUS forces establish plans for-

a. Exchange of liaison officers.b. Coordination support from local resources

and facilities.c. Determination of equipment and ammuni-

tion compatibility.d. Support in a tactical emergency.

E-2. COMMAND AND CONTROLUS forces establish the following:

a. Organization of the combined force.b. Overall command of the force.c. Roles and missions of the combined force.d. Procedure for exchange of LOs with lan-

guage ability or interpreter support, and determinethe level of exchange.

e. Understanding of differences, abilities, andpersonal characteristics of host country militaryleaders.

E-1

APPENDIX F

j

USES OF MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE

In MOPP gear, soldiers have protection against all known chemical agents, livebiological agents, and toxins. MOPP gear does not protect against initial nuclearradiation or the hazards of residual radiological contamination from induced gamma andfallout. However, it gives some radiation protection because of complete body coverage.11 reduces the chance of beta particles coming in contact with and bumming the skin, and itreduces the possibility of wearers ingesting alpha particles. This encapsulation also helpssimplify decontamination, but this protection demands a price be paid. Soldiers wearingMOPP gear cannot work long or fast. They may suffer mental distress as a result offeeling closed in and will suffer from heat stress and heat exhaustion in warmtemperatures and at high work rates. Thus, when the NBC threat is low, full protectionmay not always be worth the resultant reduction of combat potential.

The need to balance protection with the threat, temperature, and urgenLy of the mission ledto the concept of MOPP. Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection throughfive levels of MOPP-MOPP zero through MOPP4. In addition, commanders have amask-only option. Protection increases with progression from MOPP zero to MOPP4, butefficienLy decreases correspondingly; therefore, selecting the MOPP level that provides thebest balance requires judgment. (For additional information, see PM 3-4.)

F-l. MOPP LEVELSStandardized MOPP levels allow rommanders toeasily increase or decrease levels of protection.Because the levels are standardized and all soldiersunderstand them, commanders can order increasedor decreased protection without providing longexplanations. Soldiers put on first the elements ofMOPP gear that take the longest to put on and thatdegrade mission performance the least They put onlast the MOPP gear elements that can be put onquickly and degrade mission performance the mostThis flexibility gives soldiers a head start at puttingon MOPP gear.

a. MOPP Zero. Soldiers carry the protectivemask with LCE, having the MOPP gear readilyavailable (that is, within the work area, vehicle,fighting position, or the like). MOPP zero is ap-propriate when the enemy has an NBCemployment capability but chemical warfare hasnot begun or when troops are first deployed out-side the theater of operation. MOPP zero allows

soldiers to be free of the burden of wearing theovergarment and mask, and yet have them readilyavailable when needed. The battle dress overgar-ment should remain sealed in the vapor-barrierbag until needed. Soldiers carry their M258Al de-contamination kit, M8/M9 detector paper, andNAAK.

b. MOPP1. Soldiers in MOPPl wear the bat-tle dress overgarment. In hot weather, they canwear it directly over their underwear and mayleave the jacket open for ventilation, but they mustkeep the trousers closed. They attach the M9 pa-per to the overgarment and wear the protectivehelmet cover. For soldiers in MOPPl, the reactiontime needed to adopt MOPP4 protection againstan attack is half, from 8 minutes to 4.

c. MOPP2. Soldiers in MOPP2 add theirchemical-protective overboots. The overboots takeabout three to four minutes to put on; once troopsare in MOPP2, they can go to the higher MOPPlevels in seconds. In hot weather, soldiers can leave

FM 7-98

Ic

.Troops outside are at MOPP3 or MOPP4,and a chemical attack has not occurred.

.Troops outside are at MOPP4, and theunit is in a downwind vapor-hazard area

only..An attack has occurred, and the only

hazard has been determined to be

nonpersistent vapor.

Ultimately, the decision rests with the commanderto go to mask-only for personnel protected fromliquid-agent contact. Mask-only is not anappropriate command when blister-agent hazardsexist.

the overgarment jacket open for ventilation butmust keep the trousers closed.

d. MOPP3. Soldiers wear the protective maskand hood in MOPP3, making protection almostcomplete, but interference with work becomes sig-nificant. The mask and hood restrict vision, heatstress becomes a major factor, and a greater risk ofheat exhaustion exists. In hot weather, soldiersmay open the overgarment jacket and roll the pro-tective-mask hood for ventilation but must leavetheir trousers closed.

e. MOPP4. Soldiers in MOPP4 protect theirhands with a pair of NBC rubber gloves with cot-ton liners. They close the overgarment and pulldown and adjust the hood, completing protection.MOPP4 has the most negative impact on individ-ual efficiency and effectiveness.

F-2. MASK-ONLYPOSTURE

In a contaminated environment, soldiers do not needto wear protective overgarments or rubber gloves aslong as they are protected from direct skin exposureto liquid or solid contamination (transfer hazards).Tanks, some vans, and some buildings are examplesof this kind of partial shelter from contamination.Inside these shelters, soldiers may be exposed tovapor hazards but not to transfer hazards. A teletypeoperator inside a sealed communications van, forexample, can work safely and far more efficiently inmask-only posture.

a. Commanders must balance the value of in-creased efficiency that mask-only posture givesagainst the increased risk it imposes. If the shelteris penetrated by weapons fire or accident, soldiersinside might be exposed to a transfer hazard. Incase of shelter penetration, ordinary clothing pro-vides brief protection from transfer hazards.

b. Soldiers in mask-only posture must assumethe appropriate MOPP level before exiting theirshelter. To maintain mask-only posture, returningsoldiers must carefully avoid bringing liquid con-tamination into the shelter. The following situationsare appropriate for the mask-only command:

F -3. SYSTEM FLEXIBILITYMOPP is not a fixed or rigid system. Flexibility isthe key to providing maximum protection with thelowest risk possible while still allowing missionaccomplishment. Flexibility allows subordinatecommanders to adjust the amount of MOPPprotection required in their particular situationsand still maintain combat effectiveness. Also,commanders can place all or part of their units indifferent MOPP levels or can authorize variationswithin a given level.

a. Responsibility for MOPP Levels. It is corpsand higher level commanders' responsibility to di-rect minimum MOPP levels and recommend thehigher MOPP levels appropriate to the threat.They are aware of the strategic tactical intelligencethat might indicate the probable use of NBC weap-ons. These commanders have the firstresponsibility for upgrading the unit's pI:otectiveposture. Ordering MOPP2 through MOPP4 is theresponsibility of division and lower commanders.The ultimate responsibility, however, is that of thecompany commander, platoon leader, or squadleader. At this level there is a better understandingof what the unit can and cannot do. The leader in-creases or decreases the unit's protective posturebased on an analysis of the situation and guidancefrom higher command. Final responsibility at thislevel retains flexibility of the system. The leaderdoes not decrease the protective posture level be-low the minimum established level.

b. Variations to MOPP ,Levels. Considerableflexibility within each MOPP level allows vari-ations based on the situation. Certain variations of

F-2

FM 7-98

.amount of radioactive contamination that contactsthe skin and to prevent ingestion of radioactiveparticles) If soldiers can accomplish the missionwhile in full MOPP gear, they will reduce betaburns and alpha particle ingestion hazards andavoid additional decontamination procedures.

F-4. MOPP ANALYSISEvery commander has a responsibility to gothrough a MOPP analysis based on the situation.The analysis finds the balance between reducingthe risk of casualties and accomplishing themission. The use of MOPP involves risk, but thebetter the commander analyzes the complexfactors that control the need for protection, thelower the risk and the higher the missionperformance. Before deciding, the commandermust consider the following questions in the

analysis:.What is the mission?.What is the work rate?.How much time will the work require?

.Is the unit targeted?

.What is the warning time?

.What is the weather?

.What additional protection is available?

.What are the training and physical levels?

.Is it day or night?

a. Mission. What type of mission has the unitbeen given? The mission greatly influences theamount of protection needed by each soldier. Howimportant is the mission, and what risks will it re-

quire?b. Work Rate. What work rate will the mis-

sion require? Physical work rate is categorized aslight, moderate, or heavy. Clerical and administra-tive tasks and riding in vehicles are examples oflight work. Handling supplies and equipment, andpreparing defensive positions are examples ofmoderate work. Fighting or forced marching areexamples of heavy work. Soldiers doing heavywork tire more quickly than those doing lighterwork. MOPP gear reduces soldiers' effectiveness atall work rates, but the reduction becomes more se-vere as the work rate increases.

c. Required Time. How much time will it taketo accomplish the mission at different levels of

.

the wearing of MOPP gear reduce degradation ofunit efficiency. Commanders must weigh thesevariations against the possible risk of contamina-tion and mission accomplishment. Commandersshould make these decisions on the spot to modifyMOPP. The following gives some suggested vari-ations.

(1) Soldiers may leave the overgarment jacketopen at MOPP1, MOPP2, or MOPP3, allowinggreater ventilation, and they may leave the hoodopen or rolled at MOPP3. Commanders base theirdecision to use this variation on the threat, tem-perature, and unit work rate.

(2) Wearers may don the overgarment overthe battle dress uniform (BDU) or directly overunderwear. Determining factors are the tempera-ture and the work rate of personnel.

(3) Soldiers must wear the protective glovesat MOPP1 through MOPP3 when handling equip-ment that has been decontaminated. This preventscontact with agents that may absorb to the surfaceof the equipment.

(4) Where the only hazard is from residualnuclear effects, the commander may modify MOPPlevels based on assessment of the situation andcriticality of the mission. As stated earlier, MOPPgear does not protect against gamma radiation,which is the commander's immediate concern.Once it has been determined that only a low-Ievelresidual radiological hazard exists, the commandermay decide to modify the unit's posture, because ofmission requirements. This reduces the degrada-tion of unit performance caused by heat stress.

(5) Risks include burns from beta particlesand ingestion of alpha particles. Another is thegreater problem of removing radiological particlesfrom the hairy areas of the body, since showers areno longer part of the decontamination process. Asa last resort, soldiers may use the wet wipes of theM258A1 kit for this purpose. Neither situationwill cause excessive degradation of unit perform-ance, but both must be considered.

(6) One method of modifying the protectiveposture allows soldiers to wear the cloth linersfrom their butyl gloves. This helps cover as muchexposed skin as possible. Soldiers can cover theirmouths with handkerchiefs or other material thatprovides dust protection in place of their protec-tive masks. The primary concerns are to reduce the

.

F-3

FM 7-98

compounded when soldiers must wear MOPPgear, which retains even more heat. The morebody heat retained, the fewer hours soldiers canwork without increasing their chance of heat ex-haustion or heat stroke. This, coupled with thework rate, requires units to take more frequentand longer breaks, thus taking longer to accom-plish the mission. Wind speed may also be a factorto consider. High wind speeds aid in the dissipa-tion of body heat as well as decrease theprobability that the enemy will employ chemicalagents.

g. Additional Protection. What additionalprotection is available? Any form of availableoverhead cover provides additional protection.Depending on the wind speed and type of cover,the commander can reduce MOPP levels, usingsound judgment. The possibility of a percutaneous(through-the-skin) hazard still exists, and soldiersshould wear as much protection as mission and re-supply capabilities allow.

h. Troop Preparedness. How well are thetroops trained, and what is their physical condi-tion? Well-prepared troops suffer less stress whenin MOPP4 under combat conditions than dotroops who are less prepared. Well-preparedtroops are those who have trained extensively inprotective gear and are in good physical condition.It cannot be overemphasized that soldiers musttrain with their MOPP gear, including many hoursof training in MOPP4. Soldiers cannot be expectedto fight successfully in full MOPP gear if they havenot trained with the equipment. Infantrymen trainextensively with the M16 rifle to become proficientwith its use. Likewise, soldiers must continuallytrain with MOPP gear to become more confidentof the equipment and learn how to adjust their wayof working. Training in full MOPP gear helps sol-diers understand the problems they will encounterwhen required to fight in MOPP gear.

i. Time or Day. Is it day or night? The besttime to use chemical agents is between late eve-ning and early morning, when stable or neutraltemperature gradients prevail. Under these condi-tions, agents tend to linger close to the ground andmove horizontally with the wind. During unstableconditions in the heat of the day, agents rise rap-idly. This rapid rise reduces the time on target andthe agents' casualty-producing capabilities.

MOPP? The commander can estimate the timeneeded to accomplish the mission. To give thecommander an idea of how much time tasks willtake in MOPP4, Appendix A, PM 3-4, shows ta-bles for various types of units. Remember, thetables are only a guide, and only experience cangive accurate times. Increases in the time neededto conduct operations in MOPP3 are somewhatless than in MOPP4. This is because some bodyheat dissipates through the open hood and over-garment in MOPP3. However, soldiers cannotachieve normal work times until they remove theirmasks and hoods. The hood and shoulder areas re-lease most of the body heat. If retained, this heatincreases the time required to do a job. With onlyone exception, there are no major time increasesfor units operating in MOPPl and MOPP2. Theexception is extensive travel on foot in MOPP2,because overboots slow travel.

d. Target. How likely is it that the unit will beattacked with NBC weapons? The answer is ajudgment based on knowledge of the way NBCweapons are used. First, there is the matter of theunit location on the battlefield. Is the unit close tothe front lines? Mortars and artillery can deliverchemicals accurately, and the closer the unit is toenemy observers, the more accurate and timely en-emy fire is likely to be. Is the unit considered aprimary target in the rear area? Persistent agentsare more likely to be used in the rear to disruptoperations that support the front lines. If the unitis on a likely avenue of approach, use of nonpersis-tent agents is likely.

e. Warning Time. How much warning of anenemy NBC strike can be anticipated? The com-mander must consider available intelligence. Hasthe enemy used NBC weapons? Has the enemydeployed weapon systems and munitions? Dowind direction and speed place the unit in a down-wind-hazard area? If so, he must considerplacement of the unit alarms. What are the lay ofthe land and the wind direction? Are the alarmspositioned in locations that will give best earlywarning? Have adjacent units experienced any un-explained illness?

f. Weather. What are the weather conditions,and how will they influence the unit's perform-ance? High temperatures and humidity make itdifficult for the body to dissipate heat, and this is

vF-4

FM 7-98

.

j. Commanders Decision. After answeringthese questions, the commander can decide on theamount of protection needed to accomplish themission, continuously updating and refining theprocess as the situation changes. The followingscenario is an example of applying a flexibleMOPP system.

"Intelligence reports indicate Threat forces areadvancing on the corps area. Reports are thatlarge shipments of chemical munitions havebeen moved forward to artillery units insupport of the Threat first echelon. The corpscommander has directed MOPPl for all unitsin the corps area of operations. Division andbrigade commanders determined that thethreat does not involve all units within theirareas of responsibility. They recommend thatall units assume MOPP2."An infantry company commander, using theMOPP analysis and his commander'sguidance, determines that his unit is a primarytarget and must complete defensivepreparation before the Threat forces arrive inan hour. The unit alarms are in position andwill provide early warning of a chemical attack.The commander determines that he mustmodify the unit protective posture and preparefor an attack. Half the unit assumes MOPP2and continues defensive preparation. Theremainder assumes MOPP3 and providessecurity. If an attack occurs, soldiers inMOPP2 will take only seconds to assume ahigher MOPP level. Thus, the commanderapplies the flexible MOPP system andaccomplishes the mission in the required timewith the least amount of risk."

.Heat stress causes personnel inresponsible positions to tire easily.

.The voicemitter makes speech difficult tounderstand-

.The M17-series mask impairs voicecommunication in both volume andquality on radio and field phones.

.The hood impairs hearing.

.Eye lenses of the mask narrow the field ofvision.

To minimize some of these difficulties, leaders candelegate more responsibilities to reduce the stressof wearing MOPP gear. The unit SOP mustinclude specific guidelines based on the mission.When using the radio, leaders must ensure themicrophone is held close to the voicemitter. Ifpossible, they wear the microphone-equippedM24/M25 mask and use the vehicularcommunication system. To enhance verbalcommunications, they speak more slowly thannormal and repeat orders. If time permits, leadersissue written orders to ensure orders areunderstood. They use collective protection asmuch as possible to eliminate the burden ofMOPP gear.

b. Personal Identification. One way to helpidentify each soldier in MOPP gear is to use tapeshowing the soldier's name and rank. The soldierwears this tape on his protective-mask carrier andovergarment pocket. If he is in MOPP zero, thetape is placed on the overgarment bag. When theovergarment is put on, the soldier pulls the tapeoff the package and places it on his overgarmentfor identification.

c. Miosis. Small amounts of nerve agent ab-sorbed through the eyes constrict the pupils. Thiscondition is called miosis. It may involve pain,headaches, or both. The pupil is unable to dilatenormally, thus reducing night vision and the effi-ciency of operating night vision devices. Miosis canreduce the efficiency of performance of other tasksat night, such as navigating on foot, identifying andengaging targets, driving vehicles under blackoutconditions, and flying, which requires pilots tochange focus frequently. Miosis ranges from mini-mal to severe, depending on the nerve agentdosage. Victims may experience headaches whenthey are exposed to bright light. Severe miosis and

F-5. OmER PROBLEMSSeveral other problems arise when troops encounterNBC weapons. Although these problems are not asimportant as the questions already discussed, thecommander must consider them.

a. Command, Control, and Communications.In an NBC environment, command, control, andcommunications are difficult. Performance ofcommand functions while in MOPP gear presentsproblems all commanders must consider. A few ofthese problems are the following.

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FM 7-98

(1) In a contaminated area with no collectiveprotection available, leaders can relocate troops toa safe area for feeding by rotating small portions ofthe unit or by entire unit replacement. The rota-tional method selected depends largely on thesituation, distance from the safe area, and avail-ability of uncontaminated areas.

(2) If the troops are in a contaminated areawith no detectable vapor hazard or in a clean areawhere they are under constant threat of NBC at-tack, leaders can use a rotating basis for feedingabout 25 percent at anyone time. They must takecare to prevent contaminating the food.

f. Water Supply. The human body depends onwater to cool itself ina hot environment. Soldiersin MOPP4 may lose more than one quart of watereach hour. They must replace these losses continu-ally.

the reduced ability to see in dim light can persistfor 48 hours after onset. The pupil gradually re-turns to normal after several days. Full recoverymay take more than 20 days. Repeated exposureswithin this period cause cumulative effects. Com-manders must identify personnel performingcritical tasks dependent on night vision and initi-ate precautions to minimize miosis:

(1) Have key personnel mask whenever thereis risk of encountering miosis-producing hazards.

(2) Have them mask when close to ground,equipment, or other personnel known to havebeen contaminated with liquid nerve agent.

(3) After detailed decontamination (PM 3-5),personnel should move away from their equip-ment. Have them move to a contamination-freearea and conduct short unmasking periods. Theyshould disperse in the open air and use the buddysystem to observe for possible miosis symptoms.

(4) Use collective protection as much as pos-sible.

d. Psychological Effects. Commanders mustalways be aware of the psychological effects sol-diers encounter while wearing protective clothing.

(1) History shows that 10 percent of battle-field casualties are caused by psychological factors.In an NBC environment, 25 percent of casualtiesmay be psychological in origin. Symptoms may in-clude claustrophobia, apprehension, paranoia,disorientation, distorted body sensations, halluci-nations, confusion, and panic.

(2) Many of these symptoms can be preventedby continually reinforcing NBC training and byeducating soldiers on NBC survival measures.During peacetime, soldiers should receive exten-sive concurrent training in full MOPP gear. Thisallows soldiers to become more confident in theequipment. It also increases the time that MOPPgear can be worn without serious effects.

e. Food Contamination. A soldier's ability toeat in an NBC environment depends on the typeand extent of contamination. In a contaminatedarea where there is also a vapor hazard, leadersshould move troops into a collective-protection fa-cility. Since collective-protection shelters have alimited capacity, small groups should be rotatedthrough these facilities.

(1) Leaders should base an approximate rec-ommended replenishment on work rate andtemperature. For example, with a moderate toheavy work fate and temperatures below 80 de-grees F (27 degrees C), water consumption shouldbe one quart for each person every three hours.With the same work rate but temperatures above80 degrees F (27 degrees C), the water consump-tion should increase to one quart every two hours.Otherwise, soldiers can suffer rapid rise in bodyheat and heart beat, decrease in ability and motiva-tion to work, and, eventually, heat exhaustion.

(2) Troops equipped with M17 Al/M17 A2protective masks should be able to drink fromtheir canteens while masked. If the drinking tube isnot working or if masks do not have drinkingtubes, soldiers should use the buddy system andfollow the procedure detailed under food andwater consumption in PM 3-4, Chapter 5.(3) Leaders should arrange for additional watersupply by having filled canteens delivered inexchange for empty ones. If water and additionalcanteens are in short supply, they should observewater economy measures. Such measures includereducing physical activity or limiting it to the earlymorning, evening, and night hours when the heatload and sweat loss are lessened. The reduction ofwater intake to economize in turn reduces workcapability and efficiency, and increases the risk ofheat injury.

F-6

GLOSSARY

A2ABCCCACAACCADAADLADPAFSOCAIALOAMANGLICOAOAORASD/ISAASLAUTODINAUTOSEVOCOMAUTOVON

Army airspaceairborne battlefield command and control centerairspect coordination areaarea coordination centerair defense artilleryarmistice demarcation lineautomatic data processingAir Force Special Operations Commandair interdictionair laison officeramplitude modulationair and naval gunfire liaison companyarea of operationarea of responsibilityAssistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairsauthorized stockage listautomatic digital networkautomatic secure voice communicationsautomatic voice network

BAIBDARBDEBDFBDUBFVBMNTBSA

battlefield air interdictionbattle damage assessment and repairbase defensive effortbase defensive forcebattledress uniformBradley fighting vehiclebeginning morning nautical twilightbrigade support area

C2C2SRSC3C3CMCACASCECIACINCCJCSCNRCOACOIN

command and controlcommand and control strength reporting systemcommand, control, and communicationscommand, control, communications countermeasurescivil affairsclose air supportco mm uni ca tio ns -e 1 ectro ni csCentral Intelligence AgencyCommander in ChiefChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffcombat net radiocourse of action

counterinsurgency

Glossary-1

FM 7-98

COMSECCONPLANCONUSCPCSCSS ~

DAODCADCSDFDIADISCOMDODDSDTSDZ

communications securityconcept of the operation plancontinental United Statescommand posta chemical gas; combat supportcombat service support

Defense Attache Officedefense counter airdefense communications system

direction-findingDefense Intelligence Agencydivision support commandDepartment of Defensedirect supportdata transfer systemdrop zone

ECMECCME&EEENTEODEPWESMEW

electronic countermeasureselectronic counter -countermeasuresescape and evadeend evening nautical twilightexplosive ordnance disposalenemy prisoner of warelectronic warfare support measureselectronic warfare

FAFACFAOFASCAMFAXFDCFIDAFFIDFISTPMPMSFOFRAGOFSCMFSCOORDFSEFSO

field artilleryforward air controllerforeign area officerfamily of scatterable minesfacsimilefire direction centerforeign internal defense augmentation forceforeign internal defensefire support teamfield manual; frequency modulationforeign military salesforward observerfragmentary orderfire support coordination measuresfire support coordinator'fire support elementfire support officer ~

02OSOSR

Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)

general supportground surveillance radar

HC

HP

a chemical smoke

high frequency

Glossarv-2

FM 7-98

HHCHNSHPTHUMINTHVT

headquarters and headquarters companyhost nation supporthigh-payoff targethuman intelligencehigh-valuetarget.

lAWICSIDADlEDIEWIHFRIIIMINTIPBIRITU

..

in accordance withintercommunications systemInternal Defense and Developmentimprovised explosive deviceintelligence and electronic warfareimproved high frequency radioimagery interpretationimagery intelligenceintelligence preparation of the battlefieldinformation requirementsInternational Telecommunications Union

J3

JCS

JDS

JSEAD

JSOTF

JTF

KIA

operations directorateJoint Chiefs of Staff

joint deployment systemjoint suppression of enemy air defensejoint special operations task forcejoint task force

killed in action

LAWLCELICLOCLOGCAPLOSLRRPLRSULRULUPLZ

light antitank weaponload-carrying equipmentlow-intensity conflictlines of communicationlogistical civil augmentation programline of sightlong-range reconnaissance patrollong-range surveillance unitless-than-release unit

linkup pointlanding zone

MAAGMANPADSMASINTMAPMCHANMElT- TMFOMHzMIMILGPmmMNF

Military Assistance Advisory Groupman-portable air defense systemmeasurement and signature intelligencemilitary assistance programmultichannelmission, enemy terrain (and weather), troops and time availablemultinational force and observers

megahertzmilitary intelligencemilitary groupmiJlimetermultinational force

Glossary-3

FM 7-98

MOPP

MP

MRE

MSE

MSR

mission-oriented protective posturemilitary policemeal, ready-to-eatmobile subscriber -equipmentmain supply route

.

NAAKNAINATONBCNCANCONEONGFNICNLOSNODNPCC

.

nerve-agent antidote kitnamed areas of interestNorth Atlanta Treaty Organizationnuclear, biological, chemicalnational command authoritynoncommissioned officernoncombatant evacuation ordernaval gunfireNational Intelligence Centernon line of sightnight observation deviceNational Production Control Center

OBJOCONUSOJTOPOPCONOPFOROPLANOPORDOPSECORPOSB

PAOPCMPCOPHOTOINTPIRPKOPLLPOLP&RCPSYOPPW

objectiveoutside continental United States

on-the-job trainingobservation postoperational controlopposing forceoperation planoperation orderoperations securityobjective rally pointoperational support base

public affairs officepulse code modulation

peacetime contingency operationphoto intelligencepriority intelligence requirement(s)peacekeeping operationprescribed load listpetroleum, oils, and lubricantspopulation and resources controlpsychological operationsprisoner of war

l'RATfRCARPRFLRICRIPROE

radio teletypewriterriot-control agentradio frequencyrestrictive fire lineRegional Intelligence Centerreconnaissance in forcerules of engagement

Glossary-4

FM 7-98

rpmR&SRSLRSTA

revolutions per minutereconnaissance and surveillancereconnaissance and security linereconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

SlS2S3S4SSSATCOMSECDEFSECOMPSIGINTSIGSECSINCGARSSITMAPSJASOCSOlSOFSOFASOPSPSSB

.

TACSATTACFIRETACPTAlTCTC&DmATECINTTFTLETOCTOETORTOWTRADOCTTPTVA

adjutantintelligence officeroperations and training officer

supplyofficercivil affairs officersattlelite communicationsSecretary of Defensesecure en route communications packagesignal intelligencesignal securitysingle-channel ground and airborne radio subsystemsituational mapstaff judge advocatespecial operations commandsignal operation instructionsspecial operations forcestatus of forces agreementstanding operating procedurestart pointsingle side band

tactical satellitetactical firetactical air control partytarget(ed) areas of interesttraining circulartactical cover and deceptiontable of distribution and allowancesthreat equipment, captured, intelligencetask forcetarget location errortactical operations centertable of organization and equipmentterms of referencetube-Iaunched, optically tracked, wire-guided missileUnited States Army Training and Doctrinetactics, techniques, and procedurestarget value analysis

UHFUNUNDOFUNEFUSUSAF

ultra high frequencyUnited NationsUnited Nations Disengagement Observer ForcesUnited Nations Emergency ForcesUnited StatesUnited States Air Force

Glossary-5

FM 7-98

USAID

USIA

USMC

USN

UNIFIL

UW

United States assistance and internal developmentUnited States Information AgencyUnited States Marine CorpsUnited States NavyUnited Nations Interim Force in Lebanonunconventional warfare .

VHFYIP ,.WPWWMCCS

very high frequencyvery important person

white phosphorusworldwide military command and control system

xo executive officer

.

?

Glossary-6

INDEXi

~

aerial search operations, 2-13advisory assistance, D-6

Army assistance, D-9brigade organization, D-9

air defense units, 7-4airhead, development of, 5-15AirLand Battle doctrine, 2-13airlifts, tactical, 7-5air movement operations, 2-25air reconnaissance, 7-5ambush

area, C-12formationsbaited trap, C-13multiple point, C-13

patrols, C-12point, C-12positions, C-12

antitank

companies/platoons,7-4element, 6-7

antiterrorism, 3-4operational security, 3-5personal security, 3-5physical security, 3-4

arctic conditions, 7-11

Armyaviationsupportunits,7-17

artillery units, 7-3assault of terrorist positions, 3-9attack helicopter units, 7-4

planning, D- 7civil authority, support to, 5-11civil disturbance, C-4

operations,2-13close air support, 7-5COIN (see counterinsurgency)

combatting terrorism, 1-10,3-1,3-9antiterrorism, 3-4counterterrorism, 3-8deployment, 3-9operations security measures, 3-14priority intelligence requirements, 3-12specialized e~uipment, 3-10 (table)terrorism indicators, 3-12threat conditions, 3-6

combat service supportcategories, 8-3combined operations, E-lfor counterinsurgency operations, 8-4for insurgency operations, 8-4logistics intelligence, 8-2medical units, 8-6operational bases, 8-4peacekeeping operations, 8- 7peacetime contingency operations, 8-9personnel service support, 8-6planning,8-2requirements, 8-2security,8-2support levels, 8-4tailoring, 8-2transportation planning, 8-5units, 6-6, 6-9, 8-4

combat supportArmy aviation support, 7-7civil affairs operations, 7-15, D-6engineer support, 7-6fire support, 7-1military intelligence, 7-8military police support, 7-12nuclear, biological, chemical operations, 7-16

base defense, 2-15fundamentals, 2-16

border operations, 2-25

checkpoints, 2-11, 4-19 (figure)guidelines, 4-20 (table)manning of, 4-18

civil affairs operations, 7-15, D-6

Index-1

FM 7-98

t

chemical agents and munitions,employment of, B-1

flame expedients, B-1Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force

operations, 2-6herbicides, B-2operation principles, 2-8

operations,7-4planning, 2-6riot-control agents, B-2smoke employment, B-1support for, 1-3,8-4tactical operations, conduct of, 2-6task organization, 2-9

counterterrorism, 3-8assault of terrorist positions, 3-9hostage negotiations, 3-9hostage rescue, 3-9intelligence, 3-9, E-3operations security measures, 3-14

country team, 6-5 (figure)

deception plan, 5-13decontamination,7-18defensive operations, 2-15, 7-18

base defense, 2-15guerrilla offensive, 2-21high-threat environment, 5-15lines of communication, 2-20

patrols,2-19demonstrations, 5-8

prohibited,4-15deployment

in contingencies, 3-9of peacekeeping force, 4-24specialized equipment, 3-10 (table)

deserts,7-11disaster relief operations, 5-12discipline maintenance, 1-4

psychological operations, 7-14units, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8 (table)

combat units, 6-6combined operations

combat service support, E-lcommand and control, E-lintelligence, E-l

command and control, 5-13, F-5combined operations, E-lcommander's authority, 6-2commander's intent, 6-3commander's leadership, 6-2commander's presence, 6-2command relationships, 6-10country team, 6-5 (figure)elements of, 6-1mission tactics, 6-3orders, 6-3

commander's

authority,6-2intent, 6-3

leadership,6-2presence, 6-2

command relationships, 6-4common operations

air movement, 2-25border operations, 2-25foot movement, 2-25motor movement, 2-23movement security, 2-22, C-8rail movement, 2-24riverine operations, 2-24urban operations, 2-27water movement, 2-24

communications, 6-1, 6-10, F-5characteristics, 6-11, 6-12 (table)

deployment,6-14employment,6-14frequency support, 6-13means,6-11planning,6-10predeployment,6-13priority,6-10procedures, 4-27, 6-1sustainment of operations, 6-15training, 4-27

cordon and search operations, 2-12counterinsurgency (COIN), D-3

electronic warfare, 7-9

employment,6-14encirclement, C-1

reduction of, C-2

engineer supportmissions,7-6organizationsecurity, 7-7used as infantry, 7-7

Index-2

FM 7-98

airhead, development of, 5-15defensive operations, 5-15initial assault, 5-14introduction of forces, 5-14

.helicopters, attack, 7-4

hostage,negotiations, 3-9rescue, 3-9i

environmentconsiderations, I-Iurban, A-Ihigh-threat,5-14insurgency,2-2

environments, special, 7-11arctic conditions, 7-11deserts,7-11jungles,7-11mountains,7-11

equipment,6-1event template, 6-21explosive ordnance training

peacekeeping, 4-27

facilities,6-1FIDAF (see Foreign Internal DefenseAugmentation Force)

fire supportair defense units, 7-4antitank companies/platoons, 7-4artillery units, 7-3attack helicopter units, 7-4mortar platoons/sections, 7-4naval gunfire support, 7-6

planning,7-1tactical air support, 7-4

flame expedients, B-Ifoot movement operations, 2-25force

protection, 1-3, 4-23structure, 4-22sustainment, 1-4

Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation ForceFIDAF) operations,2-6

fratricide

prevention 1-4

guerrillaharassment, 2-5defense against, 2-21tactics, 2-4terrorism, 2-5warfare, 2-13

imperatives, 1-2

combat,2-14information gathering, 4-16

insurgencycharacteristics, 2-2development phases, 2-5environment,2-2goals,2-1guerrilla tactics, 2-4latent and incipient, 2-10nature of, 2-1support, 1-3,2-3,8-4

insurgent, urban (see urban insurgent)intelligence, D-l

combined operations, E-lcounterintelligence,7-9counterterrorism, 3-9human,7-9imagery,7-9logistics,8-2measurement and signature, 7-9military

and electronic warfare, 7-9categories of information, 7-9disciplines,7-9interaction,7-10missions,7-8organization,7-9synchronization of information, 7-9

preparation of the battlefield, 6-15production, D-2signal,7-9sources, D-lthreat equipment, 7-9evaluation: 6-16requirements,6-16 ("",terrain analysis, 6-17threat evaluation, 6-19threat integration, 6-10

hammer and anvil method, C-3herbicides, B-2high-threat environment

Index-3

FM 7-98

smoke and riot-control munitions, 7-16

operations,7-17organization,7-17

trainingpeacekeeping, 4-27

.

\"

weather analysis, 6-19

jungles,7-11

language instructionpeacekeeping, 4-27

lines of communication

security,2-20logistics

intelligence, 8-2support, 2-4

requirements, 5-13

$)'

maneuver forces,battalion elements, 6- 7heavy and light, 6- 7companies, 6- 7

mediation,4-15medical units, 8-6military role, 1.1military police support, 7-17

military working dogs, 7-12missions,7-12organization,7-12

minefield clearing, 4-16mission

orders, 6-3tactics, 6-3

mission-oriented protective postureanalysis, F-3levels, F-1mask-only posture, F-2uses of, F-1

mission sustainment training

peacekeeping,4-28mortar

platoons,7-4sections, 6-7, 7-4

motor movement operations, 2-23

mountains,7-11movement security, 2-22, C-8munitions, smoke and riot-control, 7-16 "

~

offensive operations, 2-10, 5-8, 7-17Phase I-Latent and Incipient Insurgency, 2-10Phase lI-Guerrilla Warfare, 2-13Phase III-War of Movement, 2-15

operational categoriescombatting terrorism, 1-3insurgency and counterinsurgency,support for, 1-3

peacekeeping operations, 1-3peacetime contingency operations, 1-3

operationsaerial search, 2-13checkpoints,2-11civil authority, support to, 5-11civil disturbance, 2-13combined, E-lcomparisons, C-2 (table)cordon and search, 2-12disaster relief, 5-12encirclement, C-1hammer and anvil method, C-3insurgent, A-2noncombatant evacuation, 5-9peacemaking, 5-10, 8-7peacetime contingency, 5-1

police-type,2-10populace and resources control, 7-18, D-8psychological, 5-13, 7-5, 7-18, D-4rescue and recovery, 5-11

retrograde,7-18riot control, 2-13roadblocks,2-11search, 2-11, C-4show of force, 5-8subsurface, C-9tactical,7-17unconventional warfare support, 5-11wedge method, C-3

operations security, 3-5counterterrorism,3-14

organization, task force, 6-6brigade, 6-6, D-9

naval gunfire support, 7-6

negotiation,4-15noncombatant evacuation operations, 5-9nuclear, biological, chemical

operations,7-16decontamination,7-18

Index-4

FM 7-98

"'

i

physical security, 3-4police-type operations, 2-10populace and resources controloperations, 7-18, D-8

population protection, D-8popular support, 2-3

predeployment,6-13prisoners of ware

handover,4-15psychological

effects wearing MOPP gear, F-6operations, 7-5,7-14,7-18, D-4

brigade, D-4employment, D-4organization, D-4

rail movement, 2-24remains, receipt of, 4-16rescue and recovery operations, 5-11retrograde operations, 7-18riot control

agents, B-2operations,2-13

riverine operations, 2-24

".

scouts, 6- 7search

house search, C-6of females, C-5of individuals

frisk, C-5strip search, C-5wall search, C-5

of populated areas, C-6

operations,2-11tunnel, C-10

parties, C-6teams, C-6technique, C-4village search, C- 7

security (see specific aspects)show of force, 5-8situational templates, 6-20smoke employment, B-1subsurface operations, C-9

tunnel detection, C-9tunnel uses, C-9

surveillance and supervision, 4-14

patrols, 2-19, 4-12peacekeeping operations, 1-3, 4-1, 4-27

assistance,4-16checkpoints, manning of, 4-18establishment of, 4-1information gathering, 4-16investigation of complaints, 4-17logistical civil augmentation program, 8- 7minefield clearing, 4-16missions,4-10negotiation and mediation, 4-15observer techniques, 4-17planning, 4-20, 8-8deployment, 4-24force protection, 4-23force structure, 4-22guidelines, 4-21political factors, 4-20technology,4-22

prisoners of war, 4-15prohibited demonstrations, 4-15receipt of remains, 4-16surveillance and supervision, 4-14tactics, techniques, and procedures, 4-11traffic control, 4-14training, 4-25types of, 4-10

peacemaking operations, 5-10peacetime contingency operations, 1-3

conduct of, 5-1characteristics,5-1critical tasks, 8-10military options, 5-6 (table)operational considerations, 5-13phases,5-1planning, 5-3, 8-9planning bases, 5-5 (table)types of operations, 5-8disaster relief, 5-12noncombatant evacuation, 5-9offensive, 5-8peacemaking, 5-10rescue and recovery, 5-11show of force/demonstration, 5-8unconventional warfare support, 5-11

personal security, 3-5personnel selection, 6-1

peacekeeping training, 4-25personnel service support, 8-6 tactical

Index-5

FM 7-98

~

v

hijacking, 3-2hostage taking, 3-2kidnapping, 3-2targets, 3-4

trainingpeacekeeping

communications, 4-27explosive ordnance, 4-27language, 4-27mission sustainment, 4-28morale, discipline, and administration, 4-28nuclear, biological, chemical, 4-27observation and reporting, 4-27

predeployment,4-25tactical skills enhancement, 4-26

post-peacekeeping mission, 4-29transportation planning, 8-5tunnel uses and detection, C-9

search operations, C-I0

unconventional warfare support, 5-11urban

insurgent, A-1operations, A-2tactics, A-1

operations, 2-27

air support, 7-4

airlifts,7-5air reconnaissance, 7-5close air support, 7-5psychological operations, 7-5weather service, 7-5

backup, D-9

operations,7-17conduct of, 2-6terrorism, 3-1

tactics, insurgent, A-1tactics, techniques, and procedures, 4-11

targetareas of interest, 6-21value analysis, 6-21

task organization, 2-9task force organization, 6-6

brigade, 6-6planning, 6-6

terrain analysis, 6-17terrorism, 2-4, 3-1

ambush, 3-2arson, 3-2assassination, 3-3combatting, 3-4definition,3-1indicators,3-12international network, 3-3nature of, 3-1objectives, 3-3strategies, 3-1tactics,3-1

threatevaluation,6-19integration, 6-20

traffic control, 4-14

bombing,3-1

water movement operations, 2-24weather

analysis,6-19service, 7-5

wedge method, C-3

working dogs, militarypatrol dogs, 7-13patroVexplosive detector dogs, 7-14patroVnarcotic detector dogs, 7-13

,,f

Index-6

REFERENCES

i

Sources Used

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 15 November 85

AR 310-50, Catalog of Abbreviations and Brevity OJdes, 15 November 85

AR 700-137, Logistics Civil Augustmentation Program (LOGCAP), 16 December 85

PM 1-100, Doctrinal Principles for Army Aviation in OJmbat Operations, 28 February 89

PM 6-20, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle, 17 May 88

PM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine, 23 August 89

PM 19-1, Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle, 23 May 88

PM 19-4, Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon OJmbat Operations, 23 May 84

PM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 85

PM 33-1, Psychological Operations, 31 July 87

PM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, 17 December 85

PM 55-2, Division Transportation Operations, 31 January 85

PM 63-6, Low-Intensity OJnflict (To be published)

PM 100-20, Low Intensity OJnflict, 16 January 81

PM 100-37, Terrorism OJunteraction, 24 July 87

JCS Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 89

JCS Pub 3-07 (Test), Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity OJnflict, October 1990

JCS Pub 5-02.4, Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Operation Planning System, Vol IV (Crisis ActionProcedures), 8 July 1988

TC 19-16, OJuntering Terrorism on US Army Installations, 25 April 83

Documents Needed

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

FM 1-111, Aviation Brigade, 27 August 90

FM 3-3, NBC Contamination Avoidance, 30 September 86

FM 3-4, NBC Protection, 21 October 1985

FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, 24 June 85

References-1

FM 7-98

9

"

PM 3-10-1, Chemical Weapons Employment, 8 April 88

PM 3-11, Flame Field Expedients, 19 September 90

PM 3-50, Deliberate Smoke Operations, 25 July 84

PM 3-100, NBC Operations, 17 September 85

PM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units, 22 April 87

PM 5-100, Engineer Combat Operations, 22 November 88

PM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 85

PM 7-8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, 22 April 92

PM 7-10, Infantry Rifle Company, 14 December 90

PM 7-20, Infantry Battalion, 6 April 92

PM 7-30, Infantry Brigade, 24 April 81

PM 17-50-1, Attack Helicopter Team Handbook, 9 May 83

PM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 14 February 86

PM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons, 27 February 76

PM 21-75, Combat Skills of the Soldier, 3 August 84

PM 24-1, Signal Support in the AirLand Battle, 15 October 90

PM 29-51, Division Supply and Field Service Operations, 13 November 84

PM 31-11, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1 August 67

PM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations, 28 March 61

PM 31-71, Northern Operations, 21 June 1971

PM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, 2 July 87

PM 34-10, Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, 25 November 86

PM 43-5, Unit Maintenance Operations, 28 September 88

PM 43-11, Intermediate Maintenance Operations, 17 December 87

PM 43-12, Division Maintenance Operations, 10 November 89

PM 44-1, US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment, 9 May 83

PM 44-3, Air Defense Artillery Employment: ChaparraWulcan/Stinger, 15 June 84

PM 44-18, Air Defense Artillery Employment, Stinger, 30 September 81

PM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 22 November 88

PM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, 27 September 88

PM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 11 May 88

PM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, 3 October 88

PM 90-3(HTF), Desert Operations (How to Fight), 19 August 77

References-2

FM 7-98

i

FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations, 16 March 87

FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOU1), 15 August 79

FM 90-10-1, An Infantryrnan's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas, 30 September 82

FM 90-12, (Base Defense) Multi-Service Procedures for Defense ofa Joint Base, 2 October 89

FM 90-14, Rear Battle, 10 June 85

FM 100-5, Operations, 5 May 86

FM 101-40, Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapon Defense, 30 June 76

JCS Pub 0-2, (0) Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), I December 86

JCS Pub I, Joint Chief of Staff Administration Publications, 15 June 88

References-3

FM 7-98

19 OCTOBER 1992

"By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

Genera/, United States Anny

Chief of Staff

Official:

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, and USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E,Requirements for PM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict (Oty rqr block no.

4766).

t

.u.s. Government Printing Office: 1992- 627-027/60031

MIL TON H. HAMILTON

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

02518