Food aid and food assistance in emergency and transitional contexts

hpgHumanitarian Policy Group

Food aid and food assistance in emergency and transitional contexts: a review of current thinkingPaul Harvey, Karen Proudlock, Edward Clay, Barry Riley and Susanne Jaspars

June 2010



About the authors

Paul Harvey is a Partner in Humanitarian Outcomes and a Research Associate at ODI. Karen Proudlock is an independent consultant working on food assistance; cash transfers in emergencies, gender and evaluation of humanitarian action.Barry Riley is an independent consultant works on issues of food security and food aid. Edward Clay is a Senior Research Associate in the International Economic Development Group at ODI.Susanne Jaspars is a Research Fellow in the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI.

Paul Harvey was the lead researcher for this review. Susanne Jaspars was the project manager within ODI. Karen Proudlock wrote the section on school feeding and, together with Ed Clay, the sections on food aid trends and de-livering food assistance. Ed Clay wrote the sections on the Food Aid Convention and food assistance trends. Barry Riley was responsible for the sections on US policy.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all those who gave their time to be interviewed for this review and for providing constructive comments on the initial draft of the report. Thanks to Joyce Maxwell for editing the report.

Finally, we would like to thank BMZ for funding the study.

The views expressed in this report are the authors’ alone. The authors accept sole responsibility for any factual inaccuracies.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondonSE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44(0) 20 7922 0300Fax: +44(0) 20 7922 0399Website: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: [email protected]

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Contents

Acronyms v

Execut�ve summary 1

Chapter 1. Introduct�on 51.1 Methodology 5

Chapter 2. Evolv�ng d�saster contexts 72.1 Foodpricecrisis 72.2 Foodaid/assistancetrends 8

2.2.1Increaseinhumanitarianassistancelevels 82.2.2Downwardtrendinoverallfoodaidlevels 92.2.3Changeintypesoffoodaidprogrammes 102.2.4Changesinsourcesoffoodaid 112.2.5Changesindonorsorfundersandrecipients 132.2.6Humanitarianreform:CERFandpooledfunds 18

Chapter 3. Food secur�ty arch�tecture 213.1 Towardsanewfoodsecurityarchitecture 213.2 AfutureFoodAidorFoodAssistanceConvention 21

3.2.1Background:foodaidasaspecialcase 223.3.2ThebasicsoftheFoodAidConvention 223.2.3TheWTODimension 233.2.4ANewFoodAidConvention? 243.2.5Theminimalistoption 243.2.6Amoreradicalreconstruction:optionsforchange 253.2.7ConventionmembershipandtheCommittee 26

Chapter 4. Def�n�ng food ass�stance 27

Chapter 5. L�nk�ng rel�ef and development: human�tar�an, trans�t�onal and development 31food ass�stance

Chapter 6. Assessment, early warn�ng and analys�s 33

Chapter 7. The food ass�stance toolbox 357.1 Cashandvouchers 357.2 Nutrition 387.3 Schoolfeeding 40

7.3.1Definitions,aimsandobjectives 407.3.2Evidence,policyandpractice 407.3.3Schoolfeedinginemergencies 41

7.4 FoodandCashforWork 417.5 Greyareas:otherfoodsecurityinstruments 42

Chapter 8. Del�ver�ng food ass�stance 438.1 Foodaidprocurement 438.2 LocalandRegionalProcurement(LRP) 44

8.2.1Donorsandagencypolicies 468.3 Monetisation 47

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HPGCommissionedReport HPG CommIssIonED REPoRT

Chapter 9. operat�onal programm�ng of food ass�stance 499.1 Rights,standardsandprinciples 499.2 Targetingandsharing 499.3 Monitoringandevaluation 50

Chapter 10. Conclus�ons 53

Annexes1. Interviewguide 552. PolicyPositionofSelectedDonorGovernments,UNAgencies,RedCrossand 57 RedCrescentMovementandNGOs3. Listofpeopleinterviewed 87

References 89

F�gures, boxes and tables

Figure1:Totalhumanitarianassistanceflowstoemergencies,byyear 9Figure2:Globalfoodaiddeliveriesbygovernments,NGOsandWFP,1990–2008 9Figure3:Globalfoodaidflowsbytypeofactivity,1999–2008 11Figure4:Globalfoodaidflowsbysourceordeliverymode,1990–2008 13Figure5:Totalnon-DACfundingtoWFP,2005–10 16Figure6:ToptendonorstoWFP,2008 17Figure7:DACandnon-DACcontributionstoWFP,2005–10 17Figure8:Topnon-DACfunderstoWFPprogrammes,2005–10 18Figure9:Decisiontreeforfoodassistance 43

Box1:Whatisfoodassistance?Somerecentdefinitions 27Box2:Innovativetechnologiesforcashdelivery 37Box3:GTZCashandFoodforWork(CFW)inNepalandAfghanistan 42Box4:WFP’sPurchaseforProgress(P4P)Initiative 45Box5:CAREUSA’spositiononmonetisation 48Box6:Targetingincomplexemergencies 50Box7:Rationsspreadthinly 51

Table1:Globalfoodaidflowsbytypeofactivity,1989–2008 12Table2:Globalfoodaidflowsbysourceordeliverymode,1989–2008 14Table3:Selecteddonorsandfunders:totalfoodaidflowsbysource,2008 15Table4:Top10donorstoWFPin2009 15Table5:Majorrecipientsofemergencyfoodaid,2007–8 16Table6:FAC1999signatories:totalfoodaidaspercentofminimumcontribution 23 inwheatandgrainequivalentTable7:Foodassistanceinstruments:issuesandgreyareas 36

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FoodaidandfoodassistanceHPG CommIssIonED REPoRT

Acronyms

ACDI/VoCA AgriculturalCooperativeDevelopmentInternational/VolunteersinOverseas

CooperativeAssistance

ACF ActionContreLaFaim

AoA AgreementonAgriculture(WTO)

BEHT BillEmersonHumanitarianTrust

BEsT BellmonEstimationStudiesforTitleII

BmZ BundesministeriumfürWirtschaftlicheZusammenarbeitundEntwicklung

(FederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)

CARE CooperativeforAssistanceandReliefEverywhere

CERF CentralEmergencyResponseFund

CFs CommitteeonFoodSecurity

CHF CommonHumanitarianFund

CoA CommitteeonAgriculture(WTO)

CRs CatholicReliefServices

DAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee

DDR DohaDevelopmentRound(WTO)

ERF EmergencyResponseFund

FAC FoodAidConvention

FAo FoodandAgricultureOrganization

FEWsnET FamineEarlyWarningSystemNetwork

FTs FinancialTrackingService

GFRP GlobalFoodCrisisResponseProgramme

GHFsI GlobalHungerandFoodSecurityInitiative

GTZ GermanTechnicalCooperation

IAsC Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee

IGC InternationalGrainsCouncil

InTERFAIs InternationalFoodAidInformationSystem(WFP)

Iom InternationalOrganisationforMigration

LRP LocalandRegionalProcurement

m&E MonitoringandEvaluation

mDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoal

mmT MillionMetricTons

nGo Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

oDA OfficialDevelopmentAssistance

PL 480 PublicLaw480

PRRo ProtractedReliefandRecoveryOperation

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TAFAD Trans-AtlanticFoodAidDialogue

UsAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

UsDA UnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture

UsGAo UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice

WE wheatequivalent

WFP WorldFoodProgramme

WTo WorldTradeOrganization

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Execut�ve summary

This report presents the findings of a review of changes infoodaidandfoodassistancepoliciesandstrategieswithintheinternationalaidsystem. Itwascarriedoutbetween JanuaryandMay2010 for theGermanFederalMinistry forEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ).Thestudyprovidesanoverviewofkeycurrent issues indonorgovernmentandaidagency policies and programming practices regarding foodassistance. The study was commissioned by BMZ to informtheGermangovernment’srevisionofitsfoodassistancepolicyinemergencyandtransitionalcontexts.Itinvolvedinterviewswith a representative selection of officials from bilateraldonors, international agencies and NGOs, and a review ofrecentliteratureandorganisationalpolicies.

Areviewofchangesinfoodassistancepoliciesandpracticesisimportantforanumberofreasons:

1. Ashiftfromfoodaidtofoodassistancebykeydonors,UNagenciesandNGOs.Intermsofassistanceprogramming,significanttrendsincludetheshiftfromin-kindfoodaidtolocalandregionalprocurement,anincreaseintheuseofcashtransfersandanincreasingroleforsocialprotectionandhungersafetynets.

2. Changes in the context in which food assistance isprovided. The global food, finance and fuel crises andclimatechange,aswellastheevermoreprotractednatureofsomeinternalconflictsareallfactorswhichareputtingpressureon the international community fora changeoffocusinfoodassistancepolicyandpractice.

3. Changes in the international architecture and thedeliveryof food assistance. The humanitarian reform agenda (theclusters,theCERF)andthefutureoftheFoodAidConvention(FAC),currentlyindebate,arecriticalareasofchangeintheinternationalhumanitarianandfoodsecurityarchitecture.

Changes �n cr�s�s contexts

The past decade has seen a rise in the number of naturaldisasters, persistent protracted conflicts and majorhumanitarian emergencies. Climatologists anticipate morefrequent extreme weather-related disasters. In response,theneedfordisastermitigation,preparednessandresponsemeasures increases. Rapid urbanisation and an ageingpopulationareaddingtothecomplexityofcrises.Theglobalfoodpricecrisishasledtocallsforchangeintheinternationalfood security architecture. Even though food prices havefallen considerably following their peak in 2008, they arelikely to remain volatile as a result of rising energy costs,increasing climatic variability, the growing demand for foodfrom emerging economies such as China and continuinginstabilityintheglobalfinancialsystem.

From food a�d to food ass�stance

An increasingnumber of donors and aid agencies areusingthe term food assistance as an alternative to food aid. Forinstance, WFP, in its new strategic plan, refers to the shiftfrombeingafoodaidtoafoodassistanceagency.ECHOtalksabout a gradual and important shift over the last 15 yearsfromusingin-kindcommodityfoodaidasadefaultresponsetoemergencyneedstowardsconsideringabroaderandmoreeffective set of humanitarian food assistance tools. Amajorreasonfortheevolutioninterminologyistoallowagenciestoincludetheprovisionofcashforfood-relatedpurposeswithindefinitionsoffoodassistance.

However,thewaysdifferentstakeholderspresentlydefinefoodassistance vary considerably. Some definitions embrace allinterventionsthataddressfoodinsecurityandnutrition(includingin-kindfoodaid,cashtransfers,someformsofproductionandmarket support) while others limit food assistance to directfood and cash-based transfers. The growing use of the term‘food assistance’ instead of ‘food aid’, but without a cleardefinition,raisesconceptualandpracticalissues.Whenshouldcash transfersbe considered foodassistance?With regard toODA (Official Development Assistance), should export creditsor only grants be considered food assistance? What aboutprogrammeaid forbudgetarysupportormonetisation?Thereisanurgentneedforclarityinwhatisbecomingadefinitionalmorass, not only to provide a basis for a possible new FoodAssistanceConvention,butalsotodeterminetheremitofWFPandthe focusofdonorpolicies.The issueof thedefinitionoffood assistance is of particular importance for those donorswithseparatefoodassistancebudgetlines.

Another debate continues, over whether food assistance isprimarilyahumanitarianinstrumentorwhetheritshouldalsobeusedintransitionanddevelopmentcontexts.Somedonors,including the European Commission, see food assistanceas primarily a humanitarian instrument and question itsappropriatenessindevelopmentcontexts.TheUS(themajordonor)andWFP,ontheotherhand,arguethatfoodassistancecan be appropriate in both development and humanitariancontexts. In many contexts, humanitarian and developmentneedsoverlap.Ratherthandebatingwhetherfoodassistanceishumanitarianand/ordevelopmental,itmaybemorehelpfultothinkabouthowtheobjectivesandmodalitiesofdifferentfood assistance and food security instruments shift withtransitionsfromhumanitariantodevelopmentapproaches.

The potential of longer-term approaches to provide socialprotection, including food assistance, as an alternative orcomplementtoemergencyreliefhasgainedcurrency,particularly

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inplaceswithchronicfoodinsecurity,repeatedperiodsofacutefood insecurity or both. The Ethiopia Productive Safety NetProgramme (PSNP) and a Hunger Safety Net Programme inKenya(HSNP)arewidelyknowncurrentexamples.

Food a�d and food ass�stance trends s�nce 2000

Theconfusionoverdefinitionscomplicatesthetrackingoffoodaid or food assistance. There are no satisfactory statisticaldataonfoodassistancebroadlydefined,althoughfundingofcash-basedtransfershasapparentlyincreased.Foodaidmorenarrowly defined – as internationally funded, concessionalfoodcommodities–istrackedbyWFPthroughINTERFAIS.1

Threemain trends canbe clearly observed in termsof foodaid. First, emergency relief accounts for an increasinglylargepercentageofoverall foodaidwithadecline in itsusefor development purposes. Second, support for local andregional procurement of food aid is growing. Third, non-OECD-DACgovernmentsarebecomingincreasinglyimportantfundersoffoodaid.

Between 1996/98 and 2006/08, the share of emergency aidrose from 38 percent to 66 percent of all food aid whilstprogrammeaidshrank from33percent to12percent.Projectaid also declined over the decade, from 28 percent to 22percent, as did monetisation.2 The last activity remains animportant component of US food aid policy and of someUSNGO programmes. Some NGOs, notably CARE, have beenrecentlyphasingoutmonetisationongroundsofefficiencyandeffectiveness.

Food has traditionally formed a large part of humanitariansectoral requirements inside the Consolidated AppealProcess (CAP) (GHA 2009). Humanitarian assistance levelshave increased since 2000, with growth accelerating from2005onwardscoincidingwiththeinceptionofpooledfundingmechanisms for humanitarian aid contributions (the CERF).

Overall, food aid levels have declined but food aid remainsthe largest component (25–30 percent) of humanitarianassistance.

Local and regional procurement has dramatically increasedboth in absolute terms and as a share of food aid. Thecommodity composition of food aid is also changing frompredominantlywheattowardsmaizeandothercoarsegrains.A growingnumberof donorshavemade their fundingmoreflexible to allow for local and regional purchase (LRP) andothertriangulartransactions.ThemajorexceptionistheUS;itsCongressonlyapproveda small trialprogrammeof localpurchasingwith food aid funds from the US Department ofAgriculture in2007.However, theUShasbeena significantfunderoflocalprocurementundernon-foodaidbudgetlines.Local purchases and other untied (triangular) procurementpracticeshavebeenfoundinalmostallcasestobecheaperandfasterthantiedin-kindaid.Concernswithimportingtiedfood aid include the potential disruption of local markets,quality control and competitive bidding. Local and regionalprocurement is also considered as having the potential todeliver development benefits to local markets and farmers.Initiatives such as WFP’s Purchase for Progress specificallyattempttomaximisepositiveimpactsforsmallholders.

Forthemostpart,themajorfoodaiddonorsremainunchanged:The US provides around half of all food aid. Others majordonorsaretheEU,itsmemberstates,CanadaandJapan.Non-DACdonorsareemergingas significantbut lesspredictablefunders: In 2008, for example, Saudi Arabia was a majordonor and non-DAC funding accounted for 20 percent of allfoodaid.Anincreasingnumberofgovernments(forexampleSouthSudan,IndiaandKenya)providecontributionstoWFPoperationsintheirowncountries.

Thetopfiverecipientcountriesin2008wereEthiopia,Sudan,Somalia,ZimbabweandAfghanistan–receivingatotalof2.6million tonnes of emergency food aid and representing 54percent of the total delivered. Countries having protractedcrisesthathavealreadybeenreceivingfoodaidforextendedperiodstendtodominatethefoodaidrecipientlist.

Food secur�ty arch�tecture

The global spike in food prices, the financial crisis and theeconomicrecessionhavegivenimpetustore-examiningfoodsecurityataninternationallevel;therehavebeenanumberofimportantrecentdevelopments.

Inresponsetohighfoodprices,theUnitedNationsestablishedaHigh-LevelTaskForce(HLTF)andaComprehensiveFrameworkofAction(CFA)toenhancetheeffortsof theUNsystemandtheinternationalfinancialinstitutionstorespondtothecrisis.AreformedCommitteeonFoodSecurity(CFS)wasendorsedattheWorldSummitonFoodSecurityinNovember2009.Atthe

1The FAC definition of food aid is based on three core characteristics offood aid: (i) international source of funding, (ii) concessionality and (iii)foodcommodities.WFPalso includes transactionsofnon-DAC fundersasreportedbyitsfieldstaff,countrypartnersandagenciestoINTERFAIS.ThereportmakesuseofdataonglobalfoodaiddeliveriesinmetrictonnesfromthedatabaseoftheInternationalFoodAidInformationSystem(INTERFAIS).INTERFAIS is a dynamic database showing the interactions of donorgovernments,internationalorganisations,non-governmentalorganisations,recipientcountriesandWFPfieldoffices.2The conventional categorisation of food aid by activity is explained forexample inOECD(2006).Emergencyorrelief foodaid is targetedon,andfreelydistributedto,victimsofnaturalorman-madedisasters.Programmefoodaidissuppliedasaresourcetransferprovidingbalance-of-payments(BoP) or budgetary support. BoP support is given either by replacingcommercial imports or by allowing additional imports where these areinhibited by foreign exchange (FOREX) constraints. This commodity aidis provided directly to a recipient government, or its agent, for sale onlocal markets. Project food aid is usually provided to support specificpovertyalleviationanddisasterpreventionactivities, targetedonspecificbeneficiarygroupsorareas.Thecommoditiesareprovidedonagrantbasisandareusuallychannelledthroughamultilateralagency,almostinvariablyWFP,orthroughinternationalNGOs.

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L’AquilaG8summit in July2009,governmentscameforwardwith pledges totalling $20 billion, including a significantproportionofnewfinancialcommitments.Anewfoodsecuritycluster, part of the sectoral coordination mechanism forhumanitarian crises and jointly led by WFP and FAO, wasagreedinearly2010.TheWorldBankGroupsetuptheGlobalFoodCrisisResponseProgram(GFRP)inMay2008toprovideimmediaterelieftocountrieshardhitbyhighfoodpricesandestablishedtheGlobalAgricultureandFoodSecurityProgram(GAFSP) trust fund to improve income and food security forpoorpeopleindevelopingcountriesinearly2010.

The UN secretary general identified the right to food as athirdtrackoftheComprehensiveFrameworkforActionattheMadrid High Level Conference on Food Security in January2009.TheUNHigh-LevelTaskForcehasemphasisedtheneedtoaddressall aspectsof food systems fromahuman rightsperspective. The Office of the UN High Commissioner forHumanRights(OHCHR)hasrecentlyjoinedtheHighLevelTaskForce(UnitedNations2009).

Current debates concerning the future of the Food AidConvention (FAC) are also significant. The FAC became thesubjectofactivebutinformaldiscussionsinDecember2009.A revision of the FAC (last negotiated in 1999) was put onholdin2004pendingtheoutcomeoftheWTODohaRoundofnegotiations on agriculture,which stalled in 2007.There arecontrastingviewsamongstsignatoriesandotherstakeholdersaboutthefutureoftheFAC,whichistheonlylegalinstrumentforensuringminimumlevelsoffoodaid.Someconsideritasirrelevant and theproductof apreviouseraof surplus fooddisposal and in-kind food aid. Others believe it should berevitalised, in order to become a key component of a newfood security architecture. However, no consensus amongstthose favouring a renegotiation has emerged. Some haveonlyaminimalistview,envisagingonlyminorchanges,suchas renaming the FAC the Food Assistance Convention andadjustingthelistofeligiblecommodities.Otherswantamoreradical revision, envisioning the FAC as providing a safetynet of support for food assistance and, possibly, expandingmembership.

The food ass�stance toolbox

The debate around definitions means that clarity is lackingwithregardtowhatinstrumentsaretobeincludedwithinthefoodassistance‘toolbox’andwhatshouldbeseenasbroaderfoodsecurity,socialprotectionorpovertyinterventions.

Food assistance instruments might include direct food-based transfers (such as general rations, food-for-work,supplementary feeding or vulnerable group feeding, schoolfeeding), food subsidies, cash transfers and vouchers(including school or user fee waivers) and agricultural andlivestock support. Food subsidies, feewaivers and livestock

support are rarely considered tobepartof foodassistance,butdofitsomedefinitions.Otherinstrumentsfallwithina‘greyarea’.Furtherambiguityremainsoverwhethercashtransfersshouldbecountedasfoodassistance,whatformsofsupporttoagriculturalproduction(seedprovision,fertilisersubsidiesand extension services) and what aspects of nutritionalinterventionsshouldcountasfoodassistance

There are several key areas of debate and innovation inhow food assistance is assessed, targeted and delivered.The Sphere minimum standards for disaster response arecurrently being revised; there is a growing use of cashtransfers, a renewed focus on the nutritional aspects offoodaidand continueddebatesaround theeffectivenessofschoolfeeding.TheSphereHandbooknowincludesachapterdevotedtofoodsecurityandnutrition, includingsectionsoncashandvouchersaswellasonfoodtransfers,foodsecurityandlivelihoods.Livestockemergencystandardshaverecentlybeendevelopedinaseparateinitiative.

Advances have beenmade in assessment. For example, theIntegrated Phase Classification for classifying populationsaccordingtoseverityof foodinsecurityhasbeendeveloped,and incorporating conflict or protection analysis into foodsecurityandlivelihoodsassessmentsincomplexemergenciesis gaining attention. The linkage between assessment andanalysis of response options remains a weakness in manycontexts.Thisappliesboth to foodaidand foodassistance.Evaluationsoffooddistributionsnotepoormonitoringasanissuethatinhibitsbetterunderstandingofimpactandimprovedperformance.Inaddition,studiesoffoodaidtargetingoverthepastdecadehaverepeatedlyshownredistributionorsharing,butthishasnotledtochangesinprogramming.Tacklingthisdilemma head-on rather than continuing to largely ignore itshould become a priority if the impact of food aid is to bebetterunderstood.

Providing people with money can prove an appropriatealternativeorcomplementtofoodaidandotherformsof in-kind assistance and is gaining acceptance. This is reflectedboth in policy positionswhich have been revised to includecash transferswithinbroaderdefinitionsof foodassistance,andinpracticewheretheuseofcashinrespondingtodisastersis growing. Cash transfers, however, still only constitute asmallproportionofoverallhumanitarianassistance.

Under-nutrition is responsible for the deaths of more than3.5 million children each year and the loss of billions ofdollars in foregone productivity and avoidable health carespending.Facedwithsuchhugecosts,actors in thebroaderdevelopmentsphereareincreasinglyfocusingtheiractionsoneffectivelytacklingunder-nutrition.Severaldonorgovernmentsand aid agencies argue that the nutritional composition offood assistance needs to be improved and that better linkswith other interventions designed to address malnutrition

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are needed. General food distributions and supplementaryfeeding have often failed to properly assess and documenttheirnutritionalimpact.

Important innovations in the treatment of severe acutemalnutrition have beenmade. Approaches have shifted fromcentre-basedtherapeuticfeedingtothewidespreadadoptionofcommunity-basedmanagementofacutemalnutrition (CMAM)whichusesready-to-eattherapeuticfoodstotreatsevereacutemalnutrition within the community whenever possible. Giventhelowcoverageofmanysupplementaryfeedingprogrammestargetedatmoderatelyacutelymalnourishedchildren,blanketdistribution of special foods to all under fives and expandedgeneral ration programmes are being consideredmore often.Newproductshavebeendevelopedforsupplementaryfeeding,suchas‘improvedCSB’and‘SupplementaryPlumpy’,butcostremainsaconstrainttotheirexpandeduseandsustainability.

School feedingcontinues tohave ferventsupportersaswellassceptics.WFP,byfarthelargestagencysupportingschoolfeeding, claims that the debate is largely won: ‘What is so clear...is that we are beyond the debate about whether school feeding makes sense as a way to reach the most vulnerable.’ Others, notably DG ECHO, DFID and various NGOs continueto question the effectiveness of school feeding in meetingtheirnutritionaloreducationalobjectivescomparedtootherpossibleinterventions.

Challenges for the �nternat�onal commun�ty

Food aid continues to make up the majority of humanitarianappealsandremainsanimportanttoolinrespondingtocrises.However, the continuing shift from tied in-kind tountied foodaid, growing levelsof local and regionalprocurementand theincreasinguseofcash-basedtransfersareleadingtoaquicklyshiftingenvironmentforpolicyandpractice.

Thebroaderconceptoffoodassistanceisgraduallyreplacingthe former narrow notion of food aid. However, there is nocommon understanding within the international communityabout terms and definitions. So it is becoming increasinglyunclearwhatfitswithinthefoodassistancetoolbox.Funders

andoperationalagenciesneedtodecidewhethertoadoptaseparatefoodaidorfoodassistancepolicyortosimplyregardfoodaid,cashandagriculturalinputsaspartofthewiderangeofinstrumentsdesignedtotacklefoodinsecurity.

Theresurgentinterestinnutritionhasanimportantinfluenceonfoodassistancedebates.This is leadingtocalls forastepped-up focus on the nutritional outcomes of food assistance, andon the quality as well as the quantity of assistance provided.Focusneedstobeplacednotjustonprovidingmorenutritiousfoodstuffs, but also on monitoring outcomes (what peopleactually receive and consume) and building stronger linkagesbetween food assistance and other dimensions of nutritionpolicy.Greaterfocusontheunderlyingcausesofmalnutritionaswellastherisksassociatedwithit,aspectswhichhaveremainedrelativelyneglectedoverthelastdecade,isalsoneeded.

This reviewof recentdevelopments leadsus to identifyandprioritise five key areas of action for agencies and otherstakeholders in their efforts tomake food assistance policyandpracticemore relevant tocurrentneedsandanticipatedchallenges:

• developing a new food security architecture whichincorporatesfoodassistance;

• workingtowardsgreaterclarityoftermsanddefinitions;• whereappropriate,continuingtoexpandbeyondfoodaid

totheuseofcashandabroaderfoodassistancetoolbox;• linking food assistance more clearly to the expansion

of social assistance within national social protectionstrategiesand

• focusing on the nutritional outcomes of food assistanceandlinkingfoodassistancemoreclearlytooverallnutritionstrategies.

Theseareasofactionshouldbeaddressedwithacleardirectioninanumberofcontexts,fromthehighestlevelsoftheUNtothe G20/G8, in a more consistent and connected manner.Particular challenges include the renegotiation the FoodAidConvention, finalising the Sphere Minimum Standards, thenew foodsecurity cluster, theUNHigh-LevelTask ForceandtherevitalisedCommitteeonFoodSecurity.

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The German government (Federal Ministry for EconomicCooperationandDevelopmentorBMZ),withsupportfromGTZ,isplanning to revise its foodassistancepolicy inemergencyand transitional contexts. This study intends to inform thatprocessbyprovidingareviewofthefoodassistancepoliciesandstrategiesofkeydonors,UNagencies,majorNGOsandthe Red Cross movement. It also intends to inform otheragencies’ food assistance policies and provide a helpfuloverview of the current state of debates around key issuesrelatingtofoodassistance.

Changes in recent years have affected the nature of foodassistance,not least the shift in terminology from foodaid tofoodassistance.Thismakesareviewoffoodassistancepoliciesandpracticesimportant.Recentdevelopmentsincludechangesintheexternalenvironment,suchastheglobalfood,financeandfuelcrisis;climatechangeandtheincreasinglyprotractednatureofmanyinternalconflicts.Inaddition,therehavebeenchangesor potential changes in aid architecture, the humanitarianreformagenda(theclusters,theCERF)anddiscussionsaroundthe future of the Food Aid Convention (FAC). Programmingapproacheshavechangedsignificantly;inparticularanincreasedemphasisoncashtransfersinbothemergencyanddevelopmentsettings,includingmovestowardssocialprotectionandhungersafety nets. This study builds on previous German supportedwork, including a major 2007 conference on food assistanceheldinBerlinandastudyin2000ofdonorandmultilateralfoodsecuritypolicies(Kracht2000,BMZ2007).

Section 2 frames current food assistance debates withinthe evolving disaster context, particularly the recent crisistriggered by high global food prices. It examines trends involumes of food assistance and looks particularly at thegrowing importance of non-DAC donors in food assistancefinancing as well as the role played by new humanitarianfinancing instruments such as the CERF. Section 3 tracesrecent developments in the evolving global architecture forfoodsecurityandfocusesondebatesaroundtherenegotiationof the Food Aid Convention. The terminology has recentlyshifted; the term food assistance is now more commonlyused than food aid in official documentation. This raises aseries of definitional questions about the meaning of foodassistanceandaboutwhich instrumentsare includedwithinthis term. This is examined in Section 4. Section 5 looks attheperennialdebatearoundrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentandatwherefoodassistancefitswithindifferentapproachesto transition and recovery from crisis and protracted crises.Section 6 traces recent developments in assessment andearly warning tools related to food assistance. Section 7examines particular food assistance instruments and foodmodalitieswheretherehavebeenrecentinnovationsorwhere

there are ongoing debates around approaches, focusing oncash and vouchers, nutrition instruments, school feeding,publicworksandother foodsecurity instruments.Section8is concernedwith the process of delivering food assistanceand considers procurement, monetisation and commoditymanagement. Section 9 is concerned with the operationalprogrammingof foodassistance, focusingonstandardsandprinciples, including the revision of Sphere and the right tofood,targetingandmonitoringandevaluation.Finally,Section10providesthemainconclusionstothereport.

1.1 methodology

Thisstudywasbasedonareviewofrecentliteratureonfoodaidandinterviewswithpeopleworkingfordonorgovernments,UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross movement withresponsibilityforfoodassistancepolicyandprogramming.Thefocuswasonhumanitarianandtransitionalcontexts.Ninety-one people were interviewed and grey literature relevantto food assistance policies and practices was gathered. Aninterviewguidewasdevelopedforgovernmentandaidagencyrepresentatives(Annex1).

There are some key gaps dictated by the time available forthe study. Itwas not possible to interviewnon-DACdonors,disaster-affectedgovernments,non-DACWFPexecutiveboardmembers or developing country civil society organisations.The study was also not able to gather the views on foodassistance of disaster-affected populations. The absence ofG77 government voices is a key gap and a clear priority forfurtherresearch.

ItwasnotpossibletocomprehensivelycoveralloftheOECDDAC donors and all major humanitarian aid agencies in thetimeavailable. Inparticular, thestudy teamwasnotable totalktotheICRC.

Annex 2 presents the policy positions of selected donorgovernments,UNagencies, theRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement and NGOs. In the time available, it was notpossible tocomprehensivelycoveralldonorgovernmentsormajoraidagencies.ApurposivesampleofOECD-DACdonorgovernmentswasselected includingmostof the larger foodassistancedonors.Someofthereportsaremoredetailedthanothers.GiventhedominantpositionoftheUSgovernmentinfood assistance, a US-based consultant was commissionedtoundertakeaseparatestudy.VisitsweremadetoBrusselsto interview European Commission officials and to Rometo interviewWFP staff, Rome-based donors and FAO. Otherinterviews were conducted by telephone and official policydocumentsconsulted.

Chapter 1Introduct�on

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According to the latest FAO estimates, the number ofundernourished people in the world increased from around870million in2004–6 tooveronebillion in2009,mainlyasa consequenceofhigh foodpricesand theglobaleconomicrecession (FAO 2009c, FAO 2009b, DG DEV 2009). Thehumanitarian system faces a number of new and ongoingchallenges including climate change, volatile food prices,the financial crisis and the HIV/AIDS and flu pandemics.Longer-term issues, notably rapid urbanisation and ageingpopulations,will also require adaptation.Our knowledge ofthe linkages between climate change anddisasters remainslimitedbutthereisconfidencethatitwillmeanmoreclimate-relateddisastersandmoreneedfordisasterresponse(Websteretal.2008,Scheumer-CrossandTaylor2009).

The contexts in which emergency and transitional aid areneededareconstantlyshifting.The2000sstartedwithdroughtintheHornofAfrica,whichhighlightedtheprotractedcrisesthatthesecountriesface,intermsofrepeatedlyhighlevelsoffoodinsecurityandacutemalnutrition.Theoutbreakofconflictandmassdisplacement inDarfur followed, the response towhichremains the world’s largest humanitarian response. ConflictinDRCandSomaliacontinues to lead tosomeof theworld’slargestandmostseverehumanitariancrises.TheAsianTsunamiin December 2004 killed over 227,000 people and displacedsome1.7millionandledtooneofthelargesteverresponsestonaturaldisasters.Theyear2008startedwiththehumanitarianaftermath of post-election violence in Kenya and conflict inGaza. It also sawmajor natural disasters inMyanmar, China,Haitiandelsewhere.In2009,theconsequencesofconflictinSriLankaandPakistancreatedmajorcrisesofdisplacementand2010startedwithmassiveearthquakesinHaitiandChile.

Intermsofnumbersofemergencies,theglobalhumanitariansituation in 2007–8 appeared to have somewhat worsenedcompared to previous years. These years saw 52 majorhumanitarian emergencies (as defined by a count of theUnited Nations consolidated and flash appeals launched),or an average of 26 per year.1 This represents an increaseof 8 percent compared to the years 2001–6. Small- andmedium-scalefloodsinparticularhavespikedinthisperiod,a phenomenon attributed by some to to climate change(DG ECHO 2009b). Considering a longer period, a four-foldincreaseof reportednatural disastersoccurred fromaround100in1971tomorethan400in2003,2causedalmostentirelybyanincreaseinweather-relateddisasters.

Themajorityofinternationalhumanitarianresources,however,continued to be focused in protracted, complex crises,such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC), aswell as thehigh-profile contextswith great powerinvolvement—IraqandAfghanistan.3Moreover,humanitarianfundingrequirementsperemergencyhaveincreasedbynearly50 percent. This mainly reflects a broadening scope forhumanitarianactionthatincreasinglyincludesearlyrecoveryandpreparedness(Harveyetal.2010).

Theevidencesuggeststhathumanitarianassistance ismoreprotected from the recession than development aid, partlybecauseofpublicsupportforsavinglivesandpartlybecausethere is no clear relationship between changes in grossnational income (GNI) and humanitarian assistance. In fact,governmentalhumanitarianassistancegrewin2008despiteareducedgrowthrateofGNIinmanycountries(GHA2009).

Giventheunprecedentedchallengesoutlinedabove,andtheinterplay between them, it is anticipated that humanitarianandfoodassistanceneedswillcontinuetoincrease.

2.1 Food pr�ce cr�s�s

International food prices fell significantly from their peak inmid-2008. Nevertheless prices for staples remain above pre-crisis levels, especially in some low-income, import-dependentcountries (Jaspars and Wiggins 2009, Johnston and Bargawi2010b).4Studiesrevealthatasurprisinglyhighnumberofruralhouseholds in developing countries are net buyers of staplefoods,challengingthecommonlyheldviewthathighpriceswouldbenefitruralpopulations(Wigginsetal.2010a,HauensteinSwanet al. 2010). There is an emerging consensus that the groupsmostaffectedbythepricespike includetherural landless, thedisplaced,pastoralists,smallholderfarmersandtheurbanpoor(Bensonetal.2008,JasparsandWiggins2009).Poorfamilies,forwhomfoodisalargeproportionofthehouseholdbudget,haveadoptednegativecopingstrategiessuchaswithdrawingchildrenfromschools(FAO2009b),shiftingtowardslessnutritiousfoodsor reducing frequency of meals (Lang 2010), seeking moreworkorborrowingmoney(Raihin2009).However,thereis lessevidencethatirreversiblecopingstrategies,suchasthesaleofproductiveassets,arebeingadopted(Wigginsetal.2010b).

Themoreimmediatecausesofthe2007–8‘globalfoodcrisis’arecommonlyunderstoodtoincludethefollowing:theimpact

Chapter 2Evolv�ng d�saster contexts

1FiguresfromOCHAFTSasof12September2009(http://ocha.unog.ch/fts).2 Munich RE/EM-DAT (International Disaster Database) / Centre forResearchonEpidemiologyofDisasters(CRED)/UNInternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction(ISDR),citedinDGECHO(2009b).

3 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2009(2009),4.4 See FAO, http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/en/ and http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/

8


oftherisingpriceofoilonfarmingcosts;measures,especiallyby the US, to encourage the processing of food crops intobiofuels, just as the oil price spike dramatically increasedthe profitability of ethanol production; recognition of therapidly risingdemand formeat and feedgrains in emergingeconomies, especially China; poor weather in Australia andfinancial speculation in the commodities futures markets(e.g.,Timmer2008).Others,forexample,contributorstotheJournalofAgrarianChange’s2010Symposiumonthe ‘WorldFoodCrisis’ point todifferent structural causes.The2007–8price volatility is seen to be an integral part of a broaderagrarianandfood-systemcrisis, inwhichfoodsupplychainshave become distorted by monopolistic international agro-industrialfoodcompaniesandthedriveforshorttermprofitshas been at the expense of environmentally and sociallysustainableagriculture(Lang2010,VanDerPloeg2010).

The combination of longer-term influences also suggestsupward pressures on real food prices over the next twentyyears. Climate change is predicted to have a negativeinfluenceon yields, livestocknumbersandproductivity, andto increase prices of major food crops in many developingcountries (Wiggins et al. 2010a, Ludi 2009, UNDP 2007).Globalpopulationgrowthisalsoincreasingexistingpressureon natural resources (Martine et al. 2008). On the demandside, inaddition topopulationgrowth,ademand foranimalproductsandadiversifieddietisgrowinginrapidlyemergingeconomiesasistheadditionalmarketforbiofuelproduction.Thepotentialforshorttermvolatilityisconsiderable,implyingpricecrashesaswellasspikes.

The global economic recession is widely perceived to havehad severe negative impacts on trade, credit and foreignaid (including remittances), further reducing the incomesand employment opportunities of the poor and significantlyloweringtheirpowertopurchaseandgrowfood(GHA2009,Wigginsetal.2010a).

Inresponsetowhatisbeinglabelleda‘globalfoodcrisis’,theUnitedNationsestablishedahigh-leveltaskforcetoenhancethe efforts of the UN system and the international financialinstitutionstorespondtothecrisis.Thetaskforcedevelopeda Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) that outlinedacoordinatedapproachtoensureaccessto,availabilityandutilisationoffood. Itdetailedtwosetsofactions:thosethatcontributetoshort-termoutcomesrelatedtoimmediateneedsandthosethatcontributeto long-termoutcomesneededforsustainable food systems able to withstand shocks (UnitedNations2009).

Thefoodcrisisalsoledtosignificanteffortsin2009towardsrevitalising the global architecture for food security (seeSection3).

DonorsandUNagenciesincreasedtheirfundingandoperationsin response to the food crisis.WFP’s response to theglobal

foodcrisisinvolveda30percentincreaseinbeneficiaries(to100million).In2008,itreceivedanunprecedentedamountofcashandin-kindcontributionsfrombothtraditionalandnon-traditionaldonors,amountingto$5.1billion5(UnitedNations2009).

Therisingpriceof foodandfuel increasedthecostofWFP’soperation,andhadadirectimpactonthecostofpurchasingfoodaidcommodities.

UNICEF allocated $52million as emergency funding to helpnational authorities in 42 countries to scale up nutritionefforts.FAOallocated$394millionforsupporttosmallholderfarmers(seeds,tools,fertiliserandirrigation)including$285millionfromtheEuropeanUnionFoodFacility.Inaddition,theWorld Bank Group set up the Global Food Crisis ResponseProgram (GFRP) inMay 2008 to provide immediate relief tocountrieshardhitbyhighfoodprices(whichcameto$2billionbyApril2009)toprovideimmediaterelieftocountrieshardhitby high food prices.Within the EC (European Commission),therewasstrongsupportforthecreationofaEuropeanUnionFoodFacilityinresponsetohighfoodprices.

2.2 Food a�d/ass�stance trends

2.2.1 Increase in humanitarian assistance levelsOverall,levelsofhumanitarianaidhavebeengrowingsteadily.Like the aid worker population, calculating the total dollaramount of funding used for humanitarian action is a difficulttask,andestimatesvary.ThemostwidelycreditedamongthesecomesfromtheGlobalHumanitarianAssistance(GHA)Report,which estimates that international humanitarian resourcestotalled$15billion in 2007and in the neighbourhoodof $18billionin2008.6TheGHAreporttakesadonor-basedapproachtothecalculation,factoringinofficialgovernmenthumanitarianassistancecontributions (as reportedtoOECDDAC),non-DACgovernment contributions (as reported toOCHA’s FTS),OECDDACgovernments’security-relatedandpost-conflictassistanceand private (non-government) contributions received by aidorganisations.Lookingjustattargetedcontributionstospecifichumanitarianemergencyresponseefforts(asreportedtoOCHA’sFTS),whichdonot includesecurity relatedexpenditures fromDACdonors,bringsthetotaldownconsiderablyto$4.4billionin2007and$6.6billion in2008.Theseyears’ totalscontinuethe general upward trend of aid humanitarian contributions,illustratedinFigure1(Harveyetal.2010).

Financialdatagoingbackto2001indicatethathumanitarianaid has risen faster than overall official developmentassistance (ODA) during that period, and that this rate ofgrowthacceleratedsignificantlyafter2005.Thisrisecorrelateswiththeinceptionofthenewpooledfundingmechanismsforhumanitarian contributions, i.e., the expanded UN Central

5AllfiguresareinUSdollarsunlessstatedotherwise.6 Development Initiatives, GHA Report 2009, (Global HumanitarianAssistance,London2009).

9


Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the country levelCommonHumanitarianFunds(CHFs).

Food has traditionally formed a large part of humanitariansectoralrequirementsinsidetheConsolidatedAppealProcess(CAP(GHA2009).Ithas,however,becomeincreasinglydifficulttoseparateoutfood-relatedassistancewithinaidoverall fortwo related reasons: First, as humanitarian aid has becomemoreimportant,somefundingoffoodaidmaynotbereportedseparatelyandsecond,thereisincreasinguseofcash-basedinstrumentstoprovidefoodassistance.Presently,therearenosatisfactorystatisticaldataonoverallfoodassistanceevenaspartofhumanitarianassistance,quiteapartfromtheissuesofdefinitionthataretoberesolved(seeSections3.2and4).

2.2.2 Downward trend in overall food aid levelsInternational food aid levels have historically been highlyvolatile (Figure 2) and driven by supply side influences, inparticular by stock levels in donor exporting countries andglobal commodity prices (OECD 2006, Barrett and Maxwell2005).7 In addition, the US has provided a high proportionof food aid, around 50 percent or more since 1980, whichmeans thatUSpolicyalone isadominant influenceon foodaidflows.

F�gure 1: Total human�tar�an ass�stance flows to emergenc�es, 2001–2008

Source:CompiledfromtheOCHAFTSasof16March2009(excludesIraqandtsunamiresponses)

F�gure 2: Global food a�d del�ver�es by governments, nGos and WFP, 1990–2008

Source:WFPFAISdatabase

7Thereportmakesuseofdataonglobalfoodaiddeliveriesinmetrictonnesare from the database of the International Food Aid Information System(INTERFAIS). INTERFAIS is a dynamic database involving the interactionof donor governments, international organisations, non-governmentalorganisations,recipientcountriesandWFPfieldoffices.

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

m�l

l�on

mT

7,000,000,000

6,000,000,000

5,000,000,000

4,000,000,000

3,000,000,000

2,000,000,000

1,000,000,000

0

Us

(co

nsta

nt)

doll

ars

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

10


Apparent trends can be highly sensitive to the choice ofperiodforanalysisandstronglyreflectUSactivity.Theperiods1992–3 and 1999 are high-side outliers (see Figure 2). The1999peakwasassociatedwiththeUSand,onalesserscale,the European Union providing large-scale government-to-governmenttransitionalprogrammeaid,especiallytoRussiaand some countries affected by the 1998 financial crisis inAsia.WFPactedasthechannelforsomeofthiscrisis-relatedaid.Afterthatepisode,foodmarketsprogressivelytightened.Thus global food aid flows have followed a clear downwardtrendsince1999,reachingthelowestlevelin2007sincetheearly1970sfoodcrisis.

Sowemust ask, is the downward trend since 1999 a resultof structural changes in circumstances and policy or mighttherebeareturntofoodaiddrivenbysurplusdisposal?TheinstrumentsthroughwhichUSgovernment-to-governmentaidwaschannelledremaininplace(seeAnnex2).Presentlymostexpert opinion anticipates, as suggested above, continuingtightmarketconditionswithpricesremaininghighandstockslow. Arguably, markets are now more volatile. Part of theargument in the WTO negotiations (see below) was aboutpreventing a recurrence of food aid acting as a vent fortransitionalsurpluses.Thedownwardtrendisassociatedwithtwootherimportantchangesinthecompositionoffoodaid:greaterflexibilityintheactivitiesthataresupportedandinthesourcingofcommodities.

Thedeclineintotalfoodaidlevelsmayalsobeassociatedwithsome increased funding for other forms of food assistance(e.g., cash-based transfers), humanitarian assistance moregenerallyor support for foodsecurity, that is, a reallocationeffect. However, the available data do not easily allow anexplorationofthisquestion.Itwouldbeamistaketoassumethat the decline is directly associated with the untying offood aid as a policy measure. The degree of flexibility ofbudget linesmaybean influence. For example, EC foodaidhas declined since the reforms of 1996 allowed the use ofbudgetlinesformerlywhollydedicatedtofoodaidandfundsforabroaderrangeoffoodsecurityactions.Probably,asthiscase illustrates, theway forward is to consider the issueonadonoragencybasis throughadetailedexaminationof aidexpenditure.

Taking a longer-term perspective, whilst most donors havebeenfundinglessfoodaid,considerabledifferencesamongstdonorsexist.ThereisaseculardownwardtrendinUSfoodaidfundingfromthehighlevelsofthe1950sand1960sbut,inthelasttwentyyears,themostapparentdynamicisconsiderableshorter-term variability. Australian, Canadian and Japanesefood aid levels have been decliningwith some shorter-termvariability related to different internal influences (the ricemarketintheJapanesecase).Europeandonorspresentaverymixedpicture—overalltheyarecontracting,asreflected(seeSection 3) in their collective contributions against their FACcommitment. EC aid has been variable, but by 2008 it has

declined to around a third of late 1990s levels. France hasphasedouttiedprogrammeaidand,asaminorfunderofWFP,hasceasedtobeasignificantdonor.Germanfoodaidlevelsare also trending lower. In contrast, the Nordic Plus group(includingNorwayoutsidetheEU,aswellasNetherlandsandtheUK)hassustained levelsagainst thetrendwithvolumesapparentlysensitivetospecificcrises.

2.2.3 Change in types of food aid programmesEmergency food aid 8 encompassingdisasterassistanceandcontinuinghumanitarianoperationshasbecometheprimaryfocusoflowervolumesoffoodaid(Table2).Despitecritiquesof its dominance in emergency appeals, food aid continuesto play a leading role in responding to emergencies. Of thesixmillionmetric tonnes of food aid provided worldwide in2008,about60percentwasforhumanitarianpurposes.Foodaidmadeupmore than50percentof totalUNconsolidated(CAP) appeals in 2008 and 2009, as it had done between2000and2005.AsMaxwelletal.(2009)argue,‘despitemanyrecentchanges, foodaidremainsthe largestsinglecategoryofhumanitarianresponseworld-wide’.

The structural change in food aid, from a dominance ofprogrammefoodaidtoemergencyfoodaid,isclearlyexposedby comparing the proportions of different types of activityduring broadly similar supply-side conditions. The 2006–8commodity price spike can be compared with 1996–8, thepreviousspike,andtheperiodoftightermarkets;globalfoodaid levels were 15 percent lower in 2006–8 than a decadeearlier,butemergencyaidlevelswere44percenthigherandtheshareofemergencyaidhadrisenfrom38percentpercentto65.7percent.Incontrast,bothprogrammeandprojectaidlevelsdeclinedinrealtermsandtheirsharesoftotalfoodaidfell from33percentto12percentandfrom28percentto22percentrespectively.

Programmefoodaidisalmostentirelyin-kinddirecttransfers.The dominant form of food aid even in 1999, it has shrunkto around 5 percent of total flows, an unprecedented lowlevel. Most donors have decreased direct transfers of foodaid, and in some important cases (USA, EC, Australia andFrance), this reduction has not been compensated for byan equivalent increase in cash contributions for local ortriangularpurchases.Theoveralldeclineinfoodaiddeliveriescan therefore be attributed to a drop in direct transferdeliveriesandabandonmentof theuseofprogrammeaid,a

8The conventional categorisation of food aid by activity is explained forexample inOECD(2006).Emergencyorrelief foodaid is targetedon,andfreelydistributedto,victimsofnaturalorman-madedisasters.Programmefoodaidissuppliedasaresourcetransferprovidingbalance-of-payments(BoP) or budgetary support. BoP support is given either by replacingcommercial imports or by allowing additional imports where these areinhibited by foreign exchange (FOREX) constraints. This commodity aidis provided directly to a recipient government, or its agent, for sale onlocal markets. Project food aid is usually provided to support specificpovertyalleviationanddisasterpreventionactivities, targetedonspecificbeneficiarygroupsorareas.Thecommoditiesareprovidedonagrantbasisandareusuallychannelledthroughamultilateralagency,almostinvariablyWFP,orthroughinternationalNGOs.

11


trendthatbeganinthemid1990s(seeFigure2andTable2).However, this downward trend was interrupted as food aidlevelsroseby3.8percentfrom6.0millionmt(metrictonnes)in2007to6.3millionmtin2008.Thisincreasewasdrivenbya1millionmtincreaseindirecttransfersofemergencyfoodaid,almost entirely channelled through WFP, while programmeandproject foodaiddecreasedby600,000and200,000mtrespectively. The 1millionmt increase,mainly from the US,Japan and Canada,9 was intended to meet the immediateneedsof countries affectedby theeconomic crisis andhighfoodprices.

Developmentproject food aidhasalsosteadilydeclinedsincethe early 1990s (Figure 3 and Table 2). Levels appear to besensitivetoshort-termsupplysideinfluenceswithlowsin1995and2007–8andtemporaryrecoveryin1999–2001.Thedefactoevidencethatalowerpriorityisaccordedtosupposedlylonger-termdevelopment,andislikelytobecrowdedoutinacrisisbyemergencyaid,has ledstakeholders tosuccessfully lobby inthe US for legislation to provide a ‘safe box’ of guaranteedminimumlevelsofdevelopmentprojectaid.

2.2.4 Changes in sources of food aidThesecondmajorchangeinfoodaidhasbeeninthesourcingoffoodaid,fromdirectaidin-kindtocash-financedlocalandtriangular transactions (Table 3). Whereas direct transferstypically accounted for 90 percent or more of food aid inthe 1980s, the share has declined to around half. There isconsiderablevariabilityinflows,especiallyofdirecttransferswith supplydrivenhigher byupwardoutliers in 1992–3and1999,butthelonger-termtrendsareclear.Forthatreason,thefocus in delivering food (Section 7) is on recent experiencewithlocalandtriangularoperations.

Theshifttolocalandtriangularpurchaseshasimplicationsforthecompositionoffoodaidrations.Thedominanceofwheatappears to be ending. In 2008, wheat and its derivativesrepresented35percentofglobaldeliveries,downfromsome40percentin2007.Theshareofricewas13percentin2008,adecline from18percent in2007.Conversely,coarsegrainsincreasedtheirshareto31percentoftotaldeliveries,upfrom22percentin2007.Theshifttolocalandtriangularpurchases,afocusonSub-SaharanAfricaandanincreaseincommoditypricescanpartlyexplainthiscompositionoffoodaid.In2008,the prices of the two main coarse grains delivered as foodaid—maizeandsorghum—wereone-thirdof thatof riceandtwo-thirdsthatofwheat.

9Comparedwith2007,theUnitedStatesofAmericaincreaseditsdeliveryby800,000mttomeettheincreasedneedsresultingfromhighfoodandfuelcostsin2008.MajorincreaseswerealsoregisteredforJapanandCanada,whiletheEuropeanCommissiondecreaseditsdeliveryby400,000mt.

F�gure 3: Global food a�d flows by type of act�v�ty, 1999–2008


12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

m�l

l�on

s

Emergency

Programme

Project

12


Year Emergency Programme Project Total

1989 1,750,363 6,518,762 3,341,213 11,610,338

1990 2,434,767 7,853,636 2,883,277 13,171,680

1991 3,470,599 6,634,883 2,623,234 12,728,715

1992 5,061,609 7,644,706 2,602,507 15,308,822

1993 4,250,191 10,551,561 2,520,852 17,322,604

1994 4,599,549 5,537,527 2,788,576 12,925,652

1995 3,719,719 4,147,252 2,334,080 10,201,050

1996 2,699,607 2,820,907 1,702,547 7,223,061

1997 3,276,262 1,767,672 2,275,188 7,319,122

1998 3,003,103 2,847,817 2,544,875 8,395,795

1999 4,815,394 7,825,865 2,401,262 15,042,520

2000 5,312,913 3,319,607 2,712,232 11,344,752

2001 5,422,803 2,372,037 3,150,263 10,945,103

2002 4,335,224 2,378,899 2,693,262 9,407,384

2003 6,411,934 1,534,414 2,269,414 10,215,762

2004 4,163,570 1,320,548 1,824,993 7,309,111

2005 5,257,415 1,150,933 1,879,710 8,288,059

2006 4,262,984 1,034,346 1,669,549 6,966,879

2007 3,725,694 910,871 1,405,688 6,042,253

2008 4,798,428 287,419 1,186,021 6,271,868

b.Index:1989=100

Year Emergency Programme Project Total

1989 100 100 100 100

1990 139 120 86 113

1991 198 102 79 110

1992 289 117 78 132

1993 243 162 75 149

1994 263 85 83 111

1995 213 64 70 88

1996 154 43 51 62

1997 187 27 68 63

1998 172 44 76 72

1999 275 120 72 130

2000 304 51 81 98

2001 310 36 94 94

2002 248 36 81 81

2003 366 24 68 88

2004 238 20 55 63

2005 300 18 56 71

2006 244 16 50 60

2007 213 14 42 52

2008 274 4 35 54

Source:WFPFAISfoodaidflows

Table 1: Global food a�d flows by type of act�v�ty, 1989–2008a.TonnesinGrainEquivalent

13


2.2.5 Changes in donors, funders and recipientsIn2008,thetopfivefoodaiddonorgovernments—theUnitedStatesofAmerica,theEuropeanCommission, Japan,CanadaandSaudiArabia—accountedfor72percentoftotaldeliveries(Table 3). The considerable differences in sourcing policiesofdonorsarealsoshowninthattablewiththeUSand,toamuch lesser extent, Japan and Canada still being providersofdirectfoodaidin-kind.Mostotherdonorscontributecashfunding,withtheUN,theECandSaudiArabiabeingin2008themostsignificantprovidersofcash.TherankingsarequitevolatilewithforexampleSaudiArabiamakingaone-offlargecontribution in2008thatwasnotrepeated in2009.ThetoptendonorstoWFPin2009areshowninTable4.

The top five recipient countries—Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia,Zimbabwe and Afghanistan—received 2.6 million mt ofemergency food aid, representing 54 percent of the totaldelivered in2008.The top ten recipientsofemergency foodaid in2007–8are indicated inTable5.Myanmar,whichwashitbyCycloneNargis,replacedtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC)asthetenthtoprecipient.Themajorityofthesecountries endure protracted conflicts or are fragile statesandmanyhavebeenrecipientsoffoodaidoveranextendedperiod

Non-DAC donors (government donors that are notmembersof the OECD DAC) have become increasingly importantcontributorstohumanitarianresponsesinrecentyears.From2000to2008,non-DACcontributionsmadeup14percentofthetotalgovernmentcontributionsreportedtotheUN’sFinancialTrackingSystem(FTS).ChinaandSouthKoreabothemergedin the 1990s as substantial providers of in-kind food aid,primarilydirectedtoNorthKorea.Indiahasperiodicallymadeone-offdonationsofwheatfromsurplusstocks.Thegroupofnon-DACdonors iswideningandbecomingmoresignificant.In2008non-DAC(andthusnon-FoodAidConventiondonors—seeSection3)contributedaround20percentofallfoodaidintermsofshipments.

Non-DAC donors tend to vary the forms of assistance theyprovide between gifts-in-kind and cash assistance. In-kind assistance is mostly food aid, but also includes othercommoditiesaswellas transportand logistics.According toFTS,non-DACdonorgifts-in-kindincreasedfrom$36millionin2007to$126millionin2008.However,cashaccountsforover70percentofnon-DACcontributions.

Most non-DAC aid is coded asmulti-sectoral; as a result, itis difficult todeterminehowmuchof the assistance is food

F�gure 4: Global food a�d flows by source or del�very mode, 1990–2008


20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

m�l

l�on

s

Directtransfer

Localpurchase

Triangularpurchase

14


Year D�rect transfers Tr�angular transact�ons Local purchases

1989 10,573,503 769,878 266,957

1990 12,008,821 773,843 389,016

1991 11,262,488 1,120,928 345,299

1992 13,321,639 1,463,572 523,612

1993 15,257,863 1,639,728 425,013

1994 10,995,123 1,441,268 489,261

1995 7,985,360 1,722,624 493,066

1996 5,617,197 1,132,278 473,585

1997 5,501,838 1,302,481 514,803

1998 6,693,531 1,236,342 465,922

1999 13,413,943 1,051,208 577,369

2000 9,359,352 1,329,501 655,900

2001 8,543,471 1,575,384 826,249

2002 7,851,124 1,031,780 524,481

2003 7,295,074 1,987,821 932,867

2004 4,899,272 1,407,630 1,002,208

2005 5,506,657 1,566,498 1,214,904

2006 4,337,569 1,381,641 1,247,669

2007 3,345,468 1,597,689 1,099,097

2008 3,681,562 1,509,891 1,080,415

b.Index:1989=100

Year D�rect Transfers Tr�angular Transact�ons Local Purchases

1989 100 100 100

1990 114 101 146

1991 107 146 129

1992 126 190 196

1993 144 213 159

1994 104 187 183

1995 76 224 185

1996 53 147 177

1997 52 169 193

1998 63 161 175

1999 127 137 216

2000 89 173 246

2001 81 205 310

2002 74 134 196

2003 69 258 349

2004 46 183 375

2005 52 203 455

2006 41 179 467

2007 32 208 412

2008 35 196 405

Source:WFPFAISfoodaidflows

Table 2: Global food a�d flows by source or del�very mode, 1989–2008a.TonnesinGrainEquivalent

15


aid. In 2006 and 2007, food accounted for 14.5 percentand 5 percent, respectively, of non-DAC donor humanitarianassistancereportedthroughtheFTS.In2008,foodaccountedfor48.2percent;however,thiswaslargelydrivenbyasingledonorallocationof$500milliontoWFP(discussedbelow).10

Themajorityofnon-DACdonorsprefertoprovidehumanitarianassistance bilaterally, as government-to-government assist-ance. This reflects the way non-DAC donors view aid—asa mutually beneficial relationship, and one that makeshumanitarian contributions visible. According to FTS, in theperiod2000–2008,thetenlargestnon-DACdonorschannelledan average of 38 percent of their humanitarian assistancedirectlytotherecipientgovernment,comparedto2.5percentforthetoptenDACdonors.Thepreferenceforgovernment-to-government assistance ismore pronounced for someof thelargernon-DACdonors.

Very little has been written on trends in bilateral food aidfrom non-DAC donors. There is evidence from examiningresponses,suchastotheprotractedcrisis inDarfurandthePakistanearthquake,thatnon-DACfoodaidcontributionshavebeen tied, especially for the poorer non-DAC donors wherediscretionary resources are limited. However, examples alsoexistwherecashhasbeenprovidedtorecipientgovernmentsto buy food and other communities. In Lebanon, non DACdonors tended to provide assistance mainly through cash

FAC Donor D�rect Transfer Local Purchase Tr�angular Total

tonnage percent of total Purchase

Australia 0 0 24,068 62,669 86,737

Belgium 0 0 6,389 4,023 10,412

Canada 111,510 44.1 36,421 104,863 252,794

EU

EC 53,587 13.8 144,624 188,919 387,130

Belgium 0 0 6,389 4,023 10,412

Denmark 276 0.5 24,540 28,483 53,299

France 306 0.9 10,299 23,272 33,877

Germany 4,631 4.0 64,478 45,550 114,660

Ireland 0 0 6,185 21,549 27,733

Netherlands 0 0 44,548 56,610 101,158

Spain 2,064 4.2 21,579 25,272 48,915

UK 66 0 43,000 88,472 131,538

Japan 161,658 45.0 75,279 122,469 359,406

Norway 108 0.2 20,108 27,703 47,920

Switzerland 2,368 9.0 8,438 15,472 26,278

USA 2,957,574 95.4 80,882 61,497 3,099,952

China 31,401 0.9 5,735 1,439 38,576

SaudiArabia 4,902 2.0 56,824 179,379 241,105

S.Korea 0 0 1,294 9,871 11,165

NGOs 30,973 42.2 34,177 8,302 73,452

UN 2,432 0.9 93,317 189,734 285,483

Totals 3,363,856 61.9 802,184 1,265,548 5,431,589

Source:WFPFAISfoodaidflows,2008Note:IncludeddonorsareFACsignatories(excludingArgentina);fortheEUthesearetheEuropeanCommissionandonlymemberstatessurveyedinthisstudyaswellasothernon-FACfundersexplicitlymentionedinthetext.

Table 3: selected donors and funders: total food a�d flows by source, 2008a.TonnesinGrainEquivalent

Government donor Contr�but�on �n dollars

1 USA 1,755,529,401

2 EuropeanCommission 342,666,730

3 Canada 225,343,299

4 Spain 213,851,823

5 Japan 202,684,092

6 Germany 132,103,739

7 UnitedKingdom 127,624,011

8 Australia 81,683,878

9 Netherlands 77,593,799

10 Sweden 72,487,335

Table 4: Top ten donors to WFP �n 2009

10GlobalHumanitarianAssistance,2009.

16


grants.Overall,however,researchinthisareahasbeenlimitedand non-DAC donors tend to be invisible to internationalevaluations on humanitarian responses. As the non-DACdonorsgrow,itwillbeimportanttolearnmoreaboutthewayinwhichfoodaidisprovidedbilaterally, includingtheextenttowhichtheprinciplesofuntyingaidarereflectedinthenon-DACdonorcommunity.

ForWFP,non-DAC‘donors’includegovernments’contributionsto food aid operations in their own countries. This is moreappropriatelytermednon-DACfunding,asthesecountriesarenot strictly donors, and it means thatWFP non-DAC figures

cannotbedirectlycomparedwithDACassistance.Totalnon-DACfundingtoWFPbetween2005and2010isgiveninFigure5.11

WFP has benefited significantly from its efforts to improvedialoguewith its non-DAC partners and has attracted somehighlevelpoliticalattention.12In2007,ChinesePremierWenJiaobao urged countries to double donations to WFP overthecoming fiveyears. InMay2008,SaudiArabiadonateda

Rec�p�ent 2007 2008 Change 2008–2007

mt (000) % of total mt (000) % of total %

Ethiopia 580 16 915 19 58

Sudan 491 13 673 14 37

Zimbabwe 157 4 344 7 119

Somalia 93 2 326 7 252

Afghanistan 205 6 309 6 51

DPRK 374 10 305 6 –18

Kenya 194 5 206 4 6

Uganda 238 6 159 3 –33

OccupiedPalestinian

Territory

Myanmar 26 1 109 2 326

Table 5: major rec�p�ents of emergency food a�d, 2007–8

F�gure 5: Total non-DAC fund�ng to WFP, 2005–10

Note:FiguresinUSdollars

11Figuresfor2010areasof11April2010.12WFP,NewPartnershipstoMeetRisingNeeds–ExpandingtheWFPDonorBase(WFP/EB.3/2004/4-C).

700,000,000

600,000,000

500,000,000

400,000,000

300,000,000

200,000,000

100,000,000

0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

m�l

l�on

s

17


F�gure 6: Top ten donors to WFP, 2008


F�gure 7: DAC and non-DAC contr�but�ons to WFP, 2005–10


landmark$500million toWFP.Thiscontributionallowedtheagencytoreachitsappealtargetof$755millioninresponsetotheglobalfuelandfoodpricecrisisandmadeSaudiArabiathesecond-largestdonortoWFPin2008.Itwasthefirsttimeanon-DACdonorwasoneofthetoptenWFPdonorgovernmentsfortheprovisionofinternationalassistance.

In comparing the contributions to DAC donors, non-DACfundersremainonlyasmallportionofthetotal.

The growing number of countries that have become WFPfundersinrecentyearsoftendosoonaone-timeoroccasionalbasis.In2006,97governmentsdonatedtoWFP;in2007,88,

2,500,000,000

2,000,000,000

1,500,000,000

1,000,000,000

500,000,000

0

USA

Saud

iArabia

Euro

pean

Com

mission

Cana

da

Japa

n

UnitedKing

dom

Nethe

rlan

ds

Spain

Aus

tralia

Italy

4,500,000,000

4,000,000,000

3,500,000,000

3,000,000,000

2,500,000,000

2,000,000,000

1,500,000,000

1,000,000,000

500,000,000

0

DACdonorsNon-DACdonors

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

18


butsixbecamedonorsforthefirsttime;in2008,98donated.Funding for food aid could grow substantially if all thesecountriesweretobecomeregular,predictabledonors.13

Non-DACfundersthathaveprovidedin-countryhumanitarianassistance include the governments of South Sudan, India,Kenya and Bangladesh. Their contributions are shown inFigure 8. In 2008, 38 recipient countries contributed almost$140 million to food aid operations in their own countries,2.8 percent of WFP’s total resources. Good local harvestsand the twinning principle have enabled governments tomake in-kind contributions, often for the first time. Forexample,Bangladeshhasbeen a consistent donor toWFP’sdevelopment operations, while Pakistan contributed foodto IDPs and refugees in response to the crisis in 2009. ThetwinningprincipleallowsWFPtocombinecashdonationswithcommodity contributions from developing country donors.In 2008, twinning enabled six governments tomake in-kindcontributions.Atotalof$12.0millionincashleveraged$12.6millionoffoodcommodities,equivalentto75,800mtoffood.Ifthecashhadbeenusedforinternationalorlocalpurchasesinstead of being twinned, the food equivalent would havebeenbetween16,000and33,000mt.14

Figure 8 showsnon-DAC funders that have contributedover$20 million in cash or in-kind resources to WFP between2005and2010.ContributionsfromSaudiArabia,theRussianFederation and South Korea provided most of the funding

to WFP’s international operations. The majority of thesecontributionshavegonetotraditionalregionsofinterestsuchasNorthKoreaandtheoccupiedPalestinianterritories.Morerecently,however,assistancehasdiversifiedtoincludeamuchwiderrangeofcountries,manyoftheminAfrica.

WFP has recently increased its focus on relationships withBrazil, the Russian Federation, India and China—the BRICcountries—that pledged in a joint statement to adopt apackage of mid- and long-term measures to tackle globalfoodinsecurity.TheBRICcountries’contributionstoWFPhavesteadilyincreasedoverthelastfewyears.Indiaisthelargestdonor,supportingoperationsin-countryandinneighbouringAfghanistanandelsewhere.BrazilonlybecameaWFPdonorin2007,buthasrisenquicklyintheranks.15

Evidencesuggeststhatnon-DACdonorsarecarefulaboutthecontexts in which theywill support themultilateral system.In the case of CERF allocations, non-DAC donors are moreinclined to earmark funds than are their DAC counterparts.Thissuggeststhatnon-DACdonorsaremorecautiousintheirengagement with the multilateral humanitarian agencies,and that whilst evidence of a growing rhetoric of supportexists, they do not consistently match it in their financialcontributions.

2.2.6Humanitarianreform:CERFandPooledFundsSince 2000, there have been some major innovations ininstruments used to finance humanitarian assistance, suchas the CERF, established in 2005, and the country-specific

F�gure 8: Top non-DAC funders to WFP programmes, 2005–10

Notes:FiguresinUSdollars.Includescontributionsbygovernmentsintheirowncountries.

13WFP,ResourcingforaChangingEnvironment,WFPInformalConsultation,12January2010.14Ibid. 15Ibid.

600,000,000

500,000,000

400,000,000

300,000,000

200,000,000

100,000,000

0

Saud

iArabia

Russ

ianFe

deration

Suda

n(G

ovtofSou

thSud

an)

India

Keny

a

Ban

glad

esh

Pakistan

Iraq

Repu

blicofK

orea

Brazil

China

19


commonhumanitarian funds (CHF)andemergencyresponsefunds(ERF).

The CERF is a fund open to both the UN system and IOM(International Organization for Migration). The emergencyreliefcoordinator(theheadofUNOCHA),whodecidesontheallocations of funds, manages it. The fund is split into twoelements, one focusing on rapid response and the other onunder-fundedemergencies.Funding for theCERF (whichhasbeenseenas largelysuccessful)has increasedyearonyearwithtotalexpenditurenowinexcessof$1billion.

The CERF aims to ensure that funding flowsmore equitablybetweendifferentcriseswhilethecountry-levelpooledfundsaredesignedtochannelfundingtoprioritieswithinaspecificcrisis.Fundingforbothhasbeenincreasingforthreeyears;in2008,theyreceived$861millionbetweenthem,comparedto$582million in 2006. Somedonors are actually channellingsubstantial shares of their humanitarian aid through thesestructures—over one-fifth of the United Kingdom’s and theNetherlands’ total official humanitarian assistance wasallocatedtothesemechanismsin2005.

Allof those interviewedfor thisstudy felt that theCERFhasgenerallybeenasuccessandhelpedtoensurethatfundsareavailable inamore timelymanner.Someexpressedconcernover the lack of a common approach to addressing foodsecurityneedswithintheCERFappealprocess,withtheresultthatfoodinterventionsareoftenspreadacrossseveralbudgetlines including food aid/assistance, livelihood interventionsandagriculturalinterventions.

The CERF and other new pooled-funding mechanisms haveresultedinreduceddiscrepanciesinfundingfordifferentsectorsofhumanitarianresponse.Coverageofstatedrequirementsinappealshasgoneupinalloperationalsectors;increaseshavebeen largest in chronically under-funded sectors (economicrecovery, shelter) and smallest in the food aid sector, whichwaspreviously thebest funded (Stoddard2008). InDRCandSudan, pooled funds are seen as having filled sectoral gaps(WillitsKingetal. 2007).However, theCERFhasnot led toareductioninthefundingavailableforfoodassistance(asfearedbysomeatitsinception).In2009,WFPreceived$163millionor38percentof thetotal fundingtoagencies insupportofnewemergenciesorunder-fundedoperations(WFP2010b).AstudyofthetransactioncostsofnewfundingmechanismsnotedthattheCERFandCHFentailedconsiderablemanagementcostsandincreased workloads at headquarters and field levels, for allagenciesincludingWFP(Salamons2009).

The CERF contributes significantly towards coordinationand support services, including logistics, emergencytelecommunications and humanitarian air services, forwhich the CERF is often the largest donor. Contributionsare usually small in amount, but because they arrive early,they provide a critical foundation for common services toinitiate deployment. For instance in Pakistan—in a situationdescribedasthelargestandfastestdisplacementofpeopleinthelast15years—a$200,000CERFcontributioninMay2008enabled WFP to make adequate storage facilities availableforhumanitarianagenciestoprovidesupport for twomillioninternally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing conflict in theNorthWestFrontierProvince(WFP2010b).

20


21


This section places the ‘discussions’ about negotiations ona new Food Aid Convention (FAC or Convention) within thecontext of the broader efforts to provide a food securityarchitecture. This addresses both current realities of rising,rather than falling, levels of hunger and anticipated globalproblems of more frequent extreme disasters, increasingmarket volatility and a reversal of the long-term downwardtrendinfoodprices.

3.1 Towards a new food secur�ty arch�tecture

The global spike in food prices, and the subsequent severeglobal financial crisis and economic recession, have given animpetustore-examiningfoodsecurityataninternationallevel.Thesediscussionshavebeensetwithin the frameworkof theComprehensiveFrameworkforAction,theL’AquilaG8andG20meetingsandtheWorldFoodSecuritySummit.Foodsecurityisagainatopicfordiscussionatthe2010G20meetinginCanada.Alongwithglobalfoodsecurity,problemsofchronichungerandfragilityofstateshavebeenofequalconcern.

The food crisis led to an increased focus on improving thelinks between food assistance and food security and tostronger coordination between the Rome-based agencies.There isnowgreaterconceptualcoherenceandstrongerUNcoordinationdrivenby theUNHigh LevelTask Force.WithintheEU,anewworkingpartyonhumanitarianaidandfoodaid(COHAFA)began in2009,andmeetsonceor twiceamonth.Other donors (e.g., the US Presidential Initiative on HungerandFoodSecurity)arealsoconsidering these issuesclosely(USAID2010).

The potential new food security architecture has a numberof components. These include a reformed Committee onFood Security (CFS), a food security cluster as part of thehumanitarian reform process, a shift in WFP programmingcategoriesand,mostimportantly,arenegotiationoftheFoodAidConvention(FAC).

The World Summit on Food Security in November 2009endorsed a reformed Committee on Food Security. ThereconstitutedCFS is tobemore inclusive, involvingmembercountriesandawiderrangeoforganisationsworkingonfoodsecurityandnutrition,includingcivilsocietyinstitutions.TheCFSwill receiveadvice fromahigh-levelpanelofexpertsonfood security and nutrition and aim to provide a platformfor greater policy convergence through the development ofinternationalstrategiesandvoluntaryguidelines(FAO2009a).However,thoseconsultedinthisstudyhavearangeofviewsonthecapabilityoftheCFStobeeffectiveinthisrole

TheUNcluster coordination system forhumanitarian crisesonlyrecently includedafoodsecuritycluster.AstheclusterapproachevolvedinIASC(Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee)deliberationsfromaresponseto‘gapsectors’toapreferredmode of coordination, the absence of a food aid or foodsecurityclusterbecameanissueasfoodaidorfoodsecurityclusters started emerging at country level (Stoddard et al.2007). Recognition of this omission led to agreement inearly 2010 to establish a food security cluster with jointleadership fromFAOandWFP.Donorsbroadlywelcomethisdevelopment seeing it partly as a recognition of what wasalready happening at field level and partly as potentiallyofferingausefulforumforpolicyandstrategydiscussionsatagloballevel.1

WFP is currently engaged in a ‘financial framework review’,whichre-examinesitsprogrammecategories(ProtractedReliefandRecoveryOperationsorPRROs,Emergency,DevelopmentandSpecialOperations)(WFP2010).

DebatescontinuewithintheexecutiveboardforWFPandonthepartof itsmaindonorsaboutwhetherWFPshouldfocusmore narrowly on humanitarian and transition situations orcontinuetoplayasignificantdevelopmentrole.Somedonorsare unconvinced aboutWFP’s role in recovery programmingHarveyetal.(2009)foundthatseveraldonorrepresentativesarguedtheneedforamoretightlydefinedrecoveryrole,withclearer exit strategies which focus more carefully on wherefoodassistanceismostappropriate.

However, the G77 developing countries onWFP’s executiveboardtendtobesupportiveofadevelopmentrole.Thefoodprice crisis and subsequent debates around food securityarchitecturehavecontributedtoshiftingthetermsofdebatearoundWFP’sroleindevelopment,withmoreactorsseeingapotentialroleforWFPinsupportingthedevelopmentofsocialprotectionstrategies,particularlyinfragilestates.

3.2 A future Food A�d or Food Ass�stance Convent�on

ThefutureoftheFoodAidConventionbecamethesubjectofactive‘informaldiscussions’inDecember2009afterahiatusofmore than fiveyears.Theagenda iswidely considered tobe open and the outcome unpredictable. The Convention, afreestanding agreement to provide minimum levels of foodaid, which was first negotiated in 1967 in the era of foodsurplusdisposal,mightbeallowed to lapse.Alternatively, itcouldberadicallyrevisedaspartofeffortstocreateaglobal

Chapter 3Food secur�ty arch�tecture

1WFP,‘ResourcesforaChangingEnvironment’,PolicyIssues:AgendaItem5,February2010.

22


foodsecurityarchitecturewitha role inaddressingdifferentand rapidly changing physical environmental, political andeconomiccircumstances.

This section intends to set out the issues at stake thatare otherwise the subject of informal discussions becauseof perceived political sensitivities. As the decision aboutextending the current FAC is pending, some stakeholdersare reluctant tomakepublic statements.Nevertheless, it ispossible to indicate the range of views on these questionsfrom informal discussions and recent public statements onfoodaid.

AfterbrieflysettingthecontextforthesenegotiationsintermsoftheConventionanditshistory,thissectionfocusesonasetofkeyquestionsregardingitsfuture:

• Is there a continuing need for a Convention within theemergingnewFoodSecurityArchitecture?

• IftheFACistoberenegotiated,shouldthisbeaminimalormore radical revision?What then is impliedby radicalrevision?

• ShoulditbecomeaFoodAssistanceConvention?• Should signatories continue to make quantitative

commitments and, if so, what should count as foodassistance contributions and how should these bemeasured?

• ShouldthemembershipoftheConventiontobeexpandedbyincludingadditional‘donors’?

• How should the Convention be better integrated into areformedfoodsecurityarchitecture?

3.2.1 Background: food aid as a special caseThe international institutional arrangements for regulatingand organising food aid have been inherited from an era inwhichfoodaidwasabout25percentofallODAwithalargeshareof global trade in cereals and fewother commodities.Presently foodaidaccountsforonlyabout3percentofODAanda smallerproportionof global food commodity trade. Itis however, significant for a relatively small number of leastdeveloped countries and in disasters and for humanitarianrelief(ClayandStokke2000,FAO2005).

Foodaidwasoverwhelmingsupplieduntil themid-1990sasdirect transfers from the donor country, that is in-kind tiedcommodity aid (Table 1). From the outset, not only donorsbutalsootherexporters(e.g.,ArgentinaforcerealsandNewZealandfordiaryproducts)recognisedthiscommodityaidasapotentialsourceoftrade-distortingcompetition.

The Convention was then negotiated as a stand-aloneinternational agreement in 1967 and lodged with theInternational Grains Council (IGC) that acts as secretariat.SignatoriesarelegallycommittedtoprovideminimumamountsoffoodaidtoODA-eligiblecountries.HistoricallytheprincipleobjectoftheConventionwastoprovideasafetynettoprotect

recipientcountriesagainstpotentialdownwardfluctuationsinannualshipmentsoffoodaid.Second,itwasaburden-sharingagreementamongstDACdonors (plusArgentina),effectivelya donor club. The Convention was probably accorded mostimportance when, in 1980, joint minimum contributions ofthen 7.6 wheat equivalent mt were explicitly linked to aninternationaltargetof10mtoffoodaid.

The supervisory Food Aid Committee reviews matterspertaining to the Convention and is recognised amongstsignatoriesasaforumforconsultationaboutthreatstoglobalfood security.2 As a stand-alone agreement the Conventionhas not been explicitly integrated into other internationalarrangements for global food security. There is however anexplicitlinktotheWTOagreementonagriculturaltrade.

Ontheinsistenceofthemajorprovider,theUSA,foodaidhasbeenexemptfromthevariousvoluntary‘soft’lawinternationalagreements under the OECD to minimise trade-distortingexportcompetitionamongstdonorsandtopromoteuntying.Instead, food aid has been the subject of a separate set ofstand-alone agreements and, unlike otherODA, is a subjectunder the ‘hard’ WTO treaty based rules and disciplinesconcerningagriculturaltrade.

In 2004, the 1999 Convention was extended and possiblerenegotiationdeferredpendingtheoutcomeofthenegotiationson food aid as part of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)within theWTO Doha Development Round (DDR). Then theDDR stalled in 2008. Whether or not the DDR successfullyrestarts,one issue toaddress inFAC iswhetherandhow totake intoaccount thesectionsof thedraftAoA thatconcernfood aid and set the trade law context for the Convention.3

This linkage between the AoA and the Conventiontakes usdirectly to the characteristics that distinguish food aid fromotherformsofofficialdevelopmentassistance.

3.3.2 The basics of the Food Aid Convention As originally negotiated, the Convention had a narrow butexplicitfocusonassuringminimumlevelsofcerealsfoodaid.Subsequent renegotiationshavemodified these levels inanadaptation to a changing reality, although they can also beseenasadilutionoftheConvention’spurpose.

Thepresent1999Conventionaimstocontributetoworldfoodsecurityandimprovetheabilityoftheinternationalcommunitytorespondtoemergencyfoodsituationsandotherfoodneedsofdevelopingcountriesthroughmakingappropriatelevelsoffoodaidavailable,inawaythatisconsistentwithagriculturaldevelopment in recipient countries within a framework forcooperation, coordination and information-sharing amongstmembers(IGC1999).

2SignatoriesmeettwiceayearatanofficiallevelattheIGCinLondon.3WTO,RevisedDraftModalitiesforAgriculture,(CommitteeonAgricultureSpecialSession2008)TN/AG/4/Rev/8February2008.SeeespeciallyAnnexL:InternationalFoodAid.

23


To this end, both commodity-based commitments and valueorcashcommitments(includingtransportcosts)wereallowedfor the first time.Theeligibleproduct listwasalsoextendedto cover virtually the entire range of commodities andprocessed foods likely to be provided as humanitarian reliefor in nutritional programmes. Seeds of eligible products areallowed.TheseallowancesmarkedasignificantchangeintheConvention: It allowsparallelbutdifferent commitmentsandweakensthelinkstocerealsaidandgrainmarkets.The1999Conventionalsorecognised,butfailedtoreaffirm,theminimumcontributionsaspartofawidercommitmenttotheminimumof10milliontonnesofcerealsaidfirstmadein1980.

Overall levels of commitments have been progressivelyreduced to accommodate wishes of some signatories(including Australia, Canada and the USA). The minimumcontributionsunder the1999Conventionareshown inTable6. The commitments are by DAC member countries plusArgentina.4As this isa trade-relatedagreement, theEUhasalways acted as a single signatory, making in effect a jointcommitmentonbehalfofitsnow27members.

TheEuropeanUnionhasbeenthesecondlargestcontributortoeveryConvention.InitiallyDG(DirectorateGeneral)Agricultureled on behalf of the EU. That responsibility passed to DG

Development and is presently with ECHO (DGHumanitarianAssistance). The EU Council agreed on an explicit divisionof responsibility for the EU’s tonnage commitment betweenCommunity Action organised by the European Commissionunder EU budget lines for food aid and National Actions ofmember states.5 However, in a retreat from transparency,the EU discontinued under the 1999 Convention the longestablished(30years)practiceofmakinganexplicitdivisionofresponsibilitybetweentheCommissionandmembersstates.Instead,theCommissionregardsthisdivisionofresponsibilityforeligiblefoodaidoperationsasan‘internalmatter’.

Signatories report annually and retrospectively on theireligiblefoodaidtransactionsinfulfilmentoftheirobligations.However,theEUhasalwaysreportedcollectively,andsotheassociationbetween the foodaidofmemberstatesand theConventioncanonlybeinferred.

3.2.3 The WTO dimensionFoodaidwasspecificallyexemptedfromdisciplinesunderthe1994 rules and the Convention was recognised as having apossible role in supporting the adjustment of food-importingdevelopingcountriestotheWTOrules(Konandreasetal.2000).

m�n�mum FAC FAIs FAC FAIs FAC FAIs FAC FAIs Contr�but�on 2005 2005–6 2006 2006–7 2007 2007–8 2008 2008–9 WE mT 000 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Australia GE 61 63 51 37

250 WE 72 46 87 66

Canada GE 65 41 51 62

420 WE 107 113 124 131

EU* GE 83 90 79 62

1908* WE 150 130 114 119

Japan GE 137 80 81 124

300 WE 118 106 143 185

Norway GE 308 308 271 163

30 WE 653 598 343 298

Switzerland GE 122 110 81 70

40 WE 154 178 175 149

USA GE 142 142 105 129

2500 WE 193 155 145 170

Total GE 112 119 88 95

5448 WE 164 138 131 146

Table 6: FAC 1999 s�gnator�es: total food a�d as percent of m�n�mum contr�but�on �n Wheat and Gra�n Equ�valent

Notes:Totalfoodaidaspercentofminimumcontributioninwheatandgrainequivalent.GE=grainequivalent;WE=wheatequivalent.GreyBox=GElessthan100percent.BlackBox=WElessthan100percent.*TheequivalencesbetweencashandcommoditiesintheEUcontributionareheregivenasWE.Source:BasedontotalfoodaidflowsasreportedbyWFPFAIS(calendaryear)andIGC(splityearJuly–June)

4 Argentina’s involvement reflects the agricultural trade origins of theConvention. Although a signatory from the outset, Argentina has, inpractice,apparentlyhardlyevermetevenpartofitsobligationtocontribute20,000tonnesayearoffoodaid.

5 As states joined the EU, they either brought with them their previousConventionobligations(e.g.Austria,Denmark,Finland,SpainandSweden)ortookonashareofthejointcommitment(Greece,IrelandandPortugal).The UK, a signatory to the 1967 Convention, withdrew from the 1971Convention,butrejoinedonaccedingtotheEUin1974.Thisactioncouldbe a relevant precedent for current negotiations allowing a signatory towithdrawwithoutprejudicingtheformalcontinuationoftheConvention.

24


TheConventionhasalsobeenrecognisedashavingaroleinthesupervisionoffoodaid.6IntheDohaDevelopmentRound,foodaidbecamea focusof intensenegotiation,asreflected inthesequenceofdraftAgreementsonAgriculture,7andthereasonforputtingrenegotiationoftheConventiononhold.

ThedraftAoAisonlyconcernedwithinternationalfoodaid.Itseescash-based(i.e.,fullyuntied)foodaidasconformingwiththerulesonagriculturalexportcompetition,whilstsettingouta rule-based framework for in-kind (i.e., tied) food aid thatapproximatesWFP’scategoryofdirecttransfers(WTO2008).8A ‘safebox’ isenvisaged foremergency (humanitarian) foodaidthatincludestworequirements:(1)adeclarationorappealbytheUNsecretarygeneral,governmentalorregionalagency,aRedCrossagencyoranNGOworkingwithoneoftheformerand(2)anassessmentcoordinatedbyaninternationalagencyor the Red Cross. Further disciplines on non-emergencyin-kind food aid are envisaged, including a requirementthat an assessment is to be undertaken by a UN agency ordonor and NGO working with government. Monetisationfacesadditionalrestrictions.AnissuefortheFACtoclarifyiswhethertransactionsacceptedasfulfillingfutureobligationsshould conformwith these draft disciplines. The draft rulesare likely to be similar towhatwill be agreed if theDDR issuccessfullycompleted.

ThedraftAoAalsoprovidesforaderogationofrulesonexportcompetitiontoallowanexporter-donorresponseinexceptionalglobal crisis conditions. The Marrakesh Accord makes anexplicitlinktotheFoodAidConventionandfoodaidasawaytolimitthecostsofadjustmenttotradereformfornetfood-import dependent countries, a provision which, so far, hasnotbeenactivated(e.g.,Konandreasetal.2000,Konandreas2005). Should a new Food Assistance Convention addresssuch trade issues or restrict itself, as some stakeholderssuggest,toemergencyandhumanitarianconcernsaspartofawiderglobalfoodsecurityarchitecture?9

3.2.4 A new Food Aid Convention?Signatories,inconsultationwithotherkeystakeholders,haveembarked on informal discussions about a new convention.Theworkinggroupisorganisingthesediscussionstobewideranging,addressingasetofissuesonwhichsignatorieshavealreadyofferedinformallytheirpreliminaryviews:

• rationaleandgoverningprinciplesofanewConvention• overallobjectivesandscopeofaConvention• roleandtypesofcommitmentsandreporting• roleofcommittee

The issueofreformingtheConvention(orthe institutionsforgoverningandorganisingfoodaidmoregenerally)repeatedlysurfaces,becauseitoriginatesinandreflectstoaconsiderabledegree a previous era. In reviewing options when the 1999Convention was being negotiated, Clay and Stokke (2000)suggested three types of possible changes to the FAC: (1)declaratorychangesintermsofobjectives,targetsandlabelling;(2)adaptationtoshort-terminfluencesand(3)reconfigurationof the architecture of international institutions as part of alonger term strategy. All three forms of response are visibleamongsttheproposalsforarenegotiatedConvention.

What is the rationale? Is there a continuing need for aConventionwithintheemergingnewfoodsecurityarchitecture?SomestakeholdersfeelthattheConventionhasceasedtohaverelevance to theirprogrammesor to thewider foodsecurityor humanitarian concerns of the international community.Recently Norway ceased to attend the committee. In someEuropean aid agencies, it is difficult to find anyone who isinformed about the Convention or who has responsibilityfor fulfilling their share of the EU’s contribution. Some, incontrast,seetheConventionasawayofensuringaminimumpredictableflowoffoodtotheworld’shungryirrespectiveofmarketconditionsandsosee littleneed formodification. Inthe context of discussions on the right to food, others seetheConventionashavingasymbolicsignificanceastheonlylegally binding treaty committing donors to provide fundingfor foodaidorany formofhumanitarianassistancewithoutprejudgingthespecificsofthatcommitment.

If theFAC is tobe renegotiated,should thisbeaminimalormoreradicalrevision?TheConventioncouldsimplybeallowedtolapsebutthatisunlikelybecauseofthenegativesymbolicmessage thiswould convey. Instead the choicewould seemtobebetweenfurthermodestadaptation,ashasoccurredinprevious renegotiations, or a radical revision as part of thereconstructionofglobalfoodsecurityarchitecture.

3.2.5 The minimalist optionThe Convention could be modified in several obvious wayswithout radically changing either objectives or scope.First, there is relabeling: As food assistance replaces foodaid in official discourse, renaming the Convention wouldrecognise the already wide range of eligible contributions.Second, further adjustments could be made to the list ofeligiblecommoditiesandthesizeofsignatorycommitments.Third, apart from the EU, other signatories could opt for acombinationofphysicalandcashcontributions.Fourth,newsignatorieswhowerewillingtomakeaminimumcontributioncould be admitted or othersmightwithdraw, as the UK didfromthe1971Convention.

6ForexamplewhenNewZealandraisedtheissueofUSdairyaidasunfairexportcompetitionintheCommitteeonAgriculture,thiswasdeflectedasarisingundertheCSDortheFoodAidConvention.7 See for example Clay and Riley (2005), Clay (2006) documenting theevolvingproposalsonfoodaidintheDDRAoA.8 An area of ambiguity is ‘partially tied aid’ where, for example, the EUallowsprocurement inthesingleEuropeanmarketor inaspecified listofdevelopingcountries.Asubstantialpartoflocalandtriangulartransactionsisfundedwithsuchpartiallyuntiedfunding.9TheWTOCommitteeonAgriculturepresentlyhasnospecificcapacitytoassess the legitimacy of food aid transactions. If cases are raised aboutamember’sactions,should thesebe referred to theFoodAidConventionsecretariat or to some other part of a reconstructed global food securityarchitecture, or should theWTOacquire the capacity to handle internallysuchtrade-relatedissues?

25


Somestakeholders,notablytheEU,lackinterestinmodifyingminor aspects of the agreement and desire to continuewith an agreement broadly similar to the 1999 Convention,that basically commits signatories to provide or fund theacquisition of food and its delivery. In comparison, the ECandsomeothers informally indicateawishtomovetowardsa Food Assistance Convention that is integrated into thewider foodsecurityarchitecture, thatmakesademonstrablecontributiontofoodsecurityincrisesandthatismorebroadlybased(includestherangeoffoodassistanceinstruments).10

IndicationsarethattheUSDAandUSAIDareconcernedthatthestrengthofthelegallybindingagreementwillbesacrificedif it moves away from being primarily food focused withquantitative commitments.US-basedNGOs involved in foodassistancehavetakenasimilarview.

JapanhasapparentlylittleproblemwiththeexistingConventionwhich recognises as eligible both its funding for developingcountry acquisition and donations-in-kind from its domesticstocks.11

Others,includingWFPstaffandtheTAFADgroupofNGOs,12areconcernedabouttherisksinvolvedinabandoningquantitativecommitments. They consider the FAC obligations of somedonors as providing a budgetary assuranceof resources forfood-relatedassistancetypicallychannelledthroughWFPandNGOs.Thisindirectbudgetaryassurancecouldbelostwithoutquantitativeobligations.

Many stakeholders and analysts (e.g., Barrett and Maxwell2005) argue that circumstances have changed to such anextent that piecemeal changesof the kind suggestedabovewillnotenoughtoreversetheprogressivemarginalisationoftheConvention.

3.2.6 A more radical reconstruction: options for changeStakeholders need to be clear about the overall objectiveof a new Convention. Does it, as at present, primarilyprovide a safety net of support for food assistance—anassurance against volatility in commodity markets and theglobal economy or the vagaries of donor policy? Is thesafety net to cover all food assistanceor primarily focus onhumanitarian needs? Alternatively, should there be a moreambitious arrangement for addressing changing needs forfoodassistanceorhumanitarianassistancemorebroadly?

The argument for the former (asmade byWFP,TAFAD, etc.)is that minimum requirements for emergency and recoveryassistance and longer-term support for the displaced andrefugeescontinue.HighprofileeventssuchasIraq(2003),the2004TsunamiorHaiti(2010)willbeaddressedandcancrowdoutotheroperations.

Minimum contributions and monitoring signatory perfor-mance.The issue of quantitative commitments seems to bethenubof thedebate about the relevanceof a Convention.Current obligations are made in terms of metric tonnagein wheat equivalents (WEMT) based on annually agreedconversionratios.Thiswayofmeasuringcommitments—inanerawithanincreasinglywidesetofin-kindcommoditiesandcashfundingoffood-basedtransfers—appearsanachronisticand finds littlesupport. It isnowdifficult to relatesignatorycommitment transactions towhat is happening in theworldof food aid. This is reflected most obviously comparingtransactionswithdeliveriesreportedinWFPFAIS(Table5).

ThelackofcorrespondencebetweenoperationsreportedtotheInternational Grains Council (IGC) and deliveries is illustratedinTable5.First,reportedFACcontributionsarecomparedwithobligations under the 1999 Convention in wheat equivalents(WE), showing that almost all donors met their obligationsthroughtherecentfoodpricespike.Theyperformedfarbetterduring 2006–8 than during the previous spike in 1995–6. Incontrast,whenthesequantitativeobligationsareexpressedingrainequivalents(GE),acrudebutbetterproxyofrealamountsoffooddistributed(onetonneofwheatisequivalentinenergyterms to one tonne of rice, maize, etc.), then the indices ofactualfoodaidflowsconfirmthatthefoodaidofsignatorieshasbeenstronglypro-cyclical.AsFigure1showsinactualtonnagesorTable 3 in grain equivalents, therewas a farmore seriouscontractionin2006–7thaninthemid1990s.13Thiscomparisonhighlights the unsatisfactory nature of theway commitmentsaredefined.Afulleranalysisisrequired,buttherelativelymoreseriouscontractioninthefoodaidofFACsignatoriesduringthe2006–8foodpricespikethaninthe1995–7spikeismaskedbythebroadenedrangeofeligiblecommodities.

The performance of EU and its member states is especiallyopaque,astheEUreportsonaconsolidatedbasisandnolongerindicates, as under previous Conventions (1995 and before),howresponsibilityforobligationsbetweentheCommissionandmemberstatesisshared.Asawiderrangeofinstrumentscomeintouse,butwithoutsystematicandintegratedquantification,thepictureregardingfoodassistanceprovidedbysignatoriesortheDACdonorgroupisincreasingunclear.

Few independent investigations have cast doubt on theeffectivenessof theConvention commitments inprovidinga

10 The European Commission in its operational strategy for 2010 states:‘The Commission will also coordinate negotiations for the reform of theFoodAidConvention(thatisonbehalfoftheEU).Themainchallengeistoturnthisinternationaltreatyintoamodernandmeaningfulconventionthathas a stronger humanitarian focus and supports an appropriate rangeoffoodassistanceresponses.’11 In 2008 Japan was the largest provider of government-to-governmentprogrammefoodaid,mostlyintheformofrice.12TAFAD(TransatlanticFoodAidDialogue)isagroupofUSandEuropeanNGOs with the explicit aim of influencing food aid policy, in particularthe Food Aid Convention. It was established in early 2005, when theNGOsparticipatingincludedCanadianFoodgrainsBank,OxfamGB,OxfamCanada,ACF-France,SC-UK,SC-US,WVICanada,CARE-USandCRS.

13 The actual levels of food aid were lower in 2006–8 than during theprevious price spike in 1995–7, but as reported to the FAC Conventionsignatories performed worse in 1995–7 under the 1995 Convention. Theapparent better performance in 2006–8 is apparently a consequence ofbroadeningtherangeofeligiblecommoditiesinthe1999Convention.

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robustfloororsafetynetunderpinninginternationalfoodaid(e.g., Benson 2000, Hasenclever et al. 1998, Hoddinott andCohen 2007). Consequently, some stakeholders insist thatthecredibilityofanewConventionmustdependonvigorousmonitoringofatransparentsetofcommitments.

Many stakeholdersnowappear tobe focusingon the issueofwhatmightreplacetheobligationsmadeinthediscreditedwheatequivalents:

• First,shouldcommitmentsbeinphysicalorfinancialterms?• Second,howcancommitmentsbemeasuredinawaythat

isunderstandableandtransparent?• Third,howcanthenegative,pro-cyclicaleffectsoffluctuating

commoditypriceandtransportcostbeaddressed?• Fourth,whatshouldbeincludedinthelistofeligibleforms

offoodassistance?

Thereiswidespreaddissatisfactionwiththewheatequivalentformula.Howeverreplacingitwithanythingmoresatisfactoryandtransparentisachallenge.Contributionsexpressedentirelyinfinancialtermsarevulnerabletopricemovementsandmustberevisedatleastannually(andonanemergencybasisintheeventofanunanticipatedmajorfoodsecuritycrisis).Thereisacaseforexpressingcontributionsinnutritionaltermsortheintendednumberofbeneficiaries,butwhensuchformulaeareexplored, theseprove tobe complex,opaqueanddifficult toadminister(HoddinottandCohen2007).

Ineffect,parallelin-kindandcashcontributionsalreadyexist.These can be expressed in simple grain equivalent terms,sincewheathas lost its dominantplacewithin foodaid.Asthe 1999 Convention illustrates, a cash contribution can beexpressedincommodityequivalentterms.Thecomplexitiesofnon-cereal,blendedandnutritionalproductaidarenoteasilyreflectedexceptintermsoffinancialcosts.Thecostofotherformsof foodassistance (e.g., cash-based transfers) isalsoeasilyexpressedinfinancialterms.IfanewFoodAssistanceConventionweretoincludequantitativecommitments,thenapossiblesolutionwouldbetotakeitastepfurtherandallowacombinationofphysicalandcash-basedcontributions.

3.2.7 Convention membership and the CommitteeRegarding the committee for administering the Convention,its membership and actual functions, a near consensuspresently exists that objectives are not realised and it isnot fit for purpose. A common criticism of the Conventionencounteredinthisstudyisthat,asastand-aloneagreementwithanarrowmembership,itlacksintegrationwiththewiderfoodsecurityarchitecture.Thecommitteeisnotevenabroaddonorclub,asthepresentgroupofsignatoriesincludesonlythose fundingabout80percentof foodaid (as reportedbyWFPfor2008).Thereistheissueofthepossibleroleofotherstakeholders, taking into account, for example, the ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness to which signatories havecommittedthemselves.

There are two broadly divergent views about membership.Someseeacontinuingusefulroleforacommitteeofdonorsorfunders,suggestingthattheConventioncouldsimplyexpand,ifothers(forexampleG20countriesthatareprovidingfundinginsupportoffoodassistance)wishedtobecomesignatories.Somesuggestthatasacommitteeoffundingoraiddonors,itwouldbemoreappropriateforEUDACmemberstoparticipateindividually rather than collectively as participation of theEU as a single signatory reflects the trade-related originsof the Convention. This arrangement would cease to beappropriate as cash replaces in-kind contributions, makingfood assistance more like other ODA, and it is a source ofnon-transparency.ThischangewouldturntheCommitteeintoa‘DACplus’body.Thus,theConventioncouldresolvetheaidarchitectureproblembyoperatingunderanotherOECD-typevoluntaryagreement.Trade-related issueswould remain theresponsibilityoftheWTOCoA.

Others oppose such a narrow membership and argue thatrepresentationshouldexpandtoincludeaid-recipientcountries,international agencies and civil society organisations. Thelegitimacyandusefulnessofapurelydonorgroupingiscalledinquestion.Indevelopedversionofthisview,theCommitteewould,ineffect,becomeasub-committeeofanenhancedCFSwithin thewider foodsecurityarchitecture (e.g.,BarrettandMaxwell2006).14

Thereis,incontrast,nearconsensusonthelackofandneedforeffectivemonitoring.Someseeremedyingthis,andtheneedtoacceptsomeformofpeergroupreviewamongstsignatories,asamatterofpoliticalwill.

Toconclude, first, currently there isawide rangeofviewsoniforhowtheConventioncanbestrengthened.Inundertakingthis review, it has been interesting to compare the informalresponses of stakeholders and their public statements withthose made at the time of the 1999 renegotiation (Clay andStokke2000).Itisapparentthatlimitedinterestexistsinpurelycosmeticrelabeling.Concernandintentamongststakeholders(includingbothgovernmentsandcivilsociety)hasshiftedfromadaptation towards a radical reconfiguring of institutionalarrangements.However,whatappearsmissing isan informedbasisfornegotiationifthisistogobeyondadaptation.

Second,thereisalackofrobustevidenceontheeffectivenessoftheConvention.Therearetheobviousdifficultiesoffindinganimprovedbasisfordeterminingcontributionsinawaythatlinkscommitmentstoneeds.TheIGChasneverbeenprovidedwith the in-house capacity for either monitoring or foodaid policy analysis. This implies the need, first, for externalassistance and addressing these issues in the course ofnegotiationsand,second, forensuringthat thereconfiguredfoodsecurityarchitectureprovidesacapacity formonitoringandanalysis.

14TheanalogyhereiswiththeSub-CommitteeonSurplusDisposal,whichisundertheFAOCommitteeonCommodityProblems.

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An increasing number of donors and aid agencies are usingthe term food assistance as an alternative to food aid andincludingawiderarrayofinterventionswithintheumbrellaoffoodassistance.However,therecontinuestobeawidearrayof terms and definitions in use and a degree of confusionaroundtheparametersofdifferentterms.

Thewaysinwhichofficialdiscourseaboutfoodaidisevolvingprovidesan important insight intopolicychangeorchangesthatsomeareseekingtoachieve.1Thisdiscourseisreflectedin official documentation such as the Food Aid Convention,WFP reports on food aid flows and publications by policyanalysts and those involved in policy advocacy both insideandoutsideofagencies.

The FAC definition of food aid is based on three corecharacteristicsoffoodaid:(i)internationalsourceoffunding,(ii) concessionality and (iii) food commodities.2 WFP alsoincludes transactions of non-DAC funders as reported byits field staff, country partners and agencies to INTERFAIS.INTERFAIShasalwaysincludedNGOsandhasrecentlybegunto include ‘private’ funders in total food aid flows, so thatthere is no exact equivalencewithODA in the formof foodaidasreportedbytheOECD.Theinclusionofprivatefundersispresumablytolegitimiseitsownengagementwithprivatesectorpartners.

The1999FoodAidConvention(seeSection3.2)allowed‘seeds’as an eligible transaction, going beyond the conventionalcategorisation of food aid as commodities and processedfoodstuffs intended for human consumption.That definitionexcludes animal feedstuffs. This example of definitionalexpansion raises the possibility, as some have recognised,of regarding the emergencydistributionof ‘starter packs’ ofseedsandfertilisersas‘foodassistance’.

In the Doha Development Round negotiations from 2000onwards ‘international foodaid’ isunderconsiderationwhichraiseissuesofexportcompetition:(traded)shipmentsoffoodin-kind from the donor country or that are cash funded andacquiredbysomeformofinternationalcompetitiveprocurement.So non-traded cash-funded transactions within the recipientcountry are excluded from consideration (see Section 3.2).

Thisdistinctionunderpinstheseparatecategorisationof localpurchasesfromotherformsoffoodaid.

WorldBankanalysts,forexample, introducedtheconceptoffood-basedtransfersortransactionstodescribeinterventionssuch as food forwork or school feeding, irrespective of thesourceoffunding(BarrettandMaxwell2005,OECD2006).ThisdistinctionisperhapshelpfulinitscontextbecausetheWorldBank,whichdoesnotreportanyofitsoperationsasfoodaid,funded some of these safety net interventions involvingfood transfers. The use of IDA (International DevelopmentAssociation) credits by some disaster-affected governmentstofundfoodimportshavealsonotbeenreportedasfoodaid(ClayandStokke2000).

More recently, the concept of food assistance, includingboth food-based transfers as well as voucher and coupon

Chapter 4Def�n�ng food ass�stance

Box 1: What �s food ass�stance? some recent

def�n�t�ons

Food assistance refers to the set of instruments used toaddressthefoodneedsofvulnerablepeople.Theinstrumentsgenerallyincludein-kindfoodaid,vouchersandcashtransfers(WFP2009e).

Humanitarian food assistance aimstoensuretheconsumptionof sufficient safe and nutritious food in anticipation of,during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis,when food consumption would otherwise be insufficientor inadequate to avert excess mortality, emergency ratesof acute malnutrition or detrimental coping mechanisms.Thisincludesensuringfoodavailability,accesstonutritiousfood, proper nutrition awareness and appropriate feedingpractices.Foodassistancemayinvolvethedirectprovisionof food, but may utilise a wider range of tools, includingthe transfer or provision of relevant services, inputsor commodities, cash or vouchers, skills or knowledge(EuropeanCommission2010).

Food assistanceisdirecttransferstoindividualsorhouseholdsfor thepurposeof increasing thequalityand/orquantityoffoodconsumption(CanadianFoodGrainsBank).

Food assistance is all actions that national governments,oftenincollaborationwithnon-governmentalorganisationsand members of civil society, and with external aid whennecessary,undertake to improve thenutritionalwell-beingof their citizens,who otherwisewould not have access toadequatefoodforahealthyandactivelife(FAO1996).

1 SeeWood (1985) andMoncrieffe and Eyben (2007) on the importanceof explicitly analysing ‘labelling’ in official policy discourse. Clay (1991)andClayandStokke (2000)discusses ‘greyareas’of foodaidwithin thisconceptualframework.2TheWFPdefinitionof foodaidclosely followsFACdefinitions (IGC1999)andthoseoftheOECDonconcessionalityofofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA).Thesearereflectedinwhattransactionsareincludedinthe(INTER)FAISdatabaseandasreportedinfoodaidflowsandtheannualreport.

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schemes, has becomemorewidely adopted. Some proposethat a Food Assistance Convention should replace the FoodAid Convention. The growing acceptance of food assistanceas a concept, as illustrated in Box 1, points to the needfor clarification within this complex area of over-lappingdefinitions and constructs. Are concessional official exportcreditsaformoffoodassistance?Shouldinterventionssuchas starter packs (or only the seeds) intended to increasefood production by households for their own consumptionto be considered as food assistance?What is the boundarybetweenafinancialtransferthatisaformofsocialprotectionfor households that are spending a very high proportion ofdisposable income on food and a voucher nominally linkedto buying food? The recent evolution of the discourse onfood aid and food transfers raises many important policyissues relevant for example to the discussions on a futureFoodAssistance Convention or the remit ofWFP EmergencyOperations (EMOPs and Protracted Relief and Recoveryoperations(PRROs).

Germany is currently working on a definition of foodassistance.WithinCOHAFA,Germanyalsoparticipatedactivelyin discussions on formulating a joint EU food assistancedefinition. The food assistance definition in themakingwillrelatetodefinitionsofsocialsafetynetsandsocialprotectionandlooktofeaturenutritionissuesmoreprominently.IntheUS, the terms foodaidand foodassistancetendtobeusedinterchangeably.

WFP,initsnewstrategicplan,talksaboutshiftingfrombeinga foodaid to a foodassistanceagency. ECHO (2009b) talksaboutagradualandimportantshiftoverthelast15yearsfromtheuseofin-kindcommodityfoodaidasadefaultresponsetoemergencyneedstowardsconsiderationofabroaderandmore effective set of humanitarian food assistance tools.The reason for the shift is to allow agencies to include theprovisionofcashforfood-relatedpurposeswithindefinitionsoffoodassistance.

Whencashshouldorshouldnotbecountedasfoodassistance,however,remainsunclear.SavetheChildren(2006)explicitlyexcludescashfromitsdefinitionoffoodaid.‘Giventheinherentfungibilityofcashitself,theprovisionofcashtorecipientsisnot classified as food aid, even if the recipients choose tousesomeorallofthatcashtopurchasefood’.Otherstrytodefine cashgrants as foodassistance if theyhave explicitlyfood-or nutrition-relatedobjectivesor if themajorityof thecashprovided isused topurchase food.Whenandwhethercashcountsasfoodassistance,however,remainsagreyarea.Thisistrue,forinstance,ofsafetynetprogrammessuchasthePSNP (Productive Safety Net Programme) in Ethiopia or theHungerSafetyNetProgrammeinKenya.Theseweredesignedasalternativestorecurrentprovisionsofemergencyfoodaidwiththehopethatmore-predictablesafetynetswouldprovideabetterwayofdealingwith chronichunger. Even less clear

iswhetherdonor-supportedsafetynetswithoutexplicitfoodsecurityobjectives—suchaspensionsorchildbenefits—butin contexts where people spent most of the cash on food,shouldcountasfoodassistance.

Anotherareaofambiguityiswhetherinterventionstoprovideagricultural inputs, such as seed or fertiliser distributionsdesignedtoincreaseaccesstofoodbyboostingproduction,fall with definitions of food assistance. They would, forinstance, seem to fall within ECHO’s definition. Wouldsuch interventions be considered as food assistance in anemergencycontext,butnotaspartofsupportforlonger-termagriculturaldevelopment?Suchadistinctionraisestheissueofwhodetermineswhatanemergency is,an issue thathasbeenasubjectofmuchdiscussionintheDohaDevelopmentRound(seeSection3).Afinalareaofuncertaintyiswhetherfoodassistancehastoimplyinternationalaid.Thisusedtobeoneofthekeydimensionsofmanyfoodaiddefinitionsbutisnotpartofmanycurrent foodassistancedefinitions(BarrettandMaxwell 2005). This means that domestic programmesofsupportsuchasfoodsubsidiescouldpotentiallycountasfoodassistance.

ECHO’s broad definition of humanitarian food assistanceencompasses a wide range of interventions including foodaid,cash,provisionofagriculturalinputs,provisionoffodder,de-stocking, re-stocking, veterinary services, and supportto livelihoods and markets (European Commission 2010).HavingbeenpublishedinanEUcommunication,EUmemberstatesmayadoptthisdefinition.Anissueraisedbyacceptingsuchabroaddefinitionisthatfoodassistancebecomeshardto distinguish from food security and the extensive rangeof possible interventions used to promote food security.On the other hand, narrowing the definition risks a degreeof arbitrary exclusion. One way of developing a narrowerdefinition is the route that the Canadian Food Grains Bankhas takenwith its focusondirect transfers for thepurposeof food consumption. ‘Measures that directly support theconsumption of food’ is a definition suggested by some ofthoseinterviewedforthestudy.

Agreementonadefinitionisneedednotleasttoclarifywhatforms of aid transaction should or should not be includedin any renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention. It wouldseemtobeofkeyimportanceindeterminingtheoperationalmandate for WFP and the division of labour between WFPand FAO. It alsomatters for donor governmentswhere foodaid or food assistance is a separate budget line. For donorgovernments without a distinct food aid budget line thedebateoverdefinitionsisperhapslessimportant.

Partofthecurrentconfusingdefinitionalpictureseemstobeaconflationofobjectives,instrumentsandfinancingmechanismsinmuchof thediscussion. It ishelpful toseparate theseout.Foodaidor foodassistance isnot in itselfanobjectivebut is

29


provided for under a range of objectives such as alleviatingfoodinsecurity,supportinglivelihoodsorsavinglivesincrises.A range of actors (UN, non-governmental, governments) canprovide food assistance and international aid or nationalgovernments can finance it. Food aid as a form of ODA is aspecific instrument for achieving many possible objectivesincluding, forexample,budgetarysupport.Foodassistance isan umbrella term for a range of instruments, including foodaid,cashandvouchers.However,itsometimesincludesothers,dependingonthedefinitionused,toachieveobjectivesrelatingtonutritionandfoodsecurity.Someactorsincreasinglysimply

talkaboutfoodsecurity,withfoodaidorfoodassistanceasoneofthepotentialinstrumentsfortacklingfoodinsecurity.

Tosummarise,therehasneverbeenasingleagreeddefinitionof food aid, but specific definitions have been adopted indifferentdomains.Clearly,attemptstodefineandworkwithinadefinitionoffoodassistance,thatisbroaderthanfoodaid,raisesmanyconceptualandpractical issues.Someof theseareexplored further inSection7 in termsofwhatmightbeincludedinafoodassistancetoolbox.Thereisanurgentneedforclarityinwhatisbecomingadefinitionalmorass.

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Debate continues over whether food assistance is primarilya humanitarian instrument or whether it should be used inemergency as well as transition and development contexts.Some donors, including the European Commission, seefood assistance as primarily a humanitarian instrument andquestion its appropriateness in development contexts. TheUS, themajordonor,andWFP,ontheotherhand,continuesto argue that food assistance can be appropriate in bothdevelopmentandhumanitariancontexts.

The ongoing confusion over terminology does not helpto bring clarity to debates about how better to link reliefand development or the role of food assistance within thatspectrum of activities. Some donor governments arguethat food assistance is not an appropriate developmentinstrument. They support expanding social protection andproviding safety nets, in which food assistance (especiallyif defined to include cash assistance) plays a part. Partof the problem seems to be a confusion between foodassistanceinstrumentsanddifferinghumanitarian,transitionand development objectives. Food assistance instruments,including cash and food, are clearly potentially appropriatein both development and humanitarian contexts and themanyplaceswherehumanitariananddevelopmentneedsareoverlapping.Food,whetherprovidedaspartofsocialassistancemeasures or long-term nutrition programmes, often formspartofdevelopmentassistance.Ratherthanlabellingfoodashumanitarian and other instruments as developmental, it ismorehelpfultothinkabouthowthemodalitiesandobjectivesofdifferentfoodsecurityinstrumentsmayshiftastransitionsfromhumanitariantodevelopmentapproachestakeplace.

The potential of longer-term approaches to provide socialprotectionandassistanceasanalternativeorcomplementtoreliefhasgainedcurrency,particularlyinplaceswherechronicvulnerabilityhasseenlongrunningreliefprogrammes(Harveyetal. 2007,Harveyetal.2009).TheEthiopiaProductiveSafetyNetProgramme(PSNP)andaHungerSafetyNetProgrammeinKenyaarewidely knowncurrent examples.Shohamet al.(2007)noted that therewaswidespreadagreement that thePSNP represents a significant improvement over previousreliefprogrammingandapositivesteptowardsfindinglong-termsolutionstoEthiopia’sfoodinsecurity.1

There has been a long running concern to better link reliefand development and to find new and more effectivemechanisms for international engagement in long-runningcrises.Concernswith the limitationsofhumanitarianaidastheinstrumentoflastresorthaveledtogrowingengagementfromdevelopmentaidactors in ‘expanding theircapacity tomobilise, coordinate and disburse resources as well as setthe policy framework for interventions in protracted crises’(Harmer and Macrae 2004). A renewed interest in socialprotectionprovidesoneavenueformovingforwardwhathadbecomeasomewhatstagnantdebateabouttheappropriateroles of relief and development actors. In arguing formorepredictableandlong-termsupportinunstablesituations,itisimportantnottoassumethatlonger-termsafetynetswillbeacompletesubstituteforshorttermhumanitarianresponses.AstheintroductionoftheProductiveSafetyNetProgrammein Ethiopia indicates, there may be major problems withexclusionfromcash-basedsafetynetsandwiththecapacityof governments to effectively deliver longer-term support(Kebede 2006). More fundamentally, a long-term safetynet may reduce the vulnerability to food security of thosehouseholdsreceivingitfollowingashocksuchasdroughtorfloods,buthumanitarianreliefwillstillbeneededasashort-termresponse.Longer-termsafetynetswillalsoneedtobeflexibleenoughtoadapttochangingcircumstancesin long-runningcrises(Harveyetal.2007).

ThegrowinginterestinsocialprotectionhasstemmedinpartfromthepositiveexperiencewithconditionalcashtransfersinLatinAmericathatresultedinincreasedchildren’senrolmentineducation,improvedhealthandareductioninthepovertygapforparticipatinghouseholds.TherehasalsobeenrenewedinterestinthepositiveimpactsofpensionsinSouthAfricaandNamibiathatplayedanimportantroleinpovertyreductionandenablingoldpeople tobearsomeof theburdenof theHIV/AIDSepidemic(CaseandDeaton1998,Devereuxetal.2005,HelpAge2004,Samsonetal.2006).RecentdevelopmentsinAfricahaveincludedtheintroductionofuniversalpensionsinLesotho;pilotcashtransfersocialassistanceinZambia,KenyaandMalawi;theproductivesafetynetprojectinEthiopiaandwell developed plans for social assistance programmes inRwandaandUganda(Samsonetal.2006,MinistryofGender,Labour and Development 2007, Hunger Safety Net 2008,WorldBank2009).InAsia,IndiahasintroducedtheNationalRural Employment Guarantee and there are several long-

Chapter 5L�nk�ng rel�ef and development: human�tar�an, trans�t�onal and development food ass�stance

1These issuesarenotnew,butwereaddressedforexample inthe1980sand1990sinBangladesh(ShawandClay1993,Doroshetal.2001).

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runningsocialassistanceprogrammessuchasSamurdhiinSriLankaandtheIGVGD(IncomeGenerationforVulnerableGroupDevelopment)programmeinBangladesh(HossainandZahra2007).DFIDhascommittedto‘significantlyincreasespendingon social protection in at least ten countries in African andAsiaby2009,supportingnationalgovernmentsandworkingwiththeUNandNGOs in fragilestates’ (DFID2006).Africangovernments, including conflict-affected countries such asDRCandSierraLeonehavemadekeycommitmentstoincludesocialprotectioninnationaldevelopmentplansinanAfricanUnionprocess(AfricanUnion2008).

Socialprotectionhasbeenpresentedasanagendathatcanstrengthen the legitimacy of the state by allowing it to re-shoulder responsibilities for ensuring the basic survival ofits citizens. Social protection instruments implemented bythestate,suchaspensions,canbeseenasacentralpartofthepoliticalcontractbetweenastateand itscitizens.Green(2008) argues that social protection offers, ‘a practical andeffective way to reduce chronic vulnerability, tackle povertyand inequality, bridge the gap between emergencies anddevelopment and nourish the relationship of rights andresponsibilities between citizens and states that lies at theheartofsuccessfuldevelopment’.

As an example of current interest in this issue, WFP isincreasinglyengaginginpolicydiscussionsaroundtransitionsfromrelieftolonger-termsocialprotectionapproaches.Thisimplies interactingwithadifferent setoforganisationsandinstitutionsandWFPstaff’sskillandcapacity toplayactiverolesinnationallevelpolicydiscussions.WFPstaffneedstobeabletositatthetablewithgovernments,theWorldBank,NGOsanddonorsandarticulatea clear role forWFPwithinlonger-termsocialprotectionprogrammesandstrategies.Forinstance, a Burundi review recommended that government

andthethreeRome-basedUNagenciesleadtheformulationof a food security and livelihood protection strategy (WFPBurundi 2008). For example, one donor noted thatWFP indevelopment contexts was often seen as old fashioned,parallel and projectised. WFP is starting to recognise thisbut its corporate culture needs a major shift to becomemore successfully engaged in longer-term social protectiondebates. Donors are concerned that if WFP does move inthedirectionofengagingmorestrongly in socialprotectiondebates, it could distract attention from its humanitarianresponsecapacity.EngagingwithdevelopmentactorsaroundlongertermsocialprotectionstrategiesmayalsorequireWFPto rethink its fundingstrategies—rather than largely relyingon PRROs it may need to compete on a level playing fieldwithotherinternationalagenciesandprivatesectoractorsforparticularcontractsandprojects.WFPmayhavecomparativeadvantagesarounditsfieldpresenceandabilitytoimplementatscalebutitwillneedtomakeaconvincingcasetodonorsinspecificcontextsforitsefficiencyandcosteffectiveness.

Clearly, the long-termgoal for social assistance is that it bestateownedanddeliveredinaccordancewithParisprinciples.However,infragilestateswherestatecapacitiesareweak,anargumentmayexistforengagingwithnon-governmentactorsto provide social assistance in the short to medium term.What combination of state and non-state actors should beinvolvedinexpandingsocialprotectionandintransitionsfromemergencytodevelopmentapproacheswillalwaysbecontextspecific. In some chronic crises, potential exists for greaterinvestments in social assistance aspart of social protectionstrategies to reduce reliance on emergency food assistancethathasbeenprovidedformanyyears.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatfoodassistance,particularly ifbroadlydefinedtoincludecashtransferswhereappropriate,shouldnotplayapartinlonger-termsocialassistance.

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Investments and developments in food security assessmentand information systems over the past decade have beensignificant. In spite of this, needs assessment remains akey weakness within the broader humanitarian system,as successive independent evaluations and reviews haveidentified (Vaux 2006, Cosgrave and Herson 2008, UnitedNations2009:15).ECHO’sannualsurveyontheconsolidatedappealprocessfoundthatneedsassessmentshadsomewhatimproved, in particular at the sector level, though someconcerns remain on the overall quality. In particular, theinter-sectoralanalysisand the identificationofgapsarestillregardedasweak.Inresponsetothe2007–8‘FoodPriceCrisis’,theUNComprehensiveFrameworkforAction(CFA)concludedthat there is a need to strengthen global information andmonitoringsystems.OCHA’s(2009)mappingofhumanitarianassessmentinitiativesfoundthatagenciesandclusterswereseriouslyengagedineffortstostandardiseandimprovetheirown assessment practices and build partnerships for jointassessmentsandinformationconsolidation.

Country-level investmentshave improvedanalyticalcapacity.Boudreau (2009) highlights the Livelihoods Integration Unitin Ethiopia in 2006,which aims to build the capacity of thegovernment’s early warning system using the householdeconomy approach as an analytical framework and has‘advancedthescience’intheareaofdisasterriskassessment.Recent efforts have improved the assessment ofmarkets inemergenciestoenablemoreappropriateresponsesandhavedevelopedanemergencymarketanalysis tool (EMMA)(AlbuandMurphy2007).

Other new tools that have been positively received includethe multi-cluster rapid assessment mechanism (McRAM) inPakistanandthePost-NargisJointNeedsAssessment(PONJA)inMyanmar.TheAssessmentandClassificationofEmergencies(ACE)projectaimstoimprovethebasisonwhichreliefactorsidentify needs and make decisions on the prioritisationand allocation of resources by supporting, harmonising andimprovingthecomparabilityofinter-agencyassessmentsandanalysisactivities(OCHA2008).

The Integrated Phase Classification (IPC), as developed byFAO, is a multi-agency technical approach which aims toprovidedecisionmakerswith timely, reliable andaccessibleinformation about the food security situation. Six countriesregularly use it and it is being piloted in others (IPC 2008).Theapproachhassignificantadvantages in that itcombinesa range of different indicators derived from different foodsecurity assessment methods rather than choosing onemethodtobasetheclassificationon.Furthermore,thefocusis

onconvergenceofevidence,ratherthanthestrictapplicationof indicators. The food security phase is determined bya technical working group, and subject to technical peerreview,ratherthanonstrictadherencetoindicatorscrossingcritical thresholds (FSAU 2006). The classification enablescomparison between population groups and countries.However,weaknessespersist, forexample, inrelationtotheinterpretationofmalnutritionandmortalityindicators,whichwasthesubjectofarecentreview(YoungandJaspars2009),and its ability to distinguish situations of less-severe acutefood insecurity.Therehas alsobeenonon-goingdebateonwhethertheclassificationmainlyidentifiesseverityofcurrentfood insecurityorwhether it shouldalso includea temporaldimension (Lawrence andMaunder 2007). OCHA is workingonatoolforconsolidatingcorehumanitarianinformationinaconsistentandaccessiblemanner,currentlyreferredtoasthe‘HumanitarianDashboard’,which isbeing furtherdevelopedandfieldtested(UnitedNations2009).

WFP food security assessments have increased their useof more quantitative data, reflecting a search for a singlequantitative indicator that will determine severity of foodinsecurity and which can therefore be comparable acrosscountries.Examplesincludethedietarydiversity,andcopingstrategies index. This complements the development ofthe IPC, FAO’s integrated phase classification to determinedifferent levels of severity of food insecurity. Each foodsecurityphase isdeterminedbya rangeof indicators, all ofwhichneedtohavea‘referenceoutcome’orthreshold.Whilstthesequantitativeindicatorsprovidevaluablenewindicatorsof food insecurity, their use could divert attention fromcollecting qualitative data on the causes of food insecurity.Thereisadangerthatthiswilllimittherangeofinterventionstoaddressfoodinsecurity.

Inconflict-relatedcrises,anumberofstudieshaveadvocatedfor greater incorporation of protection concerns into foodsecurity or livelihoods assessments. For example, Young(2007)notestheneedforWFPactivitiestobetterincorporatesecurityandprotectionconcerns intostrategicplanningandassessment processes. She also argues in the context ofDarfurthatalivelihoodsapproachtoassessmentwouldbetterinformprogrammestrategiesbyaccommodatingandanalysingthe underlying processes, institutions and policies that arelinkedtotheconflictanddestroyinglivelihoods. JasparsandO’Callaghan(2010)makesimilarrecommendationsforlinkingprotectionandlivelihoodsanalysisandstrategydevelopment.In addition, they argue that livelihoods interventions cancontribute to addressing protection concerns, and thatprotection issues need to be considered when designing

Chapter 6Assessment, early warn�ng and analys�s

34


livelihoods programmes (including food aid) so as not toexacerbateexistingpowerimbalancesorputpeopleatgreaterrisk.

AnevaluationofWFP’srecoveryprogrammingandaFeinsteinCenter/WFP study on targeting in complex emergenciesfound that limited connections were made between thefindingsofneedsassessmentsandthedesignofprogrammes.Assessments and programme designs often do not clearlyexplain the rationale behind the programming choices andmodes of delivery selected (including the other optionsconsidered)toachievethemostefficientandeffectiveresultsin line with existing delivery capacities. Partly as a result,projectdocumentsoftencontainaverystandardpackageof

interventions with little adaptation to context. In addition,programmedesigntendstobebasedpredominantlyoninitialassessments,withoutperiodicre-assessmentsorinformationupdates, and lack the flexibility to be adapted to changingcircumstances(Harveyetal.2009).Areviewoffoodsecurityresponses in theGreatLakes regionsimilarly found that thevastmajoritywerethestandardpackageoffoodaidandseedsand that these were often of questionable appropriateness(Levine and Chastre 2004). Various initiatives are underwaytoimproveresponseanalysis.Forexample,ECHOiscurrentlyfunding FAO to develop a response analysis framework forfoodsecurityemergencies.The IPC intends tosupportmoreeffective response strategies by linking information with astrategicresponseframework.

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Thereisconsiderabledebateaboutwhattypesofinterventionsfitwithinthefoodassistancetoolbox,asalreadyindicatedinthe section on definitions. Table 7 sets out a range of foodassistance instruments, defined as specific instruments ofintervention directed to food consumption and nutritionalobjectives.Thetablealsoidentifiesissueshavingalinkwithdefinitions of food security, food assistance or food aid. Akey issue iswhether the foodassistance interventionunderconsiderationisconcernedwithfoodinsecurityandnutritionalneedsinanemergencyandhumanitariancrisiscontext.Orareinstruments being consideredmore generally in the contextof chronic food insecurity and nutritional problems? Again,itwould seem important todistinguishbetween such formsof interventionandtheaid instruments thatmaybeusedtosupportsuchinterventions.1

As the table suggests there is a considerable degree ofambiguityaroundwhatsitswithinthefoodassistancetoolboxand what should be seen as broader food security, socialprotection or poverty interventions. Whether or not thisambiguity matters is another question. For donors and aidagencies with flexibility to move between food assistance(or foodaid)and foodsecuritybudget lines—orwhere foodassistanceissimplypartofanoverallfoodsecurityapproach—cleardistinctionsarenotneededandthequestionissemanticorpresentational.Whereitdoesmatterisinenablingdonorsto fulfilFoodAidConvention(FAC)obligations;somedonorswant an expanded definition of what can be counted asFAC contributions to better reflect the changing nature offood assistance. In addition, presently food aid rather thanfood assistance is subject to special treatment under OECDvoluntary rulesandwith respect toWTOdisciplines.Greaterclaritywouldhelpdistinguishbetweenhumanitarianandfoodassistance interventions that are internationally supportedandfoodassistancethatformspartofdomestic,governmentandcivilsocietyresponsestofoodinsecurity.

The followingsub-sectionsexaminesomeof thekeycurrentdebatesaroundsomeoftheinstrumentsinthefoodassistancetoolbox.The scopeof the studyprecludeda comprehensivesurveyofallofthefoodassistanceinstrumentsoutlinedabove

and of all of the different food aidmodalities (general fooddistributions,foodforwork,schoolfeeding,etc.).Instead,thereviewfocusesonthoseissueswhereinnovativenewpracticeis emerging or where there are current debates aroundapproaches. The discussion of categories of interventionis organised under conventionally accepted boundaries(e.g., nutrition) and takes the ambiguities of definition asunderstood. Cash and vouchers (7.1), nutrition (7.2), schoolfeeding (7.3), public works (7.4), and other food securityinstruments(7.5)areexamined.

7.1 Cash and vouchers

Acceptance is growing that giving people money can bean appropriate alternative or complement to food aid andother forms of in-kind assistance in response to disasters.This is reflected both in revised policy positions to includecash transfers within broader definitions of food assistanceand in practice where the use of cash in responding todisasters is growing.The2004 IndianOceanTsunamiwasamajor influence in the increased adoption of cash transferprogrammes by both NGOs and UN agencies (i.e.,WFP andUNICEF). Cash transfers were an appropriate response asmarketsquicklyrecovered;mostgoodswerequicklyavailableandagencieshadlargeamountsofprivatefundingthatcouldbeusedforinnovativeapproacheslikecashtransfers.In2010,however,theprovisionofcashremainssmallincomparisontovolumesofin-kindfoodassistance(Harvey2007).

Numerous guidelines for cash transfer programming havebeen developed—including by the International Red Crossand Red Crescent Movement (2007), Oxfam (2006), ActionContre la Faim (2007), Horn Relief (2007) and the SwissAgency forDevelopmentandCooperation (2007)—reflectingthe growing demandwithin humanitarian agencies for toolsto assist them in undertaking cash transfer projects. Theseguidelinescoversimilarterritory,providingpractitionerswithvaluableguidanceonhowtodeterminewhencashtransfersare appropriate, as well as how to design, implement andmonitor cash transfer projects.WFP has developed a policyframework for cash transfers and vouchers and ECHO hasdeveloped funding guidelines (WFP 2008, Lor-MehdiabadiandAdams2008).Cash-basedresponsesalsohavebeenthetarget of substantial research, monitoring and evaluation,resultinginanexplosionofinformationonlessonslearned.

WFP is continuing to expand its use of cash and voucher-based approaches. A cash and vouchers manual has beenproducedandacashandvouchersunithasbeenestablishedinheadquarterstoprovideoversight,technicalguidanceand

Chapter 7The food ass�stance toolbox

1‘FoodaidasaformofODAresourcetransferneedstobedistinguishedfromfood-basedprogrammes(FBP)orinterventionsundertakenbygovernmentsand NGOs in developing countries. These food-based interventions takevarious forms: the direct distribution of food, such as FFWor SFP,whichprovide either take-home food or schoolmeals, ormarket interventions,suchasfoodpricesubsidies;andfinancialtransfers,suchasfoodstamps.FBPsare funded largely internally,as in IndiaorMexico,or supportedbyinternationally sourced food aid and financial aid, as in Bangladesh orEthiopia.ThescaleofFBPsisdecliningthroughoutmostofthedevelopingworld with liberalisation of internal markets and international foodtrade’(OECD2006:p.23).

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Instrument Grey Areas

Food-basedtransfers Thereisabroadconsensusthatfood-basedtransferssuchasemergencydistributions,food-for-

and/orfoodaid workandschoolfeedingareinstrumentsoffoodassistance.aHowever,someareasofdebate

remain:

Ifandwhenshouldmonetisationofinternationalfoodaidcountasfoodassistance?b

Whenandifshouldprogrammefoodaidbeconsideredasfoodassistance?c

Aredomesticfood-basedinterventionsbydevelopingcountrygovernmentsand/orNGOswithout

internationalsupportfoodassistance?

Cash Thegeneralformulationisthatonlycashgrantswhichhavespecificfoodornutritionobjectives

shouldcountasfoodassistanceorthatcashprimarilyusedtopurchasefoodshouldcountas

foodassistancealthoughsomeargueforexcludingitaltogether.Evidencealsoshowsthateven

whenprovidedwithfoodornutritionobjectives,itisfungible,thatis,itisusedforavarietyof

purposes.d

Agriculturalinput ThesearenowincludedasfoodassistancewithinECHO’sdefinitionandwithintheFAC.

supply:seeds However,manywouldseeseedprovisionasafoodsecurityratherthanafoodassistance

interventionbecauseseedsdonotdirectlyaffectconsumption.

Otheragriculturalinputs: Theseareusuallyregardedasfoodsecurityoragriculturaldevelopmentinterventionsratherthan

e.g.,fertiliserorsubsidy asfoodassistanceinterventions.

However,emergency‘starterpacks’typicallyincludeseedsandfertiliser.

Foodsubsidies Theseareusuallynotconsideredtobepartofthetoolbox,becauseinternationalaidnowrarely

supportsthem.However,thesemeansmaybeadoptedasanemergencyresponseandthus

wouldfallwithinsomecurrentdefinitionsoffoodassistance.

Schooloruserfeewaivers Thesetendnottobeconsideredasafoodassistanceinterventionbutdopromoteaccesstofood

byfreeinguphouseholdincome.

Livestockinterventions Fodderprovision,veterinarysupport,de-stockingandre-stockingaregenerallyseenasfood

securityratherthanfoodassistanceinterventions.Theycan,however,havedirectfoodand

nutritionimpacts,forinstancebysustainingfoodsupplyandfodderprovisionwhichboost

milkproductionleadingtobetternutritioninyoungchildren.Theydofitwithinsomecurrent

definitionsoffoodassistancesuchasthatusedbyECHO.

Nutritioninterventions Theseareahybridcategory.Therapeuticfeedingandsupplementaryfeedingaregenerallyseen

asfoodassistanceinstruments.Actualmicronutrientsupplementationisincreasinglyconsidered

asfoodassistance.However,thereislessunanimityonwhetherregulatoryrequirements

forfortificationoffoodsornutritioneducationshouldbeincluded.Interventionstoaddress

malnutritionwouldincludeamuchwiderrangeofresponses,includingdiseaseasanimmediate

causeofmalnutrition,andthosewhichaddressfoodinsecurity,thehealthenvironmentand

socialorbehaviouralfactorswhichareunderlyingcausesofmalnutrition.

a ForexampletheseinterventionsareexplicitlymentionedintheL’Aquilasummitstatementonfoodsecurity(AFSI2009,para.6).

b ForexamplethedraftAoAdistinguishedbetweenmonetisationdirectedtomeetingthetransportandotherincidentalcostsof

supplyinganddistributingemergencyfoodaidandfordevelopmentalpurposes.

c Forexamplethe1999FoodAidConventionregardsprogrammeaidincludingexportcreditsthatqualifyasODAunderDACrules

aseligibleforinclusioninareportedcontribution.

d TheL’Aquilastatementdistinguishesbetweencashandvouchersas‘emergencyassistance’andinthelongerterm‘cash-based

socialprotection’(AFSI2009,para.6).

Table 7: Food ass�stance �nstruments: �ssues and grey areas

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corporatecapacitybuilding.Themanualincludesprogrammeandoperationaladjustmentsofallprojectcycleissuesrelevanttocashandvouchers(e.g.,budgettemplates,WINGS,planofoperations, etc.) The Spanish government gave €10 millionthat is being used to implement pilot projects in Uganda,Niger, Yemen, Ecuador and East Timor; IFPRI is providingrandomised evaluations for each project. In addition, cashand voucher approaches are increasingly being includedin country-level appeals on a demand-led basis. The 2010biannual management plan forecasts that 7 percent of allprogramming(approximately$300million)willbecashbasedbut this is a very rough estimate. In 2009, an estimated2–2.5 million WFP beneficiaries received cash and voucherassistance. A key issue moving forward is the need to linkimproved market analysis with feasibility studies, partnercapacitiesandscalingupresponses.

Under the general heading of cash and voucher-basedresponses, various types of innovative programming haveoccurred. In Darfur, ACF has provided vouchers to covermilling expenses for households settled in IDP camps andbenefiting from general food distributions. The programmesignificantly reduced the percentage of households sellingpart of the general food distribution. The vouchers coveredapproximately 20 percent of household expenditures. Anevaluation concluded that the programme led to improveddietsasmoreof therationwasconsumedandmore incomewasavailabletopurchasefreshfoods(MattinenandPalmaera2008).WFPisnowpilotingthisapproachinDarfur.

Providing cash to meet basic needs remains the primaryobjectiveofmostprojectsusingcashtransfers.Cashtransfershavebeenframedprincipallyasanalternativetofoodaid,andthiscontinuestobeoneoftheirprimeuses.However,cashisusuallyspentonothercrucialbasicneeds,suchashouseholdgoods, debt repayments and protection of access to healthcareandeducation.Animportantadvantageofcashisthatitenablespeopletomeetarangeofimmediateprioritieswithouthaving to sell in-kind assistance on unfavourable terms.In addition to enabling access to food, cash, like food aid,can have broader objectives, such as protecting livelihoodsor preventing distress coping strategies. If transfers arecalculated purely on household food deficits and do notinclude other basic needs, households may spend money‘intended’ for food on pressing non-food needs (Bailey etal. 2008). Dunn (2008) notes, when reviewing Oxfam cashtransferprojectsinEastAsia,that

Although needs assessments clearly show thathouseholds have immediate needs other thanfood, these needs are often not included in thecalculation of the cash transfer value. Often thecalculation of the value of the cash transfer isbasedonlyonhouseholdfoodneedsandadesiretosupplementfoodaid.

Growingsupport for cashamongdonorgovernments (whichare generally receptive to greater funding for cash-basedresponses), underpins the increased use of cash-basedresponses among operational aid agencies. With growingrecognitionthat,incertaincontexts,cashcanmoreeffectivelyand efficiently meet project objectives than other in-kindtransfers,coupledwithincreasedexperienceandcapacityforimplementing theseprogrammes, it is likely that thisoverall

Box 2: Innovat�ve technolog�es for cash del�very

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) haslaunched an electronic food voucher pilot project to aid1,000IraqirefugeefamiliesinSyria.IraqirefugeeslivinginDamascuswillreceiveatextmessageontheirmobilephonesprovidingauniquenumberenablingthemtocash inallorpart of a ‘virtual voucher’ at selected government shops.Theywillbeable toexchangetheirelectronicvouchers forrice, wheat flour, lentils, chickpeas, oil and canned fish,aswellas cheeseandeggs—items that cannotusuallybeincludedinconventionalaidbaskets.Eachfamilywillreceiveonevoucherperperson,worth$22,everytwomonths.Aftereach transaction, familieswill receiveanupdatedbalance,alsosentbySMS to theirmobilephones.Thismeans thatpeople will no longer need to queue at food distributionpointsortravellongdistancestodistributioncentres.

ThemobilephoneserviceproviderMTNdonatedSIMcardsfortheproject,whichisexpectedtorunforfourmonths,butmaybeextendeddependingontheoutcomeofthepilot(WFP2009a). In Somalia,WFP is developing a software packageto support a mobile phone-based voucher system wherebeneficiarieswillbeissuedwithvouchercardsthatwillenablethem to collect full food rations in smaller tranches fromtradersusinganSMS-baseddebitsystem(Lofvall2009).

ActionAgainstHungeriscurrentlyinvolvedinacashprojectinnorthernUgandainwhichrecipientswillbeabletoaccesstheircashusingsolar-poweredpointofsalesdevicesatlocaltraderswithintheirvillages.Thelackofpowerinfrastructureandbankpresence in these villagesmake the agents andsolarpowerparticularlyappropriate.

InKenya,aspartoftheHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP),cashisdeliveredusingasmartcardsystem.Recipientshavetheir finger prints scanned and receive a smart card whichtheytaketoalocaltraderoragenttogettheircash.Thelocaltraderoragentusesapointofsaledevicetoverifyrecipients’identities. People are also able to get their cash from abranch of Equity Bank. In addition, also in Kenya, in urbanslum areas in response to food price increases and post-electionviolence,ConcernandOxfam,inconjunctionwiththeGovernment of Kenya, are usingmobile phones to transfercash.RecipientsareprovidedwithaSIMcard(andsometimesamobilephone,iftheydonothaveone)andcanretrievethecashatanyparticipatingM-PESA/Safaricomagent.

38


(but limited)trendissettocontinue.However,manydonorsareincreasinglymovingawayfromdirectsupporttoNGOsandtowardsmultilateralfundingmechanismssuchastheCentralEmergencyRevolving Fund (CERF) andotherpooled fundingmechanisms.Thisispartofanoveralldrivewithinthedonorcommunitytorationalisebudgetsthataregrowinginacontextofstaticorshrinkingstaff.Asaresult,donorsareincreasinglyturningtoUNagenciestoactasgrantproviders.Italsomeansthat, despite the evidence supporting cash responses, thepotential for donor innovation is limited,whichmayhelp toexplainwhy few donors have developed specific policies orproceduresaroundtheuseofcash(Baileyetal.2008).

7.2 nutr�t�on

Each year, under-nutrition is responsible for the deaths ofmore than3.5millionchildren, the lossofbillionsofdollarsinforegoneproductivityandavoidablehealthcarespending.Many countries lose at least 2–3 percent of their grossdomestic product to under-nutrition (Horton et al. 2010).Under-nutritionisaconcentratedepidemicbutoflownationalpriority. An estimated 32 percent of children in developingcountries are stunted, with the highest prevalence found inAfrica (40percent) (Blacket al. 2008). Just20 countriesarehome to 80 percent of the world’s undernourished children(stuntingorlowheightforage)(DFID2009,Blacketal.2008).The causes of stunting are broadly associatedwith poverty,and stunting itself is associated with child mortality, poorschoolperformance,decreasedworkcapacity, increasedriskofadultmorbidityandearlydeath(Shrimptonetal.2001).Itis also associatedwith increasedhealth care costs and lostproductivity. In the face of these huge costs, actors in thebroader development sphere are increasingly focused onstrongactionstotackleunder-nutrition.

A recentWorld Bank report calls for a package of 13 directnutritioninterventionsofdemonstratedeffectiveness,includingcomplementary and therapeutic feeding interventions.Providingcomplementaryfoodtopreventandtreatmoderatemalnutrition in children less than two years of age in the36 countries with the highest burden of under-nutritionwouldcost$3.6billionayearandtreatmentofsevereacutemalnutrition would cost $2.6 billion per year (Horton etal. 2010). However, as stunting is an indicator of long-termunder-developmentandpovertyinthepopulationasawhole,these interventions need to be combinedwith developmentprogrammestoaddresspoverty.

In addition to the high prevalence of stunting found indeveloping countries, a number of countries, particularlyin the Horn of Africa, repeatedly suffer high levels ofacute malnutrition (Mason et al. 2008). Such situationshave been called a ‘chronic’ famine (Devereux 2006), orextended food crisis (Darcy and Hoffman 2003). In recentyears,considerabledebatehasensuedoverwhetherdifferentemergencythresholds(orreferencelevels)shouldbeapplied

in such situations and whether these high levels of acutemalnutrition are due to particular body shapes, particularlyfor pastoral populations. At a recent workshop to discussa review of malnutrition and mortality indicators for foodsecurityclassification,itwasconcludedtherewasinsufficientevidence of the functional outcomes associated with acutemalnutrition in thesepopulationgroupstochangereferencelevelsforclassifyinganemergency(YoungandJaspars2009).What is clear, however, is that such situations require adifferentandlonger-termresponsethanthosewherenutritionrapidlydeterioratesbecauseofacutecrisis.

Several donor governments and aid agencies argue that thenutritionalimpactoffoodassistanceneedstobeimprovedandthatbetterlinkswithotherinterventionsthataddressmalnutritionareneeded.Generalfooddistributionsandsupplementaryfeedinghaveoftenfailedtoproperlyassessanddocumentthenutritionalimpactoffoodreceived.Therearealsoeffortsunderwaytolookcritically at the compositionof foodaidbasketsdependingonwhether the primary purpose is, specifically, nutrition or foodsecurityor,moregenerally, incomesupport.USAID iscurrentlyfunding the major, ‘Food Aid Quality Review’, which aims toexaminethenutritionalneedsofbeneficiarypopulationsacrossthedevelopingworld,andthenutritionalqualityofcommoditiescurrentlyavailabletomeetthoseneeds.

Aparticularrecentfocusofattentionhasbeenthenutritionalneedsofchildrenundertwo.CARE(2010) for instancenotesthat‘thereisincreasingrecognitionthatcurrentinterventions(formoderateacutemalnutrition)basedontheuseoffortifiedfoodsareinadequateandthatagreaterfocuson0–24monthold children and the nutritional quality of supplementaryfoods is needed.’ A recent review of the management ofacutely malnourished infants under six months of age inemergency programmes found that wasting in infants lessthansixmonthsofage isaprevalentpublichealthproblemand that current guidelines lack consideration for this agegroup.Itshouldnotbeassumedthatinfantsundersixmonthsarewellnourishedorthatcaredesignedforolderchildrencanbesafelyextendedtothisagegroup(Keracetal.2009).

Evidencefrompastemergencies,however,suggeststhatolderchildrenfacethegreatestproportionalincreaseinmalnutritionandmortalityas thenutritional situationdeteriorates. If theaimofhumanitarianresponseistopreventexcessmortality,interventionsshouldcovertheentireaffectedpopulation.Thiswould be an argument for general ration distribution ratherthansupplementaryfeedingtargetedatundertwos(orevenunderfives)(YoungandJaspars2009).

IntheUS,agenciesparticularlyfocusonensuringthatTitleII,FoodforPeacecommoditiesaremorenutritionallybalanced.The‘RoadMap’developedbyseveralNGOscallsforexpandednutrition programmes that focus on particular needs ofpregnantandlactatingwomenandchildrenundertheageoftwo.MSFiscampaigningforfoodassistanceinterventionsto

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betteraddressmalnutrition(MSF2009). Its ‘roadmaptoendglobalhunger’forinstancecallsontheUSgovernmentto

supportmeasurestoenhancethenutritionalqualityoffoodaid,suchasimprovingtheconsistencyandnutritional profile (both in the US and locally) ofcommodities provided, diversifying the basket ofcommodities provided as non-emergency rations,and engaging governments, the UN, NGOs andotherpartnerstopromotetheadoptionofnationalfortificationpolicies.

CARE’s new emergency food security and nutrition strategycommitsittoagreaterfocusonmoderateacutemalnutritionandnotes that ‘thescaleofCARE’semergency foodsecurityoperations as well as strengths in food aid managementmean that CARE is well placed to address moderate acutemalnutrition’(CARE2010).

Important innovations in the treatment of severe acutemalnutrition are being tried. Therapeutic feeding haschangedfromcentre-basedapproachestocommunity-basedmanagementofacutemalnutrition(CMAM)whichusesready-to-eat therapeutic foods to treat severe acute malnutritioninthecommunitywheneverpossible(Deconincketal.2008,ValidInternational2006).Thishighlysuccessfulapproachnotonlytreatsseveremalnutritioneffectively,butalsoincreasesthecoverageoftherapeuticfeedingprogrammes,particularlyinruralpopulations.IthasnowbeenendorsedbyWHO.ThemainconstrainttofurtherexpansionofCMAMistherelativelyhighcostofready-to-eattherapeuticfoodssuchasPlumpinut;effortsareunderwaytosupportlocalmanufactureinseveralcountries,includingMalawi,EthiopiaandIndia.

Navarro-Colorado (2007) argues for the exploration ofalternatives tosupplementary feedingofmoderatelyacutelymalnourishedchildren,giventhelowcoverageandpopulation-level impact of current supplementary feeding programmes.His research highlighted the weakness of reporting andanalysisoftheimpactofsupplementaryfeedingprogrammes.The Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN) is developingminimumreportingstandards.Navarro-Coloradoetal.(2008)argue forapproachessuchasblanketdistributionofspecialfoodsduringpre-harvestperiodsorexpandedgeneralrationprogrammes.ENNisabouttostartaresearchprojectthatwillcompareoutcomesfromatraditionalsupplementaryfeedingapproachwithonehavingexpandedgeneralrations.CriticismoftheuseofCSB(corn-soyablend)forsupplementaryfeedingis increasing. This has led to innovation in developing newproductssuchas‘improvedCSB’and‘SupplementaryPlumpy’.Again, a major constraint to expanding the use of newcommodities,andthereforetheabilitytosustainprogrammesandhandthemovertonationalgovernments,iscost.

Blanketdistributiontoallunderfiveshasbeenrecommendedinresponsetohighlevelsofacutemalnutrition(thosefalling

more than 20 percent below -2 z-scores) since MSF’s firstnutritionguidelinesin1995(MSF1995).Thisapproachisstillused,particularlyinsituationswherethereareconstraintstoimprovingthegeneralrationorthewayinwhichitisdistributed.WFP in Darfur is currently providing blanket supplementaryfeeding on a seasonal basis in areas or population groupswiththehighestlevelsofacutemalnutrition.Mattinen(2008)describesanACFblanketdistributionofhigh-energybiscuitsto under-five-year-olds following the detection of extremelyhigh malnutrition rates in IDP camps in north Darfur inJune2007.Mattinenarguesthattimelyblanketdistributionsusingappropriateproductsaccompaniedbysensitisationcaneffectively tackle transitorymalnutritionpeaksbut that theyremain costly especially when products must be purchasedoverseasandairlifted.

The UNICEF framework on the causes of malnutrition showsthat it is driven by a combination of food security, maternaland child care, health services and environmental factors.Youngetal.(2004)notethatwithinthefoodassistancesectorthere has too often been a ‘food-first’ bias which assumesthatnutritionisprimarilylinkedtofoodsecurityandargueforgreaterattentiontosocialfactorsandthehealthenvironmentinaddressingmalnutrition.Arecentreviewontheinterpretationofmalnutritionandmortalityindicatorsinemergencieshighlightsthat the relative importance of these different underlyingcausesvarieswiththetypeofcrisis,andwiththeseverityofthecrisis(YoungandJaspars2006).Furthermore,therelationshipbetween food insecurity, social and caring behaviours andthe health environment is likely to change as food securitydeteriorates(YoungandJaspars2009).

Otherdevelopments innutrition includea focusonstrongeractiontotacklemicronutrientdeficiencies.UNICEFetal.(2009)argue that ‘effective programmes are in place that warrantgreater investment’ and ‘innovative research continues tocreatenewoptionsformicronutrientdelivery’.TheWorldBankstudy(WorldBank2009,inMSF2009)onscalingupnutritionprogrammesin36high-burdencountriesrecommended

forchildrenundertheageoffive:periodicVitaminAsupplements,therapeuticzincsupplementsforthemanagementofdiarrhoea,multiplemicronutrients,andde-wormingdrugs.Forpregnantandlactatingwomen: iron-folicsupplementsaswellas iodisedoilcapsuleswhereiodisedsaltisnotavailable.Ironfortificationofstaplefoodsandsaltiodisationwillbemadeavailableforthegeneralpopulation.Thetotalcostfortheseinterventionswouldamountto$1.5billionyearly.

Ingeneral, itcanbeconcludedthatoverthepastdecadeanincreasingly narrow view of nutrition as a clinical condition,andhencea focuson treatment rather thanprevention,haspredominated.Whilst significant advances have beenmadein such treatment, it is important to revive the discipline of

40


publicnutrition,whichtakesabroaderviewoftheproblemsof nutrition in society and which attempts to analyse andaddressitscausesaswellastheconsequences.

7.3 school feed�ng

During the last decade, the number of school feedingprogrammes (SFPs) funded by donor governments and thewiderinternationalcommunityhasincreasedsubstantially.ForexampletherehasbeenthemajorUSDA-managedMcGovern-Dole initiative in2000 (seeAnnex2). In2009,WFP’s schoolfeeding activities reached 22.6 million beneficiaries in 68countries.2 Renewed interest in school feeding is partlydue to the need to identify acceptable uses for donors’agriculturalsurpluses,andpartlybecauseitdirectlyaddressesthe goals of a number of international commitments: themillennium development goals on primary education andhungerreduction;thesix‘EducationforAll’goalsoutlinedintheDakarFrameworkforAction(2000);boostingagriculturalproduction goals as included in the Comprehensive AfricaAgricultureDevelopmentProgramme(CAADP)adoptedbytheNew Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2003and, more recently, as a safety net in various national andinternationalactionplans3respondingtotheimpactofrisingfoodprices(DGECHO2009a,WFP2009).4

7.3.1Definitions,aimsandobjectivesSchool feeding programmes have focused primarily on twobroad goals: improving nutrition and improving education.Thefirstisconcernedwithimprovingthehealthandnutritionalstatus of school children. The second is concerned withincreasing enrolment and attendance, reducing drop-outrates and, ultimately, enhancing cognitive development andacademicperformanceatschool(Adelmanetal.2008a,Bennet2003,Clayetal.1998,WFP2009d).However,schoolfeedingisalsoincreasinglybeingusedinemergencyandtransitionalcontexts to achieve a broader range of goals: providinga ‘safety net’ to alleviate short-term hunger; providing aplatform for nutrition and health interventions; reducinggenderandsocialinequitiesbyencouragingfamiliestosendall children to school; protecting children from violence orexploitationbyprovidingasafeenvironment;reinforcinglocaleconomiesthroughpurchaseoflocalgoodsandservicesandestablishing basic infrastructure to support governments toruntheirownSFPs(WFP2009b).AsBundyetal.(2009)note,theeffectivenessofSFPsinachievingthesegoalsdependsonseveral factors: theway inwhichschoolmealsareprovided(in-schoolmeals,fortifiedbiscuits,take-homerationsorsomecombination of these); whether school children are actuallythemostnutritionallyvulnerable;whetherpoorchildrencan

attendschoolandthuswhethertargetingiseffectiveandtheassociatedcosts.

School feeding has been broadly defined as ‘a set ofinterventions supporting both medium-term nutritional andlong-term education objectives that are being implementedwithfoodastheprimaryresource’(Bennett2003).Othershaveadoptedanarrowerdefinitionsdistinguishingbetweenschoolfeeding as ‘meals or snacks prepared and given to childrenat school’ and food for education, seen as broader, whichreferstoanyfoodusedasaresourcetoimproveeducationaloutcomes, including programmes where children are giventake-home food rations in exchange for school participation(Adelman et al. 2008b, DG ECHO 2009a, Save the Children2007).5WFPdoesnotmake thisdistinction,definingschoolfeeding as ‘the provision of micronutrient fortified biscuits,snacksormealsatschool,jointlywithade-wormingsolution;and/ortake-homerations.Itisconditionaluponenrolmentatschoolandregularattendance.Itisasafetynetwithnutrition,education, gender, and wider socio-economic benefits thattransfersvaluablefoodresourcestoschoolchildrenandtheirhouseholdsincrisis,recoveryanddevelopmentcontexts.’6

7.3.2 Evidence, policy and practiceSchoolfeedingcontinuestohaveferventsupportersaswellasasignificantbodyofscepticalopinion.WFP,byfarthelargestagencysupportingschool feeding, claims that thedebate islargelywon: ‘What issoclear . . . is thatwearebeyondthedebateaboutwhetherschoolfeedingmakessenseasawayto reach themost vulnerable. It does. In the face of globalcrises,wemustnow focusonhowschool feedingprogramscan be designed and implemented in a cost-effective andsustainable way to benefit and protect those most in needofhelptodayandinthefuture’(Bundyetal.2009).7Others,notably DG ECHO, Medecins Sans Frontieres and variousmembers of the European Emergency Food Security Group8

(OxfamGB,Save theChildrenUK,ACF-INandGermanAgro-Action) continue to question the ability of school feedingprogrammes to adequately address the causes of hunger,malnutrition, poor school attendance or performance. Theyalsoquestionthecost-efficiencyofschoolfeedingcomparedwithother interventions for achieving similar goals, suchaswaiving school fees or providing cash transfers directly tovulnerablehouseholds.

There issomeevidence thatschool feedingalleviatesshort-term hunger and acts as an incentive for parents and/or

2Twomillionofthesewerereachedthroughtrustfundmechanisms(WFP2010).3SeeFourthTokyoInternationalConferenceonAfricanDevelopment(TICADIV)YokohamaDeclarationandtheFAOHighLevelConferenceonWorldFoodSecurity.4In2008,20nationalgovernmentschosetoscaleupSFPsasaresponsetosoaringfoodpricesinordertobenefitthoseinneed(WFP2009a).

5Thesetransferscanbeupto10percentofhouseholdexpendituresandevenmoreinthecaseoftake-homerations(Bundyetal.2009).6 Email correspondence cited WFP School Feeding Policy and WFPProgrammeGuidanceManual.7WFPExecutiveDirectorJosetteSheeranandWorldBankPresidentRobertZoellick,ForewordtoRethinkingSchoolFeeding:SocialSafetyNets,ChildDevelopment and the Education Sector, a joint publication by theWorldFoodProgrammeandtheWorldBankGroup.8TheEEFSGisasub-groupofEuronAid/Concord’sEuropeanFoodSecurityGroup(EFSG).MembersincludeActionContrelaFaim,ConcernWorldwide,EuronAid,GermanAgro-Action,ICCO,OxfamGBandSavetheChildrenUK.

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carers tosendchildrentoschool (Kaziangaetal.2009,WFP2009d), but evidence that it improves children’s nutritionalstatus or cognitive and learning capacity is less conclusive(Bennet2003,EEFSG2006).Thefindingsfromevaluationsareinconclusiveandindicateaneedformoreinvestigationofthecircumstances under which school-feeding programs couldimprovenutritionandacademicperformance(Adelmanetal.2008c,Kaziangaetal.2009).

Otherconcerns,citedbysupportersandscepticsalike,arethatschoolfeedingprogrammesarenotthemosteffectivewayoftargetingthemostnutritionallyvulnerable,suchasthosenotenrolledinschool9orthoselessthanfiveyearsofagewhoaremostatriskofbothchronicandacutemalnutrition.Therearealsoconcernsthatlong-termcommitmentstoschoolfeedingcan reduce the resources available and flexibility needed torespondtonewemergencies,whensupporttoschoolfeedinginWFPcountrieswith limitedprogrammesorPRRObudgetsreducesfundsavailableforotherpriorities.Legitimateconcernregarding the sustainability of SFPs remains, given the highcostsofmaintainingrecurrentfoodandnon-foodsupplies.IncountrieswithalowGDPpercapita,anSFPtypicallycostshalformoreoftheireducationbudget(WFP2009).

WFPhas identifiedeightbenchmarks forgoodqualitySFPs:(1)sustainability;(2)soundalignmentwiththenationalpolicyframework; (3) stable funding and budgeting; (4) needs-based, cost-effective quality programme design; (5) stronginstitutionalarrangementsforimplementation,monitoringandaccountability;(6)strategyforlocalproductionandsourcing;(7)strongpartnershipsand inter-sectorcoordinationand(8)strongcommunityparticipationandownership(ibid).

Amongst the NGOs surveyed, Canadian Food Grains Bank,CAREInternational,CatholicReliefServicesandWorldVisionall implementschoolfeeding,eitherinpartnershipwithWFPor independently. CRS’s current policy is to expand schoolfeedingtocoverpre-schoolchildren.WorldVisionviewsschoolfeeding as a platform for undertaking health interventions,such as health promotion and HIV/AIDS education andprevention.OxfamGBhasopposedschoolfeeding,butisnowin theprocessofdevelopingapolicywhichendorsesschoolfeeding, ifonly inthecontextofprotractedcrises,aspartofanoverallstrategytoaddressfoodinsecurity.

7.3.3 School feeding in emergenciesDebate isongoingabout theextent towhichschool feedingmay be considered an instrument in the humanitarian foodassistance‘toolbox’.

WFPtakestheviewthatschoolfeedingisapplicableinmostcontextsandisafood-based‘safetynet’ inallsituations. Its

policystatesthatschoolfeedingcanbeusedinemergencies,protracted crises and situations of seasonal food insecuritytoofferanexpandedsafetynetforchildrenandtheirfamilieshithardbyshocks.Italsopromotestheuseofschoolfeedingin post-conflict, post-disaster and transitional contexts toassist in restoring the education system, encouraging thereturn of internally-displaced people and refugees andimproving social cohesion and integration among children(WFP2009b).Ofthe22.6millionbeneficiariesofWFP’sschoolfeeding programmes in 2008, 10 million were beneficiariesof development programmes, 8.7 million were beneficiariesof Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations, and 4.5 werebeneficiariesofemergencyoperations(WFPforthcoming).

Others question the applicability of school feeding inemergency contexts. For example, DG ECHO’s guidelinesfor funding school feeding state that ‘school feeding is notconsidered an appropriate means of delivering food andnutritional support to vulnerable children in emergencies,except in exceptional circumstances where all other moreeffective response options are unfeasible’. It argues thatschool feeding is unlikely to be the best use of limitedresources for addressing food insecurity andmalnutrition inmost contexts (DG ECHO 2009a). It is however, increasinglyconsidered as a tool to use in protracted crises, as part ofa long-term safety net orwhere targeting general rations isproblematic. As indicated by Oxfam’s new policy, however,it should not be implemented in isolation, as it does notnecessarily reach the most vulnerable groups (the poorestand/ormalnourished).

7.4 Publ�c work

Much food assistance continues to be delivered throughfoodor cash forworkprogrammesalso calledPublicWorksprogrammes (McCord and Slater 2009, Lamadé et al. 2009,Harveyetal.2009).Theobjectivesofcashandfoodforworkareoftenbothtoprovideresourcestothemosteconomicallyvulnerableandtocreatecommunityassetsthatpromotefoodsecurity (dams, roads, wells, etc.). Cash and food for worktherefore require significant additional funds to provide thetechnicalandmanagementsupportfortheseprojects.

WFPevaluationshighlightweaknessesintermsofthequalityandsustainabilityoftheassetsbeingbuiltandtheavailabilityof sufficient complementary resources, tools and technicalskills. Inmany cases assets built tend to deteriorate unlessexplicit care is taken to putting in place institutions andcapacitiesensuringtheirregularupkeep.Thelackofadequatebudgetsforthenon-foodcostsoffoodforassetsprogrammesisarecurringtheme.Forinstance,aWFPevaluationinKenyanotedalackoftoolsforsoilexcavationinadamconstructionproject; a lack of tools was noted in Sierra Leone andinsufficient budgets for non-food resources was noted inAngola(WFPKenya2007,WFPAngola2005,WFPSierraLeone2008).

9Levelofenrolmentandattendancearecritical.Forexample,the‘Nutribun’programme in Jamaica in 1986 reached its targetedbeneficiariesbecauseofthealmostuniversalenrolmentratesofprimaryschoolchildren(Clayetal.1998).

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Cash and food for work projects are often assumed to beselftargetingbutinpracticethisrarelyseemstobethecaseunlesswagesaresetsolowthattheyriskfailingtomeetotherobjectives(BarrettandClay2003).Thechronicallyvulnerable(sick,elderly,handicapped)usuallyneedaseparatesafetynetofdirectfoodorcashdistribution.Recentevaluationsshowedagainthatselftargetingisineffective,asthemarginalvalueoflabourvariesconsiderablybetweenhouseholdsandtheshort-termemploymentattractslessfood-insecurehouseholdswitha lackofotherworkopportunities(Harveyetal.2009,Dietz2006a,Dietz2006b).

A recent WFP evaluation in Uganda highlights the issue ofworkbeingspreadthinlywithinsufficientworkbeingavailableto satisfy demand (WFP Uganda 2005). Communities oftenaddressthehighdemandforworkopportunitiesbyspreadingthe employment benefits evenly across all households andrationingthenumberofdayseachhouseholdcanwork.Therearesomepositiveexamples.

A recent WFP evaluation in Pakistan saw food for work(FFW) activities as particularly appropriate in the post 2005earthquakecontextbecausetherewasarangeofimmediateneeds for short-term infrastructure repair that lent itself tolabourintensiveandsimplepublicworks(WFPPakistan2006).InEthiopia,theMERETprogramme(ManagingEnvironmentalResources to Enable Transition to more sustainablelivelihoods)workswithcommunitiesto invest insustainablelandmanagement through food for assets activities. It wasusedasamodelfordevelopingfoodforassetsactivitiesinthePSNPandisoftencitedasanexampleofgoodpractice(WFPEthiopia2008,Rileyetal.2009,WFP2005).ExamplesofGTZpublicworksthatbalancecashandfoodforworkinNepalandAfghanistanareshowninBox3.

7.5 Grey areas: other food secur�ty �nstruments

Although sometimes now included in the food assistancetoolbox,therewasnotscopeinthisstudytofocusindepthon recent developments in relation to agricultural inputand livestock interventions. Seed distributions continueto dominate agricultural programming in emergency andrecovery contexts. Interest is growing in a wider rangeof livestock interventions in pastoral areas, including de-stocking, re-stocking and fodder provision. New livestockemergency standards have recently been produced (Alinovietal.2007,WatsonandCatley2008).Greaterattentionhasbeen given to a broader range of interventions to supportlivelihoods and promote market development (SEEP 2007,USAID 2007, Maxwell et al. 2008). The Small EnterpriseEducation and Promotion (SEEP) network has published anew set ofminimum standards for economic recovery aftercrisis that focus on strategies and interventions designedto promote enterprises, employment, cash flow and asset

management among affected enterprises and livelihoods(SEEP2009).

Interestisincreasinginthepossibleuseofinsuranceasaformof response to food insecurity and disasters. Micro-financeproviders have been examining the possibility of extendingtheirproductrangetoprovidemicro-insurance;atamoremacrolevel some governments have taken out ‘catastrophe bonds’againstextremeweathereventsandUNagencieshavebeenpiloting weather based insurance indexes (Twigg 2004,WFP2005,SlaterandDana2006).Interestisgrowinginquestionsrelatingto land inhumanitariancrisesandarecognitionthatbetteraddressinglandissuesiscrucial(IDMC2009).

Box 3: GTZ Cash and Food for Work (CFW) �n nepal

and Afghan�stan

NepalApartnershipbetween theMinistryof LocalDevelopment,BMZ,WFP,GTZandDFID inNepalhasbeen implementinga public works programme that has provided short-termemployment to nearly 60,000 people every year, largelyon road building projects. An evaluation of the ‘RuralCommunityInfrastructureWorksprogramme’(Dietz2006a)focused in part on the appropriate balance betweenpaymentsincashorfood,recommendingcashinareaswithestablishedmarkets,foodaidforshort-termprogrammesinremoteareasandamixtureofcashandfoodforlonger-termprojectsinremote,mountainousareas.

Theevaluationfoundthatcashpaymentswerelikelytobemorecostefficientthanfoodaidandlessplaguedbydelaysgiven the huge logistical challenges of delivering food inNepal.Cashwouldenablepeopletobuyalternativestorice,potentially containing ‘more nutrients and calories’. TheevaluationarguedthatCFWwaslargelysubstitutedforotherformsofemploymentandsoaswitchtogreateruseofcashwouldnotcreateinflationrisks.Programmesusingcashhaddevelopedproceduresformanagingsecurityrisks.Themainreason for caution in the expanded use of cash was thatcashmightincreasethecostsforrecipientsinremoteareaswhowould have to travel long distances to purchase andtransportfoodtotheirhomes.

AfghanistanGTZhasbeen implementingBMZ-financed emergency andtransitionassistance(DETA)programmesinKunduz,Takharand Badakhshan provinces in northern Afghanistan since2002.Cash forworkactivitiesstarted in2004,andgainedmomentum in2006.GTZ’sCFWactivitieshaveguaranteedroughly 15,000workers access to some cashover the lastthreeyears,benefitingmorethan100,000Afghanisannually.InBadakhshanprovince,150,000workdayswereprovidedeveryyear.Onaverage,CFWbeneficiarieshaveparticipatedinCFWschemesfor15days(Lamadéetal.2010).

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Thereareagrowingrangeofoptionsandinnovationsinboththedeliveryoffoodassistanceasfoodandofcashtopeople.In delivering food-based transfers, the traditional modelof surplus in-kind food aid being transported from donorcountries to developing countries is continuing to decline,although tied foodaid continues tobea largepartof somedonors’portfolios,notablytheUS.Agrowingvolumeoffoodaidisbeingprocuredlocallyandregionally—thisisthefocusof attention as themain area of innovation.WFP ismakingefforts to ensure that its procurement policies benefit tosmallholder farmers indevelopingcountries.WFPandNGOssuchasCAREhavedevelopedstrongpartnershipswithprivatesector logistics organisations (TNT and UPS) to strengthentheircommoditymanagementsystems.1

8.1 Food a�d procurement

There is an emerging near consensus amongst funding andoperationalagenciesabouttheappropriatesequenceofstepsindecidinghow toprovide foodassistance, especially in anemergencyor reliefcontext.First,anassessment is requiredthat determines whether food assistance is required. Thesubsequentstepsarepresentedinthefollowingdecisiontree,which is adapted from that set out by Barrett andMaxwell(2005,Figure10.1).

Procurementisakeylinkinthesupplychainthatbringsfoodassistancetothoseinneed.Whenfoodtransfer,asopposedto providing cash or vouchers, is deemed to be the mostappropriate tool then three possible procurement responseoptions:

(i) usingcashtopurchasefoodaidlocallyorregionally;(ii) usingcashtopurchaseoninternationalmarketsor(iii) providingdirecttransfersofdonor-sourcedor‘tied’food

aid.

Actual decisions involve a judgement about the range ofspecific needs for particular products and commodities andtheir market conditions. Decisionsmust be sensitive to thelikelyelapsed time fordeliveryandquality.Asboth regionalprocurementandinternationaltenderinginvolvetrade-basedtransactions, WFP and other donors have conventionallyaggregatedtheseas‘triangulartransactions’thataresourcedoutside the donor or recipient country. A more refinedcategorisationwouldbehelpfulwherecountryeconomiesare

smallandthedifferencesinarrivaltimescanbeconsiderable.Forexample,movingmaizefromTanzaniatoMalawihasquitedifferentimplicationsthanorganisinganinternationaltenderorshippingin-kindfromtheUSA.

In termsoforigins, thebalanceofdirect transfersof in-kindtiedaidandcash-fundedlocalandtriangulartransactionshasshiftedstronglytothelatter,asshowninSection2(Table2).Ifthelevelsofaidduringthetwomostrecentcommoditypricespikes and periods of relatively tight supply are compared(1996–8 and 2006–8), the considerable change in sourcingbecomesclear.Totalfoodaidvolumesduringthemorerecentandmore severe price spike in 2008were down 15 percentonthepreviousspikebutthelevelsofdirectin-kindaidweredown46percent.Incontrast,levelsoftriangulartransactions

Chapter 8Del�ver�ng food ass�stance

A. Is food ass�stance requ�red?

No Thenfocusonotherformsofassistance.

Yes

B. Are local food markets funct�on�ng well?

No Providecashtransfersorjobstotargeted recipients.

Yes Thenprovidetargeted-foodbasedtransfers.

C. Is there suff�c�ent food ava�lable nEARBY to f�ll the gap?

No Providefoodtransfersbasedonlocalor regionalpurchases.

Yes Thenprovidefoodaidbasedon trans-oceanicshipments.

D. Are funds unt�ed?

No Thenacquireandshipfoodthrough internationalrestrictedorcompetitivetender.

Yes Thendeliverfoodaidin-kindfromdonor country.

F�gure 9: Dec�s�on tree for food ass�stance

1 However, some in European agencies felt their capacity tomanage theprocurementanddeliveryoffoodwhetherlocallyorfromEuropehadbeenweakened when the non-profit EuronAid, which many had used, had toceaseoperation.

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and local purchases were respectively 22 percent and 136percenthigherthanduringthepreviousspike.

In quantitative terms, local purchases during the five years2004–8 have exceeded one million tonnes. Triangulartransactions, a composite group of regional procurementoften restricted to neighbouring countries and internationalcompetitive procurement, are more variable around a 1.5milliontonneslevel.TheUSisthemainsupplierofin-kindtiedfoodaid,accountingfor89percentofallthedirecttransfersfromthefunderscoveredinthisstudy(Table3)withJapanandCanadamakingsmallerbut,relativetotheirownprogrammes,largedirecttransfers(45percentand44percentrespectively.Most funderssupport localand triangular transactions,withtheECandtheUNbeingthelargestin2008.

Cash contributions fromdonors specifically toWFP are alsoincreasing.AccordingtoWFPstaff interviewed, in2009cashmadeup53percentoftotalcontributions.Thus,WFPisableto procure more food in developing countries. In 2009, 82percentofthefoodprocuredbyWFPthroughlocal,regionalorinternationalcompetitivetenderswassourcedin75countriesthathavebeenclassifiedasleast-developedcountries(LDCs)or other low income countries (OLICs), at a cost of $ 772million(WFP2009d).2

8.2 Local and Reg�onal Procurement (LRP)

The critical issues in procurement concern the sequencingof decisions and the actual flexibility that agencies have insourcinganddelivery.Asnoted inSection2,during the lastdecademost donors havemade their fundingmore flexiblethrough embarking on systematic untying (e.g., Australiaand Canada) or removing residual tying (e.g., Denmark andNorway).Inconsequence,WFPandotheroperationalagencieswith their support have favoured LRPs and other triangulartransactions, especially in emergency contexts. In contrasttheUSasthelargestprovider,isstillalmostentirelylimitedtodirecttransferincludingahighproportionoftiedshipping.

Whenmarketconditionsarefavourable,LRPtypicallyreducesprocurement costs through savings in commodity purchase,transport and handling (ACF 2006b, Aker 2008, CARE 2006USA, OECD 2006, Coulter 2007, DG ECHO 2009b, USGAO2009b, USDA 2009, Tschirley and del Castillo 2009). Forexample,the2006OECDstudyfoundthatlocalpurchaseswereonaverage40percentlesscostlyandtriangulartransactions30 percent that direct transfers. This result is reconfirmedby theUSGovernmentAccountabilityOffice (USGAO2009b)report which found that during the period 2001-2008 foodcommoditiespurchasedinandshippedfromtheUScostsome34 percent more than had these same commodities beenpurchased in the Sub-Saharan African recipient countries.

(Comparative costsof tiedversus in-countryprocurementoffoodforLatinAmericawere,however,roughlythesame.)Thestudy also found that food from the US required 147 daysonaverage to reach ten selectedAfrican countries,whereaslocally purchased food was available in 35 days and foodprocuredinneighbouringcountriesin41days.

Another reason why LRPs are favoured is their potential tobenefit developing country agriculture and strengthen thefoodmarketsuponwhichmanyofthepoorestandmostfood-insecurehouseholdsdepend(CARE2006USACoulter2007,DGECHO2009b,WFP2009a).

Just as the favourable examples come fromevaluations andstudies commissionedby agencies supportingor organisingLRPs on a large scale, so the cautionary examples seem tocomefromthosemorecommittedtoin-kindaid.AUSDAstudysuggeststhatthecostefficiencytimelinessanddevelopmentalgains from LRPs aremore likely attainable with predictablemulti-year food procurements for delivery in developmentcontexts, and some protracted crises, than with one-offemergencyfoodaidpurchases(USDA2009).

Considering the now-large scale of LRPs and triangulartransactions, the actual reported cases of negative effectssuchasinflatingconsumerpricesanddisruptinglocalmarketstructures are few, but do occur, for example as in Niger in2005.3Thisexamplesomewhattempersthenotionthatlocaland/orregionalpurchaseisalwaysthebestresponsetofoodshortagesandpointstotheneedforcontext-specificdecisionsandfurtherdeveloping-marketanalysiscapabilities.

Other challenges in organising LRP exist: Contractinginstruments in some recipient countries are often moredifficult to enforce.Quality controlmeasuresare sometimesless rigorouslyenforced.Locally-procured transportmaynotbeavailableinneededquantityortimeliness(USGAO2009a).Forsuchreasons,WFPiskeentomaintainaflexibilitytobuysomeof its commodities, in particular fortified andblendedfoodssuchascorn-soyablend(CSB),biscuitsandvegetableandpalmoil,inmiddleincomeanddevelopedcountries.

Fewwouldnowarguethatdirecttransfersoftiedaidarelikelyto be the more efficient way to reach the most vulnerableor disagree thatwhere possible agricultural production andfoodmarkets in developing countries should be supported.Risks are associated with direct transfers: inappropriate

2 WFP’s Food Procurement Annual Report provides a breakdown of thesourcing countries: http://www.wfp.org/content/food-procurement-annual-report-2009

3In2005acombinationof localpurchasesof foodbytheGovernmentofNiger,WFPandanumberofinternationalNGOscombinedwithspeculationbylocalcommoditytraderscausedfoodpricestorapidlyescalatebeyondthereachofmostruralpeople,increasingfoodinsecurity.Ajoint,independentevaluation of the humanitarian response to the crisis concluded that thenegative impact of the local purchases was particularly severe becauseof specific market conditions. The local and regional cereal deficit in2004–5 and lower-than-anticipated potential for cereal imports were notadequately taken into consideration (Wilding et al., 2005). Consequently,the localpurchasesserved to reducesupply fromsome localitiesalreadyexperiencingadeficit.

45


commodities,thestronglikelihoodofhighercostsanddelaysandconsequentmarketdisruption,especiallyifemergencyaidarrivestoolate.LRPsarealsonotwithoutrisksforanydonororagency that is intervening in themarketsofadevelopingcountry.Asthedecisiontree(Figure9)makesclear,keyissuesareaproperassessmentofnearbymarketconditionsandtheflexibilityatanoperationalleveltomakethemostappropriateresponseinthesespecificcircumstances.

As theuseofLRPshasgrown, realising theirdevelopmentalpotential is a recognised challenge. In some cases, those

on the supply side directly benefiting from LRPs are morelikely to be either larger-scale farmers with surpluses tomarket or larger traders who can deliver large quantitiesof high quality grain, bid from existing stock positions andmeetother contract requirements (USDA2009).However, inmanydevelopingcountries,particularlyinAfrica,larger-scalefarmersdonottendtoproducethestaplefoodcommodities—cereals, ricepulsesetc.—thatcurrentlymakeupWFP’s foodbasket. In such cases, larger traders tend to buy from amultitude of smaller-scale farmers, who are often not in apositiontoselltheircommoditiesfora‘fair’priceatthefarm

Box 4: WFP’s Purchase for Progress (P4P) In�t�at�ve

WFP’sP4Pinitiativeiscurrentlyunderwayin19of21selectedcountries.ItintendstouseWFP’spurchasingpoweranddemandfor staple food commodities (cereals, pulses and blendedfoods) to help smallholder farmers and small traders benefitfromitsoperationsinagriculturalmarkets.Thisgoalisalignedwithothernational,regionalandglobaleffortstoaddressfoodinsecuritybypromoting smallholders’ agriculturalproductionandaccess tomarkets, suchas theNEPAD’sCAADP,ACTESA(Alliance of Commodity Trade in East and Southern Africa)andtheComprehensiveFrameworkforAction.Atotalof$121millionhasbeen allocated to theprogrammeby theHowardG. Buffet Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,European Commission and governments of Belgium, CanadaandtheUnitedStates.

The P4P pilot aims to test a range of new procurementapproaches:

• Compet�t�ve processes under conditions favourable tofarmers’organisationsandsmall/mediumtraderssuchas‘softtenders’withlessstringentconditions,cerealfairsandcommodityexchanges.

• D�rect contract�ng negotiated between WFP and farmers’organisationsto‘bringdemanddownthevaluechain’.Insomecountries,warehousereceiptsystemshavebeenestablished,wherebyfarmersmightdeposittheircommoditiesinacertifiedwarehouseinreturnforareceipt,whichcanbeexchangedforcash at a local institution. The commodities need to meetcertainstandardsofqualityandgrade.

• Forward contract�ng committing WFP to purchase aspecified quantity and quality of a food commodity atsomepoint in the futureat aminimumguaranteedprice.Foodpurchased through forward contractswould tend tobeforschoolfeedingornutritionalprogrammesinrecoverycontexts,wheredemandcanmoreeasilybepredicted.Suchacontractwouldnotbesignedforfoodaidinresponsetoasudden-onsetemergency.

P4P also aims to promote the development of local foodprocessing capacity by linking it to smallholder farmers tosupplyrawcommodities.

WFPisworkingwithover50partnersincludinggovernments,UNagencies,internationalandnationalNGOsandtheprivate

sector to implement P4P, as well as providing sub-grants tosupplysidepartners.Allofthe$121millionsupportscapacitybuildingactivitiessuchasstrengtheningfarmers’associations,constructing warehouses, facilitating farmers’ access tocredit,providing training inP4Pproceduresandensuring theparticipationandempowermentofwomen.

Comparedwiththe2.6millionmtoffoodprocuredbyWFPin2009,P4P is small scale.ByDecember2009, 174mtof foodhad been contracted under P4P modalities in 14 countries.Seventy-six percent was contracted in East and SouthernAfrica, 15 percent in Central America and 9 percent inWestAfrica.Ofthis,60percent(23,148mt)wascontractedthroughfarmers’organisations,eitherdirectlyorthroughsofttenders;19 percent (7,583 mt) through the Commodity Exchange inZambia; 14 percent (5,512 mt) through small and mediumtraders in Mozambique and Zambia and 6 percent (2,240mt) throughdifferent formsofwarehouse receipt systems inUgandaandTanzania(WFP2010a).

Quality control, limited presence of supply-side partnersat field level, insufficient availability of rural credit forsmallholder farmers, the difficulty of price discovery (theprocessusedtoidentifythepriceforaparticularcommodity)and natural disasters including floods and droughts are themain challenges identified by WFP’s purchase for progressteam. Others note that P4P could negatively affect marketsandthewelfareofproducersandconsumers,particularlyifitsunderlyingassumptions—(i)smallholderfarmershavelimitedaccess to markets; (ii) P4P purchases will have a minimalimpact on consumer prices; (iii) higher farm-gate priceswillencourage farmers to produce more in the long-term—arenot valid (Aker 2008). Higher prices paid to smallholderfarmersviaP4Palsohavethepotentialtodisplacesmall-scaletraders and alter traditional relationships between farmersandtraders(ibid).

P4P’simpactwilldependentirelyonthecontext,quantityandpurchasepricesofprocurements(Beekhuis2008,citedinAker2008).WFP’sVulnerabilityAssessmentUnitwillneedtomonitorarangeofindicatorsverycloselyincludingprices,productionlevelsandtradeflows.Forthisreason,AkercautionsthatP4Pis not necessarily a ‘win-win’, but a ‘win-maybe’. Amid-termevaluationisplannedfor2011.

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gate.Recognisingthatsmallerproducersandtradersarelikelyto be disadvantaged, WFP launched Purchase for Progress(P4P)—a five-year (September 2008–13), $121 million pilotinitiative—that aims to use the agency’s purchasing powerand the technical expertise of a wide range of partners toenable500,000smallholderfarmers,cooperativesandsmall/medium traders sell their staple food commodities at a fairprice(seeBox4).Theconcernsexpressedaboutthisinitiativesuggestthattherecouldbepotentialtrade-offsbetweenthemultipleobjectiveswhicharebeingloadedontopurchasing.8.2.1 Donors and agency policiesAllthedonorsandagenciessurveyedforthisstudyendorsedtheprovisionofcashtofundLRPs,albeittodifferentdegrees.Australia and Canada provide funds to WFP and NGOs toprocurefoodaidasclosetotheareaofneedaspossible.TheEuropean Commission (EC) and several EU-member states(includingBelgium,Netherlands,France,GermanyandIreland)support WFP and a range of NGOs to procure locally andregionallyinbothemergencyandnon-emergencycontextsasameansofsupportingthegrowthofagriculture,marketsandlivelihoodsindevelopingcountries.Forexample,BelgiumwasthefirstcountrytoparticipateinWFP’sPurchaseforProgressinitiativeandhassupportedBelgianNGOsworkinginDRCtopromotelocalpurchasesinsurplusareasfordeliveryinfoodemergenciesinthatcountry.

TheUSgovernmentisactually,becauseofthesheerrelativescaleof its foodaidbudget, a significant funderof regionalprocurement as emergency assistance. The administrationalso recognised (in its unsuccessful proposals—up to andincluding the 2009 Farm Bill —for 25 percent of Title IIresourcesadministeredbyUSAID)thatLRPscould,dependingon local circumstances, be an appropriate response to foodinsecurityinemergenciesandnon-emergencies.Section3206of the 2008 Farm Bill provides the USDA, not USAID, with$60millionover fouryears for the implementationofaPilotLocalandRegionalPurchaseProgramthatwillpermitgreaterflexibility in respondingtobothemergencyandchronic foodaidneedsaround theworld (USDA2009).Theexperience istobeevaluatedbyanindependentM&Efirm,startingin2011.Thereisalsocurrentinterestin,althoughlittleexperiencewith,usingLRPtobenefitsmallfarmersinlow-incomecommunities(USDA2009).

USAID spent $125 million in 2009 development assistance(DA) and international disaster assistance (IDA) resourceson local and regional purchase, as provided by the 2008Supplemental Appropriations Act (ibid).4 In addition, billshave been introduced in the present Congress that would

provide the Administration with an additional $200 millionin international disaster assistance, some or all of whichcouldbeusedforLRP,or inprovidingcashvouchersorcashtransfersdirectlytofoodinsecurerecipients.BoththeSenateand the House of Representatives have introduced bills toinitiate legislation, in the context of the President’s GlobalHunger and FoodSecurity Initiative (see below) thatwould,amongother things,enablegreaterLRP. It isunclear,at thispoint, whether these bills5 will eventually be enacted intolaw.However, greater recognitionof theneed to respond tothe problems of global hunger and food insecurity stronglysuggestthatadditionalfundswillbemadeavailable(outsidethe food aid legislative process) that can be used for LRP.However,thisefforttoincreaseLRPhasbeenstronglyresistedby commodity, transport andNGO interest groupsand, asarecentUSGAOnoted,aslongasUSlawrequires75percentofAmericanfoodtobeshippedonUSflagvessels,theabilitytouseLRPwillcontinuetobeconstrained(Hanrahan2009).

DonorsrelyheavilyonWFPtocarryoutLRPs.Theseoperationshavebeenbroadlyfoundtobecost-effectiverelativetoothermodalities when large quantities are needed for large-scaleoperations (e.g., OECD 2006). However, WFP operationalpractice isnotwithout itscritics,becauseofwhat isseentobe relatively inflexibleprocedures (Tschirley anddel Castillo2009).WFP’sgeneralprocurementpolicyistopurchasefrompre-qualifiedsuppliersthroughacompetitivebiddingprocess.WFPengages in threedifferent ‘levels’of foodprocurement:local,regionalandinternational,allthreeofwhichcanresultinthepurchaseoffoodfromdevelopingcountries.WFP’sfinancialrulesdictatethat‘whenconditionsareequal,preferencewillbe given to purchasing from developing countries.’ Beforeissuingatender,carefulconsiderationisgiventothelocationofthemostadvantageousplacetobuy,relativetotheareaofneed. Factors such as taste acceptability, delivery time andcomparisonoflocalpricestoimportparityplayanimportantpart intheevaluation. Inaddition,restrictions inbothdonorand recipient countries on the trade in geneticallymodifiedfoods influencedonorandagencydecisionsaboutwhere tosource food aid. The number of bans or restrictions on theimportationofgeneticallymodifiedfoodsinSouthernAfricancountries is a possible factor behind the increase inWFP’slocal and regional maize procurements during the past fiveyears(USDA2009).

Iflocalpricesriseaboveimportparity,tensionrisesbetweenthepreferenceforlocalpurchaseandcost-efficiency.However,in emergencies, the need for timeliness has led WFP tooccasionallypurchaseatpricesabove importparity inordertoreachthoseinneedinanexpeditiousmannerandtoavoidpipelinebreaks.

AsignificantchallengefacingWFPinachievingcost-efficiencyisthatdonors’contributionsare, inmostcases,madeonan

4WFP FAIS data indicate that the US funded local purchases of 84,560tonnes of cereals and 16,018 tonnes of non-cereals in 2008, as wellas 58,945 tonnes of cereals and 19,718 tonnes of non-cereals throughtriangular transactions in third countries. To put these acquisitions inperspective they represented about 9 percent of local and triangularpurchases in volume and exceeded the total food aid levels of France orGermanyorNetherlands.

5HR3077andSenateReport111-19,bothontheGlobalFoodSecurityActof2009.

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operation-by-operation basis. As such, money pledged bydonors does not always arrive in a timely manner. Delayscan undermine procurement planning and result in costinefficiencies, particularly in emergencies as demandsurpassessupplyandpricesbegintorisetowardsimportparity.According to WFP, multi-annual, multilateral contributionswouldhelptoaddressthis.Australiaisamongthefirstdonorstoformaliseamulti-year,multilateralcommitmenttoWFPandthis agreement is being used as a benchmark to encourageothers to follow a similar approach. As a rule, WFP onlyacceptscontributionsfromdonorsforfullrecoveryofthecostofinternationaltransport,storageandhandling.

DonorsmayalsofundNGOs,commercialtradersorumbrellahumanitarianprocurementcentres(HPCs)toprocurefoodaidindependentlyfromWFP.Some86percentoflocalpurchasesand 93 percent of triangular purchases are channelledmultilaterally(WFP2008).

Relatively little quantitative evidence is available on NGOprocurement policies and practices since the demise ofEuronAid (see below). CRS indicated that it had done$10 million worth of local purchases from its own fundsover the past seven years, which is relatively small incomparison toWFP. CRS’s current policy is to expand localand regional procurement of commodities, using practicesthatensurequalityandavoidpricespikesandhardships tonearby consumers, to increase the flexibility of emergencyresponseandtouselocalandregionalpurchasetostimulateagricultural market development across the food systemvalue chain including growing,milling and processing (CRS2009). Welthungerhilfe indicated that approximately onethird of the food aid it delivers is from WFP; the rest itprocuresindependently.

UmbrellaprocurementonbehalfofNGOscanbeacost-effectiveway of reducing the analytical and operational demandson NGOs and donor country offices, while maintaining theflexibilityprovidedbyNGOs(TschirleyanddelCastillo2009,EuronAid2009).However,in2008,EuronAid,anEC-supportedHPC, collapsed after the EC changed its public procurementlaw and, in particular, its rules on award procedures forcontracts.Thechangesleftnolegalbasisforcontractingwithanentityownedbyprivatecharities,suchasEuronAid.Singlecontracting based on competition became the only way tocomplywith the EC’s new framework for procurement usingODAfunding,whichspelledtheendofEuronAid.

Tosummarise,thecommonlycitedandwidelydemonstratedadvantages of LRP are that it facilitates the delivery ofnutritionally or socially appropriate commodities, is timelyand cost-effective and can support agricultural and marketdevelopment. In contrast, the inefficiencies and potentialnegativeeffectsoftiedaidin-kindhavebeenwelldocumented(OECD 2006, FAO 2005, Clements 2007, USGAO 2009b).However,allfood-basedtransfersimplyinterveningdirectlyor

supportinginterventioninthemarketsofrecipientcountries.Fordonorsandoperationalagencies,especiallyinemergencycontexts, making difficult decisions based in extremelyincompleteinformationandjudgementsaboutthebalanceofrisksmustbechallenging.

8.3 monet�sat�on

Inthelastdecade,therehasbeenamajorshiftintheuseofmonetisedfoodaid,andmonetisation6isnowlittlepracticedother thanbyNGOsusing funding from theUSgovernment.Monetisation in the arena of food aid refers to sale of US(or other donor) food aid overseas in a developing countryin order to generate cash resources for other programsaddressingthecausesofhunger.Duringthelasttwentyyears,monetisationhas largelybeentheprovinceofUSNGOsthathavegeneratedseveralbilliondollarsworthof‘localcurrencyproceeds’.Originallyitwasallowedinsmallportions(‘partialmonetisation’)asawaytopermitNGOstogeneratesomelocalcashtopaytheexpensesoftransportinganddistributingfoodaid,wherethefoodwasdelivereddirectlytobeneficiaries.Bythe 1990s,many food aid programs involved the sale of allfoodaidtoanNGOinacountry.ThescopeformonetisationandconditionsforavoidingWTOdisciplinesispotentiallyfarmore restricted than at present if the draft AoA were to beratified(WTO2008).

Some NGOs, for example World Vision, continue to rely onmonetisationforasignificantamountoftheirfundingfromtheUSgovernmentandarethereforereluctanttostopusingitasan instrument despite acknowledging its inefficiencies. Theirposition is that monetisation continues to provide valuabledevelopmentresourcesandthattheUSCongressisnotlikelytoapproveequallevelsofcash.Ifmonetisationwerephasedout,thetotalresourcesavailablefortheirdevelopmentprogrammesamong food-insecure populations would almost certainly bereduced. They see the sale of food commodities for localcurrencyasa ‘secondbest’ resource.The focus thenshifts totheeffectivenessofthoselocalcurrencyresourcesindeliveringfoodsecuritybenefitsfortargetedfoodinsecurecommunitiesandhouseholds versus the financial and efficiency costs andnegative consequences, if any, of the monetisation process.This isanareaofenquiryneedingconsiderablymorescrutinythanhasbeenundertakentodate.

Other international NGOs including CARE, a major US foodaid partner, and especially the members of the Europeanfood security grouping have ceased to be supportive ofmonetisation.Forexample,SavetheChildrencallsforgreater

6 Monetisation is, from an economic perspective, analyticallyindistinguishable from programme aid. The formal distinction is one ofchannel(indirectaidthroughanNGOormultilateralagency)and,usually,specificationof theuseof the funds. Inpractice, thedistinctionbetweenprogrammefoodaidandmonetisedproject foodaid isoftenoneofscaleand channels. Monetisation is usually associated with more specificallydefinedoff-budgetusesthroughNGOs.Projectaidisusuallyonasmallerscale.Projectactionsarealsomorelikelytobemarginalinrelationtothetotalsupplyofcommoditiesintherecipienteconomy(OECD2006).

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flexibility from donors to provide the most appropriateresources.Itarguesthatmonetisationisaninefficientresourcetransfer mechanism that should be replaced by equivalent

Box 5: CARE UsA’s pos�t�on on monet�sat�on

‘Experiencehasshownthatmonetizationrequiresintensivemanagementandisfraughtwithrisks.Procurement,shipping,commodity management and commercial transactions aremanagement intensive and costly. Experience has shownthat these transactions are also fraught with legal andfinancialrisks.

Monetisationiseconomicallyinefficient.PurchasingfoodintheUS,shippingitoverseas,andthensellingittogeneratefundsforfoodsecurityprogrammesisfarlesscost-effectivethan the logical alternative—simplyproviding cash to fundfoodsecurityprogrammes.

When monetization involves open market sale of com-modities to generate cash, which is almost always thecase, it inevitably causes commercial displacement. It canthereforebeharmful to tradersand local farmers,andcanundermine the development of local markets, which isdetrimentaltolonger-termfoodsecurityobjectives.

Source:CAREUSA,2006.

cash resources. Where cash resources are not availableSave the Children will ‘advocate for a principled approachto monetisation’ (Save the Children 2006). In 2006, CARE,committed itself to shift outofmonetisationby2009 (CARE2006,USA).TheproblemsCAREUSAsawwithmonetizationareindicatedinBox5.

Monetisation had been a big part of CARE’s portfolio andCARE’s food for peace funding has reduced significantlysince 2006. The white paper created perceptions internallyandexternally thatCAREwas ‘gettingoutof food forpeace’or ‘getting out of food aid’ rather than just phasing out ofmonetisation.CAREdoesstillhavebigfoodaidprogrammes(e.g.,inEthiopiawiththePSNP)anditisWFP’ssecondlargestpartner.CARE is increasingly lookingtodo itsown localandregional purchase of food aid via funding from USAID andFood for Peace to enable it to retain core procurement andlogistics capacity, which were starting to be lost with thephaseoutofmonetisation.

Critics as well as defenders of monetisation are concernedabout the predictability of fundingwhere emergencies havefirstcallonfoodaid.Thisconcernexplainstherequirementforminimummonetisationwritten intoearlier farmbillsandtheintroductionofa‘safebox’fordevelopmentalfoodaidinthe2008FarmBill(seeAnnex2).

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Thissectionfocusesonrecentdevelopmentsinthedistributionand programming of food assistance including the Sphererevisionprocess, challenges in targetingand the innovativeuse of new technologies for registration and distributionprocesses.

9.1 R�ghts, standards and pr�nc�ples

The most important new development in standards andprinciples relating to food assistance is the revision of theSphere Minimum Standards. Now reaching completion, itfeaturesarevisionofthewaysinwhichfoodsecurity,foodaidandnutritionaredealtwith.Inplaceofseparatesectionsonfoodaid,nutritionandfoodsecurity,onechapteronfoodandnutritionsecurityiscurrentlydividedintosixsections:assessmentandanalysis

• infantandyoungchildfeeding• treatment of acute malnutrition and micronutrient

deficiencies• foodtransfers• cashandvouchertransfers• foodsecurityandlivelihoods

One of the standards relates specifically to the use of cashand vouchers. The food security and livelihoods sectionhas standards relating to primary production, income andemployment and access to markets (Sphere 2010). Ratherthanstandingseparately,foodtransfersandcashandvouchertransfersarenowmore clearly integratedwith foodsecurityandnutrition.Thechapteriscurrentlyindraftformforpublicreviewandwillbefinalisedin2010.

Thefocalpointsforthe,foodsecurityandnutritionchaptersare, however, still grappling with the issue of definitionsso this may change in the final drafting process. Thenew chapter aims to better integrate food security, foodassistance and nutrition. As well as including cash andvoucher transfers as possible instruments within the foodsecurity section, other new elements are strengthenedsectionsonsupplychainmanagement(includingtheethicsoftransportcontracting)andstrongerattentiontocrosscuttingissues such as gender, the elderly and the environment.Some of the indicators have beenmademore specific. Forexample, rather thansaying thatdistributionpointsshouldbe‘ascloseaspossible’tothebeneficiariesaproposedcoreindicatorstates

Traveltimeanddistancetofinaldistributionpoints:beneficiaries should not have to walkmore than10 km (approximately 3 hours) eachway.(Sphere2010).

Itishopedthatprovidingamorespecificbenchmarkwillhelptofocusattentionontheissueandprovideastartingpointfordebatewithauthorities.

Voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisationof theright toadequatefood inthecontextofnational foodsecuritywereadoptedatthe127thsessionoftheFAOCouncilin 2004 (FAO 2005). These voluntary guidelines provide awidelyaccepted framework for foodsecurity andhavebeenused to promote a more rights-based approach to foodassistance emphasising the accountability of duty bearers,principallyrecipientcountrygovernments,donorgovernmentsandintergovernmentalagencies(BMZ2007).TheUNsecretarygeneral identified the right to food as a third track of theComprehensive Framework for Action at the Madrid HighLevel Conference on FoodSecurity in January 2009.TheUNHigh Level Task Force has emphasised the need to addressallaspectsoffoodsystemsfromahumanrightsperspective.The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights(OHCHR)hasrecentlyjoinedtheHighLevelTaskForce(UnitedNations2009).

9.2 Target�ng and shar�ng

Overthelastdecade,anumberofstudieshavebeendoneonfoodaidtargeting.Withoutexception,thesestudiesconcludethattargetingwithincommunitiesinevitablyledtosharingofrationsexceptforafewcaseswherethefoodinsecuritywasnotsevereandtheproportionofthepopulationtargetedwashigh (Jaspars and Shoham 1999, Jaspars 2000, Taylor andSeaman2004,Mathys2004).

Reviewingcurrenttargetingpracticesincomplexemergencies,Maxwelletal.(2010)notethattargetingbygroupidentity,suchasIDPs,isthemostcommonformofadministrativetargeting.InsouthernSudan,amajorfocusin2008–9wasonreturnees,even though those who never left or who were displacedlocallymaybeequallyfoodinsecure.Asinpreviousstudies,findings were that food aid is shared among amuch largergroupofpeoplethanplannedbyhumanitarianagencies.Thisisbecauseeveryonewithinthecommunityisperceivedtobeentitled to foodaid,oraffectedby theemergency.However,

Chapter 9operat�onal programm�ng of food

ass�stance

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it also happens for security considerations. In Somalia, forexample,notdistributingfoodequallytoeveryonewouldposeasecurityriskforclanleadersinvolvedinthedistribution.

Redistributionwassometimeswellmanagedbutatothertimeswaschaotic,violentandcoerciveandposedconsiderableriskfor the distribution agency andbeneficiaries alike.Thiswasparticularly the case where small amounts of food aid hadto be distributed to large numbers of people and the crisiswas severe. In such instances, it is common that the mostvulnerable (socially, politically or economically) will receivethe least or are excluded altogether, aswas found in SouthSudan in 1998 and in Somalia in 1992 and now (Jaspars2000, Jaspars andMaxwell 2008). The consequence is thatvulnerableormarginalisedgroupshavetoexposethemselvestogreaterriskstomakealiving;in2008,someIDPsinAfgoywent back into Mogadishu to find work or charity in themidstofon-goingconflict. Incontrast, inKaramoja,Uganda,generalfooddistributionisbeingprovidedtothemajorityofthe population and is contributing to protecting livelihoodsand decreasing the frequency of which people are forcedto engage in negative coping strategies. Similarly in Darfur,food aidwas found to be effective inminimising protectionrisks associated with engaging in livelihoods strategies inunsafe areas (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006, Jasparsand O’Callaghan 2008). Some more findings from the TuftsUniversity–WFPtargetingstudyareshowninBox6.

Analysingtherisksofdoingtargetingthroughlocalinstitutionsorgovernancesystemsisanimportantpartofplanningfooddistributionsincomplexemergencies.Aretheyaccountable?Representative?Localinstitutionscanvaryfromclanleaders,togovernment,toreliefcommitteesespeciallyformedforthepurposeofdistribution.Participationindecision-makingisakeyfactor.Distributionworksbestwhenchecksandbalancesalreadyexistedwithintraditionalgovernancemechanisms,orwheretheycanbe introducedthroughmonitoring,providinginformation on entitlements or establishing a complaintsmechanism(Maxwelletal.2010).TheteamproducedguidancenotesforWFPonhowtodothis(Maxwell,Youngetal.2009)

9.3 mon�tor�ng and evaluat�on

Evaluations and studies of food aid consistently note poormonitoringasanissue.AnimportantexampleistheTripartiteEvaluation of WFP by Canada, Netherlands and Norway(Christian Michelsen Institute 1993). Recent examples,includingMaxwell et al. (2010), note that ‘the lack of goodmonitoring makes it extremely difficult to assess impact ortargeting error’. In Kenya, Simkin et al. (2008) note forWFPthat‘inmanycasestheimpactindicatorsandmonitoringtoolswerenotsuccessfullyinformingandimprovingprogrammes’.MaxwellandBurns(2008)note‘littlemonitoringoflivelihoodsand almost no post-distribution monitoring’ in SouthernSudan. In a review of supplementary feeding programmes,Navarro-Colorado (2007) found programme reporting and

analysis of outcome statistics to be ‘grossly inadequate’ inmany programmes and recommended minimum reportingstandards.

WFPdonorshaveexpressedconcernoveralackofdocumentedevidenceaboutimpactandoutcomes.Forexample,areviewinBurundicitedonedonor insistingon theneed for ‘simpleevidenceofwhatistheimpactoftheirsupporttoWFP’inorderto continue funding the PRRO (WFP 2008b). Several donorsmentionedthefailureofevaluationstoaskbroaderquestionsabout the role and relevance of food aid (WFP 2007e). Arecurring theme of WFP evaluations is limited capacity foranalysisofwhatmonitoringdataisbeingcollected.InKenya,an evaluation found no data on the extent to which assetswere protected or negative coping assets avoided. Vastlyover-complicated post distribution monitoring forms werebeingusedwith the result thatdatawasnotbeingproperlycollected,analysedorused(WFPKenya2007).

The problem may relate to WFP’s tonnage-based fundingmodel, long recognised as a constraint to programmingqualitybecauseitmakesitdifficultforWFPtomaintaincorecapacity (staff, for assessmentandmonitoring)when, asanemergencyends,thevolumesoffoodbeingdeliveredstarttofall(e.g.,BarrettandMaxwell2005).

Thevolumeoffoodassistanceandwhetherornotitisenoughto have any significant effect on livelihoods and processesof asset recovery are other issues. In south Sudan, forinstance, the sufficiency of the ration provided to returneehouseholds has been questioned: ‘Assistance provided to atypical returnee household (three month food ration, seed

Box 6: Target�ng �n complex emergenc�es

Redistribution or sharing is common in targeted fooddistributions and needs to be planned for. Redistributionis frequently ignored in reporting and post-distributionmonitoring. This has major implications for the impact offoodassistanceonnutritionandfoodsecurity;tacklingthisdilemma head-on rather than continuing to largely ignoreit should be a priority in better understanding the impactoffoodassistanceonfoodsecurity.Targetingdecisionsareoftennotmadeonthebasisofassessmentinformation.Thisoccurs for a number of reasons; First, a registration, onceit has been done (as in 2005 in Darfur), determines foodaid allocations—food aid may continue to be provided tothesesameregisteredpeople formanyyears regardlessofassessment information. Second, assessments rarely givesinformation that allows targeting beyond the district orlivelihoodzonelevel.InSomalia,averysmallnumberoffoodmonitors determinedwhich villageswould get foodwithina particular livelihood zone andwhichwould not. Securityconsiderationswereoftenparamount(JasparsandMaxwell2008,YoungandMaxwell2009).

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for one feddan) appears to underestimate need.’ In UpperNile and Jonglei, ‘currently the food ration and other inputsprovided to returnees are not enough to enable them toeffectivelyre-establishtheirlivelihoods’(Frankenberger2007,BaileyandHarragin2009).

WFPstilllackscomprehensivemeasurementsofoutcomesattheoperationalleveltobeaggregatedatthecorporatelevel.Auditorreports,internalevaluationsandtheexecutiveboardcontinue to express concerns regarding WFP’s weaknessesat reporting on outcomes. As an example, in 2008, only 33percentofallactiveWFPoperationscontributingtoStrategicObjective 1 reported on the corporate outcome indicatorsfor theobjective.WFPhas identifieda lackofaccountabilitymechanisms within the organisation to reinforce outcomemeasurement,alackofstaffwiththetechnicalskillsneededfor good analysis and limited basic monitoring capacitieswithinpartnerorganisationsaskeyconstraints to improvingoutcome-monitoringperformance.

WFP recognises these weaknesses in monitoring andacknowledgesthewiderissueofhowtopromotebettersharingoflearningandinnovationthroughastrongerknowledgebase.EffortsareunderwaytogenerateimprovementsbysettingupanewM&Eunitandfocusingonresults-basedmanagement.Food consumption scores and the coping strategy indexare now used to demonstrate impact. For instance inAfghanistan, the food consumption score is used to assessthe impactofgeneral fooddistributionactivitiesonmeetingminimum dietary requirements as well as to improve thenutritionalqualityoffoodconsumption.Inpilotfoodvoucherprogrammes,itprovidedanestimationoftheimpactoftryingtoavoidborderlinepopulationsslidingintopoorconsumptionasaresultofsoaringfoodpricesstartingattheendof2007.InDarfurafoodsecuritymonitoringsystemhasbeendevelopedto draw on new tools such as dietary diversity and food

consumption scores to produce richer data which focuseson consumption and food aid utilisation, not just on whathasbeendelivered(WFP2009b).Cashtransfersontheotherhand,havebeenrigorouslymonitoredandevaluatedfromthestart,bybothWFPandtherangeofotheragencies involvedin cashdistributions.This is evidencedby the largenumberofevaluationreportsavailableinagenciessuchasOxfamGB,ACF,SC-UK,andothers

Box 7: Rat�ons spread th�nly

InKaramoja,foodbeinggenerallydistributedtothemajorityof the population is contributing to protecting livelihoodsanddecreasingthefrequencyofwhichpeopleareforcedtoengage innegative coping strategies. Inpractice,however,generalfooddistributionsinKaramojahavesometimesbeenspreadthinlyanderratically(duetopipelinebreaks).Issueswithregistrationanddiversionmeanthat rationsarebeingsharedbetweenseveralhouseholds.

AdeleOkono is a food aid recipient in ArecekVillage nearMoroto town.She isawidowwithsevenchildren (threeofwhomareadultsandnowmarried).She ison the foodaidregister and received general food distributions four timesin 2008 but each time had to share her rationswith threeotherhouseholds.Shewasnotsureaboutthereasonforthisbut therewere concerns that the volunteersmanaging thedistributionsmight be diverting someof the food aid. Thehousehold had harvested very little due to poor rains andwas coping largely through sales of firewoodand charcoalandcasual labour in thenearbytown.Thismeansthatshehad received only about 68 kg ofmaize in ninemonths—betterthannothingbutarelativelysmallcontributiontoherfoodsecurityandlivelihoodneeds.

Source:Harveyetal.2009

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53


Food assistance continues to make up the majority ofhumanitarianappealsandtobeanimportanttoolinrespondingtocrises.However,thecontinuingshiftfromtiedin-kindtountiedfoodaid,growinglevelsoflocalandregionalprocurementandincreasinguseofcash-basedtransfersareleadingtoaquicklyshiftingenvironmentforpolicyandpractice.Theestablishmentof the CERF has increased the ability of the UN to respondrapidly to emergencies.Overall, these changes have led to agreaterflexibilityforrespondingtofoodcrisis.

The overall trend in funding for food assistance broadlydefined is unclear. Food aid as an ODA transfer in-kind orfundingforpurchaseanddeliveryoffoodhasbeendeclining.TheUSAremainsthelargestfoodaiddonor,providingaroundhalf of global food aid, mainly in-kind. Understanding USpolicy is therefore key to understanding global food aidgovernance.Therearetwocleardevelopments in theoverallpattern of other DAC members’ funding: the near generalshift to untied funding for developing country procurementand a considerable contraction in food aid levels of somedonors, notably the EU, Australia and France. The numberand importance of non-DAC funders has been increasing:Theyprovidedaround20percentoffoodaidreportedbyWFPin2008.However, relatively little isknownaboutothernon-commodity food assistance, as reporting on these activitieshasnotbeenstandardisedand integrated.The reportingonfoodassistanceisclearlyinadequateandtheimplicationsofthesedevelopmentshavenotbeensufficientlyexamined.

Regarding recipients, food assistance is concentrated in arelativelysmallnumberofcountriesaffectedbyconflictsandother protracted crises, many of which have received foodaid for prolonged periods. The protracted nature of manyfood ‘emergencies’,where food aid has beenprovidedon aregularbasisformanyyears,hasledtoanumberofinitiativesto provide longer-term social safety nets as part of socialprotection strategies. Such strategies also provide potentialforharmonisationandalignmentwithnationalgovernments.In contexts such as Ethiopia’s PSNP and Kenya’s HSNP,donors are working with both governments and a range ofinternationalactors.

The global architecture for food security and within it foodassistanceappearstobeinthemidstofsignificantchanges.Developments include the revivalof theCommitteeon FoodSecurity,theUNHighLevelTaskForceandtherecentlyagreedfood security cluster as part of the humanitarian reformprocess. There is an on-going debate about the FAC, withsome regarding itas irrelevant, somewanting tomaintain itas a legal instrument for ensuring minimum levels of food

aid,andsomeseeingitasthebasisforanewfoodassistanceconvention. The majority view appears to be that a radicalre-configuring is required. This would involve reviewing thenature of commitments, how to express them (i.e., movingaway fromwheat equivalents), membership andmonitoringandreportingrequirements.

Inparallel,changesinglobalinformationsystemsforclassifyingtheseverityofcrisis(ACE,IPCetc.)havebeenmade.However,these have not yet been matched by linking assessmentinformationtoappropriateresponses.Theevidencereviewedhere indicates a still significant gap. Similarly, the use ofmethodologies that consider the causes of food insecurity,such as livelihoods or protection approaches is still verylimited.Similarly,althoughmorestudieshavebeendone,littleprogresshasbeenmadeonfindingmoreappropriatetargetingmethods, or on assessing andmonitoring impact. Targetingpracticeshaveremainedlargelyunchanged,regardlessofthegrowingevidenceofthechallengesofdoingthiseffectively,inparticularofreachingcertainhouseholdswithincommunitiesincomplexemergencies.

Abroaderconceptoffoodassistanceisgraduallybeingadoptedin place of the former focus on food aid. Some importantdonoragenciessuchasECHOhave recentlydeveloped foodassistancepolicies.Manyagenciesalsoincreasinglydealwithfoodassistancewithinthebroaderframeworkoffoodsecurityand humanitarian policies. In the revised Sphere Handbookfor Minimum Standards, food assistance has been moreclearlyintegratedwithfoodsecurityandnutrition.

There is no common understandingwithin the internationalcommunityaboutthetermsanddefinitionsinuse.Thismakesit increasingly unclear what fits within the food assistancetoolbox. Funders and operational agencies need to makechoices aboutwhether to have a separate food aid or foodassistancepolicyortosimplyseefoodaid,cash,agriculturalinputs and so forth as part of the range of instrumentsavailabletotacklefoodsecurity.

Viewsabouttheusefulnessandeffectivenessofcertaintypesof programmes differ considerably. For example, WFP andsome NGOs implementing programmes, see school feedingas an important food assistance tool, whereas other NGOsdisputewhetheritisinfactthemostcosteffectivetooleitherto improvenutritionwithinthemostvulnerablegroupsortoimproveschoolattendance.

The majority of donors that have untied their food aid inhumanitarianandtransitioncontextsincreasinglychannelthis

Chapter 10Conclus�ons

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support throughWFP. Its growing importance makesWFP’spolicies, strategies and partnerships an important domainfordebating foodassistance.Thegrowinguseofcashasaninstrument for humanitarian response encourages a widerrangeofactors,andisanareainwhichNGOsaswellasWFParelookingtoexpandtheiractivity.

Aresurgentinterestinnutritionistheotherbigtrendinfluencingfoodassistancedebates.Thisisleadingtocallsforastepped-upfocusonthenutritionaloutcomesoffoodassistanceandonthequalityaswellasthequantityofassistanceprovided.Thistrendneedstoencompassnotjustmorenutritiousfoodstuffsbut also the monitoring of outcomes (what people actuallyreceive and consume) and the building of stronger linkagesbetween food assistance and other dimensions of nutritionpolicy. Itshould includea focusontheunderlyingcausesofmalnutritionaswellastherisksassociatedwithit,somethingthathasbeenrelativelyneglectedoverthelastdecade.

This review of recent developments leads us to identifyand prioritise five priority areas for agencies and otherstakeholders in their efforts tomake food assistance policy

andpracticemore relevant tocurrentneedsandanticipatedchallenges:

• developing a new food security architecture whichincorporatesfoodassistance;

• workingtowardsgreaterclarityoftermsanddefinitions;• whereappropriate,continuing toexpandtheuseofcash

andabroaderfoodassistancetoolboxbeyondfoodaid;• linking food assistance more clearly to the expansion

of social assistance within national social protectionstrategiesand

• focusing on the nutritional outcomes of food assistanceandlinkingfoodassistancemoreclearlytooverallnutritionstrategies.

Thesechallengesshouldbeaddressedwithacleardirectionin a number of contexts, from the highest levels of the UNto the G20/G8, in a more consistent and joined-up way.ChallengesincludetherenegotiationtheFoodAidConvention,the finalising of the Sphere Minimum Standards, the newfood security cluster, the UN High-Level Task Force and therevitalisedCommitteeonFoodSecurity.

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Agency �nterv�ews (nGos, Un)

1. Doesyourorganisationhaveafoodaid,foodassistanceorfoodsecuritypolicyorstrategy?Ifso,canyoushareitwithus?

2. Does yourorganisationhave its owndefinitions for foodassistanceandfoodaid?Ifnot,towhichonesdoyoureferinyourpolicyformation,programmingandoperations?

3. What is included within your organisation’s chosendefinition of food security, food aid or food assistance?Howhas thischangedover thepast 10years?Howdoesfood assistance relate to broader food security policiesandinitiatives?

4. Which departments within your organisation deal withfoodaid/assistance?

5. Doyouhaveanydetailsaboutfoodaidorfoodassistancerevenuesandexpenditurein2007or2008?

6. Whatarethemostcommoncontextsandprojectsinwhichyour organisation provides food aid/assistance? Is foodassistance provided for humanitarian and developmentpurposes?

7. How does your organisation determine whether in-kindfoodaidorotherfoodassistancemeasures(e.g.,cashorvouchers)aremoreappropriate?Whatelsedeterminestheresponse?

8. Has your organisation adapted its food aid/assistancepolicies, programmes or strategies in response to theglobal food, fuel and financial crisis since 2007? If so,how?

9. Hasyourorganisationadapteditsfoodsecurity(includingaid/assistance policies, strategies or programmes) inresponsetoclimatechange?Ifso,how?

10.Haveyourorganisation’spoliciesinrelationtothefollowingaspectsoffoodaid/assistancechangedinrecentyears?Ifso,how?• Schoolfeeding• Nutrition• Targetingoffoodaid• Procurementandshipping• Agriculturalproduction• Generaldistributions,foodforworkandfoodfortraining• Cashtransfersandvouchers• Monetisation

11. How does your organisation’s approach to food aid/assistance relate to linking relief and developmentchallenges and social protection and safety net policiesandprogrammes?

12.How does your organisation’s approach to food aid/assistance relate to disaster risk reduction policies andprogrammes?

13.Doesyourorganisationhaveanadvocacypositiononfoodassistance?AreyoumembersofTAFAD,CoalitionforFoodAid,EuropeanFoodSecurityGroup,anddoyouhaveanyviewsontheireffectiveness?

14.IsyourorganisationinvolvedinthediscussionontheFoodAidConvention?How?• How do you think this fits within a global food

security architecture, orwithin the newhumanitarianarchitecture(reformprocess)?

• Which are the instruments of food assistance thatshouldbeincludedinapotential“new”foodassistanceconvention?

15.Doesyourorganisationhaveaviewon theway foodaidwas treated in thedraft AgreementonAgriculture in theWTODohaRoundandwhattheimplicationswouldbeiftheDohaDevelopmentRoundwerebroughttoaconclusion?

16.Howhasthehumanitarianreformprocess impactedfoodaid/assistance?• How is the evolving food security cluster process

affectingthecoordinationaroundfoodaid/assistance?• Doyouthinkthereisaneedforaglobalfoodorfood

securitycluster?Why?• What have been the impacts of financial reforms

includingtheCERF?17.Do you have any recent reports, evaluations or studies

relatingtofoodaidorfoodassistancethatyoucansharewithus?

18.Do you have any other views about the key challengesanddebates in foodaidand foodassistancewithinyourorganisationandglobally?

Donor/government �nterv�ew gu�de

1. Doesyourgovernmenthaveafoodaid,foodassistanceorfoodsecuritypolicyorstrategy?Ifso,canyoushareitwithus?

2. Does your government have its own definitions for foodassistanceandfoodaid?Ifnot,towhichonesdoyoureferinyourpolicyformation,programmingandoperations?

3. What is included within your government’s chosendefinition of food security, food aid or food assistance?Howhas thischangedover thepast 10years?Howdoesfood assistance relate to broader food security policiesandinitiatives?

4. Whichministriesordepartmentswithinyourgovernmentareresponsibleforfoodaidandfoodassistance?

5. What are themain budget lines relating to food aid andfood assistance?Would you be able to provide detailedaboutfoodaidorfoodassistanceexpenditureinFY2007and 2008?What is the breakdown of humanitarian and

Annex 1Interv�ew gu�de

56


developmentfoodassistanceandbilateral(governmenttogovernmentandthroughNGOsandmultilateralfunding?

6. What are the most common contexts and projects inwhichyourgovernmentprovidesorfundsfoodaidorfoodassistance? Is foodassistanceprovided forhumanitariananddevelopmentpurposes?

7. Howdoesyourgovernmentdeterminewhetherin-kindfoodassistanceorother foodassistancemeasures (e.g., cashorvouchers)aremoreappropriate?Whatelsedeterminestheresponse?

8. Has your government adapted its food aid and foodassistancepolicies,programmesorstrategiesinresponsetotheglobal food, fuelandfinancialcrisissince2007? Ifso,how?

9. Hasyourgovernmentadapteditsfoodsecurity(includingfoodaidand foodassistancepoliciesorprogrammes) inresponsetoclimatechange?Ifso,how?

10.Haveyourgovernment’spoliciesinrelationtothefollowingaspectsoffoodaidandfoodassistancechangedinrecentyears?Ifso,how?• Schoolfeeding• Nutrition• Targetingoffoodaid• Procurementandshipping• Agriculturalproduction• General distributions, food for work and food for

training• Cashtransfersandvouchers• Monetisation

11. How does your government’s approach to food aid andfood assistance relate to linking relief and developmentchallenges and social protection and safety net policiesandprogrammes?

12.How does your government’s approach to food aid andfood assistance relate to disaster risk reduction policiesandprogrammes?

13.Howisyourgovernmentinvolvedinthediscussionsonthefutureof theFoodAidConvention?Herearesomeof thequestions thathavebeen raisedandonwhichwewouldlike to know your government’s position or to discussinformally.• What is its position regarding the future of the

Convention?• What are your views on a potential renegotiation

process?• How do you think renegotiation might fit within a

global food security architecture, or within the newhumanitarianarchitecture(reformprocess)?

• Should the Food Aid Committee responsible foroversightoftheConventioncontinueoritsresponsibilitytransferredtosomeotherbody?WhatistheadvantagetohavetheFACandtheCommittee?

• Would your government feel the lack of a “Food AConvention?” What would change in those circum-stances?

• Should the Food Aid Committee play a role in theinternational food security architecture? What? Howcoulditbestrengthenedtoplayarole?

• What are the forms of food assistance (and relatedaidinstruments)thatshouldbecoveredbyapotential“new”convention?

• Whichinstrumentsshouldnotbeincluded?• Howmightcontributionsofdonors(presentlystatedin

“wheat equivalents”) bemeasured in the future (e.g.no change, cash, calorie supply per person, numberof beneficiaries, taking into account standards likeconnectednessetc.)

14.DoesyourgovernmenthaveaviewonthewayfoodaidwastreatedinthemostrecentversionofthedraftAgreementonAgriculture in theWTODohaRound, andwhatwouldbetheimplicationsiftheDohaDevelopmentRoundwerebroughttoaconclusion?

15.Doyouhaveanyviewsontheeffectivenessofinternationalagency and non-governmental or civil society advocacyaroundfoodassistanceandtheroleofnetworkssuchasTAFAD,CoalitionforFoodAid(CFA)andtheEuropeanFoodSecurityGroup?

16.Howhasthehumanitarianreformprocessimpactedonfoodaidand foodassistanceasprovidedbyyourgovernmentandmoregenerally?• How is the evolving food security cluster process

affectingthecoordinationaroundfoodaid/assistance?• Doyouthinkthereisaneedforaglobalfoodorfood

securitycluster?Why?• What have been the impacts of financial reforms

includingtheCERF?17.Do you have any recent reports, evaluations or studies

relatingtofoodaidorfoodassistancethatyoucansharewithus?

18.Do you have any other views about the key challengesanddebates in foodaidand foodassistancewithinyourgovernmentandglobally?

57


I. Introduct�on 59

II. Donors 591. UnitedStates:ChangingFoodAidPolicy,2007–10 591.1 ExplanatoryIntroduction 591.2 Overview 601.3 ElementsofUSFoodAid 611.4 The2008OmnibusFarmBill 62

1.4.1FoodAidPolicyandProceduralChangesinthe2008FarmBill 621.4.2LocalandRegionalProcurement(LRP) 631.4.3Monetisation 631.4.4Other2008FarmBill–RelatedFoodAidChanges 641.4.5OtherRecentUSFoodAidPolicyChanges 65

2. Canada 672.1 AidResponsibilitiesandExpenditures 672.2 UntyingCanadianFoodAid 672.3 PolicyinPractice 68

3. EuropeanCommission 683.1 Definitions 693.2 PolicyPositions 69

4. Belgium 70

5. Germany 715.1 StructureandBudget 715.2 Policy 715.3 Definitions 715.4 Instruments 725.5 FoodSecurityArchitecture 72

6. Netherlands 72

7. Norway 73

8. Sweden 73

9. UnitedKingdom 74

10. Australia 75

11. Japan 75

Annex 2Pol�cy Pos�t�ons of selected Donor

Governments, Un agenc�es, Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and nGos

58


III. Internat�onal Agenc�es 761. WorldFoodProgramme(WFP) 762. UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR) 78

IV. non-governmental organ�sat�ons 791. ActionContrelaFaim-InternationalNetwork(ACF-International) 792. CanadianFoodGrainsBank(CFGB) 793. CAREUSA 804. DeutscheWelthungerhilfe 815. InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossandRedCrescent(IFRC) 826. Oxfam 827. SavetheChildren 838. WorldVisionInternational(WVI) 84

F�gures, Boxes and Tables

Figure1:WorldVisionFoodProgrammes,FY2004–FY2009 85

Box1:ECHO’sApproachtoMainstreamingRiskReduction 70

Table1:USFoodAidProgrammeLevels,FY2000–FY2010 60Table2:USFoodAidProgrammes 61Table3:Canada:ODAExpenditureasFoodAid,FoodSecurityProgrammesand 67 HumanitarianAssistance,FiscalYear2008–9Table4:DGECHOFoodAssistancePartners,2007–9 69Table5:SwedishFundingforWFP,2004–10 74

59

Foodaidandfoodassistance

This annex presents the policy positions of selected donorgovernments,UNagencies, theRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementandNGOs.Itwasnotpossibletocomprehensivelycoverinthetimeavailablealldonorgovernments,orallmajoraid agencies. A sample of OECD-DAC donor governmentswasselectedrepresentingmostofthemajorfoodassistancedonors. Someof the reports aremore detailed than others.

Given the dominant position of the US government in foodassistance, a separate study by a US-based consultantwascommissioned. Visits were made to Brussels to interviewEuropean Commission officials and Rome to interviewWFPstaff, Rome-based donors and FAO. Other interviews wereconducted by telephone and official policy documentsconsulted.

I. Introduct�on

II. Donors1. Un�ted states: chang�ng food a�d pol�cy, 2007–10

1.1 Explanatory �ntroduct�on

US foodaidpolicy is largelyestablished in legislation,mostof it in so-called Omnibus Farm Bills enacted by Congressat five-year intervals. This legislation is both enabling and,in many respects, directive. It not only establishes thegeneralgoalsanddirections, itsetsmanyoftheoperationalparameters and modalities. Congress authorises fundingceilings foreachcategoryof foodaid (seeTable2below forthecategories)inthesemulti-yearFarmBills,but,inaddition,formal appropriations of funds are required each year inamounts that cannot exceed the authorisation levels butcan—and often do—fall below these levels. Almost all foodaidiscontainedinbudgetedlineitemsoftheUSDepartmentof Agriculture (USDA) and, as a result, it is the agriculturecommitteesof Congresswhichestablishpolicy andbudgetsfor food aid, rather than the foreign affairs committees thatgovern other forms of US official development assistance(ODA).ThisisimportantinunderstandingsomeoftheuniquecharacteristicsofAmericanfoodaid.

The formulation and management of actual food aidprogrammesisdividedbetweentheForeignAgricultureService(FAS)ofUSDAandtheFoodforPeaceOffice(FFP)ofUSAID.Each year, the descriptions of individual programmes aresubmittedtotheCongressbyUSDAandUSAIDimplementingofficesforreviewandappropriationoffunds.

USDAisinchargeoftheFoodforProgressprogrammes(establishedbytheFoodforProgressActof1985andreauthorisedinthe2008FarmBill). Under this programme,US agriculture commoditiesareprovidedtodevelopingcountriesandemergingdemocraciescommitted to introducing and expanding free enterprise in

the agricultural sector. Commodities are currently provided ona donation basis to foreign governments, private voluntaryorganisations, non-profit organisations, cooperatives, orintergovernmentalorganisationssuchasWFP.TheimplementingorganisationsrequestcommoditiesandUSDApurchasesthosecommoditiesfromtheUSmarket.USDAdonatesthecommoditiesto the implementing organisations and pays for the freight tomovethecommoditytotherecipientcountry.

USDA also manages the McGovern-Dole International Foodfor Education and Child Nutrition Program that promoteseducation, child development, and food security for someof the world’s poorest children. It provides donations ofUS agricultural products, as well as financial and technicalassistance,forschoolfeedingandmaternalandchildnutritionprojects in low-income countries. The programme wasauthorisedbytheFarmSecurityandRural InvestmentActof2002andreauthorisedinthe2008FarmBill.CommoditiesareprovidedtoWFP,NGOsandcooperativesforuseininfantandchildnutritionprogrammes,themajorityofwhichareprimary-schoolbased.

USAID manages the Food for Peace Title II programme(establishedin1954andreauthorisedinthe2008FarmBill)which contains two components—emergency programmesand non-emergency, development programmes. US foodcommodities intended for single-year emergencies areprovided largely through WFP and NGOs; those intendedto promote multi-year food-security focused developmentobjectives are provided for NGO and cooperative projects.Morethanhalfofcommoditiesintendedforthesedevelopmentactivitiesaremonetised(seediscussionofmonetisationinalatersectionofthisreport).AllUSfoodaidisprovidedonagrantbasis.

Three other food aid programmes exist in law, but areeffectivelymoribund.TheseareTitleIandTitleIIIoftheFood

HPG WoRkInG PAPER

60


for Peace Act and Section 416(b) of the Agriculture Act of1949.Thefirsttwowereso-calledprogrammefoodassistancecategories (i.e., non-project, government-to-governmentsubsidisedcreditandgrantfoodtransfers),andthethirdwasa surplus-disposal activity making US-government ownedstocks of food available to supplement either emergencyor development activities in Title II or Food for Progresscategories. None of these three programmes have receivedfundinginrecentyears.

US food aid is distinctive from that provided by mostother donors in three ways. First, it is largely provided incommodityformandshippedinUSflag(registered)vesselsfrom the US Second, a significant share of non-emergencyfoodaidismadeavailabletoNGOsandcooperativevoluntaryorganisations(most,butnotall,American-based).Asnoted,more thanhalfof thesecommoditieshavebeenmonetisedinrecentyears.Third,therearetoughlegislativerestrictionsonprocurementfromsourcesotherthantheUS,onshippingonnon-USflagcarriers,andonthepercentage(infinancialterms)of this food thatmusthavehadsome formofvalueaddedintheUS

1.2 overv�ew

Inmany respects, the policy environment inwhichUS foodaid programmes operate has changed little over the past15–20 years. To be sure, programme food assistance—i.e.,government-to-government concessional food sales (Title IandTitleIIIofP.L.4801)hasdeclinedtozeroinrecentyears

andappearsunlikelytoberevived.However,themodalitiesof non-programme food aid—emergency and developmentalike—remain very much in 2010 as they were ten, eventwenty, years earlier. Grant food aid for both emergenciesand developmental, food-security-focused projects is stillalmostentirely tied toprocurement in theUSand ismostlyshipped on US-flag vessels. The much-criticised practiceof ‘monetisation’ (the sale of Title II and Food for Progressfood commodities in recipient countries for local currencyused to cover the internalmanagement and shipping costsof the food aid and for food security and nutrition-relateddevelopmentprogrammes)proceedsunabated.Regulationssupporting maximal value-added (e.g., food fortification,bagging, etc.) prior to dispatch from US shores remain ineffect. Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts by theadministrative branch to increase the share of US food aidpurchased locally in recipient or neighbouring countries(LRP),aswellasmoveswithin theoverall foodaideffort touse more cash and less food to deal with growing hungerandfoodinsecurityinpoorcountriesinAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmerica.USfoodaidcontinuestoaccountformorethanhalfofallglobalfoodaidshipmentsfromalldonors,ashasbeenthecaseforover50years.

This is the picture of US food aid viewed from a distance,or when looking primarily at the visible surface of theseprogrammes. Close up and under the surface, a differentpicturemaybeemerging.Muchishappeningthatislikelytoleadtosignificant,thoughprobablygradual,changesinthemajorparametersofAmerican foodaid in the years ahead.This brief report attempts to identify and discuss theseelements.

Programme 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

(est�mated)

FoodforPeace 1,293 1,086 1,095 1,960 1,809 2,115 1,829 1,787 2,061 2,321 1,690

(P.L.480)1

Section416(b) 504 1,103 773 213 19 76 20 0 0 0 0

FoodforProgress 108 104 126 137 138 122 131 147 220 216 148

McGovern-Dole °™ °™ °™ 100 50 90 96 99 99 100 210

IFECN

Localand °™ °™ °™ °™ °™ °™ °™ °™ 0 5 25RegionalProcurementPilot2

TOTAL 1,905 2,293 1,994 2,410 2,016 2,403 2,076 2,033 2,380 2,642 2,073

Table 1: Us food a�d programme levels, FY 2000–FY 2010

Source: USDA ‘Annual Budget Summary’, various years, as shown in Ho and Hanrahan, International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues.CongressionalResearchService.LibraryofCongress.Washington,D.C.3February,p.10.Notes:AllfiguresinUS$million.In addition to appropriated funds, these figures contain emergency supplemental appropriations, carry-overs from previous years, transfers andreimbursementsfromotheragencies.1TitlesI,IIandIIIcombined2Thisprogrammeisdescribedlaterinthisreport.

1Theterm‘P.L.480’hasbeenreplacedbytheterm‘FoodforPeaceAct’inthe2008FarmBill.

61


Description Concessional

salesofUS

agricultural

commodities.

(Notfundedfor

pastseveral

years.)

Grantfood

commodities

andtransport.

Someissold

forlocalfunds

usedbyNGOs

forfoode–

security-related

development

projects.

Grantfood

commodities

andtransport-

emergency

programmes

Grantsof

commoditiesto

governments

fordevelopment

programmes.

(Notfundedfor

pastseveral

years.)

Grantsorcredit

salesofUS

foodaidfor

development

projectsin

selected

food-insecure

countries

Grantoffood

commodities

andtransport

andfinancial

andtechnical

assistance

forschool

mealsand

infantnutrition

programmes

Grantsof

surplus

commodities

andtransport

insupportof

TitleII,TitleIII

andFoodfor

Progress.No

commodities

havebeen

availablein

recentyears.

During the 56-year history of American international foodaid2 there has been, in fact, a continuing evolution in boththeobjectivesofUSfoodaidandinthemethodsusedinthevarious food programmes for attaining them. The graduallychangingnatureofUSinternationalfoodassistanceduringthefirst50years(1954–2004)isdescribedandanalysedbyRiley(2005).Thispresentreportfocusesonsignificantchangesthat(i)occurredinthecontextofthe2008FarmBillor(ii)arearesultofconcernwithintheUSgovernmentandamonghumanitarianorganisations and researchers over the disconcerting growthsince2006ofhungerand food insecurity inmany countries.ProgressinachievingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoal(MDG)ofhalvinghunger in theworldby2015hasbeenprogress inthewrongdirection,as thenumberof thechronicallyhungryhas increased rather thandecreasedover thepast 20 years.ThereisnowawidespreadbeliefintheUSandelsewherethatsomethingmoremustbedonetoreversethistrend,involvingbothfoodaidanddevelopmentassistance.

Specificsectionsofthisreportlookat• changesinlawcontainedinthe2008FarmBill;• changes underway in the two historicallymost criticised

elements of US food aid—tied procurement, and‘monetisation’and

• the role of President Obama’s Global Hunger and FoodSecurityInitiative(GHFSI)indealingwithboththecausesandconsequencesofhungerandfoodinsecurityinselectedcountries,andwhatrole,ifany,isforeseenforfoodaidinthateffort.

1.3 Elements of Us food a�d

SixprogrammesconstituteUS foodaid.Theseareshown inTable2.3

In addition to these six programmes, the ‘Bill EmersonHumanitarian Trust’ is a combined food commodity andcash reserve in USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation thatcan, when needed, be utilised as a supplemental source offooddonations inemergencies.Asnotedabove,Titles IandIII of the Food for Peace programme and Section 416(b) oftheAgricultureActof 1949havenotbeenactiveor receivedfunding for several years.There are no current plans tousethem, although, in theory, they could be revived. Virtuallyall food for on-going programmes is purchased in the USand shipped onUS flag vessels for use in emergencies andfood-security-focuseddevelopmentprogrammesbyNGOs,US

Programme

T�tle I T�tle II

Development Emergency

T�tle III

Food for

Progress

mcGovern-

Dole Food for

Educat�on and

Ch�ld nutr�t�on

sect�on 416(b)

Table 2: Us Food A�d Programmes

Food for Peace (formerly P.L. 480)

2008funding

(in$million)

0 354 1,981 0 166 99 0

Managing

agency

USDA USAID USAID USAID USDA USDA USDA

Implementing

partners

Governments

andprivate

entities.

USandlocal

NGOs

WFPandUS

andlocalNGOs

Government

agencies

Governments,

agricultural

trade

organisations,

WFP,NGOsand

cooperatives

Governments,

WFP,NGOs

Sameasfor

TitleII,III

&Foodfor

Progress

programmes.

2Domestic food transferprogramsaimedat thepoorarenot included inthisreport.Fromthispointonwardtheterm‘foodaid’signifiesinternationalfoodaidprograms.

3ThistableisderivedfromUSGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(USGAO)‘International Food Assistance: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.’Washington,D.C.p.13.TitleIIbudgetdataarefromUSAID’s‘USInternationalFoodAssistanceReport,2008’WashingtonD.C.AppendixV.

62


cooperativesandtheWorldFoodProgramme.NGOs4havetheauthority toconvert food intended fornon-emergency, food-security-focused, multi-year development projects to localcurrencybysellingfoodimportedfromtheUSintherecipientcountry (occasionally in neighbouring countries) for localcurrencyforuseinthoseprojects.Thelegislativelymandatedminimumofnon-emergency food commodities thatmustbeusedformonetisationis15percent.Forseveralyears,actuallevels of US non-emergency Title II and Food for Progresscommoditiesthussoldhavebeeninexcessof50percent.In2008,nearlytwo-thirdsofUSAID’snon-emergencyTitleIIwasmonetised,aswasallUSDA’sFoodforProgressfood.

1.4 The 2008 omn�bus Farm B�llAmerican food aid policy is periodically re-codified inthe context of the so-called ‘Omnibus Farm Bills’ whichare legislated at five-year intervals. Food aid is but oneelement among hundreds, in these bills. Each proposal forchange included in a pending FarmBill is negotiatedwithinthe agriculture committees of the Senate and House ofRepresentativeswiththeactiveinvolvementofinterestgroupsofdiversenature:agricultural,trade,transport,storage,value-addedmanufacturers,publicinterest,and—inthecaseofthefoodaidprovisions—NGO interestgroupsandcooperatives.Afterpassagebybothhousesthebillissenttothepresidentforsignatureandsubsequentenactment.

1.4.1 Food aid policy and procedural changes in the 2008 Farm Bill

MostexistingelementsoflawsrelatingtoP.L.480(permanentlyrenamedthe‘FoodforPeaceAct’ inthisFarmBill)andotherfood aid programmes were re-enacted, but with severalsignificantchanges:5

‘Exportmarketdevelopment’wasdeletedasanobjectiveoftheFoodforPeaceAct.

‘Food security’ and support of ‘sound environmentalpractices’ were more clearly identified as objectives offoodaidpolicy.

TitleII‘purposes’wereamendedtorecognisethatfooddeficitstobeaddressedcouldresultfromhuman-causedsituations.

A‘SenseofCongress’declarationwasincludedthat(i)directedthepresidenttoseekcommitmentsofhigherlevelsoffoodaidfrom other donors; (ii) indicated that food aid implementingorganisations receive food resources based on their own‘needsassessments’thatanalysethepotentialfordisincentive

effects to local producers and markets and (iii) highlightedcongressional concern regarding how elements of the DohaRound of multilateral trade negotiations relating to food aidcouldadverselyaffectUSfoodaidpolicyandprogrammes.

AverageTitleIIcommitmentsfortheperiod2002–07includingbothregularandsupplementalappropriationsaveragedbetween$1.5and$2billionannually.The2008FarmBillsetstheannualauthorisation level for the 2008–12 period at a higher level—$2.5billion—andsubject,asalways, toannualappropriationsof funds. The percentage of Title II funds available to NGOs,cooperativesandintergovernmentalorganisationsasdollarsforadministrativeanddistributionalexpenseswasraisedtoarangeof7.5–13percentfromthepreviousrangeinthe2002–7periodof5–10percent.Thiscouldbeinterpretedasameansofhelpingthese organisations to reduce the percentage of Title II foodaidtheyneedto‘monetise’(seediscussionbelow),sincesomeof their in-country costs previously covered by monetisationproceedscouldbecoveredby thegreateravailabilityof theseso-calledSection202(e)funds.

The on-going requirement that the administrator of USAIDmakeavailableaminimumof2.5millionMTofcommoditieseach year to all Title II programmes was extended through2012aswasacontingentrequirementthatnotlessthan1.875MMT of this amount be utilised for development (i.e., non-emergency)programmes.6This latter requirementhas rarelybeen observed in the past, since the USAID administratorretains the authority towaive it if the food cannot be usedeffectivelyor is needed for emergencies.Suchwaivershavebeengrantedasamatterofcourse inpastyearsdue to thelargenumberandmagnitudeofemergencies.ThishascreatedaproblemforNGOs.Non-emergencydevelopmentprogrammesare normally comprised of projects in agriculture, nutritionand primary education which, taken together, are intendedto reduce, over the long term, the numbers of householdssufferingfromfoodinsecurity.Whenfundsintendedforthesemulti-yearactivitiesaredivertedtoemergencies,achievementofdevelopmentoutcomesisreduced.

Inrecognitionofthisenduringproblem,especially inapost-2006 period characterised by heavy demand for emergencyfoodaid,the2008FarmBillestablishesforthefirsttimeaso-called‘safebox’forTitleIIfoodearmarkedfornon-emergencypurposes. It would ensure continuing availability of foodcommodities for NGO multi-year development projects. For2009, the ‘safe box’ funding level was set at $375 million,rising to$425millionby2012.The ‘safe-box’provisionscanstillbewaivedinextremecases,butthecriteriaforgrantingsuchwaiversareconsiderablystiffened.ResourcesoftheBillEmersonHumanitarianTrustmustfirstbefullyexhaustedandthe president must formally request additional funds fromCongress equal to the combined amount of any proposed

4 The term NGO used from this point on refers to US, international andrecipientcountryprivatevoluntaryorganisationsandUS-basedcooperativeorganisationsengagedinusingUSfoodaidfordevelopmentprogramsoremergencyfeedingindevelopingcountries.5 This discussion reflects information contained in Hanrahan, Charles E.‘CRSReporttoCongress:InternationalFoodAidProvisionsofthe2008FarmBill.’CongressionalResearchService,LibraryofCongress.Washington,D.C.(updatedJuly10,2008).

6The2.5millionMTcommoditycommitmentisbroadlyequivalenttotheUSminimumcommitmentunderthe1999FoodAidConventionof2.5millionMTwheatequivalent.

63


reductioninthesafeboxandtotalcommoditiesutilisedfromtheEmersonTrust.

1.4.2 Local and Regional Procurement (LRP)

Themostcontentiousfoodaidissueinthe2008FarmBillwastheBushadministration’scontinuedstrongpushto increasetheproportionof totalUS foodaid thatcouldbepurchasedlocally in recipient countries or in neighbouring countriesin emergencies (in other words, a proposed reduction intied food aid for emergencies). This effort to increase localor regional procurement (LRP) was strongly resisted bycommodity, transport and NGO interest groups. The US isunique among major food aid donors in tying its food aid(emergencyandnon-emergencyalike)largelytopurchasesintheUS.In2008,theadministrationrequestedtheauthoritytouseupto$300millionforLRPtospeedthedeliveryof foodinemergenciesandtoreducecosts.Ashadbeenthecaseinthefaceofearlierrequests in2006and2007,Congresswasunwillingtoagreetothepresident’srequest.However,inthe2008FarmBilltherewasaconcessionofsorts.Approvalwasgranted for initiationofa small LRP ‘pilot’programme tobeoperatedbyUSDA. Itwoulduse$60millionofnon-Food forPeace funds over a four-year period, 2009–12, to undertakelocal and regional procurement for selected NGO and WFPprogrammes and to formally monitor the results—financial,economicandinstitutional.TheexperienceistobeevaluatedbyanindependentM&Efirm,startingin2011.

Therehasbeencriticismformanyyearsbythedevelopmentand academic communities over the policy of tying mostAmerican food aid to procurement in the United States.Recently, additional public criticism has been voiced fromwithinthegovernmentaswell.InMay2009,theUSGovernmentAccountancy Office (USGAO) issued a report7 which foundthat,duringtheperiod2001–8,foodcommoditiespurchasedinandshippedfromtheUScostsome34percentmorethanhad these same commodities been purchased in the Sub-SaharanAfricanrecipientcountries.(Comparativecostsoftiedversusin-countryprocurementoffoodforLatinAmericawere,however,roughlythesame.)

UsingdatafromWFP,USGAOfurtherdeterminedthatfoodfromthe US required an average of 147 days to reach 10 selectedAfrican countries, while locally purchased food was availablein35daysand foodprocured inneighbouring countries in41days. The report cautioned there were potential detrimentalimpactsinherentinLRP,however.Theseincludedthepossibilitythat relatively large-scale procurement could drive up foodpricespaidbythepoor inrecipientcountries; thatcontractinginstrumentsinsomerecipientcountriesareoftenmoredifficultto enforce; that quality control measures are sometimes lessrigorouslyenforcedandthatlocally-procuredtransportmaynotbeavailableintheneededquantityortimeperiod.Nonetheless,

in emergencies, local or regional procurement, more oftenthannot,issensiblebotheconomicallyandintermsoftiming.Therefore, USGAO concluded, it should be available as anoption, particularlywhen speed of delivery is of the essence.TheUSGAOreportalsonoted,however,that,aslongasUSlawrequires75percentofAmericanfoodtobeshippedonUSflagvessels, theability touseLRPwillcontinuetobeconstrained.It isalsounclear,evenafter thoroughreview,whetherUS flagrestrictionsmustbeappliedtoregionallyprocuredfoodaswell.

Itisimportanttonotethattheabovediscussionpertainsonlytofoodaidlegislation,nottofundsmadeavailablefromotherbudgetedUSgovernmentaccountsforuseinotherforeignaidprogrammes. USAID, using funds contained in non-Farm Billlegislation(inthiscase,the2008supplementalappropriationbill,P.L.110–252)hasbeenabletoengageinacertainamountof local and regional food procurement in emergencies.8 Inaddition, bills have been introduced in the present Congressthatwouldprovidetheadministrationwithanadditional$200millionininternationaldisasterassistance,someorallofwhichcouldbeused for LRP, or inproviding cash vouchersor cashtransfers directly to food insecure recipients. Bills have beenintroducedinboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeto initiate legislation, in the context of thePresident’sGlobalHunger and Food Security Initiative (see below), that would,among other things, enable greater LRP. It is unclear, at thispoint, whether these bills9 will eventually be enacted intolaw. However, greater recognition of the need to respond tothe problems of global hunger and food insecurity stronglysuggeststhatadditionalfundswillbemadeavailable(outsidethefoodaidlegislativeprocess)thatcanbeusedforLRP.10

1.4.3 MonetisationThepracticeofmonetisationhasbeencriticisedforanumberof reasons. It is seen as a manifestly inefficient means togeneratecashforNGOdevelopmentprogrammes.Itisviewedas potentially harmful to food producers in the countrieswhereUS foodaid is soldbecause it increases the supplyofthe monetised commodities in local markets which tends toreducepricesearnedbylocalproducerand,consequently,ruralhousehold income.11 In addition, there is evidence in somerecipient countries of possible displacement of commercial

7USGAO.‘InternationalFoodAssistance:LocalandRegionalProcurementCanEnhancetheEfficiencyofUSFoodAid,ButChallengesMayConstrainItsImplementation’Washington,D.C.May2009.

8WFP FAIS data indicate that the US funded local purchases of 84,560tonnesofcerealsand16,018tonnesofnoncerealsin2008,aswellas58,945tonnes of cereals and 19,718 tonnes of non-cereals through triangulartransactionsinthirdcountries.Toputtheseacquisitionsinperspectivetheyrepresented about 9 percent of local and triangular purchases in volumeterms and exceeded the total food aid levels for example of France orGermanyorNetherlands.9HR3077;SenateReport111-19.10ThisinformationisderivedfromHanrahan,CharlesE.‘LocalandRegionalProcurementforUSInternationalEmergencyfoodAid.’LibraryofCongress,CongressionalResearchService.Washington,D.C.August10,2009.11Thepros and consofTitle IImonetisationarediscussed in two recentpapers: i) Barrett, Christopher B. & Erin Lentz. ‘US Monetization Policy:RecommendationsforImprovement.’Astudypreparedundertheauspicesof the Global Agricultural Development Initiative. Ithaca, N.Y. December2009.;andii)Simmons,Emmy.‘MonetizationofFoodAid:ReconsideringUSPolicyandPractice.’PartnershiptoCutHungerandPovertyinAfrica.

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importswherecommoditiesmonetisedrepresentasignificantproportion of total imports or total consumption of theseand substitute commodities. Further, if total non-emergencyUS foodaid increases,particularly in thecontextofagreaterfocus on fewer food-insecure countries (now 20 countries)theconsequencecouldwellbehigher levelsofmonetisation,concentratedinfewercountries.

The issues are complex and not as straightforward as bothcritics and supporters of monetisation contend. Evidenceof substantial or sustained harm remains to a large degreeanecdotal or based on less than faultless data. Evidence ofpositive outcomes is, with but a few exceptions,12 similarlymoreanecdotalthananalytical.Amajorareaneedingfurtheranalysis is the temporal dimension of identified adverse orbeneficial consequences of the monetisation process. It iscertainlytruethattheprocessis inefficientandproblematic,but how well-authenticated are the contentions that theprocess is entirely—or on balance—negative? How doesone compare a major but short-term adverse market effectof local commodity sales against a modest but long-termdevelopmental impact derived from the expenditure of thelocal currency thus made available? Have the secondaryandtertiaryconsequencesbeenappropriately identifiedandadequatelymeasured?ThepooranalyticalqualityofBellmondeterminations,13thelackofgood-qualitybaselinedata,andofrigorousresultsmonitoringandevaluationreporting,takentogethermakeitconceptuallydifficulttosupportmonetisationinmostinstances.It isundeniable,however,thatinallbutaveryfewcases,cashgrantstocooperatingsponsorsinlieuofmonetisedfoodwouldbemorefiscallyresponsibleandlikelytocreatefewerdetrimentalimpacts.14

Proponentsofmonetisationhaveconsistentlyarguedthatwhiletheaboveis,onbalance, likelytobetrue, ithashistorically,nonetheless,beenfareasiertoobtaincongressionalapprovalfor use of commodity food aid for monetisation than forcongressionalappropriationofbudgeteddollarstoaccomplishthe same food security objectives. Simply stated, senatorsandrepresentativesreceivepositivesupportfromtheirfarm-

basedandagribusinessconstituentsforusingAmericanfoodcommodities to generate local currency. There is no similarsupport from their constituencies for approving purchasesof local currencies directly with dollars. As a result,many15NGOs are convinced that any reduction in themagnitudeofmonetisation will not be replaced in food aid legislation byincreased grants of in US government dollar resources. Theresult would be a significant reduction in their agriculturaldevelopment, nutrition and other forms of food-security-related assistance.With a few exceptions, NGOs argue thatthe benefit of these development activities outweigh thedetrimental impactsof themonetisationprocess.16Thus far,Congresshasboughtthesearguments.

Efforts are presently (at least informally) underway in theUS government to find alternative ways to make dollarsupport available to NGOs in order to at least partiallydisplace monetisation. Some in the administration arepresently considering a tactic that would reduce annual defacto monetisation from the present 50–60 percent of non-emergency Title II commodities to the legally mandatedminimum of 15 percent of Title II development assistanceand make up the difference from development assistancefunds (i.e., budget resources outside the Farm Bill). BarrettandLentz(2009)andSimmons(2009)notethat this typeofapproachwouldbeasignificantsteptowardreducingthescaleofmonetisation.Bothofthesestudiescaution,however,thatsuchchanges, if thedecisionweremadetoeffectuatethem,wouldalmostcertainlybe implementedonlygradually.SuchaneffortisalsomademoredifficultatpresentbyexistingandprojectedUSgovernmentbudgetshortfalls.

1.4.4Other2008FarmBill–relatedfoodaidchangesTheexistingmicronutrientfortificationprogrammewasretainedintheFarmBillandlimitationsonthenumberofcountriesinwhichfortifiedfoodsmaybedistributedwereremoved.Effortsto improve themonitoringandevaluationofnon-emergencyfood aid were strengthened by the identification, as notedearlier,of$22million forenhancingUSAID’sM&Ecapability,includingaddedsupportforFEWSNET, increasingthesizeofUSAID’s monitoring and evaluation staff and strengtheningM&E methodologies. Funds for prepositioning shelf-stablefoodswereaugmentedtoincreasethesizeofstoresavailablefor emergency response. Critics contend that the costs andeffectivenessofprepositioningemergencyfoodcommoditieshavenotbeendetermined.

TheUSDAFoodforProgressprogrammewasextendedthrough2012 and the USDAMcGovern-Dole Food for Education andInternationalChildNutritionwaslikewiseextended,increasedin size and recognised as a permanent programme, thus

12 For one of the better of these exceptions, see: Save the Children andWorldVision:‘AnAnalysisofPL480TitleIIMonetizationData(2001-2005):Impacts on Domestic Production, Local Marketing and Global Trade.’February9,200613 Legally-required determinations that in-country storage is adequateand that themonetisationswill engender no substantial or lasting harm.Recently,USAIDhasbeenengagedineffortstoimprovethevalidityoftheresultsofBellmon-relateddatagatheringandanalysisintheso-calledBESTexercise.Whileanexcellentstepintherightdirection,itistooearlytoseewhatimprovementswillresultfromBEST.14ThereareseveralexamplesofNGOprojectsinchronicallyfoodinsecurecountries or regions where the process of monetising imported foodwas itself essential to the long-term success of the activity. Examplesinclude the ACDI/VOCA programs in Cape Verde—a chronically foodimport dependent country with inadequate foreign exchange earningcapacitywheremonetisation is tied to structural changes in small holderagriculture—andaproject innorthernUgandawhichused theprocessofmonetisingimportedvegetableoilthroughavegetableoilauctionsystemtodevelopasmall-scale,edibleoilprocessing industrytogainafootholdinruralareas.

15 But not all. CARE has very publicly taken exception to the practice ofmonetisation in most instances. (See: CARE. ‘White Paper on Food AidPolicy’ June 6, 2006.) Catholic Relief Services is also on record as beingcriticaltoseveralaspectsofmonetisation.16Theprincipalargumentsonbothsidesofthislong-standingdebateareanalysedinthecitedpapersbyBarrett/LentzandSimmons.

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enhancingtheimportanceofschoolfeedingandchildnutritionas identifiable elements of US international food aid. Theconcept of a continuing food reserve in the form of the BillEmerson Humanitarian Trust was retained and reauthorisedfor the period 2008–12. The cap of four million MT on thesizeof thecommodities thatcanbeheld in the reservewasremovedasasignofconcernoverthe increasingmagnitudeandnumberoffoodemergenciesinrecentyears.Thereservecanbeheldineithercashorcommodities.

1.4.5 Other recent US food aid policy changesImproving the coordination of the various agencies andprogrammesinvolvedinUSfoodaidhasbeenanobjectiveofpolicysincethe1990FarmBill.Overtheyears, theseeffortshavemademodestprogress,suchasestablishingtheFoodAidConsultativeGroupwithinseveralagenciesofgovernment.Inaddition,variousinter-agencycoordinatingmechanismshavebeen convened, and extra-governmental efforts have beenmade among food aid stake holders that focus on endinghungerandpromotingfoodsecurityobjectivesusingfoodaidasasignificantinputinthateffort.USGAOreports17arequiteclear,however,thatcoordinationbetweenUSagenciesinthefoodaiddomainisstillinadequateonmanylevels,particularlyinharmonisingobjectiveandactualnon-emergencyfoodaidprojectsinrecipientcountries.

There are efforts underway inUSAID andUSDA to define aUS position for the long-overdue update of the 1999 FoodAid Convention. The effort would ostensibly clarify the roleof food aid within a coordinated effort of all donors tobetter focus food resources—in concert with other formsof development finance—more effectively on positive foodsecurityoutcomes.Thiseffort,however,aswellasanyfurtherupdating of the US position on food aid in theWTO DohaRound negotiations, will almost certainly await the resultsof efforts now underway in a number of US governmentagencies toeffectuatetheGlobalHungerandFoodSecurityInitiative announced by President Obama at the L’AquilaSummitinSeptember2009—amajornewUSefforttoreducehungerandfoodinsecurityinatargetedsetoffoodinsecurecountries in the world. This presidential initiative and thelikelyroleoffoodaidinthiseffortisbrieflydescribedintheremainderofthisreport.

The Global Hunger and Food Security InitiativeThe growing number of people facing hunger and foodinsecurity inmanyoftheworld’spoorercountrieshas ledtoalarm that global efforts to reduce hunger are notworking.

FAO and others report that the number of theworld’s food-insecure people has not reduced, but has grown from anestimated800millionatthetimeoftheMillenniumSummitin2000tomorethanonebillionin2009.18Thecausesaremanyandinclude

• theglobalfinancialcrisis;• alossofpurchasingpowerbymanyoftheworld’spoorest

confrontedbyspiralingfoodpricesinlocalmarkets;• simultaneous secular growth in global food prices—

particularly for staple grain—highlighted by a 2006–8spikeinpricesattributedinparttoincreaseduseofgrainstoproducefueland

• declines in foodproduction inmajorproducingcountriesattributable to greater variance in climate conditionsin agricultural areas, a lack of enabling policies andincreasingagriculturalinput,transportandenergycosts.

TheUSgovernmenthasrespondedtowhatiswidelyperceivedas a hunger and food insecurity crisis likely to continue foryearsintothefuture.Atthe2009L’AquilaG8summit,PresidentObamaannouncedhisintentiontocommittheUStoathree-year,$22billion,multi-donorefforttoreducechronichunger,raiseincomesofthefoodinsecurepoorinselectedcountriesand reduce the number of children suffering from under-nutrition. A large number of US government agencies wereassignedthetaskofconcertingeffortswithprivatefirms,not-for-profitdevelopmentagencies,universitiesandfoundationsto generate a strategy framework and implementableprogrammesintheshortestpossibletimetodothat—undertheleadershipoftheSecretaryofState.ThefirstcomprehensivedescriptionofthechallengesandthebroadparametersoftheGHFSIarecontainedintheGlobalHungerandFoodSecurityInitiative:ConsultationDocument.19Itreiteratestheprincipalsenunciated at L’Aquila: (i) a comprehensive approach tofood security focused on agriculture-led growth, reducingunder-nutrition and increasing the impact of humanitarianfood assistance; (ii) leadership by each recipient country;(iii)strengthenedstrategiccoordinationatall levels—locally,nationally and internationally; (iv) leveraged benefits frommultilateral organisations and (v) delivering on a sustainedandaccountablecommitment.

Worktogiveconcreteformtothisinitiativehasbeenunderwayfor several months as of this writing. The strategic planfor accomplishing these objectives was announced by theUS government in late May, 2010 as the “Feed the Futureinitiative”.20Already theadministrationhaswovenpiecesofthe$3.5billionUSportionof the initiative intotheFebruary2011 US government budget request document. A total of$1.8billion is earmarked for theGHFSI in2011—$1.2billion

17USGAO.‘InternationalFoodAssistance:USAIDIsTakingActiontoImproveMonitoringandEvaluationofNonemergencyFoodAid,ButWeaknessesinPlanningCouldImpedeEfforts.’Washington,D.C.September2009.USGAO. ‘International Food Assistance: Key Issues for CongressionalOversight.’op.cit.USGAO. ‘International Food Assistance: A US Government-wide StrategyCouldAccelerateProgress towardGlobalFoodSecurity.’Washington,D.C.October,2009.USGAO. ‘Global FoodSecurity: USAgencies ProgressingOnGovernment-WideStrategyButApproachFacesSeveralVulnerabilities.’March11,2010.

18FAO.‘TheStateofFoodInsecurityintheWorld.’Rome.October2009.TheMDGgoalwastoreducethenumberof theworld’shungryfromover800millionto420millionby2015.19AvailableattheUSDepartmentofStatewebsite20See:http://www.feedthefuture.gov/

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for agriculture programmes, $200 million for nutrition and$408 million for global food security partnerships underthe leadership of the World Bank. In addition, but outsidethe initiative, the 2011 budget request for food aid includes$1.7billionforFoodforPeace(TitleIIprogrammes)and$2.5billion for refugees, migration and international disasterassistanceother than foodaid.Whenadded together, theseamounts,ifappropriated,representasubstantiallyincreasedUScommitmenttocombatingboththeeffectsofhungerandfoodinsecurityandtheircauses.

The principal focus of the initiative is on improving foodsecurity by investments in agricultural production in selectedfood insecure countries, 12 in Africa, 4 in Latin America and4 in Asia.21 This will be complimented by investments toimprove nutritional status in infants and young children inthesecountries.Agriculturaldevelopmentandincreasingfoodproduction in these 20 food insecure countries will be itsprimary focus. The countries were selected using agricultureproductivity,infantnutritionandhouseholdincomeindicators.

Theconceptof‘countryled’asenunciatedattheL’Aquilasummitand subsequently, is still being clarified. Food Security’ isdefinedasfollows:“...havingfourmaincomponents:availability,access,utilizationandstability.Familiesandindividualsrequirea reliable and consistent source of quality food, as well assufficientresourcestopurchaseit.Peoplemustalsohavetheknowledge and basic sanitary conditions to chose, prepare,anddistribute food inaway that results ingoodnutrition forallfamilymembers.Finallytheabilitytoaccessandutilizefoodmustremainstableandsustainedovertime.”22

Earlier food security thinkers (e.g., Amartya Sen, ShlomoReutlinger, Simon Maxwell) were concerned that inadequateaccess to food rather than inadequate availabilitywas at thecentreof causality of chronic food insecurity.While, “access”isacomponentoftheFTFdefinitionoffoodinsecurity,theFTFstrategyseems,atthispoint,tobelargelyfocusedonincreasing“availability” rather thanonenhancing the capabilitiesof thefood insecure poor to attain continuous entitlement to food.Thefocuson‘livelihoodsecurity’as,possibly,amoresuitableapproach in addressing the full nexus of causality of foodinsecurityisnowheretobefoundintheworkundertakenthusfaringivingprogrammaticformtotheinitiative.

In its just released report23 on the status of US efforts toconfront global food insecurity, theUSGAO found that tenagenciesofgovernment24areengagedininternationalfood

security activities but that they do not utilise a commondefinition of food security or a common understanding ofhow to measure success of programming activities meantto promote it. As a result, the net impact—or the actualrelevance—of the total $5 billion (half of it in food aid)spentbytheseagencies in2008 ineffortstoaddressfoodinsecurity cannot be measured. Weaknesses in fundingdataandinthemonitoringandevaluationofactualresults,outcomes, impact and sustainability, if not rectified, willgreatly weaken the ability to determine within the GHFSIwhat progress is being made, what works well and whatdoesnot:

Currentlynosingleinformationdatabasecompilescomprehensivedataontheentirerangeofglobalfoodsecurityprogramsandactivitiesacross theUSgovernment.Thelackofcomprehensivedataon current programs and funding levels mayimpair the successof thenewstrategybecauseit deprives decision-makers of information onall available resources, actual costs, and a firmbaselineagainstwhichtoplan.(p.5)

One further point about the FTF Initiative: It is clear frominterviews that pressure is tremendous to produce earlysuccesses, apparently as a means of generating evidenceto counter future criticisms and to improve the prospectsfor additional ‘out-year’ funding. There seems to be verylittle interest at this point in learning from what has beenundertaken by all development organisations over the past20 years to confront food insecurity or to be informed byknowledge aboutwhat has succeeded, what has failed andwhy.Thisisapointofconcern.

The role of food aid in the FTF initiativeTherehasbeen littlepublicdiscussionof the future roleoffoodaidasanelementoftheFTFInitiative.Oneintervieweesuggested this was a conscious decision to ensure thatthe initiative was not publicly perceived as another typeof food aid programme. Other respondents revealed thatthereisacertainambivalenceaboutfoodaidasanelementin a ‘Feed the Future’–styled initiative. Food aid is seenwithin many agencies of government as an emergencyfeeding programme, not a development programme. Otherrespondentssuggested,however,thattheroleoffoodaidinsupportoftheinitiativewouldbeveryclear:Itis,andwouldremain, a ‘safety net’, continuing to provide food transfersto the hungry poor while the GHFSI programme operatesseparatelyandsimultaneouslyto increase locallyproducedfood availability, reduce food price variance over time inrecipientcountriesandraisehousehold incomes. Ifso,andin the meantime, food aid appears likely to continue in aformquitesimilartothatofthepastseveralyears.Thiswillbeparticularlythecaseifthepresentfood-aidNGOsarenotincorporated into the groupof implementing agents of theFTFInitiative.

21 The countries are: Africa – Ethiopia, Chana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali,Malawi,Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia; Asia– Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal, Tajikistan; Latin America – Guatemala,Haiti,Honduras,Nicaragua.22http://www.feedthefuture.gov/FTF_Guide.pdf,p.ii23USGAO.‘GlobalFoodSecurity:USAgenciesProgressingOnGovernment-WideStrategyButApproachFacesSeveralVulnerabilities.’op.cit.24 USAID, USDA, Dept. of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation,Treasury,DepartmentofDefense,USTrade&DevelopmentAgency,USTradeRepresentative,PeaceCorpsandtheOfficeofManagement&Budget.

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2. Canada

TheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency(CIDA)’soverallDevelopmentStrategyaccordsahighimportancethematicallytofoodsecurityasoneofthreeprioritiesforaction:FoodSecurity,ChildrenandYouth,andSustainableEconomicGrowth.

CIDA’sFood Security Strategy,launchedinOctober2009,hasbeen rethought following the global food crisis of 2007–8.The strategic objective is to respond to immediate foodneedswhileincreasingaccesstoquality,nutritiousfoodoverthe longer term. The strategy will also seek to improve thegovernanceoftheglobalfoodsystem.

Priorities for Action include: Sustainable Agricultural Develop-ment, Food Aid and Nutrition, and Research and Innovation.WithintheareaofFoodAidandNutritionCIDAseeksto:

• SupporttheeffortsoftheUNWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)tomeet the food-aid needs of vulnerable populations indevelopingcountries.

• Explore innovative initiatives on food aid and nutritionprogramming. For example, CIDA will contribute $30million to the UNWFP's Purchase for Progress program,whichbuysfromlocalfarmers.

• WorkwithothercountriesoncontinuedimprovementstotheFoodAidConvention,includingshowingleadershipbycontinuingtomeetCanadiancommitments.

• Workwithmultilateralorganizationsandnationalgovern-mentstoincreasemicronutrientprogramming.

• Support national and regional strategies to incorporatenutrition considerations into broader food securityinitiatives.

• Supportandstrengthennationalandregionalfoodreservesandfoodcrisisalertandpreventionsystems.

A review of Canadian policies, including interviews withoperational partners and scrutiny of CIDA’s departmentalexpenditure, as well as food aid as reported to the WFP

Interfaisand theFAC,confirmsahighdegreeof consistencybetweenstatedobjectives,prioritiesandhowresourceshavebeenspentduringfiscalyearApril2008toMarch2009.

2.1 A�d respons�b�l�t�es and expend�ture

Canada’s development cooperation budget sits with CIDA,a separate agency, with the Departments of Foreign Affairs,AgricultureandAgri-FoodandinevitablyFinanceasinterestedand engaged parties for humanitarian and food assistance.CIDA demonstrates the relatively high importance accordedto foodassistancewithinapolicy framework thatalsogivesa high priority to humanitarian assistance in its pattern ofaidexpenditure. In fiscalyear2008-915%ofCIDAODAwason humanitarian assistance (well above the DAC average ofabout 10%) and 41% of that humanitarian expenditure wason emergency food aid (Table 3). Overall emergency anddevelopmentfoodaidandfoodsecurityprogramsaccountedfor 9% of bilateral ODA and 7.6% of total ODA double theoverallDACshareoffoodaid,andincontrasttomostEuropeandonorswhoareallocatingunder1%offundingtofoodaid.

2.2 Unty�ng Canad�an food a�d

Canadahasbeenafoodaiddonorsincethe1950s,exportingcereals,oilseedsanddairyproductsbothasdirectdistributionand as budgetary and/or BOP support. Then, in 1997, aCIDA Food Aid Performance Review highlighted resourcetransfer inefficiencies of Canadian programme food aid andthesimilarexperienceofotherdonors.Atthatstageuntyingwas not considered a practical option, so the focus shiftedtomakingtargetednutritionalimprovementtheprimarygoalandprogrammeaidforsalewasphasedout.Therewasverylimitedpartialuntyingtoallowlocalprocurement.In2005,inthecontextofWTOagriculturalnegotiationsandcitingfurtherOECDevidenceonresourcetransferefficiency,apolicydecisioncommittedCIDAtopartialuntyingof50%offoodaidfunding.In 2008, food aid was fully untied. These steps weremadefollowingNGOsmeetingwithdomestic agricultural interests

sector B�lateral mult�lateral Total oDA

i.ExpenditureinCanadian$(millions)

Developmentfoodaidandfoodsecurityprogrammes 53.4 0.2 53.6

Emergencyfoodaid 211.2 8.5 219.7

Totalhumanitarianassistance 447.8 88.0 535.9

TotalODA(sector) 2,924.1 659.4 3,583.5

ii.Percent(%)

TotalfoodaidandfoodsecurityprogrammesaspercentofTotalODA 9.0 1.3 7.6

Emergencyfoodaidaspercentofhumanitarianassistance 47.2 9.7 41.0

HumanitarianassistanceaspercentoftotalODA 15.3 13.3 15.0

Source:CIDAStatisticalReportonInternationalAssistance,fiscalyear2008–9Note:Totalfoodaidandfoodsecurityincludesdevelopmentfoodaidandfoodsecurityprogrammesandemergencyfoodaid.

Table 3: Canada: oDA expend�ture as food a�d, Food secur�ty (Fs) programmes and human�tar�an ass�stance, f�scal year 2008–2009

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to emphasise thebenefits of local and regional sourcingondeveloping country small farmers and the likely negligibleeffectsonCanadianagriculturalexportsand the importanceofprovidingincreasedassistancetobeneficiaries.

Theeffectsofuntyingonthesourcingof foodaidfundedbyCanadahavebeendramatic:whereasover94%ofcommoditiesdeliveredin2000-2003weredirecttransfersfromCanada,in2008 direct transfers accounted for 43%, 14% were localpurchasesand43%weretriangulartransactions.CIDAhasnotsofarreportedformallyonitsprogressinuntyingfoodaidorits impact.Howeverprocessofuntyingmorewidely,amajorchange for Canada, with its largest and also NAFTA tradingpartner,theUSmovingmuchmoreslowly,willrequireareportbacktothefederalTreasuryBoard.

Definitions and concepts: CIDA typically follows the usageof WFP. CIDA has begun to work with the concept of foodassistanceasbeingconsistentwithashifttomakingavailableuntied funding for a set of food related transfers servicesinsteadof,aspreviously,commodityaid.

2.3 Pol�cy �n pract�ce

The priority accorded to meeting immediate food needsis also reflected in practice: some fourth fifths of food aidexpenditure in 2008-9 was emergency food aid and 20%for development food aid and food security projects. WFPINTERFAISalsoreported78%ofCanadianfundedcommoditieswereemergencyaidand22%fordevelopmentprojects.

WFP is CIDA’s major partner accounting for almost 90% ofexpenditure in 2008-9. Some 10% was channelled throughNGOs, almost entirely in partnership with the CanadianFoodgrains Bank (CFGB). In the case of CFGB, this supportwas matching funding to contributions by supporters.Whereasthesehadtraditionallybeenin-kindfromthefarmingcommunity, most support is now in cash often through thelocalsaleofpreviouslydonatedcommodities.TherewerealsosmallcontributionstoUNRWAandotheragencies.

Organisationally food assistance and nutrition is largely theresponsibilityoftheMultilateralandGlobalProgramsBranchwhosebudgetaccounts foraround60%ofall bilateral foodassistance and 80% of humanitarian food aid. AdditionalGeographical Programs were responsible for over 90% ofdevelopmental food assistance and food security programs.Multilateral core funding for food aid as distinct fromhumanitarianassistance,whichismostlydirected,isrelativelyunimportant. However CIDA has made what has been ineffectfive-yearprogrammaticcommitmentofC$25milliontosupportWFPschoolfeedingprogramsinAfrica.

Since the late 1990s CIDA has accorded a high priority tonutritional improvement in its foodassistancepolicy.This isreflected in the commitment to school feeding. Untying has

beenseenasanopportunitytofocusinalessconstrainedwayonqualityoffoodassistance.Micro-nutrientsupplementationcontinues to be a high priority in its health strategy. Theemphasisonmotherandchildhealth intheG8processalsoaccordswiththispriority.

CIDA,afteruntyingitsfoodassistanceresourcesintwostages,2005and2008,isnowprogrammingfoodassistanceintermsofdirectingsupporttobroadneeds.Itnowleavesittopartnerstodeterminewhatareappropriatefood-relatedtransfersandisfoundtoaccepttheuseofawidesetofmodalities.

CIDA responded in the short term to the global food crisisby committing an additional C$50million in 2008-9. Takinga longer term perspective, the 2009 food security strategywould appear to be an attempt to learn from the crisis andthemoredepth reviewsand consultations thatwerepart ofthe response with the L’Aquila statement on food securityprovidingthebroadframeworkforcollectiveaction.

AsasignatorytotheFoodAidConvention,afterencounteringdifficultiesintheearly2000s,CIDAhassoughttoensurethatCanadameets itsminimumcommitmentsunderConvention.Canadaalsounilaterallytooktheinitiativetoreportmorefullyto the secretariat on its food aid transactions that countedtowardsitscontribution.CanadawilltakeontherotatingchairoftheFoodAidCommitteeinJune2010andiscommittedtoworkingwithothercountriestomakecontinuedimprovementsto theConvention.Regarding thewiderhumanitarianreformprocess, it isunderstood thatCIDAsetsahighvalueon theclustersystemprocessasdiscussed in themain report,andisalsoastrongsupporteroftheCERFandWFPbeingabletoaccessthesefundsforfoodassistancepurposes.

Canada has been a member of the like-minded group ondevelopmentcooperationandmorerecentlyassociateditselfwith the so-called Nordic Plus grouping. The evolution ofCIDA’spolicyduring the lastdecade for foodassistanceandhumanitarian assistance more broadly, especially the highlevel of multi-lateral channelling of aid and untying, haveresulted in it movingmore closer to the longer establishedpositionsofothersinthatgrouping.

3. European Comm�ss�on

In 2007, the responsibilitywithin the EuropeanCommission(EC) services for financing humanitarian food aid in criseswascentralisedwithinDGECHOaspartof theEC’s financialperspectives for 2007–13. In addition to using its ownhumanitarianbudgets,DGECHOcanalsodrawondedicatedcontingencyfundsundercountryallocationsoftheEuropeanDevelopmentFund.

Inpost-crisissituationsothernon-humanitarianECinstrumentscancontributetorestoringnationalfoodsecurity,includingthe

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InstrumentforStability(IfS).Longer-termfoodsecuritysupportismanagedbythedevelopmentandcooperationservicesoftheEC(DGDEV,DGRELEXandDGAIDCO)25,andisfinancedby the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyInstrument(ENPI),drawnfromtheEC’sbudget,aswellasbytheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF) forAfrican,CaribbeanandPacific (ACP)countries.AnysuchfoodsecuritystrategiesmustbeframedwithinCountryStrategy Papers (CSPs), National Indicative Programmes(NIPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs),mutuallyagreed with beneficiary countries. In addition, notably infragile contexts or in countries where these geographicallyoriented instruments cannot be used, certain food securityobjectivescanbepursuedthroughtheFoodSecurityThematicProgramme (FSTP). Additional temporary ad hoc financialinstrumentscanalsobeestablished,suchastheFoodFacility,designed toaddressbothcausesandconsequencesofhighfood prices, in the short-to-medium term, from 2009 to2011.TheFTSPwasestablished in2007and is implementedthroughDGAIDCO.Itsmandateistoaddressfoodsecurityinsituationsoftransitionandinfragileandfailedstates,whereother EC food security instrumentsmay not be adequate orappropriate.

WFPhasbeenthemainrecipientofDGECHOfoodassistancefundingbutthisisstartingtoshiftastheuseofcash,deliveredby a wider range of partners, grows and awareness growsaboutthewiderrangeofinterventionsthatthepolicyallows.

A new EC policy on food security and food assistance is inthelatestagesofbeingfinalised.DGECHOhasdevelopedahumanitarianfoodassistancepolicythathasbeenpublishedasanEU(EuropeanUnion)communicationtowhichmemberstates will sign up with a complementary staff workingdocument.AfoodsecurityindevelopmentpolicypaperisalsobeingdevelopedwithinDGDEVandtheEChasattemptedtoensurecoherencebetweenthetwo.

3.1 Def�n�t�ons

Foodassistanceisdefinedasfollows:

Foodassistance,inbothhumanitariananddevelop-mentalcontexts,generallydescribesanyinterventiondesigned to tackle food insecurity, its immediatecausesandanditsvariousnegativeconsequences.

Food assistance includes the transfer or provisionofrelevantservices,inputsorcommodities,cashorvouchers,skillsorknowledge.

Food assistance aims to ensure the intake orconsumptionofsufficient,safeandnutritiousfoodthatmeetsdietaryneedsandfoodpreferencesforadequate child growthandanactive andhealthylife(EuropeanCommission2010d).

This broad definition leads to an equally broad typology ofresponses that the EC recognises as food assistance andwhicharedescribedas

• unconditionalfoodtransfers• unconditionalcashtransfers• conditionalfoodorcashtransfers(foodorcashforwork,

foodfortraining)• vouchers• emergency livelihoodservicessuchasagricultural inputs

(seeds, fertilizer), pastoral services (fodder and waterprovision, de-stocking and re-stocking, veterinary care),agricultural training, irrigation and income-generatingactivities

• infrastructural projects to improve access to, andfunctioningof,marketsincrisis-affectedareas

• supporttoemergencyfoodsecuritymonitoringandearlywarningsystems

• milling of cereals or provision of items required forpreparing food such as cooking sets, cooking fuel andwater

• training and awareness raising on nutrition, dietarymanagementandfeedingpractices

• treatmentforacutemalnutrition• treatment of moderate acute malnutrition through

supplementaryfeeding• micronutrientsupplementation

3.2 Pol�cy pos�t�ons

DGECHOhasremainedclearlyopposedtoschoolfeedinginhumanitarian contexts and its guidelines for funding schoolfeedingstate‘schoolfeedingisnotconsideredanappropriatemeansofdeliveringfoodandnutritionalsupporttovulnerablechildreninemergencies,exceptinexceptionalcircumstances,whereallothermoreeffectiveresponseoptionsareunfeasible’(ECHO2009).

In the area of nutrition, the new policy paper endorsessupport for community based approaches to therapeuticfeeding (CMAM). In recognition of the new products andapproaches to supplementary feeding and nutrition morebroadlyitisdevelopinganinternalpositionpaperonnutritioninemergencies,which is feeding intoan inter-serviceprocessofpolicydevelopmentonnutrition.Thereisrecognitionthatthesimpledividebetweenchronicmalnutritionasadevelopment

2007(%) 2008(%) 2009(%)

UN 78 70 59

NGOs 20 23 37

RedCrossandRedCrescent 2 7 4

Movement

Table 4: DG ECHo food ass�stance partners, 2007–9

25DG=DirectorateGeneral.

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issue and acute malnutrition as an emergency issue doesnotwork, asmanydevelopment contexts havehigh levels ofacuteaswellaschronicmalnutrition.Concernexiststhatnewproductsandapproaches lackcoordinationandendorsementofandthatthecomplexarrayofnewproductsrisksturningintoamess.ECHOisencouragingWFP,UNICEFandWHOtocomeupwithaclearjointpositionandstatementonnewproducts.

Thehumanitarian food assistancepolicymakes it clear thatlocaland regionalpurchasesare favouredwhere foodaid isdeemed the most appropriate response tool. This is basedon ‘the need to reduce costs, limit transportation delaysand prevent market distortions; and to provide economicopportunitiesforsmallfarmersincountrieswherepurchasesaremade’.DGECHO,however,hasbeenlukewarminitsviewsonWFP’spurchase forprogress initiative, seeingdangers intheshort-termmanipulationofmarketsandinthemovementofWFPbeyonditsmainareasofcompetence.

The EC is in the process of formulating its policy on theuse ofGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms (GMO) in developingcountries.Inthemeantimethenewpolicycallsonpartnerstoconformtotherelevantnationalpoliciesandlegislationinthecountryofoperation.

DG ECHO supports the roll-out of the Integrated PhaseClassification (IPC) approach to food security analysis andhas been amajor contributor. The new policy also requiresfood assistance interventions to ‘consider opportunities formainstreamingriskreduction,preparednessandmitigation’.

DG ECHO is concerned over the continuing weakness offood assistance monitoring but has seen recent signs ofimprovement.InDarfur,afoodsecuritymonitoringsystemhasbeendevelopeddrawingonnewtoolssuchasdietarydiversityand food consumption scores to produce richer data whichfocusesonconsumption,notonlyonwhathasbeendelivered.WFPisnowreportingonmorethanjusttonnagein50percentof its contracts, up from 5 percent in recent years. Its newstrategicresultsframeworkpromisesfurtherimprovementsanditsvulnerabilityandanalysismappingcapacity(VAM)isbeingplacedmoreprominentlyatthecentreofreporting.

Concerning the Food Aid Convention, ECHO aims to seewhether it can be made more meaningful as part of therenegotiation process and recognises that abandonmentmight be politically unpalatable. ECHO is supportive of thenewfoodsecuritycluster.

4. Belg�um

TheDirectorateGeneralforDevelopmentCooperation(DGDC)spends over €20 million on food aid and actions for foodsecurityandthisamountisplannedtodoubleincomingyears.TheDGDC(Directorate-GeneralforDevelopmentCooperation)

alsospendsabout€40million through theBelgianSurvivalFund,whichsubsidisesprogrammesthattacklethecausesofpovertyandfoodinsecurity.

FoodassistanceforBelgiumishousedwithintheDepartmentofHumanitarianAidoftheBelgianMinistryforForeignAffairsandDevelopmentCooperation.Theministry’sfoodassistancestrategyisintegratedwithinabroaderfoodsecuritystrategy(2008–12). Belgium takes the position that in-kind food aidshouldbelimitedtoemergencyandrecoveryorrehabilitationcontexts.Itdoesnotprovideanyin-kindfoodaid,onlycash.Belgium’sfundingforfoodaidischannelledprimarilythroughWFP,FAO,UNHAS(theUNHumanitarianAirService)andsomeBelgianNGOs.

Belgium has a budget line called ‘food aid and short-termfoodsecurity’fromwhichitfinancesitsfoodassistance.Thisbudget is aimed at increasing food security and has threecategoriesofprojects:

Box 1: ECHo’s approach to ma�nstream�ng r�sk

reduct�on

The EC’s humanitarian food assistance should aim for thefollowing(EuropeanCommission,2010d):

a) incorporation of disaster-risk analysis in all foodassistanceassessments(forexample,assessingtheriskoffloodingonlandtobecultivatedusingseedsandtoolsprovidedashumanitarianfoodassistance);

b) short-term reinforcement of early-warning systems,particularly to incorporate an appropriate range ofindicatorsrelatedtoemergencyfoodinsecurityandacutemalnutrition,andlinkingthesesystemstorapidprevention,mitigation and response systems (for instance, lookingbeyondagriculturalproductionfiguresforfoodavailability,andanalysingfoodpricetrendsaspossible indicatorsofthepoorest’sdiminishingaccesstofood);

c) systematicrespectofthe‘donoharm’principlesoastomakesurethataresponsetoonecrisisdoesnotincreasebeneficiaries’ risk exposure and vulnerability to othercrises (for instance,ensuring that fooddistributionsdonot lead toovercrowdedsettlementarounddistributionpoints,promotingHIVawarenesscampaignsforfoodaidtransporters);

d) disaster-proofing emergency response interventionsto minimise future risks (for instance ensuring thatemergency food storage facilities are strong enough towithstandextremeclimaticconditions)and

e) developing capacities for preparedness and buildingresilienceduring the responseand recovery stages (forinstancebyexploiting thewindowofopportunitywhenhavingwholecommunitiesassembledatfooddistributionpoints to promote disaster and/or HIV awareness, or‘building back better’, for instance by ensuring thatpreviously floodedagricultural landhas improved floodprotection).

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• food aid supplied in crisis situationsmainly through theWorldFoodProgramme,UNRWA(theUNReliefandWorksAgency)andBelgianNGOs;

• foodsecurityprojectsthathelptoincreasefoodproductionby restoring food production systems after a crisis, themainpartnersbeingFAOandBelgianNGOsand

• structural foodaid thatsupports the foodsecuritypolicyofpartnercountriesandisusuallyprovidedonabilateralbasis.

In 2007, the total budget line was €19.6 million, of which€19millionwenttoUNagencies(WFP,FAOandUNRWA)and€600,000wenttoanNGO.In2008,thetotalbudgetlinewas€22,602,000,allofwhichwenttoUNagencies(WFP,FAOandUNRWA). In 2009, the total budgetwas€37,188,203, all ofwhichwenttoUNagencies(WFP,FAOandUNRWA).

The countries for which the Belgian government earmarksits funding vary every year depending on the crisis and thelevel of need. In 2009 it financed the following countries:Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC, OPT, Ethiopia, Niger, Somalia,Zimbabwe,Pakistan,Kenya,Laos,YemenandthePhilippines.ItprioritiseslocalandtriangularpurchaseswhereappropriateandadequateandhasbeenaleaderonthisissuewithintheEuropeancommunity.ItalsoprovidedfundstoWFPandFAOaspartofWFP’sPurchaseforProgress(P4P)initiative,whichaimstohelpsmallfarmerstoincreasetheirrevenues.In2007,the Belgian government provided€500,000 toWFP for theinitiativeinDRC.In2009,itprovidedanother€1miliontoWFPand€650,000toFAO,alsoinDRC.ThepurchaseofGMOsisprohibited(BelgianDevelopmentCooperation2008).

5. Germany

5.1 structure and budget

The FederalMinistry for EconomicCooperationandDevelop-ment (BMZ) has overall responsibility for food assistance.Within BMZ, there are two departments dealing with foodsecurity/assistance:

• Department for Development-Oriented Emergency andTransitionalAid(DETA),whichincludesBMZ’spartnershipwithWFP

• DepartmentforRuralDevelopmentandFoodSecurity

AlsoinvolvedaretheFederalMinistryofFood,AgricultureandConsumerProtection(BMELV).Inhumanitariancrises,foodaidis partlymanaged by the Federal Foreign Office (AuswärtigesAmt) during the immediate response (first six months). TheFederalMinistryofFood,AgricultureandConsumerProtection(BMELV)isresponsibleforthefollowingtopicsorareas:

1) worldfoodaffairsandcollaborationwithFAO(Forexample,since 2002 BMELV has supported projects dedicated to

overcome malnutrition and hunger through a bilateraltrust fund with FAO with an annual budget of €8.3million.Altogether,theBMELVprovided€67millionfor51projects.);

2) therighttofoodand3) internationaltradeissuesandtheWTO.

TheBMELValsoconvenesthe(annual)internationalconference‘PoliciesagainstHunger’.

SupporttoemergencyandtransitionalassistanceinterventionsimplementedbyWFP,GTZ,GermanNGOsandtheRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementwasroughly€130millionin2009and€92millioneachyearin2007and2008.SupporttoWFPdevelopmentfoodaidinterventionshasbeen€25millionperannumsince1985.

In addition, further emergency and transitional aidinterventions implementedby theWFPare financed throughathirdBMZbudgetlineadministeredbytheKreditanstaltfürWiederaufbau(KfW). In2008, thisbudget lineencompassedapproximately €42 million and in 2009, €30 million. Thiswas largely in response to the foodprice crisis. In addition,bilateralfoodsecurityprogrammesareimplementedthroughtechnicalcooperation.Outofallthesebudgetlines,multilateralcontributions(toWFP)amountedtoUS$100.5millionin2008andUS$132millionin2009.

Inresponsetotheglobalfoodcrisis,GermanyhascommittedUS$3billionoverthreeyearsaspartoftheL’Aquilaprocess.DETA’s budget for food assistance increased by roughly 30percentbetween2008and2009andGermany’scontributiontoWFPwasitshighesteverin2009.

5.2 Pol�cy

Germany is in the process developing a new food assistancestrategyaspartofitsoverallfoodsecuritystrategy(thisstudyisintendedtocontributetothat).Previousstrategiesandpoliciesarescattered—notlocatedinoneplace.TheBMZstrategyfordevelopment-oriented emergency and transitional aid (DETA)containsasectiononfoodsecuritythatmentionsthefollowinginstruments:short-termfoodaid,procuredintheregionwherepossible; cash and food for work and seeds, fertiliser andagricultural inputs. Medium-term food security programmestake a grass roots and multi-sector approach and includefosteringfoodself-sufficiency;supportingthereconstructionofeconomic,socialandinstitutionalinfrastructureandsupportingeconomicactivitiesandmarketandsocialstructures(BMZ2005).Furtherguidanceforintegratedfoodsecurityprogrammesissetoutinprojectguidelines(BMZ/GTZ1997).

5.3 Def�n�t�ons

Germany is currentlyworking on a definition for food assis-tanceandwithinCOHAFA(theWorkingPartyonHumanitarian

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Aid and Food Aid) has participated actively in formulatinga joint food assistance definition. An appraisal of activitiesand measures implemented by governmental and non-governmental, bilateral and multilateral organisations andfunded by the German government is under way in orderto get a complete picture of the approaches, instrumentsand standards used. This exercise will contribute tosharpening Germany’s definition of food assistance. Thereis an expectation that nutrition issues should be featuredmoreprominently incurrentdefinitionsof foodaidandfoodassistance(e.g.,targetingchildrenlessthantwoyearsofage,pregnantwomen, and ‘windows of opportunity’). Germany’sdefinitionoffoodassistance‘inthemaking’willalsorelatetothedefinitionof social safetynetsand,morebroadly, socialprotectionsystems(seeFAO,TheStateofFood Insecurity intheWorld2009).

5.4 Instruments

In DETA, instruments such as cash and vouchers for workhaveassumedagrowingimportance.Foodassistanceisalsoseen as an integral part of safety nets, a subset of broadersocialprotectionsystems.GermanyhasincreasedsupporttoschoolfeedingthroughWFP.Nutritionhasbeenarecognisedweaknessandthereareplanstostepitup.FoodandcashforworkhasbeenamajorpartoftheDETAportfolio,withlarge-scalecashandfoodforworkprogrammesinAfghanistanandNepal(Lamadeetal,2009;DFID,GTZandWFP2007).

5.5 Food secur�ty arch�tecture

Germanywould like the FoodAidConvention tobeadaptedto new realities and evolve frombeing a food aid to a foodassistance convention. Commitments of members shouldmove away from the tonnage-based system. Furthermore,theFoodAidCommitteeshould transform itself intoa ‘FoodAssistanceCommittee’.Itshouldpreparediscussionsamongdonors and representatives of potential recipient countriesand initiate more timely debates, especially when newemergenciesarise.Recipientcountriesshouldplayanactiverole in findingabalancebetweenshort-and long-term foodsecurityresponses.Thecommitteecouldandshouldtakeoveramoreambitiousandpro-active role andbeadonor forumthatundertakesactivities,forexample,inthefieldsofneedsassessment, applied research (e.g., on the effectiveness offoodassistancetoachievenationalfoodsecurity),monitoringand evaluation (e.g., possible negative impact of food aidon markets and sustainable food security, planned andconfirmed food assistance allocation), definition of foodassistance (toolbox,etc.),assessmentofdonorperformance(peerreviews)andpromotionofbestpracticesandexchangeof information on lessons learnt. Germany supports therenegotiationprocess,sees thecommitments that formpartoftheFACasbeingimportantsignsofpoliticalsolidarityandbelieves that letting the FACwhitherwould send thewrongsignal.

FoodaidisakeyunresolvedissueintheDohaRoundofnego-tiations.EuropeangovernmentsdisagreewiththeUSpositionastheUSiscampaigningforthestatusquotobemaintained.However,ifthestatusquooftheUruguayRoundofnegotiations,under which food aid is exempt from WTO disciplines onexport subsidies isupheld, foodaidwill continue to functionas a means of increasing subsidised donor-country exports.Furthermore,thiswouldcontributetoagenerallackofefficiencyintheprovisionofaid,asthetyingoffoodaidpreventsflexiblemanagement,particularlyinemergencies.AlongwithEuropeangovernments,Germanydoesnot feel that theuntyingof foodaidwillautomaticallyleadtoadeclineinthelevelsoffoodaidbeingdelivered,asarguedbytheUS.Infact,theuntyingoffoodaidwouldnotonly leadto lowercosts, itwouldalso increaseflexibilityandefficiencyintermsoftheadministrationofaid,aswellaspromotethelocalproductionoffood.However,untyingwould need to be carefullymonitored in order tomake suredonorcountriescomplywith the requirementsofuntied foodaidbothformallyandinpractice.

Germany is supportive of the newly agreed food securitycluster,whichitseesasprovidinganopenforumfordialogueonpolicies,strategiesandinnovationsinfoodprogrammingat the operational level. Food clusters have spontaneouslyemerged in a very large number of emergencies, showingthe high demand for the cluster. Furthermore, the clustersystemhasevolvedtobethepreferredmodeofcoordinationinemergenciesworldwide(Stoddardetal.,2007). Itwillbeimportantthatfunctionsandmandatesareclearlydefinedtoavoidoverlapwith theworkofotherglobalgoverning foodassistancebodieslikeCFS,FAC,GlobalPartnership,etc.

6. netherlands

WithinthegovernmentoftheNetherlands,threeministriesareresponsibleforfoodassistance:theMinistryforForeignAffairs,theMinistry forAgricultureandFisheriesand theMinistry forDevelopmentCooperation.IntheMinistryofForeignAffairs,theDepartment of Humanitarian Affairs andHuman Rights dealswithhumanitarianaid,onecomponentofwhichisfoodaid.TheDepartmentofEconomicDevelopmentdealswithfoodsecurity.Foodassistancestraddlestheborderbetweenthesetwo.

The Netherlands adopts the definitions ofWFP and UNICEFfor food assistance and nutrition. The Department ofHumanitarian Affairs and Human Rights is currently in theprocess of developing a humanitarian aid policy. However,this makes little reference to food assistance because it isnot considered a high priority at this time. The policy paysmuchmoreattentiontoissuesofaccountability,coordination,needsassessmentsandpartnershipswithNGOs.

In2008,theDepartmentofEconomicDevelopmentdevelopedthepaperAgriculture,RuralEconomicDevelopmentandFoodSecurity,inwhichfoodsecurityandcashtransfermechanisms

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(including social and productive safety nets, cash-for-workschemes and school feeding programmes) are seen as onestrandofa five-trackapproach thatalso includes increasingagricultural productivity in the context of climate change,supportinginstitutionsandinfrastructure,creatingsustainablevalue chains and improving market access (Department ofEconomicDevelopment2008).

The Netherlands gives an annual, multi-lateral generalcontributiontoWFPof€40million.Thisamountwasincreasedto€40millionfromapreviouslevelof€27millionin2008inresponsetohighfoodpricesandremainedatthatlevelin2009.Inaddition,itprovides€15millionayearinbilateralfoodaidtohumanitariancrises inspecificcountries,namelyUganda,Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Somalia. NetherlandsadoptsEUpolicyonlocalandregionalprocurementanddoesnotengageinmonetisation.Itpreferstoprovidehumanitarianaid via the CERF because this promotes better coordinationandeaseofmonitoring.

Although the Netherlands supports school feeding in bothemergencyanddevelopmentcontexts,itdoesnothaveaspecificpolicy on this. In addition to supporting WFP’s emergencyschoolfeedingprogrammes,itprovidesbilateralsupporttotheGhanaSchoolFeedingProgrammeandisanactivememberoftheGhanaAgriculturalInitiativeNetwork(GAIN).

The Netherlands sees the development of a food securityclusterat theglobal levelasapositivestep,andasignthatagriculture is back on the policy agenda following a longperiodofneglect.

7. norway

ForNorway,foodassistancesitsstrictlywithinitshumanitarianpolicy and is part of its overall approach to food security.Specificallyonfoodaiditstatesthat‘foodaidmustbeusedwithcautiontoprevent itunderminingsustainable localandregionalagriculture’andnotesthat‘thedistributionofmoneyisamoreeffectivealternativeinmanysituations’(NorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairs2009).

Norway’s funding for food aid is primarily through WFPalthoughitalsosupportsICRC.ItprovidesacoremultilateralannualcommitmenttoWFPthathasbeenearmarkedforthelast two years.This is due to a growing concernwithWFP’sopen-endedstrategiccommitmentsandwhatNorwayseesasa lackofprioritisationonWFP’scoremandateofemergencyresponse to shocks. In theabsenceof earmarking, it felt itscontribution was being used for under-funded projects andcountries that Norway did not see as priorities. Norway’scontribution is now earmarked for use in least-developedand food-deficit countries. Norway also contributes toWFPthroughresponsestoindividualappealsandthroughtheCERF(19percentoftheCERFofwhichWFPisthelargestrecipient).

Norway feels thatWFP is failing to differentiate sufficientlybetween acute and chronic hunger and that it is spreadingitself too thinly in attempting to respond to chronic hungerissuesthatwouldbemoreappropriatelydealtwithbyother,primarilydevelopment, actors. It feels thatbyattempting todo too muchWFP is hurting its preparedness to deal withshocks and that it would struggle to cope with concurrentmajor emergencies. Norway feels that WFP needs to makestrategicchoices inpart todealwitha$2.6billiondeficit in2009 and that this should take the form of focusing on itsemergencyoperations.

Norwayissupportiveofthecurrentfinancialframeworkreviewandwould like to seeWFPmoving away from the tonnage-based funding model and be more selective about what itincludes in its PRRO category. It would like developmentprojectstobeclearlylabelledinlong-termcountryprogrammesandnotincludedinPRROs.NorwayisnotinfavourofgreaterWFPengagementwithlong-termsocialprotectionbecauseitdesires to seeWFPmaintain an emergency focus. However,Norway recognises thatWFP’s is sometimes one of the fewactors present in fragile states and protracted crises andthereforeitisdifficulttohandovertodevelopmentactors.

Norwayis infavourofWFP’smovefromafoodaidtoafoodassistance agency and embraces cash-based programming.It has concerns over purchase for progress and would likeFAOtoplayagreaterrole,asWFPisnotandshouldnotbeanagricultureorganisation.

Norway does not contribute to school feeding and hasconcernsabout theweaknessofexitstrategies. Italso feelsthatWFP’smonitoringcapacityneedstoimprove.WFPhasagoodgenderstrategyonpaperbutneedstoimprovehowthisisimplementedatfieldlevelandshouldhaveagreaterfocusonprotectionissues.

Norway has disengaged from discussions around the FACandseesnoneedforanewconvention.TheemergingglobalfoodsecurityarchitecturecomingoutofL’Aquila,G8andG20discussions,theHLTF(High-LevelTaskForce)andtherevisedCFSmeanthatthedebatehasmovedonandfoodaidshouldfitwithinthisbroaderfoodsecurityarchitecture.

On clusters, Norway sees good practice emerging at fieldlevel; for example, in Haiti WFP, FAO and IFAD, using theclustermodel,workedwelltogetherandwithanappropriatedivisionofresponsibilities.

8. sweden

Sweden only provides food assistance for humanitarianpurposes, primarily throughWFP as well as funding for theRedCrossMovementandtheCERF(whereSwedenisthethirdlargestdonor).

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Sweden’s annual letter to WFP, which sets the frameworkfor howWFP can use the Swedish core contributions, saysexpresslythatWFPmustnotusethemoneyinitsdevelopmentprogrammes. By saying so, Sweden is stressing that seesWFP’s comparative advantage as humanitarian operationsandviewstheorganisationasahumanitarianactor,notasadevelopmentactor(MinistryforForeignAffairs2008).Swedenwould like to see a tighter use of PRROs with a narrowerdefinition of what constitutes recovery. It is supportive ofWFP’s financial framework review and would like to seea stronger prioritisation process both between and withinemergenciesonthepartofWFP.

A Swedish reviewofWFP assessed its internal and externaleffectivenessasgoodandnoted itsstrongcountrypresenceand progress in the areas of local procurement, handoverstrategiesandbetterneedsassessment,whichSwedenseesasimportant(MinistryofForeignAffairs2008).

Sweden does support the use of cash, the shift to localprocurement andother innovative tools for food assistance.As its food assistance comes from its humanitarian budgetlineand is solely forWFP, thedebateoverdefinitions isnotofparticularimportance.SwedenhasnotbeenveryinvolvedindebatesovertherenegotiationoftheFoodAidConvention,whichitdoesnotseeasamajorpriority.

9. Un�ted k�ngdom

TheDepartment for InternationalDevelopment (DFID)doesnothavea foodassistancepolicy inone identifiableplace.The2002paper‘EliminatingHunger’ isstillrelevant.DFID’shumanitarianpolicycontainsashortsectiononappropriateresponsesandcommitsDFID toexamining the roleof foodaidonacase-by-casebasis.Asocialprotectionpolicyisbeingdraftedandanewnutritionstrategyhasjustbeenlaunched.DFID also fed extensively into the newECHOhumanitarianfood assistance policy and agreeswith its principles. DFIDstill tends to use the terms food aid and food assistanceinterchangeably but is increasingly moving to using foodassistanceandagreeswiththeECHOpolicydefinition.

Thefoodpricecrisis ledtoagreaterfocusonfoodsecuritywithinDFID,especiallyonagriculturalproduction,nutritionand access issues, notably social protection. It createda better awareness that food security is not just aboutagriculturalproductionbutalsoaboutpoorpeoples’accessto food. A global level, it led DFID and others to push forstronger leadership around food security issues—the UN

HLTF and G8 and G20 engagements have been welcomeresults.

DFID’s food aid support is largely channelled throughWFP.Dependingonthedefinitionoffoodassistanceused,itwouldalsoincludeDFID’ssupporttosafetynetprogrammessuchasthePSNPinEthiopiaandtheKenyaHungerSafetyNet.

DFID continues to be supportive of the use of cash whereappropriate. However the food price crisis did challengeassumptions that cash should be the transfer of choice.Evaluations suchasone carriedoutbySave theChildren inEthiopia have argued for a mix of food and cash, but withtheflexibilitytochoosebetweencashandfoodinstruments,somethingthatisoftendifficultinpractice.

In general, DFID does not fund WFP to do developmentbecause it channels most of its sectoral funds throughcountry-led sector-wide programmes or general budgetsupport. It also reflects concern over the programmingquality of much of WFP’s traditional developmental work.School feeding for example, would need to be part of agovernment-led education programme and funded throughthegovernmentbudget.DFIDapplaudsWFPreconsiderationoftheway itdeliversschool feeding.However, itstill thinksthat universal delivery is unaffordable in poorer countries.Itbelievesschool feedingneeds tobecarefully targetedonthemostvulnerable.DFIDisalsoscepticalaboutWFP’sfoodfor work/assets programmes, which have a patchy record.Food transfers are seen as an odd ‘organising principle’aroundwhichtodesigneducation,trainingorasset-buildingactivities—and a hangover from the era when there was aneedtofindthingstodowithsurplusfood.

DFID continues to strongly support the expansion of socialprotectionandtheWhitePaperin2009“Buildingourcommonfuture(DfID,2009)containsacommitmenttobringinganother50millionpeopleintosocialassistanceandrelatedmeasures.DFIDisalsolookingtobuildstrongerlinkswithdisasterriskreduction programming, improving livestock responses inpastoralistareasandexploringnewoptionsforfoodsecuritysupport,suchasmicro-insurance.

The labellingofassistanceashumanitarianordevelopmentisnotalwayshelpfulanditispossibletoseetheconnectivityoffoodassistanceaspartofstrengtheningsocialprotectionas both developmental and humanitarian. People withinDFID are increasingly thinking in terms of developmentalapproaches—moreabouthowyoudothingsthanaboutwhatyoudo.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

SEK SEK SEK SEK SEK SEK SEK

290,000,000 390,000,000 410,000,000 390,000,000 450,000,000 415,000,000 480,000,000

Table 5: swed�sh fund�ng for WFP, 2004–10

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DFIDencouragesWFPto focuson itscorehumanitarianandlogisticscapacities.However, it isnowseeingapotential forWFPtoworkonsocialprotection,nutrition,riskmanagementandcapacitybuildingifitcandemonstraterealaddedvalue,particularly in fragilestatesandchroniccrises.DFIDcountryprogrammes are becoming more willing to consider anexpandedWFProle.However,WFPdoesnothaveahugecadreofstaffappropriatelyskilledtoengageintheseareas.

DFIDseesthecontinuationoftheHLTFasimportantandthatitwillcontinuetobeneededwhilstFAOgoesthroughaprocessofreform.TherevisedCommitteeonFoodSecurityisseenasimportantfromademocraticpointofview,bringinginG77andNGOvoices.Thereareconcernsoveritslackofusefulnessinthepastandthattherevisedstructurewillneedtoproveitsworth. DFID increasingly sees the FAC has having outliveditsusefulnessandasbeing supersededbybroaderdebatesaroundarevisedfoodsecurityarchitecture.

10. Austral�a

TheAustralian governmentdoesnot have a formal foodaidor food assistance policy. It does now have a food securitystrategy (since 2009) supported by additional financing($464.2million Australian over four years). This focuses onstrengthening agricultural productivity, rural livelihoods andbuilding community resilience in selected countries. Foodaid, however, is not includedwithin the strategy. Australia’s‘foodaid/assistanceprogramme’was finallyuntied in2005,thesametimeatwhichthebroaderaidprogrammewasbeinguntied.AusAIDdoesnothaveitsowndefinitionsforfoodaidorfoodassistanceandfollowsthoseusedbyWFP.

Although Australia does not have a formal definition offood aid or food assistance, it does see itself as flexiblein how it provides food assistance. Australia supports notonly the provision of relevant commodities but also thelogistics, emergency telecommunications, cash transfersand food vouchers, nutrition research, mapping and needsassessments,whichallcontributetoensuringthatvulnerablepopulations receive nutritious food in a timely fashion.Oneexample of the flexible approach is Australia’s provision offunding toWFP over the last three years to enhanceWFP’semergencypreparedness,needsassessmentandresponseintheAsia-Pacificregion.

Responsibility for food aid sits in the humanitarian branchwhereas food security sits within the economic and ruraldevelopment and infrastructure branch of AusAID. TheprimaryfocusofAusAID’sfoodaidisitspartnershipwithWFP.AustraliaalsosupportsprovisionoffoodaidthroughUNRWA($5.2 million (US dollars in this financial year). Much ofAustralia’ssupporttoNGOsisprovidedthroughbroadfundingtoanumberofNGOsinpartnershipagreements,ratherthanearmarkedfunding.Someofthismaybeusedforfoodaidbut

thegovernmentisnotcurrentlyinapositiontoadviseonthescopeandscaleofthiswork.Stepsarebeingtakentoensurethatthissupportisreportedinfuture.

Australiaprovided$35millionAustraliantoWFPasamultilateralregular contribution in 2009–10. Thiswas covered under anearlierMOU(memorandumofunderstanding),whichhasnowbeensupersededby theAustralia-WFPStrategicPartnershipAgreement. Australia’s multilateral regular contributionhas been supplementedwith over $64million Australian torespondtoemergenciesandothercountryprioritiesidentifiedand agreed jointly by Australia andWFP. The new strategicpartnership agreement guarantees $35 million Australiana year, unearmarked, for four years and an additional $10million Australian for school feeding. The agreement alsoprovidesforadditionalcontributionstoparticularemergencyappealsonacase-by-casebasis (AusAID2009).Thissortofunearmarkedmulti-yearcontribution isstillunusualand theagreementisbeingusedbyWFPasabenchmarktoencourageotherdonorstofollowasimilarapproach.

Inbroadterms,AusAIDconsidersWFPtobeawell-performingUN organisation and supports its broader food assistancework. It supports current attempts to reviewWFP’s financialframeworktomovebeyondthetonnage-basedfundingmodeland to allow greater flexibility in definitions and cut-offsbetween WFP’s different programming categories. AusAIDsupportsWFP’seffortstostrengthenforwardbudgetplanningandcontinuedstrengtheningof itsmonitoringandevaluationfunctions.AusAIDisinfavourofWFP’scommitmenttogreateruse of cash-based approacheswhere appropriate, increasingengagementwithwidersocialprotectiondebatesandpurchaseforprogressinitiative.Itwouldliketoseegenderconcernsmorefirmly embedded inWFP’s work. AusAID is following currentdebates in the nutrition sector with interest, particularly US-fundedresearchonimprovingthenutritionalvalueoffoodaid.

AustraliaisamemberoftheFACandhasengagedindebatesaboutitsrenegotiation.Itisinfavourofallowingmoreflexibledelivery mechanisms and as much flexibility as possible intermsofwhatisreported.Thiswouldinclude‘twinning’whereonedonorprovidescashsupportforcommoditiesprovidedbyanotherdonor.Itseespotentialforrestructuringthecommittee,whichneedstodomorethanreportagainstFACcommitments.If theFAC is toberenegotiated itwantstosee itplayamoreusefulrole.Australiadoesnotwanttohavearenegotiationjustforthesakeofit.ItstillreportsitsmetrictonnagecommitmentsagainsttheFAC,whichithas,mostly,beenmeeting.However,itfeelsthatitscontributionisunder-reportedbecausecurrentrulesmeanthatnotallofitssupporttoWFPiscounted.

11. Japan

Japan provides food aid to developing countries faced withfood shortages and supports efforts to improve the food

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productivity of such countries as amid- to long-term effort.Japandoesnothaveaspecific foodaidpolicy,buthasbeenactiveintheL’AquilaG8summitandotherinternationalfoodsecuritymeetings.

‘Foodaid’isunderstoodtorefertoaidgivenforhumanitarianpurposestohelpthosewhosufferfromhunger.Bycontrast,‘foodassistance’ isunderstood tobemuchbroader, encompassingbothfoodaidandlonger-termeffortstoachievefoodsecurity.Thetwoministriesresponsibleforfoodaid/assistancearetheMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheMinistryforAgriculture.

In2007,Japandisbursedatotalofaround¥16billioninfoodaid(KR:KennedyRound)tocountriesfacedwithfoodshortages.Ofthisamount,¥7.28billionwasprovidedintheformofbilateralassistance to Nepal, Eritrea, Cabo Verde, Burkina Faso, Haiti

andothercountries;¥8.68billionwasprovidedtoTimor-Leste,Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Palestine and others intheformofmultilateralassistancethroughWFPandtheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEast(UNRWA).JapanhasbeenmakingactivecontributionstotheWFPandbecameitsfifth-biggestdonorin2007.Itdoesnotfundschoolfeedingprogrammes.

Japaniscommittedtoincreasingagriculturaloutput,irrigationfacilities and food production through technical cooperationandotherassistanceprovidedtodevelopingcountries.Inrecentyears,JapanhassupportedZambia’seffortstodiversifyediblefarmproductsforfoodsecurityattheregionalandhouseholdlevelsinareasfrequentlyhitbydroughts.InUganda,Japanhasintroducedsustainable irrigation farming thateffectivelyuseswaterresourcesinordertoincreasericeproduction.

III. Internat�onal agenc�es

1. World Food Programme (WFP)

WFP has an increasingly dominant position in providinginternational food assistance. In 2008, donors contributedmore resources thaneverbefore toWFP (US$5billion)andWFPassistedover102millionbeneficiarieswithover3.9millionmetrictonnesof food.This includedanextraordinaryappealin relation to rising food and fuel prices, which eventuallytotalled$1billion,includinga$500millioncontributionfromtheKingdomofSaudiArabia(WFP2009a).

Arelativelysmallnumberoflarge-scaleemergenciescontinuetomakeupalargepercentageofWFP’sportfolio.Afghanistan,Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia andSudan together accounted for45percentofprogrammeexpensesin2008,withSudan,thelargestoperation,accountingfor16percentonitsown.

WFPinitsnewstrategicplansetitselfthetaskoftransformingfrom a food aid agency to a food assistance agency; thisincludedacommitmenttoprovidingcashorvoucherswhereappropriate and to strengthening the developmental gainsfor small-scale farmers from local procurement through thePurchase for Progress initiative (WFP 2008c). It has alsocontinuedtodevelopprivatesectorpartnerships(WFP2009a).AccordingtoWFP(2009a,20)thenewstrategicplan

embodiesashiftinWFP’sapproachesinresponseto global changes; there is an emphasis onassessmentandanalysistodetermineappropriateresponses to hunger in terms of context and inways that contribute to the safety and dignityof the populations in need. WFP will employ atoolkit that is broader and more flexible: it will

includecashandvoucherprogrammes, innovativenutritious food products to prevent and treatmalnutrition, and Purchase for Progress (P4P) toenablesmall-scalefarmerstoaccessnewmarketsandtoencourageincreasedproduction.

Theareasofnewemphasisinthestrategicplaninclude

• disasterpreparednessandresilience• adaptationtoclimatechange• improvednutritional response throughnewproductsand

approaches• specialattentiontotheneedsofIDPsandrefugees• post-crisisandpost-conflictsituations• expandedlocalpurchaseandclearhandoverstrategiesto

ensurelocalownership

WFPhasyet todevelopadefinition for foodassistance.TherelativelynewshiftinthenewstrategicplanfromfoodaidtofoodassistancemeansthatwithinWFPthereisstilla lackofcommonunderstandingaround the term. Inapaperoncashandvouchersitdefinesfoodassistanceasreferringto‘thesetof instrumentsusedtoaddressthefoodneedsofvulnerablepeople. The instruments generally include in-kind food aid,vouchersandcashtransfers’(WFP2009f ).This isanarrowerdefinition than that proposed by ECHO—WFP is consciousof theneedforarelativelynarrowdefinitiontodelineatetheboundariesbetween itsworkandthatofFAO,whichhas thewiderfoodsecuritymandate.

Thenumberofdonors contributing toWFPhas continued toincrease.In2008,therewere98donorsofwhich66werenotpartoftheOECD.Pooledfundinghasbecomeanincreasingly

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important aspect ofWFP’s financing. In 2008, pooled fundswerethefifthlargestrevenuesource,withthebulk(75percent)comingfromtheCERF.WFP’sshareoftheCERFhasbeenonethird between 2005 and 2008.WFP has a ten-year strategyfor expanding private sector partnerships and fundraising.In 2008, companies and foundations contributed $145.5million in cash and $48.8 million in in-kind contributions.Partnerships included TNT, Vodafone, Unilever, the BostonConsultingGroupandtheBillandMelindaGatesFoundation.WFPhasagrowinginterestinplayingaroleindebatesaroundlonger-termsocialprotectionandsafetynets.Itsstrategicplantalksaboutintegratingassistancetore-establishlivelihoodsintransitionsituationswithnationalsocialprotectionstrategiesand assisting governments in developing sustainable foodassistance systems (WFP 2008c). It sees itself as primarilybeing involved in social assistance programmes whereimproving access to food is the objective andhunger is theproblembeingaddressed.

Debatescontinuewithin theexecutiveboardofWFPandonthepartof itsmaindonorsaboutwhetherWFPshouldfocusmore narrowly on humanitarian and transition situations orcontinuetoplayadevelopmentrole.Thefoodpricecrisisandsubsequent debates around food security architecture havecontributedtoshiftingthetermsofdebatearoundWFP’sroleindevelopment;moreactors seeapotential role forWFP insupporting the development of social protection strategies,particularly in fragilestates.Broadlyspeaking,somedonorswouldliketoseeWFPplayanarrowhumanitarianrolewhilstothers seeWFPasplayingapotentiallyusefuldevelopmentrole.TheG77developingcountriesonWFP’sexecutiveboardtend to support it’s assumption of a development role. Thefood crisis also led to an increased focus on improving thelinks between food assistance and food security and onstronger coordination between the Rome-based agencies.There isnowgreaterconceptualcoherenceandstrongerUNcoordinationdrivenbytheUNHigh-LevelTaskForce.

In nutrition, WFP in 2009 developed a new approach tonutritionimprovement.Ithasbeenworkingformanyyearsonimprovingthefoodbasketthroughareassuchasfortification.Thecurrentfocusisonbothnewproductsandnewapproaches.WFPisincreasingitsfocusonpreventingmalnutritionthroughapproaches, such as blanket feeding for under-twos duringleanseasons,thataimtobringdownseasonalpeaksinglobalacutemalnutrition.WFP recognises that traditionalchannelsfor nutrition programmes such as health centres have oftenresulted in limited coverage and that new channels needto be explored. WFP has developed an improved form ofCSB known as CSB + and is using new RUTF (Ready-to-UseTherapeutic Food) products such asSupplementaryPlumpy.Someconfusionandscepticismon thepartofdonorsexistsaboutthesenewproducts,butCSB+isbasedonFAOandWHOfood standards (Codex Alimentarius) and existing guidance;theexpertnutritionalviewisthatitissaferandbetterthanthepreviousCSB formulation. Inorder todemonstrate themost

cost effective options, testing of the new approaches andproductstodiscernwhichtouseinwhatcontextsisongoing.In general, fooddistributions, improvedCSBand theuseofmicronutrientpowdersarehelpingtoenhancethenutritionalvalueofgeneral rations.New toolssuchasdietarydiversityscores and the ‘cost of diet tool’ developed by Save theChildrenarehelping tobettermonitor thenutritional impactoffoodassistance.

A new policy towards food assistance for people livingwith HIV/AIDS is being developed and will be available inJune 2010. Two areas of intervention are planned. The firstis ‘food by prescription’ where eligibility is assessed byanthropometric criteriawith clear entry andexit criteria andnutritionassistanceisprovidedthroughthehealthsectorandlinkedtotreatment.Thesecondisfoodassistanceforaffectedhouseholds, orphans and vulnerable childrenwhere foodorincometransfersmaybeprovided.

WFP’s food security analysis service has seen majorimprovements in assessment practice in recent years withthe development of standardised approaches coming outof the SENAC (strengthening needs assessment capacity)process. The shift from a sole focus on food aid to foodassistanceandgreatercoordinationwithother foodsecurityactorsmeans that new tools are needed to better prioritisesolutions. German government funding is supporting aninitiative to improve response analysis. WFP has also beeninvolved with the development of stronger tools for marketanalysis. InHaiti, in coordinationwithOxfam,WFPused theEMMAtoolformarketassessment.WFPdesirestocontinuetobuildpartnershipsfornationallevelfoodsecurityforumsandnationalcapacitiesforfoodsecurityanalysis.

WFP is continuing to expand its use of cash- and voucher-basedapproaches.Amanualhasbeenproducedandaunithas been established in headquarters to provide oversight,technical guidance and corporate capacity building. Themanual includes programme and operational adjustmentsof all project cycle issues relevant to cash and vouchers(e.g., budget templates, WINGS, plans of operation, etc.).WINGS II is the updated version of theWINGS system thatWFP has used since 2001 to keep track of all of its activity,from planning projects and tracking food aid shipments tomanagingfinancesandpayingstaffsalaries.

Spanish government funding of€10 million is being used toimplement pilot projects in Uganda, Niger, Yemen, Ecuadorand East Timor with IFPRI providing randomised evaluationsfor each project. In addition, cash and voucher approachesare increasingly being included in country-level appeals ona demand-led basis. The 2010 biannual management planforecaststhat7percentofallprogramming(approximately$300million)willbecashbasedbutthisisaveryroughestimate.In2009, it was estimated that there were between 2.0 and 2.5millioncashandvoucherWFPbeneficiaries.Keyissuesmoving

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forward are the need to link improved market analysis withfeasibilitystudies,partnercapacitiesandscalingupresponses.

In early 2010 it was agreed that WFP could co-chair withFAO a new food security cluster, which will replace theagriculture cluster.WFP also leads the logistics, emergencyandtelecommunicationsclusters.

2. Un�ted nat�ons H�gh Comm�ss�oner for Refugees (UnHCR)UNHCR has a strategic plan for nutrition and food securityfor the years 2008–12 It was developed in coordination withother sectors in the newly established Public Health andHIV Section (previously Technical Support Section) in theDivisionofProgrammingandSupportManagement(previouslyDivisionofOperationalServices).ItincludesHIV/AIDS,malaria,reproductivehealthandwater/sanitation,inordertoensureacomprehensiveandintegratedapproachacrossthesesectors.Thestrategicplanaimstoguideoperationsincamp,urbanandothernon-campsettingsaccordingtoallstagesofanemergency,aswell as in local integrationand returneesituations,duringthe period of 2008–12. It outlines four key strategies: (1)improvingnutrition(includingmicronutrients),infantandyoungchild feeding and food security; (2) ensuring provision of ageneralfoodrationwhererequired,whichissufficientintermsofquantity,quality, regularityandequity; (3)supporting foodsecurity through strategies to enhance self reliance and (4)providingessentialnon-fooditemswhererequired.

UNHCRworksinclosecollaborationwithWFPtoensurethatfoodsecurityandrelatedneedsofrefugeesandreturneesareadequatelyaddressed.IthasamemorandumofunderstandingwithWFP(establishedin1985andrevisedin1992,1994,1997and2002),which sets out thedivisionof responsibility andarrangements for, inter alia, needs assessment; resourcemobilisation; logistics; appeals; monitoring and evaluationandnutritionalsurveillance,reporting,andcoordination.

According to theMOU,WFP is responsible for transporting,storinganddeliveringbasicfoodrationswhenthenumberofpeopleinneedoffoodassistanceinagivencountryisatleast5,000,unlessotherwisedeterminedandagreeduponbyWFPandUNHCRonacase-by-casebasis.Iflessthan5,000,UNHCRandWFPwill separatelymeet the food needs of persons oftheirconcern,aswellastheneedsofanypersonswho,whilefalling within the MOU’s scope, have been excluded by asituation-specificagreement(UNHCR/WFP2002).

According to UNHCR staff, the only countries having lessthan 5,000 refugees/IDPs in need of food assistance areEritrea, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In such cases, UNHCRwill transport, store and deliver food rations. In situationswhere there are more than 5,000 refugees/IDPs in need offood assistance, WFP will provide basic food rations, andUNHCR will provide complimentary food commodities, suchas groundnut oil, fish and tomato paste, particularly whenrefugeeshavelimitedaccesstofreshfooditems.Arrangementsforthefinaldistributionoffoodcommoditiestobeneficiariesare agreed-upon jointly by the government, UNHCR andWFP, inconsultationwithbeneficiaries,particularlywomen’scommittees,andinconformitywiththeestablishedcommoditydistributionguidelines.Ajointneedsassessmentmissionwilldetermine the specific food and non-food commodities andquantitiesrequired.

WhereUNHCRprocuresitsownfoodaid, ithasapreferencefor local and regional procurement, where appropriate. Forexample, in Eritrea food aid is procured locally, and aid toZimbabwe is purchased in South Africa. However, thesequantitiesareverysmall.Assuch,thereisnospecificfoodaidprocurementpolicy.UNHCRiscurrentlypilotingcashtransferprogrammesinanumberofcountries.

UNHCR acknowledges that nutritionally, food aid is sub-optimal and that in the case of refugee populations, evengreater constraints to achieving good nutrition exist, giventhat, inmanycases, theirability toproduce foodoraccesslandisextremelycompromised.Assuch,UNHCRisengagingwith the internationalnutrition community toexplorewaysofimprovingthemicronutrientintakeofrefugees.Dependingon the context, UNHCR adopts several approaches thatinclude the use of fortified foods such as CSB + and CSB++, lipid nutrient supplements such as nutributter and/orPlumpyDoughandmicronutrientpowders.Whileitrecognisestheneedforlong-termsustainablenutritionsolutions,italsosees a need for continued use of imported fortified foodcommodities to treat high levels of anaemia and under-nutritionincamps.

UNHCR is also working to promote infant and young childfeeding practices, linking them, where possible to localproduction. For example, in crowded camps in Bangladesh,UNHCRisworkingtogetherwithpartnerstogrowvegetablesontheroofsofdwellings,andlinkingthistothefeedingofthemostvulnerablepopulations in thecampssuchaspregnantandlactatingwomenandyoungchildren.

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1. Act�on Contre la Fa�m-Internat�onal network (ACF-Internat�onal)

Foodaid/assistancefallswithinthefoodandlivelihoodsecuritydepartmentsoftheACF-Internationalmemberagencies.Thesedepartmentsarecurrentlychangingtheirterminologyfrom‘foodaid’to‘foodassistance’toreflectthatasignificantproportionoftheirfoodassistanceiscash-based.However,thesechangesarenotyetinACF-International’spolicydocuments,whichstilldistinguish between ‘food aid’ (including food commoditiesorvouchers)and ‘cash-based interventions’ (including freeorconditional cash, vouchers and cash-for-work programmes)onthebasisthattheserespectivelyaddressproblemsoffoodavailabilityandfoodaccess.

ACF-International’s Food Security and Livelihood Policy(2008) frames ‘food assistance’ as one component ofa broader package of instruments for addressing food,nutrition and livelihood security, including agro-pastoralinterventions, cash-based interventions, food aid andincome-generating interventions. It also emphasises theneed to ensure ‘food sovereignty’ in least-developedcountries, that is, ‘the right of people to healthy andculturally appropriate food produced through ecologicallysound and sustainable methods, and their right to definetheirownfoodandagriculturalsystems’(ibid).

ACF-International has a preference for cash programmingwhereappropriate,partlybecauseofitspotentialtostimulatemarketsandthelocaleconomy,andpartlybecauseitissimplyeasiertoimplement.Forexample,fewerproblemsrelatedtoshippingorstoringlargequantitiesoffoodoccur.In2006,ACF-Internationaldevelopedapositionpaperonpoliticalaspectsof foodaid,which recommends that in-kind foodaidshouldbe used only in acute local food shortages and that donorcountries should enhance local purchases and triangulartransactionsby reducing in-kinddonations in favourof cashdonations (ACF 2006b). It has alsodevelopedguidelines onimplementingcash-basedinterventions(ACF2007).

More recently, ACF-International has developed a positionpaper on hunger safety nets, defining a hunger safety netas a ‘program that provides timely, adequate, predictable,guaranteedandmulti-year resources transfers tochronicallyhungry people, thereby helping them to meet adequateminimum food requirements (in quantity and quality) andto protect, and sometimes promote, their livelihood assetsand strategies’ (ACF 2009). ACF-International sees a rolefor hunger safety nets in preventing food insecurity andmalnutrition,inparticularinchronicfoodinsecuritycontexts,forcrisisprevention,andimpactcontrol(ibid).

ACF-Internationalcurrentlyengagesinarangeofapproachesaddressingdisasterriskmanagement,includingclimatechangeadaptation (CCA)efforts (suchasprovidingdrought-tolerantvarieties of seeds), social protection (via the promotion ofhunger safety nets), natural resource management (NRM)(linked with water and agriculture) and preparedness andmitigation action for disaster risk reduction (DRR). It hasproduced a paper on the links between climate change andunder-nutrition, which it describes as a neglected issuethat requires further analysis and urgent action (Crahay,P. et al., 2010). It is producing a disaster risk managementpolicythatwillintegrateDRR,climatechangeadaptationandnatural resourcemanagementwith social protection unifiedby a livelihoods approach. This will also be applicable toconflictcontexts.ACF-International isamemberof theTransAtlanticFoodAidDialogue(TAFAD)andsupportsreformofthecommitmentstructureoftheFAC,aswellasitsintegrationintotheCommitteeonFoodSecurity.

2. Canad�an Food Gra�ns Bank (CFGB)

The Canadian Foodgrains Bank is a partnership of Canadianchurch-based agencies working to end hunger in developingcountries. On behalf of its fifteen member agencies, theFoodgrains Bank collects grain and cash donations fromCanadians, provides funds and expert advice for food aid,nutrition and food security projects submitted by memberagencies and their partners, manages the procurement andsupplyof foodcommoditiesandengages inpublicpolicyandpubliceducationactivitiesrelatedtohungerandfoodsecurity.

The Foodgrains Bank defines food assistance as ‘directtransfers to individuals or households for the purpose ofincreasingthequalityand/orquantityof foodconsumption’.By contrast, food aid is defined as ‘direct food transfers toindividuals or households for the purpose of increasing thequalityand/orquantityoffoodconsumption’.TheFoodgrainsBank regards food assistance (which subsumes food aid)asan integralpart of food security.Due to itsprogrammingrelationshipwithCIDA(andhencetheFoodAidConvention)itmakesanadministrativedistinctionbetween‘foodassistance’and ‘non-food assistance food security activities’ (usuallyagriculturaland/ornutritionalinfocus).

TheFoodgrainsBankiscurrently intheprocessofupdating itsfood security framework to place greater emphasis on rights-based programming and the empowerment of food insecurepeople,especiallysmallholderfarmers.Thelearningofthepastdecadehascalledforareframingofitsfoodsecurityprogrammingtoprovidemoreclarityforitsmembersandlocalpartners.

IV. non-governmental organ�sat�ons

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TheFoodgrainsBankspent$15.8millionCanadianonfoodaidin2007–8,$26.7millionCanadianin2008–9and$31.4millionCanadian in 2009–10. In 2008–9, 54 percent of its food aidprogramming was for emergency relief, almost entirely forslowonsetcrises;36percent, rehabilitationand20percent,social protection/development. In addition to conventionalfood transfers, the Foodgrains Bank is also supported byCIDA to implement nutrition programming despite the factthat these activities may not qualify towards Canada’s FACcommitment. However, due to its funding relationship withCIDAandtheCanadiancommitmenttotheFAC,theFoodgrainsBankremainsfinanciallyconstrainedinthegreateruseofcashtransfersandvouchers.

Since the partial untying of Canadian food aid in 2005, theFoodgrainsBankhasrapidlyexpanded its localandregionalprocurement activities. This has required the developmentof new procurement procedures more suited to the lesspredictable commercial arrangements in many developingcountries. Today virtually all of the food aid commoditiesprogrammedbytheFoodgrainsBankoriginateoutsideCanada,althoughthepossibilitytoprocureinCanadaremains,shoulditproveappropriate.TheFoodgrainsBankhasnotyetcarriedoutanylocalorregionalpurchasethroughWFPalthoughitismonitoringcloselyWFP’snewP4Pinitiative.

The Foodgrains Bank has strict guidelines for the use ofmonetisation and has had very few projects over the pastdecade that meet the criteria. It requires a demonstrationthatmonetisedfoodprovidesadditionalsupplytothemarketanddoesnot substitute for localproductsor those thatarecommerciallyimported.

TheFoodgrainsBankbecameinvolvedindiscussionsconcerningthe FAC when Canada fell into arrears on its commitmentsin 2002. It successfully advocated for meeting Canada’scommitments and then, recognising the problems associatedwith the current commitment structure, went on to work forthe reform of the Convention itself. The Foodgrains Bankwasa founderof theTrans-Atlantic FoodAssistanceDialogue(TAFAD) and a Canadian FoodAid Convention advisory group(CanFAC).TAFADadvocacywasparticularlyeffectiveatthetimeof theBerlin FoodAidConference inMay2007buthasbeenhamperedmore recentlyby theslowpaceofFAC reform.TheFoodgrainsBanktakesthepositionthattheFAC,renamedtheFoodAssistanceConvention,should,atminimum,collaborateasappropriatewiththenewCommitteeonFoodSecurity(CFS)andpossiblybeintegratedintotheCFSinthefuture.

The Foodgrains Bank’s food security activities are entirelyfundedbyprivately raisedmoney. Food securityprogrammingmadeupapproximately25percentof itstotalprogrammingin2009($10.1million–USdollars).TheFoodgrainsBankhasbeenactivelysupportingconservationagricultureandtheuseofsanddams, which are clearly linked tomore efficient water use, avitalissueinrespondingtoclimatechange.Itiscurrentlyinthe

processofdecidingwhetherornottoclassifytheseactivitiesas‘climatechangeresponses’andfundingthemassuch.

3. CARE Us

WithinCARE International,CAREUS leadsonemergency foodsecurity and increasingly on food security more broadly. It isin the process of developing an emergency food security andnutritionstrategy informedbycommissionedresearchonbestpractice that was published as a HPN Good Practice Review(Maxwell 2009). Emergency food security is part of a broaderfoodsecuritystrategythatalsoencompassessocialprotection,agricultureandvaluechains,nutritionandfinancialservices.Thefoodpricecrisishelpedtodrivethedevelopmentofaglobalfoodsecuritystrategyand internal investmentwithinCAREon foodsecurity.Foodassistanceisseenasnotjustfoodaid(includinglocalandregionalpurchase)butalsocashandvouchers.

In2006,CAREproducedafoodaidwhitepaperthatcommittedthem to ending monetisation (CARE 2006). This came intoeffectinSeptember2009.MonetisationhadbeenabigpartoftheportfolioandCARE’sfoodforpeacefundinghasreducedsignificantlysince2006.ThewhitepapercreatedperceptionsinternallyandexternallythatCAREwas‘gettingoutoffoodforpeace’or‘gettingoutoffoodaid’ratherthanjustphasingoutofmonetisation.

CARE does still have big food aid programmes (e.g., inEthiopiawiththePSNP)anditisWFP’ssecond-largestpartner.CARE is an implementing partnerwith the PSNP in EthiopiaandwiththeHungerSafetyNetinKenya.ItalsopilotedsocialprotectionapproachesinZambia.

Its education unit does not see school feeding as a goodidea,andpolicysaysthatCAREshouldnotdoschoolfeeding.CAREbelievesitdoesnotpromotegoodeducationoutcomesand has questionable sustainability. From a food securitystandpoint, it is seen as a bad targeting option. There areexceptions;forexample,in2009inZimbabweschoolfeedingwasoneoftheonlywaystogetfoodtopeople.

Innutrition,CARE’s foodsecuritystrategytalksabouta focusonfoodassistanceintheshorttermbutaboutagreaterfocuswithinCAREonmoderateandacutemalnutritioninthemediumterm.CAREwantstofocusonmoderateacutemalnutritionandhasbeen supporting theENN (EmergencyNutritionNetwork)workonminimumreportingstandards.Itwouldliketolookatcommoditiesandalternativeapproachesbutfundsarecurrentlyconstrainedbythefinancialcrisis.CAREwantsagreaterfocuson the causes of malnutrition and on integrated approachesthat includehealth,WASH (water, sanitation andhealth) andcare,aswellasfoodsecurity.

CAREdoeshavesomecashexperiencebuthasnotdocumenteditwell. Examples of this are a big CFWprogramme in Kabul

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with funding of $8 million over 12 months, cash grants inurbanslumsinKenyaandcashgrantstohostfamiliesinDRC.However, cashhasnotbeen institutionalised inCARE to thesamedegreeasithasinsomeotherorganisations.CAREseesariskof thependulumswingingtoofarawayfromfoodaid.Itseesaneedtoidentifysituationsinwhichcombiningcashandfoodcouldbeappropriate,ratherthantreatingthechoiceaseitheror.

In the area of market analysis, CARE has been developingtools (EMMA and MIFIRA or Market Information for FoodInsecurity Response).MIFIRA came out of themonetisationdecisionandwasdevelopedwithCornell.CornellisrunningaseminarseriesandisapplyingitinKenyaandUgandainthespringof2010.Akey issue isa lackofpeoplewiththerightskills to support the tools—now the toolsareavailable,butnot the people. CARE is also trying to integrate proceduresforgoodmarketanalysisintopreparednesssystemssothatitbecomesaroutinepartofassessmentandresponse.Fundingfor market analysis is tricky to access. CARE is asking FFP(FoodforPeace)toprovidesmallamountsformarketanalysis.Goodmarketanalysisiscurrentlyoneoftheweakestlinksinmovingtowardsbetterpractice.

CAREisincreasinglylookingtodoitsownlocalandregionalpurchasewithfundingfromUSAIDandFoodforPeace.FFPisstartingtohavebudgetlinesforlocalpurchase($90millionin2009,a2010budgetthathasbeenincreasedto$300million).AnnualProgrammeSupport canbeused for LRP (up to$30million)sosignificantlargescaleprogrammesareincreasinglypossible.Thiscanalsobeusedforcashandvouchers(thereisno limit,unlikeECHO)although it isexpected, inpractice,tobesmaller.

The $300 million provides real scope to do more LRP andCARE is looking at the feasibility for LRP in each crisis. It isconsidering several possibilities for using LRP: in woredas(districts) in Ethiopia that are not currently receiving GFDbut where needs are high, in Nairobi as a replacement fora voucher programme forwhich it has not been able to getrenewedfundingandinZimbabweforatargetedsafetynet.LRPalsohelpsCARE to retain its foodaidcapacity,which isimportant as some core procurement and logistics capacitywasstartingtobelostwiththephaseoutofmonetisation.CARE is developing a strategic partnershipwith UPS and istrying to revamp its commoditymanagement tools where itwasseenasa leaderbuthas fallenbehind. It isdevelopingnewinventoryandwarehousesoftware.

CAREhasbeenbuildingnewcoalitionsthroughworkwiththeCentreforStrategicandInternationalStudiesandtheChicagoCommittee for Foreign Affairs. CARE’s move away from theCoalitionforFoodAidopenedupnewdoors.Ithasswitchedfrom lobbying to change the Farm Bill to trying to get newlegislation toCongress,where ithashadgreater success. Ithasbeeninvolvedwiththeroadmapforglobalfoodsecurity.

Engagement with new NGOs has helped to give greatermomentum to advocacy efforts. CARE was part of TAFADbuthasdecidedthatitwasnotworthcontinuingtoinvestineffortstorenegotiatetheFAC.ItdecidedtofocusitseffortsonUSpolicyreforms.

4. Deutsche Welthungerh�lfe (also known as German Agro-Act�on)Welthungerhilfe (also known as German Agro-Action) doesnothaveaspecificdefinitionoffoodassistancebutsupportsthose of the EC and TAFAD. It implements all elementsof a consistent LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation anddevelopment)-approach (inter alia, food aid, food for workandcashforwork interventions) inemergency, recoveryanddevelopmentcontextsin31countriesinLatinAmerica,Africaand Asia,with a particular focus on supporting smallholderfarmers.Support is consideredsuccessful if people improvetheir quality of life to such an extent that they can takeresponsibility for providing for themselves—helping peopletohelpthemselves.Welthungerhilfeviewsfoodaidandcashtransfer-programming as an integral part of broader foodsecurity instruments and approaches. Its definition of foodsecurity follows the internationally recognised 1996 WorldFoodSummitdefinition:‘Foodsecurityexistswhenallpeople,atalltimes,havephysicalandeconomicaccesstosufficient,safe and nutritious food thatmeets their dietary needs andfood preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996).It recentlycreatedaKnowledge, InnovationandConsultancyDepartment,whichhasadedicatedmemberofstaffdealingwith food assistance and food security. Other departmentsthatdealwithfoodassistancearethepolicydepartmentandthefinancedepartment.

In the past, Welthungerhilfe has had reservations aboutschool feeding as a food assistance instrument. However,it is currently implementing a school feeding programme inBurundi inpartnershipwithWFP,encouragedbyWFP’snew,moreholisticschoolfeedingstrategy.

Welthungerhilfe’sProcurementDepartmentisresponsibleforprocuringallfoodaidnotreceivedfromWFP(abouttwothirdsof the total amount). It procures food aid locally, regionallyor internationally. It has a preference for local procurement,seen as supporting local business and markets, but only ifmarket conditions allow. It may also procure regionally orinternationally.Whileitdoesnothaveaprocurementpolicyinplace, itdoeshaveclearrulesforawardingcontracts. Italsospecifiescertaincriteria,forexample,thatgoodsaredeliveredin a timely manner and that they are free from geneticallymodified organisms. As a rule, Welthungerhilfe does notengageinmonetisationoffoodaid.

Welthungerhilfe supports the reform of the commitmentstructureof theFAC,but is keen toensure that this isdone

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inawaythatbetterconsidersbeneficiaryneedsandinwhichbeneficiaries are protected from the risks of price volatility.Given themanyongoing reformprocesses (forexample, thereformoftheComprehensiveFrameworkofAction(CFA)andtheCommitteeonWorld FoodSecurity (CFS), aswell as thedevelopmentofEUFoodSecurityStrategyandHumanitarianFood Assistance Policy),Welthungerhilfe is keen that thesebe coherent. In this regard, Welthungerhilfe is lobbying forputting food aid and food assistancewithin an overall foodsecurityframeworkbasedontherighttofood:Thisapproachwould ensure that food aid/food assistance targets thosemostinneed,doesnotunderminelocalfoodproductionandmarkets, assures food safety, respects local diets and takesthemostappropriateform.Thisapproachtendstofavourlocalandregionalpurchase,channelling resources towomenandanexplicitexitstrategyaspartofallfoodaid.

5. Internat�onal Federat�on of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)In 2003, the IFRC developed a global ‘food security andnutrition policy’ which provided guidance and direction onfood security interventions. This policy is currently beingrevised to broaden the focus, and to take into account theimpactofthefoodprice/economiccrisisandclimatechangerealities, as well as IFRC’s new ten-year strategy (Strategy2020: Saving Lives, ChangingMinds). IFRC along with ICRC(International Committee of the Red Cross) has also issuedGuidelines for Cash Transfer Programming in 2007, whichreflectsde factopolicyandpractice,andarewidelyusedbyits national societies and external partners. Other guidancedocumentationfocusesonnutritionalandlivelihoodsupportforpeoplelivingwithHIV/AIDs(developedwithWHO),andonfoodsecurityassessment.TheICRCNutritionManual(Mourey,2008)servesasacomprehensivereference,andguidanceonnutritioneducationisforthcomingfromIFRC.

The IFRC distinguishes between addressing the immediateneedsofthoseinfoodcrisisthroughitshumanitarianworkandworking to reducevulnerability through longer-termsupporttolivelihoodsandfoodsecurity.IFRCprimarilyviewsfoodaidasahumanitarianreliefmechanismforuseinemergencyandrecoverycontexts.Generally,thereisapreferenceforcashorlocalpurchasewhereappropriate.Inemergencyresponseandrecovery,IFRCworkstomeetbasicneeds,tosupportlivelihoodrecovery and rehabilitation and to address malnutrition inemergencies. Given the relevance of livelihoods and foodsecuritytolonger-termriskreduction,andtheinter-relationshipbetween nutrition and health, IFRC is seeking to increaseits engagement in food security and nutrition, and forgingclearer linkages with livelihood programme approaches. ItbelievesthattheuniquerolethatRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties and their volunteer networks play at the nationallevelprovides strategicopportunities toaddress communitybasedrisktofood,nutritionandeconomicinsecurity.

Arangeofsmall-andmedium-scalefoodsecurityprogrammesisunderway.Thereisaparticularcommitmentinacoregroupof African national societies that developed a five-year foodsecurity strategic framework for integrated community basedprogrammingin2008.ItseesthisworktostrengthenlivelihoodsasattheheartoftheIFRC’sworkindisasterriskreduction,andtobeintegratedwithcommunitybasedhealthcare,waterandsanitation,andHIV/AIDSinordertostrengthenthesafetyandresilienceofvulnerablecommunities(IFRC2008).

ThemajorityoffoodassistanceisresourcedthroughDisasterResponseEmergencyFundand/oremergencyappealsthroughmultilateral channels (by IFRC) or bilateral (through PartnerNationalSocieties).SomeNationalSocieties,mostlyinAfrica,also provide food assistance in partnership with WFP. WFPandtheInternationalFederationpursuefurthercollaborativeefforts in linkingnutritionalsupportwithARVtreatmentandoperational research in the area of nutrition and ART (ARVtherapy). It has also agreed to joint advocacy and regularconsultationsatalllevels.

The Red Cross Red Crescent categorises food assistance asfollows:

• Short-termassistance:Theneedforshort-termfoodrelief,rapidlyfollowedbyrecovery/rehabilitationanddevelopmentactivities, is typical of many ‘sudden’ disasters, includingfloods,earthquakes,highwinds,fires,pestattacks,short-termcivildisturbances,etc.Foodstockscanbedestroyed,normal food supply and market systems disrupted, andcropsdamagedorlost.Theaidmightberequiredforonlyafewdays—whichisthecasewithmanyearthquakes—oruptothenextharvest,ifsubsistencefarmersandagriculturallabourershavetotallylostfoodstocksandcrops.

• Deferredassistance:Assistancedeferred—untiljustbeforethenextharvest, forexample—willbethecasefollowingevents which have damaged but not totally destroyedcrops or food stocks, as in many floods, storms andlocaliseddroughts.

• Long-term assistance: Assistance is provided over along period and combines both relief and self-reliancedevelopment activities. Over time, the balance shiftsprogressivelyawayfromfoodrelief.Thistypeofassistanceappliestoemergenciesduetosuccessivecropfailuresandmostsituationsinvolvingrefugeesordisplacedpeople.

6. oxfam

Oxfam GB’s Humanitarian Department produced guidingprinciplesforresponsetothefoodcrisisin2002,topromoteeffective humanitarian assistance to save lives and protectlivelihoods in food crises. These guiding principles wereinformedbyareviewofthenatureoffoodcrisisandresponses,includingboth an examination ofOxfam internal issues andthe policies and practices of other actors. This review was

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laterbuiltonandpublishedasaFieldExchangesupplement(Jaspars 2006). The principles promote the identification ofappropriateinterventionsbasedonassessment,foodsecurityinterventionswhichprotect livelihoods aswell as save livesand, in particular, the use of alternatives to food aid. Theprinciples also recommend that food aid should only beprovidedwhen

• livelihoodsareatriskbecauseoffoodinsecurity;• livesareatriskbecauseofdeterioratingnutritionalstatus;• thereisanabsoluteshortageoffoodand• certainpopulationgroupssufferrestrictedaccesstofood.

In 2005, OxfamGB developed its food aid policy, whichwasadoptedacrosstheorganisation.ThethepolicywasdevelopedbecauseOxfamsometimeshascontradictorypositionsbetweenthehumanitariandepartment,thelivelihoodsteamandthetradeteamwithinthepolicydepartment.WTOtradenegotiationsandtheFACwerebeingrenegotiatedin2005,soitwasimportanttodevelopacommonpositionwithintheagency.

Oxfam’s food aid policy defines food aid as ‘the donationof internationally sourced food to recipient households,communitiesorgovernments,eitherasconcessionalsalesorfreeofcharge’.Itstatesthatfoodaidshouldonlybeprovidedinemergenciesand,morespecifically,• whenthereisatotallackoffoodavailability;• foodwillnotbeprovidedthroughmarkets if theaffected

populationisprovidedwithcashand/or• peopleareactivelydeniedaccesstofoodasawarstrategy

or have otherwise been cut off from their normal foodsources.

It also states that the humanitarian imperative will alwaystake precedence over any concerns about negative impacton livelihoods and trade. Food aid in development contextsisdiscouraged,with theexceptionof social safetynets.Thepolicytakesanexplicitpositionagainstmonetisationoffoodaid. School feeding is discouraged. Alternatives to food aidarepromotedand,ifitisnecessary,thatasmuchaspossibleshouldbelocallypurchased.

Oxfamhasnospecificdefinitionorpolicyonfoodassistancebutconsidersfoodassistanceasincludingallinterventionstoaddressfoodinsecurity.

Oxfam’s cash transfer guidelines were produced in 2006to assist staff in using cash transfers as an appropriatehumanitarian response, but also to influence others (Cretiand Jaspars 2006). Cash programmes have continued toexpand within Oxfam. A recent review found that cash andvoucher interventions implemented by Oxfam were largelyappropriate, but also that more work needs to be done onmarket assessmentsandon calculating the sizeof the cashtransfers.More thanone cash transferwasoftenneeded to

assistrecovery.Italsoshowedthatitispossibletodistributecash in insecure environments using a number of differentapproaches. Cash was used not only to meet basic needs,but also to pay off debts and tomeet social obligations. Inaddition, it stimulated trade.The report recommendsa two-stageresponseinrapidonsetemergencies:cashgrantsbasedonrapidassessments,followedbymorein-depthanalysistoexamineimpactandfurtherneeds.

The Oxfam position on social safety nets was not welldevelopedinitsfoodaidpolicy.Itneededadditionalwork,theimportanceofwhichbecameevidenttowardsthemiddleofthedecade.OxfamInternationalproducedacompendiumonsocialprotection in 2009, and Oxfam GB more detailed guidelineson social protection. The Oxfam-International compendiumviewssocialprotectionasarightandasameansofaddressingchronic vulnerability and repeated risks, which is particularlyimportant following the recent food crisis and in the face ofclimatechange.Oxfamconsiderssocialprotectionprogrammesas involving long-term commitment aswell as needing to belarge scale and achieving high coverage. Social protection isalso seen as ameans of linking relief and development. Thechoiceofinstrumentsdependsonthecontext.

ForOxfamGB,socialprotectionincludessocialassistanceandsafetynets(cash,foodaid), legislationandsocial insurance.Itisseenasatoolforreachingvulnerablepeoplethatarenotbenefitingfromlivelihoodpromotionprojectsandforreducingdependencyonhumanitarianaid,aswellasaddressingsocialand economic inequality. Within Oxfam GB, the purpose ofsocialprotectionistocontributetohouseholdincomeandtoeconomic leadership of women, with approaches includingbothdirectimplementationandadvocacy.DRRisconsideredtofallundersocialprotection.

Oxfamhas recentlydevelopedapositiononschool feeding.Itdoesnotsupporttheuseofschoolfeedinginemergencies,butmaysupportsuchprogrammesinchroniccrises.However,implementingschoolfeedinginisolationofotherfoodsecuritysupportisnotrecommended;rather,itneedstobecombinedwithsupportforeducationandforsafetynets.

Oxfam does not carry out supplementary or therapeuticfeeding, but has a policy on infant feeding in emergencies.Thispolicyhighlightstherisksofproviding infant formula inemergencies(increaseddiseaseanddeathinsmallchildren).Oxfamthereforeaimstosupportbreastfeedingandsupportsthe various international codes against the distribution ofbreastmilksubstitutes.

7. save the Ch�ldren

Save the ChildrenUK andSave the ChildrenUSproduced ajoint policy paper on food aid in 2006 and a joint positionpaperonschoolfeedingin2007.Thepolicypaperonfoodaid

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framesfoodaidasonecomponentinarangeoffoodsecurityresponses that can help hungry people to access food in apredictablemannerwithdignity. Itcalls foracomprehensiveresponse to food insecurity that includes food aid but alsoencompasses strategies for livelihoodspreservation,marketinterventions, cash transfers, policy reforms and efforts totacklediseaseandinadequatecaringpractices.Itarguesthat‘onitsownfoodaidisonlyapartialbutsometimesessentialresponse’.

The policy paper defines food aid as the ‘provision ofcommoditiesorvouchersbydonorsforthepurchaseoffoodcommoditiesbyrecipientsonagrantorconcessionalbasis’.Cashtransfersarespecificallynotclassifiedasfoodaid,giventheinherentlyfungiblenatureofcash.

It argues that food aid should only be providedwhen thereis a lack of food in communities to be targeted and thatalternativewaysofhelpingpeopletoaccessfoodwouldeithertaketoolongorotherwisebeinappropriateorunreliable.Tomakedeterminationsabout theappropriatenessof foodaidor alternatives such as cash, the paper calls for analysis oflocalmarketsand the likely impactof the responseon localproducersandconsumersoffood.

The paper calls for local or regional purchase of food aidwhen possible as it can be quicker, cheaper and providemore-appropriate and preferred commodities. It calls forgreaterflexibilityfromdonorstoprovidethemostappropriateresources. Save the Children argues that monetisation isan inefficient resource transfer mechanism that should bereplacedbyequivalentcashresources.Wherecashresourcesare not available, Save the Children will ‘advocate for aprincipledapproachtomonetisation’.

Where possible, Save the Children argues that food aidprogrammes should be linked to wider national socialprotectionsystemsandisencouraginggovernmentstodeveloplonger-term safety nets for chronically poor populations.Finally, the paper commits Save the Children to respectingthe decision of national governments with regard to theacceptanceof geneticallymodified commoditiesas foodaid(SavetheChildren2007).

Onschoolfeeding,SavetheChildren’spositionisthatschool-feedingprogrammesmaynotbethemostcost-effectivewayofachievingeducationalandnutritionalobjectives.Itarguesthatnon-foodstrategiessuchasdeworming,micronutrientsupplementation and the abolition of school fees may bemorecosteffectiveandsustainableactivities.Thepositionpaperproposesadecisiontreeforcountryofficesconsideringengagementinschoolfeedingprogrammes,whichasks,‘isschool feeding the most efficient mechanism availableto address your outcome of interest’ (Save the Children2007).

8. World V�s�on Internat�onal (WVI)

WVI’sfoodaidpolicywasrevisedin2008toincludebothin-kindandcash that isprogrammedto respond to thecausesof hunger and malnutrition. World Vision continues to usethe term food aid so using food assistance is potentiallyconfusing. (Food assistance has tended to be used in theUSasatermforaidwithintheUS.Foodaid isthatwhich isprovidedoutside theUS.). It is debatingwhether to includeagricultural production support (seeds, fertiliser) as part ofthefoodaidpolicy.

The Food Aid Management Group is part of the integratedstrategyteamandisoneofanumberof technicalgroups. ItcutsacrossthethreeWVIministrypillarsofrelief,developmentandadvocacyandisresponsibleforpolicy,procurementandprogramminginrelationtofoodaid.

WVIhascontinuedtodevelopitscash-basedprogramming,followingapilotproject inLesotho. InPakistan, itprovidedcashandvouchers forshelter. It iscurrentlydiscussing theuse of cash in Haiti. Cash has also been used in Zambia,UgandaandMalawi.Moreworkneedstobedonetoembedcash within the organisation but, in general, opennessexiststoconsidercashasanoptionforagrowingnumberofprojects.Howtheyaretobemanagedandsupportedisstillunclear.Atthemoment,theFoodAidManagementGroupistaking responsibility,butoftendoingsosomewhatoutsideofitsmandate.

The global food crisis meant that WVI reached fewerbeneficiaries per dollar because of higher food prices. Theincreasing numbers of hungry people also meant that WVIdidnotmeetitsowncorporategoals.Itdidseeabigincreasein donor support, with funding levels the highest in years(althoughtonnageswereless,duetohighprices).

WVI is engaged in school feeding and has been makinginvestments to better understand it, including what itslimitationsareandwhat itcanexpect toachieve indifferentsettings.WVIseesschoolfeedingasaplatformforintegratingother issues such as HIV/AIDS education. It has a draftinternalpositionpaperonschoolfeeding.

Concerning nutrition, World Vision is involved in debatesabout new products and approaches to supplementary andtherapeuticfeeding.Itincreasinglyrecognisesthatquantityisnotenoughandthatafocusonthequalityoffoodaidisneeded.WorldVisionisexaminingwhetherfoodaidcanadvanceandlinkmorecloselywithitshealthandnutritionprogrammes.ItistryingtobemoreinclusiveinfoodaidtargetingtogroupsthehealthteamsinWVIseeasvulnerable.

World Vision is getting involved in local and regionalprocurement (LRP). A policy has been submitted to senior

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management. LRPdoesexpose theorganisation todifferenttypes of risk. At the moment, LRP levels are static and thepolicyrecommendsonlycautiousexpansion.

World Vision was an observer on TAFAD and still has somerepresentation throughWorld Vision Canada, but there wereconflictsovermonetisationpolicies.IthasbeendoingadvocacywithWFP,otherdonors,NGOsandECHOpartnersaroundtheissueofpipelinebreaks.WorldVision’spositiononmonetisationisthatanytoolisbetterthannothing,giventhe1.2billionhungrypeopleintheworld;itadvocatesforabroaderrestructuringoftheglobalfoodsecurityarchitecturetoreformmonetisation.

In relation to the Food Aid Convention, World Vision seesa need to look at the measurement of allocations and tomove away from wheat-based commitments and to includemicronutrients. Quality and quantity need to be advancedat thesame time.Donorsneed tohonourcommitmentsandprovidegreateraccountabilityandtransparency.

Inrelationtoclustercoordination,WorldVisionseesaneedtohavesomeautonomyfor foodaid,giventhat thespeedand

paceoffoodaidresponsesisoftenmuchgreaterthanthosefor food security. In World Vision’s partnerships with WFPthereareongoingconcernswithoverheads.Negotiationsareoftenpainfulandsometimesoverheadsareinadequate.WFPstillpaysonatonnagelevelandthisleavesWVIexposedwhenthere are pipeline breaks orWFP fails to deliver committedfood aid. WVI feels a need to move away from a tonnage-basedsystem.

World Vision continues to roll out its ‘last mile solution’.WorldVisionhaspilotedanautomaticidentificationanddatacollection (AIDC) project, a ‘systematic effort to leverageinnovative technology and business practices within WorldVision’s last mile humanitarian programming’ (Narhan2008,2).This led toahardwareand software systemusingmobile barcode-scanners to manage the identification ofrecipients and the allocation of food. The evaluation of thepilotconductedintheautumnof2008concludedthat,whileattention to outstanding technological issues was neededbeforefurtherscale-up,‘implementationofhandhelddevicesby World Vision in food programming will be of significantvalue’(Carr2008,18;Ramalingametal.2009).

F�gure 1: World V�s�on Food Programmes, FY 2004–FY 2009

450,000,000

400,000,000

350,000,000

300,000,000

250,000,000

200,000,000

150,000,000

100,000,000

50,000,000

02004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

$ va

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87


KatjaAlbrecht,ECDGDevelopment

KilfemariamAmdemariam,SeniorOfficer,FoodSecurity,CommunityPreparednessandRiskReductionDepartment,IFRC

MaryAtkinson,FoodSecurityandLivelihoodsAdviser,BritishRedCross

AhmedBabaFall,SeniorFoodAidCoordinator,UNHCR

JockBaker,CAREInternational

SuzanneBerkey,ManagingDirector,ACDI/VOCA

Kirsten Bjoru, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UNorganisationsinRome,RoyalNorwegianEmbassy

SusanBradley,Director,OfficeofPolicy,ProgramandManagement,DCHABureau,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment

RebeccaBratter,DirectorofPolicy,U.S.WheatAssociates,Inc.

CourtneyBrown,OFDA

MaryChambliss,DeputyAdministrator,ForeignAgricultureService,U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture(retired)

StuartClark,SeniorPolicyAdvisor,CanadianFoodgrainsBank

MarcCohen, SeniorResearcher,HumanitarianPolicy andClimateChange,OxfamAmerica

SilviaCroes,FoodAidDeskofficer,HumanitarianAidDepartment,BelgianMinistryforForeignAffairsandDevelopmentCooperation

RonCroushorn,Director,FoodAssistanceDivision,OCBD,FAS,U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture

JeaninekeDahlKristensen,Counsellor,DanishEmbassy,Rome

SteveDarvill,ExOECD-DAC,nowCDAInc,ListeningProject

JanDelbaere,DeputyChief,FoodSecurityAnalysisService(ODXF),WFP

DavidDelConte,UNOCHA

IlariaDettori,Chief,schoolfeedingProgramme,DesignandSupportDivision,WorldFoodProgramme

StefanDoyon,Nutrition–AccessCampaign(CAME),MSF

Henning Envall, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Multi-lateralDevelopmentCooperationDivision

IreneFellmann,DeputyHeadofDETAdivision,BMZ

Marco Ferroni, Executive Director, Syngenta Foundation forSustainableAgriculture

Damien Fontaine, Focal Point for Agriculture and Food Security,BelgianMinistryforForeignAffairsandDevelopmentCooperation

UgoGentilini,PolicyOfficer,Cash,VouchersandSafetyNets,Policy,PlanningandStrategyDivision(PS),WFP

NilsGrede,PolicyOfficerandDeputyChief,NutritionandHIV/AIDSService(PS),WFP

CharlesHanrahan,SeniorSpecialinAgriculturalPolicy,CongressionalResearchService,LibraryofCongress

JimHarvey,DFID

Adair Heuchan, Ministre-Conseiller, Alternate PermanentRepresentativeofCanadatotheFoodandAgricultureAgenciesoftheUN

Hans-vanden Heuvel, Department for Economic Development,MinistryofForeignAffairs,theNetherlands

MelissaHo,Analyst inAgriculturalPolicy,CongressionalResearchService,LibraryofCongress

ArneB.Hønningstad,NorwegianGovernment

HishamKhogali,IndependentConsultant

LisaKuennen,CatholicReliefServices

Heike Kuhn, First Counsellor, Permanent Representation ofGermany,Rome

NupurKukrety,Oxfam

NicolasLamade,GTZ

Rebecca Lamade, Monitoring and Evaluation Programme Officer(OXMD)

PaulLarsen,DirectorofMultilateralRelations,WFP

SarahLaughton,PolicyOfficer,ChildHungerInitiative(PS),WFP

ChrisLeather,FoodPolicyAdvisor,OxfamInternational

SimonMansfield,DFID

ThabaniMaphosa,SeniorDirector,FPMG–OperationsandStrategy,WorldVision

NeilMarsland,FAO

HannahMattinen,FoodSecurityandLivelihoodsAdvisor,ACF

DanMaxwell,FeinsteinCentre

Mary-EllenMcGroarty,WFP(P4P)

NicoleMenage,Director,FoodProcurement,WFP

JoopMenkveld,Head,InternationalProcurement,WFP

WalterMiddleton,VicePresident,FoodProgrammingandManage-mentGroup,WorldVision

Mathias Mogge, Executive Director Programmes, DeutscheWelthungerhilfe

Marianne Muller, Policy Director and Chief of Staff, UN SystemCoordination(PandemicInfluenzaandFoodSecurityCrisis)

MilesMurray,CAREUSA

Sharon M. Murphy, Economics and Planning, Departmentof Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ireland and Chair, Food AidCommittee

HenrikNielsen,DanishGovernment

JenniferNyberg,FAO

WillemOlthof,EC-DGDevelopmentHeadofSector,AgricultureandFoodSecurity

VincentO’Reilly,FAO

FrankOrzechowski,CRS

MadsOyen,UNICEF

MariaParis-Kettering,ECDG-Relex

ReinPaulsen,Director,Quality,StrategyandHumanitarianPolicy,HumanitarianandEmergencyAffairs,WorldVisionInternational

SilkePietzsch,FoodSecurityandLivelihoodsAdvisor,ACF

Annex 3L�st of people �nterv�ewed

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JacquesPrade,EuropeAid

John Prout, Senior Donor Relations Officer, Programme DesignService(ODXP),WFP

AlexRees,SavetheChildren

KateSadler,FeinsteinCentre

PatriciaSheikh,DeputyAdministrator,ForeignAgricultureService,U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture

KazumasaShioya,JapaneseGovernment

JeremyShoham,ENN

Flora,Sibanda-Mulder,SeniorAdvisor,Nutrition,UNICEF

Emmy Simmons, Assistant Administrator for Economic Growth,Agriculture and Trade (EGAT), U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment(Retired)

Dale Skoric, Chief, Policy and Technical Division, Office of Foodfor Peace, DCHA Bureau, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment

DavidStephenson,Director,Policy,PlanningandStrategyDivision(PS),WFP

AnnaTaylor,DFID

PhillipThomas,AssistantDirector, InternationalAffairsandTrade,U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice

JohnTjaastra,InternationalGrainsCouncil

HeloiseTroc,EuropeAid,AIDCO

JeffTschirley,Chief,RehabilitationandHumanitarianPoliciesUnit,FAO

Paul Turnbull, Senior Programme Adviser, Programme DesignService(OMXD),WorldFoodProgramme,

YuichiroUoi,MinistryofForeignAffairs,Japan

TinaVanDenBriel,Chief,Nutrition,MCH&HIV/AIDS(ODXP),WFP

Pauline Van Der Aa, Policy Officer, Humanitarian Aid Division,HumanRightsandPeacebuildingDepartment,MinistryofForeignAffairs,TheHague

ConstanzevonOppeln-Bronikowski,ReferentinErnährungspolitik/FoodAidandFoodSecurityPolicy,DeutscheWelthungerhilfe

TimWaites,DFID

NancyWalters,Chief,SchoolFeedingPolicy,PlanningandStrategyDivision,OfficeoftheExecutiveDirector,UNWorldFoodProgramme

NicholasWeatherill,PolicyCoordinator,DGECHO

PatrickWebb,TheFletcherSchool,TuftsUniversity

CarolineWilkinson, Senior Nutrition Officer, United Nations HighCommissionerforRefugees

CaitlinWilson,CounsellorofDevelopmentCooperation,AustralianDelegationtotheOECD,AustralianEmbassy,Paris

WilliamWhelan,ProgramAnalyst,FoodAssistanceDivision,OCBD,FAS,U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture

Dr Petra Windisch, Head of Food Assistance, Emergency andTransitionalAid,GTZ

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About the authors

Paul Harvey is a Partner in Humanitarian Outcomes and a Research Associate at ODI. Karen Proudlock is an independent consultant working on food assistance; cash transfers in emergencies, gender and evaluation of humanitarian action.Barry Riley is an independent consultant works on issues of food security and food aid. Edward Clay is a Senior Research Associate in the International Economic Development Group at ODI.Susanne Jaspars is a Research Fellow in the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI.

Paul Harvey was the lead researcher for this review. Susanne Jaspars was the project manager within ODI. Karen Proudlock wrote the sections on disaster context, food assistance trends, school feeding and linking relief and development. Ed Clay wrote the sections on the Food Aid Convention and together with Karen the sections on food assistance trends and delivering food assistance. Barry Riley was responsible for the sections on US policy.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all those who gave their time to be interviewed for this review and for providing constructive comments on the initial draft of the report. Thanks to Joyce Maxwell for editing the report.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondonSE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44(0) 20 7922 0300Fax: +44(0) 20 7922 0399Website: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: [email protected]

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Food aid and food assistance in emergency and transitional contexts: a review of current thinkingPaul Harvey, Karen Proudlock, Edward Clay, Barry Riley and Susanne Jaspars

June 2010



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Food aid and food assistance in emergency and transitional contexts