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FORPUBLICATION
INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHERINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS
CaseNo.AP-0205-19
MARVINDONIUSandRINCONMUSHROOMCORPORATIONOFAMERICA,INC.Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
RINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS,MELISSAESTES,BOMAZZETTI,STEPHANIESPENCER,STEVESTALLINGS,
LAURIEE.GONZALEZandALFONSOKOLB,SR.,Defendants/Appellees.
RINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees vs.MARVINDONIUSandRINCONMUSHROOMCORPORATIONOFAMERICA,INC. Counter-Defendants/Appellants
OPINION
2
AppealsfromtheRinconTrialCourtIntertribalCourtofSouthernCalifornia1C5C
InCVR-2019-0002
ArguedandSubmittedJanuary23,2020
Pala,California
FiledApril2,2020
Counsel:
AttorneyforAppellantsManuelCorrales,Jr.GilleonLawFirm
17140BernardoCenterDrive,Ste.358SanDiego,CA92128
AttorneysforAppelleesScottCrowell
CrowellLawOffice-TribalAdvocacyGroup1487W.StateRoute89A,Ste.8
Sedona,AZ86336
DeniseTurner-WalshAttorneyGeneral
RinconBandofLuisenoIndiansP.O.Box1425
PaumaValley,CA92061
3
Before:JamesWare,MatthewFletcherandArthurGajarsa,AppellateJudges
OpinionoftheCourtfiledbyJudgeWare
I.INTRODUCTION
ThiscasearisesoutofadisputebetweenAppellants,RinconMushroom
Corporation, Inc., and Marvin Donius (collectively, “RMCA/Donius”) and
Appellees,theRinconBandofLuiseñoIndians,(the“Tribe”)andmembersof
the Tribe’s Business Committee. The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian
tribeundertheMissionIndianReliefActof1891pursuanttowhich it is the
beneficialownerofareservation innorthernSanDiegocounty inCalifornia.
MarvinDoniusisanon-Indianwhoownsapproximatelyfiveacresoflandinfee
simplewithin the geographic boundaries of theTribe’s reservation. Rincon
Mushroom Corporation operated a business on the land and now holds a
promissorynotefromDoniusthatissecuredbyaninterestintheland.United
StateslawallowsanIndiantribetoregulateconductonfeelandifthatconduct
harmsorthreatenstoharmthehealthandwelfareofthetribe.
Basedoneventsandconditionson thesubjectproperty that theTribe
concluded affected the health andwelfare of the Tribe, the Tribe sought to
enforce its Environmental Enforcement Ordinance against RMCA/Donius in
4
tribal court. In response, RMCA/Donius filed an action in theUnited States
DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofCaliforniaseekingadeclarationthat,
asafeeowner,theTribehadnojurisdictionoverhisland-basedactivitiesand
soughttopermanentlyenjointheTribefrominterferingwithhim.Underthe
comitydoctrine,thefederalcourtstayedtheactionandorderedRMCA/Donius
tofirstexhaustitsremediesbeforethetribalcourt. Inproceedingsbeforeit,
thetribaltrialcourtruledthattheTribehadprovedthatRMCA/Doniuswere
engagedinconductontheirlandthatthreatenedthehealthandwelfareofthe
Tribe. Thetribalcourtgranted injunctiverelief in favorof theTribeagainst
RMCA/Donius.
Withthejudgmentbelowbeingfinal,RMCA/Doniusappealthetribaltrial
court’sdecision. ThequestiononappealbeforethisCourt iswhetherunder
applicable law, the Tribe possesses authority to enforce its environmental
ordinanceagainstRMCA/Donius.Basedonthebriefingssubmittedtodateand
oralargumentbeforethisCourt,wenowaffirmin-partandreverse-inpartthe
decisionofthetrialcourt. ThisCourtdeterminesthatwhilethetrialcourt’s
findingsarecorrect,thereliefgranted,however,isoverbroadandmustbecome
focusedontheissuestoberesolved;wethereforevacatethejudgmentgranting
injunctive relief and remand the issue of relief to the trial court for further
considerationconsistentwiththisOpinion.
5
II.FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
TheRinconReservation is approximately 4,026 acres in northern San
Diegocounty.Acasinoandresortaretheprincipalsourcesofrevenueforthe
Tribe. TheTribeseeks toregulatedevelopmentonrealpropertywithin the
Reservation through codes and ordinances, the earliest relevant code and
ordinancehavingbeenenactedin2007.
The RMCA/Donius property is approximately 5 acres within the
geographicboundariesoftheRinconReservationandislocateddirectlyacross
ahighway fromtheTribe’s casinoandresort. Foryears,RMCA/Doniusand
predecessor companies had conducted activities that include the following:
“operating (i) a mushroom farm and other agricultural enterprises; (ii) a
woodenpalletmanufacturingfacility;(iii)afueldepot;(iv)atruckingcompany;
(v)anautostoragefacility;(vi)ajunkyard;and(vii)otherundisclosed‘small
activities.’”(Appellees’ResponseBriefat7.)
Tribalgroundwaterwellsunderneathbothpropertiesarethesourceof
drinking water for both properties. The groundwater from these wells is
limitedinquantityandissusceptibletocontaminationfromsurfacerunoffdue
to the porous soils and shallow depth of the groundwater supply. Surface
runoffistheprimarysourceofrechargetothealluvialaquiferthatsuppliesthe
Tribe’sgroundwater.
6
In2005,Tribalofficialsbecameconcernedaboutwastewaterdisposalon
theRMCA/Doniusproperty.Theyrequestedaninspectionofthepropertyby
theU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency. (TrialExh.102.) The inspection
revealedpotentiallycontaminatingactivities: improperstorageofwasteoil,
undocumentedmaterials in a truck repair area and injectionwells used for
sewage.Additionaltestingandmonitoringwererecommendedtodetermine
theseriousnessofthepotentialforcontamination.1Theinspectiondiscloseda
plumeofcontaminationoriginatingfromtheRMCA/Doniusproperty.In2007,
1TheEPAreportstated:
ThedrinkingwatersupplyfortheTribeshouldbeprotectedbyrequiringbackflowprevention...fromthehosesupplyingwatertothesite. If the drinkingwaterwell on the site is no longer functioning, its cause of failureshouldbedocumentedandthewellproperlydestroyed,sothatthewellboredoesnottransmitsurfacecontaminantstoundergroundsourcesofdrinkingwater.Ifthisis the case, a more permanent source of drinking waste for the site should beobtained,eitheranewwelloralegalhookuptotheTribalpublicwatersystem.Ground Water/Wastewater concerns: EPA will notify business owner of theirobligation to Inventory their (4) injection wells, and will include complianceassistanceinformationwiththatcorrespondence.EPAwillprovidebestmanagementpracticeguidelinesforthestorageofmotorvehiclefluidstothefacilityowner.ThiswillincludegeneralRCRAcomplianceassistance.EPA will recommend that in the course of determining septic system location,capacityanddesign,thattheTribebeprovidedwithadvancenoticeofthepumpingstatesothat theycanbepresent toevaluatetheconditionof the injectionwell(s).EPA recommends that the Tribe contact RCAC aswell, to utilize RCAC’s technicalexpertiseinevaluatingtheconditionofthewastewatersystem.Thesiteshouldbereinspectedforcompliancewithapplicablehousingandhazardousmaterialsregulations.(TrialExh.102at3.)
7
a “preliminary aquifer vulnerability analysis”was conductedbyBikisWater
Consultants (“BWC”). BWC identified “high risk zones” and “moderate risk
zones”withintheReservationthatmightbesusceptibletocontamination.2
Laterin2007,awildfirethatsweptacrossSouthernCaliforniaengulfed
theRMCA/Doniuspropertyanddestroyedthebuildingsontheproperty.The
fire also damaged or destroyed cars and trailers that were stored on the
propertyaswellasoildrumsandcompressedgastanks.A3,000gallonabove-
grounddieselstoragetankonthepropertyexplodedduringthefire.Although
theTribe’scasinowasnotburned, thewildfirespreaddownwindtoanarea
thatthreatenedtoinvolvethecasino.Tribalofficialsbelievedthatconditions
on theRMCA/Doniusproperty contributed significantly to the spreadof the
wildfire. RMCA/Donius did not restore or repair the fire damage to their
propertyimmediately.Duringthetrial,RMCA/Donius’expertwitnesstestified
thatthereisareasonableprobabilitythatduringthe2007-2008rainyseason,
metalcontentsfromashdebrisleachedintothegroundwater.(Tr.at622.)
In2008,RMCA/Doniusresumedcommercialactivitiesontheproperty.
RincontribalofficialsnotifiedRMCA/Doniusthatbecausetheirpropertywas
withintheRinconReservationandbecausetheyhadrepeatedlybeennotified
2(TrialExh.105.)
8
ofpotentiallyhazardousandunsafeconditionsontheproperty,Triballanduse
jurisdictionwasbeingassertedovertheirproperty;thetribalofficialsciteda
June 11, 1989, version of the Tribe’s land-use Ordinance. (Trial Exh. 112.)
RMCA/Doniusweregivenatimeperiodtoprovideinformationaboutlessees
andsub-lessees;watersupplytotheproperty;thesepticsystem;wastewater
disposal; above and below ground storage tanks, storage drums, and storm
waterrunoff;injectionwells;clean-upfromthefire;andcurrentandproposed
activitiesontheproperty. (Id.) TribalofficialsprovidedRMCA/Doniuswith
photographs of a variety of contaminants and at least two conduits for
contaminationintotheunconfinedaquiferbeneaththesite.(TrialExh.114.)
An EPA “PollutionReport” dated onMarch 20, 2008, documented the
stateofthepropertyatthattime:
EPAmaintainsaninterestincoordinatingoversightofavoluntarycleanup of this site with the Rincon Tribal authorities. Theproperty owner and Rincon Mushroom Corporation haveindividuallyexpressedtheirdesiretocooperatewiththeEPAandaddress all site concerns. Failure to complete burn ash/debrisremoval and conduct an environmental assessment of identifiedareasofconcernmayresultinanEPAremovalprogramaction.Theoverarching issueappears tobea lackofappropriate regulatoryjurisdictiononthisland.Thesiteappearstobeunregulatedfromthe standpoint of basic fire codes, land use, building codes andothermattersassociatedwithmunicipalgovernment.Theissueisalso relevant to oversight of property remediation and re-development.(TrialExh.at4.)
9
In or around February 2009 two large wooden billboard signs were
erected on the RMCA/Donius Property. The Tribe’s Sign Ordinance as of
February1,2009,provided,interalia:
[A]llsignserectedontheRinconReservationmustreceiveCouncilapproval before they are constructed/erected. All requests forCouncil approvalmust be submitted inwriting to the ExecutiveAssistantoftheTribalCouncilandmustmeetthecriteriasetforthintheOrdinance.”3
RMCA/Donius refused to submit an application for thebillboards. On
April17,2009,theTribefiledacomplaintforviolationoftheSignOrdinancein
thetribalcourtagainstDoniusandMushroomExpress,Inc.,histhencompany,
(the “Billboard Sign case”).4 Thedefendants filed a “SpecialAppearance” in
whichtheyobjectedtothesubjectmatterandpersonaljurisdictionbythetribal
court.TheTribesubmittedabriefinsupportofjurisdiction,citingMontanav.
UnitedStates,450U.S.544,565(1981). (SeeTrialExh.12.) Thetrial judge
foundthatthetribalcourthadbothsubjectmatterandpersonal jurisdiction
overthedefendantsandorderedthemtofileananswer.Whenthedefendants
failedtodoso,thetribalcourtenteredadefaultjudgmentimposinga$5,000
fineonthedefendantsandorderedthemtocorrectthesignordinanceviolation
3(SeeRinconBriefinSupportofJurisdictionat4.)4RinconBandofLuisenoIndiansv.MarvinDoniusandMushroomExpressInc.,No.02972009.
10
withintendays.Ifdefendantsfailedtofollowtimelythemandateofthecourt’s
order,thejudgmentauthorizedtheTribetoremovethebillboards.5
ThedefendantsdidnotappealthedefaultjudgmentintheBillboardSign
case.6In2009,however,RMCAfiledmultiplecivilcomplaintsintheSuperior
CourtoftheStateofCaliforniaandintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe
SouthernDistrictofCaliforniaagainstthemembersoftheRinconTribalCouncil
intheirindividualandofficialcapacities7andSDG&E8(the“October2009civil
actions”). RMCAcollaterallyattackedthedefault judgmentbythetribaltrial
courtandsoughtdeclaratoryandinjunctivereliefpreventingtheTribalCouncil
fromenforcingtheTribalordinancesagainstRMCAandthesubjectproperty.
RMCA also alleged tort claims for interference with contracts and business
relations and civil RICO causes of action. RMCA alleged that the Tribe had
implemented a plan to force RMCA to sell the property to the Tribe by
interferingwith its efforts to have SanDiego Gas& Electric re-energize the
property,orderingaclean-upcontractortoleavethepropertyandbymaking
false claims to various entities that the property was under the exclusive
5InJuly2009TribalrepresentativesenteredtheRMCA/Doniuspropertyandremovedthebillboards.(DocketItemNo.28at4.) 6BecausetheOrdinanceunderwhichthedefaultjudgmentwasentereddidnotcomplywiththesecondMontanaexception,wesetasidethedefaultjudgmentnuncprotunc.7ThedefendantswereBoMazzetti,JohnGilbertParada,StephanieSpencer,CharlieKolb,andDickWatenpaugh.8 RMCAv.Mazzetti,CaseNo.09-CV-2330.
11
jurisdictionoftheTribe.SDG&Efiledacross-claimagainsttheTribe.Allofthe
statecourtactionsweredismissed.
TheRinconTribemovedtodismissthetwoOctober2009federalcivil
actionsontheground,interalia,thatRMCAhadnotexhaustedremediesbefore
the Rincon tribal court. The district judge granted themotions to dismiss,
ruling that under the doctrine of comity, the non-Indian plaintiffs had to
exhausttribalcourtremediesbeforeseekingtohaveafederalcourtenjointhe
tribalproceedings. RMCAappealedthedismissalstotheNinthCircuit.9 The
NinthCircuitaffirmedthedistrictcourt’sexhaustionorderbutinstructedthe
lowercourttostaythecasependingexhaustion.Thedistrictcourtcomplied
andthemattersmovedbacktothetribalcourtforexhaustion.10
Coincidentallywiththereturnofthecasestothetribalcourt,in2014,
theTribeamendeditsEnvironmentalEnforcementOrdinancebyestablishing
9(See3:09-cv-2330,DocketItemNo.56.)10ThedistrictcourtstayedtheactionsanddirectedthepartiestoproceedbeforethetribalcourtandtosubmitstatusreportsonRMCA’sexhaustionofremediesbeforethetribalcourt.OnJune15,2015,thepartiessubmittedajointstatusreportinformingthedistrictcourtthatonDecember5,2014,RMCAhadsubmittedaproposedplantotheRinconEnvironmentalDepartmentthatsetsforththeactivitytobeconductedontheproperty.OnJune1,2015,theRinconEnvironmentalDepartmenthaddeniedtherequesttoapprovetheproposedplan,buthadindicatedthatthesubmissionofcertaininformationandclarificationcouldcauseittoapprovetheproposedplan.Consequentlythepartiesjointlyrequestedthedistrictcourttofurtherstaytheproceedingspendingreviewofadditionalinformation.Basedonthejointstatus report, the district court administratively closed its casewithout prejudice to anyparty tomovetoreopenandwithoutprejudice toresolutionofanystatuteof limitationsissueassociatedwiththefilingofthecomplaint.(See3:09-cv-2330,DocketItemNo.82.)
12
“catastrophicconsequences”asthestandardfortribaljurisdictiontomatch
languagenowbeingusedbytheSupremeCourt’sinterpretationsofthe
Montanacase.SeePlainsCommerceBankv.LongFamilyLandandCattleCo.,
554U.S.316,341(2008).
OnAugust25,2015,RMCA/Donius filed a complaint in the tribal trial
courtthatrepeatedthesubstanceoftheirallegationsintheOctober2009civil
action11 and theTribe filed violationnotices and a counterclaim reasserting
jurisdictionunder theamendedOrdinance. The trial judgeconsolidated the
two cases12 and ordered a separate trial on the issue of tribal jurisdiction,
followedbyasecondtrialtodecideremedies,ifnecessary.Inanorderdated
May 18, 2017 (“Tribal 2017 Order”), the trial court held that based on the
actions and inactions of RMCA/Donius, the Tribe had established that it
possessesjurisdictionovertheactivitiesofRMCA/Donius.Phasetwowasnot
trieduntil2019.OnApril22,2019,thetrialcourtissuedjudgmentinfavorof
the Tribe and also granted several forms of relief to the Tribe, including
injunctiverelief.RMCA/Doniustimelyappealfromthe2017Orderand2019
Judgment.
11 (DocketItemNo.69–71.) 12 On November 10, 2015, in the Tribal Court, the Rincon Tribe granted a motion toconsolidate federal civil actionNos. 09-CV-2330and10-CV-0591 forpurposesof furtherproceedings.
13
III.APPELLATEJURISDICTION
ThisCourt’sjurisdictiontohearthismatterisderivedfromtheArticles
ofAssociationoftheRinconBandandfromreferralofthecasebythefederal
districtcourtforexhaustionunderthedoctrineofcomity.13
IV.STANDARDSOFREVIEW
Asanappellatecourt,wedefertothefindingsoffactofthetrialcourt.
We will not reverse or vacate those findings of fact unless the trial court
committedclearerror.Astoquestionsoflaw,however,weapplythedenovo
standardofreview.GrandCanyonSkywalkDev.,LLCv.‘Sa’NyuWa,Inc.,715
F.3d1196(9thCir.2013).
13 The Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians is organized pursuant to Articles of AssociationapprovedbytheCommissionerofIndianAffairsonMarch15,1960.Section1oftheArticlesestablishes that theRinconTribalBusinessCommittee (called the “Council”) governs theRincon Band and that the Council “shall have jurisdiction over the lands within theboundaries of the Rincon Reservation (the “Reservation”).” Pursuant to Rincon TribalOrdinance3.800.”TheCouncil created thisCourt ofAppeals andpromulgatedRules andProceduresAppellate:
Anypartyaggrievedbyanyfinalorder,orjudgmentoftheRinconTrialCourtmayappealsuchorder,orjudgmenttotheRinconCourtofAppealsbyfilinganoticeofappealwiththeRinconTrialCourtwithinfifteen(15)daysaftersuchorderorjudgmenthasbeenentered.RinconApp.Ct.Rules&Proc.§3.812.
Underthedoctrineofcomity,thedistrictcourtrequiredRMCA/Doniustoexhausttribalcourtremedies.Ataminimum,exhaustionoftribalcourtremediesmeansthattribalappellatecourtsmusthavetheopportunitytoreviewthedeterminationsofthelowertribalcourts.SeeIowaMut.Ins.Co.v.LaPlante,480U.S.9,16-17(1987).
14
V.DISCUSSION
A. TribalJurisdiction
Indiantribesarerecognizedasquasidependentnationsandas“distinct,
independentpoliticalcommunities,”qualifiedtoexercisemanyofthepowers
andprerogativesofself-government.Worchesterv.Georgia,31U.S.515,559
(1832). TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthascharacterized thesovereignty
retained by Indian tribes as having a “unique and limited character” that
centers on the reservation and on tribal members within the reservation.
United States v. Wheeler, 432 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978). Subject to
congressionaloversight,tribesretainauthoritytogovernreservationlandand
theconductoftheirmembersonthereservation.UnitedStatesv.Mazurie,419
U.S.544,557(1975).Governanceofreservationsbecamemorecomplexwhen
somereservationlandswereconvertedintofeesimpleparcelsandconveyed
tononmembersundertheIndianGeneralAllotmentActof1887,25U.S.C.§331,
etseq.
1. TheMontanaSecondException
InMontanav.UnitedStates,450U.S.544,565(1981),theSupremeCourt
reaffirmed that once reservation land was converted to fee simple and
conveyedtononmembersbyatribe,thetribelosesitsplenaryjurisdictionover
thatpartoftheland.However,theMontanaCourtarticulatedtwoexceptions
15
tothatprinciple. Underthe firstexception,whenanon-Indianenters intoa
consensual commercial relationshipwith a tribe or one of itsmembers, the
tribe is permitted to exercise civil jurisdiction over the non-Indian through
taxation, licensing, or other means. Under the second exception, a tribe is
permittedtoexercisecivilauthorityovertheconductofnon-Indianownersof
feelandswithinthereservation,whenthelandowner’sconductonthefeeland
threatens to have or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economicsecurity,orthehealthorwelfareofthetribe.Id.at566.14
Attheoutsetofouranalysis,wedrawattentiontoadifferencebetween
thestandardasarticulatedinMontanaandthatoftheTribe’sOrdinance,asit
ispresentlyworded.Asoriginallyarticulated,thesecondMontanaexception
allowed for tribal jurisdiction over nonmemberswhen nonmember conduct
“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
14Theparties’briefsarerepletewithdiscussionofthesecondMontanaexceptionandtheSupremeCourtandotherfederalcasesthathaveappliedtheexception.However,intheirbriefs,thepartiesdonotalwaysaccuratelyrecitethesecondMontanaexception.Forexample,inhisopeningbrief,Doniusargues,“ThelandownersassertthattheTribehasnoregulatoryjurisdictiontoenforceitsenvironmentalordinances,becausetheTribecannotshowtheactivitieswillcauseacatastrophicriskofharmtotheTribeunderestablishedfederallaw,andthattheTribe’seffortstounlawfullyregulatethemispartoftheTribe’sschemetoforcethemtoselltheirpropertytotheTribe.”(CorrectedBriefofAppellantsat1,emphasisadded).ThisargumentisinappositeofthesecondexceptionunderMontana.Onthecontrary,theTribedoesnothavetheburdentoprovethatDonius’activitieswillcauseacatastrophe.TheTribe’sburdenistoshowthatDonius’actionsorinactionshavethepotentialtoimposecatastrophicconsequencesuponthepoliticalintegrity,economicsecurityorhealthandwelfareoftheTribe.
16
security,orthehealthorwelfareofthetribe.”Montana,450U.S.at566.Some
courtshavenowstatedthatthesecondexceptionapplieswhenthereisathreat
of“catastrophicconsequences”toatribe.15In2014,asthiscasewasbeingsent
backtotheRincontribalcourtforexhaustion,theTribeamendedtheordinance
tostatethatitappliedtoconductthathadthepotentialtoimposecatastrophic
consequencesontheTribe.
To contextualize the facts of this case in the universe of theMontana
generalruleandexceptions,itisusefultodescribethepeculiarevolutionofthe
Supreme Court’s analysis on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. The
“catastrophicconsequences”languagecodifiedintotriballaworiginatedwith
the2005editionoftheCohenHandbookonFederalIndianLaw,§4.02[3][c],at
232n.220(2005).TheCohenHandbookeditorshadquotedaSupremeCourt
decision thathelda tribemaynot imposea taxonnonmemberactivitieson
nonmember land unless the nonmember activity “actually ‘imperils’ the
politicalintegrityofIndiantribes....”AtkinsonTradingCo.v.Shirley,532U.S.
645,657-58n.12(2001)(quotingMontana,450U.S.at566). TheHandbook
editorsextrapolatedfromthe“imperils”remarkthattribaljurisdictionisnot
15SeePlainsCommerceBankv.LongFamilyLand&CattleCo.,554U.S.316,341(2008)(quotingCOHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§4.02[3][c][i], at n.75 (NellJessupNewtoned.,2012)).
17
justified unless the jurisdiction “is necessary to avert catastrophic
consequences.” CohenHandbook, supra, § 4.02[3][c], at 232 n. 220. Three
years later, the Supreme Court took that stray remark as support for the
propositionthatthereisan“elevatedthresholdforapplicationofthesecond
Montanaexception...thattribalpowermustbenecessarytoavertcatastrophic
consequences.” Long Family Land, 554 U.S. 326 at 341 (quoting Cohen
Handbook).
Thisevolution in theSupremeCourt’scharacterizationof theMontana
secondexceptionfromthe“threatensorhassomedirecteffect”triggertothe
“catastrophicconsequences”triggerarisesfromanincrediblylimiteduniverse
ofcases.Theoriginalcase,Montana,involvedanonmemberfishinginariver.
Montana,450U.S.at547.Thenextmajorcase,Stratev.A-1Contractors,520
U.S.438(1997),involvedanonmember-on-nonmembertortclaimarisingfrom
a car accident. Id. at 442. The next case was the Atkinson Trading case
involving a tax on a hotel. 532 U.S. at 647. The subsequent case, Plains
Commerce, involved race discrimination against tribal citizen ranchers by a
nonmemberbank.554U.S.at320.Thesecasesinvolveisolatedincidentswith
harmsthat likelywouldnothaveimpactedtribal lands. Noneofthesecases
involveda factpatternsimilartotheoneatbar,which involvesnonmember
activitythatislikelytoimpactcriticaltriballands.
18
However,oneSupremeCourtdecisionwithafactpatternsimilartothe
oneatbarisBrendalev.ConfederatedTribesandBandsoftheYakimaIndian
Nation, 492U.S. 408 (1989), although even its utility is limited because the
Court did not reach amajority opinion. Thatmatter involved consolidated
cases regarding the power of a tribe to impose its zoning ordinance on
nonmember-owned land. Id. at 438 (Stevens, J., lead opinion). The most
relevant of the consolidated cases (docket number 87-1622) involved a
nonmember named Brendale who owned land in fee within an area of the
Yakima [nowYakama] IndianReservation called the “closed area.” Id. The
closed areaof the reservationwasmassive, around807,000 acres, ofwhich
only25,000acreswereheld in fee. Id. Evenon the fee lands,noone lived
permanentlyintheclosedarea,whichwaspristinewilderness.Id.at438-40.
Brendaleowned20acresinthe“heart”oftheclosedarea.Id.at440.Hesought
permissionfromthecountytosubdivideanddevelophislands.Id.TheYakama
IndianNationobjectedbeforethezoningcommission,assertingthatthetribe
possessed jurisdiction over the nonmember parcel. Id. The tribe’s zoning
regulationsprohibiteddevelopmentlikethekindproposedbyBrendale.Id.at
441. The regulations took “care that the closed area remain[ed] an
undevelopedrefugeofculturalandreligioussignificance,aplacewheretribal
members‘maycamp,hunt,fish,andgatherrootsandberriesinthetraditionof
19
theirculture.’”Id.(quotingAmendedZoningRegulationsoftheYakimaIndian
Nation, ResolutionNo. 1-98-72, § 23 (1972)). Justice Stevens characterized
Brendale’sproposaltodeveloplandwithinanareathatprohibitedthattypeof
developmentasbringing“apigintoaparlor”:
The question is then whether the Tribe has authority topreventthefewindividualswhoownportionsoftheclosedareainfeefromunderminingitsgeneralplantopreservethecharacter of this unique resource by developing theirisolated parcels without regard to an otherwise commonscheme.Moresimply,thequestioniswhethertheownersofthesmallamountoffeelandmaybringapigintotheparlor.Id.
WhileJusticeStevens’opinionfocusedonthepowerofIndiantribestoexclude
persons from their lands (aquestionnotat issuehere), theStevensopinion
expressly adopted findings of the district court with respect to the second
Montanaexception:
Second,intheMontanacasewewerecarefultopointoutthatthe conduct of thenon-Indianson their fee lands [huntingand fishing] posed no threat to the welfare of the Tribe.[citationtoMontana,450U.S.at566].Insharpcontrast,inthiscasetheDistrictCourtexpressly foundthatBrendale’s“planneddevelopmentofrecreationalhousingplacescriticalassets of the Closed Area in jeopardy. . . . [O]f paramountconcern to this court is the threat to the Closed Area’sculturalandspiritualvalues. Toallowdevelopmentinthisunique and undeveloped area would drastically diminishthose intangible values. That in turn would undoubtedlynegatively affect the general health and welfare of theYakimaNationanditsmembers. ThiscourtmustconcludethereforethattheYakimaNationmayregulatetheusethat
20
Brendale makes of his fee land within the Reservation’sClosedArea.”617F.Supp.[735,]744[(E.D.Wash.1985)].
JusticeStevens,writingforhimselfandJusticeO’Connor,concludedthat
thetribe’sinterestsinzoningthenonmemberlandjustifiedtheexerciseofthat
power:
Inmyview,thefactthataverysmallproportionoftheclosedareaisownedinfeedoesnotdeprivetheTribeoftherighttoensurethatthisareamaintainsitsunadulteratedcharacter.This is particularly so in a case such as this in which thezoning rule at issue is neutrally applied, is necessary toprotectthewelfareoftheTribe,anddoesnotinterferewithanysignificantstateorcountyinterest.Id.at444.
JusticeBlackmun,writingforhimselfandJusticesBrennanandMarshall,
concurredinJusticeStevens’judgment.Id.at448-49(Blackmun,J.,concurring
in87-1622). JusticeBlackmun concluded that finding that the tribedidnot
possess jurisdiction over the Brendale property “would guarantee that
adjoining reservation landswouldbe subject to inconsistent andpotentially
incompatiblezoningpolicies,andforallpracticalpurposeswouldstriptribes
of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over which they enjoy
unquestionedandexclusiveauthority.”Id.at449(emphasisomitted);seealso
id.at458(“Andhowcananyonedoubtthatatribe’sinabilitytozonesubstantial
tracts of fee land within its own reservation-tracts that are inextricably
intermingledwithreservationtrustlands-woulddestroythetribe’sabilityto
21
engage in the systematic and coordinatedutilizationof land that is thevery
essenceofzoningauthority?”).
Brendale, while of limited utility to the federal courts perhaps, is
instructive to us for contextualizing how the Appellants’ land use choices
impact theRinconReservation. Brendale is theonlyUnitedStatesSupreme
Courtdecisionthataddressesnonmemberconductthatcouldcreateimpacts
that spread from nonmember lands to tribal lands. The Yakama zoning
ordinancefitscomfortablywithintheconstellationofcasesholdinganIndian
tribehadpower toenforce its landuse lawsonnonmember lands. Seee.g.,
Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes ofWind River Reservation,
Wyo.,670F.2d900(10thCir.1982);Hooverv.ColvilleConfederatedTribes,
2002WL34540595(ColvilleCt.App.,Mar.18,2002).
Even so, the Supreme Court’s precedents on the second Montana
exception provide little guidance to this Court. The parties appear to have
realizedthesame,namely, that theSupremeCourtprecedentsareof limited
valuetotheanalysis.TheyinsteadfocusontwoNinthCircuitdecisions,Evans
v.Shoshone-BannockLandUsePolicyComm’n,736F.3d1298(9thCir.2013),
andFMCCorp.v.Shoshone-BannockTribes,2017WL4322393(D.Idaho,Sept.
28,2017),aff’d,942F.3d916(9thCir.2019).RMCA/DoniusemphasizeEvans
asthemostpersuasivecase.EvansaroseontheFortHallReservation,hometo
22
theShoshone-BannockTribes. Id.at1300. Thetribestheretriedtorequire
thatanonmemberonfeelandsseekabuildingpermitfromthetribesbefore
constructingasingleresidencehome.Id.at1301.TheNinthCircuit,applying
thesecondMontanaexceptiontest,concludedthat,sincethereservation“has
longexperiencedgroundwatercontamination,”simplybuildingahousewould
not“meaningfullyexacerbatetheproblem.”Id.at1306.16 Further,theNinth
Circuitconcludedthat“the[t]ribes’generalizedconcernsaboutwastedisposal
andfirehazardsarespeculative,astheydonotfocusonEvans’specificproject.”
Id.
TheTribe in this case focusesmoreon theFMCcase.17 TheFMCcase
involvedthesamereservationastheEvansdecision,theFortHallReservation.
FMC, 942 F.3d at 919. That case involved the source for the polluted
reservation groundwater referenced in Evans, the FMC Corporation; FMC
stored“millionsoftonsofhazardouswasteontheReservation....”Id.at935.
TheNinthCircuitheldthatthetribepossessedciviljurisdictionoverFMCon
thebasisoftheelementalphosphorusinthegroundandthephosphinegasin
16 TheCourtdoesnotcommentonwhetheritagreeswiththeNinthCircuit’scharacterizationhere.17Thetribereliedonthedistrictcourt’sopinioninthatmatter.TheNinthCircuithassinceaffirmedthatdecision.WefocusourattentionontheNinthCircuit’sopinion.
23
theair,bothofwhichthecourt foundwere“deadly”andpose“arealriskof
catastrophicconsequences.”Id.at934-39(quotationomitted).
2. TheTribe’sOrdinance
On July 10, 2007, the Tribe enacted a comprehensive environmental
ordinance.TheOrdinanceasitwaswordedinthe2007revision,providedthat
aNoticeofViolationcouldbefiledagainsta“BandMember”orapersonwho
was “not a Band Member (non-member Indian or non-Indian).” (Rincon
EnvironmentalEnforcementCodesection304,DocketItemNo.33(PhaseTwo
Trial Ex. 33).) On February 13, 2013, the Tribe adopted a Fire Hazard
Abatement Ordinance. It empowered the Tribal Fire Chief to apply the
Ordinanceto“non-Indianactivitiesoccurringonnon-Indianownedfeelands”
iftheconductmetthesecondMontanaexception.(Section15.3003,PhaseTwo
TrialExh.36.)
The Ordinance was amended in 2008, 2012, and again, on April 29,
2014, which is the current version. In relevant part, the 2014 Ordinance
provides:
This Ordinance shall apply to activities occurring on non-Indian owned fee lands located within the exteriorboundariesoftheRinconReservationif...(4)[t]heactivitiesincludeconductthatthreatensorhassomedirecteffectonthe political integrity, the economic security, or the healthandwelfareoftheTribe.Foranactivitytoqualify...,itmust
24
beconduct thateither (A) in fact, significantly impacts thepolitical integrity, theeconomicsecurity,or thehealthandwelfare of the Tribe, or (B) has the potential to imposecatastrophic consequences upon the political integrity, theeconomic security, or the health andwelfare of the Tribe.RINCONTRIBALCODE§8.301(b).
Atoralargument,counselfortheTribeacknowledgedthattheOrdinance
isgroundedonMontanaandisintendedtoguidetheTribeincomplyingwith
theSupremeCourt’sprecedents.
The2014OrdinancerequiresthisCourttodetermine,asamatteroflaw,
whethertheAppellants’actionsandinactionsposeacatastrophicthreattothe
tribe.Seesection8.301(b)(4)(B).
3. TheTribalCourt’sFindings
TheRinconTribalCodetiesthesubjectmatterjurisdictionofthetribal
judiciarytoallactionssolongasthereis“anybasisconsistentwiththeinherent
sovereigntyoftheBand,itsArticlesofAssociationandlaws,andfederallaw.”
RINCONTRIBALCODE§3.103.BasedontheplainlanguageoftheOrdinance,the
trial court held that the Tribe had proved that it had jurisdiction over
RMCA/Donius.Thetrialcourt’sholdingcoalescedaroundfourconsequences
derivingfromtheactionsandinactionsofRMCA/Doniusthathad“thepotential
toimposecatastrophicconsequencesuponthepoliticalintegrity,theeconomic
security,orthehealthandwelfareoftheTribe.”(Id.)
25
Thetrialcourtlabeledthefirstfindingas“StewardshipoftheFeeLand;”
itinvolvedthefailureoftheRMCA/Doniustomaintaintheirproperty:
Plaintiffscontendandofferevidencethat,overthelasttwodecades or more, Defendants have not maintained theproperty in question. The property, according to thePlaintiffs, isnotandhasnotbeenwellmaintainedandthishas led to serious consequences, and if not somehowregulatedcan,infact,affectthehealth,welfare,andeconomicsecurityoftheTribe.(Tribal2017Orderat6.)
Thesecondfindinginvolvedthepotentialforcatastrophicfire.Thetrial
courtusedthelabel“FireHazard”todescribethisproblem:
Overthelastfewyears,devastatingfireshavesweptthroughthearea.ItisnotarguedthatDefendantscausedthesefires.However, the condition of the property and poormaintenance of the property in and of itself poses acatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs.Plaintiffs’rationaleisthatthepropertyislocatedapproximately60feetfromtheHarrah’sRinconCasinowhichisPlaintiffs’primarysourceofincome.At trial a video of explosions, fire embers, and otherthreatening conditions due to the fire were dangerouslyclose to the Tribe’s casino, these coming from theDefendants’ property. In short, due to prior usage, thepropertypresentsasituationwherebyanyfuturefiresinthishighly prone “fire area” can, in fact, have catastrophicconsequencesontheTribe.Id.at6.
Thecourtadded,“ThereisnodoubtintheCourt’smindthatanyfireon
Defendants’ property or passing through Defendants’ property can pose a
catastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupplyaswellasmisuseofthepropertyas
has been in the past.” (Tribal 2007 Order at 8.) The court further found,
26
“Defendants’useofthepropertyinthepasthasthreatenedtheTribe’ssafety
from fire and its water supply, exacerbating the potential of harm to its
economy.”(Id.) Indeed,therecordsshowthatduringtrial,thethreatoffire
damage arising from Appellants’ property causing damage to the Tribe’s
gaming and resort properties was dramatically demonstrated by video of
burningembersoriginatingfromanexplosiononAppellants’propertycrossing
thestreetandlandingontheroofofthetribalhotel.(Appellees’ResponseBrief
at24;Appellees’SupplementalExcerptsofRecordat791-94.)
The third finding involved pollution of the groundwater. The court
labeledthisconcern“WaterTable”:
PlaintiffscontendtheactivitiesonDefendants’property,ifallowedtocontinueunchecked,bearadistinctpossibilityofdamagingits“pristine”watertable.Evidenceattrialshowedthis,whilepossiblyremote, is a factor to be considered as argued by the Plaintiffs.(Tribal2007Orderat6.)
ThecourtfoundthattheTribe’swaterwas“‘pristine’andtheonlysource
ofwaterithas,[whichit]shareswithDefendants’property.” (Id.at8.) The
courtfurtherfoundthatafire“passingthroughDefendants’propertycanpose
acatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupplyaswellasmisuseoftheproperty
as has been in the past.” Id. The tribe’switnesses offered uncontroverted
testimony that there “is one aquifer underneath the entire reservation that
27
providesallthegroundwateranddrinkingwaterforall...ofthewellsonthe
reservation.”(Appellees’SupplementalExcerptsofRecordat55.)
Thecourt’sfinalfindingwasthatthedefendants’refusaltodisclosetheir
intendedusesoftheproperty,coupledwiththefactthatthestateandcounty
have disclaimed jurisdiction over all landswithin the reservation, creates a
“lawlessenclave.”Thecourtidentifiedthispieceas“OtherFactors”:
Plaintiffs additionally contend that Defendants’ use of thepropertyingeneralmustberegulatedfortheprotectionoftheTribe’seconomic,health,andgeneralwell-being,whichisthreatenedbylackofjurisdictionastheCountyandStatehave no civil regulatory jurisdiction over the property.Considering this, the Plaintiffs allegeDefendants’ propertybecomes a “lawless enclave” whereby Defendants can doanything they wish on the property, leaving the Tribehelpless.Plaintiffs’intentionattrialwastoshowwhattheybelievediscontinuedmisuseofDefendants’propertyposespotentialcatastrophicconsequencestotheTribe.Id.at6.18
4. Analysis
RMCA/Doniusargueforreversalofthetrialcourt’sjurisdictionfinding.
Wenowspecificallyaddresseachofthosegroundsinturn,althoughnotinthe
orderpresented.
18ThetrialcourtalsofoundthatRMCA/Donius’responsetotheTribe’sallegationswere“vagueandunresponsivetoTribalconcern.”(Tribal2007Orderat6.)
28
First,RMCA/Doniusarguethatthetrialcourtrefusedtoplacetheburden
ontheTribetoprovethatthesecondMontanaexceptionapplied.(Appellants’
CorrectedBriefat25.)RMCA/Donius’argumentthatthetrialcourtplacedthe
burdenofproofonthemasfeelandownersfindsnosupportintheopinionor
judgment.InitsMay17,2017Order,thetrialcourtnoted,“This[c]ourtiswell
aware[that]theTribehasaheavyburdenofshowingthattheactivityonthe
feelandposesacatastrophicthreattotribalgovernmentasopposedtosimply
aneffectonsurroundinglandandismindfulofallrelatedfactors.”(Tribal2007
Orderat7-8.)Allocationoftheburdenofproofshouldnotbeconfusedwith
thetrialcourt’srepeatedconclusionsthattheAppellants’actionsandinactions
couldleadtocatastrophicconsequences.(Id.at6.)19
Second,RMCA/Donius argue that the injunction that requires them to
submit a business plan effectively shifts the burden of proof away from the
Tribe.
TheTribecannot requireRMCAandDonius to firstprove to theTribethat theactivitiesbeingconductedonthesubjectpropertywill not pose a catastrophic risk to the political integrity, the
19Specifically,thetribalcourtfoundthefollowing:“However,theconditionofthepropertyandpoormaintenanceofthepropertyinandofitselfposesacatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs.”(Id.)“Inshort,duetopriorusage,thepropertypresentsasituationwherebyanyfuturefiresinthishighlyprone‘firearea’can,infact,havecatastrophicconsequencesontheTribe.”(Id.at 8.) “There is no doubt in the [c]ourt’smind that any fire onDefendants’ property orpassingthroughDefendants’propertycanposeacatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupply....”)(Id.)
29
economic security, or the health and welfare of the Tribe, byrequiringthemtosubmitabusinessplanfortheTribe’sapproval,before being allowed to engage in any activities on the subjectproperty. That gives the Tribe complete discretion and controlover the property, contrary to Montana, supra, and casesconstruing it. Itunlawfullyplaces theburdenon thenon-IndianowneroffeelandtoprovetotheTribethatitsactivitieswillnotamounttocatastrophicconsequences.(Appellants’CorrectedBriefat25-26.)
ThisCourt finds thatRMCA/Donius improperly conflate theburdenof
proofthatwasplacedontheTribe,andtheinjunctiveremedythatwasimposed
onthemafterthetrialcourtfoundthattheTribehadmetitsburdenofproof.
Once the tribehasproven that thesecondMontanaexceptionapplies to the
conductofafeelandowner,itwaspermissibleforthetribalcourttoissuean
orderthatplacestheburdenonthefee landownerstoperformactionsorto
stoptheiractionsortoseektribalpermissiontotakesimilaractions.
Third, RMCA/Donius argue that, assuming the burden of proof was
placedontheTribe,itfailedtoprovethatthethreatposedbytheirconductis
sufficienttotriggerjurisdictionunderMontanaanditsprogeny.Wesummarily
rejectRMCA/Donius’argumentforthreereasons.First,itseemstobebasedon
theexpostfactodoctrine.However,thedoctrinedoesnotapplyherebecause
althoughtheOrdinancewasamendedafteradisputehadarisen,itimposeda
moresevereburdenontheTribe,notonRMCA/Donius.Second,theviolation
30
notices,20pleadingsclaimingaviolationoftheOrdinancewerefiledafterthe
Ordinance had been amended. Finally, the judgment was based on the
Ordinanceasamendedin2014.Further,theRinconTribalCodetiesthesubject
matterjurisdictionofthetribaljudiciarytoallactionssolongasthereis“any
basis consistent with the inherent sovereignty of the Band, its Articles of
Associationandlaws,andfederallaw.”RINCONTRIBALCODE§3.103.Basedon
the plain language of the Ordinance, the trial court held that the Tribe had
provedthatithadjurisdictionoverRMCA/Donius.
The trigger point for tribal jurisdiction under § 8.301(b)(4)(B) in this
case is the potential for the defendants’ activities to create catastrophic
consequencesthatcanspreadtotriballands.Toreview,thetrialcourtfound
conclusively(1)thattheAppellantsfailedtomaintaintheirproperty;(2)that
the Appellants’ land constitutes a fire hazard in an area that is unusually
threatened by fire; (3) that the Appellants’ actions and inactions have
contributedtoasignificantthreattothepristinecharacterofthetribe’swater
supply; and (4) that the Appellants’ assertion of immunity from tribal
20TheTribeissuednewNoticesofViolations(NOV)toRMCA/Doniusafterthe2014amendment.Thenewnoticesreferredbacktoearliernotices:“TheviolationsdescribedinthisNoticehavebeenpreviouslydescribedinREDNoticesdatedOctober13,2009andJanuary15,2010,whichwereservedonthepropertyownerofrecordMr.MarvinDonius,whohasnotresponded,anddatedMarch31,2010,whichwasservedonbothRMCAandMr.Donius,neitherofwhichhasresponded.”(TrialExh.161.)
31
jurisdiction, together with local government’s demurrer, creates a lawless
enclavewithinthereservation.
WeconcludethattheAppellants’ landusechoicesonitsownproperty
havethepotentialtocreatecatastrophicimpactsontheRinconBand’slands.
We hold that the RMCA/Donius’ conduct has long created the potential for
catastrophic consequences on the tribe. There are two critical facts that
undergirdourholding.First,theTribeisdependentonasinglewatersource,
the groundwater underneath both the Tribe’s lands and the RMCA/Donius’
lands. Second,theTribeisdependentonamajorsourceofrevenuefromits
gamingoperations,whichare locatedacross thestreet fromthedefendants’
property.Ifeitherofthoseresourcesarethreatenedwithcatastrophicharm,
thentriballawauthorizestheTribetoassertjurisdictionoverthedefendants.
Moreover,insupportoftheirattackontribaljurisdiction,MarvinDonius
testifiedthathebelieved“hecouldusethelandinanyfashionhechose,short
of a nuclear waste dump.” (Tribal 2007 Order at 9.) Thus, on appeal,
RMCA/Donius ask us to disregard the trial court’s concern that the
RMCA/Doniuspropertywasa“lawlessenclave.” First, theyarguethat in its
judgmentthetrialcourtconcludedthatbeinga“lawlessenclave”gavetheTribe
the“righttoregulatetheproperty,despitetherequirementsunderMontana.”
The Court finds that this argument misconstrues the judgment. In the
32
judgment, thetrialcourtstatesthat it foundtheTribe’sefforts“tosafeguard
any potential damage to the Tribe’s economic security, health, welfare, and
safety” to be legitimate “in light of the fact that local government showsno
interestinzoning,regulating,orexercisinganyformofregulationdealingwith
anycontrolovernon-IndianownedfeelandlocatedonIndianreservationsin
SanDiegoCounty.”(Tribal2007Orderat5.)Thus,contrarytoRMCA/Donius’
argument the trial courtdidnot treat the “lawless enclave” characterof the
property as abasis for tribal jurisdictiondespiteMontana. Rather, the trial
court incorporated RMCA/Donius’ conduct on a “lawless enclave” as
supportingitsMontanaanalysis.
We also reject RMCA/Donius’ argument that, underMontana, the fact
thatfeelandonareservationisnotregulatedbylocalandstategovernmental
bodiesisnotapermissiblebasisfortheTribetoassertjurisdictionovertheir
fee land. We acknowledge that there is no discussion in Montana and its
progeny about lack of local governmental regulation as a basis for tribal
jurisdiction.However,thatwasnottheanalysisbythetrialcourt.Thelackof
localandstatehealthandsafetyregulationofmattersnormallyfallinginthe
ambitofsuchregulationisrecitedbythetrialcourtasevidencethatmaybe
consideredwhendecidingwhetherthecircumstancesherewarrantimposition
oftribaljurisdiction.
33
Inaddition,RMCA/DoniusattempttodeprivetheTribeofrelianceonthe
symmetrybetweenthe“catastrophicconsequences”languageofitsOrdinance
andthepresentarticulationsoftheMontanastandard,byarguingthatthatthe
Ordinancewas“fraudulentlyaltered.”(Appellants’CorrectedBriefat33.)As
recited in thebackground, thedisputebetweenRMCA/DoniusandtheTribe
haslastedforoverfifteenyears.Duringthattime,theTribehaspromulgated
ordinancesandamendedvariousversionsofordinances.RMCA/Doniusargue
thattheordinanceunderwhichtheTribe’sjurisdictionshouldbetestedisthe
oneineffectbeforethecurrentversionthattheTribehadadoptedonAugust
14,2012. The2012versiondidnotuse “catastrophic consequences”as the
standard. RMCA/Donius argue that the 2012 version arguably shifted the
burdenofproofaway fromtheTribebecause it requiresa fee landowner to
submitabusinessplaninwhichthefeeownerprovestotheTribe’ssatisfaction
that a proposed use will not threaten tribal health and welfare. The 2014
versionoftheOrdinancedoesnotrequireabusinessplan,butallowsoneatthe
discretionofthefeeowner.Wethereforefindthatthetrialcourtdidnoterr
whenitheldthat,asamatteroflaw,Appellants’actionsandinactionshadthe
potentialtoimposecatastrophicconsequencesonthetribe.Thisholdingmeets
thestandardestablishedbysection8.301(b)(4)(B)oftheOrdinance.
34
Finally, the Court finds that the current case is in equipoise between
Evans and FMC. The RMCA/Donius’ land use activities are far more
consequential thanthemereconstructionofasingle-familyhomeat issuein
Evans.ButRMCA/Donius’activitieshavenotbeenshowntobeaspotentially
“deadly”asthoseofthepolluterinFMC.However,itisalsohelpfultoreview
theuniverseofMontanasecondexceptioncasesforcontext.Themostrelevant
casesarethoseinwhichnonmembersassertedtheprivilegeofbeingexcepted
from tribal jurisdiction while on fee lands surrounded by tribal lands.
RMCA/Donius’ assertion of the privilege of being excepted from tribal
jurisdiction despite potentially leaching contaminants into the tribe’s
groundwater and creating conditions for extensive fire damage places
RMCA/Doniusinthatcategory.Ineachofthesecases,21theultimateoutcome
21ExamplesofnonmemberconductsimilartoRMCA/Donius’include,forexample,Wisconsinv.EPA,266F.3d741(7thCir.2001)(“hugezinc-coppersulfidemine”);BurlingtonN.SantaFeR.R.Co.v.AssiniboineandSiouxTribesofFortPeckReservation,323F.3d767(9thCir.2003)(railroadoperatingonreservationrightofwaythatcarriedhazardouswasteandsubjecttoderailmentsleadingtofatalitiesandtoxicspills);StateofMontanav.EPA,137F.3d1135(9thCir.1998)(“feedlots,dairies,minetailings,autowreckingyardsanddumps,constructionactivitiesandlandfills[;]wastewatertreatmentfacilities,commercialfishpondsandhatcheries,slaughterhouses,hydroelectricfacilitiesandwoodprocessingplants”);CityofAlbuquerquev.Browner,97F.3d415(10thCir.1996)(“wastetreatmentfacilitywhichdumpsintotheriver”);BPAmericaInc.v.YeringtonPaiuteTribe,2018WL6028697(D.Nev.,Nov.15,2018)(abandonedcopperminewithcontaminantsthatcouldseepintothegroundandsurfacewateronthereservation;settlementwithtribereachedleadingtofederalcleanupofmine);St.IsadoreFarmLLCv.Coeurd’AleneTribeofIndians,2013WL4782140(D.Idaho,Sept.5,2013)(alpacafarmwithuntreatedseptagethatcouldseepintothegroundwateronthereservation).
35
ofthedisputebetweenthetribeandnonmembersresultedincourtdecisions
orsettlementsfavoringthetribalinterests.
Here, RMCA/Donius’ own admissions about the facts in their brief
demonstrates the potential catastrophic impacts of their conduct.
RMCA/Donius concede that after amassivewildfire on the reservation and
beyondin2007,“fire-damageddebriswasleftonthepropertyfromOctober
2007untilAugust2008....Therisk-impactdebrisleftonthesubjectproperty
included ash-debris, petroleum, and ash metal.” (Appellants’ Brief at 12.)
RMCA/Doniusalsoconcedethatin2011“theTribe’sexpertengineersfounda
low-leveldieselandmotoroilplumeextendingfromoffthesubjectproperty.”
Id.Inaddition,RMCA/Doniusconcedethatin2015,theTribediscoveredthat
RMCA/Doniushadengagedinunpermittedactivities, including“constructing
mobilehomes,fabricatingorrefurbishingwoodenpallets,parkingcommercial
trucks on the property, parking refrigeration-style trailers on the property,
allowingpeople to live inmobilehomeson thepropertyandparkingmotor
vehiclesontheproperty.”Id.at14.Finally,RMCA/Doniushaveconcededthat
eachoftheseactivitiesisapotentialthreat,butresttheirdefenseontheclaim
thatnoneoftheseactivitieshaveactuallyharmedtheTribe.However,under
Montana,actualharmisnotthetriggerfortribaljurisdiction,potentialharmis.
Thus,wedonot findRMCA/Donius’defensecredible,orconsistentwith the
36
law.Inshort,RMCA/DoniusdemandthisCourttograntthemimmunityfrom
tribaljurisdiction.Giventhelonganddetailedhistoryofpotentialcatastrophe
narrowlyavoidedovertheyears,Appellants’argumentsmustberejected.
B. Remedies Afterphaseone,thetrialcourtconcludedthattherewasabasisunder
the second Montana exception for the Tribe to enforce its environmental
protectionOrdinanceoverRMCA/Donius. Duringthesecondphase,thetrial
court reviewed and affirmed jurisdiction and took evidence on what relief
shouldbe awardedbasedon thepresent conditions onRMCA/Donius’ land.
Thetrialcourtimposedthefollowinginjunctiveremedies:
1. Inordertoproceedwithanydevelopmentorfurtheruseofthe property RMCA/Donius shall provide the Tribewith abusinessplanacceptableperthestandardoftheREEO.
2. Bothpartiesshallmakeagoodfaithefforttoworktogether
to develop this business plan. Per any business planRMCA/Donius shall provideRincon access to the propertyallowing professional experts to conduct any necessary,water,andsurfaceconditionsofthepropertyandanyimpactthebusinessplanmayhaveontheTribeseconomicsafety,health,andgeneralwelfare.
3. If factuallyanyassessmentby theseexpertsconcludesany
contaminationispresentandfurtherinspectionandanalysisarerequired,RMCA/Doniusshallbearallrelatedreasonableexpenses.
37
4. Ifany“cleanup”ofthepropertyisrequiredtheREDshallsetaplan inplacesubject to theCourt’sapprovalandagain ifrequiredRMCA/Doniusshallbearallcosts.
5. As a point of clarity RMCA/Donius shall not conduct any
activityonthepropertywithoutanapprovedbusinessplanbeinginplaceandapproved. Thisincludesallcommercial,residential, or any type of personal or business activity.However,RMCA/Doniusmayremoveexistingitemsfromtheproperty.
6. ShouldRMCA/Doniusviolateanyprovisionsoftheorderor
is not in compliancewith an approved business plan theyshallbesubjecttothe$2,000(twothousanddollar)adayfinepayabletotheRinconTribe.Saidfinesshallremaininplaceuntilsaidviolationiscured.
7. With a 24 hour notice to RMCA/Donius, Rincon or its
representative experts or RED representatives shall beallowedaccesstotheproperty.
Inaddition,thetrialcourtreservedrulingonanawardof“cost”tothe
Tribe.
RMCA/Donius challenge the injunctive relief based on conflict in the
testimonybetween theTribe’s lay andexpertwitnesses and those calledby
RMCA/Donius.Wereviewatrialcourt’srulingonapplicationsforinjunctive
reliefforabuseofdiscretion.SeeWeinbergerv.Romero-Barcelo,456U.S.305,
311-313 (1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without
reference toanyguidingrulesorprinciples. U.S.v.Hinkson,585F.3d1247,
1263(9thCir.2009)(“[W]ewillaffirmadistrictcourt’sfactualfindingunless
38
thatfindingisillogical,implausible,orwithoutsupportininferencesthatmay
be drawn from the record.”) If some evidence appears in the record that
reasonablysupportsthetrialcourt’sdecisionthereisnoabuseofdiscretion.
Id.Thus,atrialcourtdoesnotabuseitsdiscretionwhenanorderissupported
bysomeevidenceevenifthereisconflictingevidence.Harmanv.Apfel,211F.
3d1172,1175(9thCir.2000).
Anawardofinjunctivereliefmustbebasedonafindingthattheparty
awardedinjunctivereliefsatisfiedafour-factortest:“(1)thatithassufferedan
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages,are inadequate tocompensate for that injury; (3) that,considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equityiswarranted;and(4)thatthepublicinterestwouldnotbedisservedby
apermanentinjunction.”N.CheyenneTribev.Norton,503F.3d836,843(9th
Cir.2007)(quotingEbayInc.v.Mercexchange,LLC,547U.S.388(2006)).
Anirreparableinjuryoccurswhentheinjuryisofsuchanaturethatthe
injuredpartycannotbeadequatelycompensatedbydamagesorthedamages
cannotbemeasuredbyanycertainpecuniarystandard.HerbReedEnter,LLC
v.FloridaEnt.Mgmt.,Inc.,736F.3d1239,1249(9thCir.2013).Apartyhasno
adequateremedyatlawwhendamagesareincapableofcalculationortheparty
tobeenjoinedisincapableofrespondingindamages.CottonwoodEnvtl.Law
39
Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); Johnson v.
Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (Irreparable harm prong
satisfied where the plaintiffs showed that it was likely that the defendants
wouldnothavetheresourcestosatisfyajudgmentintheplaintiffs’favor).
Theshowingthatatribemustmaketoestablishjurisdictionunderthe
secondMontanaexceptionalsosatisfiestheshowingthatitmustmaketobe
entitledtoinjunctiverelief.Conductthatplacesatribeunderthepotentialfor
harmtoitspoliticalintegrity,economicsecurityandhealthorwelfareunder
Montana, constitutes irreparable injury under the principles of equity.
Potentialharmtopoliticalintegrity,economicsecurity,healthandwelfareare
each a type of potential harm for which there is no adequate or certain
pecuniarystandardforcompensatorydamages. Whenweightedagainstone
another, in the faceofapotential forcatastrophicconsequences to the tribe
causedbyafeeowner’sconduct,equitygivesgreaterweighttorequiringthe
feeownertocomplywithatribe’shealthandsafetyregulationsthanitdoesto
afeeowner’sfreedomfromtribalregulation.Withrespecttopublicinterest,
environmentalpreservationisinthepublicinterest. SeeEarthIslandInst.v.
U.S.ForestServ.,351F.3d1291,1308(9thCir.2003);KootenaiTribeofIdaho
v.Veneman,313F.3d1094(9thCir.2002).
40
BasedonevidenceoflackofmaintenanceofthelandbyRMCA/Donius,
renderingitsusceptibletowildfiresandtogroundwatercontamination,anda
lackofregulationbylocalandstategovernment,thetrialcourtdidnotabuse
its discretion in concluding thatRMCA/Donius’ conduct has thepotential to
impose catastrophic consequences upon the political integrity, economic
securityandhealthandwelfareof theTribe,making it appropriate togrant
injunctive relief. It is the essence of equity jurisdiction that a court is only
empoweredtograntreliefnobroaderthannecessarytocuretheeffectsofthe
harmcausedbytheviolation. TheForschnerGrp.,Inc.v.ArrowTradingCo.,
124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997). We find that the scope of the injunction
exceeds the amount of restraint necessary to protect the Tribe from the
potentialharmpresentedbyRMCA/Donius’conduct.Therefore,wereverse,in
part,andremandthecasetothetrialcourttomoldtheprotuberancesofthe
injunctiontothehollowsofthepotentialharm.
We cite three examples as guidance. First, the injunction prohibits
RMCA/Doniusfrom“anydevelopmentorfurtheruseoftheproperty”untilthey
providetheTribewithabusinessplanacceptableperthestandardoftheREEO.
There was no evidence that all of RMCA/Donius’ development or use
threatened catastrophic consequences. An injunction is overbroad when it
seekstorestrainapartyfromengaginginlegalconduct.Linebackv.Spurlino
41
Materials,LLC,546F.3d491,504(7thCir.2008).Thus,aninjunctionagainst
alldevelopmentoruseofthelandisoverbroad.
Second,RMCA/Doniusareenjoinedtoceaseallactivityontheproperty
untiltheyhaveprovidedtheTribewithabusinessplanacceptabletotheTribe.
Thisbusinessplanrequirementisperhapsdrawnfromanearlierversionofthe
Ordinance.Sincethethreatisgrownoutofactionsorinactionsthatposeafire
hazard,groundwatercontamination,andhealthandsafetyconductthatwould
otherwiseberegulatedbystateandlocalgovernmentalagencies,theinjunction
should speak to those concerns. In addition, we instruct the trial court to
considerwhetherthereisanybasisundertheOrdinancefortheTribetogive
instructionstoSDG&EwithrespecttotheRMCA/Doniusproperty.22
Finally, with respect to the twenty-four hours’ notice requirement,
RMCA/DoniusareenjoinedtoprovidetheTribewithaccesstotheirproperty
topermittheTribetoconductprofessional inspectionsofwaterandsurface
conditions. The injunction does not address the frequency of unilaterally
22OnApril1,2008,theTribenotifiedSanDiegoGas&ElectricnotproceedwithreconnectingpowertotheRMCA/Doniusproperty.(SeePhaseTwoTrialEx.39.)Thepresentstatusofutilities,particularlyofelectricalpowertothepropertyisuncleartothisCourt.TheCourtunderstands that RMCA v. Mazzetti, Case No. 09-CV-2330-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.) is stayedpendingexhaustioninthiscase.Intheinterestofjudicialeconomy,initsreconsiderationoftheinjunction,thetrialcourtisdirectedtodetermineifelectricalpowerisnotconnectedatthedirectionoftheTribe,andifso,whetherthesecondMontanaexceptionempowerstheTribetodirectSDG&EtonotreconnectpowertothepropertyundercircumstancesthatmeetwiththeapprovalandstandardsofSDG&E.
42
initiatedtribalinspections.TheOrdinancedoesnotprovidetheTribewiththe
unilateral right to enter and inspection. Conceivably, inspections could be
soughtfromthetribalcourtasaformofemergencyrelief.Thatwouldprovide
alandownerwithaforumtochallengearequestedinspection.
VI.CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Tribe’s 2014 Ordinance meets the second
Montana exception. Thus, the Court regards an injunction that follows the
OrdinancemorefavorablythanonethatordersRMCA/Doniustodothingsthat
deviatefromtheproceduressetforthintheOrdinance.
Inreversingtheinjunction,weorderthetrialcourttovacateanyorder
findingRMCA/Doniusincontemptbasedonnoncompliancewiththeinjunction
andtovacateanyfineimposedonRMCA/Doniuspursuanttotheinjunction.
Wevacatethe2009defaultjudgmentthatwasenteredundertheversion
oftheOrdinancethatdidnotcomportwiththeMontanastandard.Wevacate
our order requiring Appellants to post a bond to stay enforcement of the
judgmentnuncprotuncandpurgeAppellantsofallcitationsofcontemptbythe
trialcourtforconductthattookplacewhilethisappealwaspending.
///
43
Pendingfurtherproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt,theTribeisordered
toremoveitsblockadeoftheRMCA/Doniusproperty.
Eachpartyshallbearitsownappellatecosts.
THEJUDGMENTOFTHETRIBALCOURTISAFFIRMEDINPART,VACATED
INPARTANDREMANDED.