Forces Transformation & Resources 1 Network Centric Operations: Insights and Challenges Mr. John J. Garstka Special Assistant Force Transformation & Analysis

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Forces Transformation & ResourcesNetwork Centric Operations:Insights and Challenges

Mr. John J. GarstkaSpecial Assistant

Force Transformation & AnalysisDASD Forces Transformation & Resources

ASD(SOLIC/IC)OUSD(Policy)

(703) 697- [email protected]

www.oft.osd.mil

Presentation toNASA ESTO AIST-05

Sensor Web PI MeetingOrlando Florida

3 April 2008

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Forces Transformation & Resources

Bottom Line Up Front

• Networking can have a significant positive impact on the operational effectiveness and efficiency of networked organizations across the spectrum of operations

3


Overview

• Overview of Theory

• Networked Forces in Combat Operations– Operational Effectiveness of Networked Forces

• Current Challenges

4


How a Networked Force Operates:Network Centric Warfare

Creates an Information Advantage Information Advantage and translates it into a decisive Warfighting Warfighting Advantage Advantage

Information Advantage - Information Advantage - enabled by the robust networking of well informedwell informed geographically dispersed forces

Characterized by:

- Information sharing- Information sharing - Shared situational awareness- Shared situational awareness - Knowledge of commander’s intent- Knowledge of commander’s intent

Warfighting Advantage - Warfighting Advantage - exploits behavioral change and new doctrine to enable:

- - Self-synchronization - - Speed of command - - Increased combat power

Exploits Exploits Order of MagnitudeOrder of Magnitude Improvement in Information Sharing Improvement in Information Sharing

5


Relevancy of Networked Forces

Major Combat Operations

Stability Operations Homeland Defense

Integrated Operations/Military Support to Crisis

6


Shared Situational• Understanding• Awareness• Assessment

Domains of Warfare

Situational• Understanding• Awareness• Assessment

InformationDomain

CognitiveDomain

Physical Domain

LeadershipUnit CohesionMorale

StrikeManeuverProtectSupport

SocialDomain

Mind of the Warfighter

Where Information is Created , Shared …..

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Information-Age Warfare …Sources of Advantage

Plan, Organize, Deploy, Employ and Sustain

Cycle

Conveyed Commander’s Intent

Physical Domain Force Advantage

Position Advantage

Information Domain

Cognitive DomainCognitive Advantage

Precision Force

Compressed Operations

Shared Awareness

Speed and Access

NetworkCentric

Operations

Social DomainCultural Awareness

Information Advantage

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• A Robustly Networked Force Improves Information Sharing• Information Sharing And Collaboration Enhances the Quality of Information and Shared Situational Awareness• Shared Situational Awareness Enables Collaboration and Self Synchronization and Enhances Sustainability and

Speed of Command• These in Turn Dramatically Increase Mission Effectiveness

Tenets of NCW: A Hypothesis Regarding Sources of Power

Physical Domain

Cognitive + Social Domains

Information Domain

Robustly Networked

Force

Information Sharing

Collaboration

Shared Situational Awareness

Quality of Information

Mission Effectiveness

Self Synchronization

New Processes

Tenets of Network Centric Operations …The New Value Chain – High Level

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Collaboration

“Networked” Force

Mission Effectiveness

Shared Situational Awareness

Quality of Information

Information Domain

Cognitive & Social Domains

Physical Domain

Information Sharing

Common“Picture”

DecisionMaking

SelfSynchronization

Individual Situational Awareness

The NCO Value Chain …Expanded

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Tactical Picture:OIF Major Combat Operations - 2003

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Tactical Picture:3/2 Stryker Brigade – Training Exercise – May 2003

II

OOO

MAIN EFFORT • Follow and Attack to seize OBJ Blaze

CAV SQDN (RSTA)• Route Recon• Recon OBJ Blaze

II

OOO

II

OOO

SUPPORTING EFFORT• Attack to clear enemy forces in disruption zone• Isolate the OBJ Blaze

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GFAC

UAV SPI

LINK-16Air Track

UAV

Friendly EPLRSPositions

GFAC9 line Target

A-10 FAC

Link-16Land Track

SADL FlightMember

F-16C HorizontalSituation Cockpit

Display

Tactical Picture: F-16C in an Interoperability Exercise in 2002

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SARS: Singapore

NRF Assessment – NRF 5: Pakistan

Earthquake Relief

Military Support to Crisis

StabilityOperations

Major CombatOperations

Stryker BCT (OIF)

UK Low-Intensity

Conflict

NATO Task Force Fox

Joint Urban Operations

Coalition Maritime

Ops (OIF)

Task Force-50 (OEF)

Naval Special Warfare Group I (OEF/OIF)

Stryker BCT (JRTC)

V Corps/3 ID (OIF)

Air-to-Air (JTIDS)

Air-to-Ground (DCX-I /OEF/OIF)

Air-to-Ground w/ Special Operations Forces (OIF)

US/UK Coalition (OIF)

NATO ACE Mobile Force Land

NATO Response Force

(NRF) Assessment – NRF 4

Network Centric Operations Case Studies Covera Wide Range of Mission Areas

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Operational Effectiveness Insights

• Network Enabled Sensing

• Air-to-Air Combat

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Network Enabled Sensing

Information“Richness”

Information“Reach”

• Content • Accuracy• Timeliness• Relevance

..

.Platform-Centric

Operations

Network-Centric

Operations

* E-3 AWACS * JSTARS

* Rivet Joint

* Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT)

* U-2

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• Application of network-centric techniques to horizontally integrate multiple ISR assets, providing machine-to-machine (M2M) interaction of multi-INT sensors, to create actionable information on time sensitive targets

• Multi-INT with Imagery, GMTI and SIGINT

What NCCT DoesWhat NCCT DoesWhat NCCT DoesWhat NCCT Does

BR03-006-16

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Network Centric Sensing

EngageFind, Fix Target, Track Assess

Order of Magnitude Improvement in PerformanceOrder of Magnitude Improvement in Performance

Spat

ial D

omai

n (M

eter

s)

10

50

100

500

1,000

Projected Performance

Notional EstimatesTemporal Domain (Minutes)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Today - 1 Platform

2 Platforms SIGINT

3 Platforms SIGINT

GMTI/SIGINT + Imagery

SIGINT + GMTI

2 Fighters ESM and 2 Platforms SIGINT

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Network Centric Sensing

EngageFind, Fix Target, Track Assess

Order of Magnitude Improvement in PerformanceOrder of Magnitude Improvement in Performance

Spat

ial D

omai

n (M

eter

s)

10

50

100

500

1,000

Projected Performance

Notional Estimates

JSOW

JDAM

HARM

WeaponThresholds

ERGM

AGM-130

Temporal Domain (Minutes)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Today - 1 Platform

2 Platforms SIGINT

3 Platforms SIGINT

GMTI/SIGINT + Imagery

SIGINT + GMTI

2 Fighters ESM and 2 Platforms SIGINT

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• Time - T+ 2 seconds• Ground Truth = 2 targets• Network View

• 2 Targets detected and reported• 2600 meter CEP SIGINT AOA-AOA only

first track• Independent Platform Views

• Multiple detections, no tracks formed and no reports

Ground Truth is RedPlatform is BlueDetections are Yellow

100%0%0%

0%0%

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• Time - T+29 Seconds• Ground Truth = 5 targets• Network View

• 4 Targets detected and reported• 89 meter CEP SIGINT AOA-AOA only

• Independent Platform Views• Multiple detections• 1 SIGINT track formed and reported from

GR 138 meter CEP

20%0%

0%0%

80%

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• 4 Targets detected and reported• 42 meter CEP SIGINT AOA-AOA AND

GMTI• Independent Platform Views

• Multiple detections• 1 SIGINT track formed and reported from

GR 138 meter CEP

20%0%

0%0%

80%

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• 5 Targets detected and reported• 42 meter CEP SIGINT AOA-AOA AND

GMTI• Independent Platform Views

• Multiple Detections• 1 SIGINT track reported from GR 138 meter

CEP

20%0%

0%0%

100%

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Air-to-Air Networking …Within a Domain

Office of Force Transformation / RAND Air-to-Air Case Study• Compare Mission Effectiveness of “Voice Only” F-15 Flights

to Those with Voice & Link 16/JTIDS Capabilities – 12K Sortie Look

“So Whats?” of a Common Tactical Picture• Info Completeness: “Ownship” & Other Friendly Aircraft

– Free Time = Ability to Focus on Fight

• Info Superiority: Quick Awareness & Understanding of Enemy

• Increased Decision Time– More Lethal and/or Survivable Intercept Geometry Decisions

• Earlier/Better Targeting – Improved Shot Lethality– Higher Number Shots per Time

• Battle Manage & Target While Cold (with Same S.A.)

• Better Ability to Self-Synchronize (“Swarm”)

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Quality of Individual Info:Voice Only

AWACS

BLUE 11 / 12

BLUE 13 / 14

TTTT QQQQ 4321

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

BBBB QQQQ 4321

TTTT QQQQ 4321

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

BBBB QQQQ 4321

TTTT QQQQ 4321

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

BBBB QQQQ 4321

Q1 Completeness: Detect

Q2 Correctness: ID

Q3 Correctness: Location

Q4 Correctness: Velocity

Voice + Link 16

RED 11 / 12

RED 13 / 14

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Time

B11 (Flight lead)

Voice Only Information Understanding Awareness Decisions

B12 (Wingman)

Air-to-Air: Quality of Individual Info Voice Only

AwarenessInformationVoice Only

DecisionsVoice + Link 16 AwarenessInfo Understanding

AwarenessInfo Understanding Decisions?Voice + Link 16

80

25 26

269/69

80

310/89

B11 (Flight lead) B12 (Wingman)80

25 26

16 15

28 30269/69

80

25 26

16 15

28 30272/70

B11/13 (Flt Lds) B12/14 (Wings)

Voice + Link 16

“Combat Reserve”

“Combat Reserve”

AwarenessInfo Understanding

AwarenessInfo Understanding

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VoiceVoice + Link 16

Degree of Information Sharing

Quality of Individual Information

Degree of Networking

Quantity of Retrieved Info

Quality of Decisions

Kill Ratio

Quality of Organic Info

Quality of Sensemaking

0.28

0.51.00.08

1.0

0.4

0.91

3.10:1

8.11:1

1.0

0.22

1.0

Air-Air Case Study Conclusions

• Application of NCO Value Chain Yielded Results Consistent with Live Flight & Pilot Interview Results

• Validated Relationships Between NCO Capabilities Hypothesized for the Air-Air Mission

“Information Advantage”

“Physical Advantage”

“Cognitive Advantage”

Kill Ratio ComparisonKill Ratio Comparison

Voice Only

Voice +

Link 16

Day 3.10 8.11

Night 3.62 9.40

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2008

• Networks are a key enabler of the DoD Enterprise• Ongoing significant investments in C2,

Communications, and Networking capabilities• Increased focus on cyber defense and information

assurance

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Challenges

• Accelerating the development of Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for networked forces

• Information sharing with mission partners• Enhancing leader development

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Process Innovation

Technology Innovation Leads

People Innovation

Organizational Innovation

Technology InnovationTechnology

Process

Organization

People

Initial Capability

Technology

Process

Organization

People

Evolving Capability

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Process Innovation

Technology + Process Innovation

People Innovation



Process

Organization

People

Technology

Process

Organization

People

Initial Capability

Evolving Capability

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Process Innovation

Transformation Process:Full Spectrum Innovation

People Innovation



Process

Organization

People

Technology

Process

Organization

People

Initial Capability

Evolving Capability

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Overcoming Impediments to Innovation & Transformation

InformationDomain

Cognitive &

SocialDomains

Physical Domain


Individual BehaviorOrganizational BehaviorOrganizational Values

Organizational Incentives Organizational Structure

Organizational Processes

Increasing Level of Difficulty for Change

TechnologyInnovation

ProcessInnovation

Platform “Technologies”Information “Technologies”

“New Concepts”

Vision and Leadership are key to overcoming Impediments to Innovation

PeopleInnovation

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Challenges

• Accelerating the development of Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for networked forces

• Information sharing with mission partners• Enhancing leader development

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• Operational impact of networking is more significant than originally projected

• Technology/process linkage is critical to successful implementation of Network Centric Operations

• People are our an organizations most critical asset with respect to implementation of Network Centric Operations

Summary

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Questions?

Documents

Forces Transformation & Resources 1 Network Centric Operations: Insights and Challenges Mr. John J. Garstka Special Assistant Force Transformation & Analysis