FOREIGN POLICY

CONTENTS Page

Foreward

European Union Enlargement: The Turkish Case As an Example of Stabilization in

Europe‟s Periphery

Emmanuelle Raoult

Strategy: Defining Strategy

Ercan Özer

Emerging Nationalism or New Strategy of

Independent Kazakstan

Meryem Kırımlı

Turkmenistan, Land of Tribes, Oil and Gas

Meryem Kırımlı

The Euphrates-Tigris Watercourse Controversy

and the 1997 Convention on the Law of the

Non-navigational Uses of International

Watercourses

Bülent Olcay

Strategy: Defining Strategy Ercan ÖZER*

trategy is an intriguing word. The word itself carries a built-in importance. It is

used frequently and in different contexts. The meaning alluded to it varies

according to the user and often times strays off mark.

Strategy has a dynamic structure. It needs to be exami-

ned in full dimension and step by step in logical sequence con-templating the

exigencies of both war and peace.

In the realm of strategy, there is an interplay of theory and historical experience. Most

of the definitions of strategy are normative in response to how to best deal with a

particular question in a given context.

Defining Strategy:

For the man in the street, strategy is something related with wars; it is a military

concept. This popular perception is mostly shaped by Karl Von Clausewitz‟s definition

of strategy:

“The employment of battle as a means towards the attainment

of object of war”.1

However, the man on the has not got it all right. Yes, it is true that strategy has been

developed as a concept about war

as well as the planning and conduct of it. Yet. It is a lot more than that.

The word strategy is derived indirectly from the Greek strategos (general: art of

general) which does not carry the connotation of the modern word. The Greek

equivalent for the modern day understanding of “strategy” would have been strategike

episteme (general‟s knowledge) or strategon sophia (general‟s wisdom). Cognates * Dr. Ercan ÖZER is a member of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

S

such as strategicos or strategikon have a didactic connotation. On the other hand,

strategemata describes a compilation of strategema, precisely “strategems” or tricks

of war (ruses de guerre). Much more commonly used by the Greeks was taktike

techne, which described an entire body of knowledge on the conduct of warfare

including both techniques and tactics proper as well as diplomacy.2

Strategic thinking may go way back to B.C.. Sun Tzu‟s “Art of War” was written in

China about 500 B.C..Thucydides (460-404 B.C.) is often thought to be first important

writer on war. Modern strategy has been generally considered to begin with the

Napoleonic wars. As opposed to limited wars, Napoleonic wars presaged total war.

The concept of strategy, changed from being the “art of the general” focusing on the

battlefield, to being arrangement of a nations whole disposition of war including the

peacetime affairs.

The first writer to incorporate Napoleonic warfare into what become a major treatise

on strategy was the Swiss military theorist Henri Jomini (1779-1869). With the

declining relevance of his prognosis, he was overtaken in reputation by Karl Von

Clausewitz (1780-1831). Widely acknowledged as the “first modern strategist”,

Clausewitz has been the leading exponent of what has been called the “political

philosophy of war”: War is rational, national and instrumental. Because of the

contemporary significance of his emphasis on the relationship between “ends and

means”, contemporary strategic thinking has been dominated by “neo-Clausewitzs”.

The analysis of physical capabilities is a key consideration which has involved the

need for a sound appreciation of progressively more complex technological factors. In

terms of the evolution of strategic thinking, the Second World War was most

impressive in the realm of practice rather than theory. Theories of mechanical warfare

and air power were the most interesting features in the evolution of strategic doctrine

in the interwar years. After the Second World War, accommodating the problem of

continuous technological development into existing strategic concepts has been

dominant consideration.

The Clausewitzian philosophy of war fitted conveniently into the conflict doctrine

which was developed by Karl Max and Lenin. During the Cold War era, nuclear

strategists dominated the scene. Henry Kissinger argued to incorporate strategy

within its proper “home”, i.e. within foreign policy.

STRATEGY AND POLITICS

Fundamentally, strategy is about the ways in which military power can be used

to achieve political objectives. Waging war is only one of the ways in which military

power can be used to realise the political goals.

Helmuth von Moltke described strategy as: “The practical adaptation of the

means placed at a general‟s disposal to the attainment of the object in view.”

Same understanding was conveyed by Lindell Hart who defined strategy in

terms of “The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of the

policy.”

Robert Osgood has suggested that “Military strategy must be understood as nothing

less than overall plan for utilising the capacity for armed coercion, in conjunction with

economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power, to support foreign

policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit means.”

Andre Beaufre has also mentioned the need of devising an overall strategy which

would incorporate and coordinate the political, economic and military instruments of

policy.

Michael Howard argued that it was only natural for the strategist to include the

political component.

The connection between politics and strategy has been well expressed by Roymond

Aron: “Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment

in history from the problems which events themselves pose.”

General Andre Beaufre‟s definition3 “The art of dialectics of wills that use force to

resolve their conflict.” (L‟art de la dialectique des volontes employant la force pour

resoudre leur conflict.) reflects the interplay of adversaries that use force to resolve

the conflicts.

Clausewitz‟s famous recommendation that war ought to be a continuation of political

intercourse with an mixture of other means has become the famous strategic aphorism.

Today, strategic thought is so inextricably entwined with international politics

that it would be misleading to try to separate the two subjects. International politics

forms the background for strategic analysis.

The US definition of strategy is based on five key steps the last of which is to

achieve a political objective:

– It is a plan of action;

– It is based on a contingent event;

– It priorities the allocation of resources;

– It orchestrates the simultaneous and sequential employment of military

force;

– It achieves a political objective.

In strategy, the ability to argue logically and to follow

strategic reasoning is very important; but even more important is the political

judgment which enables the analyst to evaluate the analysis and put it in a wider

political framework. A strategist, therefore, should familiarises himself with political

behaviour and relate military policies to political events. Invariably, the strategists

must acquaint themselves with the political problems which provide the context for

strategic theorising.

STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS

When it comes to deciding policy, the intellectual constraints of strategic man is forced

to make way for a more human behaviour, and the policies have to be designed to take

account of human behaviour which may be reasonable or unreasonable. Strategy is

pursued at a rational level at which attention is focused on reasonable, conscious and

artful behaviour motivated by cold calculation of national interests. In this kind of

approach, strategic man evaluates every conceivable action in terms of “cost-benefit

analysis”.

For further emphasis, an analogy can be drawn between strategy and economic

behaviour.

Economics is concerned with allocating resources, choosing doctrines and techniques

so as to get the most out of the available resources. In other words, economists try to

make the best and most efficient use of resources available in all spheres of economic

activity.

The problem of combining the limited quantities and qualities of means, be it soldiers,

weaponry, technological levels of warcraft and warfare, to produce a strategic

defence or offence that will maximise deterrence of enemy attack or to produce an

offence that will maximise the effect of the attack and minimise costs of the war, is just

as much of a problem in economics. As the problem in economics is combining the

limited quantities of inputs to produce output in such a way to maximise profits and

minimise the loss.

In both cases, there are objectives and constraints to achieve those objectives which

challenges the strategist to economise. There are also alternatives to maximise the

benefits out of those constraints. Therefore, the problem is to choose that strategy

which maximises the possibility of attainment of the objectives with the given

resources used in a most efficient or economical way thereby minimising the cost.

STRATEGY: MEANS OR/ AND ENDS

The definitions stated so far mostly emphasise that strategy is primarily about

“means” rather than “ends”. It has been assumed that political goals are the proper

business of politicians and that strategic planners are only interested in how given

military resources can be applied to the achievement of those goals. Their job, it has

been argued, is to harness military power to the attainment of national interests, but

their mandate does not extend to determining what that national interest is.

The question which comes into mind is “should strategic analysis concentrate on

identifying and evaluating the various choices available to the states in their use of

military power for ends clearly defined by political authorities?

While it may be legitimally argued that politicians rather than military should decide

the goals, they need the advise of military as to their practicability and consequences.

Thus, the strategists become not only advisers to the government but executors as well.

Consequently, politicians must exercise the ultimate control, but the decisions ought to

be shaped in coordination with military. Clemanceau may be right in claiming that

war is much to serious to be left to the generals. However, war is also too serious to be

left solely to the politicians. What is required is a continuous dialogue between

political and military minds.

STRATEGY: SCIENCE OR / AND ART

When references are made to the dictionaries, the definitions state that strategy is both

art and a science. Following are some of the definitions cited from different

dictionaries:

“Strategy is an art or science involved in the direction of the forces at his disposal by

the commander in chief of a belligerent nation or by those assisting him.”4

“Strategy is the science and art of employing the armed strength of a belligerent to

secure the objectives of war with the large scale planning, direction and operation in

adjustment to combat area, possible enemy action, political alignment, etc.”5

Lexicon of Military Terms6 defines strategy as “A science, an art, or an a plan (subject

to revision) governing the raising, arming, and utilisation of the military forces of a

notion (or a coalition) to the end that its interest will be effectively promoted or

secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed.”

The definition of strategy in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for

Joint Usage7 is more inclusive “The art and science of developing and using political,

economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to

afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and

favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.”

The standard definition of strategy from Webster‟s Third New International

Dictionary8 reads as “The science and art of employing the political, economic,

psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the

maximum support to adopted policies in peace and war.”

STRATEGY: FOR WAR OR / AND FOR PEACE

The foregoing definitions release the knot which binds the concept of strategy

with war so that strategy can be used not only for and in war but also for and in peace.

In our contemporary world, with the advent and advance of the mass destruction

weapons, a deeper thought would reveal that strategy is more about peace than it is

about war, giving the priority to peace rather than war. Therefore, a satisfactory

definition of strategy must take into account primarily the peacetime applications of

strategic thinking and must consider the use of force in the more general context of

foreign policy implementation.

Prof. Dr. Feridun Ergin defines strategy in its narrow and technical meaning as

“Planned action or a way of behaviour comprising application of force of

certain intensity or threat of force to reach a specified political objective.”9

This is a politico-military concept securing itself a place in between level of

political objectives and the level of battleground tactics. In this context, strategy with

diplomacy constitutes one of the basic factors of international political behaviour. For

Prof. Ergin, in its broader meaning, strategy is a concept which embodies any kind of

planned action whether it includes the use of force or not to achieve certain objectives

in every sphere of human behaviour be it economic, political, social, etc10

.

At every stage of formulation of strategy, not only military and political but a

combination of all other relevant factors should be taken into account. Once the

formulation of strategy is broadened to incorporate political, economic and other

relevant components, it logically follows that monopoly of the military on strategy is

no more.

STRATEGY: TIME AND TIMING

Strategy that reaches an objective for today only to lose it a day later is not a

strategy at all. Strategy must secure the objective for the required time. Strategy must

project itself as long as projection allows. Strategist must protect and preserve the

strategy as long as it is relevant, pertinent, valid and applicable.

In essence, element of time must be used to the strategists‟ advantage.

Sometimes, strategy may also be used to gain time, but one should use the time to

implement the strategy rather than use the strategy to gain time. Strategy will be most

effectively implemented when it finds its right and best timing. It will have a better

chance of securing the predefined objectives if it is implemented when the conditions

are most ripe. In the implementation, strategist must consider all interferences that

could negate the strategy.

CONCLUSION

When all off the definitions are put in a big boiler of analysis and stirred, some

“common denominators” surface.

Strategy is the

–science and art of………………………… (what)

–use and threat to use of………………….. (what)

–means to achieve…………………………. (what)

–ends in……………………………………… (when)

–wartime or peacetime

Let us give more precision to our definition.

Strategy is the

–science and art of (what)

–developing, planning, adapting and applying (what)

–use and threat the use of (what)

–means (what kind)

–overt, covert or tacit

–military, political, economic, cultural,

historical, psychological and ethnic in an (how)

–optimum, economical ad cost-effective way

–with alternatives and options

–considering time constraints

–with best timing (for what)

–to achieve, secure and maintain (what)

–predetermined ends (for when)

–for and in wartime and peacetime (for when)

In a paraphrased form,

STRATEGY is the SCIENCE AND ART of DEVELOPING, PLANNING,

ADAPTING AND APPLYING the USE AND THREAT TO USE OF OVERT, COVERT

AND TACIT MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, HISTORICAL,

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ETHNIC MEANS in an OPTIMUM, ECONOMICAL AND

COST-EFFECTIVE WAY with ALTERNATIVES AND OPTIONS CONSIDERING

TIME CONSTRAINTS and WITH BEST TIMING to ACHIEVE, SECURE AND

MAINTAIN PREDETERMINED ENDS FOR AND IN WARTIME as well as

PEACETIME

In a capsulized form, strategy is the science and art of using minimum means to

achieve maximum ends.

Strategy must be realistic, applicable, sustainable and consistent. Otherwise, it loses

its viability. Use of the state of art technique and technology in the implementation of a

strategy always helps. It is a dynamic process that needs review and reconsideration

to keep up with the changing conditions.

END NOTES 1 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, 1976.

2 Luttwak, Edward N. , Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,

Massachusetts, USA, 1987.

3 Beaufre, Andre, Introduction a la strategie, Library Armand Collin, Paris, 1963.

4 Howard, Michael, The Franco-Prussian War, Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1968.

5 Silahlı Kuvvetler İngilizce Türkçe Askeri Terimler Sözlüğü, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1969.

6 King, James E, Jr. ed., Lexion of Military Terms Relevant to National Security Affairs on Arms and Arms

Control, Institute for Defence Analyses, Washington,

1960.

7 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 1964.

8 Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary, Webster‟s Press, New York.

9, 10

Ergin, Feridun, Uluslararası Politika Stratejileri, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi Yayını, 1975.

EMERGING NATIONALISM OR NEW STRATEGY OF INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN

Meryem KIRIMLI*,1

The future path of Kazakstan after attaining indepen- dence on December 16, 1991, has occupied the minds of intellectuals and analysts both in the republic itself and in the western world. Questions abound: Will this newly independent republic which was under colonialist pressure for years develop rapidly?, Will Kazakstan be able to preserve its political and economic independence?, or, Will it, after the enthusiasm of independence fades away, attempt to find shelter under the protective umbrella of Russia?; Will Kazakstan be able to remain stable despite its complex ethnic mixture and despite the difficult economic chaos and many problems which Kazakstan has inherited after the Soviet disintegration? Should Kazakstan refrain from asserting to establish its national identity as the land of Kazaks or should it try to balance its policies not to disturb its multi-ethnic structure and remain not as the Kazak land, but as the land of a multi-ethnic society? Do Kazaks agree to call themselves the citizens of the Republic of Kazakstan as opposed to the citizens of the Kazak Republic? In other words, is Kazakstan a Kazak state or is it a state of its multi-ethnic citizenry? Which national hero should the youth in Kazakstan study?; The heroes of the Second World War, the heroes of the former Soviet Union, or the heroes of Kazak nationalism such as Kenesary Kasimov, who has regarded by many ethnic Kazaks as the first Kazak nationalist and who had „great stature‟ among all of the Kazaks, and led the Kazaks in the nineteenth century in a revolt which was the greatest challenge to the Russian tsarist authority in the steppe.2

The aim of this paper is to invite the reader to a journey in the pages of the Kazak language newspapers in order to discover the discussions and debates going on in the indigenous Kazak media, which is under the threat of extinction due to paper and other printing material shortages. Discussion and articles studied are mainly concentrated from 1994, 1995 and 1996. Some heated debates about many aspects of the future of the republic took place especially right before and after the first post-Soviet elections on March 7, 1994. Western analysts have reported that Kazaks won an overwhelming majority as a result of the first election of the newly independent Kazakstan. At the same time this first election was also publicised as the one at which “...The...grouping, which wants Russian to be a state language and dual citizenship for the country‟s Russians, ...failed to get any of its candidates elected.” According to the same analytic report, “Since 1993 President Nazarbayev has deliberately followed a policy of “Kazakhisation”; top jobs with few exceptions go to ethnic Kazaks regardless of ability and place names have been changed to Kazak ones.”.3

As it can be seen from earlier western reports, an assertion of Kazak identity as opposed to the identity of the citizenry of Kazakstan can be noticed in this newly independent state of Kazakstan, especially in matters regarding the official state language

and policy-making body. As the chief executive of the republic the ever-strengthened personality of President Nursultan Nazarbayev is also very prominent. In the pages of the indigenous media, he seems to be pleased with depictions of him as a leader similar to the Great Kazak Khan Abilay. abilay, throughout the nineteenth century, had inspired the Kazaks to resist the economic and political changes imposed by the Russian tsarist colonial policy and was the leader not only of the Middle Horde but all of the Kazak Hordes.

It seems the Kazaks, especially the native intelligentsia, has realised that, although Kazakstan has reached independence rather smoothly without any bloody fighting and without long years of struggle, their real war of independence has started after December 1991. The main argument is how to get rid of the remnants of the Soviet legacy and to assert the new and genuine as well as the nationalistic policy of Kazak land regardless of a multi-ethnic society. Many of the vital issues regarding the future path of Kazakstan have also been brought to discussion in Kazakstan since 1994. As early as the 1994 election campaign, some parties in the republic even used some issues in order to win more votes particularly from the Russians as well as from those who were already assimilated to the Russian society and culture.

There are of course many different opinions on the future path of the republic. Many groups, including the well-known Kazak intellectual and the president of the Peoples Congress Party, as well as the Kazak Ambassador to Italy, Oljas Suleymenov, argue for the confederation of Kazakstan with Russia, and also for granting official status to the Russian language in the republic. Other arguments are concentrated on the privatization of Kazak land by selling or renting it to individuals as an extension of privatization of the state assets, as well as on granting double citizenship to the Russian population of the republic. At the same time, arguments in support of the Russians in the republic is based on the possibility of a civil war, and cautioning the Kazaks to refrain from conflict with the Russian Federation by displeasing the Russian citizens in the republic. It seems that there are some indigenous people who have forgotten their mother tongue and been assimilated into the Russian society, are supporting these kind of ideas. Among them, there are many native Kazaks who have not4 adapted themselves to the new circumstances psychologically, and who still feel strange about the idea of breaking away ties with the seventy-years-old Soviet legacy. According to some Kazak intellectuals, this group is the one that has unintentionally, and rather suddenly have lost their privileged positions when they were the staunch defenders of the now-disintegrated old order.5 Many Kazak intellectuals argued against these ideas and put forward counter arguments.

Kazak intellectuals, among them there are writers, poets, newspaper correspondents,

academicians, opposed the idea of granting double-citizenship to people in Kazakstan. This seems a protect of the Kazak state interest as opposed to the Russian interest, and according to the then Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev “Russia‟s national interest in „neighbouring territories‟ needed to be protected „with utmost firmness‟. Nazarbayev, on the other hand, has equated this statement with Hitler‟s ideas on the Sudeten question.6 However, there are, even among the ethnic Kazaks, arguments of keeping the Russians in the republic happy and allowing them to have whatever they

want, such as giving an official language status to the Russian language, double-citizenship to the Russian speaking lot. This group attempts further to scare the Kazaks by saying if Kazak government does not provide Russians with double-citizenship right and if the Kazak government does not grant an official status to Russian, the independence of Kazakstan will be threatened. This kind of threat might, according to their argument, come from two sides; first from the Russian government in Moscow with which Kazakstan still has very close ties and secondly from the Cossack groups settled in the area close to the Kazak-Russian border region. A counter argument to this from a Kazak intellectual claims that this is a mere clamour, and if Russia and the Russians are sensible enough not to bring any personality like Zhirinovsky to the political leadership of the federation, there will be no threat against Kazakstan.7 In addition to this, the author states, the Russian federation has enough trouble to keep stable and peaceful some twenty autonomous regions within its border, and it is nonsensical for Russia to attempt for further trouble to restore the old-already disintegrated empire, instead of trying to tackle the problems within the borders of the federation. Those times, writes one Kazak author, are already history in which one country would swallow another in front of the world public opinion. A giant country like Kazakstan, he says, whose flag is among the nations of the United Nations, and one which is diplomatically recognised and has economic ties with many countries of the world, is a huge piece not to be swallowed easily.8

There are two different opinions in the Kazak republic. The first is rather optimistic

on the future of the country as an independent entity, whose future is full of positive hopes, and the second depicts not only Kazakstan but the whole Central Asian states as weak countries that do not have enough means and strength to develop rapidly. The latter opinion considers Kazakstan as a country that became independent by chance, stemming from the sudden disintegration of the big empire. When the so-called „fashion of independence‟ ends, the group claims, things will return to their past shape in the republic. Therefore, as they claim, countries of the post-colonial world, do not have the strength to remain independent. As an example of this contention, they refer to the post-colonial turmoil in Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. However, the group does not bring any clarity to the sources of conflict in the above-mentioned areas.

There are also discussions in Kazakstan about a possible future alliance of the

republic with other countries. Such a discussion was carried out in an article, which entitled “Kazakstan Does Not Have A Future Without Russia”.9 The authors of the article attempted to give a geopolitical perspective and describe Kazakstan as a country on the periphery of the center, the area around Moscow and St. Petersburg. According to this opinion, Kazakstan is a landlocked area, and does not have a chance of opening to the outside world without Russia. Writers of the article refer also to the southern and eastern neighbouring countries of Kazakstan, namely Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, as well as China, and to the further south, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan as the region that has no hope of opening for the landlocked Kazak territory. Thus it was argued in the article, there is only one source, for Kazakstan to eliminate the negative effects of being a landlocked country, and that is Russia. If Russia agrees to help Kazakstan, it will save the country. Russia, the authors argue, can help Kazakstan for the sake of the Russian citizens in the republic, if not for the sake of Kazaks. If the Kazak government, they claim, mistakenly offends the Russian citizens in the republic,

Kazakstan‟s future will be similar to that of post-Colonial African countries. In the concluding part of the article, it has been foreseen by the authors, Masanov and Amirkulov, that in the first half of the next century Kazakstan will join Russia.

Oljas Suleymenov, writer of a much debated book, Az I Ya, and also one of the strongest initiator of anti-nuclear movement in Kazakstan against Soviet nuclear testing in the country, is another figure who has supported the idea of confederation of Kazakstan with Russia. He sees that confederation with Russia is the number one condition for Kazakstan‟s future and for Kazakstan‟s development. He seems to be inspired by the tendencies in Europe towards a debatable confederation of Europe.10

Another aspect that drew some of the so-called marginal Kazaks closer to the idea of confederation with Russia is the close economic ties between the Kazak republic and the Russian federation, which is another remnant of Soviet legacy. A counter argument by another Kazak intellectual, Aqselev Seydimbek is as follows:

Why should Kazakstan enter into confederacy with Russia? Is it because we

are neighbours? Kazakstan has other neighbours as well. Is it because 60-70 percent of Kazakstan‟s industrial and productive centers are dependent on Russia? Are not these the result of colonialist status of Kazakstan under the Soviet domination? Should not the real independence aim to get rid of this kind of dependency? We were in a confederation with Russia before (during the Soviet period). During that period about four million Kazaks died, not even a single Kazak intellectual or a leader died of natural causes. During the Soviet period, in the midst of the Kazak sea, 500 nuclear tests were conducted. During the Virgin Land Development, two million Slavic settlers were brought to Kazakstan among them there were 12,000 specially selected prostitutes. During this campaign, about one thousand Kazak schools were closed down... and about 40 percent Kazak youth have forgotten their own native language... Questions of confederation should not even come up for discussion. Neither confederation, nor a bloc, but Russia should remain as our mere neighbour.11

Another article also reacts against the idea of confederation and attacks Oljas Suleymenov for his support of it. The author describes the idea of confederation with Russia as something similar to “a man sleeping with an elephant”. The writer also refers to the US support of the official Kazak policy and suggests that “the new strategy of Kazakstan should include having good neighbourly and peaceful relations with China and Russia, but it should also emphasise good relations of Kazakstan with the USA.”12

Another argument which occupied the pages of the Kazak language media in

Kazakstan was about the still debated matter of granting the Kazak language official status. This matter was especially used during the election campaign earlier in 1994, and it was also made a motto for those who aimed to win the votes of Russian speaking people in the country. It has been reported by the Kazak media that “some „officious‟ politicians

were trying to instigate the Russians by saying “Kazak is the official language of the republic and there will not be any future for the children of Russians. Russians are suffering under such a threat.”13 As a reaction to this idea, in an open letter addressed to Oljas Suleymenov, Kazak intellectuals has stated the following:

Oljas, although you write in Russian, you are well aware of the problem that the real dilemma of the Kazak language is the compulsion which has forced the Kazaks to use Russian as their first language of the fact that the land on which they lived is the Kazak territory and this compulsion was forced onto Kazaks as a result of the communistic aggressiveness. Thus the Kazak language had to be replaced with the Russian and remained in the secondary position. If, as you propose, the language law should be discussed in the parliament and if there will be any legislation about an amendment to the language law, then the Russian language will be given official status, it will bring grave consequences with it. This kind of attempt will recude the Kazak language into secondary position again, and within the next 20-30 years, Kazak literature and the Kazak language will take its place among the archive materials of history. We do not like to see this kind of disaster. In Kazakstan, one cannot find any single Russian who has forgotten the Russian language but there are many Kazaks who have forgotten their native language. Kazaks have been Russified as a result of the communistic aggressiveness. Kazaks have become very close to the edge of losing their identity. For seventy-years, national consciousness was choked. In practice, Russian language is being continuously used in every phase of life and actually the Russian speaking fellows have no language difficulty. The only reason to give official status to the Kazak language was to improve the national consciousness of the Kazaks which was choked during the Soviet era. It was also necessary, in the first place, to urge the Kazaks themselves (who are forgetting their language in still increasing numbers). The main idea behind issuing the language law was this (the above-stated reasons), to be honest. Your (Oljas Suleymenov‟s) proposal about the revision of language law in the constitution might have grave consequences for the Kazak nation. Our call is directed not only to you but to the whole in the republic to be cautious in not making any mistake and adding more to the language dilemma of the Kazaks. The party you lead, the Peoples Congress Party and the candidates of the Socialist Party are using the language problem during the election campaign. This attempt might disturb the peaceful friendship among the nationalities in the republic and it might lead to great political turmoil or even might lead to bloody fighting. We would like to protect the people in Kazakstan from a danger of this kind. We are all against re-discussing the language section of the Constitution altogether.14

Another argument states that, in Kazakstan, all the official meetings and correspondence are carried out in the Russian language in practice. Eighty percent of all the news in radio and television stations use Russian. The number of newspapers and periodicals in Kazak is 252 as opposed to this, the number of periodicals and newspapers

in Russian is 331. The number of students that use Russian at school is 38 percent. However, there are almost no Russian student who go to Kazak schools. In Almaty, number of Kazak schools is 26, as opposed to this, the number of Russian schools in the capital is 93.15

In addition to all of these vital issues, in the Kazak media, a group of Kazak academicians, writers, and poets published a letter addressed to the President of the Republic. This letter asks Kazak President to honour the famous Kazak hero, Kenesary Kasimov, who was described as the famous Kazak state and military figure in the nineteenth century in Kazak history, a gifted diplomat of his age, the last khan of all the Kazaks, the leader of the most important national-liberation movement of the Kazaks. The letter also stated that:

the name of Kenesary has remained eternally in the history of struggle against colonial Russian policy. Kenesary, was a grandson of Abilay Khan, who united the three hordes of the Kazaks against Tsarist administration, and led the Kazaks to attempt to form an independent entity. Kenesary Kasimov also was described as a great reformist, gifted military leader and diplomat. The letter also claimed that (during the Soviet period) the name of Kenesary was abandoned, the movement led by him was described as feudalist-monarchist reactionary movement, and the people who wrote about him were persecuted and the books about him (Kenesary) were banned during the totalitarian administration. Only when the Kazak state became independent, Kenesary Khan was rehabilitated, his honour was restored, and his name began to be pronounced again among the Kazak national heroes. Many books began to be published about him, a big commemoration and many conferences devoted to his activities were organised. Despite all of these activities, making the name and memory of Kenesary eternal has not been completed. Many nations in the world gave honour to their national heroes, kings, presidents, and emperors by having their statues establishing eternally in the memory of the people and in their most prominent places in their countries. In the Kazakstan‟s capital,... there is no single monument or even a single statue established to the memory of the heroes who died for us (for Kazaks)16

This open letter is requesting official help and a decree from the President of the Republic, Nursultan

Nazarbayev, to support and finance the discovery and transportation of the graves of Kenesary and his

friends, who, in the nineteenth century, were killed during a battle with Kyrgyz manaps, traditional Kyrgyz

tribal leaders who had both religious and social authority, from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakstan. There is also

another request of establishing a horse-mounting statue of Kenesary placed in one of the squares in Almaty.

Most important of all the requests, there is one that is to name the military school (probably in Almaty) after

Kenesary Kasimov. This open letter is also significant because of the following idea: displaying respect,

states, the letter writers, after the name of Kenesary will fulfil a great duty in improving the patriotic feeling

of the youth and of the people. It will, they state further, help to consolidate the strength of the newly

independent state.

As it has been stated above in the article, the search for finding the most suitable

path for the future of Kazakstan is now turning towards a more nationalist inclination in the eyes of Kazak intellectuals. According to the efforts of the Kazak intellectuals, the youth in Kazakstan will grow up learning the struggle of their forefathers and of their former Khans against the colonialist Russian administration. This inspiration will especially be stronger in the memories of those future graduates from the Kazak military school, if Kenesary‟s name will be given to the institution. According to the wishes of a handful of Kazak intelligentsia, the writers, poets, correspondents, the Kazak language should remain as the sole official language, Kazaks should be given opportunity to restore the past wrongdoings of the previous administration, and the republic has to be protected by any outside as well as inside interference that will hinder the independence and free development. The republic of Kazakstan is the land of a multi-ethnic society, however, it should also be remembered that the real owners of the land are the Kazaks. The unsealable stampt of the Kazaks should be placed eternally right from the beginning of the independent era. Any attempt to force the newly independent Kazakstan into any kind of future commitment, economically and politically, especially of the kind that reminds the still lively memory of the Soviet experience is staunchly rejected by the Kazak intellectuals. This group of intellectuals are the representatives of the genuine culture of the Kazaks and they, in the Soviet period, were kept in their jobs for the sake of bringing colour to the multi-ethnic culture and literature of the Soviet society. They are the Kazak intellectuals who have not enjoyed the special privileges of being the party elite, but they were the preservers of an almost forgotten native culture. According to Oljas Suleymenov, these Kazak intellectuals were the “village teachers” of the Soviet period that, in Oljas‟s description, have no awareness of the movements and ideas of the world outside the Kazak village awyl, or the town.17 However, Suleymenov is ignoring another fact that these Kazak intellectuals are the genuine representatives of the Kazak lot, not of the Russian or Russian speaking and Russified or at least sovietised group. Ironically, according to the above-statement of even the most prominent Kazak writer, being Sovietised or being Russianized is equal to being modernised and being informative of the outside world. Indeed, the above idea is an apt description for most of the intellectuals lived during the Soviet era, the present day realities proves the opposite fact. That is to say, in the newly independent republics, opening to the outside world is not limited only to those intellectuals who won the favour of the party and the administration, and who gets the privilege of travelling throughout the world, like Oljas Suleymenov did during the Soviet era.

However, the last word is vested to the Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is an authoritarian leader and who seem, at least for now, have complete command and control of the republic‟s multi-ethnic groups. He is also in a very critical position having an official obligation to keep all the ethnic groups content in the republic. However, in the pages of Kazak language publications he seems to accept the description of himself as the Kazak leader similar to that of Abilay Khan. He also is a politician that

knows how to appeal to the unique national viewpoints of all the ethnic groups. When he talks to the Kazaks, he uses the age-old proverbs of the Kazaks and even refers to poems uttered during the time of Abilay Khan which definitely and always has a positive and supportive effect upon Kazaks regarding any policy of Nazarbayev. In an interview appeared in the pages of Kazak Adebiaty, Nazarbayev referred to a poem from the time of Abilay which describes the strategic concerns of the then Kazak leader in avery traditional Kazak way, in verses.18 For Nazarbayev, courting popular support among the Kazaks comes with emphasising his identification with the former Kazak khans. Will he be another great Abilay Khan of the Kazaks?, Will he be the successor to Kenesary Kasimov, and, will Nazarbayev be the political leader of Kazaks to complete the unfulfilled plans of Kenesary? are all yet to be seen in the future. Rehabilitation and gratification of the name and fame of Kenesary, as had been demanded from Nazarbayev by a number of Kazak intellectuals, will be the first clue for the future direction of the Kazak president. On the other hand, there is the problem of preserving the stability of the republic by appealing to the feelings of non-Kazak groups as well. In order “to keep the non-Kazaks happy” Nazarbayev used the 40th anniversary of thre Khrushchev‟s Virgin Lands scheme on February 25, to give a speech in the mainly Russian town of Aqmola. He spoke about the positive contribution made by the non-Kazaks to the country.19

When the current Russian nationalism is “borrowing its symbols, heroes and spirit from the Russian messianic nationalism used by the Tsarist regime throughout its expansionist existence,”20 it seems a natural inclination for Kazak intellectuals to stress the name of heroes who have voiced the national interests of the Kazaks in the past. There are also, in the Kazak politics, favourable and contrary currents, towards thwarting Russia‟s efforts to reesteablish the old status quo. The aim of the Kazak intellectuals is to support the struggle to strengthen independence and sovereignty and to use these to offset the concentration of the armed forces and economic power in Russia‟s hands. “The establishment of widespread foreign relations, securing international protection that comes with diplomatic recognition and ending political, cultural, scientific isolation”21 are the ideas supported by the native intellectuals as the necessary conditions for Kazakstan stepping towards a bright future.

Economic dependency of Kazakstan on the Russian federation is another reason for those to support ideas of confederation with Russia. The ideas of confederation means Kazakstan‟s submission to Russia politically and still more militarily which draws parallel with the idea of the Uzbek president Islam Karimov, who reportedly said that “Uzbekistan does not see a future for itself without Russia.”22 Karimov then also emphasised Russia‟s role as a guarantor in preserving stability and peace in the region. Fragility of stability in the region is of concern to all the leaders in the region. However, problems of forming a nation-state and its symbols as opposed to the former communist values is another dilemma for the regional leaders. Any attempt to realise this kind of aim will be hindered by “Russian troops stationed in Central Asia and in conjunction with economic and political means of influence, they will effectively assert Russian interest.”23

Above all these, it is necessary to understand the dilemma faced by the Kazaks in their effort to establish their genuine national independent country. Any attempt to realise this aim is to bound to certain conditions to be fulfilled in the near future. As early as the 1994, Kazakstan‟s Nursultan Nazarbayev was on the move to realise one of the most important conditions in establishing the cornerstones of independent Kazakstan. This is

the transfer of the Kazak capital from Almaty to Aqmola( meaning not white molla as it has been translated in Economic Intelligence Unit Report of 1994-1995, but white graveyard), a town in the north of Kazakstan whose Soviet name was Tselinograd and which has only 300,000 inhabitants consisting of 46 percent Russian and 23 percent Kazak.24 The most important reason of this kind of decision is to prevent ethnic Russian claims of annexing the northern part of Kazakstan into Russia. The area once even claimed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn as Russian territory consist of Qostanay(47 percent Russian, 18 percent Kazak), North Kazakstan(62 percent Russian, 19 percent Kazak), Kokchetav (40 percent Russian, 30 Kazak), Aqmola (46 percent Russian, 19 percent Kazak), Pavlodar (45 percent Russian, 30 percent Kazak), Qaragandy (53 percent Russian, 28 percent Kazak), and East Kazakstan (65 percent Russian and 28 percent Kazak). Although “this decision... blighted property prices in Almaty, infuriated the foreign community and worried reformers as to how the move be paid for.,”25 the Kazak president asked for Turkish help in moving the Kazak capital to Aqmola during a visit by Turkish president Suleyman Demirel to Kazakstan in June 12-14, 1995. According to Turkish daily Milliyet, Nazarbayev referring to the transfer of the Turkish capital from Istanbul to Ankara, has asked the Turkish high officials to give help in this vitally important move.26 If Turkey helps Kazakstan in realising this aim of moving the Kazak capital to Aqmola, it would certainly help Kazakstan in easing at least one problem of Kazakstan in its way towards independence, that is the Russian claim of annexing the northern part of Kazakstan into Russia, which is opposed by Kazaks, and which scares the world public opinion that this will bring a bloody ethnic clash between the ethnic Russians and Kazaks in this republic.

Kazak intellectuals fully support the policies of Nazarbayev in correcting some of the difficulties to which native Kazaks were subjected during the previous period. An Uighur writer in Kazakstan, Ziya Samedi, has congratulated Nazarbayev after the presidential referendum of extending his term to year 2000, by wishing him the same path as the first Turkish President and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.27 This is also interesting for the fact that the first Kazak president, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakstan is depicted by the Kazak intellectuals both as Abilay Khan of the Kazaks and as Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. However, these wishes will come true only when Nursultan Nazarbayev takes radical measures to meet the demands of the native Kazaks and form a balance between the demands of other ethnic groups in the republic. As Kazak constitution effectively allows only Kazaks to stand for presidency28, other Kazaks who are trying to meet the demands of non-Kazak groups in the republic, such as the poet and writer, Oljas Suleymenov or others might be possible future candidate to the presidency. The possibility of ethnically Kazak but linguistically and mentally Russified presidential candidates, such as Oljas Suleymenov will definitely make the non-natives happy. Being aware of this possibility, Kazak intellectuals and native Kazaks are supporting Nazarbayev and placing substantial responsibility on Nazarbayev‟s shoulders in maintaining the sovereignty and independence of the republic.

Another issue that Kazakstan cannot overcome solely by its own effort is to use effective means to sell its huge oil reserves to meet its economic needs. One obstacle to this is the need to change the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as an international one and the establishment of pipelines that will carry and sell the Kazak oil and gas to the outside

world. When the Turkish President Suleyman Demirel visited Kazakstan, the Kazak President has reportedly asked Turkish help on the international arena to support the Kazak case in defining Caspian Sea not as a lake which is so considered by other nations that have shores to the Caspian Sea, but as a sea to which international naval laws and principles can be applied.29

It is not only mere curiosity but a genuine wish of all freedom loving, democratic countries of the world to see Kazakstan as a democratic, free member of the world community of nations. However, the current uncertainties and emerging balance of power in the region, makes many hesitant in placing to much hope on the future of this newly independent republic.

END NOTES

1This article was prepared within the framework of a NATO institutional fellowship granted to the Department

of International Relations, Bilkent University. I avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks to NATO

and to Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu for his support in carrying out this project. I am also grateful to Assistant

Professor Nur Bilge Criss of Bilkent Universiry for editing this article.

2 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.65 and 67.

3 Economist Intelligence Unit-Country Report-First Quarter 1994, pp.40-52.

4Aytan Nusipqan, Odaqqa Barar Joldyng Oily-Shungqyry Kop, Kazak Adebiyaty No.32-33., 19 August 1994.,

p.3.,

5 ibid.

6 Uwe Halbach and Heinrich Tiller, „Russia and Its Southern Flank,‟ Aussen Politik, 11/94, pp.156-165.

7 Kabdesh Jumadilov,‟Bolashaqty Boljaganda,‟Kazak Adebiyaty, No.13, 1 April 1994, p.3. Jumadilov‟s idea has

been supported by western observers as well. EIU Country Risk Service First Quarter 1995, p.3 stated the

following:

Kazakstan‟s main problem will be the coming presidential elections in Russia. Kazakstan needs a candidate who

will continue present Russian policy to win. The most likely winner until now, and the best Russian president

from Kazakstan‟s point of view, has been Boris Yeltsin. However, his increasingly erratic behavior, as shown by

his bungled reshuffle and then the Chechenya operation, may have ruined his chances. The only other moderate

candidate planning to stand is the prime-minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin.The election of former Russian Vice-

President and putschist Aleksandr Rutskoi or the neo-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky would be disastrous. Both

would end democracy in Russia and scare away foreign investors. In addition, they would pressure Kazakstan to

concede more rights to the Russian minority.

8 Jumadilov, ibid

9 Nurbolat Masanov and Nurlan Amirkulov, ‟Kazakstan Does Not Have a Future Without Russia,‟Karavan,

Feb., 4, 1994, cited by Kabdesh Jumadilov in ibid.

10

Open Letter-to Oljas Suleymenov, poet, President of „Peoples Congress‟ Party”,Kazak Adebiyaty, No.4, 28

January 1994, p.2.

11

Aqselev Seydimbek,”Qalyqty Alangdatpayiq,”Kazak Adebiyaty, No.9, 4 March 1994, p.6.

12

Sheriyazdan Elevkenov,”Tatti Arman Kermek Tatymasyn Desek,” Kazak Adebiaty, No.14-15., 15 April 1994,

p.3.

13“

Open letter to Oljas Suleymenov,” ibid.

14

ibid.

15

Aqselev Seydimbek, ibid.

16

”Open Letter to the President of the Republic of Kazakstan, N.A. Nazarbayev,” Kazak Adebiaty, No.2, 14

January 1994, p.3.

17

Oljas Suleymenov,”Bizding Muratymyz Tagy da Sol-Tawlardy Alasartpai Dalany Asqaqtatuv,”Kazak

Adebiaty, No.7, 18 Febraury 1994, pp.6-7.

18

”Elding Jayi meni qatty mazalaidy,”Kazak Adebiaty, No.37, 16 September 1994, pp.2-3.

Bilay barsang Kokang bar, salmaq salyp qoqangdar,

Bilay barsang Qalmaq bar, kushingdi eppen almaq bar,

Bilay barsang Kitay bar, japyragyngdy butay bar,

Bilay barsang Orys bar, bala berseng qonys bar.

This poem refers to the strategic concerns of the Kazak state during the time of Khan Abilay, which was

surrendered by the Khanate of Khokand in the south, by the Mongols in the east, by the Chinese in the further

south-east, and by Russia in the north and west, of which all of these should be handled with great caution.

19

Economist Intelligence Report, ibid., p.42.

20

Kemal Karpat,”The Socio-political Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of Central Asian States,”

Paper submitted to the SAIS, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1994.

21

ibid

22

Bogdan Szajkowski(et.al), Encyclopedia of Conflicts; Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia

and the Successor States, London, 1993., p.445.

23

Uwe Halbach and Heinrich Tiller, ibid, p.163.

24

EIU, 1994-1995, p.68.

25

ibid.

26

”Nazarbayev‟e Is Listesi,”Milliyet, 14, Haziran 1995.

27

Ziya Samedi,”Halkynga Qydyr, Elinge Qyzyr Bol,” Kazak Adebiaty, No.10, 2 June 1995, p.1.

28

EIU, Country Risk Service, 1st Quarter 1995, p.3.

29

Please see Milliyet, ibid. Still another demand put forward by the Kazak President to the visiting Turkish

delegation on June 12-14, 1994 was Turkish help in giving credit to Kazakstan in improving Kazak agriculture.

TURKMENİSTAN, LAND OF TRIBES, OIL AND GAS

Meryem KIRIMLI

Turkmenistan is a country of 4,5 million people, whose most important feature is of

being one of the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union. It has still some remnants of its

pre-Soviet nomadic origin and of its Soviet past. It is a country that only at the beginning of

this century, have been forced to accept the Bolshevik power. The defeat of the struggle of

their famous Cuneyd Khan together with Nurberdi Khan, Derdimurat Khan, Oraz Serdar,

Dikma Serdar and Gara Batir with the Red Army are still in the memories of the present

Turkmen citizens.1 After being under the Soviet rule for about 70 years , it has declared its

independence in October 1991. Since then, this new member of the international community

is gradually adjusting to become a free and independent nation on the world scene, by

forming official diplomatic and economic ties with other nations.

Turkmenistan is a land where gas and water were provided free of charge2 and

unemployment is nonexistent. Average wage is around ten US dollars. This country has huge

natural gas and oil reserves as well as a small population which could live well off if this

country would ever find ways to sell its natural resources to the outside world.

Turkmenistan's annual gas production is 84 million cubic meters and this makes it the world's

fourth largest gas producer behind the USA, Canada, and Russia. It's annual oil production

is 5.4

million tones and cotton production reaches 1.4 million tones a year.3

Another peculiarity that gives Turkmenistan a different feature is its president

Saparmurad Niyazov, an old Communist Party member who now seems to have

turned into a dictator or became the new Shah or the "new Sheikh of the

Kara Kum Desert Sheikhdom". Saparmurad Niyazov has established a cult of

personality in a traditionally nomadic country by calling himself Turkmenbashi ,

head of Turkmens, and by renaming ports, streets, squares, international airports after

his name.4 There are also criticism of Niyazov's policy of building hotels, palaces,

luxury homes and monuments while meat, sugar, butter, rice and vegetable oil are

rationed and infant mortality rate is 94 to 1000.5 In March 1990, Turkmen Supreme

Soviet heavily dominated by the Communist Party elected Niyazov as the Chairman to

the Supreme Soviet Presidium. On October 26, 1990, Niyazov appeared as the only

candidate to the post of presidency and won 98.3 percent of the votes cast in the

election. In order to improve his chances, Niyazov has raised the pensions and

allowances for large families and went to pilgrimage to Mecca right before the

elections took place.

During the Soviet period, Turkmenistan was also known as the most isolated and the

poorest among the fifteen republics. In addition to this, it has environmental problems as well.

Turkmenistan suffers from acute water shortage and only two-and-a-half percent of its land is

arable. Furthermore, this country suffers from man made calamities such as overuse of

pesticides and fertilisers that have heavily polluted the agricultural land, and even the

populated areas.

As for the people, Turkmens are historically been a rural and nomadic community of

people and thus traditions and customs still play an important role in their social life. During

the Soviet period and even after independence, there are reports of tribal values dominating

even political life in the country. According to an internationally famous expert of the region,

"Tribal affiliation and loyalty are more important than any national sense of cohesion. A

distinct tribe called Teke has tended to dominate the political scene, including the Communist

Party."6 Tribal bonds are so strong that an individual Turkmen prefers to give his loyalty first

to his extended family than to his clan and than to his tribe rather than to the state.7 This

strong tribal loyalties are very likely to hinder attempts to make the Turkmens a nation.

Albeit being all former Communist Party apparatchiks, Turkmen officials seem to

have well understood the importance of the maintenance of their newly acquired independent

status. According to a military analyst "protection of independence and strengthening of that

independence is the most crucial security interest of Turkmenistan today."8 Furthermore,

Turkmenistan wants to build CIS relations on the basis of bilateral relations rather than on the

basis of surrendering powers, once again, to a central authority which would threaten this new

state's independence. It seems that the leaders of Turkmenistan will try to do their best to

enhance their own independence and maintain independent statehood. This however, will not

necessarily pave the way for the democratisation of the regime.

Senior Turkmen officials also seems to have quickly adjusted themselves to their

country's new status. The idea of restoration of the old system does not seem easy and

acceptable for them as well. Muhammed Galandarov, a high official in the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs says that recentralization of the CIS is impossible and any attempt to move in

this political direction will be assessed as a step backward in history.9 This view has been

confirmed by a Russian academician who states that "The Islamic states of the CATR(Central

Asian and Transcaucasian Region) have begun to develop as sovereign entities and will be

persuing such policies so as not to become dependent upon any foreign power." Among them

Turkmenistan is particularly more 'isolationist' towards the idea of CIS integration and

probably thus it has preferred not to sign the Collective Security Treaty with Russia.10

Another expert states the following: "In line with its policy of steering clear of multi-national

treaties, Turkmenistan did not join the Collective Defence Treaty that was established at the

CIS summit in mid-May in Tashkent. It was the only Central Asian state to stay out. Equally,

in line with its policy of developing bilateral relations, it signed a three-year military

cooperation agreement with Russia on June 8, (1992)."11

Interpretations differ to explain this

policy of Turkmenistan. Some have referred to the pre-Soviet, Russo-Turkmen clash during

the Bolshevik maintenance of power in the 1920s. Memories of those pre-Soviet years seems

to be one of the factors for Turkmens "in determining the future of an independent

Turkmenistan's relations with Russia. This factor has much to do with recent statements by

President Niyazov that Turkmenistan would not cooperate with the CIS or with any Central

Asian economic cooperation."12

The continuing flow of the Turkmen natural resources to the old center, Russia,

without any payment was the other dilemma of this newly independent republic to have strict

control of its relations with the members of the former union. Economic difficulties of this

new state have increased due to the unpaid gas bills of the former union members as Ukraine

and Uzbekistan. For example, the question of a fair market price for oil and above all, natural

gas has set Turkmenistan against Ukraine.13

President Niyazov have used such matters quite

well in gaining the support of the Turkmen population during the first presidential election

campaign. He stated that, with Turkmenistan's gas and oil wealth his government would turn

the republic into another Kuwait.14

Political Opposition

Same as all the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union,

Turkmenistan is also administered by the old Communist Party men and no opposition party

is allowed to be active in the republic. Many who became the deputies to the 1990 Supreme

Soviet of Turkmenistan chaired by Saparmurad Niyazov, still run the country. Avdy Kuliyev,

the former Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan has recently stated the following;

Our president, in order to secure his position, has resurrected the divide-and-

conquer approach and appoints a certain number of officials from each

tribe..For the past decade; Turkmenistan's destiny has been shaped by one man

with the result that the country has made minimal progress towards

democratisation.15

Many in the west held their breath when the first informal group Agzybirlik (unity)

was formed by some 600 academics and intellectuals in 1989. However, later Turkmen

authorities forced the newly formed Democratic Front Party of Turkmenistan to hold its

first congress in Moscow because the meeting was banned in Ashkhabad in October 1991.16

The reason to the suppression of the opposition was given as the pressing need of political

unity by the current Turkmen officials. It seems that concentration on nation building and

consolidation of the Turkmen independence is given priority over democratisation.17

In other

words, in the eyes of the Turkmen officials and administrators, having a multi-party system

seems equal to social and political anarchy in the country, and they feel insecure and

immature yet to tackle with the intricacy of a multi-party system in Turkmenistan.

Religion

Despite Turkmenistan being geographically closest to the most fundamentalist Islamic

country in the area, it has been predicted that religion will not follow a fanatical path though

its visibility will increase. Same as in the other Central Asian states, Islam is viewed as part of

the native tradition to be restored along with Turkmen national dignity and the culture of the

republic. Turkmen traditions found wide practice particularly in the areas such as the Kara

Kum desert and survived to certain extent there even during the Soviet period.18

Prayer and

fasting are strictly observed in the countryside in Turkmenistan as well. Although Islam is

getting stronger in the area, a fanatical or a so-called fundamentalist Islamic regime is

unlikely to develop in the country.

Turkmen-Russian Relations

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all fifteen republics of the Soviet Empire

faced difficult questions in matters of rearranging their relations with their former union

members. It was particularly difficult for Russia, as the old center, to simply let the former

peripherial countries to fully enjoy their easily achieved independence. Russia has difficulty

in simply withdrawing from the so-called near abroad specifically for three major reasons.

The first and the most important of these is security. Russia is sensitive to the so-called threats

of Islamic fundamentalism surrounding its southern frontier. The second reason is the nuclear

weapons which involved Kazakstan only. The third was the Russian interest of controlling

transport lines to the West, Middle East and the Far East.19

Any possible political change that is to occur in Central Asia also gives concern to the

Russian government and with this new fact, Russia has discovered that, it was also vulnerable

to the effects of the changes in the area. The causes of Russian susceptibility to the area are

not limited to security and political change. There is another significant factor. Russia is

dependent upon the resource rich Central Asia economically as well. Free flow of Central

Asian oil, gas, cotton, minerals and other materials to the West and the free world would have

deprived the old center from its previous advantages.

Turkmen-Turkish Relations

Historically and linguistically one of the closest nations to the Turkmens is considered

to be the Turks of Turkey. Yet the two brotherly nations had not have close contact until after

the Soviet disintegration in early 1990s. However, Turkish-Turkmen relations have started

with very high expectations right after the Turkmen declaration of independence in 1991.

Both sides indicated their enthusiasm to establish close contact yet not realising the unique

features and differences of each side. Turkey, as an independent nation which has longer

tradition of democratic life than the newly independent Turkic nations of Central Asia and the

Caucasus, was lacking the vital institutions of researching, studying, and observing their long-

forgotten brothers in the area. Both on academic and on official level, number of specialists of

the area was very few if not totally non-existent. Even the historical and linguistical features

of the area was unknown to many in Turkey. Due to the lack of enough trained personnel in

Turkmen and in Russian, communication difficulties occurred many times during official

meetings. Despite all of these obstacles, during the years of 1990-1992, about 21 agreements

and protocols have been signed by different Turkish and Turkmen administrative organs on

the areas ranging from education, culture, sports, health and medicine, science,

communication, economic and trade cooperation.20

Turkish side also have proposed to build

small scale factories ranging from production of fertilisers and many other chemical materials,

production and processing of fruits, vegetables, and baby food, improvement of textile

industry to building of cement factories. In addition to this, big projects such as construction

of natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey through Iran as well as construction of

Tecen-Serahs railway(130km. ) and Karancik-Tvarkir railway(150 km. ) was proposed by

Turkey.21

Turkish trade firms have faced problems of communication, transportation,

financial difficulties, difficulties of barter trading, and thus seem not to be very eager to take

risks in working in this newly independent country. However, on the areas of construction and

textile, very few number of Turkish firms reached success. There are about 28 Turkish firms

actively working in Turkmenistan.22

Turkmen-Iranian Relations

Geographically, Iran enjoys an advantageous position compared to other neighbouring

Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey in improving its relations with

Turkmenistan. Iran shares the Caspian Sea with Turkmenistan and it provides Central Asian

countries with the shortest route to international markets. Historically, Iran or rather Persian

influence have taken deep root in the area where Turkmenistan lies today. In addition to this,

more than one million Turkmen live in Iran and seek solution to be united or at least to be in

close contact with their kins and relatives across the border. Iran's recognition of the

independence of Turkmenistan and establishment of diplomatic relations with the Ashkhabad

Government was the beginning of strengthening and expanding its influence in the republic.

Iran's location as a line of supply and communications if not only transport helped it to

develop economic relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia. As the most

convenient way to reach outside world, it is logical for Central Asian countries to establish

ties with Iran. Construction of the Turkmen-Iranian Tecen-Serahs-Mashhad railway is

described as the "golden link" of the trans-Asian transport line. At the same time, Turkmen

officials are also seeking to turn the country into a Eurasian transport center as well as

restoration of Turkmenistan's historical status as a country which situated at the crossroads of

the world. According to the Turkmen Ambassador to Russia, " The direct connection of the

steel lines of Russia, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran with the East Caspian Astrakhan-

Yeraliyev-Bekdash-Turkmenbashi-Bendery-Torkemen(Iran) railway will be of international

significance."23

On the other hand, Iran also seems hopeful to improve relations with other

Central Asian countries by opening rail and other transport links between Teheran and

Ashkhabad. Leaders of both countries have already visited each other's capital several times

and signed friendship and cooperation agreements. Iran offered Turkmenistan economic aid,

particularly by ensuring access of Turkmen gas and cotton to world markets.

On 22 January 1996, President Niyazov visited Iran and the leaders of both countries

discussed regional affairs, such as Caspian Sea, the ECO and the security of the entire region.

As it is known, work on both sides are in progress to complete the joint rail link project.

During Niyazov's visit, Iranian president Rafsanjani told that with the effort of both countries

world will witness the revival of the Silk Road from Iran to Turkmenistan.24

Later in

April(1996), head of the two countries and many others invited to the area have witnessed the

opening of Mashhad-Serahs-Tecen railroad. This new railway line gave hope to other Central

Asian countries in breaking their landlocked position in reaching the outside world. A report

about the ceremony indicates that the inauguration of this railways linking Turkmenistan to

Iran would give the whole Central Asian republics access to world markets.25

Turkmen-Pakistani Relations

Pakistan has showed great interest in establishing new ties in Central Asia. As one of

the Islamic countries in the region, Pakistan tried to establish commercial ties and thus tried to

follow a dynamic policy to be influential in the region. Cotton prices is low in Central Asia

compared to the world market. However, production of raw Turkmen cotton needs Russian

help. Pakistan thus has offered increasing help to the countries in the region. For example, on

15 March 1996, Pakistani Foreign Minister visited Turkmenistan and held talks with

President Niyazov. They agreed to boost bilateral cooperation and to speed up shipments of

Turkmen cotton to Pakistan in exchange for 10,000 tones of wheat.26

Although Pakistan does

not lack geopolitical ambitions, it is not likely that it will be a par to Iran in the region.

Turkmen-Pakistani relations, at least for the time being, seems limited only to commercial

interest.

Turkmen-Uzbek Relations

The problem of sharing Central Asia's water resources and territorial issues have the

biggest potential to damage Uzbek-Turkmen relations in the future, if not immediately.

Uzbeks are reported to have territorial ambitions on the Turkmen side of the border which is

inhabited by some 300,000 Uzbeks. At the same time, both sides suffer from the problems of

water sharing in the area, where it is the most important environmental dilemma in the region.

Drinking water is an important problem for Turkmenistan and it relates to the dessication of

the Aral Sea as well. Turkmens claim that Uzbeks pollute the Amu Darya river and have to

pay for it or compensate it by other kind of friendly manner.

Conclusion

Turkmenistan is now an independent country and thus is subjected to international law

and principles. There are discussions, at least on the academic level, whether these newly

independent countries of the old Soviet Empire will adjust themselves to the new situation.

However, along with other CIS states, Turkmenistan also suffers from the problems inherited

by the old Soviet system of administration. Environmental calamities, transport and economic

matters, problems of security as well as problems of adjustment to the new situation as an

independent state all are waiting to be solved. Most important of all, transition to democracy

is hindered by the current political leadership in the republic, and it is unlikely that it can take

place in the short term. The country's tribal, social structure constitutes another obstacle to

democratisation. Nevertheless, despite all the adverse circumstances, the present regime in

Turkmenistan is making successful attempt to gradually consolidate the independent

statehood.

END NOTES

1 Esedullah Oguz,"Dunden Bugune Turkmenistan,"YeniFORUM, Haziran 1996, pp.23-28.

2 Charges for electricity has been introduced in Turkmenistan since July 1996. Please see the SWB Report of

July 22, 1996, SU/2670 G/4.

3 Phillip Petersen,"Central Asian Security,"European Security, Vol.4, No.1(Spring 1995), p.193. Please also see

Steve Levine,"Palaces and Poverty in Central Asia," Washington Post, 11 November 1994

4 Ibid.

5 Alan Coopedman,"Big Dreams, Instatiable Ego in Turkmenistan," FF056, 30 May 1994, A report of an AP

correspondent from Ashkhabad. RFE/RL Turkmen Service archive.

6 Graham Fuller,"Central Asia: The New Geopolitics," RAND/R-4219-USDP, p.67.

7 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia,Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.200.

8 Petersen, p.184

9 Ibid.

10

Vitaly Naumkin, "The Political and Security Linkages Between the Gulf and the Muslim States of CATR,"

From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, Edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Exeter:

University of Exeter, 1994, p.207.

11

Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia, London: Harper Collins

Publishers, 1994., p. 148.

12

Ahmed Rashid, p.194

13

Grigory Bondarevsky and Peter Ferdinand, "Russian Foreign Policy and Central Asia," in New Central Asia

and Its Neighbors, edited by Peter Ferdinand, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p.521. 14

Ahmed Rashid, p.198.

15

"There is Only One Way out-by Getting Rid of This Leader and This Government," Transition, 17 May 1996,

pp.34-38.

16

Ahmed Rashid, p.196.

17

Dilip Hiro, p.200.

18

Ahmed Rashid, p.200.

19

Grirory Bodarevsky and Peter Ferdinand, Pages, 43, 51, and 52.

20

T.C. Milli Egitim Bakanligi: Talim Terbiye Kurulu Baskanligi-Turk Cumhuriyetleri ve Turk Topluluklari

Dairesi., Turkiye ile Turk Cumhuriyetleri ve Turk Topluluklari Arasinda Yapilan Anlasmalar, Iliskiler ve

Faaliyetler, Birinci Kitap, Ankara, 1993.,pp.343-436.

21

T.C. Disisleri Bakanligi, Turkmenistan Ulke Raporu, Turk Isbirligi ve Kalkinma Ajansi Yayinlari, No.7.,

Ankara, 1994., p. 47 and 48.

22

Ibid., p.49.

23

"Turkmenistan: Future Eurasian Transportation Crossroads," An Interview with the Turkmen Ambassador to

Russia appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 May 1996, FBIS Translated text,FBIS-SOV-96-126-S, 28 June

1996, p.103.

24

SWB, SU/2517,G/3, 24 Jan. 1996.

25

SWB, SU/2591, G/2, 20 April 1996.

26

SWB, SU/2564 G/1 19 march 1996.

Dr. H. Bülent OLCAY**

Introduction

Idealistically, shared natural resources must not be a source of conflict but

springs of benefit and peace. Assuming that water is inevitably related to conflict and

suggesting that Middle Eastern states inevitably turn their water problems into

political disputes, is a negative approach. It seems to prevent local and international

actors from seeking settlements. The consequent deficiency of established international

law on the uses of trans-boundary streams presents a primary obstacle in the

settlement of differences, with the result that progress in development is often held up

for years, to the loss, not only of the concerned countries, namely Turkey, Syria and

Iraq, but of the economy of the world in general.i

In the absence of a formal body of clear and enforceable law to which nations

assent to, resolution of water disputes depends on the negotiation of treaties among

riparian countries. Nevertheless, despite the gloomy picture in the world, and

particularly in the Middle East, there have recently been a successes on this front. The

most notable achievement is the “Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses

of International Watercourses,”i signed in April 1997, which had its origins in works

of a number of commissions that drafted it

years before. Only time will prove, though, whether it will work and be signed by

considerable number of countries who already put amendments to some articles of the

Convention. Turkey, Syria and Iraq are amongst them.

Every state must, in the exercise of its sovereignty, consider the needs of the

neighbouring state. Thus, it is now generally admitted that a state may use the waters

of an international watercourse system flowing through its territory, provided that

such use does not cause an unreasonable injury to the interests of other basin states. If

such undue prejudice is occasioned, the state causing it incurs international

responsibility. It is generally thought that international responsibility comes into play

only if the injury is „significant‟, „appreciable‟, „serious‟, „grave‟, „considerable‟ or

„substantial‟.

While regional and international legal mechanisms can reduce water-related

tensions, these mechanisms have never received the support or attention necessary to

resolve many conflicts over water. Indeed, as Gleick points out, there is a growing

evidence that “existing international water law may be unable to handle the strains of

ongoing and future problems.”i In this connection, the work of UN organisations, such

as those which International Law Association (ILA) and International Law

Commission (ILC), is most welcome and have without question been contributed to the

resolution of existing disputes and the avoidance of future controversies.

Since 1959 the ILC has been drafting principles on the non-navigational use of

rivers. Some international organisations i.e., the World Bank, several UN agencies

and the European Union, have an active interest in water projects particularly in the

Middle East. Nevertheless, their perception of the issues and concerned interests differ

to some extent from those of the states concerned. Conceivably, the analysis of a

conflict resolution among riparians of a shared river basin requires definitions of the

most frequently used terms, together with examination of the evolution of the law

which generates them.

I. The Origins of the 1997 Convention

The problems of international rivers have interested associations of international

law and individual jurists since the beginning of the twentieth century. The study of the

subject was included on the program of the Institute of International Law in 1910. The

following year saw the adoption of the Madrid Resolutioni on the uses of international

rivers. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the trend toward international

cooperation in the utilisation of non-maritime waters was demonstrated by the

adoption of the two only existing general multilateral conventions concerning the

utilisation of international rivers. These conventions were concluded in the framework

of two conferences on the freedom of communication and transit convoked by the

League of Nations in 1921 and in 1923; they concern, respectively, navigational and

agricultural uses.

In 1956, the International Law Association of United Nations (ILA) published

the Dubrovnik rules for international rivers.i In 1959, Bolivia introduced a resolution

in the UN General Assembly which requested the Secretary-General to prepare a

report on laws related to international rivers. Thus, a resolutioni recommended that

preliminary studies should be carried out on the problems associated with the

development and use of international rivers in order to determine whether these could

be codified. In response, the UN Secretary-General submitted two reports in 1963.

Although the works of both the ILA and ILC needs to be evaluated in detail, I will

simply outline here the ways in which controversies on the basic terminology have

contributed to a confusion of prospects for an accommodating framework. Therefore,

before further analysis of the works of the ILC, its Draft Articles and the Convention,

it is necessary to evaluate the work of the ILA in its course.

A. The Works of the ILA

a. The 1956 Dubrovnik Rules

Its committee on “the uses of the waters of international rivers” submitted its

first report in 1956.i The ILA, at its meeting in August 1956 at Dubrovnik,

unanimously adopted a statement of principles “as a sound basis upon which to study

further the development of rules of international law with respect to international

rivers.”

Acceptance of these or substantially similar principles by the parties to

international water disputes might do much to aid adjustment and agreement. The

principlesi are as follows:

i. An international river is one which flows through or between the territories of

two or more states.

ii. A state must exercise its rights over the waters of an international river within

its jurisdiction in accordance with the principles stated below.

iii. While each state has sovereign control over the international rivers within its

own boundaries, the state must exercise this control with due consideration for its

effects upon other riparian states.

iv. A state is responsible, under international law, for public or private acts

producing change in the existing regime of a river to the injury of another state, which

it could have prevented by reasonable diligence.

v. In accordance with the general principle stated in No (iii) above, the states

upon an international river should (in terms of reaching agreements, and states or

tribunals in settling disputes), weigh the benefit to one state against the injury done to

another through a particular use of the water. For this purpose, the following factors,

among others, should be taken into consideration:

(a) The right of each to a reasonable use of the water;

(b) The extent of the dependence of each state upon the waters of that river;

(c) The comparative social and economic gains accruing to each and to the

entire river community;

(d) Pre-existent agreements among the states concerned;

(e) Pre-existent appropriation of water by one state.

vi. A state which proposes new works (construction, diversion, etc.) or change of

previously existing use of water which might affect utilisation of the water by another

state must first consult with the other state. In case agreement is not reached through

such consultation, the states concerned should seek the advice of a technical

commission; and if this does not lead to agreement, recourse should be made to

arbitration.

vii. Preventable pollution of water in one state which does substantial injury to

another state renders the former state responsible for the damage done.

viii. So far as possible, riparian states should join with each other to make full

utilisation of the waters of a river, both from the viewpoint of the river basin as an

integrated whole, and from the viewpoint of the widest variety of uses of the water, so

as to assure the greatest benefit to all.

The report recommended a statement of principle providing, inter alia, for the

application of the “sic utere tuo” maxim, for the responsibility of a state for every act

affecting the waters of an international river to the injury of another state which it could have

prevented with due attention. After a long debate, the Association, by committing the

reference to the maxim, retained the clause about state responsibility. With the later

enlargement of the committee, it produced a unanimous statement of four agreed principles of

international law and ten agreed recommendations which were adopted in 1958.

b. The 1966 Helsinki Rules

The most comprehensive and accepted study until the ILC draft was completed

by the ILA, was the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.i

International organisations have attempted to derive more general principles and new

concepts governing shared fresh water resources. The ILA‟s Helsinki Rules of 1966

(since modified) and the work of the ILC are among the most important examples. A

resolution in the UN General Assembly on laws for international watercourses

suggested that the Helsinki Rules should be considered as a model. The Sixth

Committee of the UN discussed this proposal. While the Committee felt that the subject

of international watercourse law was important, three reservations on the Helsinki

rules surfaced.

First, the rules had been formulated by a professional organisation which did not

represent nation-states. Second, some countries such as Ethiopia argued that since

nations had not participated in preparing the Helsinki Rules, adoption of these rules

as a model could preclude new considerations on this complex issue. Therefore, she

did not want to preempt fresh consideration on the topic. Greece, on the other hand,

argued that privileging the Helsinki Rules might hamper the work of the ILC. The

third, and probably most important reservation was expressed on the fact that the

Helsinki Rules advocated a „drainage basin‟ framework. Countries like Brazil,

Belgium, China and France felt such an approach could be a potential threat to

national sovereignty.i In contrast, Finland and the Netherlands described the drainage

basin framework as the most rational and scientific approach. Some countries

considered that the problem of international river basins was so diverse that

codification was not a feasible approach.i At that stage the USSR and the US took

mildly supportive and negative positions.

In the end, the Sixth Committee deleted all references to the Helsinki Rules, and

the topic was referred to the ILCi where it has been on the agenda ever since. The first

report in 1974 revived the idea that the river basin was the appropriate basis for

international agreements.i Whereas Iraq firmly opposed, Syria and Turkey remained

non-respondent to the ILC Surveys on the drainage basin framework between 1976

and 1982.i

The concept of “international river” has been described in the Comment (a) of

Article II of the Helsinki Rules,i “historically, the concern regarding use of an

international river was almost completely for navigation, and there was little necessity

for dealing with any portion of an international drainage basin other than the

navigable channel of the stream.” The comment further states that “with the relatively

recent multi-use development of international rivers, the concern ...encompasses all

waters included in the entire system comprising the international drainage basin.”

Accordingly, the international drainage basin is defined as “an indivisible

hydrologic unit which requires comprehensive consideration in order to effect

maximum utilisation and development of any portion of its waters; ...a geographical

area extending over two or more states determined by the watershed limits of the

system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common

terminus.” The ILA intensified this expanded definition by declaration that “a system

of rivers and lakes in a drainage basin should be treated as an integrated whole.‟‟

The terminology has changed several times, with the old term „international

river‟ converted into „international river basin,‟ „international river system,‟

„international drainage basin,‟ „international watercourse,‟ and „international

watercourse system.‟ The works of the ILA on the definition and principles regarding

the use of the waters of international rivers have been a turning point in the progress

of international river law.

The Rules embodies elaborate “procedures for the prevention and settlement of

disputes” in Chapter Six. To prevent and resolve differences arising out of the utilisation of

the waters of international rivers, Article XXXI comes to terms:

“If a question or dispute arises which relates to the present or future utilisation

of the waters of an international drainage basin, it is recommended that the basin

states refer the question or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the agency

to survey the ....basin and to formulate plans or recommendations for the fullest and

most efficient use thereof in the interests of all such states.”

The Resolution declared that, “each basin state is entitled ...to a reasonable and

equitable share in the beneficial use of the water of an international drainage basin.”i

„Reasonable and equitable‟ share is to be determined taking into account various

relevant factors and amongst them, is “the past utilisation of the waters of the basin

including in particular existing utilisation.”i

The comment attached to this article states: “no factor has a fixed weight nor

will all factors be relevant in all cases. Each factor is given such weight as it merits

relative to all other factors. And no factor occupies a position of pre-eminence with

respect to any other factor.” It has been made clear that a present reasonable use may

not be sacrificed to “reserve for a co-basin state a future use of such waters.” Article

VIII contained more specific provisions regarding the existing use, expressed in the

following words:

An existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the factors

justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion

that it be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.

A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational

it is incompatible with an already existing reasonable use.

In the comment, it was said that if it is accepted that prior use confers a vested

right, then such inference may deny the “dynamic character of water development”

and freeze it. At the same time, failure to give any weight to existing use can only serve

to inhibit river development because it would discourage states to invest large capital

for the lack of effective legal protection. It went on to say that

“the rule stated in this Article reflects the current international attitude in this

matter, a middle ground between the two extremes. It gives protection to an existing

use but only so long as the factors justifying its continued existence are not outweighed

by factors showing the desirability of its modification or termination ...There may also

be instances where an existing use will be „phased out‟ over a period of time in order

to give the user the opportunity to develop alternative sources of water.”

The article purports to compromise the possible disputes regarding the status of

existing use. It also states that when the operation of one use is incompatible with an

earlier use, the former is not considered as existing use under the Resolution.i It

seems, therefore, that when conflict arises between two existing uses, the earlier use

will acquire the status of existing use even if the later one is more reasonable. The lack

of broadness is unavoidable because of the unique features which every river system

possesses and the diversity of purposes which each is required to serve. So the

contributions of various bodies have sufficiently reflected the principles, and their

implementations in individual cases are left in the good hands of those responsible for

resolving them.

In 1976, the Committee of the ILA on “International Water Resources Law”

produced a set of draft articles on international water resources administration, which

was approved by the ILA. The first Article defines the term “international water

resources administration,” and the first paragraph of the second Article states: “With

a view to implementing the principle of equitable utilisation of the waters of an

international drainage basin and consistent with the provisions of Chapter VI [of the

Helsinki Rules], the basin states concerned and interested should negotiate in order to

reach agreement on the establishment of an international water resources

administration.”i

c. The 1977 Mar del Plata Action Plan

In 1977, the UN Water Conference considered in great detail the implications

of various forms of water use at national, regional and global levels and drew up the

Mar del Plata Action Plan.i The Conference adopted a report which contains similar

inspirations and rules to regulate trans-frontier detrimental acts. The relevant

recommendations of the Conference, which constitute part of the Mar del Plata Action

Plan, state that cooperation is necessarily required in the case of shared water

resources and that:

“Such cooperation ...must be exercised on the basis of the equality, sovereignty

and territorial equality of all states, and taking due account of the principle expressed,

inter alia, in principle 21 of the [Stockholm] declaration.”i

At the Conference, numerous recommendations stated and suggested the need for

institutional water resources management including management at the regional or

international level. It stressed the importance of the establishment of necessary

organisations as a basis for cooperation. Recommendation 85 of the Action Plan

obliges that countries sharing water resources, “on the request of the countries

concerned ...co-operate in the establishment of programs, machinery and institutions

necessary for the co-ordinated development of such resources.”i The Conference

adopted a special resolution on “River Commissions,” recommending that the

Secretary General of the UN prospect, “the possibility of organising meetings between

representatives of existing international river commissions involved that have

competence in the management and development of international waters, with a view

to developing a dialogue between the different river basin organisations on potential

ways of promoting the exchange of their experiences.”i The first meeting of

international river commissions and interested countries was held in Dakar, 1981.i

The meeting concluded, in part, that “in view of the hydrologic unity of the drainage

basins, it would be desirable that integrated development programs be drawn up and

possibly executed at the basin level by recognised agencies. Where this approach is

not viable, co-ordination of the activities of the various agencies concerned should be

sought.” The conclusion further sets out the composition, functions and procedures

that could be followed by joint commissions. It has been further affirmed, inter alia,

that: “realisation of joint international river basin projects involves a gradual process

of well recognised steps requiring cooperation between basin states.”i The occurrence

of international water resources offers a unique kind of opportunity for the promotion

of international unity.

The vast expansion of human activities leading to the potential for conflict are

leading to an extended adoption of international regimes, and that development pin-

points the significance of cooperation. The potential for cooperation arises when one

party can help the other. That is, “reciprocity can form the basis of cooperation only

where each party can be of assistance to the other and there is a common perception

of mutual benefits from the relationship over the long term.”i

The text on international cooperation, as approved by the Mar del Plata

Conference, expressly declares that “it is necessary for states to co-operate in the case

of shared water resources in recognition of the growing economic, environmental and

physical interdependence across international frontiers.” The report further declared

that relevant “national policies should take into consideration the right of each state

sharing the resources to equitably utilise such resources as the means to promote

bonds of solidarity and cooperation.” Therefore, a concerted and sustained effort is

required to strengthen international water law as a means of placing cooperation

among states on a firmer basis.i “The optimum beneficial use of such waters calls for

practical measures [if not legal] of international association where all parties can

benefit in a tangible and visible way through co-operative action.”i

B. The Works of the ILC

In 1959, the Bolivian delegation to the General Assembly of the UN submitted a

draft resolution under which the ILC was to be requested to study the possibility of

codifying the existing law relating to the utilisation and exploitation of international

rivers. In the same year,i the General Assembly decided that preliminary studies

should be initiated on the legal problems relating to the development and use of

international rivers, with a view to determining whether the subject was appropriate

for codification.i This led to a fairly comprehensive background documentation which

provided a basis for further study of the subject. By resolution 2669 (XXV) of 8

December 1970, the Assembly called for the development and codification of

international law relating to international watercourses as one means of focusing

world-wide attention on the question of the development and management of such

watercourses and, more especially, as a means of urging early consideration of the

subject by the ILC. It also noted in the Resolution that the preservation and protection

of these resources is of great importance to all nations.

The ultimate goal of the ILC has been to incorporate this law into a multilateral

convention. Ever since the 1970 discussion in the UN General Assembly, many nations

have expressed their reservations as to whether a framework convention on water

would be useful or even possible. A convention may add a limited moral pressure on

refractory countries. Legal codifications only affect powerless or satellite states. The

behaviour of strong national states only considers political and economic self-interest.

The UN delegated the task of codifying existing international law on the non-

navigational uses of international watercourses to the ILC in 1971. The first

discussions took place in 1976.i In 1983, the ILC debated the first of its draft articles:

Article (i) put the term “international watercourse system,” which had been described

as “a watercourse system ordinarily consisting of fresh water components, situated in

two or more system States.”i

The “international drainage basin” concept of the Helsinki Rules was

disregarded. The ILC completed the draft by adopting seven new articles at its 1991

session. Article 2, entitled “Use of Terms”, is the cornerstone of the entire set of draft

articles. Due to doctrinal disputes, however, the ILC had to defer the definition of

international watercourses in its forty-third session and later revised them at its

forty-fifth and forty-sixth sessions. The Draft Articles on the Law on the Non-

Navigational Uses of International Watercourses were adopted by the Drafting

Committee on second reading by the ILC in July 1994. The Article 2 describes a

watercourse as “a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue

of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common

terminus.” i

An international watercourse is “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in

different States.”i A “watercourse state” has been defined as a “State in whose

territory part of an international watercourse is situated.” The evolution which the

basic terms had, show how difficult is the delivery of international law on

international watercourses.

In Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of states, adopted on

12 December 1974, the Assembly declared that: “In the exploration of natural

resources shared by two or more countries each state must cooperate on the basis of a

system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve the optimum use of

such resources without causing damages to the legitimate interests of other States.”

The 1994 Draft, was approved on its first reading in 1991 and had been sent to

governments for their comments, which the Commission requested should be returned

by January 1, 1993. However, related governments had not responded by the deadline

and their replies delayed or not received for several years, as usual. Thanks to the

General Assembly, which gave the ILC a mandate to address the non-navigational

uses of international rivers, the ILC rules have a degree of authority. The Helsinki

Rules were short of this degree of authority and promulgated by the non-official ILA.

Moreover, the ILC plan is new and its UN support may encourage the parties

constructing a water agreement to choose the ILC Articles.

The ILC 1994 Draft Articles, regarding water law, divided into six parts:

Introduction, General Principles, Planned Measures, Protection, Preservation and

Management, Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations, coupled with five

articles (in 1994, Article 33, Settlement of Disputes included) under the section:

Miscellaneous Provisions. Although, the Commission had two more parts in the 1993

reading, on “Implementation” and “Fact-finding and Settlement of Disputes,” those

were not approved. The ILC Articles had a number of basic provisions to be able to

facilitate a peaceful resolution of conflicts. The most important of these are the “twin

cornerstones” of the ILC draft: „the equitable utilisation‟ and „the obligation not to

cause harm.‟

The articles take the form of a framework agreement which states may apply and

adjust through specific agreements to suit the conditions of individual watercourses

and the needs of the states concerned. As such, the draft‟s provisions are confined for

the most part to setting forth general principles and rules and to encouraging states to

consult with regard to such important matters as joint management of international

water resources. Any conflict between the uses of an international watercourse is to be

resolved in light of the principles and factors contained in Articles 5 to 7 regarding

equitable utilisation and the rule against causing significant harm to other

watercourse states, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human

needs. Article 24 specifies that an international watercourse management may include

the establishment of a “joint management mechanism.” McCaffrey explains why the

term “joint commission” was not preferred, as saying: “to include such arrangements

as periodic meetings of competent officials or technicians.”i

The Commission‟s draft articles on the non-navigational uses of international

watercourses expected to be influential in controversies between states as well as in

international development activities. However, the standards set in the draft Articles

are criticised as being too elastic. Should the Articles combined with the primacy

placed on the role of negotiated solutions between watercourse states, in fact, favour

the interests of stronger states? Whether this outcome is due to political compromise

by the ILC in the face of opposition by some upper riparian states, notably the USSR

at the time, to the codification of international law on this subject is debatable.i

The 1997 Convention, seems the most comprehensive and proper one. ILC‟s

Draft Articles have been changed over the years and discussed many time in the past

and now has become a “Convention” on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of

International Watercourses. The Convention now defines and refers to terminology of

the subject such as „international watercourse‟ and „watercourse states.‟i These states

must use water in an „equitable and reasonable manner‟ to attain „optimal and

sustainable utilisation thereof‟, and cooperate on the basis of mutual benefit and

ecological protection. The combined impact of all these deliberations has been the

emergence of the Convention and such regulations will only come into force if ratified

by states. The Convention provides in part that where there is a conflict between uses

of an international watercourse by different states, that conflict is to be resolved in

accordance with the principle of equitable utilisation and the obligation not to cause

significant harm to co-riparian states. The Convention is currently under the

consideration of all related states and is likely to be signed by most. In order to

evaluate the conflict in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers dispute, applicability of the

related articles of the Convention, as a frame of reference, will be reviewed.

II. Highlights from the 1997 Convention and the Euphrates-Tigris Watercourse System

At present, the Convention is operative and binding to the extent that they codify

existing customary international law. The articles will become fully operative between

watercourse states that adopt them.

The Commentary to Article 1, paragraph 1 states that the word “uses”, apart

from navigational uses, covers all uses of an international watercourse. Furthermore,

the commentary explicitly includes water diverted from a watercourse.i It means a

country cannot refuse application of the Convention by separating a portion of water

from a watercourse. The Convention may be used as a framework agreement. They

provide the states with “general principles and rules governing the non-navigational

uses of international watercourses in the absence of a specific agreement among the

states concerned, and provide guidelines for the negotiation of future agreements.”i

Therefore, the concerned parties will use the Convention as a starting point in

negotiations; where necessary, consider harmonising agreements with the basic

principles of the present Convention, related to uses of a watercourse. Negotiations

which rely on Article 3, paragraph 5 that puts affirmative task on riparians to “consult

with a view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of concluding a watercourse

agreement or agreements” can be identified by any party. The Convention articles are

the default provisions used to resolve disputes in the absence of custom or specific

accords to the contrary. Article 3, paragraph 3, states that: “apply and adjust the

provisions of the present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular

international watercourse or part thereof.”

The legal positions of the Euphrates and Tigris River System riparians

regarding their rights to the waters of those rivers range from assertions of absolute

territorial sovereignty by Turkey, to absolute territorial integrity by downstream

countries Syria and Iraq. Although Turkey defines those rivers as “trans-boundary,” a

term which reflects its national, rather than international character, nevertheless the

river system qualifies for inclusion in the framework agreement provided by the

Convention. The both rivers are watercourses according to the definition provided by

the Convention Art.2., par. (a). Since both rivers flow through more than one state,

they fall within the definition of “international watercourse” established by the

Convention [Art. 2. par. (b)]. Both rivers are located on part of the territory of each of

the riparian states; thus each state qualifies as a “watercourse state” [Convention

Art. 2. par. (c)]. Any of the three riparian states may invoke the Convention. Absolute

territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity cannot be reconciled with the

demands of the Convention. The overarching principles of no significant harm and of

equitable utilisation do not tolerate either of these extreme positions.

An optimal utilisation will never be realised without a basin-wide accord

allocating the Euphrates and Tigris rivers among the riparians. What should be

understood by the optimal utilisation is, however, another issue. It is defined in the

Commentary as the attainment of the “maximum possible benefits for all watercourse

states as parties to the agreement.”i The Commentary to the 1994 ILC Draft Articles

(which the present Convention based upon), Article 4, paragraph 2 stated that

“technical experts consider that the most efficient and beneficial way of dealing with a

watercourse is to deal with it as a whole, including all watercourse states as parties to

the agreement.”i

National security concerns, rivalries, and other parochial interests will prevent

optimal utilisation of the river until the basin states negotiate a watercourse

agreement. The fears and insecurities of the various states have stymied negotiations.

A variety of ongoing co-operative efforts, for example the Arab-Israeli accords,

however, have assuaged fears and built the foundation for greater cooperation. Given

the current environment of cooperation, the states of the Euphrates and Tigris basin

seem not a long way from embracing the Convention‟s framework agreement. The

existing regime of watercourse agreements or accords (i.e., 1987 Accord between

Syria and Turkey; 1946 Agreement between Turkey and Iraq) would continue to exist

within the framework agreement, until the riparians negotiated new agreements.i

The potential obstacles which may be expected to prevent the realisation of a

watercourse agreement accepted by all the riparians are should be sought at the

political relations of the riparian states.i The operative character of the Convention

avoids the deadlock that might otherwise arise if a riparian refuses to exchange

information, consult or negotiate in good faith.

Turkey allocates water from the Euphrates River to irrigate land in the Harran

Plains of south-eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, that land does not lie outside the

physical confines of the Euphrates and Tigris river basin. On the contrary, it is exactly

between the two rivers. Turkey‟s neighbours cannot argue that the transfer of water

outside the river basin, by building the Atatürk Dam and irrigation canals, is

inherently an inequitable use. The term watercourse, as defined by the Convention,

includes diverted waters.i Thus, Turkey‟s removal of the water from the Euphrates

River does not take the water outside the scope of the Convention.i

The Euphrates River system is unable to satisfy the water needs (in fact,

demands) of all its watercourse states. This conflict of uses finds its resolution in

Articles 5, 6 and 7. Article 6 is the basis used to determine whether Turkey‟s use of the

Euphrates River water is equitable and reasonable. Each of the seven factors are

pertinent to the Euphrates and Tigris river system. Factor (a) calls for consideration

of “geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of

a natural character,” including consideration of quantity and quality of the water. The

total water resource of the Watercourse System is approximately 32 billion cubic

meters (BCM),i and the quality of the water deteriorates as the river flows south. The

qualitative and quantitative demands of Turkey, Syria and Iraq exceed the capacity of

the river. Factor (a) represents the basis of the problem and weighs heavily in the

scale balancing the equity and reasonableness of Turkey‟s use.

Factor (b) commands riparians to consider the “social and economic needs of

the watercourse states concerned.” Both Turkey and Syria rely heavily on the

resources of the Euphrates River system, whereas Iraq enjoys the abundant Tigris

River waters as well. Firmly imbedded in the principle of equitable and reasonable

utilisation is the goal of attaining optimal utilisation. Factor (c) requires consideration

of the population dependent on the concerned watercourse in each watercourse state.

Factor (d) seems heavily against Turkey and Syria in terms of their upstream

positions, when it considers “the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one

watercourse state on other watercourse states.” Factor (e) calls for an appraisal of

“existing and potential uses of the watercourse.” This factor leads to two different

considerations. If an existing use carries more weight, then Iraq and Syria may argue

for more water because they have used it for centuries. On the other hand, if potential

uses outweigh existing uses, then upstream states Turkey and Syria will prevail. In

fact, denying upstream users the opportunity to develop their portions of the river (the

Euphrates and Tigris) waters simply to maintain Iraq‟s as well as Syria‟s historical

supremacy seems quite irrational.

While according conditional priority to existing beneficial uses is generally

recognised in customary water law, it is rejected in the Convention. The Article 6 (1)

(e) refers to both existing and potential uses as relevant considerations in the

allocation process “in order to emphasise that neither is given priority.” This attitude

represents a complete reversal of the ILC‟s prior policy: In 1991 the ILC opted for the

no appreciable harm rule, which protects existing uses of the upstream riparian from

challenges; the present Convention, however, adopts the equitable utilisation standard

without requiring either the maintenance or precedence of existing uses. This version

probably demonstrates a preference for redistribution over maintenance of the status

quo. But this position, similar to the ILC‟s previous one, is arguably too extreme. A

middle course must be taken, one that gives conditional priority to existing beneficial

uses.

Factor (f), on the other hand, relates to the “conservation, protection,

development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the

costs of measures taken to that effect.” Turkey has expended a great deal of time,

effort, and finance to develop its huge GAP projects which cover many dams and

irrigation canals, to supply water to its irrigable land and produce electricity. To deny

the legitimacy of that use would impose a great hardship on Turkey‟s social and

economic life. On the contrary, the Convention do not recognise any use as essentially

superior to any other. Turkey‟s investment in its water distribution system and its

efficient irrigation techniques to some extent justify that this factor in Turkey‟s favour.

Turkey refuses to recognise any limitation on its utilisation of the Euphrates and

Tigris waters originating in its territory.i This assertion of absolute territorial

sovereignty stands against the spirit and letter of Article 5, para.1., which imposes on

all riparians the duty “to utilise an international watercourse in an equitable and

reasonable manner.” Moreover, Article 5, par. 2., requires riparians to “participate

in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable

and reasonable manner.” Whereas the principle of equitable and reasonable

utilisation recognises Turkey‟s right to share in the benefits and the uses of the both

waters, it also requires that Turkey abstain from depriving other riparians of their

rights to equitable utilisation.

The other point is that Article 7 obligates states “not to cause significant harm,”

thus limiting Turkey‟s right to exploit the waters of the Euphrates as well as the

Tigris.i The Article prevents Turkey from exercising its control over the waters within

its territory in a way that causes damage to downstream riparians.i According to the

Commentary, Articles 5 and 7 are complementary principles.i A use that causes

significant harm to another riparian may not be justified by claiming that the use

causing the harm is equitable. Uses causing harm are regarded as „prima facie‟

inequitable.i

However, the text of the 1993 ILC Draft Article 7 referred to “appreciable

harm,” hence, the obligation imposed by the Article was not an absolute prohibition.

Rather, “appreciable” denotes a harm “capable of being established by objective

evidence. There must be a real impairment of use, i.e., a detrimental impact of some

consequence upon, for example, Public health, industry, property, agriculture or the

environment in the affected state.”i The definition of appreciable falls somewhere

between “detectable” (measurable) and “serious” (substantial). In this case, claims of

the downstream riparians must rely on facts which indicate definite and substantial

harm. In the next reading in 1994, ILC replaced “appreciable harm” with a stronger

term: “significant harm” which remains in the Convention.

Both of the lower riparians‟ argument relies on their historical utilisation of the

rivers. The lowest riparian, Iraq, regards its utilisation as a custom, and thus its

argument carries some force. Nevertheless, Convention Article 10, paragraph 1 states

that “no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.”

Long established use of the concerned waters by Iraq and Syria neither allows nor

denies other watercourse states the opportunity to utilise their portions of the

Euphrates or the Tigris. Reliance of Turkey‟s downstream countries Syria and Iraq on

custom is justified to the extent that there is no “conflict between uses.”i Complete

acceptance of downstream reasoning, however, would effectively freeze any significant

utilisation by upstream watercourse states, including Syria (in position to Iraq) and

Turkey. This issue, which is a “conflict” in the terminology of the Convention, must be

appraised under Article 10, paragraph 2 “be resolved with reference to articles 5 to

7.”i The argument of the downstream watercourse states, Syria and Iraq, taken to its

extreme, would violate Article 5‟s mandate that watercourse states “utilise an

international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.” The Commentary

to paragraph 1 of Article 5 states that “a watercourse state has the right, within its

territory, to a reasonable and equitable share, or portion, of the uses and benefits of

an international watercourse.”i No watercourse state can deprive a fellow

watercourse state of its right to equitable utilisation.

In Article 5 as a whole, the most “equitable and reasonable” outcome would

tend to fall on the side of the vast untapped potential available to the uppermost

watercourse state, Turkey. Whereas, “optimal and sustainable utilisation” does not

necessarily correspond to “maximum use,” the most technologically efficient use, or

the most monetarily valuable use, denying the upper watercourse state the opportunity

to develop its equitable portions of the Euphrates and Tigris waters simply to maintain

Syria and Iraq‟s historical pre-eminence would be irrational.

Article 6 requires that “all relevant factors and circumstances” be taken into

account in determining whether a watercourse state‟s utilisation is equitable and

reasonable. It sets forth a non-exclusive list of seven factors to guide the

determination. These factors, as well as other relevant factors, must be weighed in

applying the “general and flexible” principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.

Syria‟s utter dependence on the Euphrates River is the primary point in its

favour. Meanwhile, Iraq has the Tigris on which Turkey has very few projects and Iraq

receives more water than it needs, therefore, it has built a canal to divert it into the

Euphrates. Without the water provided by the Euphrates, Syria will not be able to

survive. Therefore, Article 6, para.1 (a), which calls for consideration of “geographic,

hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural

character,” clearly favours a substantial amount of water portion for Syria. Factor (b)

enjoins watercourse states to consider the “social and economic needs of the

watercourse states concerned.” This is applicable for all parties‟ claims, and is

therefore not to be considered. Factor (c) considers the population who are

“dependent on” the concerned watercourse in each country. Factor (d) considers “the

effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse state on other

watercourse states.” This does not support downstream riparians‟ unqualified

assertions that upstream countries have the right to utilise the waters of the concerned

rivers without prior approval. If this theory were accepted, downstream watercourse

states would have a veto power over projects of upstream watercourse states.

Nevertheless, under Part III of the Convention, downstream countries do have the

right to demand exchange of information and negotiation with upstream watercourse

states if they believe their planned measures may have “possible effects.”i Factor (e)

calls for an appraisal of “existing and potential uses of the watercourse.” Evaluation

of this factor could lead to two widely divergent conclusions. If existing uses carry

more weight, then mainly downstream users will prevail since they utilised it even

before Turkey utilised it. If, however, potential uses outweigh existing uses, then the

upstream watercourse states, Turkey and Syria, will prevail.

In considering all factors, a spectrum of alternatives appears. As each

watercourse state shares a qualitative “equality of right” to participate in the uses

and benefits of an international watercourse, each does not necessarily have a

quantitative right to enjoy a pro rata share of the rivers‟ resources. Syrian and Iraqi

assertions of territorial integrity are inadmissible. At the same time, both Syria and

Iraq have a right to share in the benefits of the concerned rivers. While other

watercourse states implement their planned measures, they must exchange information

about the possible effects of their plans. The planning state must consult in good faith

with the others. If, after consultations begin, it is determined that the planned measure

would produce an appreciably adverse effect, the parties must follow the notification

and consultation procedures set out in Part III of the Convention.

As a whole, the Convention gives an advantage to states that developed their

uses early. By enshrining prior appropriation, the Convention places a premium on

early, but not necessarily rational, development of the watercourse system. The terms

of the Convention may, in cases involving trans-boundary (or successive) rivers, have

the effect of freezing the development of all but the lowest riparian. Naturally, to

maximise their own contentment, states often overlook the well-being of the world

community. As cooperation produces greater results than unilateral activity, the

Convention provides a pragmatic foundation for cooperation on condition that states

leave their provincial viewpoints for the sake of an opportunity to attain optimal

utilisation of the international watercourse.

Conclusion

Despite the wide scope of international water law, the three Euphrates riparians have

failed to comply with its demands. Turkey, the uppermost riparian, considers the

Euphrates to be a regional rather than an international river.i Under this

interpretation, the Helsinki or the Convention rules would not apply at all. Even if it

did grant the status of the river as international, Turkey insists that there are no

international laws or rules that would force it to share what it terms trans-boundary or

“cross-border waters.‟‟i In fact, Turkey has expressed no interest in any negotiated

accords concerning the “sharing” of the Euphrates water with Syria and Iraq. This

refusal is at odds with Iraq‟s claim to a guaranteed water level. Furthermore, Turkey

regards the area of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers as one basin, while Iraq views

them as separate units. These opposing constructions will further hinder diplomatic

progress on the regional water problem. Syria, on the other hand, has come out in

favour of the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty.

At this stage, it seems that the utility of international water law is subject to the

whims of the various riparians. Thus, a solution based purely on international law is

bound to fail. In general, upstream position confers power. From this position one can

usually take actions that can be contested or countered by a downstream opponent

only with considerably increased difficulty or cost. The upstream actor can confront

lower actors with faits accompli whose alteration is far more demanding than the

original actions. Diversion, overuse, contamination, and flow delay are available in

accordance with one‟s position on the riparian totem pole. The only qualification is an

adjustment for flow; being upstream from the watercourse‟s significant flow (i. e.,

before it gathers its basic strength) reduces power accordingly. Otherwise, upstream

position confers clear power advantages.

The few arrangements on international river utilisation in the Middle East that

exist are bilateral and official legal interpretations of them are completely different.

The official view of Turkey is that, as the upstream state on the Euphrates and Tigris

„trans-boundary‟ rivers, it does not recognise co-ownership of rivers originating in its

territory, but claims to be utilising them in an equitable and reasonable manner. Syria

and Iraq emphasise the absolute integrity of the Euphrates and Tigris watercourse

system, although Syria does not consider the Orontes (Asi) River, (shared by Lebanon,

Syria and Turkey) to be international. The foregoing considerations lead to the

conclusion that any division of the waters must take into consideration the needs of

each basin state. This, naturally, calls for some compromise on the part of all basin

states. Although, Turkey seems to have the physical power to cut off all the water

within its jurisdiction, however, the exercise of such a power to the detriment of

interest of lower states would not be tolerated. Furthermore, downstream states Syria

and Iraq could not be permitted to require Turkey to give up its power altogether in

order that the river might come down to it undiminished. All three states have real and

vital interests in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that must be reconciled as best as

they may be.

It must be concluded that the role of the law has generally been only one factor

influencing the outcome of major international water controversies. On the other

hand, states have rarely shown a disposition to defy generally accepted principles of

international law, and indeed, usually rely on those principles in their diplomatic

exchanges. Further, the more concrete and generally accepted the applicable legal

principles become, the more likely it is that they will play a major role in the

resolution of international water controversies.

END NOTES

i Whiteman, Marjorie M., op. cit., (1964), p. 920, quoted from Integrated Rivers Basin Development: Report by a

Panel of experts, ESC Resolution. 599, UN ECOSOC 21st. Sess.,pp.38, 43, UN Doc. E/3066 (1958).

i Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the Sixth

Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole. Fifty-first session Agenda item 144. UN Doc.

A/51/869. 1997. (Hereinafter the Convention) .

i For a more detailed analysis, see Gleick, P. H., “Water and Conflict”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Occasional Paper, No. 1, Cambridge, Massachusetts, with the University of Toronto, September 1992.

i “International Regulations Regarding the Use of International Watercourses for Purposes Other than

Navigation, adopted by the Institute of International Law at Madrid, 20 April 1911. Text in Majorie M.

Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, Washington, Department of State. 1964, p. 921.

i See Report of the Forty-Seventh Conference of the ILA, held at Dubrovnik, 1956, 1957.

i Resolution No. 1401 (XIV) of 21 November 1959.

i See Report of the Forty-Seventh Conference of the ILA, held at Dubrovnik, 1956, 1957.

i UN Doc. A/42/10 (1987), Integrated River Basin Development: Report by a Panel of Experts, ESC Res. 599,

UN GAOR, 42nd. Sess., Supp. No. 10.

i Report of the Fifty-Second Conference ILA, (1966 Helsinki Rules).

i Biswas, Asit K., “Management of International Waters: Problems and Perspective”, International Journal of

Water Resources Development, Vol.9, No. 2, 1993. p. 172.

i Ibid, p. 173.

i UN GAOR, 6th Comm., 25th Sess., 1236th meting, at 327, UN Doc. A/7991, A/C.6.SR1236 (1970). The final

resolution vote in 1970 Yearbook at 810, UN General Assembly in Resolution 2669 (XXV) of Dec. 8, 1970. G.

A. Res. 2669, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 127, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

i Report of the ILC on the Work of its Twenty-Sixth Session, [1974] 2 (1) Yearbook of ILC, 300, UN Doc.

A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1.

i UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976; 1407-1409th Meetings, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of the

International Watercourses, [1976] 1 Yearbook of ILC 268, pp. 12-21.

i Report of the Fifty-Second Conference ILA, (1966 Helsinki Rules).

i Ibid, Art. IV.

i Ibid, Art. V, para 2(d).

i Despite Bangladesh's objection, India continued to construct the barrage at Farraka on the River Ganges and a

feeder canal to divert waters to another river. After 15 years of negotiation, a joint River Commission was

established in 1972 to study and propose settlement but India never stopped its unilateral construction.

i

ILA, Report of the Fifty-Seventh Conference, 1976, p. XXXIV.

i UN Doc. E/Conf. 70/29, Report of the UN Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, New York, 1977.

i Ibid., recommendation 90.

i Ibid., p. 51.

i Ibid., p. 77.

i UN Doc. ST/ESA/120, 1981, n. 8

. i Topic I, II and III (3). Institutional and Legal Arrangements, Ibid., p. 9.

i Ibid.

i UN Doc. E/Conf.70/29, 1977, op. cit., p. 23.

i UN Doc. A/CN.4/254, op. cit., p.328, The Report of the Committee on Natural Resources established by

ECOSOC, as summarised by the Secretary-General.

i UN Resolution 1801 (XIV) of 21 November, 1959.

i See Debates in Official Records of the General Assembly of the UN, 14th Session, Sixth Committee, 606th-

614th Meetings. New York.

i See for a detailed information on the progress and rapporteurs‟ works: McCaffrey, Stephen C., “The Law of

International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions”, Denver Journal of

International Law and Policy, 17, 1989, pp. 505-507.

i UN Doc. A/38/10 (1983). Report of the ILC on the Work of its Thirty-Fifth Session, UN GAOR, 38th Sess.,

Supp. No. 10, p. 156.

i UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.489 (14.7.1993). The ILC met from 31 May, to 23 July 1993, in Geneva where one of the

main points for discussion was the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. ILC Forty-

Fifth Session, 4th May-23rd July 1993. The following year (1994) the ILC made some changes in the Articles.

i McCaffrey, Stephen C., “Current Developments: The Forty-Third Session of the ILC”, American Journal of

International Law, 1991 pp. 703, 705.

i McCaffrey, Stephen C., “Current Developments:…” op. cit. 1991. pp. 703, 705.

i Tarasofsky, Richard G., “International Law and Water Conflicts in the Middle East”, Environmental Policy and

Law, 23/2, 1993, p. 70.

i Article 2 (b) and (c) of the 1997 Convention.

i The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, YILC, UN Doc.

A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 2). [1987] p.26.

i Ibid. p. 27.

i Ibid. p. 32.

i Ibid., p. 28.

i Article 3, para.3, p.162.

i Olcay, H. Bülent., “Hydropolitics Among the Riparians of the Euphrates and Tigris Watercourse System.”

Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Leicester University, 1997. pp. 130-203.

i Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the ILC, UN

GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, pp.162, 174. UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991.

i As long as the component parts of the watercourse [i.e., rivers, aquifers, reservoirs, canals, etc.] are interrelated

with one another, they form part of the watercourse ...Thus, water may move from a stream into the ground

under the streambed, spreading beyond the banks of the stream, then re-emerge in the stream, flow into a lake

which empties into a river, be diverted into a canal and carried to a reservoir, etc., ibid, p.174.

i Kolars, John., “Hydro-Geographic Background to the Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East.” In

Proceedings of the 1986 Annual Meetings of the American Society of International Law. Washington DC The

American Society of International Law; Turkey, Official Book by Office of the Prime Ministry Directorate

General of Press and Information, Ankara 1993; “Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq”, (The book

presented by the Turkish Foreign Ministry,) Ankara, June 1996.

i For the Turkish justification see “Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq”, (The book presented by the

Turkish Foreign Ministry,) Ankara, June 1996.

i Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the ILC, UN

GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, p. 164.

i For Commentary, see [1988] YILC, 22, pp.35-36. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.1 (part 2).

i [1988] YILC, 22, p.36. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.1 (part 2).

i Ibid.

i Ibid.

i The Convention Article 10, para. 2.

i Ibid.

i See The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, [1987] 2 YILC., p.31, UN Doc.

A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 2) i The Commentary defines “possible effects” which has been used in Article 11, as “all potential effects of

planned measures, whether adverse or beneficial.” [1988] YILC, 22, p. 45. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.1

(part 2). i Tripartite Conference on Water Problems in the Middle East, Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly, July 2,

1990, p. 3. i Turkey put forward a three stage plan including mapping all water resources in the region, establishing each

country's needs, and jointly improving wasteful practices. The Iraqi and Syrian ministers repeated their long-

standing demand that Turkey guarantee an adequate quota of 700 m³/second of water downstream. See, Cohen,

Sam., “Iraq, Syria, Challenge Turkey on Water Use”, Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1990, p. 6.

Emmanuelle RAOULT*

Since the foundation of the Republic, Turkey is pursuing a western oriented policy.

Since modernisation had become a goal in the establishment of the Turkish republic,

Turkey opted for the western model of a nation state.

Although Turkey remained neutral during the World War II, it joined at the last

moment to the coalition of triumphant states. With the rising East-West tension, the

early years of the Cold War showed the strategic importance of Turkey in the eyes of

the Western bloc.

The first ambiguity between Turkey and its western allies arose when Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and concluded an

Association Agreement with the European Community in 1964. Its fundamental strategic location within the western bloc together with the process of secularisation and modernisation of the society made Turkish authorities sure of the western vocation of their country.

Then, the Turkish diplomacy began to take the country‟s European character as

granted as if, sooner or later, Turkey will become a full member of the EC. But the

end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union showed the limits of Turkey‟s

aspirations as regards getting integrated into the EC

The turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet Union could explain the Europe‟s

“wait and see” policy towards enlargement to a certain extent. Although Turkey asked

officially for the full membership to EC in 1987, the answer of the European

Commission became clear in 1990: that Turkey won‟t be integrated to EU in the next 5

years.

Furthermore, the possible enlargement of the EU to Eastern European countries, sent

back the oldest associate member of the EC to the queue wagon of the EU applicants.

In fact, between the European Commission‟s answer in 1990 and 1997, Turkey was

increasingly marginalised in Europe.

To the Europeans, Turkey‟s poor on human rights record, the Cyprus issue, the Greek-

Turkish conflict, its unstable democracy, the Islamic revival, the delicate question of

free-movement of Turkish workers in Europe, and the economic cost of integrating

Turkey in EU are the main reasons that justify the negative answer to Turkish

application for full-membership.

But beyond those official reasons that explain Turkey‟s marginalisation, it seems that

the EU-Turkey relations suffer from ambiguities and lack of clear policies. Firstly, the

rise of political Islam in Turkey and the possibility of a new military coup frightens

Europe which doesn‟t want to include an unstable or military ruled country as one of

its members. Secondly, the economic cost of the Turkish membership could unbalance

the EU budget and the competitiveness of the Turkish agricultural and textile sectors

would damage the economies of EU‟s Southern Members (especially Greece, Spain

and Portugal). Thirdly, the traditional Turkish reaction to EU recommendations

concerning the Cyprus and Kurdish issues and the constant crisis between Greece and

Turkey reinforces EU suspicions that Turkey, as a full member

wouldn‟t fit in the future European Common Foreign Policy framework at the regional

and international levels.

Unfortunately, to my opinion, the announcement of those classical reasons are not

enough to understand the current problems of the EU-Turkey relations and obviously,

do not help to overcome future difficulties .

The presence of a lot of ambiguities and misunderstandings between EU and Turkey

not only reflects the “Turkish case” but also points out the uneasy relationship

between EU and its periphery in general. This is closely related to the gap between

the European project and its real achievements.

First of all, one needs to concentrate on the ambiguity existing in the EU-Turkish

partnership.

Although European officials argue that they need to recognise the strategic

importance of Turkey, their political, cultural and economical arguments work against

Turkish membership. As an example, in 1990, Abel Matutes said that „despite the

negative answer from the Commission, Turkey is an “eligible member of the

Community”‟ reflects the ambiguous European attitude towards Turkey. This shows

the European Community‟s ambivalent attitude and can be summarised as “neither

with you, nor without you”.

In fact, since more than five years, Europe has been following a “hot and cold policy”

towards Turkey. Three examples illustrate this ambivalence in the European policy:

1. EU facing the Turkish dilemma: one the one hand, official declarations mention the

strategic importance of Turkish partnership and on the other hand, less official ones

concentrate on the Muslim character of Turkish society and its unstable democracy.

2. The Customs Union Agreement of December 1995: after the conclusion of the

agreement, the financial aid was blocked until the human rights situation improved in

Turkey.

It is true that the Greek veto is the main cause of Europe‟s financial aid blocking. But

on the other hand, the human right issue which is damaging EU-Turkey relationship

for 30 years should have led Europeans to realism. Any radical change would not

occur quickly, even if Turkish officials gave assurance about improvement of Human

rights.

3. Recently, EU declared the opening of membership talks with the Greek Cypriots. It

is so obvious that membership of only one side to the European Union is going to

confirm the de jure division of the island which is de facto divided. Instead of

pressuring for a settlement of Cyprus issue, that could lead to a radicalisation of the

Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot position and will have a worsening effect on EU-Turkish

relations.

It appears that EU is not acting in a very diplomatic manner, but playing into

dangerous waters. Unfortunately, the EU officials didn‟t evaluate the real

consequences of such acts on Turkish domestic scene which should definitely have

been taken into account.

Since 1994, Turkey has been passing through a troubled political and sociological

transition period. The last parliamentary elections of December 1995, put the Islamic

party of Necmettin Erbakan (Welfare Party) as the ruling Party in Turkey. Then, the

unsuccessful coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan and Tansu Ciller, and

the tensions with the military, showed that Turkey was facing one of its biggest political crisis since the foundation

of the Republic in 1923. It is

true that it is not the first time that this country is facing political troubles that lead military

power to intervene (in fact,

a full-fledged military coup didn‟t occur). But the reality is that Turkey is facing a serious

challenge not only in political arena, but also at the cultural and sociological scene.

Since the end of the cold war, the economic problems and the political instability

persisting, the difficulties faced in Turkey‟s regional integration process has led some

segments of the Turkish people to question the whole process of westernisation and

even the values that built up the Turkish republic. It is not only the question of getting

integrated into the Western value system but also to envisage Turkey‟s future either in

Europe or in the Islamic world.

What Turkey is facing now is an identity crisis: identity of its people and of the state.

Then, the renewal of political Islam is the symbol of the difficult synthesis between

Islamic culture and its secular oriented values. Qualifying Turkey as a bridge between

West and Middle East is not enough to explain Turkish reality. Turkey is a specific

country which chose to anchor itself to the Western values, to take part in the club of

the developed countries. Unfortunately, political and economic tensions are being

exploited at present, by the Islamic movements which were thought laying dormant

since the establishment of the republic.

This identity crisis is a serious and dangerous one that can lead to polarisation and

division of the Turkish people.

Taking into account that Turkey’s trouble and strengthening of Islamic

oriented movements would be damaging not only for regional stability but even for

the European one, the European attitude has to change now.

These changes can be reduced to two major issues: definition of European identity and

clear definition of European project.

First, the clear definition of European identity seems essential, especially regarding

the EU‟s enlargement issue. Although the criteria of democracy and Europeanness in

terms of geographical location appear to be the basic two factors justifying EU

membership; the cultural and religious factors are more and more involved in this

definition.

Regarding Turkey, Islam seems to be one of the main obstacles on which EU

concentrates regarding the Turkish case. At the same time, in Turkey, there is a growing

feeling that the main obstacle to Turkish membership is the religious factor which is not

spoken loudly. Obviously, the confrontation of the two imaginaires (e.g.imaginaire oriental

vs. imaginaire occidental) underlines this feeling, the religious factor becomes more and more

central in the enlargement debate.

It is obvious that a clear definition of European identity is the central question

regarding EU‟s future. One should keep in mind that the choice between restrictive

and extensive definitions of the European identity (with a juridical basis) will be

determinant for the future European prospect. Certainly, a strict definition of

European identity (as a Christian community) could damage diplomatic standing of

EU, especially by its marginalising effect. But on the other hand, suspicions can lead

to misunderstanding and tension. Then,

a clear European attitude is required.

Second, the dichotomy between full member/associate member is not enough

concerning the challenges EU has to face since the end of the Cold War. If this can be

explained by the fact that association to EU that originally seemed to be transitional

becomes more and more a static status; at the same time, the potential candidates to

EU increased since the 1990. Thus, the new geopolitical context means also juridical

evolution of European integration process.

Regarding instability factors, economic agreements are not sufficient to stabilise

peripheral relationship. In fact, this can be explained by the fact that most of the applicants

countries to EU integration suffer of “ integration / marginalisation obsession”. Furthermore,

been integrated or rejected to EU symbolises, in a certain manner, the recognition of

development. If one can argue that it is a psychological factor, the virtual instability of EU‟s

periphery implies a clear comprehension of psychological factors as a diplomatic issue.

So, it seems, that within the context of the IGC, transitional political partnership

should be settled for the purpose of maintaining dialogue and building a clear long-

term relationship.

Regarding the Turkish case, some improvement in this framework could be welcomed

with the purpose of avoiding tension and radicalisation in the EU relationship. Then, I

suggest some measures that could enhance EU-Turkey partnership:

- Settlement of an effective mixed EU-Turkish Commission on Human rights issue: this

implies a clear knowledge of Turkish political situation, study of the Turkish legislative and

penal rules regarding human rights. Instead of continuous and general critics about Turkey‟s

Human Rights record, Europe should discuss with Turkey about specific reforms that should

be implemented. This also requires the good will of the Turkish authorities.

- Knowledge of the Turkish state principles, the general political and sociological

factors affecting territorial integrity of the country. Obviously, Europeans do not have a clear

comprehension of Turkish society and policy. Unity and cohesion of the Turkish society are

regarded as essential to protect Turkey‟s territorial unity involving a large variety of ethnic

groups1.

- Acknowledgment of domestic political effects of the Turco-Greek “cold war”, and

the Cyprus issue. Europeans should understand that those two issues are not only

regional, but also national. For example, any European initiative towards the Cyprus

issue should take into account its effect on Turkey‟s domestic scene. Ignoring this fact,

the EU takes the risk to cause Turkey‟s uncompromising attitude (eg. The opening

membership talks with Greek side of Cyprus).

- Understanding the Turkish point of view about regional security and regional

threats. The historical context Turkish Republic‟s foundation (especially the

independence war) leads the Turkish people to consider that their borders are still

threatened. This regional threat feeling is a major difference between European states

and Turkey. Regional mistrust is directly linked with what Europeans consider as a

nationalistic approach to regional stability.

- Clear explanation to Turkish authorities about the consequences of full membership.

Obviously, in Turkey, EU‟s membership is considered as a symbol of the recognition of the

country‟s Westernisation. The full consequences of European membership (especially

regarding the delegation of sovereignty) do not seem to be fully understood in Turkey.

-Gradual adaptation of Turkey‟s laws to the EU‟s legal framework.

The European integration process implies common laws and a heavy juridical

framework. Turkey could already start to adapt to some of those European laws.This

would lead to two major consequences:

1. This would avoid future incompatibilities of Turkish laws with European‟s juridical

framework.

2. The beginning of legislative reform could show Turkey‟s good will to be fully

integrated to Europe. Not only because of its political and economical benefits, but

also regarding its cultural and social stand.

-Real association of Turkey regarding regional stability and security measures in a

general sense (not only in the WEU context but even with official political European

statements). The Yugoslav war made clear that Turkey and Europe share common security

concerns . Then, a better association of Turkey with EU‟s decision process and statements

will enhance regional stability2.

This kind of measures can be seen as a transitional phase to membership in a long term

perspective. In fact, it presents the advantage to set clearly the meaning of EU membership.

Then, if Turkey finds those conditions too hard to apply, both parts (EU and Turkey) could

easily decide to slow down or stop the process. The main advantage of this transitional status

is that, without giving assurance, it stabilise the relationship and avoid ambiguities and

misunderstandings.

The example given above can, to a large extend, be applied to other EU applicants.

But one can argue that the implementation of transitional status and a clear definition

of European identity are not directly linked with stabilisation of EU‟s periphery.

Especially when such other International Organisations as UN, OSCE, NATO already

deal with regional stability.

Then, we come to the main point: what is the vision of the EU ?

Will EU become an isolated economic and political regional state-grouping or a

strong and influential actor in world politics ?

Obviously, since the end of the Cold War, EU seems willing to move towards an

influential policy. In the same time external actors see EU as a strong and powerful

Institution. The critics about EU ineffectiveness at the beginning of Yugoslav War is a

clear example of expectations towards EU virtual role.

In sum, Europe has to choose between a simple regional group of economic and

political interests and a world power which implies diplomatic and military strength and

implementation of rational dialogue with its periphery. In the context of long-term relations,

EU should understand that security and stability are, in a large sense, determined by clear

positions and objectives.

In the search for regional stability and diplomatic influence, EU should, first of all,

change the terms of dialogue pursued with its periphery.

In the 1990‟s, definition of security is very extensive, all I described above is part of

the new security challenge EU has to deal with.

The challenge described above does not only concern the Turkish case.

In fact, Turkey is just an example of the structural and conjectural ambiguities in the

European project. Nationalism, religious tensions, polarisation, human rights, minority rights,

mistrust in neighbouring relationships, are issues that concern the southeast as well

as the Central and Eastern Europe.

This is an urgent matter as the new expansion of the EU is about to take place.

END NOTES

1 Then, any recognition of ethnical differences is still considered as the first step towards territorial

disintegration. The collective factor appears to be more important than individual rights. To some extend, the

severe repression against Kurdish rebellion is linked with the fear of a new division of Turkey‟s territory. The

considerable reduction of Turkey‟s territory since the fall of the Ottoman Empire has strongly influenced the

Turkish people‟s “obsessional fear” of territorial loss.

2 In this context, it seems that Turkey‟s association to Europe‟s decision process in the security field should not

be considered with a Turkish veto power. It should rather be settled as the association of Turkey to EU‟s

decisions any time its security is concerned.