Forfeiting Accountability

8/7/2019 Forfeiting Accountability

1/18

By Erin Norman andAnthony Sanders

March 2011


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ExEcutivE Summary

Georgiahassomeof theworstcivilforfeiturelawsinthecountry.ArecentnationalreportgavethePeachStateaD-foritscivilforfeiturelawsandpractices;onlyfourotherstatesreceivedsimilarlylowgrades.Tomakemattersworse,thisreportfindsthatGeorgialawenforcementagenciesroutinelyfailtofollowbasicstatereportinglawsthatwouldprovidesomemeasureofpublicaccountability. Civilforfeitureisthepoweroflawenforcementtoseizecash,cars,homesandotherpropertyonthemeresuspicionofcriminalactivity.Unlikecriminalforfeiture,theownerneednotbeconvictedtoloseproperty.Indeed,akeyproblemwithGeorgiaslawisthatitforcesownerstoprovetheirinnocencetogettheirpropertyback,effectivelytreatingpeoplecaughtupinforfeitureproceedingsasguiltyuntil

proveninnocent.Worse,thelawenforcementagenciesthattakethepropertyreceive100percentoftheproceedsfortheirownuse,providingastrongincentivetopursuepropertyinsteadof criminals. Georgiascivilforfeiturelawsdohaveonegoodfeature:Theyrequirelawenforcementagenciestoannuallyreportforfeitureproceedsandexpenditurestothelocalauthoritythatprovidestheirfunding.Localgovernmentsarethenrequiredtomaketheserecordspubliclyavailableonline. Thesereportingrequirementsoughttoserveasaminimalcheckonforfeiturepracticesandpotentialabuse.Theyshouldalsopreventforfeiturefundsfrombecomingoff-the-booksslushfundsthroughwhichlawenforcementagenciescanself-finance,exemptedfromdemocraticcontrols. However,thisreportfindsthatGeorgiasreportingrequirementsarerarelyfollowedbylawenforcementagencies:

-Inarandomsampleof 20Georgialawenforcementagencies,onlytwowerefoundtobereportingasrequiredbylaw.

-Of 15majorlawenforcementagenciesinGeorgiasfivemostpopulouscitiesandcounties,onlyoneproducedtheforfeiturereportrequiredbylaw.

-Ourfindingsmirrora2002stateauditthatfoundthat85percentof 26agenciessurveyedfailedtocreateannualreportsasrequired.


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Atthesametime,federaldataindicatethatforfeitureuseisontheriseinGeorgia:

-AfederalsurveyshowsthatGeorgiaagenciestookin$6millioninforfeitureproceedsin1993,butthatfigureroseto$33millionby2003,themostrecentyearforwhichdataareavailable.ThesefiguresarelikelyunderstatedsignificantlyasthesurveycoversonlyasampleofGeorgiaagencies.

-Georgiaagenciesaretakinginlargeandincreasingamountsof propertyunderfederalforfeiturelaw;itisunlikelythatagenciesforfeitingpropertyunderfederallawarenotalsodoingsounderstatelaw.From2000to2010,Georgiaagenciesreceivedmorethan$185millionfromforfeituresprocessedunderfederallaw.In2010,Georgiaagenciestookinarecord$28.6millionmorethananyotherstateexceptTexasandCaliforniaandfourtimesthenationalaverage.

-The15majorlawenforcementagenciesinGeorgiasmostpopulousareasaccountedformorethan70percentoftheforfeitureproceedsreportedin2003,accordingtothefederalsurvey.

-Someoftheseagencieshavetakeninlargeamountscomparedtotheirannualbudget:2003datashowtheCobbCountySheriffsOfficetookin$9.5millioninforfeitureproceeds76percentofits$12.4millionbudgetforthesameyear.

Thesefederaldataareincomplete,notspecifictoGeorgialawanddonotrevealhowlawenforcementagenciesarespendingforfeiturefunds.Thus,theyarenosubstituteforagenciesfollowingstatereportingrequirements.Theydoindicate,however,thatmillionsinforfeitureproceedsarebeingusedbylawenforcementwithlittleornoaccountingtopublicofficialsorthepublicat-large. ThelimitedprotectionsforinnocentownersandperverseincentivesofGeorgiascivilforfeitureregimemakeitripeforabuseproblemscompoundedbyalackof publicaccountability.Georgiascivilforfeiturelawsareinneedofreform.Butattheveryleast,lawenforcementshouldfollowthereporting

lawsthatarealreadyonthebooks.


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Introduction

JulianSmithfelthehadnothingtohideduringaroutinetrafficstopinRockdaleCounty,Ga.,soheconsentedtoavehiclesearch.Policethenspentanhourransackinghiscar,includingachildsdiaperbag,beforetheyfoundlessthanoneone-thousandthof anounceof marijuana.Becauseof thistracepresenceofillegaldrugs,policeassumedthe$12,000incashJulianwascarryingaspartof hisjobasamusicpromoterwasdrug-relatedandseizedit.1Withthehelpofanattorney,JulianrecoveredhismoneybecauseGeorgialawdoesnotallowforfeiturewhenthe

suspectedcrimeispossessionof lessthanfourouncesof marijuana,2butitcosthim$8,000inlegalfees.3

Throughcivilassetforfeiture,lawenforcementagenciescanseizepropertymerelywithasuspicionitisconnectedtoacrimeevenif theownerhasnotbeenaccused,letaloneformallyconvicted.Incontrasttocriminalassetforfeiture,wherepropertyistakenonlyafteraconviction, civil assetforfeiturelawsallowlawenforcementtotakeactionagainstthepropertyitself.Thepropertycanbedeemedguiltyandtakenregardlessoftheinnocenceof theowner. TheincentivesinGeorgiaforpursuingsuchactionsaresignificant.Theagencythatseizestheassetskeepsupto100percentoftheproceedsminusafeepaidtotheDistrictAttorneysofficeforprocessing,usuallyaround10percent.Fromthere,itishardto

tellwhattheseagenciesdowithforfeitedproperty.WhileaGeorgiastatute 4requireslawenforcementagenciestoreportproceedsfromforfeituretothelocalgovernmentsthatprovidetheirfinancing,manymunicipalitieshavenorecordof thesereportsandalargenumberof lawenforcementagenciesadmittobeinginnon-compliancewiththereportinglaw. Whileitisimpossibletodetermineexactlywhereseizedpropertyisgoing,someindividualcasessuggestproceeds

arenotalwaysusedforlegitimatelawenforcementpurposes.Inoneinstance,CamdenCountySheriffBillSmithwasvotedoutof officeafteritwaspublicizedthatheusedseizedassetstopurchasea$90,000sportscaranda$79,000boatandtohireinmatestoworkonhis,hisgirlfriendsandhisex-wifesprivateproperty,amongotherquestionableexpenditures.5InDeKalbCounty,PoliceChief TerrellBoltonassigned10vehiclesforhispersonaluse,includinga2004RangeRovervaluedat$32,000anda2006Mercedes-Benzvaluedat$55,000.Bothwereacquiredbycivilforfeiture.

Boltonexplainedthatthevehicleswereathishomebecausehefearedanotheragencywouldtakethemanddefendedhisweekenduseof thevehiclesbyclaimingitwasneededtokeepthebatteriesandtiresinworkingorder.6 Suchabuseshighlightthedangersof alegalregimethatincentivizesforfeitureandtheneedformeaningfulpublic


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accountability.Togainabetterunderstandingof theuseof forfeitureinthePeachState,theInstituteforJusticeexaminedexistingdataandattemptedtoacquireadditionalinformationthroughpublicrecordrequests.Ultimately,wefoundthatdatawerealmostimpossibletoobtaindespitestatelawsthatrequirelawenforcementagenciestokeeprecordsandtomakethemavailabletothepublic.Whatdatawedidfindpointstosizableandincreasinguseof forfeiturebyGeorgialawenforcementofficials.

Georgias Civil ForfeitureRegime: Among the Nations

Worst

AlthoughitsuseiswidespreadthroughouttheUnitedStates,7civilassetforfeitureisnotwidelyrecognizedorunderstood.Unlikeacriminalproceedinginwhichlegalactionisbroughtagainstanindividual,incivilforfeiture,thegovernmentproceedsagainstthepropertydirectly,asifthepropertysomehowactedtoassistinthecommissionofacrime.Itisaschemebasedon18th-centurymaritimelawthatpermittedcourtstoobtainjurisdictionoverpropertywhenitwasvirtuallyimpossibletoobtainjurisdictionoverthepropertyowners

pirates,forexampleguiltyof violatingthelaw. AlthoughcivilforfeitureremainedarelativebackwaterinAmericanlawformanyyears,moderncivilforfeitureexpandedgreatlyduringtheearly1980sasgovernmentsatalllevelssteppedupthewarondrugs.Nolongertiedtothepracticalnecessitiesof enforcingmaritimelaw,theforfeiturepowernowappliestoabroadrangeof crimes.Almostallstatesandthefederalgovernmenthavecivilforfeiturelaws,andGeorgiasisamongtheworst.Indeed,arecentInstituteforJusticereportgaveGeorgiaaD-foritscivilforfeiturelawsandpractices;onlyfourotherstatesreceivedsimilarlylowgrades.8 OnekeyfeaturethatmakesGeorgiascivilforfeiturelawparticularlybadishowitshiftstheburdenof proofinforfeiturecases.Inacriminal

case,thegovernmentmustproveitscaseagainsttheaccused,whoispresumedinnocent.Ifitcannot,theaccusedgoesfree.Theburdenof proofisonthegovernment.InGeorgia,theburdentoprovethatseizedassetsarenotrelatedtocriminalactsrestsonthepersonwhoseassetswereseized.Inotherwords,thepropertyownerispresumedguiltyandhastoprovehisinnocencetogethispropertyback.9Andthegovernmentonlyneedstomeetalowpreponderanceoftheevidencestandardtoholdontoseizedassets.10Thisstandardissignificantlylowerthanthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardlawenforcementmustmeettoconvictapersonofacrime,againputtingownersatadisadvantage. AnotherreasonfortheD-gradeisthatupto100percentof forfeituremoneycangotolawenforcementunderGeorgialaw.11ThisprovidesGeorgiapolicewithastrongincentivetopursuepropertyinsteadof criminals.Italsoprovideslawenforcementwithlargeamountsof cashandotherassetsthattheydonothavetoobtainthroughthenormalbudgetarychannels,i.e.,convincingelectedrepresentativestolevytaxesorissuebonds.Thismoneyandpropertybecomesaself-fundingmechanismexemptfromthedemocraticprocess. Totrytopreventcivilforfeitureproceedsfrombecominganoff-the-booksslushfund,the

Georgialegislaturerequireslocallawenforcementagenciestoannuallyreportanditemizeallpropertyobtainedthroughcivilforfeitureaswellaswhattheydowithit.Thelawisclear:Any

locallawenforcementagencyreceivingpropertyunder[theforfeiturestatute]shallsubmitanannualreporttothelocalgoverningauthority.Thereportshallbesubmittedwiththeagencysbudgetrequestandshallitemizethepropertyreceivedduringthefiscalyearandtheutilizationmade

thereof.12 Thisspecificstatuteconcernsforfeituresrelated

todrugcrimes(whichconstitutemostcivilforfeitureactions),butstatutesof manyothercriminaloffensesincorporatethestatutebyreference.13Thus,locallawenforcementagenciesarelegallyrequiredtoreportalmostallforfeitureproceeds.

A recent Institute for

Justice report gave

Georgia a D- for its civil

forfeiture laws and

practices; only four

other states received

similarly low grades.


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Despitethiscrystalclearcommandmany,perhapsmost,Georgialawenforcementagenciessimplyfailtoreporttheirforfeitures.14Thus,millionsof dollarsfloweveryyearthroughlawenforcementcofferswithoutnoticetooutsideelectedofficialsortaxpayers.Thetemptationforabusewiththatmoneyisobvious.Themoneyandpropertyobtainedthroughforfeiturecaneasilyturnintoaslushfund.Notonlythat,thefailuretoreportisinviolationof statelaw. Itisnotasthoughthelegislaturerequiredthesereportsbutthenforgotaboutthem.In2010,thelegislaturepassedanewlawthatrequiresalllocalunitsof governmenttomaketheirfinancialrecordspubliclyavailableonawebsiterunbytheUniversityof GeorgiasCarlVinsonSchoolofGovernment.Inadditiontogeneralbudgets,thelawsinglesoutforfeiturereports.Thus,notonlydoesstatelawrequirelawenforcementtoaccountfortheirforfeituremoneyandproperty,buttheymustmakethataccountingpubliclyavailableontheInternet.

State Reporting Requirements

Ignored

Togainsomesenseof theextentof forfeitureactionsunderGeorgialaw,aswellastofindoutwhetherreportingrequirementsarebeingfollowed,werandomlyselected20Georgialawenforcementagencies15andrequestedfrom

eachagencysfinancingmunicipalityacopyof theannualforfeiturereportrequiredbylaw.Onlyeightof the20surveyedmunicipalitiesrespondedwiththerelevantinformation.16These

reportsshowthereceiptandexpenditureof amountsbetweenafewthousanddollarsandwelloverhalfamilliondollarsinasingleyear. However,of theeightlocalitiesthatsentinformationonlytwoareinfullcompliancewiththelaw.Theremainingsix

haveseveralissueswhichkeeptheminnon-compliance.First,therequestsinallsixof theselocalitieswerepassedoff tolawenforcementagencies,suggestingthemunicipalitiesarenotinpossessionof forfeitureinformationasthelawrequires.Secondly,twoof thesixresponsesdidnotappeartobeformalreportsbutsimplyinformationcompiledtofulfillouropenrecordsrequest.Finally,anothertwoof thesixmunicipalitiesdidnotreportexpendituresasrequired.Thus,basedonthisrandomsample,compliancewiththelawappearsspottyatbestwithonlytwoof the20lawenforcementagenciesreportingasrequired.

Butsincetherandomselectionofagenciesskewedtowardsmallercountiesandcities,itispossiblesomeof thesesmalleragenciesdonotparticipateasfrequentlyinstate-levelforfeitureandthereforesimplyhavenothingtoreport.Totestthistheory,werequestedannualreportsforthepolicedepartmentsinthefivemostpopulouscountiesandcitiesinGeorgia.17Werequestedthesedocumentsfromboththefinancingmunicipalitiesandlawenforcementagenciesthemselvestomaximizethechanceswewouldfindthedatawewereafter.Intotal,wemade20requestsinhopesof obtaining10documents.Wereceivedoneofthe10reportswesought.

Noneofthecountiessentaforfeiturereport.Clayton,FultonandGwinnettCountiesadmittednoreportexistedintheirrecords.CobbandDeKalbcountiessentsomerelevantforfeituredata,buthadnotcompletedtheformalreportrequiredbylaw. Amongthecities,onlySavannahprovideduswithaformalforfeiturereport.Athens-Clarkesentforfeituredatabutspecificallymentioned

Millions of dollars flow

every year through law

enforcement coffers

without notice to

outside elected officials

or taxpayers.


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inacoverletterthat[thereports]havebeenpreparedinresponseto[the]request.18Agencieswithinthecityof Atlantakeptreferringustodifferentagencies,andnoonehasyetproducedameaningfulresponse.ThecityofColumbusinformedusitdoesnotfundtheNarcoticsandViceUnitof thepolicedepartmentandthereforewouldnotbeinpossessionof thereportbuthasnotansweredourquestionaboutwhatbodydoessupplyfunding.TheColumbusPoliceDepartmenthasnotrespondedtorequestsforthereport.Asof thiswriting,officialsfromRichmondCounty(Augusta)saidtheywerestillworkingontherequest.19

Wethenfollowedupbyrequestingcopiesof requiredreportsfromsheriffsofficesinthefivecountieslistedabove.Theseofficeswereequallypoorincomplyingwiththelaw,withnoneof thefivesupplyinguswithreports(seeTable6fordetails).TheClaytonandDeKalbcountysheriffsdidnotrespondandtheCobb,FultonandGwinnettsheriffssentsomeinformationbutnottheformalreportrequiredbylaw. Insum,of15majorlawenforcementagenciesinthemostpopulatedareasof Georgia,onlyonewasabletoproducetheassetforfeiturereportrequiredbylaw.OurfindingsdonotseemtobeatypicalasastudyconductedbythePerformanceAuditOperationsDivisionof

theDepartmentof AuditsandAccountsforthestateof Georgiain2002showed85percentof26agenciessurveyeddidnotcreateanannual

forfeiturereportasrequired.Thereportalsoconcludedadditionalreportingrequirementsarenecessaryandwouldbeinexpensivetoimplement.20Untillawenforcementagenciesfollowthelaw,itwillbeimpossibleforpublicofficialsorcitizenstoknowhowmuchcashandpropertytheseagenciesareforfeitingandhowtheyareusingtheresultingproceeds.

Seeking Forfeiture Data from

Judicial Circuits

Wealsotriedgatheringforfeituredatabyrecreatingapartof the2002Performance

AuditOperationsDivisionProgramEvaluation.Thisreportincludedasurveyof Georgiasjudicialcircuitcourtstodeterminetheamountof propertyforfeitedunderstatelaw.Thiswasaone-timereportnotrequiredbystatelaw.Moreover,thereportadmitsthatthedataproducedfromthissurveyunderestimatetheextentof forfeitureasoverhalfof thecircuitsthatrespondedtothesurveydidnotreportvaluesof realpropertyforfeited.ResultsrevealcivilassetforfeitureoccurredinnearlyeveryjudicialcircuitinGeorgia,21withagenciestakinginacombined$18.5millionbetweenDecember2000andNovember2001. InhopesofgatheringcomprehensivedataonassetforfeitureunderGeorgialaw,welikewisesenteachof Georgias49circuitcourtsaletterrequestingpublicrecordsdetailingthe

Table 1

Results of foRfeituRe suRvey of 49 GeoRGia Judicial ciRcuits

Number of Circuits Percentage of Circuits

No Response 4 8.2

Request Denied 3 6.1

Unaware in Possession of Records 6 12.2

Available for Review in Person Only 14 28.6

Willing to Send 22 44.9


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totalamountof forfeiturethatoccurredinthe

jurisdictionineachyearandhowtheproceedsweredistributed. Ofthe49judicialcircuitsfromwhichwerequestedinformation,weobtainedrecordsfromonlyfive.Threecircuitsdeniedourrequest,withonecallingourrequestfordataunreasonable.22FivecircuitsthathadpreviouslyoutsourcedforfeitureproceedingstotheProsecutingAttorneysCouncilof Georgia(PAC),astatewideagencytaskedwithassistingjudicialcircuits,wereunawarerecordshadbeensentbackafterbudgetcutsrequiredPACtodiscontinueitsforfeiturework.AsixthadmitteditreceivedtherecordsbutstillreferredusbacktoPAC.23Many

circuitcourtssimplydidnotknowhowmanyforfeiturecaseswerepursuedintheirjurisdictionandhadnorecord-keepingsysteminplacetokeeptrack. Whilemorethanfivecircuitswerewillingtosenddata,thecostof obtainingitwasprohibitive.24Only20circuitswereabletoprovideuswithacostestimate.Theremainingcircuitseithergavenoinformationorgave

thehourlycostof laborthatwouldbeusedto

processtherequestbutwereunabletogiveanestimateof howmanyrecordsexistedorhowlongitwouldtaketoretrievethem.AsshowninTable3,basedontheapproximationswedidreceive,weestimatethecostof obtainingallof therelevantrecordsforthestateof Georgiawouldbemorethan$42,000,assumingallcircuitsweretocomplywiththerequest.Evenstill,thisestimatemaybeunderstated.Onecircuit,whereweoriginallyestimatedthecostat$300,respondedtoourlettersevenmonthslateraskingfor$3,500plusthecostof copiesbeforetheywouldfulfilltherequest.25 Thecourtsystemhasarecordofevery

timepoliceseizepropertyundercivilforfeiturelawandthisinformationispublicrecord.Theserecordsarenosubstituteforlawenforcementagenciesproducingandfilingrequiredreports,butattheveryleast,theywouldprovidecitizenssomeideaof howmuchpropertyisbeingtakenviacivilforfeiture.Nonetheless,itisnearlyimpossibletoaccessthisinformationwithoutspendingthousandsof dollarsandinvestinga

Table 2

summaRy of foRfeituRes by Judicial ciRcuits, 2008-2009

2008 2009

Clayton

Currency $285,325.44 $128,702.78

Property Items 227 391

Grifn

Currency $217,011.02 $217,995.36


NortheasternCurrency $130,924.68 $69,683.16


Flint

Currency $47,150.71 $94,098.78


Waycross

Currency $58,103.32 $107,108.82



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Table 3

total cost estimates foR obtaininG foRfeituRe data fRom GeoRGia Judicial ciRcuits

Alapaha $3,067.85*Alcovy $1,030.84

Appalachian $1,045.00

Atlanta $584.85*

Atlantic $584.85*

Augusta $282.32

Bell-Forsyth $534.11*

Blue Ridge $448.76

Brunswick $584.85*

Chattahoochee $3,788.03*

Cherokee $433.81

Clayton $20.75

Cobb $2,057.00

Conasauga $584.85*

Cordele $584.85*Coweta $830.00

Dougherty $584.85*

Douglas $885.25*

Dublin $584.85*

Eastern $584.85*

Enotah $1,549.80*

Flint $28.75

Grifn $81.82

Gwinnett $1,575.00

Houston $584.85*

Lookout Mountain $355.33

Macon $428.00

Middle $8,024.70*

Mountain $584.85*

Northeastern $0.00

Northern $1,151.70*

Ocmulgee $53.85

Oconee $567.50

Ogeechee $178.75

Pataula $584.85*

Paulding $623.13*

Piedmont $584.85*

Rockdale $493.45*

Rome $584.85*

South Georgia $1,100.00

Southern $450.00

Southwestern $584.85*Stone Mountain $584.85*

Tallapoosa $547.35*

Tifton $288.30*

Toombs $676.17*

Towaliga $584.85*

Waycross $55.00

Western $543.45*

Total $42,553.64

* Estimated based on averages of administrative, legal, copying and shipping costs from circuits that responded with estimates. Somecircuits provided partial information. In those cases, costs not directly quoted were estimated.


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greatdealof timesubmittingpublicrecordsrequestsandvisitingjudicialcircuitsinperson,thingstheaverageGeorgiacitizenlikelycannotdo.ThisisyetanotherreasonwhyGeorgiasreportingrequirementsareessentialandlawenforcementagenciesoughttocomplywiththem.

Federal Sources SuggestForfeiture Use Extensive and

Growing in Georgia

Withlawenforcementagenciesfailingtofollowstatereportingrequirementsandjudicial

circuitsrefusingtoprovideinformationorrequestingexorbitantsumsforit,thereisnowaytoknowhowmuchforfeitureishappeningunderGeorgialaw,norhowthefundsarebeingspent.However,twofederalsourcesgiveapictureof theextentof assetforfeitureinGeorgiaalbeitanincompleteone.ThesefederaldatasuggestthatforfeitureuseisontheriseinGeorgiaandmillionsinproceedsarebeingusedbylawenforcementwithlittleornoaccountingtopublicofficialsorthepublicat-large. First,theLawEnforcementManagementandAdministrativeStatisticssurvey(LEMAS)isastudyof lawenforcementagenciesnationwide

conductedeverythreetofouryearsbytheU.S.CensusBureaufortheBureauofJusticeStatisticswithintheDepartmentof Justice.LEMAScollectsinformationon,amongother

things,thetotalamountof fundsreceivedbyagenciesthroughdrugforfeitures.26 Second,theU.S.DepartmentofJusticesAssetForfeitureFund(AFF)reportsannuallyonassetsforfeitedviaafederalprogramcalledequitablesharinginwhichGeorgialawenforcementagenciesparticipate.Withequitablesharing,stateandlocallawenforcementcanforfeitpropertyunderfederalforfeiturelawratherthanstatelaw,aslongastheunderlyingcriminaloffenseisalsoafederaloffense.Agenciesmaydothisinjointoperations(suchasmulti-jurisdictionaltaskforces)ortotakeadvantageoffederalresourcesforprocessingforfeitureclaims.Stateandlocalagenciesturnthepropertyovertothefederalgovernmentforforfeitureproceedingsandthenreceiveasmuchas80percentoftheresultingproceedsfortheirownuse. Bothof thesedatasourcesarelimitedandneitherisasubstituteforthekindof detailedagency-levelreportingrequiredbyGeorgialaw.TheLEMASsurveyisonlydoneeverythreetofouryears,themostrecentdatamadepublicareeightyearsoldandthesurveycoversonlyasampleof Georgialawenforcementagencies.LEMASalsodoesnotdistinguishbetweenforfeituresunderstateandfederallaw,sothesedatamaycontainsomeof both.Equitable

sharingdataarereportedannuallyandcoverallagenciesthatparticipateintheprogram,butreportonlyhowmuchGeorgiaagencies

Table 4

foRfeituRe PRoceeds foR lemas-suRveyed aGencies*

Total Assets Forfeited

1993 $6,134,768

1997 $22,516,125

2000 $10,354,997

2003 $33,672,939

Total $72,678,829

*LEMAS covers only a sample of agencies in Georgia. These gures likely underestimate the total value of assets forfeited in Georgiaby local law enforcement agencies. See endnote 26 for more information.


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receivefromforfeitureunderfederallaw,notstatelaw(thoughitisunlikelythatagenciesengaginginfederalforfeiturearenotalsousingstateprocedures).Finally,neitherdatasourceaddressesexpenditures,orwhatagenciesarespendingforfeitureproceedsoncriticalinformationforensuringaccountabilityinthecivilforfeitureprocess. Itisalsoworthnotingthatbothofthesesourcesincludedatafrombothcivilandcriminalassetforfeitureanddonotreportthemseparately.However,sincetheLEMASsurveyandDepartmentof JusticeAFFprogram

specificallyaddressdrugforfeitureandanearlierstudyfoundthatapproximately80percentoffederaldrugforfeitureswerenotaccompaniedbyprosecution,27itissafetoassumethevastmajorityof thedatacollectedthroughthisstudyrepresentscivilratherthancriminalassetforfeiture. AsshowninTable4,LEMASdatarevealthatGeorgialawenforcementagencieshave

receivedasubstantialamountof forfeituremoney.28Datashowasharpupwardtrendduringtheperiodfrom1993to2003,themostrecentyearforwhichLEMASdataareavailable. 29In1993,theagenciessurveyedtookinabout$6millionthroughforfeiture,butby2003thatnumberrosetomorethan$33million.ItisimportanttoremembertheLEMASdataareunderstatedandlikelybyasignificantamount.Forexample,the2003LEMASsurveyshowed47agenciesof78surveyed30takinginproceedsthroughsometypeofassetforfeitureprogram.Incontrast,115Georgiaagenciesparticipatedin

DOJequitablesharinginthesameyear. Equitablesharingdatashowasimilartrendlargeandincreasingamountsofpropertybeingseizedbylawenforcementagencies.Table5reportstotalequitablesharingpaymentstoGeorgiaagenciesfrom2000to2010,andFigure1showsagraphicalrepresentationof thesedata.Overthistimeperiod,equitablesharingproceedstoGeorgialawenforcementagencies

Table 5

foRfeituRe PRoceeds Received by GeoRGia aGencies fRom the

dePaRtment of Justice equitable shaRinG PRoGRam, 2000-2010

Total Assets Forfeited*

2000 $13,997,177

2001 $11,476,049

2002 $10,578,412

2003 $10,113,910

2004 $10,544,040

2005 $13,852,774

2006 $20,266,682

2007 $23,866,060

2008 $15,878,429

2009 $25,133,072

2010 $28,660,009

Total $184,366,614

*Includes cash and proceeds from sale of property.


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Figure 1

foRfeituRe PRoceeds foR GeoRGia aGencies fRom the

dePaRtment of Justice equitable shaRinG PRoGRam, 2000-2010*

*Includes cash and proceeds from the sale of seized assets.

$35,000,000

$30,000,000

$25,000,000

$20,000,000

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 20102005 2006


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increasedsteadilyandtotaledmorethan$185million.In2010alone,Georgiaagenciestookinarecord$28.6million,whichismorethansevenpercentof totalequitablesharingpaymentsfortheentirenationwideprogrammorethananyotherstateexceptTexasandCalifornia.31Figure2showsthatGeorgiareceivedmorethanfourtimesthenationalaverageinequitablesharingpaymentsin2010.

Lges JsdonsFofe he mos-nd Flo repo

WhileLEMASgivesonlyapartialpictureof assetforfeitureinGeorgia,itdoesallowforthetrackingofforfeitureproceedsforcertainlargeragenciesovertime.Table6showsthetotalamountofpropertyforfeitedbythefivemostpopulouscountiesandcitiesinGeorgia,32asreportedbyLEMAS.Togetherthese15lawenforcementagenciesaccountedformorethan70percentof theforfeiturereportedin

the2003LEMAS.Moreover,someoftheseagencieshavetakeninastaggeringamountof propertycomparedtotheirannualbudget.Forexample,theCobbCountySheriffsOffice,withabudgetof $12.4million,tookin$9.5millioninforfeitedproperty76percentofitsbudget.33 TheagenciesinTable6arethesameonesforwhichwesoughtannualforfeiturereportsthroughopenrecordsrequests.Theseagenciesaretakinginupwardsofhundredsof thousandsof dollarseachyearandyetarefailingtoreportexactlyhowmuchisseizedandhowitisspent. Thesepopulationcentershavealso

takeninasizeableamountof moneythroughequitablesharingpayments,asillustratedinTable7(thoughsomeof thesefundsmaybeaccountedforintheLEMASdataaswell).Overthelastsixyears,agenciesintheselocalitieshavereceivedpaymentstotalingmorethan$50million,withseverallocalitiesreceivingmorethan$2millioninasingleyear.

Figure 2

equitable shaRinG Payments to states fRom dePaRtment of Justice asset foRfeituRe fund, 2010

$0

$5,000,000

$10,000,000

$15,000,000

$20,000,000

$25,000,000

$30,000,000

$35,000,000

GA

NationalAverage


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Table 6

foRfeituRe PRoceeds of toP five most PoPulous counties and cities in GeoRGia, as RePoRted by lemas

1993 1997 2000 2003Agency

Averages

SuppliedForfeitureReport on

Request**

ForfeitureProceedsin 2009***

Counties

Cobb CountyPolice Department

$141,225 $0 $3,310,000 $456,000 $976,806 No

Cobb CountySheriffs Ofce

$446,723 $611,832 $70,000 $9,531,701 $2,665,064 No

Clayton CountyPolice Department

$80,000 $70,571 NA $45,000 $65,190 No

Clayton County

Sheriffs OfceNA $213,378 $30,000 $0 $81,126 No

Fulton CountyPolice Department

$177,506 $16,774 $42,434 $315,485 $138,050 No

Fulton CountySheriffs Ofce

NA $12,000 NA NA No

DeKalb CountyDepartment of Public Safety

$775,563 $550,000 $769,900 $985,100 $770,141 No

DeKalb CountySheriffs Ofce

$18,000 $36,909 $21,221 $14,095 $22,556 No

Gwinnett CountyPolice Department

$161,176 $329,659 $272,585 $292,314 $263,934 No

Gwinnett CountySheriffs Ofce

$45,000 $18,798 $5,000 NA $22,933 No $94,223

Cities

Atlanta Police Department $1,523,000 $1,207,441 $858,594 $11,592,328 $3,795,341 No

Richmond County

Sheriffs Ofce*$38,609 $470,192 $350,000 $900,000 $439,700 No

Columbus Police

Department$115,774 $269,625 $20,000 $205,888 $152,822 No

Savannah-Chatham

Metropolitan Police

Department

$5,077 $400,000 $6,000 NA $137,026 Yes $858

Athens-Clarke

Police Department$100,000 $19,168 $50,000 $104,345 $68,378 No

Totals $3,627,653 $4,226,347 $5,805,734 $24,442,256

Average Forfeited per Agency $279,050 $281,756 $446,595 $2,222,023

Order based on population.*The city of Augusta does not have its own police department. It uses the services of the Richmond County Sheriffs Ofce.**No indicates a report was not provided by the agency, the agency did not respond to our request or the report provided was not in fullcompliance with the law.***Based on reports obtained through open records requests.


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conlson

Civilassetforfeiturelawscreateincentivesforlawenforcementagenciestoseizepropertyevenwhenitisunclearif acrimehasbeencommitted.Ontopoftheseperverseincentivesisthelackof accountabilityandtransparencywithforfeitedassetsandhowtheproceedsaredispersed. Georgialegislatorsrecognizedthepotentialforabuseandenactedlawsdesignedtoinformcitizensof thefrequencyof forfeiturethroughmandatoryreporting.However,lawenforcementagenciesappeartobeignoringthisrequiredreporting,leavingGeorgiacitizenstowonderhowprevalentcivilassetforfeitureanditsabusesareinthestate.Thecourtsthatprocesstheseactionsarethemselvesunabletoquantify

themagnitudeofforfeiturethatoccursintheirjurisdictionsanddonotseemtobeinterestedindoingso. Georgiascivilassetforfeitureregimeallowslawenforcementagenciestogainfinanciallybyseizingpropertyfromtheinnocent.Ideally,lawswouldbeamendedtorequirethatpeoplebeconvictedbeforetheylosetheirpropertyandtoremovetheperverseincentivesthatencouragelawenforcementtopursueforfeitures.Attheveryleast,lawenforcementagenciesinGeorgiashouldberequiredtofollowtheexistinglawsdesignedtoinformthepublicof theiractions.


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Endnotes1 Torpy,B.(2008,November30).Georgialegalscene:Controversialattorney,Atlanta Journal-Constitution,p.1D.

2 GA. Code Ann.,16-13-49(e)(2).

3 Torpy,2008.

4 GA. Code Ann.,16-13-49(u)(4)(c)(iii).

5 Williams,M.R.,Holcomb,J.E.,Kovandzic,T.V.,andBullock,S.(2010).Policing for profit: The abuse of civil assetforfeiture.Arlington,VA:InstituteforJustice.

6 Tagami,T.&Simpson,D.(2009,February21).DeKalbCEOoutlinescasetofireBolton,Atlanta Journal-

Constitution.http://www.ajc.com/services/content/printedition/2009/02/21/bolton0221.html .

7 Williams,Holcomb,Kovandzic,andBullock,2010.

8 ibid

9 GA. Code Ann.,16-13-49(e),(s).

10 Sandersv.State,259Ga.App.422,577S.E.2d94(2003).

11 GA. Code Ann.,16-13-49(u)(4).

12 GA. Code Ann.,16-13-49(u)(4)(c)(iii).

13 See, e.g.,16-5-44.1(e)(motorvehiclehijacking);16-6-13.3(b)(underageprostitution).

14 SeeState Reporting Requirements Ignoredbelow.

15 Theagencieswereselectedfromalistof thosethathadparticipatedintheU.S.Departmentof JusticesEquitableSharingProgramin2009.

16 Lawenforcementagenciesrandomlyselected(informationprovidedbyagenciesinitalics):AtlantaHIDTA,Brantley County Sheriffs Office,BrooksCountySheriffsDepartment,CandlerCountySheriffsDepartment,DouglasCityPoliceDepartment,EarlyCountySheriffsDepartment,Forsyth County Sheriffs Office,GainesvilleCityPoliceDepartment,Georgia State Patrol(nottechnicallyrequiredbylaw),Lake City Police Department,Lamar County SheriffsOffice,LowndesCountySheriffsDepartment,Monroe CountySheriffs Office,MorganCountySheriffsOffice,Oakwood

City Police Department,TroupCountySheriffsDepartment,UpsonCountySheriffsOffice,Waycross City PoliceDepartment,Whitfield County Sheriffs Department.

17 Basedonthe2000Census.

18 LetterfromKimberlyVassak,OpenRecordsTechnicianatAthens-ClarkeCounty,December9,2010.

19 Thesefindingswerewrittenthreemonthsaftertheinitialrequestwassenttothefivemostpopulouscountiesandcities.

20 Bernard,P.E.(2002).Programevaluation:Property

forfeituresunderstateandfederaldruglaws.Atlanta,GA:DepartmentofAuditsandAccounts.

21 Onecircuitdidnotreplytothesurvey.

22 EmaildatedJuly21,2010,fromTravisSakrison,DeputyChiefAssistantDistrictAttorney,DeKalbCountyDistrictAttorneysOffice.

23 TheProsecutingAttorneysCouncilofGeorgia(PAC)isastateagencythatformedin1975andprovidessupporttoprosecutorofficesthroughoutthestate.PACwasresponsibleforhandlingassetforfeitureprosecutionsinseveralcircuitsuntilthestartof Georgias2010fiscalyearwhenbudgetcutsforcedPACtoturnthistypeofprosecutionbacktotheindividualcircuits.AsofJuly1,2010PAChadreturnedforfeiturerecordstotheindividualcircuits.

24 Wepaidforandreceiveddatawherethetotalchargewaslessthan$100.Thiswasdoneinanattempttomimicwhatanaveragecitizenwouldbecapableofdoing.Evenifallcircuitshadcomeunderthis$100cap,thetotalcostof datacollectioncouldhavebeenasmuchas$4,900.

25 LetterfromChattahoocheeDistrictAttorneyJuliaSlater,February21,2011.

26 LEMASdataarebasedonasamplethatincludesallstatepoliceagencies(i.e.,statetrooperorhighwaypatrol)andlocalpoliceagencieswith100ormorefull-timeswornofficers.Inaddition,anationallyrepresentativesampleofsmallerpoliceagenciesisselectedforparticipation.Dataandsupportingdocumentationforthestudyareavailableathttp://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00092 .

27 Blumenson,E.,&Nilsen,E.(1998).Policingforprofit:Thedrugwarshiddeneconomicagenda. University ofChicago Law Review,65(1),35-114.

28 TheLEMASsurveyusesaweightingschemetoensureitisanationallyrepresentativesample.Aswearenotreportingnationalfigures,thenumbersinTable4areunweighted.Thecorrespondingweightedfiguresfor1993,1997,2000and2003are$7,856,684;$26,022,402;$20,767,039;and$38,330,861.

29 LEMASsurveysinanygivenyearaskaboutforfeitureproceedsforthepreviouscalendaryear.

30 LEMAScontacted88Georgiaagenciesin2003but10respondedwithDontknowtotheforfeiturequestionandarethusexcludedfromthisanalysis.

31 http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2010affr/report2b.htm .

32 Basedonthe2000Census.

33 CobbCountyComprehensiveAnnualFinancialReportfortheyearendingSeptember30,2002.


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Erin Norman

ErinNormanisaresearcherwhopreviouslyservedasresearchanalystattheInstituteforJusticeandworkedatLiebermanResearchWorldwide,aconsult-ing-focusedmarketresearchfirminLosAngeles.SheholdsaMastersinPublicPolicyfromTheCollegeofWilliamandMaryandgraduatedcumlaudefromBostonUniversitywithaBachelorsinBusinessAdministrationfocused

onMarketing.

Anthony Sanders

AnthonySandersisastaff attorneyattheInstituteforJusticeMinnesotaChapter(IJ-MN)wherehelitigatescutting-edgeconstitutionalcasesprotect-ingeconomicliberty,privateproperty,freedomofspeechandotherindividuallibertiesinbothfederalandstatecourtsacrossthecountry.

PriortojoiningIJ-MN,SandersservedasalawclerktoJusticeW.WilliamLeaphartontheMontanaSupremeCourt.HealsoworkedforseveralyearsinprivatepracticeinChicago.

SandersreceivedhislawdegreecumlaudefromtheUniversityof MinnesotaLawSchoolin2004,whereheservedasanarticlessubmissioneditorfortheMinnesotaLawReview.HereceivedhisundergraduatedegreefromHamlineUniversityinSt.Paul,Minnesota,andhismastersdegreefromtheUniversityofWisconsin-Madison.

Sandershaspublishedseveralarticlesinleadinglawreviews,includingananalysisof stateconstitu-tionalprotectionsofeconomiclibertiesinall50states.

About IJ

TheInstituteforJusticeisanonprofit,publicinterestlawfirmthatlitigatestosecureeconomicliberty,schoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,freedomofspeechandothervitalindividuallibertiesandtorestoreconstitutionallimitsonthepowerof government.Foundedin1991,IJisthenationsonlylibertarianpublicinterestlawfirm,pursuingcutting-edgelitigationinthecourtsof lawandinthecourtof publicopiniononbehalf of individualswhosemostbasicrightsaredeniedbythegov-ernment.TheInstitutesstrategicresearchprogramproduceshigh-qualityresearchtoinformpublic

policydebatesonissuescentraltoIJsmission.

Illustrations by Thom Zahler thomz.com

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Forfeiting Accountability