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1
Forging Collaboration for Large-Scale Technology: Government, Industry, and Energy
Innovation
By
Maja Husar Holmes Assistant Professor of Public Administration
West Virginia University P.O. Box 6322
Morgantown, WV 26501 [email protected]
W. Henry Lambright
Professor of Public Administration and Political Science Maxwell School
Syracuse University 419 Crouse-Hinds Hall 900 S. Crouse Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020 [email protected]
Paper prepared for presentation to the 11th Public Management Research Association, Syracuse, New York, June 2-5, 2011. As this is a work in progress, please do not cite without contacting the authors first.
Abstract:
A dominant theme in contemporary public administration research is collaboration. In public administration, collaboration is defined as the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve public problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations (O’Leary and Bingham 2006). Cross-sector collaboration provides a possible path for solving the endemic issue of developing and deploying large-scale technology to meet energy needs. The paper examines the extant literature on cross-sector collaboration to generate specific hypotheses relevant to large-scale energy innovations and presents a case study analysis of two government-industry collaborative projects in carbon capture and sequestration. The projects contrast in terms of whether government or industry has been the prime driver. They also differ in terms of relative smoothness or turbulence in their course from concept to actuality. Stable and strong cross-sector collaborative leadership is clearly critical as a success factor. The paper concludes with implications for future research linking collaboration and energy innovation.
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Introduction
A dominant theme in contemporary public administration research is collaboration. In
public administration, collaboration is defined as the process of facilitating and operating in
multi-organizational arrangements to solve public problems that cannot be solved or easily
solved by single organizations (O’Leary et. al 2006). Collaboration can include working with
actors from different sectors of state, business, and society in order to achieve policy goals.
Cross-sector partnerships serve to advance governance by addressing three policy deficits. The
regulatory deficit can be filled by allowing partnerships to provide new norms of acceptable
behavior by non-state actors in arenas where states have historically lacked capacity.
Partnerships can address the implementation deficit by encouraging actors to carry out policy
objectives. Partnerships help overcome participation deficit by inviting less powerful
stakeholders, such as local citizens, to deliberate over and shape public policy (Forsyth 2010).
There are, however, a number of potential challenges to developing public-private
partnerships that seek to mitigate negative social, environmental, and economic externalities,
such as in the case of developing energy innovations. Challenges include finding the right
balance between private investors’ willingness to invest and public values in sustainability
objectives that are stewarded by the government; finding an incentive structure that supports
economic and sustainability objectives; and establishing an institutional framework that
combines economic, environmental, social, and financial regulatory regimes (Koppenjan and
Enserink 2009). Existing research on cross-sector collaboration has not adequately addressed
these challenges.
Extant scholarship explores the antecedents (Grazley 2008), structures (Huxham and
Vangen 2005) and process (Thomson and Perry 2006) of collaborative public management. The
exploration of collaborative relationships has focused on the implementation of social services
(Sowa 2008), emergency management (Waugh and Streib 2006) and environmental governance
(Koontz et al. 2004). Conversely, the research on relationships of organizations across sectors
(public, private, and non-profit) has almost exclusively focused on outsourcing public services
(Van Slyke 2007). We know far less about collaborating where industry is a partner, and perhaps
even a lead partner in a cross-sector relationship. It may well be, as Bryson and Crosby (2008)
have written, that practice is outstripping theory in cross-sector partnerships. This is especially
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salient in the quest to develop and deploy technologies to address negative social, environmental,
and economic externalities inherent in meeting the public need of energy generation.
Public-private partnerships in science and technology are different from those of
traditional public-private relationships that serve to contract out public services. The traditional
role of public organizations in coordinating and monitoring the execution of public policy
through private organizations does not adequately describe the emerging relationship between
government and industry to develop and deploy large scale technological advances. These new
government-industry relationships operate largely in a policy vacuum (critical legislation and
regulation has yet to be established), the success and the risk of developing new technologies to
address public needs are uncertain, and the adoption of new technologies requires significant
political and industrial will over a lengthy period.
This paper analyzes two contrasting projects of government-industry partnerships in the
energy field. Both are large in scale (both well over $1 billion and involving a host of industry
and government parties), long-term projects, and require significant political and industrial
will to be carried out. One model is a government–driven collaboration called FutureGen based
in Illinois. The other is an industry-driven model at the Mountaineer coal-fired power plant
located in West Virginia. FutureGen was begun by President Bush, terminated under Bush, and
resurrected by President Obama. The Mountaineer project was initiated by American Electric
Power and financially supported by the U.S. Department of Energy and partially funded through
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The aim of these two projects is to develop and
demonstrate new technologies to capture and store carbon emissions produced by fossil-fuel
burning power plants. In deploying new technology, they reveal the potentialities and problems
in large-scale, complex government-industry collaborations.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section examines the extant literature on
cross-sector collaboration to generate specific hypotheses relevant to the projects. The second
section defines the policy context of developing large-scale energy innovations. The third section
presents a case study analysis of two industry-government collaborative projects as vehicles to
assess articulated hypotheses. The paper concludes with implications for future research on
assessing the impact and limits of cross-sector collaboration to deliver large scale solutions to
endemic public issues.
4
Theoretical Expectations
The vision, commitment, and resources necessary to build and sustain cross-sector
collaboration assume that institutions do not enter these partnerships lightly. Bryson and Crosby
(2008) argue that cross-sector collaboration occurs as result of failure of any one sector -
business, markets, governments, non-profit organizations, the community at large, or even the
media - to create public value (Moore 1997). Cross-sector collaboration can advance governance
by addressing three policy deficits. The regulatory deficit can be filled by allowing partnerships
to provide new norms of acceptable behavior by non-state actors in an arena where states have
historically lacked capacity. Partnerships can address the implementation deficit by encouraging
actors to carry out policy objectives. Partnerships help overcome the participation deficit by
inviting less powerful stakeholders, such as local citizens, to deliberate over and shape public
policy (Forsyth 2010).
H1: The development and deployment of large scale energy innovation projects
requires explicit collaboration across public and private sectors because of the
inability of one sector to accomplish progress on its own.
Government and industry are inherently guided by a different set of incentives and
values. Industry, especially the utility industry, strives for reliability, reduction of uncertainty,
and of course profits. Government strives to mitigate potentially negative long-term impacts of
public and private activities, assuring environmental protection, financial stability, and public
health. Cross-sector collaboration offers opportunities to reconcile competing incentives and
values by collectively establishing institutional frameworks (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009
PAR) or defining performance measures (Amirkhanyan 2008).
H2: Cross-sector collaboration provides a mechanism to reconcile the competing
incentives and values of industry and government to develop and deploy large
scale energy innovations.
Innovation is guided by the prospect of being the first to successfully commercialize an
idea, technology, or process. Inventing the technology is not enough to lead to innovation.
5
There is a growing recognition that research and development alone will not inherently lead to
technological innovation. Rather, technological innovation “is a complex process, involving
invention, development, adoption, learning, and diffusion of technology into the marketplace”
(Alic et al., 2003). Commercially deploying technologies requires a suite of actors, technology
developers and manufacturers, firms that adopt and use the technology, financial sponsors that
enable the implementation, monitoring, and validation of the technology, and government
regulators to define legal requirements and enforce compliance. In the energy sector where the
capital costs are high, the prospects of success are uncertain, and the solutions take a long time to
implement, collaborating with other public and private organizations offers an antidote to
turbulent conditions (Trist 1983) and technological and market uncertainties (Nelson 1982).
H3: Innovation in large scale technology can be understood as an inter-
organizational process, in which various organizations play different roles:
technology developer, technology user, financial sponsor or other roles. Of
particular importance is who plays the role of “driver” in the process.
Contrary to conventional wisdom that innovation is a linear model flowing from
fundamental research to development to innovation, extant research illustrates the path to
widespread adoption of new innovations as highly iterative. The path from invention to
innovation requires extensive organizational learning and incremental changes by government
and businesses. One influences the other over time. Individual organizational goals become
systemic goals in successful innovation experiences (Lambright and Teich 1976). The road to
widespread adoption of innovations, especially large-scale technologies, requires a market for
the technology, diffusion of technical and cost information, and reliable constituencies.
Policymakers use regulation, market incentives, and federal investments to spur innovation along
the bumpy road towards widespread adoption (Alic et al. 2003). The affected public plays a
critical role in large scale energy technology. Changes in energy costs influence the interest
groups at the local and national level. Public support or opposition to the implementation or
potential impact of innovation can spur or stall the path towards widespread adoption.
6
H4: Organizations concerned with innovation in technology interact in a political
environment; policymakers, affected public, and others influence the dynamics of
their relationships.
Policy Context of Emerging Large-Scale Technological Innovations
The U.S. government has a tradition of promoting, supporting, and deploying large scale
technological innovations in a variety of fields, including space, defense, and energy. The fruits
of these investments can be seen in the success of manned and unmanned missions to the moon,
the planet Mars, and Earth orbit, the unparalleled defense capabilities compared to other
countries, and the advancement of nuclear, hydro, and other fields of energy generation sources.
Each of these large scale technological advances faced issues of risk, political discord, and
implementation challenges that tested their survival. Today, with the impact of climate change
looming in the imminent future, advancing technologies that will mitigate carbon emissions is
critical.
One solution promoted by an unlikely set of actors that includes environmental scientists,
environmental advocacy organizations, technology manufacturers and utility industry is the
development and deployment of large scale capture and storage (or reuse) of carbon emissions
from energy generation facilities. In 2004, a team of Stanford scientists argued for deploying
existing technology to stabilize carbon emissions globally. One of their hallmark proposals was
to create a technology “wedge” to stabilize carbon emissions by implementing carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS) at existing coal and natural gas plants (Pacala and Socolow 2004).
Environmental advocacy organizations, specifically Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Clean Air Task Force, and World Resources
Institute (WRI), actively support the commercialization of CCS technology, recognizing that
coal and natural gas will continue to fuel energy generation globally in the near-term. Even
though many environmental groups would like to abandon fossil-fuel burning power plants and
leap to renewable energy sources, the current reality that two-thirds of all electricity produced in
the U.S. is generated by fossil-fuel burning power plants limits this reality. As a result various
environmental organizations have partnered with utility users, technology developers,
policymakers, and others to promote the adoption and implementation of CCS technology.
Collectively, these organizations promote policy solutions to advance commercialization of CCS
7
technologies, bring together key stakeholders around CCS innovations, and serve to educate
policymakers, regulators, and citizens at the state, local, national, and international level on
potential impact of CCS on climate change.
Perhaps the most unlikely group of actors in adopting CCS technologies is the utility
companies. A small, yet influential, group of utility companies, including American Electric
Power (AEP), Southern Company, and Duke Energy, have independently piloted project
demonstrations to develop and deploy CCS technology. These industry projects face regulatory,
investment, and legal hurdles in transitioning to larger commercial scale projects. Mass
commercialization of CCS technology requires direct government support (financial and
otherwise), clarification and adoption of key regulations, and buy-in from state public service
commissions (that regulate electricity rates), landowners, and potentially affected citizens, who
pay for the electricity or who perceive possible harm from carbon sequestration in their
backyard.
At the national level, the U.S. Department of Energy has emerged as a key player in
coordinating the government promotion of CCS technology. In the last decade, CCS technology
has gained momentum as a way to mitigate the single largest source of carbon emissions from
electricity-generating power plants (EIA 2010), while maintaining continued demand for low
cost electricity. CCS is particularly salient as global demand for electricity continues to rise,
especially from coal sources, and international pressure mounts to reduce carbon emissions to
mitigate the potential impact of climate change. The concept of CCS represents an opportunity
for the government to partner with industry to successfully develop and adopt large scale
commercialization of CCS technologies.
The following section presents two case studies of government-industry partnerships to
deploy CCS technology. The case studies of the two projects serve as a vehicle to assess extant
hypotheses about cross-sector collaboration. The two case studies include an analysis of the
CCS projects developed through FutureGen and AEP’s Mountaineer Power Plant.
Case 1: FutureGen
In May 2001, Vice-President Dick Cheney released the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEPD) Report. One of the recommendations for promoting “reliable,
affordable, and environmentally sound energy for America’s future” included investing $2
billion over 10 years in research for clean coal technology (NEPDG 2001). The report cited the
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progress made through the U.S. Department of Energy Clean Coal Technology program to
reduce Sulfur Dioxide (SOx), Nitrogen Oxide (NOx), and mercury emissions from coal-fired
power plants. The report also highlighted the emergence of a new technology to dramatically
increase the efficiency of coal-fired power plants, integrated gasification combined cycle
(IGCC). What the report lacked was explicit acknowledgement for the need to reduce carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions to meet U.S.’s energy demand.
In the following months the Bush Administration established the Clean Coal Power
Initiative (CCPI) to facilitate government-industry partnerships to increase investment in clean
coal technology. The CCPI program selected projects for its government-private sector
partnerships through an open and competitive process. In January 2003, eight projects were
selected under the first round CCPI solicitation, of which two were withdrawn. Of the
remaining six projects supported by the first round of the CCPI, one was discontinued before
award, two were discontinued during project development, and three have been completed (DOE
2011a).
Birth of FutureGen
On February 27, 2003, the emphasis on clean coal technologies took an even more high-
profile turn with the announcement by President Bush to fund a $1 billion venture with the
electric power industry to design, build, and operate the world’s first coal-fired, zero-emissions
power plant. The U.S. government pledged $700 million from the Department of Energy budget
and an alliance of energy and power companies collectively committed $250 million to the
FutureGen project. Additional funding came from the governments of India, China, Australia,
and South Korea. While CCPI programs offered opportunities for improving efficiency in
power generation (and potentially reduce carbon emissions), the FutureGen project was
conceived to eliminate the release of carbon emissions to the atmosphere. FutureGen was billed
as a first of its kind international flagship enterprise to integrate carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) with IGCC technology in a single commercial scale plant. It linked financial sponsors,
coal companies, utility companies, and policymakers in an alliance focused on a massive
demonstration project.
FutureGen was the biggest innovation globally. Europe, Asia, and Australia had yet to
deploy CCS technology. FutureGen offered countries, especially India and China, an opportunity
to demonstrate commitment to climate change and access to potential new technology by
9
contributing to FutureGen funding. Given that much of India was still not electrified, India had
concerns about the cost of CCS implementation. China’s interest in CCS was that it wanted to
do it, but China did not wanted to be first, and it did not want to be the only nation deploying
CCS. They initiated research and development on CCS a bit later than some of the western
nations, but once the U.S. initiated FutureGen, the Chinese moved forward with their own
version of FutureGen called GreenGen.
For the original industrial companies FutureGen served as an opportunity for their
engineers to gain experience with a new technology. A formal partnership arrangement was
created in April 2005, between U.S. Department of Energy and a dozen electric utility and coal
companies from around the world.i While coal companies were part of the alliance, the balance
of power lay with the electric utilities. The FutureGen Industrial Alliance was structured as a
501(c)(3) non-profit organization, with the following clarification:
None of the members of the Alliance will realize any direct financial benefit from
their contributions to the Alliance. As a not-for-profit entity, the Alliance will own
the power plant and sell the electricity, water, and other useful byproducts to the
marketplace. Any revenues derived from operations and sales will be used to
offset the project’s operating costs (FIA 2010, 3).
This arrangement emphasized the research-mission of the FutureGen project. If revenue
generation was not the goal for the industrial partners of the FutureGen Alliance, the research in
action was a direct benefit to the partners. The benefit to the electric utility and coal companies
was that FutureGen was an opportunity for experience building. The value of this experience
was paraphrased by one DOE staffer involved with the FutureGen project.
There is no substitute for having engineers’ boots on the ground. It is one thing to
read reports about why one technique worked over another. It is another to be
involved directly when decisions were being made. The direct experience is
invaluable for replicating and building on future opportunities. Ultimately one
demonstration can answer a lot of questions (Holmes, interview with anonymous
DOE official, June, 2010)
For the U.S. government, FutureGen represented a flagship program propelling energy
technology development to address carbon emissions and reduce costs for electricity subscribers.
Interest in carbon sequestration, and ultimately in carbon capture, began under the Clinton
10
Administration, arguably spurred by the 1997 Kyoto protocol discussions. In 1999, U.S.
Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson addressed an audience of coal experts
emphasizing that “carbon sequestration must become the third leg of our climate change strategy
– joining energy efficiency and the greater use of low- or no-carbon fuels” (Kripowics 2000, 4).
Congressional appropriations for research on carbon sequestration grew from $50,000 in 1999 to
$19 million in 2001. When President Bush took office in 2001, the Administration reframed
carbon capture and sequestration as an opportunity to promote technological innovation, rather
than explicitly mitigate carbon emissions. One observer of the FutureGen project noted that
despite administration rhetoric denouncing claims about climate change, there was much support
for research and development on CCS (Forbes 2010). Moreover, it appeared that FutureGen
project itself was spearheaded and firmly supported by the new Bush-appointed DOE Secretary,
Spencer Abraham. In February 2003 remarks announcing the creation of the Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum, a mechanism to develop high level international commitment
for developing and deploying CCS, and promoting FutureGen, Secretary Abraham noted that:
FutureGen will be one of the boldest steps our nation takes toward a pollution-
free energy future. Virtually every aspect of this plant will be based on cutting
edge technology. The plant will be a living prototype - a global showcase - testing
and evaluating new technologies as they emerge from research and development
(2000).
Finding a Site for FutureGen
The implementation strategy for getting FutureGen sited, developed, built, and fully
operational was ambitious. DOE aimed to the have the 275-megawatt power plant operating at
full-scale continuously by 2012. This meant that DOE and the FutureGen Industrial Alliance
had to articulate the specifics of a public-private partnership, conduct a site-identification
process, and build the power plant in less than 10 years (DOE 2004). To meet these ambitious
goals, the project required political support and industrial will. The international interest and
sponsorship was a bonus.
Political support for FutureGen was manifested in the departure from the traditional 50
percent maximum cost share the agency charged for research and development projects. The
funding arrangement for FutureGen required the U.S. federal government to foot 74 percent of
the costs. To shepherd the development of FutureGen through the implementation phase, DOE
11
created a project management position. DOE actively recruited individuals with significant
political and budget management experience, rather than those with an engineering background,
to fill the position. DOE believed that more important than understanding the engineering
aspects of FutureGen was managing the budget and political process of the project. The
implementation of FutureGen would require coordinating with other federal agencies, including
Environmental Protection Agency and State Department, state and local governments interested
in siting FutureGen, and state-level Public Service Commissions.
Domestic politics also played a role in FutureGen. DOE entered into a cooperative
agreement with the FutureGen Industrial Alliance to conduct the site selection process. The
FutureGen Industrial Alliance, under the oversight of DOE, was tasked with developing the
Request for Proposal for the site selection process. In an effort to make the RFP as objective as
possible, the FutureGen Industrial Alliance identified over 100 “qualifying and scoring criteria”
for evaluating the proposals.
Interest in bringing FutureGen to specific states was high. Twelve sites responded to the
RFP, including four from Illinois, two from Ohio, and one each from West Virginia, Kentucky,
Wyoming, and North Dakota. The interest in Texas was so high that the state completed an
initial selection process and ultimately submitted two proposals to the FutureGen Industrial
Alliance. In addition to the written proposal process, the Alliance also conducted site visits for
all twelve proposals. Four sites were initially eliminated by the Alliance because they did not
meet all the evaluation criteria.ii To finalize the list of four potential sites to build the FutureGen
facility, the Alliance compared the top five sites based on “best value criteria.” These included
factors such as cost and ownership of land, expedited permitting, power sales, and CO2 title and
indemnification. In the end, the Alliance selected four sites for the Candidate Site List which
included Matton (Illinois), Tuscola (Illinois), Heart of Brazos(Texas), and Odessa (Texas).
With the conclusion of the candidate site list, DOE could move forward with completing
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements for the four candidate sites (FIA
2006).
The site selection process was intended to be driven by objective criteria, transparency in
defining and communicating the site selection criteria and scoring. The response to the
announcement of two Texas sites and two Illinois sites as candidates for the construction of
FutureGen sparked cries of political favoritism. More likely factors that influenced the choice of
12
the four candidate sites included the presence of a “geological sweet spot” in Texas and
especially in Illinois and regulatory support from the respective state governments. The geology
of the sites provided the necessary depth to sequester CO2 and density of the caprock to contain
the CO2. Policymakers in Texas and Illinois state governments had agreed to assume liability
for the geological storage of CO2 (GAO 2009). Moreover, there is evidence that Illinois state
officials had been actively marshalling support from local governments, economic development
interest groups, state agencies, and the media to win support for the FutureGen site (Hund and
Greenberg 2010).
The unique arrangement of using a non-profit organization to coalesce industrial groups
to provide additional financial support and the staffing resources to build FutureGen was a test of
industrial will in itself. The user-driven FutureGen Industrial Alliance was tasked with
managing the site selection process, recruiting and retaining industrial companies to commit to
the construction of FutureGen, and managing the project message. As a non-profit organization,
the FutureGen Alliance had a Board of Directors that included representatives from the founding
companies. Mike Mudd, a former executive with AEP and one of the original utility companies
that founded FutureGen Industrial Alliance, initially served as the Alliance’s acting CEO. In
November 2006 as the FutureGen Industrial Alliance moved forward to select the final site the
Board of Directors elected Mike Mudd to serve as CEO. The industrial interest in the FutureGen
project continued to grow as the Alliance added two additional companies in 2006.
A significant purpose of the FutureGen partnership for DOE was building relationships
with other nations to promote the development and deployment of CCS projects globally. From
the onset there was clear international interest in FutureGen. Selling the FutureGen project
internationally was both an “easy and a tough sell.” It was an easy sell, because for a relatively
low price tag, it carried a high symbolic value. The implication was that countries funding
FutureGen were contributing to a “first of a kind.” It was a tough sell because contributing
countries had a low level of responsibility and control of the project. The U.S. Department of
Energy wanted control over the project. Certain countries wanted more direct managerial
involvement in the project. The FutureGen Industrial Alliance and DOE were not interested in
sharing control. U.S. Office of Management and Budget was initially supportive (read
mandating) of international contributions to the project. But the State Department and DOE
were tasked with managing the diplomatic relations, so that international funders felt welcome
13
even though they were not involved directly in technical and managerial decisions. The expected
or desired roles of the different players got muddled as a result.
Testing the Strength of the Partnership
By 2006, FutureGen was reaching a pivotal point. The project was launched under an
ambitious timetable, striving for an operational date of 2012. Yet the final site selection was still
underway. Four potential candidate sites were selected and announced by the FutureGen
Industrial Alliance in July 2006. DOE began the environmental assessment process required by
NEPA for all four sites. DOE issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in May
2007 and a Final EIS in November 2007. The 2005 FutureGen Site Selection RFP noted that
DOE would issue its own acceptable list of candidate sites at the conclusion of the NEPA
process. DOE’s Record of Decision for the NEPA process was expected in September 2007.
The actual announcement of the final site selection occurred in December 2007. Even though on
paper the FutureGen project was seemingly progressing on schedule a number of emerging
issues were testing the strength of the industrial partnerships developed through the Alliance and
the partnership between the Alliance and DOE.
Interest in participating in the Alliance from utility and energy companies began to wane
as the project moved at what they regarded at a slow pace. FutureGen was not intended to make
money for the electric utility and coal producing companies. It was an opportunity to gain access
to critical engineering experience and project environmental concern. The lack of progress on
FutureGen reduced their incentive to collaborate. Moreover, some companies both within the
U.S. and globally were initiating CCS projects without government financial support.
On the policy side, DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham, who was an advocate of
FutureGen, left DOE in 2005 and Samuel Bodman took over in his role. Secretary Bodman
appeared to have much less interest in FutureGen than his predecessor. Additionally, DOE
launched several new initiatives in 2005 and 2006 aimed at creating alternative CCS research
and development opportunities for utility companies. These funding streams were smaller in
scale, and so was the expected CO2 capture capacity. But as result, utility and energy companies
began seeing partnership opportunities for developing CCS technology beyond FutureGen.
The most visible challenge affecting the FutureGen project and the cohesion of the
partnership between the Alliance and DOE was the escalating cost of the project. In 2003, DOE
made a commitment to fund 74 percent of the project. By 2007, the projected cost of the project
14
escalated as a result of higher material and well drilling costs and other inflationary increases
(GAO 2010). Throughout 2007, the Alliance sought to secure commitment from DOE on
covering the escalating costs. For example, in an April 2007 project status update to DOE,
Alliance CEO Michael Mudd reiterated that industry was contributing over $400 million to the
FutureGen project with no expectation of financial return or intellectual property rights.
Fork in the FutureGen Road
As 2007 came to an end, the Alliance was anxious to announce a final site selection for
the FutureGen site. In November 2007, DOE issued a final EIS for the NEPA process in
assessing the candidate sites and found all four sites suitable. By law DOE had to wait 30 days
to issue a Record of Decision that finalized the recommendations. DOE was under increasing
pressure to address the escalating costs of the project and the anticipated value of the outcome of
FutureGen. The cost estimates for FutureGen jumped from $1 billion to $1.8 billion, mostly
related to the cost of rising steel and raw material prices (i.e. copper). DOE, under Bodman’s
leadership, was seeking to renegotiate DOE’s financial commitment with the FutureGen
Alliance. It asked the Alliance to delay the announcement of the final site selection until the cost
commitments had been renegotiated. The Alliance, however, had already made its decision on a
site location and was ready to meet its expected announcement deadline. On December 18, the
FutureGen Alliance announced that Mattoon, Illinois would be the future site of FutureGen.
DOE responded within hours by stating that it would not sign any Record of Decision on the
EIS. A Record of Decision is required for the federal funds to be expended for construction.
This decision point for DOE represented a choice between focusing on smaller scale
technology development that created a more diverse and potentially more efficient pipeline of
component innovations, or FutureGen, a full scale comprehensive power plant. The rationale
was that companies were themselves developing advanced technology, but needed help to build
it up. “Yes, FutureGen would be huge if it works,” noted one official with DOE, but it needed to
close the gap to where the risk was manageable(Holmes, anonymous interview with DOE
official June 2010). DOE also saw its mission as to promote energy innovations. The question
was if FutureGen was the best means for doing so? The challenge was to promote innovations
with risk adverse utility companies.
As FutureGen costs rose, the question was where the additional money was going to
come from. There was concern that if DOE’s Office of Fossil Fuels put additional money into
15
FutureGen, the Office in essence became the “Office of FutureGen.” The only other alternative
was to seek additional funding from Congress or negotiate a power purchase agreement with the
State of Illinois (this guaranteed that Illinois bought power from FutureGen, securing a revenue
stream). Neither option was pursued with much vigor by DOE. The decision point climaxed
with a January 30, 2008 letter. DOE notified the FutureGen Alliance that it would terminate
support for FutureGen at Mattoon, citing two concerns: First, “the Department’s serious concerns
over the substantial escalation of projected costs” and second “the Alliance’s insistence
regarding project financing” (DOE 2008)
Restructuring FutureGen
The early days of 2008 were marked by uncertainty for the FutureGen project on several
fronts. The United States was in the midst of an election year that would bring a new
administration to the U.S. Presidency, the U.S. and global economy was showing signs of a
potential downturn, and the FutureGen project was at a stalemate. Illinois senators continued to
back the FutureGen site selection choice to build a new power plant in Matoon, Illinois. DOE
sought to restructure FutureGen funding to support CCS implementation by retrofitting a power
plant rather than a newly built power plant sited for Mattoon, IL (DOE 2011b). The FutureGen
Alliance representatives testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations to secure
funding for the project in May 2008. A month later, DOE announced that it would cease funding
for the FutureGen site in Matoon, IL. By July 2008, the FutureGen Alliance succeeded in
getting the Senate to pass legislation to secure $134 million in funding for the Matoon site of
FutureGen (FIA 2008). The gap between the principal financial sponsor, DOE, and the
FutureGen Industrial Alliance remained wide.
The original FutureGen project was going nowhere. The U.S. economy stood on the
verge of collapse as the summer drew to a close, and the fall brought the election of a new U.S.
President. Funding and focus of FutureGen related projects remained in limbo. The Obama
appointee for Secretary of Energy Steven Chu took office in January 2009 and within six months
reversed the Bush Administration decision to halt funding of the FutureGen project in Matoon.
Secretary Chu authorized just over $1 billion of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) funding to support the construction of a new power plant in Matoon. The one billion
dollars represented a third of the $3.4 billion ARRA funding allocated for carbon capture and
16
storage initiatives. The principal sponsor was back in the partnership, but the industrial alliance
was weakening.
The FutureGen Industrial Alliance was now facing an internal threat. Three of the
original members of the Alliance defected. American Electric Power (AEP), Southern
Company, and PPL Corporation withdrew their financial support from the FutureGen Industrial
Alliance in July 2009. Moreover, the window of opportunity for being on the forefront of energy
technology innovation was closing. The IGCC technology slated as a groundbreaking
innovation in the FutureGen proposal was already being demonstrated at other sites globally. The
cutting-edge uniqueness of FutureGen technologies was sunsetting.
By July 2009, the project was being advanced on multiple fronts with varying degrees of
coordination. DOE, under the leadership of Secretary Chu, appeared interested in moving
forward with the original FutureGen Alliance decision to site the project in Matoon. A year and
a half after the NEPA Final EIS was completed, DOE issued a Record of Decision supporting all
four candidate sites proposed by FutureGen Industrial Alliance in 2008. Issuing the Record of
Decision was a critical step in moving forward with the Matoon site. The Record of Decision
also articulated significant changes to the project, including a reduction in required carbon
emission capture and technical modifications to allow for a variety of coal types to be used at the
power plant.
The FutureGen Industrial Alliance was actively seeking new members to help finance the
project given the recent departure of the three key utility companies. Recruiting new members
proved to be a difficult sell given the state of the economy and the continued uncertainty in how
the costs would be recuperated, given that electricity rates were highly regulated. By 2010, the
FutureGen Alliance recruited Exelon Corporation, a utility company, and Caterpillar, a
manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, to join the Alliance and provided additional
financing.
The continued slow progress in finalizing the funding structure and technological design
changes (i.e., transitioning carbon capture technology from IGCC to oxy-combustion
technology) was putting the project at risk for cancellation once again. The deadline for
obligating the ARRA appropriations was closing in. The total ARRA funding for the DOE
Office of Fossil Energy, which was responsible for coordinating the FutureGen project, was $3.4
billion. The FutureGen financing represented a third of the ARRA funding to DOE’s Office of
17
Fossil Fuels. Not obligating the billion dollars by the deadline would have been disastrous for the
Office of Fossil Fuels, as well as for its flagship project.
As the summer of 2010 drew to a close, FutureGen took one last turn in the road.
Secretary Chu and Illinois Senator Dick Durbin jointly issued a video announcement on the
Senator’s website that FutureGen would be constructed at an existing power plant in Illinois, not
built at a new construction site in Matoon, Illinois (Durbin 2011). Within weeks DOE selected
the Meredosia Power Plant, owned by Ameren Energy Resources, as the site. Babcock and
Wilcox, a utility construction company was added to the cooperative agreement to receive the
ARRA funding to install oxycombustion technology to capture the carbon at the Meredosia
Power Plant. FutureGen Industrial Alliance maintained a role in the cooperative agreement with
DOE, but its responsibility was now reduced to developing the pipeline, geological sequestration
site, research center, and jobs training site for the project. The goal for FutureGen 2.0, as it was
now officially called, was to begin renovating the Meredosia power plant and constructing the
carbon emission pipeline by 2012 and completing the project by the end of 2015.
This third advent of FutureGen prompted yet another round of siting competition to
determine the location of geological sequestration of the carbon captured at the Meredosia Power
Plant. The FutureGen Industrial Alliance issued a Formal Request for Site Proposals in October
2010 that included funding for a CCS research, education, training and visitor center (FIA
2010b). Within one month, six communities submitted full proposals and a month later the
FutureGen Industrial Alliance narrowed the site selection choice to four candidates (FIA 2010c).
On February 28, 2011 the FutureGen Industrial Alliance selected Morgan County to site the
carbon storage (FIA 2011).
Case 2: AEP Mountaineer Power Plant
In 1981 on the banks of the Ohio River, American Electric Power built its fourth coal-
fired power plant in West Virginia and aptly named it Mountaineer, a powerful state symbol of
West Virginia. The power station provides 1300 MW of electricity, which was enough electricity
to service a city of over a half a million residents. Since it was built 30 years ago, AEP had
replaced Mountaineer’s taller chimney stack with a shorter stack that included scrubbers to meet
Clean Air Act regulations. The Mountaineer power station is one of AEP’s most stable operating
plants, provided with a consistent source of coal located adjacent to the power plant.
18
In 2003, AEP as a company was undergoing significant changes. E. Linn Draper, who
served as Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of AEP for ten years, was retiring.
In the past ten years, AEP had expanded and grown to become the leading producer of electricity
in the U.S. It also became the single largest source of CO2 emissions in the U.S. (NRDC 2011).
The company was still responding to the general shocks affecting the utility industry with the
collapse of Enron in 2001 and the massive Northeast power outage of 2003. Moreover,
legislative, regulatory, and business competiveness issues of mitigating climate change at the
global level were looming on the horizon for utility companies. The 1997 Kyoto Convention had
encouraged nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through national measures. Even though
the provisions of the Kyoto Convention were never ratified by the United States, Kyoto spurred a
series of proposed bills in the U.S. Congress to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, mostly
focusing on alternative cap and trade mechanisms (Larson 2011). The Kyoto Convention also
prompted several state and local governments to commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Since 2005, several Governors have issued Executive Orders or signed state legislation to begin
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. AEP was in the crosshairs to either innovate to reduce CO2
emissions or face potential regulation that would diminish its capacity to grow as a company.
AEP had a history of providing low-cost, reliable electricity that took advantage of fuel
sources close to its power stations. With its base of operations in Ohio and significant utility
resources in West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, and Indiana, AEP relied heavily on coal for
electricity generation. It expanded its energy and fuel resources beyond the greater Appalachian
region to include low sulfur coal mined from Wyoming and Montana and natural gas resources.
Yet, approximately two-thirds of the electricity generated by AEP continued to come from coal-
fired power plants (Morris 2010). Given its heavy reliance on coal-based fuel to generate
electricity and regulatory mandates set forth by the 1970 Clean Air Act and its subsequent
amendments in the 1990s, AEP was an early adopter of SOx and NOx removal technologies.
AEP had to face emissions reductions head on given its status as one of the largest utility
companies in the U.S.
Birth of CCS at Mountaineer
By 2000, the possibility of regulation of carbon emissions was looming on the horizon.
AEP took a decisively active role in being on the forefront of the carbon regulation debate
because it would directly impact its bottom line. AEP had little control and political capacity to
19
raise electricity rates in the states that it served. AEP argued that the customers and public utility
commissions expected low electricity rates and were hesitant to raise rates to cover emission
controls. AEP’s strategy to address impending policy changes on carbon emissions was to take
the stance of an early adopter (Morris 2010). It would move energy emissions innovation before
being forced to do so. AEP wanted to take the lead in the utility industry.
In 2003, AEP became a founding member of the Chicago Carbon Exchange (CCX), a
voluntary greenhouse gas emission and offset trading platform. CCX members make a legally-
binding commitment to meet annual greenhouse gas reduction requirements. AEP committed to
cumulatively reduce or offset 48 million metric tons of CO2 from 2003-2010 (AEP 2010). AEP
has also been actively lobbying for federal legislation that created a federal cap and trade system
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lobbied against legislation that targeted specific sectors
of the economy, such as the electric utility sector. Internally, AEP began exploring CCS
technologies. At the time many companies were “dabbling in CCS, vendors, utility companies,
even BMW” but no one company was taking specific action on implementing CCS (Morris
2010).
In 2002, DOE launched a research initiative to test the geological storage of carbon
sequestration in saline formations. DOE entered into an agreement with Battelle, AEP, BP,
Schlumberger, and the Ohio Coal Development Office to implement the $4.2 million test project.
DOE, through its National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), provided $3.2 million in
funding. AEP volunteered its Mountaineer Power Station as the test site, and the other
organizations provided either financial or in-kind services for the project. The project
represented the first site-specific investigation of CO2 storage in the world located at an active
power plant.
Collectively, AEP’s strategic choices, active lobbying for carbon emission legislation and
participation in carbon sequestration research initiatives poised AEP to pioneer CCS technology.
The Mountaineer Plant specifically was identified by AEP as a potential site to develop and
deploy CCS technologies. The challenge remained in moving CCS from conception to reality.
Finding a CCS Technology for Mountaineer
The turning point for AEP in deploying CCS technology came in 2005. Michael Morris
was completing his first year as AEP’s new CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board. One of
his first directives to his Executive Management Team was to evaluate current CCS technologies
20
and recommend a technology strategy for AEP to begin capturing carbon. Concurrently, the
Bush Administration signed into law the Energy Policy Act that included $1.6 billion in funding
for clean coal technologies. The funding was predominantly intended for developing carbon
capture technology and geological storage capacity. In 2005, DOE through the Office of Fossil
Fuel began announcing funding opportunities for commercial scale CCS projects. The Energy
Policy Act authorized three funding rounds for the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI).
The mission of the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) was to “enable and accelerate the
deployment of advanced technologies to ensure clean, reliable, and affordable electricity for the
United States. The CCPI was a cost-shared partnership (with industry providing a minimum of
fifty percent of the cost) between the Government and industry to develop and demonstrate
advanced coal-based power generation technologies at commercial scale” (DOE 2011c). The
three rounds of funding focused on three distinct technologies and outcomes. The first round
solicited projects that improved power plant efficiency, economics, and environmental
performance. The second round focused on project proposals that improved mercury controls
and gasification technology in power plants. The third round solicited projects that demonstrated
advanced coal-based electricity generating technologies that captured and sequestered carbon
dioxide emissions. The objectives of Round 3 projects were explicit. The projects had to
demonstrate technologies at commercial scale and:
1. operate at 90 percent capture efficiency for CO2;
2. make progress towards capture and sequestration at less than a 10 percent increase in the
cost of electricity for gasification systems and a less than 35 percent increase for
combustion and oxy-combustion systems; and
3. make progress towards capture and sequestration of 50 percent of the facility's CO2
output at a scale sufficient to evaluate full impacts of carbon capture technology on a
generating plant's operations, economics, and performance (DOE 2011c).
AEP focused its strategy on meeting the requirements of the Round 3 of CCPI funding.
The site characterization completed at the Mountaineer Power Plant in 2003 through partial
funding provided by DOE had identified two feasible injection reservoirs. The challenge
remained for AEP in selecting a carbon capture technology strategy. Three general technologies
for carbon capture were circulating in the utility manufacturing industry. The first was
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) which was an original technology to enable
21
carbon capture. However, demonstration projects using IGCC were proving to be either
unsuccessful or yielding very high capital and production costs. The second option, Oxy-
Combustion had proved successful in other industrial applications that separated carbon, but it
had yet to be deployed by utility companies at commercial scale. This option also used oxygen
to separate the carbon, and oxygen was an expensive ingredient for the process. The third option
was the Chilled Ammonia Process. It offered a post-combustion option to capture the carbon
emissions. The Chilled Ammonia Process was patented by Alstom, a global transportation and
power generation company. The Chilled Ammonia Process had the benefit of lower costs due to
its extensive use in other industrial applications.
Building Partnerships and Technological Choice
In March 2007, AEP, the technology user, made a decisive choice to pursue the Chilled
Ammonia Process. AEP contacted Alstom, the technology developer, to negotiate an agreement
to add CCS technology at the Mountaineer Plant. AEP wanted to avoid going to the open market
for collaborators. The burden for AEP was getting the deal sealed as quickly as possible, noting
that “There was synergy is doing research on CCS technology ahead of time, picking one
solution, but once you take that leap, you do not want someone to beat you to the punch” (Morris
2010). Alstom agreed immediately to work with AEP to construct a plant parallel to the
Mountaineer Plant that would capture carbon using the Chilled Ammonia Process.
AEP’s decision to partner with Alstom paved the way for DOE to provide additional
funding and technical support through Battelle to conduct a ten-year proof of concept effort.
The DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy contributed $7.2 million while Alstom and AEP contributed
$1.4 million for the initial phases of the project. The proof of concept focused on small-scale
pilot projects that offered process validation. DOE wanted to use the proof of concept projects to
illustrate lessons learned for deployment. The proof of concept projects had redundancies built-in
and were “gold-plated,” a fact that made them cost more or take longer to develop. The point
was to find all the quirks of the new technology and mitigate them (Sarkus and McMillan 2010).
In the case of the Mountaineer Power Plant, the proof of concept project would generate 20 MW
of electricity and capture 100,000 tons of carbon dioxide annually. In comparison, the
Mountaineer Plant currently generates approximately 1,300 MW of electricity and emits almost
7 million tons of CO2 annually without CCS technology. Hence, the proof of concept project
represented only 1.5% of the plant’s capacity.
22
By 2009 RWE, a German based utility company, and EPRI, the electricity industry’s
research institution, joined AEP and Alstom as project sponsors. Collectively, the two new
parnters committed $100 million to the proof of concept project to implement Chilled Ammonia
Process for carbon capture and sequestration at the Mountaineer Plant. In September of that
same year AEP successfully captured carbon emissions from the plant. A month later AEP
injected the carbon a mile and half underground through wells located on AEP-owned property
(DOE 2011d).
AEP leveraged the success of the proof of concept to secure an additional $334 million to
scale up the project. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2008 authorized funding
for a second set of CCPI Round 3 initiative that supported the commercialization of CCS
technologies. In December 2009 the Mountaineer Plant was selected by DOE to be eligible for
the cost share demonstration project. AEP and Alstom would provide half of the $668 million
required to scale up the project and DOE would provide the other half. Financial sponsors,
technology developers and technology users worked in a tight collaborative system led by AEP
to decisively move forward as quickly as possible. The aim was to evolve toward a commercial
scale CCS project.
Generating Global Support
AEP’s commercial-scale installation of CCS technology continues to progress in 2011.
Since the project involved federal funding through CCPI, DOE was required to meet NEPA
requirements by conducting a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In June 2010, DOE
filed a Notice of Intent to prepare the EIS for the CCS project at the Mountaineer Power Plant.
By 2011, DOE had issued the Draft EIS for financing the Mountaineer CCS project and was
scheduled to hold a public hearing in New Haven, WV, the community adjacent to the
Mountaineer Power Plant. As of March 2011, the public hearing has been postponed with no
indication of when the public hearing will be rescheduled.
In February 2011, AEP received additional financial support and legitimacy for its CCS
project at the Mountaineer Power Plant from the Global CCS Institute. The Institute is a non-
profit organization funded by an initial AU$100 million dollar investment from the Australian
Government to promote knowledge sharing, advocacy for commercialization, and reducing
barriers for deploying carbon capture and sequestration technologies. AEP applied for and was
awarded AU$4 million through Global CCS Institute Project Support Program to document and
23
share its experience in deploying a large scale CCS project. The Global CCS Institute funding
does not directly cover construction or deployment costs for integrating CCS technology at the
Mountaineer Plant. It does identify and showcase the Mountaineer Power Plant as a credible and
significant project that will offer useful lessons for deploying CCS technology at a commercial
scale. The linkage between Mountaineer and FutureGen for AEP lies at least in part on the
reality that as AEP invested in Mountaineer, AEP saw less need to invest in FutureGen.
Particularly, as FutureGen went through sporadic starts and halts.
Hypotheses Assessment
The FutureGen and Mountaineer case studies offer opportunities to test extant hypotheses
regarding cross-sector collaboration.
H1: The development and deployment of large scale energy innovation projects
requires explicit collaboration across public and private sectors because of the
inability of one sector to accomplish progress on its own.
The two projects illustrate that no one sector can accomplish large-scale innovation on
their own. The absence of a regulatory framework that either dictates carbon management or
provides incentives for carbon management partnership between public and private sector is a
barrier to innovation. Explicit interest, commitment, and even financial incentives may not be
sufficient to sustain long-term partnerships to develop large scale innovations in the energy
sector. The FutureGen and Mountaineer projects are alive, and may succeed in spite of these
barriers, but the incentives are incomplete. There needs to be both push from the research and
development side and pull in the form of a regulatory regime for carbon reduction.
H2: Cross-sector collaboration provides a mechanism to reconcile the competing
incentives and values of industry and government to develop and deploy large
scale energy innovation.
The case analysis of the two projects does not necessarily support this hypothesis.
Incongruence between industry and government incentives and values remain through the
partnerships in deploying large scale technology innovation. Specifically, industry seeks to
24
move decisively when opportunities arise for deploying technologies, while government
institutions seek a more deliberative decision-making process that involves the affected public,
local and state agencies, other competitive industrial organizations, and other nations. The
values espoused by the actors within the partnership are multiple and often inconsistent.
Industrial organizations operate within an incentive structure system that is constantly evaluating
investment choices from a spectrum of opportunities, funding is only provided to the projects
that offer greatest return on investment compared to other potential projects. This return on
investment may be financial, but also experience and learning from new technologies.
Government programs on the contrary are structured to promote specific technologies,
innovations, or initiatives and face losing funding if project funding is not obligated according to
certain “rules of the game,” which usually entail constraints. State and local government
agencies must balance values of economic development, potential impact of the CCS project,
and the cost of electricity rates. The affected publics articulate their values in terms of the
impact of the CCS project on their personal property, health, and livelihood. Other nations
espouse a myriad of values that include promoting economic development, anticipating carbon
emission regulation, and promoting innovation and learning. All players want a cross-sector
mechanism, which may be formal or informal, to maximize their distinct values.
H3: Innovation in large scale technology can be understood as an inter-
organizational process, in which various organizations play different roles:
technology developer, technology user, financial sponsor or other roles. Of
particular importance is who plays the role of “driver” in the process.
One of the striking differences between the two cases is who drove the innovation process. In
the case of FutureGen, government was the lead driver. In the case of Mountaineer, AEP led the
way to implementing CCS technology. Government failed as driver for FutureGen, but may
have recovered momentum recently. Even though the FutureGen Industrial Alliance played a
significant role in facilitating the technological design, siting process, and securing private sector
financing for the project, DOE remained in control of the project due to its dominant financial
responsibility for the project. DOE exercised this authority by mandating a change in the CCS
technology, withdrawal of financial support, negotiating an alternative site for FutureGen under
25
the Obama administration, and ultimately reducing the responsibility of the private sector
partners to address the sequestration component of FutureGen. AEP has been more successful
driver of innovation demonstrated by its capacity simply to move forward to implement CCS
technology. AEP has had greater control of the innovation process and its choice of actors
involved in implementing CCS technology. In the case of the Mountaineer Power Plant, the role
of government was limited to provided funding for the CCS project. The level of funding has
made DOE serve as facilitator rather than as a managing partner. DOE had no control over
AEP’s choice of CCS technology. The scope of affected publics was limited in that AEP owned
the land for the injection site. In short, the business organization made its goals the goals of the
inter-organizational (inter-sectoral) relationship.
H4: Organizations concerned with innovation in technology interact in a political
environment; policymakers, affected public, and others influence the dynamics of
their relationships.
The FutureGen case illuminates the politics of innovation graphically. The lack of long-term
political support accounted for FutureGen’s demise under the Bush administration more than any
technological factor. What one DOE Secretary started, another maintained, and then abandoned.
What happens to FutureGen under Obama and Mountaineer going forward will also depend on
political support. Sequestration of carbon will raise NUMBY (Not Under My BackYard) issues.
For both FutureGen and Mountaineer sites were chosen where public attitudes were perceived as
favorable – or at least not actively hostile. The process of innovation has a long way to go and
will require support from affected publics as projects move from carbon capture to sequestration.
Conclusion
It is clear that there is a need to join contemporary public administration research in
collaboration with efforts to understand large scale technological innovation. Collaboration
involves bringing often contesting actors together for public purposes. Technological
innovations in energy are an increasing urgent purpose. Government and industry need to be
aligned to bring about required reforms. The evidence presented in these case studies illustrates
how difficult it is to do this under some circumstances, but does show it is also possible. The key
is leadership in orchestrating collaboration. The more collaboration researchers think about
26
innovation in energy technology, the more relevant will be their research, and more effective will
be efforts to cope with the nation’s energy and climate challenges.
27
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i The partner companies in the FutureGen Industrial Alliance in 2005 included Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.,
(Linthicum Heights, MD), American Energy Power (AEP), Inc (Columbus, OH), Anglo American Services (UK) Limited
(London, UK), BHP Billiton Energy Coal Inc (Melbourne, Australia), China Huaneng Group (Beijing, China), CONSOL
Energy Inc (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), PPL Corporation (Allentown, PA), Peabody Energy Corporation (St. Louis,
Missouri). Rio Tinto Energy America (RTEA) Services (Gillette, Wyoming), Southern Company (Atlanta, GA), E.ON
U.S. LLC (Louisville, Kentucky), Xstrata Coal Pty Limited (Sydney, Australia).
ii These sites included proposals from Ohio (Meigs County), North Dakota, Wyoming, and West Virginia. The
remaining eight sites were first scored based on the proposal criteria individually by members of the Alliance
Proposal Evaluation Team. The goal was to identify sites that would meet two specific goals, an acceptable
location for siting a power plant and an acceptable location to support geological storage of the CO2 emissions.
The scores were aggregated to create two ranked lists of sites, one based on the suitability criteria for the location
of power plant and one on the geological target formation. The result of the rankings yielded five potential sites
that ranked the highest and within 5 percentage points of each other. The other three sites had significantly lower
scores than the top‐ranked sites.