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FORMIDABILE GENUS ARMOR UM:
THE HORSE ARCHERS OF THE
ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY
by
DAVID WILLIAM McALLISTER
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1991
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Classics)
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April 1993
^
ABSTRACT
The equites sagittarii formed a considerable force in the
auxilia of the early and middle empire, but they, and particularly
their role and employment, have received little scholarly
attention. This paper will attempt to define their place on the
battlefields of the high Empire.
While horse archers are known to have been used in eastern
armies such as the those of the Persians and Parthians with great
effect, they were recruited into and employed by the Roman army in
strength only starting at the reign of Augustus. Units of horse
archers were almost exclusively recruited from eastern lands and
were employed there as well, not only in war, but also as the
border garrisons of Pannonia, Dacia, Africa, and the Levant.
Chapter one discusses the equipment in use by horse archers.
The bows in use were invariably compound recurved bows of eastern
design. Other specialized archery equipment was also eastern in
origin while their general military and cavalry equipment seems to
have been standard Roman military issue.
Horse archers, like all military systems, can be defined in
terms of their characteristics: qualities which determine their
pattern of effectiveness, and therefore role, on the battlefield.
The characteristics of horse archers are: flexibility, mobility,
vulnerability, and firepower. Chapter two analyzes mounted
archers' characteristics to explain in detail the reasons for their
effectiveness.
Chapter three looks at the question:^Were these units
ii
invariably bow-armed? It appears that they had at their disposal
a variety of weapons (including javelins and other weapons) for use
according to the situation.
Chapter four analyzes the evidence of the role of horse
archers in all phases of war: the advance to contact, the attack,
the pursuit, the defence, and the withdrawal. They were were
especially valuable in independent battlefield operations, due to
their mobility.
Appendix one is a list of known and suspected units of
sagittarii, together with a brief commentary on certain of the
mounted units.
Mounted bowmen's firepower has a certain pattern of
effectiveness. Appendix two analyzes arrow fire through
application of the Theory of Small Arms Fire in order to explain
certain paradoxes of archer employment on the battlefield.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract^ ii
Table of Contents^ v
Acknowledgements^ vi
INTRODUCTION^ 1
Chapter One^Weapons and Equipment^ 13
1. Archery^ 132. Bows^ 163. Arrows^ 194. Horses and Cavalry Equipment 235. Protective Clothing^296. Other Equipment^ 31
Chapter Two^A Military Analysis of Horse Archery^33
Chapter Three^Questions of Armament^ 43
Chapter Four^Operational Employment^ 58
1. Advance to Contact^622. Attack^ 763. Pursuit^ 814. Defence^ 855. Withdrawal^ 866. Summary^ 89
Chapter Five^Conclusions^ 92
Appendix One^Bow-Armed Units^ 95
Appendix Two^Analysis of Arrow Fire with Referenceto the Theory of Small Arms Fire^102
List of Figures^ 109
Figures^ 112
Glossary^ 124
Bibliography^ 127
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would first of all like to thank my thesis advisor,Professor James Russell, for his support and advice, and for hiscriticism of the earlier forms of this work, without which it wouldindeed be vastly inferior.
I also owe a debt of gratitude to Raymond Gabin, who kindlyconsented to apply his military knowledge to review some of thechapters; and especially to my fiancee, Christine Parker, not onlyfor her advice and suggestions, but also for her unflagging supportwhile I was researching and writing. All errors and omissions areof course mine alone.
Of course, one needs not only scholarly assistance to write apaper of this length. I would like to thank in particular myCommanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Bell-Irving, forhis indulgence and understanding in allowing me a reduced workschedule for research and writing; and my fellow subalterns of theSeaforth Highlanders of Canada, for their support and constantcomments about "how the Roman archers would have done it". Thisthesis is dedicated to them. Ducimus.
li
INTRODUCTION
It is not known who the first people were to combine
horsemanship and archery; probably the combination is as old as
both skills, and preceded such technological innovations as the
chariotl. We first encounter the bow in the hands of a cavalryman,
however, in the near East in the first millenium before Christ, in
the armies of the Scythians and Assyrians2. Although mainly known
for its infantry phalanx, fifth-century Athens maintained a force
of horsemen, among whom were a number of mounted archers3. This
may have been partly as a counter against the cavalry of the
Persians, but already it is clear that these troops were becoming
more important. The high point in the history of the mounted
archer came with the destruction of Crassus' army at Carrhae in 53
B.C. by a Parthian army composed mostly of lightly-armoured, bow-
1The prevailing view is that chariots preceded cavalry, andthis is supported by Assyrian and Egyptian reliefs (see Y. Yadin,The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands [Jerusalem 19631 4-6); but itis hard to believe that this technological innovation precedes anon-technological one. Some of the first known mounted archerswere nomads, and these peoples produced little in the way ofpermanent artwork that would record their methods of hunting orfighting. That the skills of mounted archery could be acquired ina relatively short time can be demonstrated by the fact that thePlains Lakota (Sioux) Indians of North America gained them soonafter the horse was introduced to them: see E. McEwen et al. "EarlyBow Design and Construction" Scientific American, June 1991. 76-82.
2Seen on a stone relief found in the palace of Ashurnasipal IIat Nimrud: Yadin (op. cit.) 297, 384-5; G. Denison, A History of Cavalry (London 1913) 10-11.
3G.R. Bugh, The Horsemen of Athens (Princeton 1988) 221-4; andXenophon, Memorabilia III, 3, 1.
armed cavalry.
Although by the late Republic the Romans had experienced first
hand the effectiveness of mounted archers, there is no evidence of
these troops in a Roman military force until the time of Caesar
when they formed part of a contingent sent to Caesar's rival Pompey
by Antiochus I of Commagene4. The equites sagittarii first make
their appearance as regular auxiliaries in Germanicus's campaign
against the Chatti5. From this point on, references to them become
more frequent in the epigraphical and literary sources as they came
to assume a greater role in the Roman military of the Empire.
The nomenclature assigned to the alae and cohortes
sagittariorum gives some evidence for the history of these units.
The names show, for example, that they were raised mostly in the
east, especially in the provinces of Syria and Thrace°. Obvious
examples of these are the cohortes Commagenorum, Antiochensium,
Damascenorum, and Thracum. Some come from areas outside the
boundaries of the early Empire. Parthia, for example, was
obviously the origin of some of the mounted archers in the ala
Parthorum et Araborum. The cohors XX Palmyrenorum milliaria
equitata sagittariorum seems to have been formed in the late second
century A.D., about the time Palmyra became part of the Roman
Empire, from the numerus Palmyrenorum that is known to have served
in Dacia in the early part of the same century. Unit titles, where
4Bellum Civile III, 4, 5.
5Tacitus, Annales II, 16.
°See Appendix one for a full listing of known bow-armed units.
2
they appear, may supply an approximate terminus post quem for the
employment of the bow-armed units to which they were granted. A
number of bow-armed units, for example, bear the Imperial titles
Augusta, Flavia, or Ulpia. These titles seem to have been assigned
when the units were raised or reorganized7. Two such units were
the cohortes I Flavia Damascenorum
after the revolt of Civilis
possible to assign precise
and I Flavia Canathenorum,
in 69-70 A.D.8. It is not
dates to the formation or
formed
always
dissolution of each unit.
There is evidence for the existence of a total of twenty four
mounted, bow-armed auxiliary units in the Roman army from the first
to the third centuries A.D.9. As we have seen, they were raised
mainly in the east and they appear to have served mainly in the
east as well. At least three units composed of mounted archers
formed part of the garrison of Dacia in the second century, as well
as at least seven units of foot archers. Pannonia had a similar
number of horse archer units among its garrison, as did the African
provinces of Mauretania Tingetana, Numidia, and Egypt. At least
four mounted archer units are known among the garrison of Syria,
and from the late second century the cohors XX Palmyrenorum was
7Aks far as can be determined, there is no evidence of theawarding of such titles to bow-armed units as a reward forperformance in battle. See P.A. Holder, Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman army from Augustus to Trajan. BAR International Series#70 (Oxford 1980) 14-18.
8Holder (op. cit.) 16.
9At least four other mounted units may have been sagittaria aswell. See Appendix one.
3
stationed at Dura-Europos. Only one unit of bow-armed cavalry is
known to have served in Germany: the cohors I Flavia Damascenorum
milliaria equitata. While a cohors Ramiorum sagittariorum is known
to have served in Britain, no alae or cohortes sagittariorum are
known to have been raised in or to have served in Gaul, Hispania,
or Italy.
But what was their role? What was it about them that caused
their commanders to use them as they did, and what made them so
effective on the battlefield? How were they used? The purpose of
this thesis is to attempt an answer to these questions, applying
where relevant the techniques of military analysis and an
understanding of military affairs based on experience.
SOURCES
The sources for the employment of horse archers in the Roman
military are primarily literary, though there are also considerable
amounts of archaeological, papyrological, and epigraphic evidence
for their equipment, distribution, history, and composition.
The historians of the Roman imperial period furnish the
greatest amount of information on horse archers. Many details of
their employment, especially as a screen and guard for the army on
the march, can be gleaned from a careful reading of Josephusm.
Tacitusll gives hints of their actions in attack and pursuit.
MEspecially Bellum Iudaicum II, 500-1; III, 66-9; and V, 47-9.
"Ann. II, 16-7
4
Arrian is an especially important source as he was in command of an
army in Cappadocia in 135 which included horse archers12; he was
also a historian, and his account of Alexander the Great's army in
India13 is valuable as comparative evidence for the role of the
mounted archers in an ancient army. Ammianus Marcellinus had first
hand experience of military affairs, so that his history might
reasonably be expected to contain useful information on mounted
archers. He does refer to them as a "formidable arm of the
servicel", but unfortunately he makes few other references to this
type of cavalry and these are too vague to be of much value.
Finally, Procopius in his Bellum Gothicum frequently describes the
Roman battle line of the sixth century which was mainly composed of
mounted archers. Although war in his day differed greatly from the
high Empire, being by that time largely a contest between cavalry
formations, he occasionally mentions small forces of horse archers
operating as independent units apart from the main force. Since
this seems also to have been the function of the horse archers in
the high Empire, some indications of their employment in that role
may be garnered from Procopius's account of them in his day.
Unfortunately the writers of the Greek tactical manuals,
Aeneas Tacticus (mid fourth century B.C.), Asclepiodotus (early
first century B.C.), and Onasander (mid first century A.D.), are
"Eirccc4; Komi AAAivow
13'Avdeficcatc 'AXE4dcv8pou , e specially V, 14-8.
un ...formidabile genus armorum..." Res Gestae XVI, 12, 7.
5
silent on mounted archery in war. The latter two do contain some
indication of ancient thinking on cavalry, albeit from an earlier
time, but these references are nevertheless of little use. The few
references to archers and cavalry that are found in the
Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyaenus likewise do little to
illustrate the employment of mounted archers but do give some
indication of the use of cavalry. Vegetius15 (late fourth century
A.D.) does not, unfortunately, mention mounted bowmen. On the
other hand, he is of considerable value for his many references to
archery, the training of soldiers, and the use of cavalry in Roman
times. Finally the Strategikon, attributed to the Byzantine
emperor Maurice (late sixth or early seventh century A.D.),
although it describes, like Procopius, a type of battle much
different from that of the high Empire, contains16 important
references to the training and employment of bow-armed infantry and
cavalry which can serve as indications of earlier practise.
Most modern scholarship on the subject of the equites
sagittarii has been confined to consideration of them as archers or
as cavalry, not as a distinct arm of the service. Another body of
scholarship has been concerned with archery equipment and the
history of bow-armed units. These topics are important for any
discussion of mounted archers, but comparatively little attention
has been paid to details of employment and their role on the
battlefield of the high Roman Empire. The most comprehensive work
15De Re Militari, especially book I.
MEspecially in book XII.
6
on the archer in Roman service is that of J.C. Coulston17. While
he includes much discussion on the subject of archers, Coulston
concentrates mainly on technical details of the evidence for the
construction of archery equipment and the physics behind the
operation of bows18 and does not discuss questions of employment
with any great sophistication. Though dealing with a period
considerably later than ours, A.D.H. Bivar's19 study of the eastern
frontier of the Byzantine empire and the equipment and tactics of
both the Byzantines and their enemies provides comparative evidence
of the use of archer-cavalry in the earlier Empire. A number of
other writers28 have discussed archers in some detail; they have,
however, not been concerned with the technical details of the
deployment of horse archers themselves on the battlefield.
The main epigraphic evidence for horse archers in the Roman
period is to be found in tombstones, which give indications of
which units were bow-armed as well as details of their equipment.
The tombstones having the most value for a study of horse archers
""Roman Archery Equipment" in M.C. Bishop, ed. The Productionand Distribution of Roman Military Equipment. BAR InternationalSeries #275 (Oxford 1985) 220-336.
18 W.F. Paterson's article ("The Archers of Islam" Journal ofthe Social and Economic History of the Orient 9 (1966) 69-87)provides similar detail on later Persian and Arabic archery.
19"Cavalry equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier"Dumbarton Oaks Papers 26 (1976) 272-291.
20E. g.g P. Medinger "L'arc Turquois et les archers Parthes a labataille de Carrhes" Revue Archeologique 6, II (1933) 227-234; D.B.Saddington "The Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus, Josephus, and OtherEarly Imperial Writers" Acta Classica XIII (1970) 89-124; and H.van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts "Note sur les corps d'archers auhaut Empire" Die Araber in der Alten Welt I (1964) 661-667.
7
are reproduced here (figs. 18-21). Military diplomas locate bow-
armed units and indicate when they were present at various
locations and in combination with what other types of military
units. Important details of day-to-day activities and equipment
are found in the papyri and graffiti from Dura-Europos. An
especially well-documented unit of mounted archers, the cohors XX
Palmyrenorum milliaria sagittariorum equitata, was stationed there
after the late second century.
Columnar sculpture provides some evidence for archery and
cavalry equipment. Unfortunately, Trajan's column is of little
help for a study of mounted archers. A careful examination of this
column did not reveal any mounted archers on it, and the pedites
sagittarii that do appear on it are armed in an improbable and
inconsistent manner21 (figs. 14, 16, 23-4). Examination of the
Marcus column is only marginally more useful, as it shows at least
one bow-armed cavalryman (fig. 22). Unfortunately, his equipment
is damaged, and the foot-archers on the same column (fig. 25) are
shown armed in the same improbable manner as those on Trajan's
column22.
The equipment and weaponry used by the equites sagittarii, and
indeed most auxiliaries in the service of Rome, are reasonably well
understood. How they dressed, armed and protected themselves, and
21See Florescu, F.B. Die Trajanssdule (Bonn 1969) passim, andCoulston (op. cit.) 235. The bows are depicted with curled ears,which is a feature totally unknown from archaeological or othersculptural evidence.
22See G. Becatti, Colonna di Marco Aurelio (Milan 1957) passim,and Coulston (op. cit.) 235.
8
equipped and mounted their horses, has generated a considerable
scholarship based on archaeological finds, sculptural
representations, the occasional literary reference, and exhaustive
attempts at reconstructions. A chapter is included briefly
reviewing the evidence on his bow and his mount, the two components
that, along with himself, made the eques sagittarius so effective
as a weapon system, to employ the terminology of current military
theory.
Analysis of any military system, however, requires not just
analysis of technology but also analysis of its use: in order to
understand how it "ticks" we must look at what actually affects how
it operates. We must, in short, look at its characteristics.
Horse archers can be fast, and they need not be within arms' reach
of their enemy to kill him. This much is obvious, but much more
can be understood from a closer examination. Chapter two discusses
in detail the characteristics of the mounted archer: not of the
Roman version per se but of any individual armed with a bow and
riding a horse.
During the research for this paper I became aware of a gap in
knowledge that was being continually ignored or glossed over in the
literature. Coulston23 partially recognized the problem and
wondered how the mounted members of the cohortes equitatae
sagittariorum were armed. One of the difficulties lies in the
absence of any depictions showing them as bow-armed. This is only
part of the problem, however. No force equipped inflexibly can
230p. cit., 284-5.
9
operate with flexibility. The cohorts of mounted archers that
garrisoned Rome's eastern provinces had a multitude of fighting, as
opposed to engineering, tasks to fulfil, including border patrol,
policing, and convoy and dignitary protection 24, as well as
defence. To limit their armament to bows would be to endanger the
soldiers and hinder them in the performance of their tasks. Such
a limitation would also be counterproductive to the original and
principal raison d'être for the cohors equitata, namely economy
with flexibility 25 . Chapter three is devoted to a closer look at
the evidence of armament.
Chapter four forms the central focus of the thesis. In this
chapter a number of ancient battles are examined to determine how
the Romans employed their horse archers in battle. It is not my
intention to provide an exhaustive survey of all appearances of
mounted archers in the literature of the Roman period, but to cover
only those where the evidence is sufficient and reliable enough to
give a clear picture of events, and where enough detail is supplied
to reach general conclusions of a comprehensive nature concerning
their role in battle as a whole and in support of other arms, and
not just their deployment in a single action or manoeuvre.
According to current military theory, battles are composed of a
number of phases. These phases, as well as the characteristics of
24Border patrol, policing, and convoy and dignitary protectionare fighting tasks in that those engaged in them must always beprepared to fight even if battle never occurs.
25R.W. Davies "Cohortes Equitatae" in Service in the Roman Army(New York 1989) 140-51.
10
the equites sagittarii discussed in chapter three,^provide a
framework for analyzing their role on the Roman battlefield of the
high Empire.
No work on Roman archers would be complete without a list of
the units they served in. The most complete list to date is that
of Eric Birley, published in 1977 by Jeffrey Davies 26 . It is
reproduced here, with some modifications, in the first appendix,
along with a brief commentary. The second appendix contains an
analysis of the "fire" 27 of archers in terms of modern military
practice. This exercise may explain certain puzzling aspects of
the employment of archers, both mounted and on foot, by quantifying
what would be obvious to one who has been in the position of
controlling or creating fire, but would be only dimly perceived by
one unaccustomed to these experiences. A glossary is also supplied
to explain the many technical terms employed in the discussion:
not only military terms, but especially those concerning the bow.
The bow is a complex instrument with many components, some with
Arabic names that would be unfamiliar to the non-specialist.
I have six years' experience in military matters including
comprehensive training as a regular infantry officer in the
Canadian Forces. My training has been in the command of both
dismounted and mechanized infantry forces as well as in the more
theoretical aspects of war. In addition, I have commanded an
26"Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the Sagittarii of theRoman Army." Britannia 8 (1977) 269-70.
27For the meaning of "fire" in this sense, see Glossary.
11
infantry platoon for one year. On the basis of this experience, I
have applied my personal knowledge to the subject of mounted
archers in order to provide a new approach to their study. I will
be successful if I have provided some contribution to the
monumental scholarship on which I base my work.
12
CHAPTER ONE
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
Horse archery needs certain basic equipment: the bow, the
arrow, the horse and its associated gear, protective clothing for
the archer, and related items such as the quiver and the bow-case.
This chapter will cover the essential elements of horse archery and
the equipment used, in order to give a clear picture of how these
soldiers were equipped and what they were capable of.
1. ARCHERY
The mechanics of shooting an arrow consist of three actions:
drawing the string, holding the string back and sighting the shot,
and loosing the arrow. This section will briefly cover these
actions as well as the question of range and penetration (see figs.
1 and 3).
Known alternately as a "hold" and a "release", the way in
which the archer holds the arrow on the string is clearly
associated with the drawing of the string. The most common hold
today is called "Mediterranean". In this hold the arrow is placed
along the left side of the bow resting on the side of the left
hand, the string is fitted into the nock, and the base of the arrow
is gripped between the tips of the index and middle fingers of the
right hand. The tips of the right hand index, middle, and ring
fingers hook over the string. This appears to be the only hold
13
used by archers in the service of Rome28. When an arrow is fired
using this hold, the fletchings of the arrow brush down the left
arm. This hold thus precludes the use of a shield as it will foul
or damage the fletchings. A smooth band known as a bracer is often
worn on the left forearm to protect it from abrasion by the arrow
as it moves-past29.
Another common hold is the "Mongolian", where the arrow is
placed along the right hand side of the stele and both the arrow
and string are held between the right thumb and the side of the
index finger. As the arrow is on the right-hand side of the stele,
it does not touch the left forearm, and so a small shield can be
worn strapped to the left forearm38. The Mongolian hold requires
the use of a thumb-ring, usually made of bone, to protect the thumb
from abrasion; these rings have not been identified before the
Byzantine period, and so the Mongolian hold was probably not used
by Roman auxiliaries of the high empire31.
When the arrow has been placed on the string, the archer faces
the target and raises the bow with his left hand, keeping the bow
vertical; at the same time he pulls the string back with his right
28J•C• Coulston, "Roman Archery Equipment" The Production andDistribution of Roman Military Equipment. BAR International Series275 (Oxford 1985) 278.
29Ibid., 275-6.
mW.F. Paterson, "Shooting Under a Shield" Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 112 (1969) 27-8.
31See below (note 29).
14
hand to his right cheek or ear32, and aims at the target, sighting
above or below the arrowhead, depending on the range. It is best
to hold this position for as little time as possible to reduce
fatigue and shaking.
To loose the arrow the archer must ensure that the string
slides smoothly off his fingers without catching on clothing or
equipment, and that the arrow is also unobstructed. At target
practise he would "follow-through" by holding his firing position
until the arrow hit the target, but in battle he would not waste
time between shots.
The range of accuracy of the ancient bow has been estimated33
to be in the order of 150 m for a stationary firer and target; it
would be less if the firer or the target were moving. Since the
bow used by a mounted archer would most likely have been smaller,
its range would have been reduced34. More precise figures are not
possible owing to variations in individual skill and in the quality
of equipment produced.
Finally, perhaps because of a scarcity of reconstructions of
Roman archery equipment, precise details of armour-piercing
32Procopius (Bellum Gothicum I, 1, 15) mentions that archersof his day drew the string to the ear; he contrasts this with theHomeric (cf. Ii. iv, 123) practise of drawing the string to thechest, which would result in inaccurate aiming.
33I4.E. McLeod "The Range of the Ancient Bow" Phoenix 19 (1965)1-15; and idem, "The Range of the Ancient Bow: Addenda" Phoenix 26(1976) 78-82. Vegetius mentions a target range (de re militari I,15) of six hundred Roman feet.
34Coulston (op. cit.) 291; and see below, section 4 on cavalryequipment.
15
capability of this equipment are not known. Parthian horse archers
were able to penetrate armour with their arrows at Carrhaem.
Assuming that they did not come far within the maximum range of the
Roman legionaries' pila and their auxiliaries' bows, the Parthians
probably came no closer than 30-50 T1136 from the Roman line.
Because of the smaller bow used on horseback and the difficulty of
aiming while galloping it seems best to assume a distance of 30-50
m as the maximum for effective penetration of enemy armour from
horseback, and perhaps double that range for striking unarmoured
targets37.
2. BOWS
There were two main types of bow used in the ancient world:
the self-bow and the compound bowm. The self-bow is made of a
single piece of shaped wood (the stave), more or less straight,
tightly strung with a string of leather or sinew. This form of
mPlutarch, Crassus XXV, 6
mthese figures are based on an arbitrary figure for the rangeof the Roman auxiliaries' bows of 80-100 m and the fact that theywere behind the lines of legionaries.
37For a more complete discussion of the application of fire todifferent types of targets, see Appendix two.
mthe main works on the subject are: Coulston (op. cit.) 220-366 and especially 222-259; and W.F. Paterson "The Archers ofIslam" in The Journal of the Economic and Social history of the Orient 9. (1966) 69-87. See fig. 3 for a depiction of the parts ofthe bow.
16
bow, the mainstay of the English battle line at Agincourt39, was
used in Crete and Gaul since well before Roman times" and is
characterised by slower initial arrow velocity (and thus range and
power) for a given draw weight°. Since the eastern auxiliaries
that are the subject of this study did not use the self-bow, little
more mention will be made of it here.
The compound bow (fig. 3) is a development from the self-bow,
making use of horn and sinew as compound levers and springs to
increase the power imparted to the arrow on release.
"The thin wooden core provides adhesive
strength and the general shape but plays a
minor part in the bow's physical actions.
When a stave is drawn the horn belly is pulled
into a compressed curve and the back sinew is
stretched. The bow is constructed to elicit
the maximum distance of curve and stretch by
39P. Warner, Firepower (London 1988) 33.
"that Cretan mercenaries were using self bows may be impliedfrom Xenophon (Anabasis III: 3, 7 and 4, 17): the first passagedescribes the Cretans' range as less than that of the Persians'(...a yap EArec Naximpa T8V IIepaoiv kge)om...); while the secondimplies that their bows were of the same size (...geyeamaimitgaviHemmitaw...). Since it is clear that the compound bow was usedby eastern peoples including Persians (Burke, "A History ofArchery"), a significantly shorter range indicates the use of theconsiderably less powerful self-bow.
°For a detailed discussion of the physics behind self- andcompound bows, see Coulston (op. cit.) 245-8, P.E. Klopsteg, "ThePhysics of Bows and Arrows" The American Journal of Physics 11(1943) 175-92, and W.F. Paterson, "The Archers of Islam" TheJournal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 9 (1966)69-87.
17
making it in a "reflexed" shape so that it
reverses itself when unstrung.^The extra
distance from the reversed to strung positions
gives a greater potential energy storage than
with a straight self-bow stave."42
The lever action of the ears increases the pull on the string
by differing amounts: most when the string is slightly pulled
back, and progressively less as the draw length increases. This
effect causes the firer to feel as if the "...pull on the bowstring
reduces, though this is not, in fact, the case..."43. As energy
is stored in the bow itself, and in the dustars and ears in
particular, and not in the arm and shoulder muscles of the firer,
this bow is less tiring to draw", and so greater power can be
attained for a given amount of exertion.
Upon release the levers tend to accelerate the arrow more or
less smoothly until it leaves the string. This acceleration is a
more efficient transfer of power to an arrow than the steadily
decreasing hard push of a self-bow45, and thus greater power is
transferred to the arrow on firing.
42Coulston (op. cit.) 245.
43Paterson (op. cit.) 79.
"Coulston (op. cit.) 247.
45See Klopsteg (op. cit.).^Self-bows must have the stringmoving at very low speeds at the moment the arrow leaves it inorder to reduce the "virtual mass" of the limbs; a compound bowachieves this by having the limbs, in effect, "unroll", and so theyare moving very slowly (and the string comparatively quickly) atthe arrow's final contact with the string.
18
The ears of the compound bow can give a further useful effect.
The archer's tombstone found at Housesteads (fig. 12), on the
assumption that this is an accurate representation46, shows the
ears of the bow angled forward although the bow is at rest; such a
design causes the string, when the arrow has been loosed, to press
against the inside of the ears close to the dustars. The string is
thus effectively shortened, which imparts a final acceleration on
the arrow.
Bowstrings in the Roman era were most probably made from sinew
or leather, but because of their organic and fragile nature none
survives, and we are limited to conjecture their actual nature.
Whatever material they were made from, however, they had to be kept
dry in order to prevent stretching47.
3. ARROWS
Arrows are the most variable piece of archery equipment. The
length of the arrow varies according to the size of the archer and
his draw length; the materials from which it is made depend upon
the type of bow used and the intended target. As is the case with
bows, I will attempt to give as complete a description as possible,
with emphasis on what is relevant to my study of horse archers48.
"As Coulston (op. cit., 236-7) believes.
47See Coulston, op. cit., 270.
lAs with the bow, Coulston (op. cit., 264-70) discusses thesubject in great detail; the reader is referred to his article fora more extensive treatment. See figs. 4-7 for roman arrows and
19
An arrow is composed of an arrowhead; a shaft or stele; and
vanes or fletchings (fig. 4).
Arrowheads are usually made from metal, iron being the most
commonly used metal for war arrows because of its hardness and
toughness. Flight arrows, used in distance shooting competitions,
sometimes had ivory tips49. Such tips were not designed for
penetration but only for aerodynamic qualities as they would have
shattered upon striking anything tougher than skin or dirt".
Military units would have had a supply of properly made arrowheads
on hand. When these ran out, or if there was not sufficient time
to prepare the metal properly, craftsmen would be forced to use
substandard materials or techniques".
Arrows had various cross-sections. Most surviving examples
are vaned, the most common would be trilobate (fig. 6), although
occasionally ones with four vanes are attested. Vaned arrowheads
would often be barbed. Some are flat-bladed (fig. 5); these are
usually not barbed. Arrowheads with a square cross-section are
arrowheads.
49See Paterson (op. cit.) plate IV.
"Apparently the Huns used bone tips for their war arrows; uponhitting an unarmoured enemy these could splinter and causeconsiderable damage (Amm. Marc. XXXI, 2 and see Coulston [op. cit.]268).
"The arrowheads of defenders of Masada seem to have beenhastily fabricated. One was analyzed and found to be made of lowquality iron without tempering; Coulston (op. cit., 270), citingKnox et al., "Iron Objects from Masada: Metallurgical Studies"Israel Exploration Journal 33 (1984) 99-100.
20
known as bodkin52. Finally, there are fire-arrow heads, consisting
of a pointed cage of three curved bars, into which flammable
material would be inserted, then lit (fig. 7).
Obviously different forms of arrowhead have different
functions. The heavier the arrow, the greater momentum it will
carry, and thus greater penetration. Flat-bladed arrowheads
contain less material and so are lighter. Their shape also lends
them to easier sharpening. They are therefore more suitable for
soft targets (animals and infantry or cavalry unprotected by
armour) than the trilobate versions, which are considerably heavier
and tougher, owing to their self-reinforcing shape. Trilobate
arrowheads also suggest a more sophisticated manufacturing process
than the flat examples (which are often simply hammered out) and so
could be examples of prepared stocks rather than emergency
supplies. Little survives from antiquity regarding recommendations
for use of different arrowhead designs".
There were two methods of attaching arrowheads to shafts:
sockets and tangs (figs. 4 and 7). The first is self-explanatory,
except that either glue or a pin would hold the parts together; the
second depended upon a hollow stele or one made hollow by drilling,
and the arrowhead was pushed or hammered in and held in place by
52These appear to have been used for target practise on an ox-skull found in Northumberland with several small, square holespunched in it (Coulston [op. cit.] 265). This is apparently theonly extant example of a practice target from antiquity.
"The Ghunyah of Taybughah, a medieval Arabic archery manual,apparently contains such recommendations for different equipment,but unfortunately it is unavailable to me at present.
21
friction.
The shaft or stele was made from a variety of materials. In
the Roman west, wood dowels were commonly used; in the east, hollow
reed or cane was the norm. Sometimes a composite construction is
found, where the arrowhead is joined to a wood dowel, which is in
turn attached to a reed shaft; Coulston believes that this was to
prevent the more fragile reed from splitting upon impact with an
armoured target54 which would lessen the arrow's momentum and
penetration. At the base of the stele is the notch or nock, which
must be wide and deep enough for the string to fit properly55 (fig.
8). At the base of the stele near the nock the vanes or fletchings
are attached. The purpose of fletchings is to give the arrow
stability in flight and therefore accuracy and penetrative power.
All evidence from antiquity indicates that these were made from
bird feathers56. They were glued in place, and sometimes further
fastened with a whipping of sinew front and back. The exact
location of the fletchings on surviving examples is important for
reconstruction of shooting methods. It has been claimed57, for
example, that fletchings extending right back to the nock make the
540p. cit., 268.
55An example found at Dura-Europos has a nock depth of 0.95 cmand a width of 0.4 cm at its deepest. See S. James "Dura-Europosand the Introduction of the "Mongolian Release"" Roman MilitaryEquipment: the Accoutrements of War. BAR International Series#336 (Oxford 1987) 77-84.
56The surviving arrows from Dura-Europos have featherfletchings. See James (op. cit.) 78, and figs. 3 and 4.
57James (op. cit.) 78-81.
22
"Mediterranean release" impossible58.
As different firers have arms of different lengths, their draw
lengths will differ correspondingly. Arrows must therefore be made
in a length appropriate for each firer. This suggests that each
archer in an archer unit will have his own personal supply in the
form of a quiverful or two of arrows sized for him, ready at his
side in battle. Once these run out, however, he would be reduced
to using stock issue arrows of uniform length, or recovered enemy
arrows, until he could have more made for him59.
4. HORSES AND CAVALRY EQUIPMENT
The subject of the Roman cavalry horse is extremely complex,
58James (op. cit., 78) is probably correct that the arrowsfound at Dura could not be shot using the Mediterranean release,i.e. gripping the stele with the index and middle finger at thestring and thus crushing the fletchings; but James fails toconsider the Sassanid release, wherein the arrow is held betweenthe tip of the middle finger and the side of the index finger,which is extended straight along the arrow between the fletchings(see W.F. Paterson, "The Sassanids" Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 112 (1969) 30; and my fig. 1). This grip wouldavoid crushing the feathers (see especially my fig. 2 for adepiction of an arrow being drawn with the fletchings extending allthe way back to the base of the fingers). The thumb ring alsofound at Dura is indeed interesting but, since little is known ofits context, it is difficult to conclude with James that the"Mongolian release" was used at Dura-Europos during the Romanperiod.
59Here as throughout this chapter I follow Coulston (op. cit.,270), but he does not provide evidence to support this statement.A useful analogy is that the butt lengths of modern Canadianinfantry weapons can be adjusted as appropriate for each firer. Ifa soldier loses his rifle in battle he must be prepared to make dowith one of the wrong size until it can be adjusted for his armlength.
23
and only certain topics are of importance to a study of the
employment of mounted archers60. This section will attempt to
cover these topics in enough detail to give the reader a clear
picture of how they affect archers. As for cavalry equipment, I
will restrict discussion to the saddle and some bridle equipment,
as these are the main items of significance for this study.
The horse of Roman times was somewhat smaller than his modern
counterpart. Hyland's examination of military horse bones from the
Roman eram indicates an average height of approximately 150 cm62,
which is average for modern horses; the Romans, however, preferred
the largest horses available to them for war purposes, and many of
the breeds preferred for civilian employment were much smaller.
Robust horses were preferred by Roman cavalrymen as they were
easier to ride for a rider whose saddle did not have stirrups. The
reason for this was that a a horse of robust appearance usually had
a wider back, and frequently also displayed the the phenomenon
known as a "double back" characterized by ridges of muscle along
either side of the spine. This would have ensured both a more
comfortable ride and made it easier for a rider to maintain his
balance.
The build of the horse has another effect: the "...well to
60The definitive work on the subject is that of A. Hyland(Equus: the Horse in the Roman World. [London 1990]), and much ofthe information in this section comes from this source.
MOp. cit., 68.
621 use metric measurements rather than the technically correctterm "hands" used in measuring horses in order not to introduce yetanother definition to confuse the reader.
24
moderately fleshed animal usually has a good food conversion ratio
with a slower metabolism than the leaner types..."63. In other
words, it can go longer with less feeding than a slim horse. It
is, however, "...usually not such an enduring animal as the lean,
racy type of equine.. . "64. This suggests that cavalry mounted on
smaller horses would have to take greater care to ensure adequate
forage for their mounts but could operate over longer distances and
in tougher terrain than their heavier-mounted comrades.
The disposition of the mount is also of great concern.
According to Hyland, "...Arabians are sometimes too clever and
individualistic, more suited to...Oriental warfare...in a looser
formation. A more phlegmatic animal is more suited to close-order
action. ..."65. Hyland suggests as well that Oriental units would
be less apt to use mares than stallions, and that stallions would
be left uncastrated66. A list of cavalrymen and their horses of
the cohors XX Palmyrenorum from Dura-Europos67, however, includes
°Ibid., 69.
"Ibid., 69.
°Ibid., 79-80.^This does not mean that each man was anindividual, off fighting on his own somewhere; obviously in orderto produce an effect on the enemy there must be concentration offire. The horses had to be close enough to enable their riders toproduce such an effect but leave enough space for them to be ableto pick targets and fire without hitting their comrades in theback.
66Because of related cultural attitudes men in middle easternlands today do not like to ride mares. p. 81.
67PDur. 97; see R.O. Fink, "Roman Military Records on Papyrus".(Michigan 1971) 340 - 4; and R.W. Davies, "The Supply of Animals tothe Roman Army and the Remount System" Service in the Roman Army(New York 1989) 157-9.
25
mares (equum quadrimam or probatam). The other horses are male
(equum quadrimum or probatum), but it is unclear whether this
refers to stallions or geldings, or indeed whether any distinction
was made.
We turn now to cavalry equipment. As Coulston says, "...it
might be expected that eastern archers exhibited oriental features
in their clothing and armour. On the contrary the tombstones of
auxiliary sagittarii suggest that they differed not at all from
other auxiliarii except in the carrying of archery
Little can be discerned from these tombstones
about the saddles they rode on but the other parts of the horse's
tack or equipment seem to be identical to that employed by other
auxiliaries; it therefore seems most likely that the saddles were
the same as well. Such standardisation would make sense in the
Roman army as myriad types of equipment only burden the supply
system unnecessarily. The only item that seems not to have been
standard was the bit.
We shall first examine the Roman military saddle. Contrary to
popular belief, imperial Roman cavalry saddled their horses. The
saddle used has been reconstructed69 (figs. 9-11) from various
pieces of evidence and appears to have given the rider a
considerable amount of support with its four inward-curving
"horns". This support may have been sufficient to ensure that
613Coulston (op. cit.) 278.
69See P. Connolly, "The Roman Saddle" Roman Military Equipment: the Accoutrements of War. BAR International Series 336 (Oxford1987) 7 - 27; and Hyland (op. cit.) 130-44.
26
stirrups would in most situations have proved less of an advantage
than is usually believed70. Curving over the hips and thighs from
front and back, they kept the rider in his seat, with assistance
from the rider's thighs, during all types of manoeuvres including
turns, movement uphill and downhill, and close quarter battlen.
The traditional assumption has been that the size of the bow
was limited because the rider had little support from his saddle.
This meant "lack of stability", on the assumption that the drawing
of a large bow (and therefore one with a large draw weight) would
unbalance the rider because of his lack of footing72. There are
two objections to this assumption. First, it is now clear that the
cavalryman had very good support indeed from his saddle. Second,
drawing a bow, regardless of its weight, does not unbalance the
archer; no actual weight is produced, and almost none is shifted.
A large bow, however, is more cumbersome. It is more difficult to
shift from a target on one side to one on the otherm. A large bow
also requires a correspondingly longer bow-case, which was carried
vertically on the side of the horse to the immediate rear of the
saddle. If it were too long, it would be an encumbrance, perhaps
even hitting the ground or getting entangled with the horse's legs
mCoulston (op. cit.) 292.
nConnolly (op. cit.) 12, 16 - 7; and Hyland (op. cit.) 130-4.
72Paterson (op. cit.) 85.
The archer has to lift it up and over the horse's neck;clearly, if the target is in motion across the horse's front, thearcher must take his aim off it for a time. Also in a situationwhere an enemy is almost directly in line with the horse's frontthe archer will have difficulty directing fire upon him.
27
during some manoeuvres. Thus it seems that a shorter bow would be
desirable; however, Coulston claims that "...it is not always the
case that bows used on horseback were short...and the trend in
central Asia was for an increase in length over time..."74.
Perhaps the later horsemen developed techniques and technology to
counteract the problems of a long bow. The question, however,
remains open.
The final piece of cavalry equipment to be covered briefly is
the bit. Usually the rider conveys commands to the horse through
three channels: the action of the bit and the reins, knee
pressure, and voice. The first and last pose problems for a
mounted archer, however. In order to use his bow he must drop the
reins, and in the din of battle auditory commands would be of
limited use. The bow-equipped rider must therefore give all
commands to the horse through knee pressure and movement. When not
in battle, however, he may elect to put away his bow, and take up
the reins for easier control of his horse. The bit used by the
Romans has been tested on horses by Hyland 75 and she describes it
as "punishing" and "crue1"76. It seems highly unlikely that
horsemen who have reached such a level of control over their horses
that they do not need reins in battle would resort to the use of
such an extreme tool when away from action. There is, however, no
74Coulston (op. cit.) 246. He does not, unfortunately, backthis statement up.
750p. cit., 136-40 and plates 9-14.
760p. cit., 138-40.
28
evidence for other, more gentle bits.
To conclude on the horse used by the Oriental horse archer of
the Roman army: it was small by today's standards, and even
somewhat smaller than its comrades in contemporary cavalry units.
In temperament it would probably have been spirited and even
"volatile"77. For best effect it would probably have had a wide
back; it could have been either male or female, and there is no
evidence for the practise of castration. It was saddled with the
horned cavalry saddle that gave its rider considerable support, and
it appears doubtful that the severe bit of the Roman cavalry was
used. So much for the animal; now we turn to the rider.
5. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
Unfortunately, there are few sculptural representations of
Roman mounted bowmen from the high Empire. Those that do exist,
however, tend to show them "...dressed and armoured in the same
manner as other auxiliary units..."78. Funerary representations
of equites sagittarii show them wearing tunics and either short or
long trousers (figs. 18-22), and only the tombstone of the ala
Parthorum et Araborum (fig. 18) seems to show one wearing a
helmet79. The horse archer on the Marcus column80 (fig. 22),
"Hyland (op. cit.) 81.
78Coulston (op. cit.) 280.
79This tombstone is badly damaged, however, rendering detailsunclear.
29
however, is clearly depicted wearing lorica hamata. His head, on
the other hand, is damaged and it is impossible to tell whether he
is wearing a helmet, but, as his clothing otherwise resembles that
of other auxiliaries on the column, it seems reasonable to include
the helmet among his armour. No Roman representations depict an
archer's horse with protective armour81.
There exist a number of representations of Roman foot archers
(figs. 14-16, 23-25). These seem to show much the same clothing as
the depictions of horse archers. All but one of the foot archers
on Trajan's column "...appear in the well-known ankle-length robes,
with conical "spangenhelme" and either loricae squameae or
hamatae..."82. These may indeed not be Roman or Middle Eastern
soldiers at all, but Sarmatian83. The other archer is dressed like
other auxiliaries&. All other representations of foot-archers
show them without armour or at most a helmet°.
mCichorius's scene LVII; fig. 22.
81Nor do the the horse archer grafitti from Dura-Europos, whichalso seem to show the rider either bareheaded, or with a conicalcap or helmet (F. Cumont Fouilles de Doura-Europos - Atlas [Paris1926] Plate XCVIII; and Inventaire des inscriptions Palmyreniennes de Doura-Europos. [Paris 1939] 69); these representations arebelieved by M. Rostovtzeff (The Excavations at Dura-Europos: Preliminary Report of the 5th Season of Work. Oct. 1932 - Mar. 1933 [New Haven 1934] 264; quoted in Coulston [op. cit.] 280, note 110)to be not of auxiliaries in Roman service but of irregularPalmyrenes or Sassanids.
82Coulston (op. cit.) 279.^The archers are in scenes LXX,CVIII, and CXV.
°Ibid.
&Scene XXIV.
°Coulston (op. cit.) 278-80.
30
Although Vegetius recommended that foot archers wear armourm,
representations of archers in Roman service of the high Empire seem
to indicate that the equites sagittarii wore little in the way of
protective armour. As stated above87 the type of release most
probably used in the Roman period precluded the use of a shield
when firing the bow. This seems to be confirmed by the
representationsin sculpture, none of which depict archers using
shieldsm.
6. OTHER EOUIPMENT
To carry arrows an archer needs a quiver and to keep his bow
dry, and carry his bow when unstrung, he needs a bow-case89. Since
there are no representations of bow-cases in Roman art of the high
Empire", it is difficult to determine what form of bow-case Roman
auxiliaries may have used. Quivers, however, are shown suspended
from the right hand side of the saddle to the rear of the rider's
mDe Re Militari I, 20 and II, 15.
87Section one, Archery, p. 11.
mCoulston (op. cit.) 281.
89For a detailed description of the evidence for and use ofbow-cases and quivers in the medieval and ancient world seeCoulston (op. cit.) 270-275.
"The tombstone of the eques of the ala Parthorum et Araborum(fig. 18), seems to show the archer's quiver as long and curved,though it is also possible that the object depicted may be a bow-case. As the tombstone is badly damaged, it is impossible toidentify the object with certainty.
31
lee. They appear to be about one metre long, and are straight
and cylindrical in shape (figs. 19-21). Their capacity is unknown,
but the author of the Strategikon recommends that horse archers in
his day carry quivers of "thirty to forty" arrows92.
It seems likely that horse and foot archers carried some sort
of a weapon for use as a last-ditch defence weapon. Archers from
the Roman period are not shown with swords as side-arms. One
representation from Housesteads, however, shows a foot-archer
carrying a long knife (fig. 12). This same archer is also carrying
what appears to be a bill-hook in his right hand, used perhaps for
the collection of arrow materials93. Swords, on the other hand,
would be of little use to an archer who, after all, carried no
shield. The horse archer would rely on his speed to carry him from
danger, and his dagger, if indeed he carried one, when in dire
straits. They would in any case be out of sight on the left hand
side of the horse, which could explain their absence from the
surviving representations. It is therefore unlikely that mounted
archers carried swords.
91An exception is the tombstone of a member of an alaScubulorum from Walbersdorf, Austria, where the archer carries hisquiver on his back on a strap (mentioned but not shown by Coulston[op. cit.] 271). Foot archers carry their quivers in this manner(see fig. 12), presumably to keep them from dragging on the ground.
92Strategikon I, 2.
93Coulston (op. cit.) 280.
32
CHAPTER TWO
A MILITARY ANALYSIS OF HORSE-ARCHERY
The study of the military, any military, is not simply a study
of the equipment used. It comprises also, in part, the study of
how this equipment was used, and why it was used that way. This
chapter is intended to answer the question of how this equipment
affected the way these individuals did their job. In order to
answer this question it will be necessary to analyze horse-archery
in a theoretical sense. Before undertaking this analysis, it is
necessary first to provide definitions, using the examples of
legionary infantry and foot archers before proceeding to mounted
archers. From this, it will become clearer just how mounted
archers should be viewed, and precisely how the three arms
compared.
Military theorists in part explain military systems in terms
of their "characteristics". A "characteristic" may be defined as
a feature of a system that establishes the system's effectiveness
when the system is operating in its normal or intended context. In
other words, the characteristic determines the system's use on the
battlefield. In a military sense everything has its
characteristics 94 . Because of technology, contemporary infantry
94To use a contemporary analogy, the modern Canadian lightmachine gun is, among other things, "...a belt and magazine fed,gas-operated weapon, capable of a sustained high volume of fire in
33
and armour have additional characteristics such as "communication"
which their ancient counterparts could not share. Most land arms,
ancient and modern, however, may be characterized under the
following headings:
1. Flexibility:^the fluid nature of the battlefield
necessitates rapid reorganization and the performance of
several different types of tasks.
2. Mobility:^in order to exploit enemy weakness, or to
minimize the effect of their own weakness, forces must be
moved around the battlefield guickly95. In particular, a
high degree of mobility can aid in achieving surprise.
3. Vulnerability: such factors as armour, camouflage, degree
of training, and discipline affect the ability of a soldier to
stay alive on the battlefield and so the ability of a force to
carry out its tasks.
4. Firepower: the effects of weapons and ammunition (range,
penetration, and destructive effects), and logistic effects
bursts..." Canadian Forces Publication B-GL-317-019/PT-001 TheLight Machine Gun 5.56mm C9 (Ottawa 1987) 2-24.
95It is important to realize that the mobility of a force islimited by that of its logistical "tail"; that is, no force canmove faster than that part of it that is carrying its shelter,food, and weapons' supplies such as ammunition, replacements, andspare parts.
34
(rate of fire and ammunition supply).
Employing these rather technical concepts derived from current
military theory let us now define the characteristics of Roman
legionary infantry, since they are familiar and relatively well
understood. Roman military commanders put special emphasis on the
flexibility of their units. Vegetius describes a sort of military
"cross-training" for the infantry. This includes not only
marching96, jumping97, fighting with the scutum and g/adium98, and
throwing the hasta99, but also swimming100, throwing rock101 and
leadl" missiles, archery103, and mounting horses104.
Legionaries could expect to be employed in building not only the
regular military works like fortifications but aqueducts and roads
96Vegetius De Re Militari I, 9.
97To clear ditches and other obstacles; op. cit., I, 9.
980p. cit. I, 11.
990p. cit. I, 14.
1000p. cit. I, 10.
1010p. cit. I, 16.
1020p. cit. I, 17.
1030p. cit. I, 15.
1040p. cit. I, 18. Although Vegetius does not name the arm tobe trained in this way, and although it might seem to bespecifically a cavalry skill, I think it in keeping with the spiritof the first book to take this passage to refer to the training ofthe infantry, as most modern commentators seem to assume: forexample Davies (op. cit.) 15.
35
and other public projects as well105. A force so trained is
flexible and provides a commander with the ability to do more tasks
with the same number of resources and provides the force with
greater security. A legionary could thus be expected to be
proficient at fighting a battle, at carrying messages on horseback
or even serving as a replacement for wounded cavalry106, and at
defending a camp after an unsuccessful battle107. Certainly the
cavalry had the advantage herem, since they could be employed
dismounted to reinforce the infantry in a situation that afforded
little room for manoeuvre109. This would certainly be a much more
common situation than the reverse, since, owing to the amount of
training necessary for a cavalryman to become proficient, it would
be difficult for infantry to take the place of cavalrylio.
Legionary infantry was extremely mobile although not very fast
or, when in formation, manoeuvrable. They could go across rivers
by swimming or fording, through dense woods, through broken country
and over steep hills, but not for more than about fifteen or twenty
10Davies (op. cit.) 64.
mThere is no evidence for this, but for the opposite, cf.n.17 infra.
107E.g. as an archer.
108Cf. R.W. Davies's (op. cit., 146-50) opinion that the needfor flexibility in provincial garrisons led to the introduction ofcohortes equitatae.
109Cf. Ostorius Scapula against the Iceni, Tac. Ann. XII 31, 4.
110Although an infantry legion did have a large supply ofhorses, most of these horses were chosen for traits (eg. docility)which would be an asset to beasts of burden but a liability for thecavalry. See Davies (op. cit.) 158-61.
36
miles a day. They would have to stop about noon in order to give
time for the completion of the camp to give the soldiers some
measure of protection from surprise attack at night, and this would
further decrease their mobilitym.
All soldiers, regardless of their type, are vulnerable all the
time. The fact that legionary infantry had to build fortifications
at every night's bivouac was a reflection of this vulnerability;
and obviously in battle even armour could not protect them fully
from enemy weapons.
Finally, legionary infantry had sword and spear with which to
kill their enemies. This was the equivalent of the "firepower"
characteristic of modern armies. In terms of range these are both
severely limited, and the value of the spear was further restricted
by the number carried, usually no more than two. Once these were
gone, the only hope for resupply until the end of the battle was to
pick up a used one from the ground"2.
Archers' characteristics are the same in general, although the
specifics are different. Foot-archers frequently fought alongside
slingers or cavalrym as a component of the levis armatura. As
such, they had to remain unencumbered by armour in order to keep up
with the horses or escape enemy pursuers. Nor could they carry
Vegetius (op. cit.) I, 9; and H.P. Judson Caesar's Army(Boston 1888) 63.
1121 realize I am oversimplifying legionary use of missile-weapons; but the weight and size of a pilum or hasta was adisadvantage which the Romans early on had to develop tactics toovercome.
113E.g. Caesar, BC III, 88, 6, and 93, 3.
37
shields as it is impossible to carry a shield and shoot a bow
simultaneously114. This vulnerability limited their employment to
situations where they could be adequately covered by troops, or
placed in a location that was difficult to attack by virtue of
steepness or obstacles"5. Because of the heavy investment of
time spent in practice to maintain proficiency in archery the time
available to archers for training in other military skills must
have been limited. As a consequence, their flexibility as a
fighting force would suffer. Furthermore, because bow-strings of
sinew or leather lose their elasticity when exposed to wet, archers
become useless when there is rain or snow116.
Mobility, being an essential merit of the foot archer on the
battlefield, was clearly among the major characteristics of this
arm of the military. Foot archers were able to move rapidly from
a position in reserve or on a flank to deal with an unexpected
opportunity or emergency as a member of a group. A single foot
archer could approach the enemy front line with comparative
immunity on his own to snipe, create disorder, and terrorize the
enemy, then retreat to safety if threatened.
The foot-archer's prime characteristic, however, was his
firepower. He could, depending on the type of bow used, fire
114see supra, p. 12.
lnE.g., Arrian Trugt; KaukVámov 12-13.
116This happened to Antiochus's archers in Lydia (FrontinusStrategemata IV 8, 30).
38
deadly and accurate missiles at a long range117 either at
individuals or broad targets such as masses of troops. He could
fire several arrows per minute until his quiver was empty, at which
point he would have had to return to draw more from his regimental
stores or pick up any he could find on the battlefield. His
effective firepower would, of course, be expected to drop
considerably when moving over difficult terrain or at speed. If,
for example, he was obliged to climb a series of hills or run
following cavalry or from a pursuing enemy, his ability to fire
accurately and draw the bow with force would be adversely affected.
An eques sagittarius can be seen in a military sense as an
improvement over his pedes counterpart in all of the above
categories, though there were some limitations. He shared with
other cavalry the ability to carry out a role dismounted. He was
able to close with and retire from the enemy at greater speed, and
bypass or outflank an infantry battle line. Thus, he may have been
used in situations where the distance would have been too great for
a dismounted archer to cover in the time necessary. A horse-
mounted archer was faster than one on foot but, as a rule, this
advantage could only be realized in open country; he lost this
mobility when faced with steep hills or very rough terrain. He was
able to cross fast rivers more safely than foot soldiers, and could
even facilitate the crossing of infantry in such situations, but he
117Coulston (op. cit., 290-1) quotes a variety of sources, mostarriving at a figure of 200 to 300 m for accuracy and 100 to 150 mfor an effective (killing) range; this latter range would obviouslydrop for an armoured target. See supra, pp. 3-4.
39
had to take care to keep his bow and string dry 118. A formation
of horse-archers could turn, wheel, advance, and retire like other
cavalry, much faster than a similar formation of infantry, but
always assuming that the terrain was open and reasonably level. In
close or broken country it would have been very difficult to move
at all and keep formation. Close country also presented another
danger to cavalry: vulnerability to ambush or trap. Infantry were
also liable to be surprised where visibility was low but were more
suited to fighting in these conditions119. Depending on the
amount of armour worn by a horse-archer and his mount, he was more
or less vulnerable to attack by other horse archers or by different
cavalry. On the other hand, his speed would usually have enabled
him to outdistance a pursuer, and he would still have been able to
harass him while retreatingin. Furthermore, compared to other
cavalry, their inability to carry a shield obviously limited their
protection from all forms of weapon.
There were other disadvantages too. The larger the bow, the
larger the bow-case, and the need for this bow-case121 makes use
"8Cf. Caesar's use of cavalry in river crossings to slow thewater for the infantry and to catch any who lost their footing inthe swift current (BG VII, 56; and see Judson [op. cit.] 70).
119Horses can be wounded or killed, or merely frightened; theythen become difficult to control and the resulting confusion makesan organized response difficult. Infantry, on the other hand, canmove about more freely and, when well trained, are less likely tobe so completely surprised that they are incapable of response.
1201.e. the Parthian shot.
121This would be necessary to keep the unstrung bow and itsstrings safe from moisture and to facilitate their carrying whennot in use. See supra, p. 28, and Coulston (op. cit.) 270.
40
of a large bow on horseback an impracticability. The case needed
for a six- or even five-foot bow would not only come close to
dragging on the ground but might interfere with the horse's legs
during running. Finally, the need to be able to shift from one
target to another that might require sighting from different sides
of the horse quickly militates against the use of a large bow,
which would have to be lifted over the horse's neck and head122.
Thus the size of bow that could have been used on horseback was
limited, and with it its range and armour-piercing capability.
Horse-archers would have been able to compensate for this
disadvantage to a degree by their mobility, but if they could be
kept away from their targets by a force of foot-archers employing
longer-range bows, their usefulness would diminishm.
It is conceivable that a mounted archer could carry larger
amounts of ammunition simply by carrying more quivers or bundles of
arrows. There is no actual evidence for this possibility, however,
although there are signs that ancient commanders recognized the
problem of archers' limited ammunition supply and attempted to deal
with it in other ways124. Horse-archers could pick used arrows
122Moreover, shooting at a target directly to the front of thehorse would be almost impossible; see supra, p. 25.
mCrassus's foot-archers at-Carrhae were probably armed withself-bows instead of compound bows like the Parthians; thus theywere outranged and unable to affect the Parthian horse-archers'access to the Roman infantry.
124Cf. Surenas's use of a train of camels loaded with arrows atCarrhae (Plutarch Crassus, XXV). This prodigious use ofammunition, and the incredible logistical preparations necessary tosupport it, foreshadows modern practise.
41
from the field like their unmounted counterparts, albeit with less
ease, but they held the advantage in that they could retire in
small groups to a rear location to be resupplied and return to the
battle far more quickly125.
So we see that the effectiveness of horse-archers can be
defined in terms of their flexibility, mobility, vulnerability, and
firepower. In open ground they represent improvement in all of
these characteristics over pedites sagittarii in one way or
another, except in range and armour penetration, i.e. "firepower".
This disadvantage they make up for in part by their ability to
close with and retire from their enemy at speed causing casualties
the whole time. They were, like all cavalry, at a disadvantage in
close country, and would have to be protected by infantry. In some
situations the way ahead would have to be cleared of enemy before
the cavalry could proceed. These characteristics would form the
basis for an ancient commander's disposition of his units of
equites sagittarii.
125Cf. Plutarch, Crassus, XXV.
42
CHAPTER THREE
QUESTIONS OF ARMAMENT
Central to the question of the employment of horse archers is
the question of their arming. Were these soldiers entirely, and
exclusively, bow-armed? Or were units or individuals allowed
greater flexibility to equip themselves according to the needs of
the situation? Furthermore, if they were permitted to choose
weaponry according to the situation, was it only during garrison or
border control duties, or did this flexibility extend to when they
were employed as part of an expeditionary army? This section will
show that, contrary to what is generally believed, the equites
sagittarii had the flexibility to use bow, spear, and even club and
sling according to the requirements of the situations they found
themselves in.
To begin, it is necessary to establish what was required to
ensure effectiveness in a unit of horse archers. Caesar126,
Tacitus127, and Josephusull all refer to units of equites
126Bellum Civile III, 4, 5. Amongst Pompey's forces were 200mounted archers sent by the Commagenian Antiochus I.
127Annales II, 16, 12.^Mounted archers were part ofGermanicus' force against the Chatti and accompanied his legions atIdistaviso.
1282e11um Iudaicum II, 500, 5: Antiochus IV of Commagene sent2000 horse- and 3000 foot-archers along with Cestius Gallus; Gallusalso took six cohortes of auxiliary infantry and four a/ae. Ifthese units were quingenary, the Commagenian and Roman totals wouldbe approximately the same; Josephus may have confused the two here.D.B. Saddington, "The Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus, Josephus, and
43
sagittarii, these being ethnic units supplied en masse by client-
kings129. Their ability on horseback and with the bow would have
required them to begin their training at an early age; Sarmatians,
for example, received training in horsemanship and archery starting
at an early age and kept it up at a high level throughout their
lives. This phenomenon of training in specialist skills from an
early age had good parallels. Children of the Balearic Islands,
for example, were believed in antiquity to have been allowed to eat
only when they had secured their food by hitting it with a missile
from their slingm. Whether this was true or not, other ancient
civilisations certainly placed an emphasis on training their male
children in military skillsm.
Horsemanship, especially at a level of skill where a bow can
be used effectively while galloping, is extremely difficult to
master and would require daily training for many years. For many
peoples their safety and livelihood depended on an effective horse
other Early Imperial Writers" in Acta Classica XIII (1970) 117-8does not seem to notice this and accepts that the auxiliary forcesconsisted of both Roman and client-king forces. A more detaileddiscussion would be outside the scope of this paper.
129Caesar and Josephus say exactly this; it is in any eventperfectly natural for these units, whose specialist skills were notfound in the Roman world itself at the time, to be recruitedoutside the boundaries of the Empire.
130Strabo III, 5, 1 in Griffiths "The Sling and its Place inthe Roman Imperial Army" in van Driel-Murray, ed. Roman MilitaryEquipment: the Sources of Evidence. BAR International Series #476(Oxford 1989) 263; and Vegetius, De Re Militari I, 16.
mE.g. the ancient Spartans and Athenians; wrestling, javelin,and discus throwing have obvious military applications and probablyhad a military origin.
44
archer force capable of providing defence: the Palmyrenes and
Nabataeans, especially, depended on horse archers to secure the
routes through the desert that brought their cities trade and
supplies. They also revered the skills of the mounted archer to
the extent that some of the gods they worshipped were mounted
archers132. They must have devoted considerable effort to the
raising of horses suitable to carrying these mounted archers and no
doubt spent a comparable effort in archery training. Without
question, mounted archery requires a considerable amount of
training for it to be effective in battle.
In practise it proved difficult for mounted archers to
maintain their skills at a high standard for several reasons. Once
a unit has been removed from its place of origin, it did not take
long even in peacetime, before disease, accidents, and retirement
would take their toll and replacements would have to be found.
Obviously a replacement for a specialist unit would have to be able
to carry out the tasks required of him. Reinforcements for horse
archer units must therefore have required comparable training if
they were to equal the performance of their comrades already in
service. These replacements must have come from either the same
place as the units in which they were being enrolled or from some
region where horse-archery traditions were equally strong.
The evidence for the origin of the auxiliary sagittarii, as
132Coulston (op. cit., 237) and see M.I. Rostovtzeff "TheCaravan-Gods of Palmyra" JRS 22 (1932) 107-116 for others.
45
distinct from their officersm, is quite well documented. Van de
Weerd and Lambrechts134 show with reasonable certainty that they
were recruited in Syria and the east, the traditional lands of the
mounted archer. This suggests that military ability and specialist
knowledge, at least in the case of the sagittarii, were to Roman
commanders the crucial factors for recruitment rather than ease of
recruitment. Moreover, there must have been some provision for the
transportation of replacements from the east to units that were
stationed far away. Units such as the cohors I Hemesenorum
milliaria equitata, the numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium, and
the cohors I sagittariorum, stationed in Pannonia Inferior, Dacia,
and Germania Superior respectively, were the beneficiaries of such
a systemlm. The considerable expense and trouble of finding and
recruiting men in the east, and transporting them to the locations
of their new units to receive their initial military training,
underscores the importance placed on the effectiveness of bow-armed
units.
The evidence for this practise, however, is far from
mThere are, on the other hand, signs that officers ofauxiliary sagittarii were, for a time, exclusively Italian inorigin at a time when many auxiliary units were commanded byofficers of eastern origin. H. van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts("Note sur les corps d'archers au Haut Empire" Die Araber in derAlten Welt [Berlin 19641 661-677), relying on prosopographicalevidence, believe that this evidence, if pointing to a regularpractice, indicates a fear in the Roman high command of theloyalties of their equites sagittarii.
'340p . cit., 667-70.
135G.L. Cheesman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army(Oxford 1914) 82-4, H. van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts (op. cit.661-2), and J. Davies (op. cit. 261-2).
46
conclusive. Kennedym points to a number of Parthian units that
formed the force of horse-archers in the Roman army before Syrian
units were recruited which may have lost their function as bow-
armed units since there was presumably no mechanism for recruitment
and replacement from skilled sources. As the supply of skilled
recruits from the original source dried up, it became more and more
difficult to train new members recruited locally to a decent
standard. This resulted in the gradual transformation of the
character of these units from sagittarii to more conventional
auxiliary regiments"7. Coulstonm discusses the tombstone of
136,D.L. Kennedy, "Parthian Regiments in the Roman Army" J.Fitz, ed. Limes: Akten des XI Internationalen Limeskongresses (Budapest 1976) 530.
137Kennedy bases his conclusion that Parthian units stoppedbeing bow-armed mainly on the lack of the -sag suffix ininscriptional evidence. While he may find it "surprising" thatonly one text referring to a Parthian unit describes it as - sag, isit not more surprising that any would describe a Parthian unitas such? As he himself says, "Parthian soldiers are notedfor.. .above all.. .horsemanship and archery" (op. cit., 527) andindeed, those Parthians most likely to become mercenaries and fightfor Rome are from the lower classes. These lower classes suppliedthe horse-archers to the Parthian armies, while the upper classessupplied the armoured lancers. The "Parthian shot" was a leitmotifin Roman literature (Coulston [op. cit.] 292). Since the Parthianswere so universally known as mounted archers, it would be asredundant officially to title them "archers" as it would be todayto title the Seaforth Highlanders "infantry". All highland unitsare infantry. As he notes, however, "...there is no evidence toshow continued oriental archers being drafted to the regimentsafter their formation..." (527). We must be careful to distinguishbetween recruitment and membership on the one hand, and tacticalfunction and armament on the other. My point is that although thefirst may, and in the case of archers almost certainly will, havean effect on the second, it is not the only factor.
1381985: 289. The tombstone is discussed by N. Benseddik inLes troupes auxiliares de l'armee romaine en Mauretanie Cesarienne sous le Haut-Empire (Algiers 1979), 38-40, fig. 11, which isunavailable to me.
47
a soldier of the ala I Augusta Parthorum, stationed in Mauretania.
This depicted the deceased armed with a spear and javelin, evidence
that could be construed to indicate that this regiment had ceased
being bow-armed at some stage. Since there is no archaeological or
other evidence whatsoever to suggest that it was ever bow-armed,
however, we must conclude that it had lost whatever function it may
originally have had as a regiment of archers early onm.
Other units were not kept so far from home and, in Coulston's
words, "...the strategically important Eastern regiments would not
have been allowed to decline in skill... nuo These would have
been units such as the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, whose situation was
vital in controlling an important trade route in the desert and in
patrolling a large section of frontier territory. Palmyra is close
to Dura Europos and recruiting, selection, and transport of new
troops was thus much simpler. This is not to say that these units
would not train with other weapons as well. Clearly they would
have been obliged to use a variety of weapons in order to carry out
their tasks for which the bow was unsuitableul.
Evidence of the difficulty in maintaining a high standard of
ability in a unit of horse-archers comes from El-Kantara, Numidia
139"None of the known personnel of the ala Parthorum were oforiental origin and perhaps two centuries of isolation inMauretania resulted in a change of weaponry." Coulston (op. cit.)289.
1400p. cit. 289 (e.g. the coh. XX Palmyrenorum).
ulConvoy protection, for example, requires that soldiersengaged in it be armed with both short- and long-range weapons.Those protecting a convoy must be able to fight attackers who havepenetrated a missile screen and have come to close quarters.
48
in the form of a tombstone (I.L.S. 9173). A Palmyrene centurion,
Agrippa, of the cohors III Thracum Syriaca equitata undertook the
training of the Palmyrenian archers of the cohors I Chalcidenorum
(curam [e]git Palmyr. [s]ag.). The cohors I Chalcidenorum, with a
numerus Palmyrenorum, was in the area long enough to construct an
amphitheatre and other public works, and during this time perhaps
the archery skills of the numerus had begun to deteriorate. In any
case, a senior soldier from a unit of archers stationed in an area
where archery traditions were strong was brought in, and the
assumption may reasonably be made that it was to maintain the
skills of the archers and not simply take care of the soldiers
themselves142.
A further example of an expert moving about to train archers,
and particularly horse archers, is Barsemis Abbei of Carrhae143.
His career included tours with a numerus Hosroruorum, the cohors I
Hemesenorum milliaria sagittaria equitata, and the ala firma
Katafractaria. As Coulstonl" says, "To judge from this series of
units Barsemius must have been an equestrian trainer and/or an
archery expert... (perhaps) a skilled horse-archery campidoctor."
Shooting skills, it should be noted, were not the only skills
required in an archer-unit that would begin to deteriorate with
142For further discussion of this case see J. Carcopino "Lelimes de Numidie et sa garde Syrienne" Syria VI (1925) 119-22.
1431, ...Barsemis Abbei dec(urio) ala firma Katafractaria exnumero Hosro [en] orum, mag ( i s ter) coh (ortis mil iariae )Hemes(enorum), n(atione?) d(omo) carris..." CIL III, 10307.
1440p. cit., 289.
49
time spent away from where the unit was recruited. The members of
such a unit would also need to have considerable skill to build
bows, and ample time to acquire and practise the skill145. Like
archery itself, the knowledge of making bows requires a lifetime of
training and practisel". The climate in which bows are
constructed might also have been a factor in the efficiency of
archery units removed from their original home in the east. The
application of the layers of glue-soaked sinew requires low
humidity and warm temperatures, features not normally associated
with northern European climates. It is thus possible that a
decline in the quality of bows coming from the regimental stores
persuaded commanders to diversify their weaponry.
This is not to say that a mounted unit that began to use other
forms of weaponry would lose its function as horse-archers, as
clearly archery training was a part of life for all Roman soldiers.
Indeed a unit of mounted archers would serve as a repository of
knowledge of archery and horsemanship second to none and could be
the source of skilled trainers for the other arms. This is
speculation, it is true, but the sequence of Barsemius Abbei's
career leads to the conclusion that an expert in one form of
fighting could be sent to units of different function as a
campidoctor to broaden their training and increase their
flexibility.
1451i period of up to a year for bow construction is recorded inthe Ghunyah of Taybughah (Coulston [op. cit.] 249).
1461g.F. Paterson, "The Archers of Islam" Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 9 (1966) 69-85.
50
It is generally assumed that a unit of mounted archers must be
armed exclusively with the bow. This assumption, implicit in most
writing on auxiliaries147, however, requires some qualification.
The bow-armed cavalry of other ancient peoples is frequently
represented carrying other weapons in addition to the bowm. The
Strategikon attributed to the Byzantine emperor Maurice describes
the Byzantine battle line as consisting of horse-archers with those
inexpert at the bow carrying light javelins149. The Byzantine
battle line of the sixth century described in Procopius was armed
with the bow but certainly could hold its own in a hand-to-hand
melee; it too used sword or spear as requiredm.
There is plenty of evidence for the cross-training of other
branches of early imperial auxiliary cavalry in other forms of
weaponry. Arrianl" discusses it in detail in his manual on
cavalry training. There exists, moreover, the text of an imperial
in Kennedy (op. cit.), Cheesman (op. cit.), andSaddington (op. cit. 91, 95, 117-119).
mCoulston (op. cit., figs. 33, 44), Y. Yadin The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (New York 1963) 295-7, A.D.H. Bivar"Cavalry Equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier" DumbartonOaks Papers 22 (1976) 282.
149Strategikon II, 3. In the case of the Byzantines we aredealing with a main battle line intended for close contact with theenemy and not a unit of chasseurs, but my point is that differencesin ability and level of training were recognized and dealt with bya modification of armament; individual soldiers were expected to beflexible enough to use different weapons according to thesituation, and this manual prescribes training sufficient to bringthis about.
150.Bellum Gothicum I, 1, 12-3.
151Teritl tarrucT1 43, 1.
51
address given by Hadrian to units of cavalry given after a parade-
ground demonstration. In it the Emperor praises the troopers of
the cohors VI Commagenorum for, among other things, their vigorous
use of slings and javelins152. The use of slings points to a
great deal of training for both men and horses. Not only is
slinging a difficult skill to master153 but unless horses become
accustomed to the sound of an object whirling over their head, they
may rear or bolt154. Infantry units of the Imperial period were
certainly expected to be generalists in weapon skills. Vegetius in
his De Re Militari describes training in the use of the bow as well
as the slingm for regular legionary infantry, while infantry are
also to be taught to ride horses156. Birley's belief 157 that all
of the cohortes Comma genorum were primarily and originally bow-
armed seems correct, but, for the reasons already stated, there is
152” verum vos fastidium calore vitastis strenue faciendo quaefieri debebant. addidistis ut et lapides fundis mitteretis etmissilibus confligeretis..." CIL VIII, 18042, 11. 8-11.
1531K.B. Griffiths, "The Sling and its Place in the RomanImperial Army" C. van Driel-Murray, ed. Roman Military Equipment: the Sources of Evidence. BAR International Series #476 (Oxford1989) 264. He observes that it is not clear from the text whetheror not the equites were mounted when they used the slings; however,all of the other exercises described in the text are cavalryexercises (frequens dextrator, Cantabricius densus...saluistisubique expedite "the right wheels were in quick succession, theCantabrian gallop was done tightly together, and you jumpedeverywhere promptly"), so it seems most likely that the slingingwas also done on horseback.
154Hyland (op. cit.) 168.
1551, 15-16
1560p. cit., I, 18.
157In J. Davies (op. cit.) 270.
52
no reason to believe that they, or any other bow-armed unit for
that matter, used the bow to the exclusion of all other forms of
weaponry158.
If, however, the cohors VI Commagenorum was indeed bow-armed,
we must explain why it is not referred to as such in the address of
Hadrian. The text in fact describes them as fighting
missilibusm but this word, when it can be defined with
certainty, refers to javelins or other weapons rather than to
arrows168. Coulston161 suggests that the horsemen of the cohortes
equitatae sagittariorum may have been armed with javelin and spear,
and bases this on the evidence of Hadrian's address. However, in
a unit where the career pattern went from pedes to eques162, it
seems unlikely that a soldier would be made to re-arm and re-train
on his promotion; rather, he would stay with the weapon or weapons
that he had trained in for many years. The commanders of bow-armed
units had made a considerable investment in recruiting and
158Certainly the fact that they, and the Ituraeans andPetraeans, were well known as archers may help to explain why thereis so little reference to them as such in the epigraphical sources.Of the ala Augusta Ituraeorum and the cohortes II FlaviaCommagenorum, I Augusta Ituraeorum, and III Ulpiae Petraeorum (allattested as sagittariorum) only the coh. II Flavia Commagenorum isso attested more than once. Cf. my comments on the Parthians, note13 supra.
1591. 10.
1601 know this from my own survey of the literature but I havebeen unable to find any corroborating discussion in scholarlywriting.
1610p. cit., 285. He does not make any conclusions, however.
162R.W. Davies (op. cit.) 145 and note 31.
53
selection from lands where horsemanship and archery skills were of
a high standard. This system was intended to ensure an effective
corps of archers. It is scarcely credible that they would squander
this investment by forcing these archers, when they had been
promoted equites, to acquire the skill of, for example, spearmen.
In conclusion, the reference to the cohors VI Commagenorum in
the address by Hadrian does not necessarily mean that it was not
bow-armed. Clearly it was armed with a variety of weapons, and it
demonstrated its prowess in the use of the spear and in
horsemanship to its Emperor in the parade commemorated by the above
inscription. This suggests either a series of formal, standardized
parade-ground rehearsed formations for show and training, or that
cavalry units were cross-trained in weaponry. Indeed, it is likely
that both were the case.
In addition to the epigraphical and literary evidence
discussed above, tombstones and other archaeological finds provide
further evidence for the arming of mounted archers. It is clear
that many of the units thought to have been composed of archers
have been identified as such only on the basis of a single
tombstone showing a soldier engaged in that activity163.
Furthermore, ...no equites cohortales appear as tombstone
figures..."1", so we have no indication of how they were armed
163The ala I Augusta Ituraeorum, the cohors I Ascalonitarumequitata, and the cohors II Flavia Commagenorum equitata areexamples of units only once described as bow-armed. See Appendix1 for further examples.
164Coulston (op. cit.) 284.
54
from this direction. Archaeological evidence of laths and
arrowheads is not taken as evidence of an archery function for a
unit since many units had a supply of bows and arrows for mural
defence and general training as a matter of course165. Indeed, it
is known that a soldier from a non-archer unit could take
sufficient pride in his accomplishments with the bow to commemorate
them in stone166. It should not, therefore, be surprising that
another could do the same, and show himself riding or shooting the
bow when his unit was not officially designated as bow-armed. Thus
some of these funerary depictions of archers may represent nothing
more than pride in the deceased's skill as an archer, and not that
he belonged to a bow armed unit. Some of the tombstones showing
mounted archers, therefore, may be taken as evidence not of the
proliferation of units armed in such a way, but as further evidence
for the detailed cross-training of the Roman military167.
As far as a unit such as the cohors XX Palmyrenorum was
concerned, normal patrol and border control duties would surely
165J• Davies (op. cit.) 265; and Coulston (op. cit.) 285.
1660L III, 3672 (= ILS 2558), and Dio LXIX, 9, 6. A soldierof the cohors Batavorum milliaria equitata swam the Danube in fullkit, then fired an arrow straight up and hit and broke it withanother before it hit the ground, all under the gaze of the emperorHadrian.
167MY comments above on units from known areas of horse-archerytraditions notwithstanding. For example, the ala Celerum is onlysuspected to be bow-armed on the basis of an inscription describinga trooper as highly skilled in archery (...vir sagittandiperitissimus...: CIL III, 4832). Although this unit did serve inArabia and may have been recruited there (J. Davies [op. cit.] 269)I think that this is hardly reason to assign such a role to theentire regiment. The trooper of the a/a Batavorum (see note 43)was also very skilled in archery.
55
require considerable flexibility in weaponry. In a large
expeditionary army a general could always call upon different units
for different tasks, but auxiliary alae and cohortes garrisoned in
isolation often had large areas under their control. In these
situations, a variety of possible situations might arise calling
for flexibility in armament. The use of a cohors equitata for riot
control is attested168, and for escort duties169 a smart commander
would ensure that his men were prepared for both short- and long-
range fighting. Indeed the caravan-gods of Palmyra, gods of
convoy-escort, are depicted mounted and armed with both bow and
spearlm.
Our evidence for the armament of archer units in large-scale
expeditionary armies is somewhat less equivocal. Arrian, in his
INn414 imacCALA6vwv, groups his units according to armament. Horse
archers are employed in the advance guard precisely because they
are horse archers: their characteristics such as mobility and
firepower suit them for this task, and their use of weapons other
168E.g. a cohors equitata was taken to Jerusalem by Florus inA.D. 66 to carry out riot control; the cavalry was used for crowdcontrol but later, when the crowd became too unruly the infantrycontained them with clubs (or "riot-batons" to use Davies'modernistic euphemism) and the cavalry moved them on (cf. J. Davies[op. cit.] 88, 147).
169Escort duty is attested in the papyri for cohors XXPalmyrenorum (for which see J.F. Gilliam, Roman Army Papers [Amsterdam 1986], and R.W. Davies [op. cit.] 146-7) and in the Actsof the Apostles 23.23, 31-33 Paul was escorted to Caesarea bycavalry and infantry, presumably members of the same cohorsequitata.
lmSee p. 45 supra.
56
than bows would render them much less effective.^Likewise
Josephusln seems to describe an expeditionary army advance guard
composed in large part of innat64otat. A commander could, of course,
re-arm his mounted archers for an upcoming battle in which he saw
little use for them; we lack evidence for this sort of flexibility,
however172.
Since it is clear that skilful use of the bow on horseback
requires years of training to acquire and constant practise to
maintain, a horse-archer unit without a source of skilled recruits
to draw from, would, after a period of time, begin to lose its
proficiency. A unit could obtain a skilled instructor such as
Agrippa or Barsemis Abbei to help resist this tendency, to be sure,
but his students' generally lower standards of skill at the time of
recruitment would begin to limit what they would be capable of
after training. Eventually it would be necessary to arm some or
even the majority with other weapons in order to give them some
effectiveness on the battlefieldim. The fact that some units
did, however, maintain a high level of skill in archery in order to
carry out their mission does not mean that these units did not
train with other weapons; in fact, on account of the variety of
tasks required of them, they were most probably able to use
whatever weapon they needed.
171Bellum Iudaicum III, 115-126, and V, 47-9.
172Evidence is only lacking for mounted archers, however. Forother cavalry, see Chapter 2 supra.
173As in the case of the Strategikon.
57
CHAPTER FOUR
OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
The equites sagittarii undoubtedly formed an important part of
the Roman field army of the high Empire. Their employment on the
battlefield, however, has received little attention. Coulston174
believes that their employment has already been studied in detail
but the studies to which he refers either discuss horse archers
only amongst other arms175 or confine consideration of them to a
limited periodlm. These studies also tend to be more concerned
with historical issues, with limited attention to purely military
considerations1". Those scholars who have an interest in the
military tend to confine their interest to broad strategic and
political topics relating to auxiliary forces, to terms of service,
or to archaeological questions. Such inquiry is vital, to be sure,
but an understanding of the soldiers themselves, why they fought,
and especially how they closed with their enemy and killed him, is
the most certain way to discover what made the Roman military
'740p. cit., 220. Coulston is referring to the employment ofarchers in general, not specifically horse archers. Obviouslythere are significant differences in the role of the two arms.
175E.g. D.B. Saddington, "Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus,Josephus, and Other Early Imperial Writers" Acta Classica 13 (1970)89-124.
176Saddington (op. cit.), and P. Medinger, "Les archers Partheset l'arc Turquois A la bataille de Carrhes" Revue Archeologique serie 6, no. 2 (1933) 227-234.
Somewhat of an exception to this rule is E. Darko, "Note surles corps d'archers au haut empire" Altheim and Stiehl, eds. DieAraber in der Alten Welt (Brussels 1935) 287-310.
58
machine so effective. Politics and strategy do not win battles.
What makes groups of armed men so effective in violent combat does.
Such a study of the military with emphasis on its lower levels
has been ably done for the Greek world by Victor Hanson178 but
Rome has so far gone without this kind of treatment. Mordecai
Gichon's discussion of the Roman military in the Jewish revolts";
is highly realistic and obviously based on experience of soldiering
and especially soldiering in desert conditions. His treatment,
however, views war from the perspective of the general, not of the
prefects, tribunes, and centurions. These junior officers
commanding the a/ae, turmae, and centuriae had to decide how best
to employ men and carry out their tasks at regimental and company
level. How precisely these commanders employed them, however,
remains unclear. In this chapter, therefore, I intend to explore,
through analysis of the relevant sources, literary and
archaeological, and of scholarly literature, why the equites
sagittarii were so important, how they fought, and how their
commanders employed them.
Before addressing these questions it is necessary to provide
a few definitions. War, on an operational or tactical, as opposed
to a strategic or political level, is considered by military
theorists to take place in a number of phases. These phases differ
178v Hanson, The Western Way of War (New York 1987).
179M. Gichon, "Aspects of a Roman Army in War According to theBellum Judaicum of Josephus", P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, eds., TheDefence of the Roman and Byzantine East, BAR International Series297(i) (Oxford 1986) 287-310.
59
by virtue of the different requirements they impose on commanders
affecting disposal of troops, logistical preparations, and spirit
of operations. On an individual level war is simply attack and
defence. At sub-unit level (i.e. company or squadron in modern
terms, or centuria or turma for a Roman auxiliary unit) and unit
level (i.e. battalion or regiment, or cohors or a/a), however,
there are five different phases of operations, which fall into the
basic categories of attack and defence. It will be convenient to
take these five phases of war in the order presented below, if only
because that is the order in which Western military schools teach
them. "Attack" is composed of:
1. Advance to contact: movement of a force towards a
known or suspected enemy location or through enemy-held
or -dominated country. Enemy reaction is unknown and so
all-round defence is essential, as is thorough
reconnaissance. Economy of force is often achieved by
the use of highly mobile, lightly equipped units for
reconnaissance and protection.
2. Attack: the process of closing with and destroying
the enemy including preparatory fires. Maximum combat
power and violence applied at the "right" point in time
and space is prerequisite for successmcl.
180The definition of the term "right" as applied to time andplace varies over time and even between and within armies at thesame time. Until the Second World War it was common to attack only
60
3.^Pursuit: the pursuit of a defeated enemy force in
withdrawal. Never allowing a force to regroup, rest, or
prepare for further operations will weaken it and hasten
its defeat. Highly mobile forces are well used in this
phase to keep up constant pressure.
Defence is divided into:
1. Defence proper: holding of ground against an enemy
force intent on its capture.^A fortification is a
defensive position and we may also consider a battle line
receiving an attack to be in a defensive posture. Mobile
reserves detailed to plug gaps, launch counterattacks,
and relieve worn out troops are as essential to the
success of the defence as is dogged persistence in
maintaining position.
2. Withdrawal: the movement of a force, which might be
in or out of contact, with the intention of removing it
from circumstances unfavorable for battle. Withdrawals,
of course, can themselves be designed to lead an enemy
into a larger trap or onto ground unfavorable for him.
strongpoints; now it is common to bypass strongpoints and exploitareas of maximum weakness.
61
What does all this have to do with mounted archers? As with
all troops, mounted archers' actions in battle vary according to
the phase of war their leader is fighting at any given moment. It
is necessary that the reader understand what they are and what
happens in them in order to understand why the equites sagittarii
do what they do.
1. ADVANCE TO CONTACT
We turn first to the advance to contact. In antiquity this
often consisted of an army moving from one fortified camp to
another in hostile country.^Two sources contain our main
references to such movements, Josephus 181 and Arrian182.^Both
authors must be regarded as extremely important since they both had
first-hand experience as generals. One was a leader of such
movements, while the other, before becoming an observer of military
actions from the Roman side, had commanded troops in several major
actions against them183.
Josephus has two notable digressions on the organization of
181For ref., see below.
182Arrian, INmoc4; icate/dahNow, especially 1-2.
183With proper regard for their limitations as sources we canmake considerable use of them. "...Josephus' accounts must.. .beread with due criticism. This must necessarily be most severe whendealing with his opinions of political motives...and...when dealingwith the narrative of their (definite persons) deeds. On the otherhand, descriptions of...institutions and their functioning (italicsmine)...have been largely sustained by all outside evidenceavailable." Gichon, op. cit., 287.
62
the Roman column of march. The first describes the army under
Vespasian marching into Galilee in 67184; the second that of Titus
on its way to Jerusalem in 70185.
auxvO 6 Kai Napa COW 13ocauliew ovvitten avRgaxixOv,'Avrthxou Rev Kai 'Aypirna Kai Zoaigou napaaxogevow &vacSuyxkliovc ice4oi); to4Otac xai )ca,iou; tivirciç, toi 8e "Apapo;Waxen) xaiouc negwavroc inneic ivI itcoc nevtaxtcrxtliotc,
frrav46tat...tolic Rev ye xrul,olic tóveinxo6ixov Kaito4Ocac poayetv exe)teuoev, thc ecvaxOrtotev Tac e4a7ttvaiouc
Ov noXeRiew entSpoptic; icai. Stepeuvev tac ikrOrtovc xaiXoxdoOat truvagevag 0A,a; . . . (BJ I I I, 68, 116 )
.../cp6; oic at te 're6v aaiAwvauggaxiat nai) rleiou; xaiovxvoi Vint (loth Ivpiac trixoupot auviWov....npotOvn 8i eicnoXeRiav TIN npoilyov Rev oi 13ccathxoi Kai nay toavpRaxtx6v.... (B,7 v, 42, 47)
"Also, a great allied force had beengathered by the kings Antiochus186,Agrippa187, and Soaemus188, each providingtwo thousand foot-archers and one thousandcavalry, while the Arab Malchus sent athousand cavalry and five thousand foot. Themajority of the latter were archers.... He(Vespasian) ordered the light-armed troops ofthe auxiliaries and the archers to go inadvance, in order to beat off any sudden enemyattacks and search suspicious woods suitablefor ambushes."
...In addition to these came the kings'forces in much greater strength, and a great
184Be11um Iudaicum III, 115-126.
185 j V, 47-49.
16.Antiochus IV of Commagene.
ivAgripp a II of Chalcis.
lmSoaemus, king of Emesa.
63
number of allied troops from Syria.... Thekings' forces and the entire auxiliary forcepreceded Titus on his march into enemyterritory."
The advance guard of the army of Vespasian consisted of "the
auxiliaries and archers" whose task was reconnaissance and forward
protection; that of Titus's army was made up of the client-kings'
forces with the remainder of the auxiliary force. Auxiliaries are
not referred to as being in any other part of the order of march,
except as the rear guard of Vespasian's army. The client kings'
forces with Vespasian's army consisted largely of archers both
mounted and on footm; Titus also received auxiliaries from the
kings. We may conclude that a large portion of the advance guard
of both armies consisted of mounted archers.
Let us take a closer look at the organization of this portion
of the army. It is the light-armed troops and the archers who go
ahead of the main bodyl". If Josephus's statement that the
"entire force"'m of troops contributed by the kings to Titus'
army was deployed in the advance guard was true also for
Vespasian's march, and assuming Josephus's figures of the kings'
contribution to Vespasian's army are correct, then there were up to
189What Antiochus, Agrippa, and Soaemus sent is not madeperfectly clear. Josephus says that they each contributed twothousand foot-archers, and one thousand cavalry (BJ III, 68) but Ithink that cdtenac certainly refers to both infantry and cavalry.Malchus of Arabia, however, clearly sent a large force of both footand horse archers (BJ III, 68).
190BJ III, 116
191BLT^42, 47.
64
eleven thousand foot archers and four thousand horse archers
preceding Vespasian's legionsm. The composition of Titus' army
is less clear, but it seems reasonable to assume that the client-
kings made similar contributions. There was as well a considerable
body of regular auxiliaries accompanying Vespasian's army193.
The point of this is not a mere exercise in "bean counting".
Fifteen thousand is a very large body of troops with which to find,
mark, and guard a routem. Gichonm on the evidence of
passages from Caesarm, believes that Roman advance guards were
echeloned in depth (i.e. divided into two bodies: the larimi
antecursores and the antecursores) as is the practice in more
192Since Antiochus, Agrippa, and Soaemus each supplied threethousand troops, and Malchus sent six thousand. However, I believethat Josephus is giving very rounded numbers here, rather thanexact parade or paper strengths. He is writing a history, not amilitary manual, and thus may reasonably be expected to giveapproximate figures or pass over details of interest toprofessional soldiers in the interest of producing a readable text.
193There were twenty-three cohorts (ten infantry, thirteencohortes equitatae: " TiOv 8g amp& ai &Ica ggv glxov avec )0cruc 7ce0i)c,8g Xourai, Senapeig ecvec gaicoaiouc ggv ICE4oi)c, iniceic 8g &at& Erman; . . " BJ III ,67.) and six a/ae of regular auxiliaries with Vespasian's army. Ofthese, five cohorts and one ala were from Caesarea, and five a/aewere from Syria. Some of these units were probably bow-armed.Josephus does not describe precisely where these were located inthe order of march, but merely says that "light infantry...and alarge amount of cavalry..." ("...7m0A..xaiteiyvtangwvolynA..." BJ III,126.) formed part of the rearguard. For a more detailed breakdownof Vespasian's army according to the evidence of Josephus, seeGichon (op. cit., 303-8).
194This figure does not include any regular auxiliaries thatmay have been included in the advance guard as well.
1950p. cit., 291.
196BG II, 17 and 19; BC III, 75.
65
modern armies. Evidence for this tactic is absent from all ancient
sources197, as is the essential provision of flank guards.
Gichon198 suggests that this omission from the sources may be
explained because it seemed self-evident and not worth mentioning.
Josephus, like Caesar and Arrian, was a general, and so his
interest in military matters can be expected to spill over into his
writing. On the other hand, he was writing for a wider audience,
who could be expected to have little interest in this degree of
detail. This will explain why he omits some information of
interest to historians and soldiers in the interest of producing a
readable text. However, even without explicit reference to
them, it should be possible to establish some information about the
advance and flank guards. Their sheer number, and the speed with
which they could cover ground compared to the remainder of the
force, suggests that they probably both operated far in front of
the main body and, even if echeloned in depth, covered a great
lateral distance.
Gichonm calculates the overall length of Vespasian's force
as between 30 and 35 kilometres.^The conclusion is obvious:
...the head of the troops entered camp for their overnight rest,
197Except for Arrian; see pp. 70-72 infra.
198Op. cit., 290-1.
199For example, Josephus, when describing the marching order ofthe legions, says simply that "a centurion" ( "... ucticateArcapxoc..."BJ III, 124) kept the legionaries in order; at six thousand men perlegion, I think more than one would be necessary.
aw0-.p cit., 307.
66
before the last of the troops were able to leave the site of the
previous overnight-stay... "a". The length of an average day's
march for a Roman army has been calculated202 at a little over 30
kilometres. The army would leave camp around dawn203 and march
until about midday. Probabably the antecursores would leave
shortly before the remainder of the force in order to leave a large
enough space204.
The enormous length of the train consisting not only of
soldiers but of equipment, pack animals, and baggage as well will
require it to have considerable protection along its entire length.
Their number suggests that the antecursores did not merely scout
and clear forward of the main body but well off to the flanks as
well, thus providing flank protection. But what sort of forces are
required to perform such a task? Unless the ground ahead is
thickly wooded or full of defiles, clearing it and guarding it is
a relatively simple matter of searching possible enemy ambush sites
and occupying locations dominating the march route and approaches
to it. Small parties can search large areas, and a force of a few
hundred would be sufficient to hold almost any key point at least
201 ibid.
NmH.P. Judson, in Caesar's Army (Boston 1888) 67, arrived atthis figure with reference to American army staff tables.
203Josephus, BI V, 51.
204There must be a space between the advance guard and the mainbody so that both elements will have space for manoeuvre in case ofcontact with the enemy.
67
temporarilym. Josephus provides us with an example of a limited
cavalry force, though not specifically identified as composed of
horse archers, conducting reconnaissance: Titus in 70 scouted
Jerusalem with a force of six hundred206. Such a use of small
parties is more economical and effective in clearing a route than
employing large forces, which are more difficult to manoeuvre as
well. The more sub-units into which an advance guard can be
divided, the more ground it can cover.
If an advance guard was organized along these or similar lines
we might account for the lack of references to flank guards in the
surviving literature as follows. The advance guard would cover
such a wide area that it would take on the responsibilities of
flank guard by clearing and occupying areas far to either side of
the march route. Flank guards per se would therefore not exist in
the Roman army as they would be unnecessary. The job that they
perform in more modern armies would be done by the advance guard.
An enemy attack through the latter would be unlikely given the time
required to penetrate them. Indeed, the large numbers of troops
that we have seen preceding the Roman armies in response to the
Jewish revolts would require an enormous area to either side of the
205E. g. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 68, 3, where an infantry cohortholed up in a turret held four legions at bay for a few hours,despite having 130,000 arrows shot at them.
aldi.RAJ V, 52-65. The six hundred tmAirmw buiwv_u areobviously forming a bodyguard for Titus. Were this a lessimportant reconnaissance (i.e. a route reconnaissance, which acommander does not normally carry out) the number would likely bemuch smaller.
68
main body unless they were grouped in several echelons. Such an
organization in echelons, however, would be clumsy and dangerous
without provision for wide reconnaissance.
One point to be kept in mind is that cavalry are suited for
scouting and skirmish; conversely, they are useless at capturing
and holding ground207. Even foot archers are vulnerable when
faced with an attack by determined infantry. Germanicus covered
them with auxiliary infantry at Idistavisom for this very
reason, and Arrian planned to protect his foot archers with the
infantry of a cohors /ta/ica209.
The mobility of horse archers and their inability to hold
ground seem to support the view that they would form part of the
antecursores or primi antecursores rather than a picket force.
Their characteristics make them more suited to reconnaissance of
selected locations and pinning any enemy there until the arrival of
an attack force proper. The speed with which they were capable of
moving suggests that they would not have travelled as part of a
force including infantryvo. Unfortunately, Josephus does not
207This point is axiomatic and a truism for the student of war;cf. Caesar, BG VII, 80, 7.
208Tac, Ann. I, 16.
209.Arrian, "Eicugtgicaul'AXemov 13.
mArrian (see pp. 69-71 infra) does not include any infantryin his advance guard; rather, the cohortes equitatae even seem tobe divided, the cavalry in the advance guard, the infantryfollowing with the remainder of the auxiliaries. Interestingly,the cohortes equitatae are divided for battles as well; for more,see Davies, "Cohortes Equitatae." in Service in the Roman Army (NewYork 1989) 141-152.
69
provide more explicit information on this subject.
Our most informative source for the actual deployment of horse
archers in the field is our second major authority, the second
century Roman writer and general Arrian. While commanding the army
in Cappadocia in 135, Arrian issued a set of orders to his army for
dealing with an attack into the province by the Alani. His order
of march against the Alani seems to have included horse archers, in
an arrangement similar to that supposed for Vespasian's army, as a
protective guard in front of the rest of the advance guarel. He
actually says that the horse archers are behind the forward
reconnaissance screen, in two groups under the command of
decurions:
`Hydaeou Rev TIN than; oval-Lac TC4); icoctaalcOnovcflat:ea; êiri Svoiv tecawivouc av t oiniop hyr.p.Ovt.toinotc St to); innoto4enac 'CO'66 Ilerpaiouc, ica toótouç tni,Svoiv. ecy•fprcow St akoi); o SencSecpxat. tni^toircot;trozroixecov oi anO tfjç en.% finvt Abinocvoi 6voga.ovvrenixecov abtoic oi %fig =tip% Tric tealinn; tv 'Panay,fç amccov Mohr% Kopivetoc. tni tokotc St of. dcne ç ERIN fiOvolux Katovoi. auv<teyrecxecov St ainotg Trupaiot Kai KypivaiotKai oi ecnO ç nOrric Tatruci16. augntivrow St wimpy dcpxtuoAnuirptoc. iti TO6T01.; St ot Kat01: 1,7C71Eig, icat abtoi tni 6o, Kaiwimpy inTia0co ticomentrapxoc, 15anep èiviowatoniSou. (licta4t;'Kate( 'Ail.avow 1-2)
"The mounted reconnaissance troops are tolead the entire army grouped in twoformations, each under its own commander.Following these will be the Petraian horsearchers, also in two formations under thecommand of decurions. Following them are tobe grouped the men of the ala Auriana. With
mArrian, "Ertcc4t; -Kat& 'Abivoyv 1.
70
them are to be deployed are the troops of thecohors 1111 Raetorum under the command ofDaphnes of Corinth. Following these will bethe men of the ala Colonorum; let the Ituraeiand the Cyrenaians and the men of the cohors IRaetorum be deployed with them. Demetrios isto command all of them. The Celtic cavalryare to follow them, also in two formationsunder the command of the centurion who is incharge of their camp."
Clearly the horse archers follow the icataaminot to protect them
and cover any deployment of the main force or the advance
guard212. Does the phrase bd. tcrinot; imply that the Petraians are
right behind the iconaminot, or that they follow at some distance?
The same phrase when used later in the same passage seems to
indicate that the Colonoi follow closely the Raeti. Do the
innovgama take on any of the reconnaissance tasks? Again, Arrian
is not completely clear, but their position close behind the
212A problem lies in the chain of command and deployment. WhenArrian says that the decurions are in charge, does this mean incharge of individual turmae? Or does he mean of the two divisions,and would decurions, normally commanders of turmae, be put incharge of such larger forces? The Ilerpcciovc have been identified asthe cohors III Ulpia Petraiorummilliaria (see E. Birley, quoted inJ. Davies, "Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the Sagittarii ofthe Roman Army" Britannia 8 (1977) 269; and R. Davies, op. cit.,143.). If this identification is correct then there were up to 125eguites (assuming a strength of approximately 250 for the equitescohortales of a milliary cohort) in each of the two groups intowhich the lead mounted archers are divided, or about three or fourturmae. Given the rigid hierarchy within the rank centurio, it isreasonable to suppose a similar system for decuriones. Having thesenior decurio in each group in charge would then not seem sostrange. Arrian is telling the tribunus cohortis that he wants himback ready to command the rest of his soldiers if contact is made,and to leave the less demanding task of commanding the cavalrytroops to his junior officers.
71
reconnaissance troopsm would indicate that they are there for
protection of these tconotaicentot; they could perhaps have taken part
if a reconnaissance in force was required, but there is no
indication of this.
What is the organization of the rest of the advance guard?
Arrian does not describe it in detail, but it is reasonable to
speculate that the other mounted units that follow the Petraians -
the a/a Auriana, the equites of the cohors IV Raetorum, the ala
Colonorum, and finally the equites of the cohortes I (?) Ituraeorum
(sagittariorum), III Cyrenaica (sagittariorum), and I Raetorum - do
so in a body, ready to deploy where they are needed214. As to why
oiWomiinmeic follow these last in two detachments, it may have had
something to do with the fact that the horse of the four cohortes
equitatae which they precede are working as flank guards. The
total number of horse in the advance guard would be around 2000 -
an effective striking force in any situationm.
Apart from the references in Josephus and Arrian discussed
above, there is little other evidence for mounted archers
participating in an advance guard. Caesarm used mounted
213A numerus exploratorum: Ritterling (1902), quoted in theTeubner edition of Arrian (Vol. II, Scripta Minora, A.G. Roos, ed.[Leipzig 1968] 177).
214The fact that they are under the command of a singleindividual (Daphnes of Corinth) may support this supposition.
2151 partly follow R. Davies in this paragraph; see op. cit.,143.
216Caesar, BG II, 19
72
reconnaissance detachments sent far in front of the main body of
his armies. Ammianus Marcellinus also makes passing reference to
such forces217. Of course equites sagittarii are not the only
military arm suitable for such a role; any light armed cavalry will
do, but those armed with the bow have the advantage of range, so
important in a skirmish, which is, after all, a hit-and-run affair.
But, as we have seen, the evidence of mounted archers in the
advance to contact points to their use as a fighting force.
The evidence of Josephus and Arrian considered thus far points
to a fighting role for mounted archers in the advance to contact,
but furnishes no evidence of their actually fighting. Evidence for
this is available only in an oblique form through Arrian's account
of the battle which occurred between the forces of Alexander the
Great and the Indian king Porus upon Alexander's crossing of the
river Hydaspes. Our main source for this battle is book five of
Arrian's ',04.1)(cOpm)%1Nat pocatc218. Admittedly, Alexander was not a
Roman, but Arrian, being a Roman general as well as an historian,
was in a unique position to analyze and comment, and it is
reasonable to suppose that his interpretation of events was based
in part on his own personal experience.
2'17E.g. Amm. Marc. 31, 12, -for exploratores and 27, 2 forspeculatores. Both these references are to reconnaissancedetachments operating in front of the main body; for a detaileddiscussion of such operations in Ammianus, see N. J. E. Austin,Ammianus on Warfare, Collection Latomus 165 (Brussels 1979) 117-139.
218Dioodorus (XVII 87-91) also has an account of the battle butit is extremely sketchy and omits the river Crossing entirely.
73
Sg innoto4Otac it; irticr% trnou npoetate....TaiNxovi Se te) to4cpxti irpocytta4c toO6 to4Otac enartvbump._ Kai gni toiyrouc tà v npika tiatip.wat 'A)14av8povpin(); AiyEt tok irnot64otag, akOv 8g olyetv tokitpoaayetv yap oilleilvat 116pov 4iw tti that! &wallet... 66 OgKatOakv &pad; to ickfieoc TO tin/^evtaii0a OVcogbruccaelv akoic 41:w tij ap.4). akeyv taro?... ('Aveliccatc'AAE4dcv8poi) v, 13 - 15)
"(Alexander) stationed the horse archersin front of the entire force of cavalry....(When he advanced) he ordered Tauron, thearcher-commander, to lead them against thecavalry.... (Ptolemy) says that Alexanderfirst sent his horse archers against these(enemy that had appeared), and that he wasbringing up the rest of the cavalry, since hebelieved that Porus was pressing forward withhis entire force.... When he learnedaccurately the strength of the Indians,immediately he made a violent attack on themwith the cavalry that was with him..."
After crossing the river Alexander arrayed his battle line as
follows: various infantry on the left and bringing up the rear,
his cavalry on the right, his archers and other missile-armed
troops on either flank, and his mounted archers in front of his
entire force of cavalrym. He advanced his cavalry and light-
armed foot quicklym; his infantry followed more slowly. First
contact was made with a force of chariots and possibly cavalry.
Though unsure about the strength of this force, Arrian reports that
Alexander sent his cavalry against it, led by his horse archers,
and destroyed it. In the above passage, Arrian seems to suggest
that Alexander's horse archers were used to pin a large opposing
m'Aveeriam; —v (Vol. I, Anabasis. A.G. Roos, ed. 1967: Teubner[and all further references unless otherwise indicated]), 13, 4.
22014, 1.
74
force before the battle. Evidently Alexander wished to destroy
this force in detail to prevent their returning to Porus with
information on the attacking force, or to prevent them from being
a problem in the upcoming main battle. In either case, the horse
archers are clearly not believed by Arrian or his source Ptolemy to
have been able to defeat such an enemy in detail or quickly, and
for this reason they were replaced in the attack by the remainder
of the cavalry, a force which was capable of accomplishing this.
Alexander seems to have intended that by engaging his mounted
archers he would gain time for his infantry to catch up and move
into battle formation. It became obvious, however, that it was not
necessary to commit his entire army, so he sent just the cavalry.
Alexander himself was at this point countering the mobilit y221 of
the chariots with the far greater mobility and firepower of his
mounted archers. He could have used any of his cavalry as a
forward guard, but his employment of horse archers for this role
suggests that they were only lightly armed for melee purposes222.
Alexander thus employed his horse archers in this battle first as
a covering force, to pin down the Indian vanguard before effecting
their destruction in detail by regular cavalry.
To conclude on the role of horse archers in the advance to
contact, the only explicit evidence we have for their use in the
221Not so great, as it turned out; the chariots got stuck inthe mud (15, 2).
222.A covering force pins its enemy most effectively by notbecoming involved in a pitched battle (and thus getting killed); itdelays and deceives the enemy by hit and run tactics: mobility andfirepower.
75
Roman army is in Arrian and Josephus. In both authors they seem to
form part of the very first element of the advance guard and
perform there a role of skirmishing and perhaps reconnaissance to
locate and pin down small enemy forces. The advance guard or
antecursores, according to the evidence of Josephus, probably
covered a wide enough area to protect the main body from flank
attack. Although from very different circumstances, the
comparative evidence of Alexander the Great's use of horse archers
comes from Arrian's pen and seems to corroborate the evidence of
Roman times. Horse archers could also make up part of a larger
fighting force advancing in front of the main body.
2. ATTACK
The next phase of war we turn to is the attack. If a Roman
army meets an enemy force the commander can either decide to stop
and fortify, to withdraw, or to attack. In this section we shall
look at the role of the horse archer in the attack.
We turn again to Arrian's account of Alexander's final battle
with the Indian king Porus.
"11811tc vrOc fieXouc tyiyvero icai t4ticev tri, to ictpactO 66vvilov Thy ivribv toi); i7riroto4errac, Ovrocc tc ,caiovc, thgtapgat TO6C Torkti t.earidecac Tib V 7COX.E4LiOni It] NurvOriti 'ccT,65v to4eugaixov icat T6jv triton/ It brelAican. icat a*.ctc St TO1‘);ttocipovc Exow toi); t7téaçnapfiXavvev 64toK tri tO 66vugovTiOv pocpriipow...CAvalkcat; 'AX4dcv6pou v, 16)
"As he was already within range Alexandersent his horse archers, a force of about a
76
thousand, against the Indians' left wing, inorder to disorder those of the enemy arrayedthere by the storm of arrows and the horses'charge. He himself, with the cavalry of the"Companions", violently charged the Indians'left wing..."
After advancing on the Indian army, Alexander kept his army
out of range until the infantry caught up, and began a series of
manoeuvres which both gave time for the infantry to rest and
deceived Porus about his intentions for the battle223. Alexander
attacked the Indian left flank with his cavalry, having ordered his
infantry commanders not to attack until the enemy was plainly in
confusion from the Macedonian cavalry attack.
Horse archers once again led the attack on their enemy. Their
purpose was plainly not to destroy the Indians in detail but to
damage their morale and command structure, thus paving the way for
the main attack by the regular cavalry224. Arrian says that
Alexander planned to hit the Indians once they were thrown into
confusion, and since up to that point only his horse archers had
been in contact, it is only logical to see them as the agents of
the Indians' confusionm Arrian's phrasing suggests certain
things about Alexander's employment of horse archers in this
mArrian is explicit about the first point, but the second isimplicit from his description in 16, 1.
224It is not entirely clear from the text whether Arrianbelieved that the horse archers were attacking infantry or cavalry.I believe that Arrian means "cavalry" here, but whichever arm theywere attacking, the conclusions are the same.
mIt is preferable to regard them as agents for confusing theinfantry on the flank, as it makes little sense to weaken the enemyat one point and then attack elsewhere.
77
battle. That the Indians would be confused by the "density" of the
arrows suggests volley fire rather than individual sniping; it also
suggests a formation compact enough to produce a dense storm of
arrows. The fact that the charging of the horses would also have
an effect also suggests a somewhat compact formationm. Such a
formation would facilitate getting out of the way of the remainder
of the cavalry when it charged immediately following the horse
archers' attack227.
In the next phase the main infantry forces joined battle and
the cavalry fought a somewhat detached fight, although the Indians
were driven back upon their own forces. Little can be made of the
part of horse archers here except that, as their casualties were
lightm and it seems that they were at best lightly armed with
melee weaponsm, they likely played at most a supporting role.
According to the evidence of Arrian, therefore, Alexander
used his horse archers to throw the Indian force into disorder
before charging it with his regular cavalry. It seems that the
Macedonian horse archers fought from a distance and avoided close
combat, and that they employed volley fire and formations dense
Mu Somewhat" compact because if the horsemen were too closetogether they would not have been able to shoot without hitting themen in front of them; for this very effect, see Procopius, BellumGothicum: V, 27, 47.
2271.e. in order to exploit the effects of the arrows best,just as Roman legionary infantry charged immediately upon throwingtheir Iona; and as modern infantry try to attack at the earliestpossible time following cessation of artillery fire.
nEiTen killed from an original force of a thousand: V, 18, 3.
229see above, Chapter one, p. 31, under Other Equipment.
78
enough to wreak significant damage on their target.
The role of horse archers in the attack may be further
illustrated by Tacitus's account of the battle of Idistavisom
where both mounted and unmounted archers played an important role.
noster exercitus sic incessit:auxiliares Galli Germanique in fronte, postquos pedites sagittarii; dein quattuorlegiones et cum duabus praetoriis cohortibusac delecto equite Caesar; exim totidem aliaelegi ones et levis armatura cum equitesagittario ceteraeque sociorum cohortes....Visis Cheruscorum catervis, quae per ferociamproruperant, validissimos equitum incurrerelatus, Stertinium cum ceteris turmiscircumgredi iubet, ipse in temporeadfuturus.... praemissus eques postremos aclatera impulit. ...Arminius...incubueratquesagittariis, illa rupturus, ni RaetorumVindelicorumque et Gallicae cohortes signaobiecissent... (Tac. Ann. II, 16-17)
"Our forces advanced in the followingorder: Gallic and German auxiliaries infront, followed by foot archers; next camefour legions with Caesar (Germanicus),accompanied by two Praetorian cohorts andpicked cavalry; following them, an equalnumber of other legions, light-armed troops,the mounted archers, and the rest of theallied cohorts.... Having seen groups ofCherusci which had rashly begun their attack,Germanicus ordered his elite cavalry to attacktheir flank, and Stertinius with the remainderof the cavalry troops to circle around to therear. He himself would follow at the righttime.... The cavalry that had been sentforward attacked the (enemy) flanks and rear....Arminius ...had pressed his attack on thearchers, and would have routed them if theRaetian, Vindelician, and Gallic cohorts hadnot stood in his way..."
amTac. Ann. II, 16. The text is the Oxford Classical Text,C.D. Fisher, ed. (Oxford 1985).
79
Foot archers, covered by auxiliary infantry, led the Roman
army against the Germans drawn up on the plain next to the river
Weser. One German tribe, the Cherusci, failed to maintain
discipline and began the battle by attacking the auxiliary and bow-
armed advance guard231. These auxiliaries fought back, supported
by Germanicus's picked cavalry force which attacked the German
flank232.
Germanicus also sent the "remainder" of his cavalry under
Stertinius around to attack the enemy's rear. Tacitus, however,
does not make clear whether his horse archers are included. As no
other mounted troops are explicitly mentioned, it seems best to
take them as forming part of this force. The auxiliary force at
the rear of the Roman legions was clearly the rear guard and it is
unlikely that Germanicus would have let himself be exposed to
surprise attack from this directionm. Moreover, since Tacitus
231Saddington (op. cit., 92: note 26) unaccountablymisrepresents Furneaux (The Annals of Tacitus. 2nd. ed. [Oxford1907] ) as taking the sagittarii here as the equite sagittario ofII, 16. Furneaux says in fact that they are pedites sagittarii.
222 Furneaux (ad loc.) evidently believed that the archers andthe Gallic and German auxiliary force deployed into line upon beingattacked, with the archers on the right. This is an overlymechanistic view of Roman tactics and battle drill. Clearly forthe archer commander to deploy his troops between his coveringforce and the enemy would have been insanity. It is not whathappened anyway. Since the "...Raetorum Vindelicorum et Gallicaecohortes signa obiecissent..." and prevented the Germans frombreaking through, they must have been in front of the archers.
MA provision probably resulting from his experience ofcampaigning in Germania, with its natives' propensity for guerillawarfare (as he encountered following this battle [Tac. Ann. II,19]), and since he had already received one attack from the flank,it is likely he would be on his guard for others.
80
makes no further mention of the rear guard, it seems most likely
that they stayed at the rear and formed a reserve, taking no part
in the battle until perhaps the very end.
Thus the evidence of Arrian and Tacitus indicates that the
function of mounted archers in the attack was to support other
forces. Arrian's account of Alexander's army suggests that mounted
archers would support an attack by preceding it and "softening up"
the enemy. The battle of Idistaviso as recounted by Tacitus gives
an example of how mounted archers could be used with other cavalry
to relieve the pressure on a force under attack by engaging the
enemy from another direction. In this use they are little
different from other cavalry, but as their exact function is not
recorded, we cannot be certain whether they preceded other forms of
cavalry in the flank attack, as was the case in Arrian's account of
Alexander's battle against Porus's Indians.
3. PURSUIT
The next phase of war is the pursuit. Unfortunately there is
no direct evidence for actual actions of mounted archers in the
pursuit, but Arrian, in the 1Nma4t; xata'Aulavani, provides an explicit
description of their intended role in this phase.
TO & tianlaiv N.ucccv Kat& eDtac xai A,Oxov; Oxite4vvrerayggvov t4CCIT6C1X0 VA; 14*, to gtv 'PA; xipaatvtxatepat,c, npol3arjv Exov toi); &aim; np$5 xai toi);to4errac, A,Oxot •51)o, TO 8i Tij giom 44.Xayyt, A,Oxot E4 * fillit0V.TIZIKYCCOV Sg /Sam Rev ix/cc/T*1m 700)61.0V tfic 050=nm;
81
g4)EaTrpcgtoxrav, cbc ôirEptocSav Ikcip a*rfic. Oaot 8gX01704)Opot f icovrapOpot f gaxatpoOpot f zaacoOpot eic telcrdluiyuit icaTipokev...ecncoaeevrov 8g ei giv 4rn ?Lam&ygwycat, Staxaveiv M AZ; zeCticecc Tec4Etc icat 71;FACC6VELV toi);
newrac toi); A,Oxou; (kW TO1‘); iplacac. cenixEloct 8gnixinou; awe; -Kai /yawl, bratiacmatv. toi); 8g •IllaucVaal; EncaOat jtv TOiC gnEX.oviwouatv, ev vi4Et 8g Kai=wad rti 8uget xpwivouc, 66 ei Rev (Puri1 icaprrEpec icatixot,gic8e4aaeat cv npforriv 8iogtv docgittotc TOT.; tn./wig, ci 8g TLCbacrcpainj icatoacciAtivot, enttiecaket toic einorp4ovatv...("Erca4; Iona 'Maven/ 20-21, 27-28)
"The entire cavalry force, organized by theregiments and the eight squadrons2254, is tosupport the infantry. Part, consisting of twosquadrons, (having formed up) on each flank,is to keep the infantry and the archers infront of itself as a guard; the other part,consisting of six squadrons, (is to form up)at the middle of the infantry battle-line....All of the mounted archers are to form up nearthe infantry battle-line, so they can fireover it; while all of the lance-, pike-,sabre-, and axe-bearing (cavalry) will form upon each flank... If when the enemy have beenrepulsed and their flight should becomeapparent, not all, but only half of thecavalry turmae must move through the infantrybattle-line and charge on; whichever troopsdrive through first are to form up and charge.The other half is not to make a wholeheartedcharge but must follow the pursuers information, so that if, on the one hand, astrong retreat should ensue, (those following)might take over the lead in the pursuit withtheir horses fresh; while, on the other hand,if a reversal should occur, they might attack(the enemy) who are forcing the retreat..."
234The "iancoug ?oath" seem to be the cavalry of the cohortesequitatae accompanying Arrian's army. Although there were nine ofthese cohorts, one (the cohors III Cyrenaica) is only present as avexillatio, and its cavalry seems to be grouped with the cohorsIturaeorum (A.B. Bosworth, "Arrian and the Alani" Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 81 [1977] 249-50).
82
Apparently only the Xáxot of immycogama, of which there were
fivem, were to take part in the pursuit. The remainder of the
cavalry were drawn up on the flanks, and the pursuit force was
clearly instructed to pass through the infantry. The other cavalry
were instructed to wait for a signalm, presumably to join
battle, while during the battle itself the inircragozat would provide
only fire support. The iniccrth4grat thus seem to have been employed
primarily as pursuers. The horse archers were divided into two
parts for the pursuit in order that some would remain fresh if
needed, one half to maintain close contact with the enemy, and the
other to remain properly arrayed in formation to take over the
pursuit with fresh horses when the occasion demanded it. Those
actively pursuing were expected to lose their formation when doing
so, and thus might have been more easily put to flight in their
disorganized state.
Arrian's plan for the conduct of the pursuit made full use of
the mobility and firepower of mounted archers, and also provided
for possible reverses or problems. The fact that only theinnougamn
were to pursue the enemy is significant, since they were the only
force capable of maintaining pressure on the enemy while still not
coming into close contact with him. If the enemy were to turn
about and fight, the pursuers were still separated from them, and,
owing to their lack of encumbering equipment, could outdistance the
235See Bosworth (op. cit.) 237.
.6iXintlX0V rt -Kai TO 4iivertta npocrixevOvrav. . . " 21.
83
enemy; moreover, they could harass the enemy even if put to flight
themselves. They also had a backup force for relief should this
happen. If the enemy should turn about in strength, they could
delay his approach to the infantry line and thus give it a chance
to re-form or redeploy.
Tacitus237 provides one possible example of mounted bowmen
pursuing a defeated enemy in an action that may be more properly
termed a rout.
...quidam turpi fuga in summa arborumnisi ramisque se occultantes admotissagittariis per ludibrium figebantur, aliosprorutae arbores adflixere. (Tac. Ann. II,17)
...(after the battle of Idistaviso) Somewho had shamefully fled by climbing to thetops of trees and hiding amongst the brancheswere shot as a lark by archers. Others weredashed to the ground when the trees werefelled."
Tacitus does not specify to which force these archers
belonged. Archers mounted on horses, however, certainly had the
mobility with which to hunt down a scattered enemy, and since
Tacitus informs us that the forest floor was clear beneath high
branchesm, cavalry could have operated there. It therefore
seems plausible that the sagittarii who hunted down and killed
German fugitives following the battle of Idistaviso were mounted,
237Tac. Ann. II, 17-18.
2381, ...editis in altum ramis et pura humo inter arborumtruncos..." Tac. Ann. II, 16
84
probably the same ones that took part in Stertinius's flank attack
earlier in the battlem.
The evidence from Arrian and possibly Tacitus, therefore,
points to an important role for equites sagittarii as a pursuit
force following a successful battle. Their horses gave them the
speed to run down infantry and other cavalry, and their bows gave
them the long range, accurate firepower with which to harass and
keep pressure on their enemy and still maintain the separation that
their vulnerability made necessary. It is significant that in the
one certain reference to their role in the pursuit they are the
only cavalry that pursue. Their characteristics obviously made
them best suited for this task.
4. DEFENCE
Apart from one reference in Arrian there is no evidence for a
role for mounted archers in the defence. Mounted archers are
mobile, and lightly armouredm, and, like other cavalry, are
unable to hold ground against a determined infantry assault. They
can, however, contribute firepower. This is exactly the role that
Arrian envisaged for them in support of his infantry battle line
against the Alans. Arrian seems to have intended that the storm of
arrows from his archers would provide his main line of defence
239see pp.79-80 supra.
240See above, chapter one, pp. 35-7, under Protective Clothing.
85
against the armoured Alan cavalr^He placed his innoAama
behind the line of infantry "...so that they can fire over
it...1,242. They are engaged in providing missile support to the
infantry along with foot-archers to the rear and flanks and
artillery to the flanksm. However, since Arrian has irECoitogencct
immediately behind the infantry, the mounted archers seem almost to
be an afterthought. The foot-archers are presumably placed where
they are with the task of engaging the enemy, as they have no
ability to support a pursuit; their fire would be masked by their
own pursuing forces244. The horse archers are located behind the
infantry in order to make a speedy transition from defence to
pursuitm. Their height and weapon range merely gives them the
ability to assist with fire support.
Apart from this passage from Arrian, there is no evidence,
Roman or otherwise, for the employment of mounted archers in the
defence. Nor, given their lack of defensive armament, can a common
active role be readily envisaged.
5. WITHDRAWAL
N°See Bosworth (op. cit.) 236-7.
242-Extot4; nevi ,Axa' vwv 21.
mTragu; icauk 'Aakirvwv 18-19.
24Although the cohortes NUmidarum, Cyrenaica, Bosporanorum,and Ituraeorum are formed up behind the infantry (1Nmgtgicaui'MAvwv18), only the archers formed up on the right flank and covered bythe cohors Italica are ordered to support the pursuit (29).
245 27.
86
The final phase of war is the withdrawal. An active role for
mounted bowmen in this phase can be envisaged but unfortunately
there is no evidence for it from the high Empire. There is,
however, a brief mention in Procopiusm about mounted archers
conducting a feigned withdrawal, from which some information may be
gleaned.
In A.D. 537 Rome was under siege by the Ostrogoths. The Roman
commander, Belisarius, encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements,
decided to take the initiative against the besiegers. According to
Procopius, he sent a force of two hundred horse archers to a
location near the enemy camp where they were to wait in full enemy
view, and, if attacked, to hold off the enemy until out of arrows
and withdraw at full speed to Rome, where an ambush was set. This,
according to Procopius, is precisely what happened, and "...not
less than one thousand Goths are said to have died in this
action.. ,247
Does this passage, however, provide an accurate account of
events? The Strategikon prescribes for Byzantine troops of the
sixth or early seventh century quivers holding up to forty
arrows 248. Skilled archers can fire up to about fifteen arrows
per minute. At this rate, and assuming a similar ammunition
supply, the Byzantine archers had between two and three minutes of
mBellum Gothicum V. 27.
24711^Aiyovrat Si reneot ateaaov f iltot v 1:4 tpyq? wimp ducoeaveiv. "•
Bellum Gothicum V, 27, 11.
248Strategikon I, 2.
87
shooting before they exhausted their ammunition and were forced to
retreat. The Byzantines would hardly have begun firing until their
targets were in range249, but even a dismounted manm could have
covered the distance of a bowshot in less than two minutes. The
Goths were mounted31 and would therefore have closed with the
Byzantines well before the latter had run out of ammunition. It
thus seems more likely that the Byzantines withdrew before all
their arrows had gone, and fired at their pursuers while
retreatingm, and in this way incited them to follow to the
ambush at the city wall.
This tactic, the so-called "Parthian Shot", is known from the
defeat of Crassus by the Parthians at Carrhae in 53 B.C.253.
There too, mounted archers turned and fired at their pursuers,
causing considerable damage. Arabic archery manuals from the
middle ages also describe a variety of shots, some of them to the
rearm. Such a skill "...was common to all good horse-archers
from the Scythians to the Crimean Tatars...pm. Although there
249Less than 200 m; see chapter one, p. 22, under Archery.
250Running at 10 mph, or 4.5 m/s: not a difficult speed, evenwhen burdened by equipment.
251Be//um Gothicum V, 27, 9.
mProcopius himself says in another context they are adept atdoing this : " . . .814mcovu5c; 're 13aaetv tai); 7COXEILiC/U; xai (peliyovrac . . " BellumGothicum I, 1, 14.
mPlutarch, Crassus 24, G.
mThe Ghunyah of Taybughah, cited in Coulston (op. cit.) 292.
mIbid.
88
is no direct evidence of mounted archers in Roman service using
this tactic, it is probable that they were well acquainted with it,
and therefore were able to make use of it if necessary.
Unfortunately no evidence survives from the high Empire of
Roman use of horse archers in an organized withdrawal. The
preceding example from Procopius shows how bow-armed cavalry was
able to withdraw from a pursuing enemy while continuing to engage
him. It is possible that a retreating army would use their horse
archers in a similar manner to delay and disrupt the enemy pursuit.
6. SUMMARY
The equites sagittarii of the high Empire seem to have been
above all a support arm on the battlefield. In the advance to
contact they seem to have played a very important part; the
evidence of Josephus and Arrian indeed suggests that they formed a
large part of the advance guard and flank guard which was necessary
to protect the army from surprise attack while on the march. A
fighting role is all that can be certainly deduced from the
evidence, but pure reconnaissance would certainly not have been
beyond their capabilities.
When an army attacked, the comparative evidence of Arrian's
account of Alexander suggests that mounted archers may have led the
attack. Their job was to cause casualties and confusion among the
enemy and to weaken them for the main attack which would soon
follow. If part of the main army was in difficulty, a commander
89
could send a force including horse archers to relieve them, as
happened at Idistaviso. The mobility of horse archers allowed them
to pursue a withdrawing or scattered enemy most effectively, and to
keep them from regrouping. Arrian in his Ilicricicacci'ALMNwv provides
detailed evidence of a Roman commander's intended use of mounted
archers in the pursuit.
Owing to their difficulty in holding ground, mounted archers
could contribute little to a static defence except their fire.
Although one can imagine an important role for mounted archers in
the withdrawal because of their ability to manoeuvre and run from
harm's way while maintaining a steady fire upon their attackers
while ammunition lasted, no direct evidence of such a role survives
from the high Empire. Only comparative evidence from the Byzantine
period allows us to glimpse how the ancients employed them in this
phase of war.
In conclusion, the employment of any arm depends on the
situation and on the experience and knowledge of the commander, and
this is especially true for the deployment of bow-armed cavalry.
Mounted archers were clearly a support arm on the battlefield of
the high Empire. Their light armour meant that they were too
vulnerable to remain in close contact with an enemy for long or to
hold up against a determined attack, but their mobility and
firepower enabled a hit-and-run role which was of greatest value in
the mobile phases of war, viz, the advance to contact, the attack,
the pursuit, and the withdrawal. Judging from the evidence of the
historians, they seem to have been an important arm, despite the
90
scarcity of evidence for their use in battle.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
The equites sagittarii fought in the service of Rome from the
early Empire onwards. That they were an important arm of the Roman
military is evident from their numbers: twenty four units armed
with the bow can be certainly identified as being mounted, and at
least four other mounted units may have been sagittariae256 .
Further discoveries of inscriptions, especially diplomas, may yet
increase this number.
Although they were raised and to some extent trained in the
east, Rome's archers seem to have used much the same dress and
equipment as other auxiliary units, differing mainly in the
ancillary equipment needed with bows. Their bows were of eastern
design. Compound and recurved, made of wood, sinew, bone, and
glue, they were extremely powerful weapons, capable of punching an
iron arrowhead through armour plating. The arrows fired were of a
number of different designs, each perhaps with its own specific
use; unfortunately the intended uses have not entirely come down to
us today.
Units of mounted archers seem to have ridden small, fast
Arabian horses, bred in the same areas where the skills of mounted
archery flourished. These horses were best suited to the type of
looser, faster warfare that the mounted archers engaged in. Their
saddles and other equipment, however, seem to have been the same as
36see Appendix one.
92
other auxiliary units used. When it was necessary to use weapons
other than the bow, they would probably have used standard issue as
well.
As a military system, horse archers can be understood in terms
of their characteristics: flexibility, mobility, vulnerability,
and firepower. They were flexible enough to use different
equipment according to the situation, and even operate dismounted
if necessary; mobile like all cavalry, and vulnerable, since they
could not use a shield; but above all they had the firepower of
their bow and arrows. It is these four things that determined
exactly how horse archers were effective, and thus how their
commanders would use them.
As mentioned above, the equites sagittarii seem to have had
the flexibility to use different weapons if the situation demanded
them. Since they often formed provincial garrisons, they would
have to have had access to a variety of weapons in order to carry
out the multitude of tasks required of them. Some inscriptional
and literary evidence points to this conclusion as well.
As can be expected from cavalry, mounted archers seem to have
been most used in the mobile phases of war: the advance to
contact, the attack, the pursuit, and the withdrawal. Of these,
only their actions in the pursuit are little attested in literary
sources. Horse archers seem to have had been of little use in the
defence, and may have been dismounted, especially for mural
defence. Horse archers used their combination of mobility and long
range, penetrative firepower to harass and soften up an enemy, or
93
pin him down until heavier forces could be brought to bear.
This much is known about mounted archers, and much can be
surmised, but many questions remain. The detailed history of the
Palmyreni sagittarii is not clear. What was the sequence of events
from their initial raising as a unit in Roman service to the
establishment of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum milliaria equitata
sagittariorum? As stated above257, it seems unlikely that the
harsh bit used by regular Roman auxiliary cavalry would be used by
horse archers as well. Did they use another form of bit?
Furthermore, the military works of Vegetius and Arrian need up-to-
date commentaries and translationsm These will facilitate
further research into the study of all aspects of the Roman
military.
The Roman military machine of the Empire is a natural object
of study because of its tremendous successes and failures, in which
the equites sagittarii played a part. Although they were little
referred to in literature, their part seems to have been an
important one.
257See chapter one, pp. 28-9, under Cavalry Equipment.
mThere is a recent English translation of the INmgt; by B.H.Bachrach (A History of Alans in the West [Minnesota 1973] 126-132;from Bosworth [op. cit.] 217), but apparently it is "... riddledwith errors and useless for historical interpretation." (ibid.).
94
APPENDIX 1
BOW-ARMED UNITS
In 1977 J. L. Davies259 published Eric Birley's list of the
bow-armed units of the Imperial Roman military of the first to
third centuries. I reproduce it here, together with a brief
commentary on some of the units known or suspected to have been
mounted.
a. Alae:
1. I Batavorum2. Celerum2613. I Hamiorum Syrorum (Mauretania Tingitania)4. I Augusta Ituraeorum
259"Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the sagittarii of theRoman Army" in Britannia 8 (1977) 269-70.
260This unit is only believed to be bow-armed from CIL III,3676, which however identifies it as the coh. I Batavorum. The alahas been placed at Razboieni in Dacia during the reign of Hadrian.See I. B. Cataniciu, The Evolution of Defence Works in Roman Dacia,BAR International Series 116 (Oxford 1981) 24, 30, and notes 200and 371.
NOSpeidel ("The Roman Army in Arabia" Aufstieg und Niedergangder ROmischen Welt II, 8 [1977] 702-3) makes a case for the originof this unit as under Philip the Arab; apparently it originallyserved in Arabia but moved to Noricum sometime after the mid thirdcentury, as shown by a tombstone at Virunum.
262This unit is only known to be bow-armed by the evidence ofCIL XVI, 99, and perhaps from a diploma of 154-161 (M. Roxan Roman Military Diplomas 1978-1984 [London 1985] no. 182). This unit mayhave been stationed at Micia in Dacia before the reign of Hadrian(Cataniciu [op. cit.] note 122).
95
5. Parthorum et Araborum2636. (I Sag)ittariorum Surorum milliaria2647. I Thracum veteranorum2658. III Augusta Thracum sagittariorum (Pannonia)
b. Cohortes:
1. I Antiochensium2662. I Apamenorum equitata (Eg
^) 267
3. I Ascalonitarum equitata'4. I Bosporanorum equitata
263The only reason to believe that this unit should be includedhere is a single sculpture of a mounted archer (fig. 18; for thetext, see AE 1959, 188: "...ala part(h)o(rum) et araborum...");but see chapter three and Kennedy (op. cit.) for a closerdiscussion of the problem of Parthian units in Roman service.
2 See infra, note 25.
266This unit has been tentatively identified from threediplomas of 154-161 (Roxan [op. cit] nos. 102, 103, and 110, p.168-70, 172-3, and 182). It seems possible, based on the numberthat are known to be composed of archers, that most units ofThracum were bow-armed. This is merely speculation, however.
266This unit is only known to be bow-armed from a diploma of161. They may have some connection with the forces sent byAntiochus IV of Commagene to Vespasian's army in Galilee in 67; seep. 59 supra. This unit apparently constructed a stone camp atDrobeta in Dacia in the early part of the second century. Amongthe later occupants of this fort were the coh. I Sagittariorum.See Cataniciu (op. cit.) 11-12.
NWCIL VI, 3654; and III, 600 (= ILS 2724).
268This unit is only known to be bow-armed from CIL XVI, 106.This unit is mentioned elsewhere (in III, 600, for example) but isnowhere else called sag(ittariorum).
269Evidence that this unit exists comes only fromTicra4t; 3 and18; Ritterling ("Zur Erklárung von Arrians 'DerAx4Kicatd'A),av6iv" WienerStudien 24 (1902) 363: quoted in Roos' Teubner edition of Arrian)believes that it is equitata, based on Arrian's wording (3
. . . Bocriropavoi ag iti 'MA'AM; 140i ia•vrav. . . " , suggesting that the Boanoptavoihad falai; as well as infantry); he also believes that this unit ismilliary, a concllusion not supported by the text. I followRitterling in assigning it the ordinal I, keeping in mind Arrian's
96
5. I Flavia Canathenorum milliariam6. I Flavia Chalcidenorum equitata2717. I Cilicumm8. II Classica9. II Flavia Commagenorum equitatam10. III Cyrenaica11. II Cyrrhestarum12. I Flavia Damascenorum milliaria equitatam13. I Hamiorum14. I milliaria Hemesenorum equitata civium Romanorum15. I Augusta Ituraeorum (Dacia Superior)16. I Ituraeorum (Mauretania Tingetana)
habit in this work of mentioning a unit's designation only if it isother than the ordinal I. Either of the possible names(Bosporanorum or Bosporiana) can be supported by the text, and Ibelieve Birley hesitates to assign the unit a name for this reason;but an ala I Bosporanorum is known at Cristesti in Dacia (Cataniciu[op. cit.] 22, 24, and notes 187 and 371) in the reign of Hadrian,and so I assign the cohort the same name.
mRoxan (op. cit.) nos. 51/104, p.174. Perhaps this unit isthe same as the cob. I Augusta Canathenorum equitata known to be inMotha, Arabia before 125. See Speidel (op. cit.) 709.
mThis unit is known to be sagittaria only from CIL III, 6658.
mThis unit was stationed in Moesia, and it is known to bebow-armed only from a diploma of 145/146. It has been, however,tentatively identified as such in a diploma of 112 (Roxan [op.cit.] 85, p.146). This unit is not to be confused with the cohorsI Flavia Cilicum equitata, which formed part of the garrison ofSyene. See Speidel (op. cit.) 785.
mThis unit may have constructed and certainly garrisoned theearthwork fort at Micia in Dacia during the reign of Hadrian. SeeCataniciu (op. cit.) 14-15, 22, 43, and notes 184 and 380.
mThis unit was stationed in-Germania Superior and was one ofthe few units of mounted archers to serve outside of desert areasor areas with a mounted archer threat. I believe that theplacement of this unit is evidence of a desire of Roman commandersto maintain a flexible force throughout the Empire. Beyond theneed for dry conditions for the construction and storage of bows,however, there seems to be no explanation why this would not holdtrue for Britannia, where we have no evidence whatsoever for unitsof mounted bowmen.
97
17. I Numidarum27518. XX Palmyrenorum milliaria equitatam19. III Ulpia Petraeorum milliaria equitata27720. I sagittariorum (Egypt)21. I sagittariorum (Germania Superior)22. I sagittariorum milliaria equitata (Dada)27823. I Aelia sagittariorum milliaria equitata (Pannonia Superior)24. I Ulpia sagittariorum equitata25. III sagittariorum26. I milliaria nova Surorum equitata (Pannonia Inferior)27. I Syrorum27928. II Syrorum milliaria equitata (Mauretania Tingitana) NW
mRitterling finds it necessary to label this unit asequitata, apparently because of its placement with the Boanoptavoi inTircattc 18. Nothing in the text, however, supports this: footarchers from this unit are indeed placed in the battle line alongwith the foot archers from three cohortes equitatae, but when it ismentioned before, in INmgt; 3, there is no suggestion that it ismounted. As with the cohors Bosporiana (see above, note 10) Ifollow Ritterling in attributing to it the ordinal I.
mThis fascinating cohort deserves a book all to itself. Thereader is referred to M.P. Speidel ("Europeans' - Syrian EliteTroops at Dura-Europos and Hatra" in Roman Army Studies 1[Amsterdam 1984] 301-309), and the rebuttal, D.B. Campbell ("WhatHappened at Hatra? The Problem of the Severan Siege Operations" inFreeman and Kennedy, eds. The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East i, BAR International Series 297[i] [Oxford 1986] 51-8) for oneinteresting problem pertaining to the Palmyrenes.
277The equites of this cohort were at the head of the regularunits of Arrian's army: INmgt; 1.
mSee supra, note 8; they may also have occupied the forts ofTibiscus and Zavoi for a time (Cataniciu [op. cit.] 22). Mentionedas sagittaria in AE 1959, 311 but not as mill. This unit mayperhaps be identified with the -cohors I Cretum sagittarior(um)mentioned in a diploma of 110 from Porolissum: CIL XVI, 163.
mThis unit is known to be bow-armed only from AE 1961, 358;and 1962, 304 (mil (es) coh(o)rt(is) Syro(r)um sagit(tariorum)).
mThis unit is known to be bow-armed from CIL XVI, nos. 181(II Syror(um) saggit(ariorum)), 170, and 182; and perhaps a diplomafrom 109 (Roxan [op. cit.] no. 84, p. 144).
98
29. I Thracum sagittaria (Dacia Superior) 2131
30. III Thracum Syriaca equitata31. I Tyrorum (Dacia Inferior) N232. II Ulpia equitata
C. Numeri:
1. Hemesenorum2. Palmyrenorum Porolissensiumm3.^Osrhoenorum
Probable Units284
a. Alae:
1. I Commagenorumm2. I Augusta Parthorum3.^Sebastenorum
mEvidence of diplomas from Dacia shows that it was presentthere in the early second century, although its location has yet tobe identified. See Cataniciu (op. cit.) note 160. It was there atleast until 179, when it is attested in a diploma (Roxan [op. cit.]no. 123, pp. 196-7).
282This unit is known to be bow-armed from Dacian diplomas (CILXVI, 1934 = ILS 2685; and AE 1962, 264: I Tyr(orum)sag(ittariorum)) but is as yet unlocated (Cataniciu [op. cit] 30,45).
NO ...It is probable that the numerus PalmyrenorumPorolissensium c. R. at least contained horse archers because ofthe likely 3rd century formation of an a/a and a cohorsPalmyrenorum from it...." Coulston, [op. cit.] 285. This unit isgenerally identified as the Palmyreni sagittarii mentioned in earlysecond century diplomas of Dacia Superior (Cataniciu [op. cit.]note 181, and see J.C. Mann "The "Palmyrene" Diplomas" in Roxan[op. cit.] Appendix II, pp. 217-9).
284J. Davies passes over the following probable alae andcohortes without comment. Presumably he regards them as bow-armedon the basis of their origin.
285This unit is suspected to have been in Egypt and Nubia from83 to 96 (Speidel [op. cit.] 784-5).
99
4.^Palmyrenorum286
b. Cohortes:
1.^I Chalcidenorum equitata2871. II Chalcidenorum2. I milliaria Hamiorum3. II Hamiorum4. I Sebastenorum5.^Seleuciensium
c. Numeri:
1.^Surii Sagittariiam
286This unit is my own addition to Birley's list. Evidencethat it may be bow-armed is the well-known function of its parent(the numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium) and sister unit (thecohors XX Palmyrenorum).
287This unit is my own addition to Birley's list. It seemslikely that this unit was composed of archers in view of theinscription (ILS 9173) naming the Palmyrene Agrippa who was put incharge of a force of Palmyrene archers attached to this unit. Inthis I follow J. Carcopino, "Le Limes de Numidie et sa gardeSyrienne" in Syria 6 (1925) 119-20.
amThis unit is my own addition to this list. Cataniciu (op.cit.) mentions such a unit in her index; at the pages she sites,however, there is only mentioned a "numerus Syrorum". This unitapparently formed part of the Flavian garrison of Romula along withthe cohors I Flavia Commagenorum. The origins of both of theseunits suggest that they were composed of archers. It may be arguedthat garrisoning a location with archers alone would giveinsufficient flexibility to deal with problems; Romula is, however,situated on an interior defence line in Dacia, closely flanked byother, differently armed units: the cohors II Flavia Bessorum atCincsor, the a/a I Asturum (which at least constructed the fort atHoghiz, and possibly was stationed there), and the cohors IINumidarum at Feldioara (Cataniciu [op. cit.] 30 and n. 72). Italso faces the Roxolanian Sarmatians to the southeast across theCarpathian mountains: this fact suggests that at least one of thetwo units was mounted. The a/a I sagittariorum Surorum milliariais only known from the early third century (R.W. Davies [op. cit.]269); it may be possible to suggest a link similar to that betweenthe numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium and the later cohors andala Palmyrenorum (see note 21 supra).
100
All the cohortes Commagenorum, Ituraeorumm, and UlpiaePet raeorum.
289A cohors II Ituraeorum equitata is known to be in Nubia from99 until at least 131 (Spiedel [op. cit.] 786, 788).
101
APPENDIX 2
ANALYSIS OF ARROW FIRE IN TERMS OFTHE THEORY OF SMALL ARMS FIRE
Frequently in ancient accounts of battle foot-archers and
other missile troops such as slingers are spoken of as massed on
the flanks of the infantry290. Exactly why they were placed there
is never mentioned, but modern commentators have been quick to
explain their placement as a tactic to cover or protect the flank
of the infantry formation291. It seems likely that this was not
the case, however, and that their placement is to be explained, not
as any sort of a protective force, but simply as mass missile
support for the main fighting force. Their exact location would be
determined by how best they could take advantage of the effect of
the fire of their weapons and the pattern that multiple missiles
form when fired at the same target or a general area. There are
good reasons to question this explanation of the placement of foot-
archers on the flanks. The vulnerability of archers to infantry is
well known today, and was certainly understood by the ancients292.
290Most notably Arrian, Mgt; 12-14; also (Pseudo) Caesar, deBello Africo 60 and 81.
mCoulston Hop. cit.] 292-0, however, mostly avoids analysisof reasons, and contents himself with a straightforward rehearsalof evidence.
292the most striking examples are Caes. BG VII, 80, 7 (Gallicfoot archers were killed when they were attacked by Romaninfantry); and BC III, 93-4. Maurice's Strategikon (XII: trans.Dennis, 1984. 127-169) never prescribes that foot-archers beplaced where they are vulnerable to the enemy. They are always to
102
It is absurd that a body of troops would be protecting others
against troops to whom they are especially vulnerable. By their
very nature they are most effective with their enemy at a distance.
Their opponents understood this, and would attempt to close with a
bow-armed enemy as fast as possible in order to nullify the effects
of the arrowsm
Modern commanders analyze a situation, and decide how best to
employ their projectile weapons, by applying the theory of small
arms fire. This theory applies to all projectile weapons, ancient
and modern, and will be a convenient means to understand why
weapons are employed as they are. The effects of weapons are
obvious to one who fires them or directs their fire; these effects
are, however, not at all obvious to one who has not used the
weapons. I will first describe the theory (see figs. 26 and 27).
No weapon, no matter how accurate, can hit precisely the same
spot with a missile every time it is fired, even if it is set on a
perfectly unmoving base and fired at precisely the same point of
aim every time. This fact is due to many factors. Small
variations in missile mass and aerodynamics, propulsion variations,
and perturbations in the air over the flight path of the missile
increase or decrease range and deviation left or right of and above
and below the target. The decrease in number of these variations
be protected by other arms. Where they are not in or behind theinfantry or cavalry battle line, they are on the flank, but eventhere they are to be protected by heavy cavalry, or by heavyinfantry when acting as a flank guard for the cavalry (p. 144).
mTac. Ann. VI, 35.
103
is inversely proportional to their magnitude; in other words, the
larger the deviation, the less likely the deviation is to occur.
A large number of missiles fired from a single weapon at a
given point of aim, then, will tend to describe a cone, bent into
the parabola of the trajectory, with its axis the optimum
theoretical path from the weapon to the target. The intersection
of this cone with the ground is known as the beaten zone, and takes
the form of an ellipse with its long axis parallel to the line from
the weapon to the target. Its total area is directly proportional
to the distance the missiles are fired.
Factors affecting the shape of the beaten zone are the shape
of the ground on which the missiles fall, the aspect of the firer
to the ground, and the angle at which the missile is travelling
when it hits the ground. If any obstacles such as ditches, mounds,
or walls lie in the beaten zone, they will create dead ground or
ground which is free from the missiles' impact. As well, if the
ground on which the missiles fall is tilted toward the firer, or if
the firer is higher in elevation than the target, the beaten zone
will be smaller, less elongated, and denser in impacts; this type
of fire is known as plunging fire, since the missiles hit the
ground or their target at a high angle: they plunge down into it.
Plunging fire is also created when missiles are fired at a high
angle or at the extreme end of their range; in both cases the
missile has lost most of its forward momentum and is dropping more
than moving forward.
While the beaten zone is the area on the ground where the
104
missiles actually hit, the missiles' trajectory creates a much
larger area where targets can be hit depending on their height
above ground. That is, the missile is descending for a while
before it hits the ground; a standing human can be hit at any
location where a missile descends below his height. For obvious
reasons this is known as the dangerous zone and forms an ellipse
the same width as that of the beaten zone but much longer. Its
shape too is affected by the shape of the ground and the firer's
aspect to the ground at his target.
A single weapon firing a single shot at a single target is
known as a point weapon and its fire is known as point fire. This
fire is used against individuals or single objects. When a weapon
or group of weapons is fired at a broad target or area - a mass of
troops, for example, or the space on the ground between wall
turrets - it becomes an area weapon and its fire area fire. This
fire is used for harassment, attrition, or area denial and is
represented by machine gun fire today.
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the fire of a
limited number of weapons or of an area weapon the firers place
themselves so that the long axis of their weapons' beaten zone is
coincident to the long axis of the target. In terms of battle,
both ancient and modern, this means placing missile weapons on the
flanks. Fire from the flank is known as enfilade fire.
The value of plunging enfillade arrow fire against a battle
line of armoured infantry lay in the fact that the infantry were
relatively well protected in the direction of the threat that is
105
perceived as the greatest, usually the front, by their shields
while parts of their arms, legs, and necks were bare when seen from
the sides and from above. Arrows fired from a distance could not
penetrate the armour of a line of men directly but were certainly
able to wound if they dropped from the sky or hit the men from the
flank. Arrows fired from close range, however, had the power to
penetrate thicker armour; but if the enemy was within a hundred
metres or so the archers would have to spread out in order to give
more than just the men in the front the opportunity to shoot. The
arrows would have had to be fired at such a low trajectory that
only the front men in a compact formation could fire, but a loose
formation was extremely vulnerable if attacked by infantry. This
fact required that the archers find cover294 or height above their
enemiesm
When considering the effects of ancient weaponry it is
absolutely essential that one consider what it would actually be
like to face these weapons in battle. Imagine a soldier in the
ranks in an armoured infantry formation before combat. All that
would be visible to him would be the helmets, shields, and spears
of those around, and ranks of the enemy to the front seen as
glimpses between his comrades' heads. The fear of every man
increases the closer he gets to the enemy ranks, and faltering or
294Arrian (IN=4; 13) placed light infantry in front of hisarchers on the flanks to protect them.
295horse archers could be used behind the line to fire over it;cf. Arrian ('amg14 21).
106
breaking ranks now would mean weakening the line and encouraging
the enemy. Consider the effect upon the soldier of arrows falling
thickly around him at this moment. He is surprised; the missiles
have come from an enemy the soldier has probably not yet seen. If
he himself is not wounded, he has seen his comrades hurt, heard
them screaming, seen their blood, and watched them falling and
being trampled by those behind them. This is an experience
soldiers cannot be trained for but can only be inured to by
experience296 .
Regardless of their experience, however, a sudden deadly
missile attack from an unseen enemy terrified and demoralised
soldiers and made them vulnerable to the enemy to their front at
precisely the worst time. Such an attack would also have
devastating consequences if it was delivered during a crucial
moment after battle had been joined, causing either a loss of
momentum for those getting the upper hand or the "final straw" for
those nearing rout.
Archers give a commander the flexibility to launch this kind
of attack at the most opportune time and place on the battlefield,
and horse archers have even greater utility because of their
greater speed, being able to move to wherever they are needed and
then depart at speed if threatened. Foot-archers, because of their
location on the ground, when firing their weapons en masse at a
large target such as an infantry battle formation, create plunging
296Romans threw their pila and then immediately charged theirenemies with drawn swords to gain exactly this effect; before theenemy had time to recover from his shock they were upon him.
107
fire with a large dangerous zone. The large dangerous zone and its
alignment with the enemy's battle line make them most valuable on
the flanks.
Thus it appears that the use of foot-archers and other missile
troops on the flanks can be explained by application of the theory
of small arms fire: the bow used en masse creates a pattern of
fire on the ground that is exploited most efficiently when it is
fired from the flanks. The same theory is also a convenient way of
looking at the usefulness of any missile troops in any given
situation.
108
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Figs. 9-10
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
The Sassanid hold.^From W.F. Paterson "TheSassanids". Journal of the Society of ArcherAntiquaries 112 (1969) fig. 1.
Different representations of the Sassanid hold fromPaterson (op. cit.) fig. 2.
The parts of the compound bow. From Coulston 1985:fig. 1.
The parts of the arrow. From Coulston (op. cit.)fig. 8.
Roman flat-bladed tanged arrowheads. From Coulston(op. cit.) fig. 42.
Roman trilobate tanged arrowheads. From Coulston(op. cit.) fig. 46.
Roman arrowheads found at Bar Hill, Scotland. Notethe fire-arrowheads in the centre. From R.W.Davies, Service in the Roman Army. (New York 1989)Fig. 4.6.
Arrow steles found at Dura-Europos. Note how thefletchings on the far left example extend all theway to the nock. From S. James, "Dura-Europos andthe Introduction of the Mongolian Release" RomanMilitary Equipment: the Accoutrements of War. BARInternational series #336. (Oxford 1987) fig. 4.
A reconstructed Roman saddle in use. Note the widerange of movement possible. From P. Connolly "TheRoman Saddle" Roman Military Equipment: theAccoutrements of War Plates
Side view of a reconstructed Roman saddle. Notehow the "horns" seem to hold the rider in thesaddle. From A. Hyland: Equus: the Horse in the Roman World (London 1990) Plate 8.
Tombstone of an archer of the cohors I Hamiorumfound at Housesteads. Note the strongly recurvedbow with set-back handle, and the unusual hook-shaped device in his right hand, and the long knifetucked into the belt on the archer's left side.From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 26.
109
Fig. 13
Fig. 14
Fig. 15
Fig. 16
Fig. 17
Fig. 18
Fig. 19
Fig. 20
Fig. 21
Fig. 22
Detail of the bow in fig. 12. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 27.
Bow detail from Trajan's column, scene CXV. Notethe strong recurve, and the unusual curling of theears. From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 23.
The tombstone of Monimus, an archer of the cohors IIturaeorum. His bowstring seems to be slacklystrung. From Davies (op. cit.) fig. 4.5.
An auxiliary archer from Trajan's Column, sceneXXIV. His dress seems to be the same as that ofthe other auxiliaries on the column, but his bowhas the same strange shape seen in fig. 14. FromCoulston (op. cit.) fig. 19.
A Palmyrene representation of caravan-escort gods.Both are carrying what appear to be combinationbow-cases and quivers slung from their saddles; theleft-hand rider seems to be holding a bow in hisleft hand. From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 33.
The tombstone of a member of the ala Parthorum etAraborum. The rider may be carrying a combinationbow-case and quiver but the representaton is toodamaged for certain identification. The horsearcher seems to be flocking three arrows on thestring at once! From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 31.
The tombstone of an archer of the a/a I AugustaIturaeorum from Gyor, Hungary. He is shooting at around target from which three arrows protrude.From Davies (op. cit.) fig. 4.3.
Another member of the ala I Augusta Ituraeorum,from Tipasa, Algeria. From Coulston (op. cit.)fig. 32.
The tombstone of Flavius Proculus, an equessingularis Augusti from Mainz. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 29.
The sole surviving columnar representation of amounted archer. From the Marcus Column, sceneLVII. Note the lorica hamata. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 25.
Figs. 23-24 Foot archers from Trajan's Column, scenes CXV andCVII respectively. Because of their unusual dressthey may not be regular auxiliaries but Sarmatiansin Roman service. From Coulston (op. cit.) figs.
110
20 and 22.
Fig. 25 The^cone^of^fire.^From^Department^of NationalDefence Publication B-GL-317-019/PT-001 The LightMachine Gun 5.56 mm C9^(Ottawa 1987)^fig. 2-2.
Fig. 26 The beaten zone. From idem,^fig.^2-4.
Fig. 27 The dangerous zone. From idem,^fig.^2-6.
1 11
FIGURES
Fig. 1
1^
2^
3^
4
FIG. 21. After Morse, Additional Notes, Fig. 30. Sassanid c. A.D. 400.2. After Morse, A. & M. Methods, Fig. 57. Sassanid 5th cent. A.D.3. Ardashir I (?), from silver plate, Archaeological Museum, Teheran, item No. 7700. cf. Fig. I.4. Firoz 1 (A.D. 458-484), Hermitage Museum, Leningrad.
Fig. 2
112
Fig. 3
113
1
Fig. 4
ARROW TERMINOLOGY
Fig. 5
114
4.6) Arrow-heads and bone terminals from composite woodand bone bows found in the well in the headquartersbuilding of the fort at Bar Hill on the Antonine Wall,Scotland.
Fig. 71
Fig. 8
115
116
Fig. 11
Fig. 12 Fig. 13
117
Fig. 16
Fig. 17
119
.t^gtof '"77^E447
t.
Fig. 20Fig. 18
Fig. 19
120
Fig. 21
Fig. 22
Fig. 23
121
Fig. 24
Fig. 25: Cone of Fire
122
Fig. 26: Beaten Zone
FIRST CATCH
BEATEN ZONE
DANGEROUS ZONE
DANGEROUSSPACE
Fig. 27: Dangerous Zone
123
GLOSSARY
Because this paper deals with a technical topic, in order to
avoid confusion some definitions are necessary. I hope I am not
insulting the reader's intelligence but it occurs to me that the
distinction between, for example, "tactics" and "strategy" may not
be completely clear to someone without experience of the military.
Other terms are certainly obscure and I include them here in order
not to burden the chapters with constant definitions.
Back: The generally convex surface of the bow facing the target.
Belly: The surface of the bow facing the firer.
Bodkin: A type of arrowhead without blades, with a square ortriangular cross-section.
Braced: The bow, when strung; also called "at rest".
Characteristic: an attribute which determines the effectiveness ofa weapon or weapon system in battle. As this paper will show,the characteristics of horse archers are flexibility,mobility, vulnerability, and firepower.
Dustar: The "limb" or flexible section of the bow; between the"grip" and the "ear".
Ear: The stiff outer section of the dustar; usually stiffened withhorn and designed to act as a lever. Also known as the"siyah".
Fire: the application of weapons or ammunition to a target.Fires can be short- or long-range, and are usually coordinatedor timed for maximum effect. As this paper will show, onefunction of horse archers in the attack was to prepare theenemy with their fire before the main attack.
124
Fletching: The feathers attached at the base of the stele tostabilize the arrow in flight.
Grip: The handle area in the middle of the bow where it is heldand the arrow is rested during firing.
Guard: a protective force placed between one's army and the enemy.The job of the guard (be it advance, flank, or rear) is togain information and to delay, deceive, and destroy the enemy;in other words, a guard does its job by fighting.
Knee: The recurved junction between the ear and the dustar.
Lathe: The bone piece used to stiffen the ear; also refers to bonestiffeners for the grip.
Loose: To release the string and fire the arrow.
Nock: The notch on the back surface (facing the target) of theear. Also refers to the notch on the end of the arrow intowhich the string is fitted.
Reflexed: The bow, unstrung.
Screen: a reconnaissance force whose job is merely to locate theenemy and gain information about him. A screen does not fightexcept in self-defence.
Stave: The bow itself, excluding the string.
Stele: The shaft of the arrow, made from reed or wood.
Strategy: the art of forcing upon the enemy one's own plan ofaction, usually by disposing armies. The allies' strategy in1944 was to create a third European front to divide the Germanarmies.
Tactics: The art or skill of disposing men and machines on theground, especially in contact with the enemy. When confrontedby an enemy with a weak flank, a commander may decide toattack that flank. The flank attack is his tactic.
Tang: A spike on the rear end of the arrowhead, designed to fitinto a hollowed out section of the stele.
Trilobate: Formed of three "vanes" or blades.
Weapon: a device with which to kill. A weapon may or may not bethe actual means of killing: for example, a bow is a weaponeven if it does not have arrows with it.
Weapon system: the entire means by which a weapon is brought to
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bear in battle. A horse archer, including bow, man, horse,protective clothing, extra ammunition, and other equipment, isa weapon system.
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