Immigration Aff

1AC

Court/Privacy Mechanism---1ACThe United States federal judiciary should rule that a warrant is required for search or seizure when enforcing immigration or customs laws.

The Fourth Amendment fails to protect immigrants at the border---encounters are simply deemed as nonsearchesRaquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf In this battle, not unlike the “war on drugs,” which disproportionately targeted blacks,12 a casualty has been noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Fourth Amendment applied to immigration enforcement , even if with

increased tolerance for racial profiling.13 However, as discussed in this Article, through a subsequent the Fourth Amendment has become moribund, barely able to grant any privacy protections to noncitizens , particularly in the realm of immigration enforcement series of sweeping decisions,. One significant explanation for this Fourth Amendment exceptionalism is the Court’s early treatment of immigration as a matter of civil as opposed to criminal enforcement .14 The characterization of immigration enforcement as administrative has colored the

evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. In particular, by characterizing removal proceedings as nonpenal, the Court has, since 1984, precluded the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary remedy, except within the narrow “egregious violations” exception.15 Moreover, the application of the consent doctrine in immigration enforcement under the most coercive circumstances increasingly defies the fictional premise that reasonable people feel free to walk away from law enforcement encounters. In

immigration encounters, Fourth Amendment doctrine assumes the reasonable person is free to refuse questions of immigration agents at immigration checkpoints .16 That same assumption applies during unannounced workplace raids conducted by dozens of armed immigration agents, some of whom question workers while others guard the exits;17 or even during the execution of administrative warrants in a person’s home while she is handcuffed for more than two hours.18 The resulting picture is that when immigration agents target immigrants inside the border, the Fourth Amendment offers little protection . Immigrants are unprotected either because the exclusionary rule has no application in removal proceedings , or even when the exclusionary rule applies, as in criminal proceedings, most of those encounters are deemed nonseizures and nonsearches.

The ICE can access search warrants without probable causes Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf But what if this “reasonable” noncitizen learns to walk away from the immigration agent and refuses to answer his questions? This is a likely scenario because immigrant rights groups advise their clients to maintain a code of silence when they encounter “la migra.”19 Would immigrants then have a privacy expectation to refuse questions and even to walk

away from ICE? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Except in very limited circumstances, ICE is conducting this latest wave of raids with easy access to civil warrants in a way that expands the scope of its law enforcement power, compelling mandatory compliance . Today, DHS’s regulatory arm reaches into employer hiring practices,20 university requirements for foreign students,21 the government’s distribution of public benefits,22 and driver’s licenses,23 among other areas. In turn, this preoccupation has caused the proliferation of databases that, in most cases, grant ICE easy access to information about a person’s immigration status as a worker,24 student, 25 or driver.26 With easy access to such information in these databases, ICE can arm itself with civil warrants even where there is no particularized probable cause , to conduct raids in private or quasiprivate spaces without having to seek the information directly from immigrants themselves. These warrants name no suspects. Rather, they are issued precisely to allow ICE to identify and arrest persons for removal or to charge them for criminal immigration violations. Indeed, ICE agents have employed this strategy in the latest wave of workplace raids.27 Moreover, ICE has easy access to more than 600,000 civil warrants to enforce against persons with prior removal orders who are labeled absconders or fugitives and who appear in their outdated databases.28 While such “absconder warrants” target a particular suspect, their execution is no different than the indiscriminate targeting of immigrants that occurs in workplace raids. For example, despite the fact that the target often no longer lives at the address that appears in the database, no oversight occurs to protect third parties from privacy invasions. Not surprisingly then, ICE strategically enforces these warrants in people’s homes to arrest as many persons who may be in the country without authorization, often relying on racial profiling and intimidating tactics in the process .29

The Supreme Court should rule narrowing exemptions to the Privacy Act---dramatically reduces border surveillanceAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrImmigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors in border, migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has afforded federal officials considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs enforcement activities. This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where the Court has deemed “routine,” suspicionless searches and seizures of individuals and property for purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, “ simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border .” 311 The Court has reached this conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or invocations of history and tradition with little more.312 In some instances, the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this “border exception” to the federal government’s power over immigration, which it has long deemed to be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as falling within the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth Amendment limits for administrative or “special needs” searches.313In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere, policed by large numbers of actors other than federal immigration officials—and in which immigration surveillance activities reach large numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful immigration status— the justifications for such sweeping

deference become more difficult to maintain. The categories of potential deprivations that can result from immigration surveillance activities have multiplied drastically beyond the simple ability to enter and remain in the United States. With the expansion of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance, these enforcement activities can place restrictions on the rights to international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service benefits, and freedom from physical restraint in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement processes. As discussed above, the powerful tools of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous deprivations and are easily susceptible for uses beyond those originally contemplated when implemented.

Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at stake in immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.314 However, these interests have continued to be given insufficient weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most noncitizens from the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Act’s exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law

enforcement and national security purposes. Narrowing these exemptions in the Act’s coverage would enable these interests to be given the weight that they deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications.

Surveillance is the linchpin of the overall border enforcement regimeAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFar from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both fixed and mobile . New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration governance.248

Congress/Data Mechanism---1ACThe United States federal government should substantially monitoring, collection of data, and tracking pertaining to persons involved in immigration.

Congressional legislation should provide a framework of transparency, oversight, and accountability of the collection of data through implementing greater public engagement and review of mechanisms for errorsAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFinally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to transparency, oversight, and accountability . Whether programmatically or in the context of individual adjudications, immigration agencies, although improving in some ways, have long suffered from major transparency and accountability deficits.315 Those deficits are amply evident in immigration surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines created by the deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of different levels.First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency, oversight, and accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or detailed legal authority to support and guide such major and complicated initiatives. No framework statutes govern or constrain immigration surveillance activities , which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the limited privacy protections available under the

Privacy Act. This lack of a statutory framework governing surveillance activities that implicate privacy interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to other areas, such as communications and financial services, in which government access, storage, and dissemination of personal information have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316Whether coming from Congress , the executive branch, or both acting together, accountability and oversight of immigration surveillance would be better served by a more detailed, coherent legal framework governing immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public engagement with those rules . As the Markle Foundation has emphasized, new national security information sharing initiatives demand privacy and security protections that “address the hard questions [such as secondary use and redress] . . . as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.”317 These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which immigration surveillance activities take place and will only become more relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate technology-based surveillance mechanisms in other aspects of immigration governance.Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from immigration surveillance activities, whether administrative or judicial in nature, can still play an important role—not only in remedying those individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to ensure that information maintained in their database systems is accurate and complete.318 Current redress mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient

opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations. While courts have begun to fill this gap , more robust and regularized redress mechanisms at the administrative level would

create additional incentives for the authorities involved in immigration control to ensure the accuracy and integrity of their data.Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of structural oversight. Because of the necessarily opaque manner in which database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often function—and the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their operation over extended periods of time—oversight of these systems can be particularly difficult in the context of individual cases.319 This is undoubtedly more true in the immigration enforcement system, which has traditionally been ill-equipped to supervise investigatory practices.320 Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress mechanisms to fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the stakes in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate effectively.321 Especially as immigration surveillance integrates the institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions of other domains, the blurred lines of accountability among different institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322

Limiting and constraining immigration data collection is keyAnil Kalhan 2013, Associate Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 12/14/ 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfTo begin with, automated immigration policing invites reassessment of the interests at stake when personal information is collected, maintained, processed, and disseminated for immigration enforcement purposes and the mechanisms to protect those interests.207 As I have explored elsewhere, the proliferation of zones in society in which immigration enforcement takes place, and where immigration status has become visible, salient, and subject to pervasive ∂ monitoring, carries a range of social costs.208 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for immigration enforcement purposes in some contexts and subject to certain constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in society in which immigration surveillance activities do not take place, and in making sure that when they do take place they are appropriately limited and constrained.∂ To some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal process.211

Surveillance is the linchpin of the overall border enforcement regimeAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFar from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of

layered boundary points , both fixed and mobile . New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration governance.248

Federalism Advantage---1ACThe federal immigration surveillance state is expanding---destroys effective immigration federalismAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfIn the avalanche of state and local immigration-related lawmaking in recent years, few initiatives have stirred passions like those involving the police.1 Take, for example, the charged disputes over Arizona’s S.B. 1070, whose most controversial provision requires state and local police to ascertain the immigration status of individuals they encounter and share that information with federal authorities.2 Even by the heated standards of discourse on immigration, clashes over S.B. 1070 have been fierce. Advocates of tougher enforcement have embraced the Arizona law and successfully urged other jurisdictions to adopt copycat laws.3 At the same time, civil rights and community-based advocates have vigorously objected that S.B. 1070 and similar laws enable racial profiling, improper arrests, and violations of due process, and drive wedges between local police and immigrant communities.4¶ The Obama Administration swiftly joined the fray by filing suit to challenge S.B. 1070, arguing not that the law offended equal protection, due process, or Fourth Amendment principles—as civil rights advocates urged in their own lawsuits—but rather that it was preempted by federal law.5 The district court enjoined four of the law’s many provisions, and in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court largely agreed with the Obama Administration’s position, facially invalidating all but one of the disputed provisions and cautioning that the final provision remained vulnerable to as applied challenges.¶ While Arizona has been widely interpreted as putting the brakes on state and local immigration regulation, it hardly brings state and local involvement in immigration law and policy to an end.7 With respect to immigration policing, in particular, while the Court brushed back the state’s unilateral attempts to regulate and enforce immigration law, it simultaneously gave a boost to state and local immigration policing under the aegis of federal initiatives that enlist state and local cooperation.8 Running counter to a conventional narrative of federal inaction on immigration control, the steady expansion of these federal arrangements in recent decades has contributed to an enduring convergence of immigration control and criminal law enforcement and the removal of unprecedented numbers of individuals.9 The long shadow cast by mass immigration enforcement has integrated the principles, priorities, and procedures of immigration control into the day-to-day practices of many state and local police and criminal justice institutions to a considerable extent.¶ Those federal programs are now undergoing a sea change with the deployment of technology. For example, even as it forcefully has urged invalidation of S.B. 1070 and similar laws, the Obama Administration has presided over the largest expansion of state and local immigration policing in U.S. history with its implementation of the “Secure Communities” program. Secure Communities integrates the criminal records databases maintained by states and the FBI, which are routinely queried by police conducting background checks on individuals they arrest, with the immigration databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—thereby automating DHS’s ability to identify potentially deportable noncitizens in state or local custody.11 The program has transformative aspirations: to automatically determine the immigration status of every person nationwide who is arrested and booked by state and local police in order to identify potential immigration law violators.¶ Secure Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing. Automated immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other technologies to automate and routinize the identification and apprehension of potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and other moments of day-to-day life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full significance of this shift remains underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of previous federal efforts to enlist state and local police assistance,

emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14¶ In this Article, I take a complementary but different approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect a massive increase in the number of state and local law enforcement officials involved in immigration policing— although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More fundamentally, as a leading edge of what I conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime, automated immigration policing contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders immigration status visible, accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever before, and subject to routine monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and private actors.15 By using technology to make determinations of immigration status and the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the nature of both “immigration federalism” and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new initiatives raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based surveillance and dataveillance that “monitor[] people in order to regulate and govern their behavior.”¶ Accordingly, I assess automated immigration policing in the context of the emergence of this nascent immigration surveillance state, drawing upon technology-, surveillance-, and privacy-based frameworks to complement and refract the insights of existing analyses. In Part II, I recount the evolution of state and local immigration policing in recent decades, from which an equilibrium has been emerging that—perhaps ironically, given Arizona’s strong endorsement of federal power—contemplates considerable enmeshment of state and local police with immigration control under federal auspices, but with room for voluntary state and local choices along the cooperation–noncooperation spectrum. In Part III, I examine the federal government’s two recent automated immigration policing initiatives—Secure Communities and the National Crime Information Center’s Immigration Violators File—and show how the architecture of these programs disrupts that nascent equilibrium by curtailing state and local choices concerning the nature and extent of their participation in immigration policing. Instead, both initiatives make immigration status determinations by law enforcement automatic, pervasive, and effectively mandatory. In the process, these initiatives also blur the substantive lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local agencies and departments. ¶ Because they intersect with and share continuities with a broader, longer term set of developments concerning technology, surveillance, and information sharing, in Part IV I situate and analyze automated immigration policing within that wider context, addressing the surveillance- and privacy-related problems that these initiatives present.18 While automated immigration policing initiatives can facilitate the efficient identification of large numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens, they also carry several categories of costs—all of which are exacerbated by the heightened vulnerabilities of noncitizens and the limited procedural protections afforded in immigration removal proceedings. These costs arise from the inherent fallibilities of automation, the tendency of surveillance mechanisms to be used for purposes beyond those for which they were initially implemented, the displacement of state and local control over information that states and localities collect and share with federal authorities, and the everyday effects of these initiatives on both law enforcement agencies and the communities being monitored. Finally, in Part V, I identify and advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of automated immigration policing initiatives and other programs that similarly are reshaping immigration enforcement practices with the use of new technologies. As with other forms of technology-based surveillance, the expanded use of automated immigration policing demands greater attention to the interests at stake when personal information is collected for immigration enforcement purposes. I argue that the existing potential for conflicts over control of information between federal and subfederal governments may help to protect those interests, and that the importance of those interests demands improved transparency, oversight, and accountability in the implementation of automated immigration policing mechanisms and other technology-based initiatives that are contributing to the development of the immigration surveillance state.

Specifically, it destroys state flexibility in immigration lawAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfAutomated immigration policing has enabled massive levels of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement that could never have been achieved under earlier programs. The NCIC Immigration Violators File, for example, now makes over 298,900 records of potentially deportable individuals accessible to state and local police nationwide.111 Under Secure Communities, over twenty-eight million sets of fingerprints have been transmitted to DHS since the program’s inception—“thousands” of fingerprints per day, according to one official, including fingerprints of all individuals born outside the United States or whose place of birth is unknown—from which DHS has identified over 1.4 million matching records in IDENT. ICE has returned or formally removed 279,482 of these individuals, with the number of removals attributable to Secure Communities jumping from 14,364 in 2009, representing four percent of all removals, to 83,815 in 2012, representing one-fifth of all removals.112 In light of these numbers, the Obama Administration has decreased its reliance on task force agreements under the 287(g) program, one of the cornerstones of the previous generation of federal immigration policing

initiatives.¶ In order to achieve these numbers, these initiatives have forcefully challenged and eroded the equilibrium on immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years , illustrating the powerful ways in which the technological

architecture of federalism itself can shape and govern the institutional relationships among different levels of government.113 While sharing with its predecessors the goal of reducing the federal government’s information deficit vis-à-vis states and localities in the identification of potentially deportable noncitizens, automated immigration policing departs from those earlier initiatives by precluding states and localities from making affirmative, calibrated, and negotiated choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to furnish. Instead, these initiatives—while nominally still tethered to “voluntary” forms of federal–state cooperation— affect informational end runs around those choices through the use of technology. Both programs tightly weave immigration policing mechanisms into established, deeply ingrained systems designed to facilitate criminal investigation, prosecution, and sentencing—transforming the process of monitoring and verifying immigration status into a routine, seamless part of virtually all ordinary law enforcement encounters with members of the public.¶ This approach erodes the conception of immigration federalism that has emerged in recent years by narrowing the space for states and localities to make affirmative choices concerning their cooperation on immigration policing that are independent from other decisions—initially made decades earlier—to exchange identification and criminal history records for wholly separate criminal justice purposes. With the NCIC, given the manner of its extensive use by state and local police, the inclusion of immigration records means that individual police officers will automatically receive immigration status information when making routine queries, even if their jurisdictions have policies—which are likely immune from preemption—prohibiting or restricting officers from collecting that information from members of the public they encounter. Once presented with that information, police officers may then be induced to detain or arrest suspected civil or criminal immigration law violators without regard to their formal immigration arrest authority, which Arizona v. United States now clarifies to be highly constrained, or the extent to which their jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with ICE.114¶ Secure Communities goes even further, inducing and routinizing the assistance of state and local police en masse. Here, the informational end run proceeds in the opposite direction from the flow of information using the NCIC. Rather than sending immigration status information to law enforcement officials, DHS automatically extracts identification and criminal history information from state and local law enforcement agencies when they routinely transmit that information to the FBI for purposes that are unrelated to civil immigration enforcement, but understood as essential for criminal law enforcement.115 DHS then uses that information for immigration enforcement purposes—without regard to whether those jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in helping to identify potentially deportable individuals whom they encounter.¶ While technology—being “plastic,” as Lawrence Lessig has emphasized— likely could be designed to preserve the room for state and local choices that existing federal immigration policing initiatives contemplate, these new automated immigration policing initiatives are early components in a broader federal strategy that instead appears poised not simply to erode existing conceptions of immigration federalism even further, but to expand these surveillance mechanisms to encompass even larger numbers of U.S. citizens.116 Federal officials have championed Secure Communities not just as an immigration policing program, but as the first phase of the FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI) initiative, a

biometric database system intended to upgrade and replace IAFIS, which will enable the collection, storage, processing, and exchange of unparalleled quantities of biometric and biographic information of both U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.117 The scope of NGI’s database system is enormous, encompassing multimodal biometric records of fingerprints, multiple photographs, iris scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information, and populated with data from a multiplicity of sources—including not only law enforcement agencies, but potentially also commercial databases, security cameras, publicly available sources, social networking platforms, private employers, and individuals. Using powerful facial recognition and search tools, NGI not only enables more sophisticated means of immediately identifying particular individuals, but also makes it “trivially easy” to locate, identify, and track individuals remotely for investigative, intelligence gathering, or preventive purposes.118 To the extent that DHS stores the fingerprints of U.S. citizens collected under Secure Communities, as discussed above, the implications of Secure Communities for U.S. citizens will become even more consequential under NGI and any other programs that might involve broader sharing of those fingerprints and other biometrics along with any personal information that may be linked to those biometric records.¶ The comprehensive immigration reform bill recently adopted by the Senate also proposes to use technology in a manner that promises to reshape existing conceptions of immigration federalism. The bill would require employers to verify employees’ identities against DHS databases using an enhanced version of E-Verify, DHS’s existing online employment eligibility verification system, which incorporates a “photo tool” containing photos and personal information drawn from state driver’s license and identification bureaus.119 With all of these automated initiatives, the manner in which information from different database systems and regulatory domains is routinely aggregated and exchanged blurs the lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains, on the one hand, and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local institutions, on the other.120

Constraints on federal immigration surveillance solve---they’re key to effective division of power between the states and federal governmentAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfTo some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal process.¶ Vindicating these interests in the immigration enforcement context therefore requires context-appropriate constraints on the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, including limits on secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated. While courts may seem unlikely to readily recognize and impose such limits, in fact the value of these kinds of limits has nevertheless long been recognized by numerous government actors—including courts and even federal immigration officials themselves.212 However, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable databases and other new technologies may be clouding attention to the continued importance of these limits when implementing those systems. In an era in which more data is almost always assumed to be better, more information sharing and interconnectivity between database systems is also often assumed to be better as well.213 But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized, “complete interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce new vulnerabilities” and “exacerbate existing problems.” Accordingly, they argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and interoperability and retaining “friction in [the] system”

may often be more optimal.¶ Moreover, with advanced database systems, as Erin Murphy suggests, “to simply ignore that there is any special import to a database search” misapprehends both the potential benefits and harms of those systems and the broader implications of their use.215 Outside the immigration context, both scholars and judges increasingly are acknowledging and engaging those implications. For example, in United States v. Ellison, the defendant sought suppression of evidence discovered in a search that was prompted by a police officer’s suspicionless NCIC query for the license plate number of the defendant’s vehicle.216 While the Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of that suppression motion, Judge Karen Nelson Moore dissented, emphasizing that the nature of law enforcement databases invited careful consideration of whether some “measure of heightened suspicion or other constraint” should limit police access to information within them.217 She cautioned that while an NCIC database search may seem only minimally intrusive, the “psychological invasion” from having personal information “subject to search by the police, for no reason, at any time one is driving a car is undoubtedly grave,” and that the possibility of database errors might also justify suspicion or some other constraint on permitting police to access those databases.218¶ The specific legal or regulatory forms that such constraints upon immigration-related data collection, information sharing, and secondary uses might take are varied. As a matter of policy and institutional design, more constrained information collection, usage, and dissemination practices would better serve the full range of interests at stake in automated immigration policing. Such constraints could, for example, enable states and localities to choose whether or not their officers receive immigration records when making routine NCIC queries. Similarly, Secure Communities could be modified to enable states and localities to choose whether to share fingerprint records for immigration enforcement purposes, or even to refine the flow of fingerprint records from the FBI to DHS more generally—for example, by only enabling DHS to access FBI information in the context of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for which DHS needs that information. These approaches might help preserve space for states and localities to make voluntary choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to provide, restoring some version of the equilibrium in immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years and better respecting local control of law enforcement.¶ Other kinds of constraints on the collection, use, and dissemination of information may be warranted in these and other immigration enforcement contexts. By neglecting or minimizing the interests at stake in these practices, however, as implementation of automated immigration policing has so far, all of these possibilities fall off the table.

Relations Advantage---1ACUS-Mexico relations low due to immigration policies Esther Pan 6, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate, February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-border-woes/p9909#p8The relationship has been in a downward spiral over the last six years , experts say. When Fox and Bush came to power in 2000, better relations between the two countries were high on the priority lists of both leaders. But after 9/11, the United States shifted its focus to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, and Mexico was pushed down the list. At the same time, a strong current of anti-immigrant feeling in America focused on Mexico , illegal immigration, and border issues. Mexicans accounted for 91 percent of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants and 74 percent of all formal removals of immigrants in 2003, according to the Migration Information Center.

As a result, the health of the relationship between the two countries "was ceded to the hardliners " in the United States, Sweig says. The Mexican reformers who argued that closer ties with the United States would be good for Mexico "now have mud on their faces," she says. As Mexico prepares for a presidential election in July, the immigration issue will likely boost the nationalism of all the candidates and foster the strong current of traditional anti-Americanism in Mexico , Sweig says.

Tensions over border enforcement spill over to destroy the US-Mexico relationship broadlyMarc R. Rosenblum 12, Specialist in Immigration Policy for the Congressional Research Service, “Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry,” 1/6/12, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdfThe United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border; but with Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts and with the United States being the primary market for illicit drugs from Mexico as well as a source of illegal weapons flowing into Mexico, border enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension .155 On one hand, given that Mexicans represent a majority of all unauthorized migrants in the United States and of aliens apprehended at the border,156 and given that drug-related violence in Mexico raises persistent concerns about “spillover” violence on the U.S. side of the border,157 the U.S.-Mexican border is inevitably a major focus of U.S. enforcement. On the other hand, while Mexico does not question U.S. authority to make and enforce its own immigration laws, Mexicans from across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths , and the

protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups of migrants.158 More generally, the use of military technology and the heavy presence of law enforcement personnel at the U.S.-Mexican

border may work against the diplomatic and commercial goals of a closer economic and political partnership among the U nited States, Mexico, and other Latin American countries.

Mexico’s key to broader Latin American relationsPamela K. Starr 9, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35Mexican sentiment toward the United States matters. If Mexicans mistrust the United States, question what our country stands for, and feel treated like a second-class ally, it will be difficult for Washington to foster a cooperative relationship that extends beyond drugs and trade. Further, without a cooperative relationship with its nearest Latin American neighbor it will be difficult for the United States to improve relations with the rest of the region . And as demonstrated by the expansion of Chinese investment, Russian military sales and naval maneuvers, Iranian diplomatic visits, and Hugo Chávez’ regional sway, U.S. influence in the Latin American region can no longer be taken for granted.

Reforms on immigration rebuild relations with Mexico Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35The futures of Mexico and the United States are inevitably and increasingly intertwined , something that is reflected in the stable, cooperative and institutionalized bilateral relationship that has developed behind the scenes over the past 25 years. Yet public perceptions of the relationship are much less reassuring. Positive attitudes toward the United States have fallen tangibly in Mexico during the past five years. In part, this is due to Mexican disappointment at having been shunted from the center of the U.S. foreign policy stage during the Bush administration’s

first months to the margins of Washington’s concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is also partly due to the dashing of Mexican hopes for a comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. Beyond the failure of the policy initiative, Mexicans widely perceive a hostile turn in U.S. treatment of Mexican immigrants and see that hostility extending to Mexico itself . These perceptions have been shaped by rhetoric that sometimes

turned insulting toward Mexicans and by concrete actions such as the 2006 legislation to build the border “wall” and immigration raids that have split thousands of families since mid-2007. The declining esteem for the United States further reflects Mexicans’ deeply rooted fears about the main features of the Bush foreign policy and especially its unilateralism. Like many others in the United States and abroad, Mexicans have been disheartened by a series of events including the U.S. decision to invade Iraq; its seeming loss of a moral center evidenced by the violations of human rights committed at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo and apparent support for a 2002 military coup against a democratically elected government in Venezuela; and its unwillingness to listen to the concerns of historic U.S. allies, especially those located in the Western Hemisphere. In a 2008 survey, only 30 percent of Mexicans said they admired the United States, while 29 percent expressed contempt for their northern neighbor, and fully 61 percent said they distrusted the United States (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México, las Américas y el mundo 2008). More recently, media reports painting Mexico as a country overrun by violence and comments by former and current U.S. government officials referring to Mexico as a future “failed state” have rankled Mexicans and fed their sense of vulnerability to the whims of their powerful northern neighbor.

US-Latin American relations are key to broader US legitimacy and power in multilateral forums Christopher Sabatini 12, adjunct professor at Columbia University in the political economy of Latin America and the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, 6/13/12, “Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America,” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/

Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability.But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the

Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it.Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations:

1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies .

Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S . when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention.Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.”At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more

representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them .If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights.2. Latin America is becoming more international.It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America.For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region .It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum.The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba.

3. There are security and strategic risks in the region.Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border .

FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government.

At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America .In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north.Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states .

Latin American relations are key to sustaining green environmental cooperationDaniel Kammen 12, serves the U. S. Secretary of State as an Energy and Climate Fellow and is a Professor at the University of California Berkeley, 12-5-12, “Building Bridges to a Sustainable Energy Future,” http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/05/building-bridges-to-a-sustainable-energy-future/The Americas are undergoing a transition in the energy sector that will have global geopolitical ramifications . At the same time as the United States is touted to become the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, and a net exporter by 2030, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Panama show the most promise in becoming regional hubs not only for clean energy investment , but for sustained low-carbon economic growth (see related story: “U.S. to Overtake Saudi Arabia, Russia as World’s Top Energy Producer“).

Although Latin America and the Caribbean lag behind the United States and Canada in terms of implemented clean energy policy and project funding, 7 percent of the region’s total installed capacity today is renewables, and it is expected to grow faster in years to come. (See related interactive map: “The Global Electricity Mix“) Faced with ever-changing economic and political realities, regional collaborations for knowledge-creation and -sharing are crucial for fostering lasting partnerships that can make ‘sustainability science’, well, sustainable.International partnerships that lead to concrete action are often the clearest signs of innovation. At the state to state level, the Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas (ECPA) and at the person-to-person level, the Fulbright NEXUS program provide clear evidence regional collaborations that are clearly changing the modes of engagement within the hemisphere. One of us just returned from a partnership-building ECPA sponsored trip to Nicaragua, facilitated by both the U. S. Embassy team and a local NGO, blueEnergy, which is discussed below and here, focused on community energy.Just two years after its launch by President Obama in 2009, ECPA has moved beyond its initial focus on knowledge sharing around cleaner and more efficient energy, and now also supports sustainable forest and land use initiatives as well as climate change adaptation strategies . Governments and institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have all worked together to support regional technical workshops, business strategies, and other initiatives for new and cleaner ways to provide energy. ECPA has also become a vehicle for leaders in sustainability research and practice to work at the institutional level to link industry, university, and civil-society groups in the New World.The two-year-old Fulbright NEXUS program has already become a regional model for the support of scholars from around the hemisphere committed to applied research and collaboration on sustainability science. At a recent meeting in Banff, Canada, the 20 NEXUS fellows focused equally on individual and group projects to assess and

address environmental issues plaguing the Western Hemisphere. Interestingly, the focus was on solutions science, not just in quantifying the extent of environmental change.During the coming year, the Fulbright NEXUS Fellows will be working across the region on projects ranging from forest health and productivity in Alberta, Canada, to local perceptions and strategies for climate change adaptation in the High Andes of Peru, to understanding the interactions between climate mitigation and adaptation strategies for Brazil’s power sector .

Environmental collapse will be detrimental to the following ---

1. WaterMillennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the findings of the MA process, “ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdfMany aspects of the world's hydrological (water) cycle are regulated by the natural functions of ecosystems and associated geophysical processes (such as evaporation and the

functioning of the climate system). Human interventions in watersheds, lakes and river systems take many forms - deforestation, farming, irrigation, river damming and extractions from subterranean aquifers. Wetlands play a crucial role in the filtering of fresh water, including the removal of various chemicals and potentially toxic elements (e.g. heavy metals such as cadmium and lead).∂ Fresh water is essential for human health . It is used for growing food, drinking, personal hygiene, washing, cooking and the dilution and recycling of wastes.

Water scarcity jeopardizes food production, human health, economic development and geopolitical stability. Globally, the availability of water per person has declined

markedly in recent decades. One third of the world's population now lives in countries experiencing moderate to high water stress. This fraction will continue to increase as both population size and per capita water demand grow - reflecting the escalating use of fresh water for irrigated agriculture, livestock production, industry and the requirements of wealthier urban residents. Over 1 billion people lack access to safe water supplies; 2.6 billion people lack adequate sanitation. This has led to widespread microbial contamination of drinking water. Water-associated infectious diseases claim up to 3.2 million lives each year, approximately 6% of all deaths globally. The burden of disease from inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene totals 1.7 million deaths and the loss of more than 54 million

healthy life years. Investments in safe drinking-water and improved sanitation show a close correspondence with improvements in human health and economic productivity . Every day each person needs 20-50 litres of water free from harmful chemical and

microbial contaminants, for drinking, cooking and hygiene. The growing challenge of providing this basic service to large segments of the human population is highlighted by one of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, MDG-7, which calls for halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and basic sanitation.

2. Food productionMillennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the findings of the MA process, “ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdfProductive terrestrial and marine ecosystems, both wild and managed, are the source of our food - a prerequisite for health and life. Global aggregate food production currently is sufficient to meet the needs of all. However, of the present world population of 6.5 billion, over 800 million - nearly all of them in low-income countries - do not obtain enough protein and calories for energy. Worldwide, a similar (increasing) number are now overfed. Several billion people experience deficiences of one or more micronutrients (especially vitamin A, zinc and iodine). In poor countries, especially in rural areas, the health of human communities often is directly dependent on locally productive ecosystems providing sources of basic nutrition. Local food production is critical in preventing ∂

hunger and promoting rural development in areas where the poor do not have the capacity to purchase food from elsewhere. Wild foods are important locally in many developing countries, often bridging the hunger gap created by stresses such as droughts and civil unrest. In richer urban communities, human dependence on ecosystems for food is less apparent but no less fundamental.∂ Worldwide, undernutrition accounts for nearly 10% of the global burden of disease. Almost all of this occurs in poor countries where food production has not kept up with population increases, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, undernutrition is related strongly to poverty in developing countries with high mortality rates; between one-sixth and one-quarter of the burden of disease is related to childhood and maternal undernutrition. In developed countries with low mortality rates, diet-related risks (mainly overnutrition, often in combination with physical inactivity) account for between one-tenth and one-third of the burden of disease. The nutritional disparity between rich and poor primarily is caused by social and economic factors as well as the uneven impacts of world food trade. In the future,

however, adverse changes in food-producing ecosystems are likely to play an increasingly important role in nutritional disparities (medium certainty).

4. Timber, fibre and fuelMillennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the findings of the MA process, “ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdfMany processes and resources in nature provide power that can be harnessed by human communities, especially wind, water and biomass combustion. Different geographical regions and countries at varying stages of development use varied methods of generating power. This has many health impacts and the availability of power, especially electricity, has important applications in health care.∂ Over half of the world’s population continues to rely upon solid fuels for cooking and heating. These fuels – including wood, crop stubble and

animal dung - are a direct product of ecosystems . Indoor air pollution produced by the combustion of biomass fuels as well as coal in poorly ventilated heating and cooking environments, causes significant mortality and morbidity from respiratory diseases, particularly among children.∂ In areas where the demand for wood has surpassed local supply and people cannot afford other forms of power, there is increased vulnerability to illness and malnutrition from consuming (unboiled) microbiologically contaminated water and improperly cooked food, as well as from exposure to cold. Poor women and children in rural communities often are those most affected by a scarcity of fuel wood. Many must walk long distances searching for fuel and firewood (as well as water) and hauling it home. These time-consuming tasks reduce the time and energy available for tending crops, cooking meals or attending school. Therefore, provision of adequate and sustainable energy supplies is fundamental not only to economic development, but also to health and well-being .∂ Outdoor air pollution is caused predominantly by the combustion of

non-renewable fossil fuels for electricity generation, transport and industry. Globally, urban air pollution is responsible for significant mortality every year, mostly as a result of heart and lung diseases. In addition, the accompanying release of a major greenhouse gas (CO2) and its consequent contribution to global warming have further, mostly adverse, impacts on human health. Air pollution due to forest fires and burning practices in agriculture also can have serious local and regional health consequences. This was highlighted by the public health experiences in south-east Asia in 1998, following widespread (drought-associated) forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, Indonesia in the latter part of 1997 and early 1998.∂ Timber exploitation has contributed to species' loss and ecosystem degradation in many regions of the developing world, affecting traditional livelihoods, microbial ecology and causing other health-related risks. In particular the destruction and fragmentation of habitats, accompanied by new patterns of human-

microbe contacts, has introduced new infectious diseases into human populations – e.g. the Nipah virus in Malaysia and various viral haemorrhagic fevers in South America. Deforestation also endangers health by intensifying the effects of natural disasters such as floods and landslides.

5. Regulation of infectious diseaseMillennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the findings of the MA process, “ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdfInfectious diseases are caused by viruses, bacteria and other types of microbes or parasites. Only a few infectious agents cause actual disease in plants, animals and humans; usually these are constrained geographically and seasonally by ecosystems and ecological relationships in nature. Patterns of microbe entry into the human species (sometimes as new mutants) are sensitive to climatic and micro-environmental conditions. These factors may impact upon the spread of microbes between humans; their more distant dissemination; and the activity of vector organisms (e.g. mosquitoes) involved in their transmission. Often humaninduced changes in ecosystems and in physical environmental conditions alter these natural influences oninfectious agent range and activity.∂ The pattern and extent of change in incidence of a particular infectious disease depends on the particular ecosystems affected, type of land-use change, disease-specific transmission dynamics, sociocultural changes and the susceptibility of human populations. Infectious disease risks are affected particularly by destruction of , or encroachment into, wildlife habitat (particularly through logging and road∂

building); changes in the distribution and availability of surface waters, e.g. through dam construction, irrigation and stream diversion; agricultural land-use changes, including proliferation of both livestock and crops; uncontrolled urbanization or urban sprawl; resistance to pesticide chemicals used to control certain disease vectors; climate variability and change; migration and international travel and trade; and the accidental or intentional human introduction of pathogens.∂ Recently, there has been an upturn in the rate of emergence or re-emergence of infectious diseases. Factors contributing substantially to this trend include: intensified human encroachment on natural environments; reductions in biodiversity (including natural predators of vector organisms); particular livestock and poultry production methods; and increased long-distance trade in wild animal species (including as food). Further contributors include: habitat alterations that lead to changes in the number of vector breeding sites or in reservoir host distribution; niche invasions or interspecies host transfers; human-induced genetic changes of disease vectors or pathogens (such as mosquito resistance to pesticides or emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria); and environmental contamination by infectious disease agents.

6. Climate regulationMillennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 2005, MA Board represents the users of the findings of the MA process, “ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: Health Synthesis,” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosystems/ecosys.pdfRegional climatic conditions are influenced by changes in ecosystems and landscapes, especially deforestation and desertification. On a larger scale, the ongoing human induced alteration of atmospheric composition (the greenhouse effect) also affects climatic conditions.∂ Each of the ecosystem services described above is sensitive to climatic conditions and therefore will be affected by human-induced climate change. In turn,

these ecosystem changes will affect the well-being and health of human populations . Meanwhile, climate change itself does, and will, affect human health.∂

Although climate change will have some beneficial effects on human health, most are expected to be negative. Direct effects, such as increased mortality from heatwaves, are most readily predicted but indirect effects are likely to have greater overall impact. Human health is likely to be affected indirectly by climate-induced changes in the distribution of productive ecosystems and in the availability of food, water and energy supplies. These changes will affect the distribution of infectious diseases, nutritional status and patterns of human settlement.∂ Extreme weather events (including heatwaves,

floods, storms and droughts) and sea-level rise are anticipated to increase as a result of climate change . These events have local and sometimes regional effects: directly through deaths and injuries and indirectly through economic disruption, infrastructure damage and population displacement. In turn, this may lead to increased incidence of certain communicable diseases as a result of overcrowding; lack of clean water and shelter; poor nutritional status; and adverse impacts on mental health.

Federalism Advantage

UQ---Supreme CourtFederal supremacy over states now---Supreme Court decisionsKarthick Ramakrishnan 2014, professor of public policy and political science at the University of California, “Understanding Immigration Federalism in the United States,” Center for American Progress, March 2014, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/StateImmigration-reportv2.pdfTwo major developments in 2012 led to a steep decline in the legal and political fortunes of these restrictive issue entrepreneurs and their plans for attrition through state enforcement. First, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down most provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in Arizona v. United States. 56 In the wake of the ruling, federal courts also placed significant limitations on local enforcement schemes, leaving the future legal status of much restrictive enforcement legislation in doubt.57 As a matter of legal theory, courts have been much more likely to side with the long-standing notion of federal supremacy on immigration enforcement than to side with the theories of Secretary Kobach and others who claim inherent authority for states to engage in the policing of immigrants.

UQ---Surveillance Hurts FederalismImmigration surveillance state expanding, threatens federalismAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfIn the avalanche of state and local immigration-related lawmaking in recent years, few initiatives have stirred passions like those involving the police.1 Take, for example, the charged disputes over Arizona’s S.B. 1070, whose most controversial provision requires state and local police to ascertain the immigration status of individuals they encounter and share that information with federal authorities.2 Even by the heated standards of discourse on immigration, clashes over S.B. 1070 have been fierce. Advocates of tougher enforcement have embraced the Arizona law and successfully urged other jurisdictions to adopt copycat laws.3 At the same time, civil rights and community-based advocates have vigorously objected that S.B. 1070 and similar laws enable racial profiling, improper arrests, and violations of due process, and drive wedges between local police and immigrant communities.4¶ The Obama Administration swiftly joined the fray by filing suit to challenge S.B. 1070, arguing not that the law offended equal protection, due process, or Fourth Amendment principles—as civil rights advocates urged in their own lawsuits—but rather that it was preempted by federal law.5 The district court enjoined four of the law’s many provisions, and in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court largely agreed with the Obama Administration’s position, facially invalidating all but one of the disputed provisions and cautioning that the final provision remained vulnerable to as applied challenges.¶ While Arizona has been widely interpreted as putting the brakes on state and local immigration regulation, it hardly brings state and local involvement in immigration law and policy to an end.7 With respect to immigration policing, in particular, while the Court brushed back the state’s unilateral attempts to regulate and enforce immigration law, it simultaneously gave a boost to state and local immigration policing under the aegis of federal initiatives that enlist state and local cooperation.8 Running counter to a conventional narrative of federal inaction on immigration control, the steady expansion of these federal arrangements in recent decades has contributed to an enduring convergence of immigration control and criminal law enforcement and the removal of unprecedented numbers of individuals.9 The long shadow cast by mass immigration enforcement has integrated the principles, priorities, and procedures of immigration control into the day-to-day practices of many state and local police and criminal justice institutions to a considerable extent.¶ Those federal programs are now undergoing a sea change with the deployment of technology. For example, even as it forcefully has urged invalidation of S.B. 1070 and similar laws, the Obama Administration has presided over the largest expansion of state and local immigration policing in U.S. history with its implementation of the “Secure Communities” program. Secure Communities integrates the criminal records databases maintained by states and the FBI, which are routinely queried by police conducting background checks on individuals they arrest, with the immigration databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—thereby automating DHS’s ability to identify potentially deportable noncitizens in state or local custody.11 The program has transformative aspirations: to automatically determine the immigration status of every person nationwide who is arrested and booked by state and local police in order to identify potential immigration law violators.¶ Secure Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing. Automated immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other technologies to automate and routinize the identification and apprehension of potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and other moments of day-to-day life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full significance of this shift remains underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of previous federal efforts to enlist state and local police assistance, emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14¶ In this Article, I take a complementary but different

approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect a massive increase in the number of state and local law enforcement officials involved in immigration policing— although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More fundamentally, as a leading edge of what I conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime, automated immigration policing contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders immigration status visible, accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever before, and subject to routine monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and private actors.15 By using technology to make determinations of immigration status and the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the nature of both “immigration federalism” and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new initiatives raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based surveillance and dataveillance that “monitor[] people in order to regulate and govern their behavior.”¶ Accordingly, I assess automated immigration policing in the context of the emergence of this nascent immigration surveillance state, drawing upon technology-, surveillance-, and privacy-based frameworks to complement and refract the insights of existing analyses. In Part II, I recount the evolution of state and local immigration policing in recent decades, from which an equilibrium has been emerging that—perhaps ironically, given Arizona’s strong endorsement of federal power—contemplates considerable enmeshment of state and local police with immigration control under federal auspices, but with room for voluntary state and local choices along the cooperation–noncooperation spectrum. In Part III, I examine the federal government’s two recent automated immigration policing initiatives—Secure Communities and the National Crime Information Center’s Immigration Violators File—and show how the architecture of these programs disrupts that nascent equilibrium by curtailing state and local choices concerning the nature and extent of their participation in immigration policing. Instead, both initiatives make immigration status determinations by law enforcement automatic, pervasive, and effectively mandatory. In the process, these initiatives also blur the substantive lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local agencies and departments. ¶ Because they intersect with and share continuities with a broader, longer term set of developments concerning technology, surveillance, and information sharing, in Part IV I situate and analyze automated immigration policing within that wider context, addressing the surveillance- and privacy-related problems that these initiatives present.18 While automated immigration policing initiatives can facilitate the efficient identification of large numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens, they also carry several categories of costs—all of which are exacerbated by the heightened vulnerabilities of noncitizens and the limited procedural protections afforded in immigration removal proceedings. These costs arise from the inherent fallibilities of automation, the tendency of surveillance mechanisms to be used for purposes beyond those for which they were initially implemented, the displacement of state and local control over information that states and localities collect and share with federal authorities, and the everyday effects of these initiatives on both law enforcement agencies and the communities being monitored. Finally, in Part V, I identify and advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of automated immigration policing initiatives and other programs that similarly are reshaping immigration enforcement practices with the use of new technologies. As with other forms of technology-based surveillance, the expanded use of automated immigration policing demands greater attention to the interests at stake when personal information is collected for immigration enforcement purposes. I argue that the existing potential for conflicts over control of information between federal and subfederal governments may help to protect those interests, and that the importance of those interests demands improved transparency, oversight, and accountability in the implementation of automated immigration policing mechanisms and other technology-based initiatives that are contributing to the development of the immigration surveillance state.

Destroys immigration federalism---kills state flexibilityAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfAutomated immigration policing has enabled massive levels of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement that could never have been achieved under earlier programs. The NCIC Immigration Violators File, for example, now makes over 298,900 records of potentially deportable individuals accessible to state and local police nationwide.111 Under Secure Communities, over twenty-eight million sets of fingerprints have been transmitted to DHS since the program’s inception—“thousands” of fingerprints per day, according to one official, including fingerprints of all individuals born outside the United States or whose place of birth is unknown—from which DHS has identified over 1.4 million matching records in IDENT. ICE has returned or formally removed 279,482 of these individuals, with the number of removals attributable to Secure Communities jumping from 14,364 in 2009, representing four percent of all removals, to 83,815 in 2012, representing one-fifth of all removals.112 In light of these numbers, the Obama Administration has decreased its reliance on task force agreements under the 287(g) program, one of the cornerstones of the previous generation of federal immigration policing

initiatives.¶ In order to achieve these numbers, these initiatives have forcefully challenged and eroded the equilibrium on immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years , illustrating the powerful ways in which the technological

architecture of federalism itself can shape and govern the institutional relationships among different levels of government.113 While sharing with its predecessors the goal of reducing the federal government’s information deficit vis-à-vis states and localities in the identification of potentially deportable noncitizens, automated immigration policing departs from those earlier initiatives by precluding states and localities from making affirmative, calibrated, and negotiated choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to furnish. Instead, these initiatives—while nominally still tethered to “voluntary” forms of federal–state cooperation— affect informational end runs around those choices through the use of technology. Both programs tightly weave immigration policing mechanisms into established, deeply ingrained systems designed to facilitate criminal investigation, prosecution, and sentencing—transforming the process of monitoring and verifying immigration status into a routine, seamless part of virtually all ordinary law enforcement encounters with members of the public.¶ This approach erodes the conception of immigration federalism that has emerged in recent years by narrowing the space for states and localities to make affirmative choices concerning their cooperation on immigration policing that are independent from other decisions—initially made decades earlier—to exchange identification and criminal history records for wholly separate criminal justice purposes. With the NCIC, given the manner of its extensive use by state and local police, the inclusion of immigration records means that individual police officers will automatically receive immigration status information when making routine queries, even if their jurisdictions have policies—which are likely immune from preemption—prohibiting or restricting officers from collecting that information from members of the public they encounter. Once presented with that information, police officers may then be induced to detain or arrest suspected civil or criminal immigration law violators without regard to their formal immigration arrest authority, which Arizona v. United States now clarifies to be highly constrained, or the extent to which their jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with ICE.114¶ Secure Communities goes even further, inducing and routinizing the assistance of state and local police en masse. Here, the informational end run proceeds in the opposite direction from the flow of information using the NCIC. Rather than sending immigration status information to law enforcement officials, DHS automatically extracts identification and criminal history information from state and local law enforcement agencies when they routinely transmit that information to the FBI for purposes that are unrelated to civil immigration enforcement, but understood as essential for criminal law enforcement.115 DHS then uses that information for immigration enforcement purposes—without regard to whether those jurisdictions have affirmatively chosen to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in helping to identify potentially deportable individuals whom they encounter.¶ While technology—being “plastic,” as Lawrence Lessig has emphasized— likely could be designed to preserve the room for state and local choices that existing federal immigration policing initiatives contemplate, these new automated immigration policing initiatives are early components in a broader federal strategy that instead appears poised not simply to erode existing conceptions of immigration federalism even further, but to expand these surveillance mechanisms to encompass even larger numbers of U.S. citizens.116 Federal officials have championed Secure Communities not just as an immigration policing program, but as the first phase of the FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI) initiative, a

biometric database system intended to upgrade and replace IAFIS, which will enable the collection, storage, processing, and exchange of unparalleled quantities of biometric and biographic information of both U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.117 The scope of NGI’s database system is enormous, encompassing multimodal biometric records of fingerprints, multiple photographs, iris scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information, and populated with data from a multiplicity of sources—including not only law enforcement agencies, but potentially also commercial databases, security cameras, publicly available sources, social networking platforms, private employers, and individuals. Using powerful facial recognition and search tools, NGI not only enables more sophisticated means of immediately identifying particular individuals, but also makes it “trivially easy” to locate, identify, and track individuals remotely for investigative, intelligence gathering, or preventive purposes.118 To the extent that DHS stores the fingerprints of U.S. citizens collected under Secure Communities, as discussed above, the implications of Secure Communities for U.S. citizens will become even more consequential under NGI and any other programs that might involve broader sharing of those fingerprints and other biometrics along with any personal information that may be linked to those biometric records.¶ The comprehensive immigration reform bill recently adopted by the Senate also proposes to use technology in a manner that promises to reshape existing conceptions of immigration federalism. The bill would require employers to verify employees’ identities against DHS databases using an enhanced version of E-Verify, DHS’s existing online employment eligibility verification system, which incorporates a “photo tool” containing photos and personal information drawn from state driver’s license and identification bureaus.119 With all of these automated initiatives, the manner in which information from different database systems and regulatory domains is routinely aggregated and exchanged blurs the lines between immigration control and other regulatory domains, on the one hand, and the institutional lines between federal, state, and local institutions, on the other.120

Solvency---Brink/Fed Law SolvesFederal law determines state authority over immigration---it’s ambiguous nowKarthick Ramakrishnan 2014, professor of public policy and political science at the University of California, “Understanding Immigration Federalism in the United States,” Center for American Progress, March 2014, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/StateImmigration-reportv2.pdfSince the late 1800s, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government is vested with the exclusive power to regulate the admission and expulsion of immigrants; these laws are traditionally referred to as “immigration laws.”14 As a corollary, the Supreme Court has consistently opined that states and localities do not have the power to regulate immigration as such.15 Nevertheless, states and localities have been left with some authority to enact laws that regulate the treatment of immigrants once in the United States. These laws are often referred to as “alienage laws.”16∂ States can, for example, require residents to be U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents in order to access certain benefits or gain certain types of public employment.17 It is important to note, however, that while states are permitted to control some aspects of immigrants’ lives, the extent to which states can regulate the treatment of noncitizens is far from clear. That is, within the sphere of alienage law, the court is still determining the dividing line between federal and state control. The Constitution and federal laws help determine these boundaries.

Solvency---Curtailment SolvesConstraints on federal immigration surveillance are key to effective division of power between the states and federal governmentAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfTo some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal process.¶ Vindicating these interests in the immigration enforcement context therefore requires context-appropriate constraints on the collection, use, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, including limits on secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated. While courts may seem unlikely to readily recognize and impose such limits, in fact the value of these kinds of limits has nevertheless long been recognized by numerous government actors—including courts and even federal immigration officials themselves.212 However, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable databases and other new technologies may be clouding attention to the continued importance of these limits when implementing those systems. In an era in which more data is almost always assumed to be better, more information sharing and interconnectivity between database systems is also often assumed to be better as well.213 But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized, “complete interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce new vulnerabilities” and “exacerbate existing problems.” Accordingly, they argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and interoperability and retaining “friction in [the] system” may often be more optimal.¶ Moreover, with advanced database systems, as Erin Murphy suggests, “to simply ignore that there is any special import to a database search” misapprehends both the potential benefits and harms of those systems and the broader implications of their use.215 Outside the immigration context, both scholars and judges increasingly are acknowledging and engaging those implications. For example, in United States v. Ellison, the defendant sought suppression of evidence discovered in a search that was prompted by a police officer’s suspicionless NCIC query for the license plate number of the defendant’s vehicle.216 While the Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of that suppression motion, Judge Karen Nelson Moore dissented, emphasizing that the nature of law enforcement databases invited careful consideration of whether some “measure of heightened suspicion or other constraint” should limit police access to information within them.217 She cautioned that while an NCIC database search may seem only minimally intrusive, the “psychological invasion” from having personal information “subject to search by the police, for no reason, at any time one is driving a car is undoubtedly grave,” and that the possibility of database errors might also justify suspicion or some other constraint on permitting police to access those databases.218¶ The specific legal or regulatory forms that such constraints upon immigration-related data collection, information sharing, and secondary uses might take are varied. As a matter of policy and institutional design, more constrained information collection, usage, and dissemination practices would better serve the full range of interests at stake in automated immigration policing. Such constraints could, for example, enable states and localities to choose whether or not their officers receive immigration records when making routine NCIC queries. Similarly, Secure Communities could be modified to enable states and localities to choose whether to share fingerprint records for immigration enforcement purposes, or even to refine the flow of fingerprint records from

the FBI to DHS more generally—for example, by only enabling DHS to access FBI information in the context of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for which DHS needs that information. These approaches might help preserve space for states and localities to make voluntary choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to provide, restoring some version of the equilibrium in immigration federalism that has been emerging in recent years and better respecting local control of law enforcement.¶ Other kinds of constraints on the collection, use, and dissemination of information may be warranted in these and other immigration enforcement contexts. By neglecting or minimizing the interests at stake in these practices, however, as implementation of automated immigration policing has so far, all of these possibilities fall off the table.

Information Federalism ILInformation federalismAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfThe significance of these anti-detainer policies and the extent to which they take hold in other jurisdictions remain to be seen. However, the broader trajectory leading to their adoption suggests that as state and local institutions— including hospitals, educational institutions, and others—increasingly collect and maintain personal information that might be relevant to immigration enforcement, analysis of immigration federalism may benefit from greater understanding of and attention to the dynamics of information control. Moreover, like the fingerprints collected through Secure Communities, the information sought by federal immigration authorities to identify potentially deportable individuals need not even directly include immigration status itself. As databases become increasingly interoperable and capable of aggregating information from a variety of different sources, federal officials may well regard other forms of personal information—whether or not personally identifiable—as amply sufficient to serve their immigration enforcement purposes.225 Accordingly, while states and localities may still find that restrictions on collection and dissemination of immigration status information play an important and useful role, they also will likely find those limitations insufficient to fully achieve the immigration-protective objectives they have sought to advance with those laws. ∂ Beyond immigration, these episodes raise the question of whether conflicts over information control might be harnessed to help protect social interests in privacy and constrain federal surveillance activities. Scholars have critically assessed the potential for states and localities to protect privacy interests as regulators.226 Separately, scholars have also assessed the prospects for aligning the interests of companies collecting personal information with interests in privacy.227 Since, as discussed above, states and localities increasingly possess large volumes of information that federal authorities seek for their own sußßsrveillance and enforcement purposes, the institutional role of states and localities as holders of this information warrants critical examination as well. For example, Robert Mikos has recently argued that under prevailing understandings of Tenth Amendment principles, federal efforts to compel states to provide this information should be foreclosed as an impermissible form of commandeering.228 While anti-commandeering doctrine itself has limits, as Mikos acknowledges, his analysis points to the possibility of information federalism as a constraint on federal surveillance, whether as a matter of constitutional doctrine, legislation, or technological design.229ß

Federalism Good---Privacy/RightsState immigration law protects immigrant privacy rights and limits rights abusesAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfB. Immigration Federalism and Information Federalism¶ One important means of fostering and facilitating these kinds of constraints—of creating “friction in [the] system” in aid of the public good— may be to harness the existing potential for conflicts over information control between the federal government and states and localities.219 While it is customary, in immigration as in other areas, to think of the federal government as a “bulwark” against rights violations by states, federalism also establishes multiple centers of power with the capacity to exert independent checks upon federal authority. Particularly in the face of broad exercises of federal power, state and local institutions can play important roles in the protection of rights and liberties—as focal points for the expression of political opposition to national policies, as “seedbed[s] for political change at the national level,” as sources of alternative and potentially broader conceptions of federal rights, and as potentially moderating influences on the federal actors who seek their cooperation.¶ Immigration scholars have long discounted these possibilities, devoting greater attention to more restrictive subfederal impulses. However, in recent years, scholars increasingly have recognized that states and localities can and do play affirmative and constructive roles in integrating, protecting, and otherwise affirmatively engaging their noncitizen residents.221 Indeed, with respect to the collection, processing, storing, and dissemination of immigration status and other personal information for immigration enforcement purposes, states and localities have long played precisely this kind of role—for example, by fashioning policies that constrain the collection of that information or its dissemination to federal immigration officials.222¶ Automated immigration policing initiatives such as Secure Communities directly respond to these forms of resistance by reducing the need for affirmative state and local assistance in collecting information about potentially deportable noncitizens in their custody. However, as both surveillance and federalism scholars might have predicted, that resistance itself has persisted in the form of efforts to limit the ability of federal immigration officials to use that information.223 A growing number of states and localities have adopted policies limiting their cooperation with ICE at the next stage of the enforcement process, when ICE issues detainers to facilitate apprehension of individuals identified through Secure Communities. For example, California recently adopted the Trust Act, which, except in cases involving individuals charged with or convicted of serious criminal offenses, prohibits law enforcement officials within the state from detaining individuals for immigration enforcement purposes, at ICE’s request, if those individuals are otherwise eligible for release.224¶ The significance of these anti-detainer policies and the extent to which they take hold in other jurisdictions remain to be seen. However, the broader trajectory leading to their adoption suggests that as state and local institutions— including hospitals, educational institutions, and others—increasingly collect and maintain personal information that might be relevant to immigration enforcement, analysis of immigration federalism may benefit from greater understanding of and attention to the dynamics of information control. Moreover, like the fingerprints collected through Secure Communities, the information sought by federal immigration authorities to identify potentially deportable individuals need not even directly include immigration status itself. As databases become increasingly interoperable and capable of aggregating information from a variety of different sources, federal officials may well regard other forms of personal information—whether or not personally identifiable—as amply sufficient to serve their immigration enforcement purposes.225 Accordingly, while states and localities may still find that restrictions on collection and dissemination of immigration status information play an important and useful role, they also will likely find those limitations

insufficient to fully achieve the immigration-protective objectives they have sought to advance with those laws.¶ Beyond immigration, these episodes raise the question of whether conflicts over information control might be harnessed to help protect social interests in privacy and constrain federal surveillance activities. Scholars have critically assessed the potential for states and localities to protect privacy interests as regulators.226 Separately, scholars have also assessed the prospects for aligning the interests of companies collecting personal information with interests in privacy.227 Since, as discussed above, states and localities increasingly possess large volumes of information that federal authorities seek for their own surveillance and enforcement purposes, the institutional role of states and localities as holders of this information warrants critical examination as well. For example, Robert Mikos has recently argued that under prevailing understandings of Tenth Amendment principles, federal efforts to compel states to provide this information should be foreclosed as an impermissible form of commandeering.228 While anti-commandeering doctrine itself has limits, as Mikos acknowledges, his analysis points to the possibility of information federalism as a constraint on federal surveillance, whether as a matter of constitutional doctrine, legislation, or technological design.

Econ Advantage

Immigration Good for Mexican EconOpen borders helps the Mexican economyNonie Darwish 2013, “IS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION GOOD FOR MEXICO?,” Frontpage Magazine, 6/18/2013, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/193700/illegal-immigration-good-mexico-nonie-darwishEven if we ignore the fact that the US cannot absorb and assimilate all the people who want to come to America, we cannot ignore the question of whether we are doing Mexico a favor with our open borders. No doubt, life as an illegal alien in the US is much better than being unemployed and poor in Mexico or any other third world country.∂ At face value illegal immigration seems to be good for Mexico, which benefits tremendously from the pouring of US dollars into its economy, supporting families and relatives of immigrants in America. That is why the Mexican government is not complaining and is happy to maintain the status quo on its borders. The government of Mexico acts like it is a right for its citizens to cross the borders into the US to find work. Not a bad deal for any government that does not want to be accountable to its own citizens to improve their lives, the economy and human rights conditions. The message of the Mexican government to its citizens is: You want a job, human rights and medical care, then go to the US if you can’t afford it here.

Unemployment rates low in Mexico because of illegal immigrationMichael Carr 2014, editor of the Market Technicians Association monthly newsletter and is on the board of directors of the MTA Educational Foundation, “Illegal Immigration Helps Mexico Maintain Low Unemployment,” Newsmax Finance, 06/ 22/ 2014, http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/MichaelCarr/Illegal-Immigration-Mexico-Unemployment/2014/08/22/id/590252/Unemployment in Mexico was just 4.9 percent in June, the latest available data. That figure could be significantly higher if the United States enforced its immigration laws.∂ There are an estimated 11.7 million illegal immigrants in the United States with about 52 percent of that number believed to come from Mexico. An unusually high percentage of the illegal immigrant population is of working age. ∂ The Migration Policy Institute estimates that 80 percent of immigrants were between the ages 18 of 64 while 60 percent of the native-born population is in that age group.∂ Full deportation, a policy that is impossible, could return 4.9 million working-age adults to Mexico. In June, there were 2.5 million unemployed in Mexico and just fewer than 50 million jobs.∂ Full deportation could increase Mexico’s unemployment rate to 13 percent. ∂ The disproportionate number of working age illegal immigrants in the United States indicates these individuals left their home country in pursuit of employment. While the decrease in unemployment is most likely welcome news to Mexican politicians, the country could suffer in the long term as the economy is robbed of the future output of millions of workers who left.∂ Illegal immigration is a multi-faceted problem. Mexico’s economy looks stronger than it is in the short term as unemployment remains low because millions of workers are, in effect, exported.

Immigration Good for US EconImmigration helps the US economy by increasing productivityGordon H. Hansen 2007, Pacific Economic Cooperation Chair in International Economic Relations and director of the School’s Center on Emerging and Pacific Economies, “The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration,” The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on American Competitiveness, April 2007, CSR No. 26 pg. 19-20Immigration generates extra income for the U.S. economy, even as it pushes down wages for some workers. By increasing the supply of labor, immigration raises the productivity of resources that are complementary to labor. More workers allow U.S. capital, land, and natural resources to be exploited more efficiently. Increasing the supply of labor to perishable fruits and vegetables, for instance, means that each acre of land under cultivation generates more output. Similarly, an expansion in the number of manufacturing workers allows the existing industrial base to produce more goods. The∂ gain in productivity yields extra income for U.S. businesses, which is termed the immigration surplus. The annual immigration surplus in the United States appears to be small, equal to about 0.2 percent of GDP in 2004.33

NAFTA Bad for Mexican EconNAFTA and other trade agreements have not helped the Mexican economy, it has actually made it worse. Justin Akers Chacón 2010, professor of U.S. History and Chicano Studies in San Diego, California, “The U.S.-Mexico border: Free trade without free people,” International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/73/us-mexico-borderThe potential population displacement resulting from NAFTA was supposed to be offset by new job creation. However, this failed to materialize for the majority of Mexicans.41 Aside from NAFTA, Mexico has also signed forty-four separate free-trade and bilateral agreements and twenty-seven “investment protection agreements” with other nations, making it the most open economy in Latin America.42 Economic displacement has resulted from the massive influx of capital and cheap goods from foreign sources, primarily from U.S.-based enterprise, inducing a radical restructuring of Mexico’s economy. Mexico is now identified by the World Bank as having the largest diaspora of economic emigrants in the world.43 Large-scale displacement and out-migration, primarily to the United States, is countered by intensified border enforcement efforts and an immigration and visa system that has not been updated to account for the realities of globalization. As the economic forces of displacement have been more powerful than the political actions taken to stop unauthorized immigration, instead of curtailing cross-border movement, the border zone and enforcement efforts into the interior have only made it more deadly.

Surveillance Bad for US EconImmigration deportation costs and the shutdown of immigrant businesses ripple the economy Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," Rounding up all of the estimated eleven million undocumented individuals—while

appealing to the law and order folks—is extremely costly . A report by the Center for American Progress conservatively estimates that the costs to find and deport these

people would top US $57 billion a year for five years —approximately the entire budget of the Department of Homeland Security , or roughly US$23,000 per deportee. 30 This doesn’t consider the disruptions to the workplace: factories, restaurants, hotels, construction sites, laundromats, farms, and ranches could all shut down, rippling through the economy .

US Econ Key to Mexican EconUS economy is K2 Mexico's economic stability Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35Mexico’s relies on the U.S. market to absorb over 80 percent of its exports , accounting for 25 percent of its gross national product; its industrial sector is tightly integrated with U.S. manufacturing; it earns $11 billion a year from U.S. tourists traveling

in Mexico; it depends on over $20 billion in annual remittances sent by its citizens living and working in the United States ; and it relies on the U.S. financial

system as its main source of international credit. This reality quickly transmitted the impact of the U.S. economic crisis into Mexico. Growth in January 2009 plummeted as Mexican consumers copied the anxiety driven austerity of their U.S. counterparts; after months of layoffs in the manufacturing sector, unemployment registered its highest rate on record in February; and fears about Mexico’s ability to meet its foreign obligations produced a nearly 30 percent drop in the value of the peso. The economy is predicted to contract by 3.5-4.5 percent in 2009 before returning to anemic growth in 2010, but these numbers have been adjusted downward with disturbing regularity during late 2008 and early 2009. While most economists conclude that Mexico is not on the brink of a balance of payments crisis or a default on its foreign debt (public or private), there is a full recognition that this “optimistic” scenario depends heavily on the U.S. economy finding its footing by late 2009 or early 2010 at the latest.

Productivity ILWhen there is productivity in the US, it creates productivity in MexicoGordon H. Hansen 2007, Pacific Economic Cooperation Chair in International Economic Relations and director of the School’s Center on Emerging and Pacific Economies, “The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration,” The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on American Competitiveness, April 2007, CSR No. 26 pg. 15Illegal immigration also brings low-skilled workers to the United States when the productivity gains of doing so appear to be highest. During the past twenty years, Mexico has experienced several severe economic contractions, with emigration from the country spiking in the aftermath of each downturn. In terms of the economic benefits, this is ∂ exactly when one would want workers to move—when their labor productivity in the United States is highest relative to their labor productivity at home. Long queues for U.S. green cards mean there is little way for legal permanent immigration to respond to such changes in international economic conditions.

Relations Advantage

Immigration/Plan KeyTensions over border enforcement spill over to destroy the US-Mexico relationship broadlyMarc R. Rosenblum 12, Specialist in Immigration Policy for the Congressional Research Service, “Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry,” 1/6/12, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdfThe United States and Mexico also cooperate extensively on border enforcement operations at the Southwest border; but with Mexicans being the most frequent target of U.S. immigration enforcement efforts and with the United States being the primary market for illicit drugs from Mexico as well as a source of illegal weapons flowing into Mexico, border enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension .155 On one hand, given that Mexicans represent a majority of all unauthorized migrants in the United States and of aliens apprehended at the border,156 and given that drug-related violence in Mexico raises persistent concerns about “spillover” violence on the U.S. side of the border,157 the U.S.-Mexican border is inevitably a major focus of U.S. enforcement. On the other hand, while Mexico does not question U.S. authority to make and enforce its own immigration laws, Mexicans from across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the construction of border fencing, the effects of border enforcement on migrant deaths , and the

protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups of migrants.158 More generally, the use of military technology and the heavy presence of law enforcement personnel at the U.S.-Mexican

border may work against the diplomatic and commercial goals of a closer economic and political partnership among the U nited States, Mexico, and other Latin American countries.

Immigration key to US/ Mexico relationsEnrique Peña Nieto 2015, President of Mexico, “Why the U.S.-Mexico Relationship Matters,” Politico, 1/ 06/ 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexico-relationship-enrique-pea-nieto-113980.html#.VaqtpCpVikoThe United States and Mexico have recognized that the challenges and opportunities we face on immigration should be addressed from a broad regional perspective and based upon the principle of shared responsibility. Consequently, we are committed to working with our neighbors in Central America to foster development and prosperity in that region.Over 34 million people of Mexican origin live in the U.S., 22.9 million of whom were born here. Mexican-Americans are socially and economically active members of their communities, and they maintain a strong binational identity. These communities are pillars of the relationship between our countries and will help us build a more prosperous shared future . ∂ My government applauds President Obama’s recently announced Immigration Accountability Executive Action, which acknowledges the positive economic and social impact of Mexican immigrants to their communities in the U.S. Furthermore, these measures will allow immigrants to increase their contributions to American society and live without fear of being separated from their families. My administration will continue to work with the U.S. government by providing services and consular assistance in order to improve the well-being of the Mexican community in this country. In order to raise living standards in Mexico—which will discourage undocumented immigration—my government has embarked upon a transformational path. We have

sought to enhance my country’s competitiveness, strengthen the rights of the Mexican people and consolidate our democracy.

US-Mexico relations low due to immigration policies Esther Pan 6, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate, February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-border-woes/p9909#p8The relationship has been in a downward spiral over the last six years , experts say. When Fox and Bush came to power in 2000, better relations between the two countries were high on the priority lists of both leaders. But after 9/11, the United States shifted its focus to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, and Mexico was pushed down the list. At the same time, a strong current of anti-immigrant feeling in America focused on Mexico , illegal immigration, and border issues. Mexicans accounted for 91 percent of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants and 74 percent of all formal removals of immigrants in 2003, according to the Migration Information Center.

As a result, the health of the relationship between the two countries "was ceded to the hardliners " in the United States, Sweig says. The Mexican reformers who argued that closer ties with the United States would be good for Mexico "now have mud on their faces," she says. As Mexico prepares for a presidential election in July, the immigration issue will likely boost the nationalism of all the candidates and foster the strong current of traditional anti-Americanism in Mexico , Sweig says.

Action SolvesLatin America wants broader legalization for immigration--- relieves social ills Esther Pan 06, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations and Stanford University graduate, February 21, 2006, "U.S.-Mexico Border Woes," http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-border-woes/p9909#p8U.S. immigration policy is viewed negatively in Latin America , Sweig says. "The wall [proposed in the current legislation] is a symbol of the souring of U.S.-Latin American relations over the last few years," Sweig says. Eleven Latin American foreign ministers met in Cartagena, Colombia, February 13 to discuss ways to protest U.S. plans to build the border wall and lobby Congress to defeat HR 4437. Latin American countries, most of which have significant populations of nationals working in the United States, are arguing for guest-worker programs and the legalization of undocumented migrants to the United States.But Latin American countries also have a massive stake in keeping immigration to the United States open. Allowing citizens to emigrate to the United States gives Latin American societies a release valve for their own social ills : high unemployment, barely functional governments, and massive income inequality. "Overwhelmingly, the case in Latin America is that the lack of a social contract makes societies dysfunctional and ineffective," Sweig says. "There are huge problems of governance and development because of a lack of investment by the elites in their own economies. People are driven away." Sweig discusses these issues in her forthcoming book, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century.

Mexico is pushing for legislation in the border--- immigration is an eminent concern for its governmentClare Ribando Seelke 14, Specialist in Latin American Affairs in the Congressional Research Service, 12-16-2014, "Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations," https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdfSince the mid-2000s, successive Mexican governments have supported efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform in the United States, while being careful not to appear to be infringing upon U.S. congressional authority to make and enforce immigration laws. The Mexican government has pledged to enforce legal emigration, increase security along its northern and southern borders, and create opportunities for workers in Mexico so that fewer individuals will emigrate. Mexico has aggressively combated transmigration by unauthorized migrants crossing Mexico bound for the

United States and worked with U.S. law enforcement to combat alien smuggling and human trafficking. Due to a number of factors, illegal emigration from Mexico is estimated to be at a 40-year low.87 Still, corruption remains endemic within Mexico’s National Migration Institute (the entity within the Interior Ministry that enforces immigration laws).88 Mexico’s southern border also continues to be porous and insecure.President Peña Nieto, like former President Calderón, has not promised Mexicans that he can affect immigration reform efforts in the U.S. Congress or influence the Obama Administration. Both leaders saw how former President Vicente Fox’s failure to secure a bilateral immigration accord with the United States in 2001 proved to be a major blow to his Administration. Nevertheless, Peña Nieto has pledged his full support for efforts to enact comprehensive immigration reform, and is likely to continue Mexico’s efforts to improve border security and enforce its migration policies to combat illegal transmigration from Central America. On November 20, 2014, the Mexican Foreign Ministry issued a statement welcoming President Obama’s executive action on immigration;89 some 3 million of the estimated 5.2 million unauthorized immigrants who could qualify for the programs Obama announced are Mexican.90

Nevertheless, several migration-related issues have concerned the Mexican government . Mexico has protested the alleged excessive use of force by U.S. agents on the border; defended the rights of Mexican migrants in the United States, regardless of their status; and challenged certain state laws against illegal immigration. Record numbers of removals (deportations) under the Obama Administration, as well as certain removal procedures, such as the treatment of unaccompanied Mexican minors and removals that release migrants into violent border regions at night, have been issues of concern.91 Recent increases in Mexicans from some regions seeking asylum in the United States due to threats of violence in their communities and a rise in Central American migrants in transit through Mexico has been a concern of both governments. Emigrants from Mexico and Central America have increasingly become victims of kidnapping and abuses by organized crime, sometimes in collusion with corrupt Mexican officials.

Mexico Key to LA RelationsMexico’s key to broader Latin American relationsPamela K. Starr 9, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35Mexican sentiment toward the United States matters. If Mexicans mistrust the United States, question what our country stands for, and feel treated like a second-class ally, it will be difficult for Washington to foster a cooperative relationship that extends beyond drugs and trade. Further, without a cooperative relationship with its nearest Latin American neighbor it will be difficult for the United States to improve relations with the rest of the region . And as demonstrated by the expansion of Chinese investment, Russian military sales and naval maneuvers, Iranian diplomatic visits, and Hugo Chávez’ regional sway, U.S. influence in the Latin American region can no longer be taken for granted.

LA Relations Impact---MultilatUS-Latin American relations are key to broader US legitimacy and power in multilateral forums Christopher Sabatini 12, adjunct professor at Columbia University in the political economy of Latin America and the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, 6/13/12, “Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America,” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability.But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the

Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it.Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations:

1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies .

Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S . when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention.Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.”At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more

representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them .If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights.2. Latin America is becoming more international.It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America.For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region .It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum.

The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba.

3. There are security and strategic risks in the region.Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border .

FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government.At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America .In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north.Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states .

LA Relations Impact---EnviroLatin American relations are key to sustaining green environmental cooperationDaniel Kammen 12, serves the U. S. Secretary of State as an Energy and Climate Fellow and is a Professor at the University of California Berkeley, 12-5-12, “Building Bridges to a Sustainable Energy Future,” http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/05/building-bridges-to-a-sustainable-energy-future/The Americas are undergoing a transition in the energy sector that will have global geopolitical ramifications . At the same time as the United States is touted to become the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, and a net exporter by 2030, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Panama show the most promise in becoming regional hubs not only for clean energy investment , but for sustained low-carbon economic growth (see related story: “U.S. to Overtake Saudi Arabia, Russia as World’s Top Energy Producer“).

Although Latin America and the Caribbean lag behind the United States and Canada in terms of implemented clean energy policy and project funding, 7 percent of the region’s total installed capacity today is renewables, and it is expected to grow faster in years to come. (See related interactive map: “The Global Electricity Mix“) Faced with ever-changing economic and political realities, regional collaborations for knowledge-creation and -sharing are crucial for fostering lasting partnerships that can make ‘sustainability science’, well, sustainable.International partnerships that lead to concrete action are often the clearest signs of innovation. At the state to state level, the Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas (ECPA) and at the person-to-person level, the Fulbright NEXUS program provide clear evidence regional collaborations that are clearly changing the modes of engagement within the hemisphere. One of us just returned from a partnership-building ECPA sponsored trip to Nicaragua, facilitated by both the U. S. Embassy team and a local NGO, blueEnergy, which is discussed below and here, focused on community energy.Just two years after its launch by President Obama in 2009, ECPA has moved beyond its initial focus on knowledge sharing around cleaner and more efficient energy, and now also supports sustainable forest and land use initiatives as well as climate change adaptation strategies . Governments and institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have all worked together to support regional technical workshops, business strategies, and other initiatives for new and cleaner ways to provide energy. ECPA has also become a vehicle for leaders in sustainability research and practice to work at the institutional level to link industry, university, and civil-society groups in the New World.The two-year-old Fulbright NEXUS program has already become a regional model for the support of scholars from around the hemisphere committed to applied research and collaboration on sustainability science. At a recent meeting in Banff, Canada, the 20 NEXUS fellows focused equally on individual and group projects to assess and address environmental issues plaguing the Western Hemisphere. Interestingly, the focus was on solutions science, not just in quantifying the extent of environmental change.During the coming year, the Fulbright NEXUS Fellows will be working across the region on projects ranging from forest health and productivity in Alberta, Canada, to local perceptions and strategies for climate change adaptation in the High Andes of Peru, to understanding the interactions between climate mitigation and adaptation strategies for Brazil’s power sector .

Immigration Advantage

Immigrant DeathsIncreased Border Security hugely increases deaths of immigrants Robin Emmott ‘07, Journalist, Correspondent and Editor for Reuters, 7/12/2007, “More migrants die as U.S. tightens border security”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/12/us-mexico-usa-deaths-idUSN1231212420070712 Tougher security along the U.S.-Mexico border is forcing migrants to take more dangerous, remote routes to cross into the United States and pushing up the number of deaths in the desert. This year could see a record of well over 500 such deaths. At least 275 Mexican bodies have been found in the first six months, according to a Mexican Congressional report backed by U.S. and Mexican border groups and academics. They say at least 4,500 Mexicans have died trying to cross since the United States drastically increased border controls in late 1994 to stem illegal immigration. Following the failure of President George W. Bush's immigration reform proposals in Congress last month, U.S. policy is centered on tighter border security rather than giving immigrants more options to find jobs legally. But some border experts say enforcement does not stop those trying to get into the United States and only makes it more dangerous , greatly raising the fees charged by people smugglers. As security increases, so will the number of deaths, they say. "Has enhanced border security increased the number of migrant deaths? Unquestionably," said Wayne Cornelius, an immigration expert at the University of California San Diego. "There is no other way to explain the sharp increase in fatalities." The Border Patrol recovered some 116 bodies in the Arizona desert between last October 1 and the end of June, and it only records deaths on the U.S. side of the frontier. It blames ruthless smugglers for taking migrants through dangerous terrain and sometimes abandoning them there. "The number of migrant deaths is increasing because smugglers are taking them to less-patrolled, more dangerous areas," Border Patrol spokesman Ramon Rivera said. He said agents rescued 1,450 people in the desert in the same period. Unknown numbers of migrants from Central America and other countries also die each year. The U.S. government has raised its Border Patrol deployment to around 13,500 agents today from fewer than 4,000 in 1993 and plans to add a further 9,600 agents by 2012. It deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to the border last year for a two-year period until more agents are hired. Washington aims to have "operational control" of the border by 2013 by building a 700-mile (1,120-km) wall along parts of the frontier and creating a "virtual fence" in desert areas with drones, sensors, cameras, satellite technology and vehicle barriers.

Robust statistics prove our argumentRay Walser 11, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation, 6/22/11, “The Human Tragedy of Illegal Immigration: Greater Efforts Needed to Combat Smuggling and Violence”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/the-human-tragedy-of-illegal-immigration-greater-efforts-needed-to-combat-smuggling-and-violenceWhile apprehensions of illegal immigrants along the U.S. southern border declined by more than 50 percent between 2004 and 2009, deaths have increased by nearly 28 percent in the same time.[6] In 2009 alone, U.S. Customs and Border Protection found 417 bodies along the U.S. border with Mexico.[7] In 2009, along the deadliest areas of the border, such as Arizona’s Sonoran Desert, the risk of death

for illegal border-crossers was one and a half times greater than it had been in 2004, and a staggering 17 times greater than it had been in 1998.[8] According to various estimates, between 80 percent and 95 percent of illegal immigrants employ smugglers to assist in crossing the southern border.[9] While smugglers often ease the means of travel, there are also significant risks in employing these networks. Chief among the concerns is that smugglers have been known to leave behind people who fail to keep up with the group due to exhaustion, injury, dehydration, or age.[10] Furthermore, immigrants seeking to cross the southern border illegally increasingly do so in desert regions where the extreme heat can lead to over-exhaustion and death. A study by the American Civil Liberties Union and Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission estimates that 30 percent of the 390 people whose bodies were recovered in 2008 died due to exposure to extreme heat.[11] Those left behind often lack food and water, and face little chance of survival. Illegal immigrants may also be packed into trucks, hidden under seats, or smuggled in trunks to avoid detection. There they risk death and injury from suffocation or overturned vehicles.

Increasing deaths among immigrants crossing the borderFernanda Santos 13, Phoenix bureau chief for The New York Times, 5/20/13, “Arizona Desert Swallows Migrants on Riskier Paths”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/us/immigrant-death-rate-rises-on-illegal-crossings.html?_r=0 Less people are coming across,” said Bruce Anderson, the chief forensic anthropologist at the medical examiner’s office, “but a greater fraction of them are dying.” There were 463 deaths in the past fiscal year, which ended Sept. 30 — the equivalent of about five migrants dying every four days, according to an analysis by the Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights group. In the time federal statistics have been compiled, only 2005 had more deaths, and in that year, there were more than three times as many apprehensions. As security at the border has tightened, pushing migrants to seek more remote and dangerous routes, the largest number of the deaths last year occurred along the punishing stretch of desert that spans the southernmost tip of the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector, the busiest along the border. The only riskier stretch is the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas, where, from Oct. 1 to April 30, law enforcement officers or ranchers found the bodies of 77 immigrants, or more than half the number of bodies recovered there in all of the past fiscal year: 150. In that sector, the most deaths have occurred in Brooks County, small and struggling at 944 square miles, where the average household income is $25,000. The number of migrant remains recovered is on pace to double that of last year, a record for the county, at 129, said a county judge, Raul Ramirez. Most of the dead are believed to be from Central America, Judge Ramirez said.

Dangerous/Different RoutesBorder Security Doesn’t Stop Immigration- Instead Forces Immigrants to risk lives on unsafe parts of border Calynn Dowler 13, BA in Political Science, A in Migration Studies from the University of Sussex, 5/24/13, “DIVIDING THE SKY: THE FORTIFICATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER”, http://themigrationist.net/2013/05/24/dividing-the-sky-the-fortification-of-the-u-s-mexico-border/ In 1993, the Clinton administration took the first steps toward fortifying the border, largely in an effort to quell Republican criticisms of the administration’s lax approach to immigration. Subsequent administrations have continued these policies, allocating unprecedented funding to an impressive display of force along the southern border: steel fences, high-intensity lighting, remote-controlled, 24-hour-a-day video surveillance systems, helicopters, and unmanned surveillance drones (Cornelius 2005: 779). In the early days of border fortification, strategists determined not to distribute resources uniformly along the border. Instead, they focused attention on “high-risk” sections of the border, where 70-80% of crossings were made. The logic was that if authorities could secure these areas “geography would do the rest” to discourage would-be migrants from leaving their homes (Cornelius 2005: 779). Policymakers assumed that the natural borders of the U.S. – soaring mountains, swift rivers, and wide deserts– would deter crossings. They believed that migrants would not risk their lives crossing such brutal terrain. Twenty years later, it is clear that they were wrong. The flow of migrants has continued, and there is no evidence that the expansion of border enforcement has effectively deterred irregular migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 776). However, there is ample evidence from recent research that border fortification policies have contributed to the “bottling up” of unauthorized migrants in the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 782). Unwilling to risk traveling home, undocumented migrants have ended up staying in the U.S. longer, and more migrants have settled permanently. This has resulted in a paradox policymakers seem hesitant to discuss: an explosion in the numbers of unauthorized migrants living in the U.S. at a time when this country spends more on border security than ever before (Cornelius 2005: 777). In fact, Washington now pours more money into immigration control than all other federal criminal law-enforcement agencies combined, its total spending estimated at over $18 billion a year.

Causes diversion to more dangerous crossingsAlex Peña 12, freelance foreign correspondent currently covering Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, 9/20/12, “Migrants face higher risks illegally crossing the border”, http://nbclatino.com/2012/09/20/migrants-face-higher-risks-illegally-crossing-the-border/“Migrants face higher risks of death in the desert than in previous years,” the report stated. “Also, certain deportation practices put migrants at risk. For example, migrants can be deported at night and/or to cities hundreds of miles from where they were detained. These same cities are also some of the border region’s most dangerous.” Through initiatives referred to as “prevention through deterrence,” border enforcement operations have been directed at moving migrants towards more remote and inhospitable areas of the border. According to Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, around 370 to 800 migrants are dying every

year in U.S. territory while trying to cross the border. The U.S. government estimates the number to be closer to 300 – 400. The majority of these deaths result from dehydration, hypothermia in the desert, or drowning in the Rio Grande canals. In Arizona, despite a decrease in flows since 2007 and an increase in Border Patrol and National Guard presence, the Tucson-based “Coalicion de Derechos Humanos,” (Coalition of Human Rights) found 2010 to have been one of the deadliest years for migrants, with 253 bodies found in the Arizona desert. Their data showed that while migrant deaths in Arizona dropped in 2011, the number of remains found per 100,000 apprehensions actually increased. In Mexico, as many as 20,000 migrants, mostly from Central America, are kidnapped – some tortured, raped or even murder – by organized crime each year on their way through Mexico and to the north, according to Mexico’s independent National Human Rights Commission.

K Advantage

General InequalityThe border represents inequality between Mexico and the US Calynn Dowler 13, BA in Political Science, A in Migration Studies from the University of Sussex, 5/24/13, “DIVIDING THE SKY: THE FORTIFICATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER”, http://themigrationist.net/2013/05/24/dividing-the-sky-the-fortification-of-the-u-s-mexico-border/ International borders often overlap with the fault lines of global inequality. The divisions and differences between the U.S. and Mexico do not begin and end in the borderlands, but the border is where they come into sharp focus. As Alvarez (1995) has pointed out, borders “graphically illustrate the conflicts and contradictions of a hierarchically organized world.” Therefore, the management of the U.S.-Mexico border holds a meaning that extends far beyond the two countries, representing a larger struggle on the part of countries in the “North” to deter, detect, detain, and deport migrants from the global “South.” As Stephen Castles notes: The perceived ‘migration crisis’ is really a crisis in North-South relations, caused by uneven development and gross inequality. Migration control is essentially about regulating North-South relations. The U.S.-Mexico border clearly illustrates a crisis in North-South relations. The border acts as a dividing line between the wealth of the world’s largest economy and the poverty of the “third-world” nations that lie south of it. Thus far, policymakers have largely refused to address the patterns of economic inequality that spur migration to the United States in the first place, opting instead for a heavily fortified border. However, U.S. officials have historically shied away from robust internal controls in the labor market, which has lead some migration scholars (e.g. Castles, Cornelius) to claim that the government has in fact intentionally allowed low-skill labor into the country through illegitimate channels in order to create an undocumented and thus more readily exploitable working class, all while maintaining their legitimacy with the electorate through a display of force at the border.

The border further enforces unequal power relations and creates exclusion between immigrants and citizensJustin Akers Chacón 2010, professor of U.S. History and Chicano Studies in San Diego, California, “The U.S.-Mexico border: Free trade without free people,” International Socialist Review, http://isreview.org/issue/73/us-mexico-borderAS U.S. astronaut José Hernández gazed back at his home planet during a six-million-mile mission to the International Space Station in 2009, this space traveler, who is also a son of Mexican immigrants, observed something peculiar. “What surprised me is when I saw the world as one. There were no borders. You couldn’t distinguish between the United States and Mexico,” he was quoted as saying.1 Like millions of others whose lives have been affected by migration, barriers, and restrictions, Hernández’s insight speaks volumes about the role of borders in the daily lives of those for whom they exist. His epiphany also sheds light on a reality that need not require a celestial journey to comprehend: the U.S.-Mexico border exists more as a social constructor of identities and less as a physical barrier that delineates and defines distinct and exclusive landscapes.∂ Since its inception as a boundary imposed by a war of expansion the U.S.-Mexico border has functioned in a dualistic manner. It has served both as a gateway to economic opportunity and as a barrier that creates and maintains unequal power relations. This paradox—the border as both conduit and

obstacle—is most apparent when analyzing the movement of peoples and capital. For American capitalists , investors, tourists, and retirees, the border provides access . For Mexicans moving north , the majority of whom cross to seek economic opportunity in low-wage industries , the border imposes exclusion . This border duality defines the social identities of both peoples in relationship to each other—a

status that manifests most starkly once one crosses into the other’s country.∂ The matrix of disequilibrium produced by the U.S.-Mexico border offers portable sovereignty to the American and the stigma of illegality to the Mexican when each crosses the border. Upon entry into each country, this imposed identity defines social relations. Contrary to the gravitational force of economic globalization, which ignores boundaries and obliterates barriers, the border wall socially and politically disaggregates and segregates all those who pass through it. It is the existence of the border wall more as a signifier of status than as a barrier that sustains each population in its own form of isolation on the opposite side. While the compelling forces of regional integration yearn to make two parts whole, the border forces them apart. While the border stands defiant, the world around it rapidly changes.

Border surveillance constructs a system of exclusion and a worthy/unworthy dichotomy for the undesirables James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan, "From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance," Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3481/3435Under such conditions migrants encounter a highly stratified ‘mobility regime’ (Shamir

2005) where all travellers are identified, sorted, and classified as desirable or undesirable, safe or risky, and, thus, admissible or inadmissible. Consequently, access to the territories and societies of rich nations has emerged as a significant determinant of life -chances and a primary axis of global inequality (Bauman 1998).1 For tourists,

professionals and other affluent transients, borders are generally experienced as conduits or zones of transit where surveillance is ‘thin’, momentary and superficial (Torpey 2007). For

undocumented workers, sanspapiers and other ‘ undesirables ’, borders are sites of intensive scrutiny, closure and trauma where surveillance is ‘thick’ (Torpey 2007) and functions as a ‘banopticon’ (Bigo 2002) oriented towards exclusion rather than correction or discipline. Through regimes of surveillance and classification, states do not merely control movements but also enact rituals of ‘purification and prophylaxis’ (Douglas 1966; cf. Salter 2007) that construct and codify moral distinctions between those worthy and unworthy of membership. Here those marked as undeserving and undesirable are constituted as ‘anti-citizens’ whose presence is deemed hazardous and whose sociopolitical existence is rendered invisible and unauthorized (Inda 2006). Thus, more than just administrative techniques, border patrols, workplace raids, and related forms of surveillance provide normative performances that call into existence the very categories and divisions (legal/illegal, alien/citizen) they purport to represent and enforce .

PanopticonLiberties are constrained inside Border Patrol facilities Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, “BORDERWORLD: HOW THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY”, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-security-bordersSharon Ansick, a tactical logistics officer who went to high school with my sister, gave me the grand tour of the Del Rio facility. Video cameras were everywhere, 150 in all. Doors and windows were secured, and passage in and out of facilities, as well as from one area to another within a compound or building, was tightly controlled. Ansick explained that this was called passive security. Everyone who entered this facility, whether they knew it or not, had entered a panopticon. Their every move was registered, recorded, observed, and controlled. No one could leave without permission. Border runners would be met with road spikes that jut up from the pavement at the push of a distress button. Few would ever realize the degree to which their liberty had been constrained. All incoming and outgoing license plates are photographed, and all drivers too. All recently issued passports, green cards and day-entry cards contain radio-frequency ID chips that broadcast the identify of a traveler at the primary checkpoint, and the Del Rio port is the first to deploy a special RFID lane to speed processing. When I was there, traffic was light and lines were short, but there was a sense of high alertness throughout the facility. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents armed with M-4 rifles loitered near the secondary station. Supervisory agents, in a glass-encased control room overlooking the traffic lanes, kept watch over the whole proceeding, monitored the video feeds, and maintained radio contact with personnel all over the port. The port's noncommercial traffic—about two million vehicular travelers and 50,000 pedestrians annually—is not routinely scanned. Instead, CBP officers interview drivers in a primary lane and use special angled mirrors to inspect the underside of all vehicles, and if a dog sniffs something suspicious or something about the car seems unusual, or if the driver seems nervous or simply came from an area of interest, the officer will call for a secondary inspection. At that point, density meters, mirrors, x-ray scanners and the whole repertoire of what CBP terms non-intrusive inspection techniques come into play. Nowadays few cars are dismantled or drilled without evidence derived from one of these methods. One recent seizure came about because an officer manning the primary lane noticed that a vehicle, driven by a lone male, was uncommonly clean. A trip to the VACIS x-ray scanner settled the matter. After some probing and chipping, agents discovered several pounds of heroin and methamphetamine.

RaceRace plays a role in the immigration laws are carried out. Doris Marie Provine 2015, Professor Emérita, School of Social Transformation, Arizona State University, “Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law,” Norteamérica, 11/11/ 2013, Year 8 Special Issue 2013 pg. 32Over time, the role of race and racism in immigration law has changed. Laws that explicitly target particular groups for inclusion or exclusion can no longer be justified on eugenic grounds (Gomez, 2007). Yet immigration laws and policies that leave room for race to play a significant role in enforcement are not only tolerated, but often embraced by immigration restrictionists (Sinema, 2012). They typically feature a large measure of discretion for the front-line officials who determine when surveillance occurs and what cases get priority. Safeguards to prevent abuses are generally lacking.∂ The enduring relationship between race and immigration law can be traced to popular fears and anxieties about racial “others” and the fragility of national allegiances, which depend on a sense of fellow feeling among “members” (Omi and Winant, 1994; Bosniak, 2006; Kanstroom, 2007). As Benedict Anderson suggests, one's membership in a national body is in reality “an imagined community” of people who believe that they belong together. This abstract sense of membership leaves a lot of room for the exclusion of people who seem different, and perhaps not suitable for assimilation (Anderson, 1983; Kanstroom, 2007; Zolberg, 2006). It is thus not surprising that much of the pressure for exclusion comes from citizens themselves, not from the top, where commercial interests and international diplomacy may dictate a more cosmopolitan approach. In Europe, for example, populist parties have made sharp restrictions on immigration a central plank in their platforms.∂ The question is not so much why race matters to citizens who feel threatened by rapid demographic change, but rather how the law adapts to racial anxieties. In a time when race-neutral rules have found favor, how does racial disadvantage persist?

This essay offers a two-part explanation, based on the U.S. experience. Latinos in the United States, particularly immigrants of Mexican and Central American origin, have been disproportionately targeted for deportation ( Provine and Doty, 2011).

The pattern is evident in popular stereotypes about immigrants, in the spending and construction that are taking place on the southern border with Mexico, and in the racial/ethnic patterns associated with deportation.∂ This essay first details the role that race plays in federal immigration-enforcement operations, and then turns to the local level, where, under a federal policy of devolution, local law enforcement agencies are being asked to assist in enforcing federal immigration law. Arizona's participation is highlighted here because the state stands out for the enthusiasm with which it has embraced deportation as the solution to unauthorized residence and for its effort to supplement federal enforcement with its own laws and policies. The mix of

federal , state, and local law and policy that I describe here institutionalizes racism by facilitating ethno-racial profiling, hyper-surveillance, abusive stops, problematic searches, and unwarranted detention of suspected unauthorized immigrants. The targets of these actions are disproportionately Latinos because U.S. Americans, including members of the law enforcement community, have been conditioned to see the problem of unauthorized entry and residence in racial terms, as a Mexican and Central American phenomenon (Chavez, 2008; Ngai, 2004). Ironically, those who demand more enforcement invariably ignore these problems in order to focus on the illegality of the immigrant's actions in remaining without authorization. The much more significant story in a nation that honors the rule of law is the failure of government to adhere to its own high standards.

The Federal Government paints Immigrants to be Mexican or Central American.Doris Marie Provine 2015, Professor Emérita, School of Social Transformation, Arizona State University, “Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law,” Norteamérica, 11/11/ 2013, Year 8 Special Issue 2013 pg. 32In one sense, it is not surprising that the spotlight has focused on Mexicans and persons from further south who have illegally crossed the southern border. This border was for a long time relatively open, in deference to border communities and U.S. employers desiring temporary Mexican labor (Kang, 2010; Ngai, 2004). Past porosity and the historic relationship between the two nations have set the stage for continued illegal immigration from Mexico because would-be migrants rely upon their connections with already-resident family and friends as a form of social capital (Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002). The problem of illegal entry or re-entry is exacerbated by the difficulty of gaining work or visitation visas in Mexico and by the extremely lengthy wait requirements for legal immigration from Mexico.∂ The upshot is that Mexicans constitute slightly over half of the unauthorized population within U.S. territory, giving law enforcement some reason to focus on people who appear to them to be from Mexico or Central America. To the extent that this logic informs enforcement, however, the federal government, through the weight of its authority, paints the face of illegal immigration as Mexican or Central American. Lost in the translation of policy into practice is the reality that persons without legal status can be found in all colors and among all classes and every nationality.

Racism is the foundation for immigration laws.Harvard Law Review 2015, “Policing Immigrant Communities,” Harvard Law Review, 4/10/ 15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771Certain features of the immigration-enforcement regime have remained static over the last two centuries; others have changed dramatically. The forces driving the immigration regime, for instance, have not changed: regulation has always been driven in part by an image of immigrant criminality, an image which itself has been driven by racism. The tools to implement those forces, though, have changed. The modern criminal justice system and immigration enforcement regime have fused together, and today it is possible to say that immigration enforcement is the work of police generally. This is due not only to an explosion of criminal laws governing migration, but also to the extent to which federal, state, and local police enforce both these criminal laws and the civil provisions of the immigration law. This section describes these changes from two perspectives: the laws that are enforced and the actors who enforce them.

Idk what to tag this, or if it is even useful Harvard Law Review 2015, “Policing Immigrant Communities,” Harvard Law Review, 4/10/ 15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771As the authority to deport expands, the power to stop deportation contracts. Congress’s initial removal regime afforded courts “broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation.” By 1990, Congress had eliminated that discretion. And in 1996 Congress eliminated the Attorney General’s power to prevent deportation. The consequences of criminal conviction, then, are not only severe but also inevitable. The Supreme Court has now said that criminal defense attorneys are constitutionally incompetent if they do not advise their clients of these consequences.∂ In addition to adding civil-immigration consequences to otherwise criminal behavior, Congress has labeled immigration violations as criminal. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) criminalized certain violations of immigration law, and the scope of criminal immigration law has continued to expand. In 2005, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice piloted “Operation Streamline,” a zero-tolerance program that files criminal charges against people arrested by CBP officials. Men, women, and children are automatically charged with illegal entry, a misdemeanor punishable by six months in federal prison. Others are charged with illegal

reentry, a felony offense that could, if the reentrant has a criminal record, result in twenty years in prison.∂ It is hard to overstate the significance of these legislative changes to immigration enforcement for criminal justice enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, and incarceration. Immigration crimes like illegal entry and reentry did not exist before the 1980s, but since 2004 they have “topped the list of federal prosecutions.” Since 2009, they have constituted more than half of the entire federal criminal docket. In some parts of the country the numbers are more dramatic: eighty-eight percent of all federal prosecutions in the Southern District of Texas are for illegal entry or reentry into the United States. A surge in immigration policing has stretched courts thin and changed the face of American prisons.

Solvency/Mechanisms

Specific Policy RecommendationsThe Supreme Court should rule narrowing exemptions to the Privacy Act--- reduces amount of surveillance in border Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrImmigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors in border, migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has afforded federal officials considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs enforcement activities. This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where the Court has deemed “routine,” suspicionless searches and seizures of individuals and property for purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, “ simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border .” 311 The Court has reached this conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or invocations of history and tradition with little more.312 In some instances, the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this “border exception” to the federal government’s power over immigration, which it has long deemed to be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as falling within the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth Amendment limits for administrative or “special needs” searches.313In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere, policed by large numbers of actors other than federal immigration officials—and in which immigration surveillance activities reach large numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful immigration status— the justifications for such sweeping deference become more difficult to maintain. The categories of potential deprivations that can result from immigration surveillance activities have multiplied drastically beyond the simple ability to enter and remain in the United States. With the expansion of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance, these enforcement activities can place restrictions on the rights to international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service benefits, and freedom from physical restraint in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement processes. As discussed above, the powerful tools of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous deprivations and are easily susceptible for uses beyond those originally contemplated when implemented.

Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at stake in immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.314 However, these interests have continued to be given insufficient weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most noncitizens from the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Act’s exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law

enforcement and national security purposes. Narrowing these exemptions in the Act’s coverage would enable these interests to be given the weight that they deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications.

Congress should pass a legislation that provides a framework of transparency, oversight, and accountability of the collection of data through implementing greater public engagement and review of mechanisms for errorsAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFinally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to transparency, oversight, and accountability . Whether programmatically or in the context of individual adjudications, immigration agencies, although improving in some ways, have long suffered from major transparency and accountability deficits.315 Those deficits are amply evident in immigration surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines created by the deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of different levels.First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency, oversight, and accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or detailed legal authority to support and guide such major and complicated initiatives. No framework statutes govern or constrain immigration surveillance activities , which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the limited privacy protections available under the

Privacy Act. This lack of a statutory framework governing surveillance activities that implicate privacy interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to other areas, such as communications and financial services, in which government access, storage, and dissemination of personal information have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316Whether coming from Congress , the executive branch, or both acting together, accountability and oversight of immigration surveillance would be better served by a more detailed, coherent legal framework governing immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public engagement with those rules . As the Markle Foundation has emphasized, new national security information sharing initiatives demand privacy and security protections that “address the hard questions [such as secondary use and redress] . . . as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.”317 These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which immigration surveillance activities take place and will only become more relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate technology-based surveillance mechanisms in other aspects of immigration governance.Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from immigration surveillance activities, whether administrative or judicial in nature, can still play an important role—not only in remedying those individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to ensure that information maintained in their database systems is accurate and complete.318 Current redress mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient

opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations. While courts have begun to fill this gap , more robust and regularized redress mechanisms at the administrative level would create additional incentives for the authorities involved in immigration control to ensure the accuracy and integrity of their data.Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of structural oversight. Because of the necessarily opaque manner in which database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often function—and the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their operation over extended periods of time—oversight of these systems can be particularly difficult in the context of individual cases.319 This is undoubtedly more true in the

immigration enforcement system, which has traditionally been ill-equipped to supervise investigatory practices.320 Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress mechanisms to fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the stakes in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate effectively.321 Especially as immigration surveillance integrates the institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions of other domains, the blurred lines of accountability among different institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322

The USFG should set up the United States Border Enforcement and Immigration Review Commission BNHR 8, Border Network for Human Rights, human rights advocacy and immigration reform organizations located at the U.S./Mexico Border, November 2008, "U.S.-Mexico Border Policy Report," https://law.utexas.edu/humanrights/borderwall/communities/municipalities-US-Mexico-Border-Policy-Report.pdf1. Create a United States Border Enforcement and Immigration Review Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission should be an independent agency legislatively established to oversee the implementation of all federal border and immigration policies , projects, programs, and activities, both those of DHS—Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—and those of other relevant agencies. It should be vested with legal authority to provide recommendations regarding federal immigration andsecurity policy, enforcement, and complaint procedures, and it should also be able to hold federal immigration agencies accountable . Its broad purposes should be to promote best practices at the border, to enhance internal capacities in border agencies, and to strengthen relations between the community and government agencies. The Commission should be composed of a diverse group of people who understand the complexities of the border, and most of them should be border residents. It must have three powers: (1) investigatory power, (2) auditing power, and (3) legal power, including the power to subpoena. The independent commission also needs to be able to formulate and fund an effective outreach strategy to border communities. The Commission should report annually to Congress.

Immigration Surveillance Increasing Surveillance technologies have substantially increased funding and use of immigration controlAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrIn this Article, I examine a set of important but underappreciated consequences of this entrenchment of mass immigration enforcement, tracing and analyzing the evolution of immigration governance into an enduring regime of immigration surveillance.4 By any measure, enforcement levels have soared in recent years.

Federal expenditures on border and immigration control have grown fifteen-fold since 1986 and now substantially exceed expenditures on all other federal law enforcement programs combined .5 These activities have been supplemented by a

dizzying array of initiatives, often administered by state, local, and private actors, that indirectly enforce immigration law by regulating access to rights, benefits, and services—including employment, social services, driver’s licenses, transportation services, and education—based on citizenship or immigration status.6 Increasingly, immigration control objectives also are pursued using criminal prosecutions.7These initiatives have yielded a staggering, widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens formally removed from the United States.8 Much less widely noted, however, has been the full significance of that growth—including an attendant sea change in the underlying

nature of immigration regulation itself, hastened by the implementation of transformative new surveillance and dataveillance technologies . Like many other areas of

contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly become an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At virtually every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are now subject to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for immigration control and other purposes. This information is aggregated and stored by government agencies for long retention periods in networks of interoperable databases and shared among a variety of public and private actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little transparency, oversight, or accountability . 9

Border Patrol organizations have massively multiplied Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrHistorically, territorial borders and their functional equivalents have been the focal points of immigration control, and as immigration enforcement activities have expanded in recent decades, the federal government has continued to invest heavily in border control and other measures to control entry into the United States. Among these measures, the most visible initiative involves the quasi-militarized fortification of the U.S.-Mexico land border.29 CBP’s Border Patrol, which totaled a few thousand agents in the early 1990s, has doubled since 2004 to over 21,000 agents, with the vast majority posted along the southwestern border.30 In addition,

congressional mandates have prompted the construction of over 650 miles of fencing and other physical barriers.31 Current immigration reform proposals would go dramatically further, doubling both the number of Border Patrol agents and the extent of fencing and physical barriers.32

Immigration surveillance expands from the boundaries of the traditional frameworkAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrHowever, legal scholars have given virtually no attention to the revolution taking place in the techniques and technologies of immigration enforcement themselves—their swift proliferation, enormous scale, likely entrenchment, and broader meanings. In this Article, I theorize and assess these shifts, situating and analyzing them within a broader, longer term set of developments concerning technology and surveillance in contemporary governance.16 Immigration control has not simply evolved into a system to effectuate the removal of noncitizens on a massive scale, although it manifestly has done that. More fundamentally, the evolution of this system has reshaped the meanings and functions of immigration governance itself, transforming a regime of immigration control , operating primarily upon noncitizens at the border, into part of a more expansive regime of migration and mobility surveillance, operating without geographic bounds upon citizens and noncitizens alike.17 Traditional immigration law frameworks offer neither the vocabulary to fully engage with this transformation nor the mechanisms to constrain these surveillance activities across the many domains in which they occur. Accordingly, I advance a framework to understand and respond to these developments rooted in scholarship on surveillance and privacy, bridging a larger divide identified by Vicki Squire between scholarship on the law and politics of “control” and scholarship on the law and politics of “migration or movement.”18

Congress has reinforced efforts to monitor noncitizen immigrants Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrThis expansion of direct post-entry enforcement consists of several component mechanisms. First, noncitizens have been subject to more extensive, ongoing monitoring and registration requirements while in the United States. While noncitizens have long been required, as a formal matter, to register and be fingerprinted upon arrival, to carry proof of registration at all times within the United States, and to notify immigration officials promptly of changes of address, these provisions went largely unenforced for decades . 66 Even today, these registration requirements largely remain a legal fiction.67 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the government did step up both its formal and informal efforts to monitor certain categories of noncitizens within the United States.68 For example, beginning soon after the attacks, the FBI initiated a program of “voluntary” interviews for thousands of Arab and Muslim men with nonimmigrant visas.69 In early 2002, the Justice Department announced plans to aggressively enforce the change of address provision, warning of severe adverse consequences for noncompliance. 70 Later in 2002, the Attorney General initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), which imposed registration requirements on nonimmigrant men who were at least sixteen years old and current or

former nationals of twenty-five countries, all but one predominantly Arab or Muslim.71 Congress and DHS also tightened oversight of international students and schools where they are enrolled to ensure compliance with the terms of student visas.72

Federal officials encourage immigration monitors at the state and local levelAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrThird, federal officials have enlisted hundreds of thousands of state and local law enforcement and corrections officials in immigration policing.77 These initiatives, whose particular manifestations have evolved swiftly, seek to identify potentially deportable noncitizens by screening individuals when they are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated to determine their citizenship and immigration status and potential deportability. In addition to these federal initiatives, some states and localities unilaterally have sought to become directly involved in immigration policing. For example, several states and localities—most prominently Arizona, with its controversial and widely-noted Senate Bill 1070—have authorized or required law enforcement to inquire about the immigration status of individuals they encounter and in some instances to convey that information to federal immigration officials.78 While the Supreme Court left open the possibility of as-applied challenges to Section 2 when it reviewed SB 1070, it declined to facially invalidate the provision, and it has previously signaled its willingness to tolerate an active role for state and local police in direct immigration enforcement.79

Immigrants are surveiled at departure for any time violations and drug traffickingAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFinally, DHS has implemented mechanisms to monitor and control departures from the United States. In a series of laws dating back to 1996, Congress has mandated the establishment of a comprehensive, automated system to monitor and collect records of the departure of every noncitizen lawfully admitted to the United States.103 This system seeks to match departure records with arrival records to confirm whether noncitizens admitted under temporary, nonimmigrant admission categories have departed the United States when required and to identify individuals who have “overstayed.” As with screening and registration upon initial entry, a complete exit control system necessarily involves monitoring and verifying citizenship and immigration status for all individuals traveling from the United States. Increasingly, exit controls have been justified with reference to national security and criminal law enforcement.104 At some locations along the U.S.-Mexico border, departing individuals are subject to additional screening under initiatives that target drug trafficking.105 Other mechanisms restrict the ability of noncitizens to travel outside the United States altogether.106While implementation of this system has proven challenging, the federal government has continued to make considerable investments in its development and automation. Under the system in place for many years, nonimmigrants would fill out an I-94 arrival/departure form when seeking admission at the border. Upon admission, border inspectors would stamp and retain this form, returning to individuals a departure receipt to be submitted to transportation carriers upon departure and then forwarded to immigration officials.107 This process has recently been automated for individuals arriving by air and sea, and immigration officials have piloted automated systems to track exits by verifying and collecting biometric identification information from these travelers.108 Immigration reform proposals in Congress would go further by requiring

air and sea carriers to collect exit data from passengers before departing the United States.109

Surveillance Key to Border Control**Also in Random DA Links**

Surveillance and interoperable databases are key to extensive border controlAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFar from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both fixed and mobile . New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration governance.248

Privacy/Probable CauseThe ICE can access search warrants without probable causes Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf But what if this “reasonable” noncitizen learns to walk away from the immigration agent and refuses to answer his questions? This is a likely scenario because immigrant rights groups advise their clients to maintain a code of silence when they encounter “la migra.”19 Would immigrants then have a privacy expectation to refuse questions and even to walk away from ICE? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Except in very limited circumstances, ICE is conducting this latest wave of raids with easy access to civil warrants in a way that expands the scope of its law enforcement power, compelling mandatory compliance . Today, DHS’s regulatory arm reaches into employer hiring practices,20 university requirements for foreign students,21 the government’s distribution of public benefits,22 and driver’s licenses,23 among other areas. In turn, this preoccupation has caused the proliferation of databases that, in most cases, grant ICE easy access to information about a person’s immigration status as a worker,24 student, 25 or driver.26 With easy access to such information in these databases, ICE can arm itself with civil warrants even where there is no particularized probable cause , to conduct raids in private or quasiprivate spaces without having to seek the information directly from immigrants themselves. These warrants name no suspects. Rather, they are issued precisely to allow ICE to identify and arrest persons for removal or to charge them for criminal immigration violations. Indeed, ICE agents have employed this strategy in the latest wave of workplace raids.27 Moreover, ICE has easy access to more than 600,000 civil warrants to enforce against persons with prior removal orders who are labeled absconders or fugitives and who appear in their outdated databases.28 While such “absconder warrants” target a particular suspect, their execution is no different than the indiscriminate targeting of immigrants that occurs in workplace raids. For example, despite the fact that the target often no longer lives at the address that appears in the database, no oversight occurs to protect third parties from privacy invasions. Not surprisingly then, ICE strategically enforces these warrants in people’s homes to arrest as many persons who may be in the country without authorization, often relying on racial profiling and intimidating tactics in the process .29

The Fourth Amendment fails to protect immigrants at the border---encounters are simply deemed as nonsearchesRaquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf In this battle, not unlike the “war on drugs,” which disproportionately targeted blacks,12 a casualty has been noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Fourth Amendment applied to immigration enforcement , even if with

increased tolerance for racial profiling.13 However, as discussed in this Article, through a subsequent the Fourth Amendment has become moribund, barely able to grant any privacy protections to noncitizens , particularly in the realm of immigration enforcement series of sweeping decisions,.

One significant explanation for this Fourth Amendment exceptionalism is the Court’s early treatment of immigration as a matter of civil as opposed to criminal enforcement .14 The characterization of immigration enforcement as administrative has colored the

evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. In particular, by characterizing removal proceedings as nonpenal, the Court has, since 1984, precluded the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary remedy, except within the narrow “egregious violations” exception.15 Moreover, the application of the consent doctrine in immigration enforcement under the most coercive circumstances increasingly defies the fictional premise that reasonable people feel free to walk away from law enforcement encounters. In

immigration encounters, Fourth Amendment doctrine assumes the reasonable person is free to refuse questions of immigration agents at immigration checkpoints .16 That same assumption applies during unannounced workplace raids conducted by dozens of armed immigration agents, some of whom question workers while others guard the exits;17 or even during the execution of administrative warrants in a person’s home while she is handcuffed for more than two hours.18 The resulting picture is that when immigration agents target immigrants inside the border, the Fourth Amendment offers little protection . Immigrants are unprotected either because the exclusionary rule has no application in removal proceedings , or even when the exclusionary rule applies, as in criminal proceedings, most of those encounters are deemed nonseizures and nonsearches.

Probable reason becomes manipulated for immigrants--- privacy is eliminated Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf These civil immigration warrants are neither very different from nor less offensive to liberty values than the general warrants that originally inspired the Fourth Amendment. The infamous general search warrants in early U.S. history were issued by executives and legislators, without judicial intervention, with neither a probable cause requirement or oath, nor a description of the particular places to be searched and persons or things to be seized.34 Today, immigration laws and codes authorize the compelled collection of information on ever-expanding databases over which persons retain no expectation of privacy and that become the basis for the issuance of warrants . Moreover, the Camara35 legacy of balancing government regulatory powers against individual liberty interests36 has validated the use of indiscriminate warrants to conduct immigration raids for decades.37 The principle mischief of the Fourth Amendment balancing

doctrine is that it has redefined the probable cause requirement as one of a flexible inquiry of reasonableness , rather than requiring probable cause to fulfill the prerequisite of reasonableness.38 Judicial preapproval becomes a mere procedural formality when warrants do not require particularized suspicion based on probable cause. In the immigration context particularly, the Fourth Amendment scale has tilted heavily in favor of the state. The trend toward eliminating noncitizens’ expectations of privacy in the spaces they occupy inside the border cannot be detached from the ongoing war against undocumented migration . Local governments’ interests in

protecting the economy or the federal government’s interest in controlling immigration or national security weigh heavily against the privacy interests of undocumented immigrants to hide their “illegality.” Increasingly, local and federal laws have sought to make the mere presence of undocumented immigrants in U.S. spaces illegal, rendering them neither deserving nor reasonably expectant of privacy’s protection.39 Like cars40 or certain “heavily regulated” businesses,41 immigrants have become so regulated that any Katz42 expectation of privacy to occupy spaces in silence without detection becomes unreasonable

Immigration RaidsRaids are often issued on flawed information--- it wrongly devastates families Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf Immigration raid abuses include the issuance of civil warrants that are not substantiated on particularized probable cause . Instead, the warrants are often issued based on flawed information contained in databases whose information was

never intended to have a law enforcement purpose.56 These abuses also include the dragnet-like and intimidating execution of warrants in people’s homes and in the workplace with devastating effects on families and communities.57 Still more abuses include the racially charged nature that has always characterized immigration law enforcement.58 Yet, courts have mostly turned a blind eye to these abuses by pretending that removal is not punishment, ignoring the fact that raids carry criminal consequences for many, or, worse yet, allowing the “illegality” of those arrested to justify law enforcement’s wrongdoing.

Workplace raids increasing now--- authorities appeal to theft crimes and terror Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf Immigration worksite raids have occurred for decades .73 In the past, complaints by government, employers, and civil rights groups of economic disruption and violations of civil liberties had convinced immigration officials to shift their efforts to immigration enforcement near the border and at checkpoints.74 Recently, however, the landscape for worksite immigration enforcement has changed. In 2006, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made worksite enforcement a priority, announcing in April 2006 a nationwide immigration enforcement strategy that would aggressively target employers who knowingly or recklessly hire undocumented workers.75 ICE’s new worksite enforcement strategy, begun in eleven major U.S. cities, adopts a comprehensive approach focusing on how undocumented workers enter the country and obtain identity documents, as well as targeting employers who knowingly hire such workers.76 As a result of this strategy, the number of persons arrested in the workplace for being unable to prove legal immigration status jumped nearly tenfold since 2002 to 4,385 in fiscal year 2006. 77 In addition, an increasing number of persons arrested during workplace raids are criminally prosecuted and face felony criminal charges with a real threat of jail time for violating immigration or other U.S. laws principally related to identity theft. In 2006, for example, that number was 716 of the total arrests (sixteen percent), up from only twenty-five in 2002 (five percent).78 In fact, ICE today is effectively, even if deceivingly,79 appealing to identity theft concerns , as well as to the image of foreigners as potential terrorists. This appeal increases the level of tolerance for civil rights erosions , especially of privacy interests . Consider, for example, Chertoff’s remarks in defense of worksite raids: [Document fraud] is a serious problem not only with respect to illegal immigration, but with respect to national security. And that’s precisely the point made by the 9/11 Commission a couple of years ago, because illegal documents are not only used by illegal migrants, but they are used by terrorists who want to get on airplanes, or criminals who want to prey on our citizens. And so, as part of this overall strategy of worksite enforcement, we’ve gotten very focused on the question of those who exploit illegal documents and identity theft in order to pursue illegal acts. So yesterday’s enforcement action [in the Swift Co. raids] demonstrates another step in this work site

enforcement strategy. A tough stance against worksites that employ illegal aliens and against individuals and organizations that commit or facilitate identity theft or fraud.80These workplace immigration raids are representative of Fourth Amendment exceptionalism for immigrant workers in the United States. It is not that the Fourth Amendment has no application in this context, but rather that privacy expectations about immigration status in the workplace have been eroded . Such erosion occurs through statutes authorizing the creation of databases from which ICE has easy access to obtain civil warrants to conduct raids without particularized suspicion. Unions representing some of the workers arrested during the Swift & Co. raids have filed complaints alleging, inter alia, Fourth Amendment violations when ICE arrested a large group of workers without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion.81 The likely success of the litigation, however, is quite narrow even for workers who may have a remedy in criminal proceedings. Fourth Amendment violations will be difficult to establish under current Fourth Amendment doctrine. The threshold for a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy in a worker’s immigration status is likely quite high in light of the heavily regulated nature of workplace immigration enforcement that allows unregulated databases, compels employer “collaboration,” and sanctions general warrants.

Warrants are often incorrect--- faulty recordkeeping and address changes aren't reported Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf The apprehension teams arresting “priority” absconders comprised both immigration and FBI agents,192 though ICE alone has conducted the most recent raids. The apprehension teams procured warrants to execute the raids based on information compiled on each absconder from their immigration records. At least some of the information gathered from the arrests was then entered into a criminal database.193 Unfortunately, much of the information that forms the basis for these fugitive warrants is unreliable . Immigration agencies have been notorious for atrocious record-keeping and faulty databases , including errors in removal order files.194

Several other factors also result in incorrect records. First, many of the removal orders date back years,195 which increases the probability that persons other than the person subject to the removal order live at the address when the warrant is finally executed. Second, DHS relies on the addresses provided by noncomplying immigrants, who often move to avoid immigration authorities. Third, address changes reported to immigration agencies often are not recorded in the databases .196 In addition, many persons in the databases are not even aware of their removal orders because notice was sent to the incorrect address or because DHS never gave the immigrant notice of her removal order.197 As a result, the administrative warrants are often issued on the basis of incorrect information about the person’s place of residence,198 or against people who do not know they have a removal order at all.

Post-Immigration SurveillanceThe government surveils noncitizens post-immigration and deports them Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrIn recent decades, however, the regulation of immigration after noncitizens have entered the United States has increased dramatically. In part, post-entry enforcement serves as an extension of regulation of the territorial border, intended to apprehend noncitizens who are unlawfully present. Under what Daniel Kanstroom terms an “extended border control ” model of enforcement, officials seek to deport not only unlawful entrants but also the many individuals—estimated in recent years to comprise between forty and fifty percent of all unauthorized migrants—who lawfully enter as temporary nonimmigrants and then overstay or otherwise violate their terms of admission.57 But Congress also has fashioned a second model of deportation by expanding the bases upon which individuals who are lawfully present may be “ delegalized” and deported for post-entry conduct . 58 The trend toward this model of what Kanstroom calls “post- entry social control” has been particularly severe for individuals with post- entry criminal convictions.59 Until the 1980s, only a limited number of serious crimes rendered noncitizens deportable, and in most instances, those individuals could seek discretionary relief from deportation. Since 1988, however, Congress has steadily (and at times retroactively) expanded the list of criminal deportability grounds to include a broad range of comparatively minor crimes, including a variety of misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies, and has sharply narrowed eligibility for discretionary relief.60The consequences have been transformative, as federal officials now place unprecedented emphasis on direct post-entry enforcement within the United States. Over half of all individuals removed in recent years have been deported from inside the United States.61 Since 1999, deportation of individuals with criminal convictions has been the government’s highest stated interior enforcement priority, and the number of individuals removed on criminal grounds has increased accordingly.62 Of the 391,000 individuals removed in 2011, almost half had a prior conviction , compared to three percent in 1986.63 Moreover, as the U.S. economy has slumped since 2008 and the number of unauthorized migrants has dropped—and as southwestern border enforcement strategies have increasingly emphasized criminal prosecution rather than immediate expulsion—the number of informal, “voluntary” returns without formal removal orders, which typically occur at or near the territorial border, has plummeted.64 As a result of these shifts, lawfully present noncitizens have become immigration enforcement targets to a greater extent than ever before, and the number of formal removals arising from interior enforcement activities now significantly dwarfs the number of informal returns arising from apprehensions at or near the territorial border.65

Ankle Braces/TrackingAnkle bracelets used to track immigrants subjects them to scrutiny. Maria Sacchetti 2013, has a masters in Latin American studies and covers immigration for Merto Desk, “Program to track immigrants grows, drawing scrutiny,” Boston Globe, 03/17/ 2013, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/03/16/monitor/A6e2Hxv3hRAOJufFLqT7QN/story.html#Behind a smoky-glass door, a private company called BI Incorporated monitors immigrants facing deportation with office visits, surprise home inspections, and even GPS devices attached to their ankles, making sure they show up for immigration court or their final departure.∂ The program has boomed in recent years as deportations soared, and the White House has proposed expanding such monitoring because it is less expensive and more humane than immigration detention. But advocates for immigrants, who

have clamored for alternatives to jail, now say the program has morphed into a profit-driven enterprise that subjects thousands of immigrants to scrutiny usually reserved for serious criminals .∂ “I don’t know why they put it on me. I’ve done everything they’ve asked,” said Norma Urbina, a petite 40-year-old seamstress from Honduras who has worn a GPS ankle monitor for more than a year, though she has no criminal record. “I have four children. Where am I going to go?” ∂ Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Homeland Security agency in charge of deportations, said the program seeks to compel immigrants to obey court and deportation orders; a decade ago, the vast majority did not. BI said in a recent report that 96 percent of participants attended their final court hearings and 77 percent showed up for deportation.∂ An ICE spokesman said federal immigration agents oversee the program and make key decisions, such as whether an immigrant should be supervised by BI or wear an ankle monitor.∂ “All decisions regarding the level of supervision required for individuals in removal proceedings are made on a case by case basis, in order to ensure that ICE maintains sufficient resources to detain serious criminal offenders and other individuals who pose a serious or significant threat to public safety,” said ICE spokesman Ross Feinstein.∂ BI, which stands for Behavioral Interventions, says its program costs less than $8 a day compared with $119 a day to keep an immigrant in jail. In 2009, ICE awarded BI a five-year contract worth $372.8 million.

Ankle monitoring is cruel and unusual punishment and has negative effects. Maria Sacchetti 2013, has a masters in Latin American studies and covers immigration for Merto Desk, “Program to track immigrants grows, drawing scrutiny,” Boston Globe, 03/17/ 2013, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/03/16/monitor/A6e2Hxv3hRAOJufFLqT7QN/story.html#In the last year, federal judges ordered fewer than 1 percent of convicted criminals released on supervision to wear the monitors, according to the courts. In Massachusetts, fewer than 3 percent of criminals on probation, including sex offenders by law, and 5 percent of parolees, wear the monitors.∂ “It’s not appropriate to have intensive supervision and especially GPS devices for people who pose very little flight risk,” said Megan Bremer, a lawyer with Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service in Baltimore. “There are other ways.”∂ Bremer and others said immigration officials could get results with phone calls, some home visits, and helping immigrants plan to leave the United States. Others also favor referring immigrants to legal aid, transportation, and other services that help them comply with the law.∂ Advocates for immigrants say the monitoring traumatizes immigrants and their children . Immigrants hide the blinking ankle monitors under their clothes. Winter boots cannot fit over the bulky devices,

so some slog through the snow in wet sneakers. At night, they sleep plugged into the wall to charge the devices. Some become withdrawn, even suicidal .∂

Ralph Isenberg, a Texas real estate developer turned immigration activist, has financed multiple lawsuits against ICE for attaching the monitors to immigrants, calling the practice “cruel and unusual punishment .” He said he is trying to get ICE to remove a GPS device from a disabled woman in Oregon.∂ “These monitors are the most demeaning, shameful things that I think I’ve ever experienced,” Isenberg said. “These things are not being put on hardened criminals. They’re being put on housewives.”

Restrict Data CollectionImmigration data collect should be limited and constrained. Anil Kalhan 2013, Associate Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 12/14/ 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfTo begin with, automated immigration policing invites reassessment of the interests at stake when personal information is collected, maintained, processed, and disseminated for immigration enforcement purposes and the mechanisms to protect those interests.207 As I have explored elsewhere, the proliferation of zones in society in which immigration enforcement takes place, and where immigration status has become visible, salient, and subject to pervasive ∂ monitoring, carries a range of social costs.208 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for immigration enforcement purposes in some contexts and subject to certain constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in society in which immigration surveillance activities do not take place, and in making sure that when they do take place they are appropriately limited and constrained.∂ To some extent, those interests stem from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when immigration status is routinely monitored.209 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and information management.210 In the immigration enforcement context, the importance of constraining those aggregations of power is heightened by the particular vulnerabilities of noncitizens facing removal proceedings and the limited extent to which their interests are afforded meaningful protections in the immigration enforcement and removal process.211

Border DronesThe DHS has plans to expand its use of drones over the US-Mexico border Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrDespite implementation challenges, Congress and DHS have placed new surveillance technologies at the heart of border control strategies.162 Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have been supplemented with advanced lighting, motion sensors, remote cameras, and mobile surveillance systems, and DHS has deployed a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor coastal areas and land borders.163 To date, these drones primarily have been used to locate illegal border crossers and individuals suspected of drug trafficking in remote areas using ultra high-resolution cameras, thermal detection sensors, and other surveillance technologies.164 However, drones also have been used to patrol and monitor activities within Mexico itself . 165 In addition, government

documents indicate that DHS’s drones are capable of intercepting wireless communications and may

eventually incorporate facial recognition technology linked to the agency’s identification databases.166 According to one official, CBP’s drones can “scan large swaths of land from 20,000 feet up in the air while still being able to zoom in so close that footprints can be seen on the ground.”167 The DHS has plans both to expand its fleet of drones and to increase their surveillance capabilities , and immigration reform proposals in Congress would significantly build upon these recent expansions.168

Domestic use of drones causes radical operational change in border surveillanceRoger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, “BORDERWORLD: HOW THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY”, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-security-bordersAt that point, though, technology would continue to play a ma jor role. Indeed, it would most likely be every bit as transformative for border operations as air power was in military affairs. Borkowski singled out the domestic use of unmanned aerial systems as having the most potential for radical operational change. SBInet might have failed, but the idea behind it was sound: watching as much of the border as possible, all the time. A drone has a different, but complementary, mission: targeted surveillance. "A UAV can get somewhere fast, and can stay there," he said—far longer than a conventional aircraft—"but it looks through a soda straw. Different purpose. Different mission." Leaning forward on his desk, Borkowski was quick to credit his fellow assistant commissioner Michael Kostelnik, the retired Air Force general who runs OAM, for pushing the deployment of drones along the border and elsewhere. OAM has been operating Predators in domestic airspace for six years now and is using them in many situations that have little or nothing to do with border security, notably in disaster-recovery missions after hurricanes, fires and floods, but also in what Kostelnik (at a border summit I later attended in El Paso) called "pop up" missions responding to contingent homeland-security situations. For routine border missions, OAM operates its unmanned aircraft with a

certificate of authorization from the FAA that permits it to fly them over the entire southwestern border, as well as the Gulf Coast as far east as New Orleans and the northern border from Spokane, Washington, to the western end of the Great Lakes. The agency also has transit certificates that allow it to fly drones across the country from one area of operations to another. The FAA will not yet permit OAM drones to fly over large metropolitan areas on a routine basis, but Kostelnik said his agency can now secure an emergency authorization and within a day put a Predator drone in the sky anywhere in the country.

Employment Immigrants' data are collected by employers to verify them with the DHS database--- failure to identify leads to de-authorization to workAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrEmployment Eligibility Verification. The process by which employers verify whether their new hires are eligible to work in the United States is undergoing a significant

transformation with the implementation of USCIS’s E-Verify system . Under this pilot

program, which was first authorized and initiated during the 1990s, employers collect personal information from the identification and work authorization documents that employees already must present under the existing, paper-based verification process and submit that information through the online E-Verify system. The system then attempts to match the individual’s data with records contained in databases maintained by DHS, the State Department, and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in order to determine whether the individual is authorized to work in the United States . If the system

finds a match, then the employer is informed that the individual is authorized to work. If there is no match, or there are discrepancies between the information submitted and the database records, the system will issue a “tentative non-confirmation” and direct the employer to refer the employee to either DHS or SSA to resolve the issue. If the issue is not resolved within eight days, the employer will be informed that the individual is not authorized to work.200While formally still a pilot program that remains voluntary for most employers, E-Verify has grown extensively in the past ten years due to a series of federal, state, and local mandates. In 2008, the Bush Administration mandated the system’s use by federal contractors and subcontractors, and the Obama Administration has maintained the requirement.201 In addition, while some states have sought to limit the system’s use by employers within their jurisdictions, a growing number of states and localities have mandated its use by various categories of employers.202 Leading reform proposals would dramatically extend the reach of this system —not only by requiring all employers to use E-Verify but also by enhancing the system to incorporate biometric identification mechanisms and, potentially, by making the employment verification system interoperable with other database systems.203

The No-Match laws force employers to fire more immigrants Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf Additionally, the SSA has been sending so-called No-Match letters, about 130,000 every year ,103 which provide employers with a list of employees whose names or SSNs on their Wage and Tax Statement (Form W-2) do not match SSA records.104 The SSA’s stated purpose for this letter is to correct errors in its database, not to provide employers grounds for firing an employee or reporting him to immigration authorities .105 However, some employers fire employees or report them to ICE out

of fear that not doing so could make them liable for knowingly hiring undocumented workers or subject to IRS fines. 106 In reality, employers face neither IRS107 nor IRCA liability when they receive SSA No-Match letters.108 However, in June 2006, ICE issued proposed rules regarding an employer’s legal obligations upon receiving a No-Match letter.109 The rule would allow ICE to use an employer’s failure to act after receipt of these letters as evidence that the employer had “constructive knowledge” of an employee’s work ineligibility.110 Under the proposed rules, an employer must fire a worker with a No-Match SSA letter if within ninety days that worker has failed to rectify the mistake.111 Failure to do so could lead to stiff civil sanctions, $10,000 per violation, or prosecution . 112 On August 10, 2007, Secretary Chertoff and Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez in a joint press conference presented a new immigration enforcement plan that includes the new SSA No-Match rule, which took effect in September 2007.113 This move is very likely to provoke employers to fire even more , or report immediately to ICE, employees identified in SSA No-Match letters.114

Description of TechImmigration control serves as the leading edge for biometric surveillance Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrInfused with this national security significance—and substantial resources, as a result—immigration authorities have implemented a complex and far-reaching set of identification systems.118 Officials now collect large quantities of personal information about both noncitizens and U.S. citizens in a variety of different contexts. In line with the September 11 Commission’s recommendations—but building upon nascent initiatives already under way before the 2001 terrorist attacks—these systems collect not only biographic data but also biometric identifiers, which are “unique markers that identify or verify the identity of people using intrinsic physical or behavioral characteristics,” such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans, DNA, palm prints, hand vein scans, or voice prints.119 Based on the supposition that automated biometric processes enable efficient and highly accurate identification of individuals, their use has exploded since 2001, with immigration control serving as a leading edge of this trend.120Immigration authorities store this biographic and biometric information in a growing system of interoperable databases. At the core of this database network is DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”), which INS originally developed to help the Border Patrol identify and track individuals unlawfully crossing the U.S.–Mexico border. Today, IDENT is used for a much broader variety of immigration and security-related functions and constitutes the main DHS-wide biographic and biometric information system.121 Growing at a rate of ten million new entries per year, IDENT holds records on over 160 million subjects who have had any contact with DHS, other agencies, and even other governments—including visa applicants at U.S. embassies and consulates, noncitizens traveling to and from the United States, noncitizens applying for immigration benefits (including asylum), unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border or at sea, suspected immigration law violators encountered or arrested within the United States, and even U.S. citizens enrolled in DHS’s registered traveler programs or who have adopted children from abroad. Given its data collection and retention practices, IDENT also contains fingerprint records for many naturalized U.S. citizens who were fingerprinted before naturalizing and lawfully present noncitizens.122 At the same time, IDENT does not include records of noncitizens who have never had any contact with DHS, such as those who entered the United States without inspection.123

Border control aggregates data from different sources in order to assess the risk of an individualAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrOther systems aggregate and analyze information from a multiplicity of sources to furnish automated, probabilistic risk assessments to officials in real time, with the goal of identifying unknown individuals whose names might not be listed in immigration, criminal records, or antiterrorism databases, but whose information matches previously identified profiles and who therefore are deemed to warrant closer scrutiny. For example, CBP’s Automated Targeting System (“ATS”), a

“decision support tool” originally developed by the U.S. Customs Service to screen cargo for illegal drugs and other contraband, aggregates detailed information about all travelers entering and leaving the United States and assesses the risks presented by each of them in order to identify and prioritize individuals deemed to warrant greater attention by CBP border inspectors.137 The ATS analyzes information collected from a wide variety of different sources, including information collected from transportation carriers about travelers and information contained in a broad array of other government databases.138 For domestic flights, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (“CAPPS”) operated by the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) performs a similar role.139

The government even surveils the transportation and mobility of immigrantsAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrThe proliferation of settings in which immigration enforcement activities take place also has given rise to extensive government monitoring and control over travel and mobility of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens. In the wake of the 2001 attacks, travel itself has been deemed a source of potential danger to public safety: in the words of the September 11 Commission, “Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money.”144 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that border screening systems be integrated into a broader network of screening systems covering transportation and other sensitive facilities.145 Government authorities have invested heavily to develop and upgrade systems that collect, analyze, store, and disseminate detailed information about individuals’ mobility and travel plans—both internationally and domestically, and including both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.146 These travel and mobility tracking systems have been developed within a broader context in which the government’s capacity to undertake day-to-day location tracking, using GPS systems, cellular telephone location data, automated license plate readers, and other mechanisms, has also been significantly enhanced.147 In combination with authorization mechanisms that restrict travel for certain individuals, these systems have enabled a comprehensive regime that accumulates and stores detailed, permanent records about individual travel histories and patterns, and enables much individual travel, both international and domestic, only to take place upon receipt of affirmative, advance government permission.148Several information systems enable this regime of mass surveillance and control of travel and mobility. As discussed below, CBP collects several categories of personal and travel information from transportation carriers, computerized reservation systems, other government agencies, and directly from individual travelers using a variety of mechanisms— beginning before individuals commence their travel and extending through completion of the inspection process at the port of entry. This information is stored within a series of database systems—but even when it does not store information in its own systems on travel and mobility, DHS has required transportation carriers to provide real time access to obtain this information directly from their reservation and departure control systems.149 In addition, the new e-passports have the technical capacity to include an archive of the holder’s travel history, although to date this feature has not been activated for U.S. passports.

Surveillance technology constantly advancing Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, “BORDERWORLD: HOW THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY”,

http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-security-bordersSmugglers are often stupid, and sometimes they are greedy. They are just as frequently ingenious, however.The Rio Grande Valley sector employs dozens of Remote Video Surveillance Systems, most of which are on fixed towers. Each RVSS is made up of four cameras, two of which are infrared for night duty. The agents who are assigned to camera duty in the control room zoom and pan the cameras as needed. At night they can manipulate the contrast of the infrared video, shifting from "black hot" to "white hot," rewinding and forwarding through the digital file as needed to identify what is often merely a fleeting glimpse of an unidentified animal, possibly human. Sources of thermal energy abound. Rocks, concrete blocks and even the plants radiate heat, but warm-blooded animals stand out most vividly, and they move. A seismic sensor buried alongside an active trail detects foot traffic and transmits its radio signal to the command center. Such unmanned ground sensors have been used for decades, but engineers continue to reduce their size and increase their sensitivity. Border Patrol agents have placed some 11,000 sensors along the U.S. border, and they move them constantly in an effort to keep up with the ever-shifting traffic patterns along the infinitely forking paths that radiate outward from the line.

Other Stuff

TourismBorder security kills tourism from Mexico to the USEdward Alden 12, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2012, “Immigration and Border Control”, Cato Journal, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-8.pdf Third, increased border control efforts have not just discouraged illegal border crossers, but legal travelers as well. Tourism, business travel, crossings at the land borders, and other legal entries into the United States have all been flat or falling over the past decade. Skilled immigrants have been discouraged and sought out more hospitable countries. The economic costs of these declines have never been measured in any comprehensive way, but they are certainly large. The questions for Congress and the Obama administration in the near future ought to be these: What are the goals of border control? How much is enough? How much can we afford? How can the economic costs of tighter border enforcement best be mitigated? How can better legal immigration and temporary work programs help to reduce further the illegal migration problem? Unfortunately, in the current political environment such questions are not being asked. Instead, Congress and the administration continue to be focused on the elusive goal of creating a perfectly secure border through enforcement measures alone.

Border BudgetThe massive increase of surveillance doubles the border budget Roger D. Hodge 12, former editor of Harper's Magazine, 1/17/12, “BORDERWORLD: HOW THE U.S. IS REENGINEERING HOMELAND SECURITY”, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/how-us-reengineering-homeland-security-borders My initial question was relatively simple: How does the border work? What devices and systems have we invented to secure a 1,954-mile international boundary—of river valleys and canyons, mountains, deserts and vibrant communities straddling both sides of the line—that people have crossed more or less freely for hundreds of years? What I discovered, over weeks and months of reporting, is that no real agreement exists among policymakers about how to define the border itself. Is it an obstruction or a conduit? A military domain or a civil and commercial one? Is it meant to join communities or keep them apart? I searched in vain among the pronouncements of our political leaders for clarification of such questions. What was once little more than a line on a map has become a theater of operations. Despite this ambiguity—or perhaps as a result of it—the federal government has since 2003 doubled the flow of funds to Customs and Border Protection, the division of the Department of Homeland Security with primary responsibility for policing the border. CBP, which encompasses the Border Patrol, has in turn deployed increasingly advanced means not only to scrutinize, search out, and seize an immense stream of drugs and bodies (to use CBP parlance), but also to channel a concomitant river of data—electronic manifests, lists of travelers' names, dates of entry, and untold terabytes of video footage—all of which must be analyzed, quantified, indexed, and stored. Technologies of surveillance and control all aim to achieve a perspectival advantage over some adversary, but the vast quantities of data produced by these devices threaten to overload the system, thus defeating the original goal. Fusing those rivers of data into a comprehensive and intuitively manageable real-time graphical interface, for instance, had been one of the foremost aims of the Secure Border Initiative Network, or SBInet, the federal government's doomed mega-contract with Boeing to build a "virtual fence" along the nation's borders. In January 2011, after five years of effort and more than $1 billion had yielded a mere 53 miles of partially operative tactical infrastructure in southern Arizona, the Department of Homeland Security canceled SBInet. It was not yet clear what would take its place. Despite the failure of SBInet, the border is increasingly defined not by geography or war or acts of Congress, but innovation. Border-control assets—from radar blimps to Predator drones to virtual fences and other military-grade surveillance machines—are evolving rapidly, if imperfectly, and with them so is the border itself. What was once little more than a line on a map has become a theater of operations.

Random Offcase Answers

AT: TopicalityInterpretation: Surveillance is systematic monitoring to sort populations John Gilliom 13, Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean in the College of Arts and Sciences at Ohio University, "SuperVision: An Introduction to the Surveillance Society," P. 2the systematic monitoring , gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations , and exercise power

Automatic immigration policing is surveillanceAnil Kalhan 13, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, JD, Yale Law School, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 74(6), 2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/14-Kalhan.pdfSecure Communities illustrates a broader, technology-based shift toward what I refer to as automated immigration policing. Automated immigration policing initiatives deploy interoperable database systems and other technologies to automate and routinize the identification and apprehension of potentially deportable noncitizens in the course of ordinary law enforcement encounters and other moments of day-to-day life.13 While scholars and advocates have devoted critical attention to these programs, the full significance of this shift remains underappreciated. Observers primarily have analyzed these initiatives as extensions, in degree, of previous federal efforts to enlist state and local police assistance, emphasizing analogous questions, costs, and benefits.14 In this Article, I take a complementary but different approach. Automated immigration policing does not simply effect a massive increase in the number of state and local law enforcement officials involved in immigration policing— although as I discuss, it certainly does that, on an enormous scale. More fundamentally, as a leading edge of what I

conceptualize elsewhere as an emerging surveillance regime , automated immigration policing contributes to a broader transformation in kind that renders immigration status visible, accessible, and salient in more legal and social domains than ever before, and subject to routine monitoring and screening by a wide range of public and private actors.15 By using technology to make determinations of immigration status and the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration enforcement purposes automatic, widespread, and continuous, automated immigration policing effects a basic shift in the nature of both “immigration federalism” and ordinary law enforcement activities.16 As such, the implementation of these new initiatives raises questions analogous to those arising from other forms of technology-based

surveillance and dataveillance that “monitor[] people in order to regulate and govern their behavior .”

AT: Immigrants Dangerous DATurn: Immigrants commit less crimes than their US-born counterparts--- make cities safer Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," Also, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, the evidence suggests that those newly arrived are the least likely to commit crimes , meaning immigrants may in fact make U.S. cities safer . As noted by New York Times columnist David Brooks (and backed up with research by

Harvard professor Robert Sampson, among others), “as [U.S.] immigration has surged, violent crime has fallen 57 percent .” 71 These and other studies find that immigrants commit fewer crimes than American-born whites or African Americans, and not by small margins. First-generation Hispanic immigrants are 45 percent less likely than third-generation and above native-born Americans to commit violent crimes; second-generation Hispanic immigrants are 22 percent less likely to run afoul of the law. 72 Incarceration rates for young immigrant men are also lower : in 2000, they were five times less likely to be behind bars than their U.S.-born counterparts. 73

AT: Terror DA---No ThreatTerrorist threats on border minimal Tom Barry 11, senior policy analyst and director of CIP's TransBorder Project, specializes in immigration policy, homeland security, border security, and the outsourcing of national security, co-founded the International Relations Center (IRC), and joined CIP in 2007, 6/1/11, “Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control”, http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/failures-of-border-security-and-new-directions-for-border-controlDespite the border security buildups and a hundred billion dollars spent along the southwestern border, no terrorists or terrorist weapons have been seized. DHS does point out, however, that every year it regularly apprehends illegal border crossers from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. Those apprehended are mostly from Cuba, with single digit numbers from Iran, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. Border security hawks point to these arrests of citizens from “special interest countries” as evidence that the “broken border” keeps Americans vulnerable and that the border should be completely sealed.6 Ten years after the federal government undertook a new commitment to homeland security and border security, the nation deserves to know what the tens of millions of dollars spent on securing the southwestern border have accomplished. Before more tax dollars are dedicated to border security, we need new policy frameworks for immigration and illegal drugs that disaggregate these issues from homeland and national security. This report looks at the evolution of border security policy and the persisting failures. Starting with a brief review of border and immigration policies prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, the report then moves to the 21st century and the launch of the border security bandwagon of budget increases and alarmism spurred by the new security framework for border control operations. The new security rhetoric has not been accompanied by more narrowly and strategically focused border operations. Instead, illegal immigrants and illegal drugs are the continuing target of the border security buildup. “Policy on the Edge” concludes with eight recommendations for a more effective, more sharply focused and less expensive U.S. border policy.

AT: Terror DA---Border Control FailsBorder Control does not work--- records prove Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," Ignoring the multiple and wide-ranging factors behind rising Mexican immigration, the United States fixated on the border. Throughout the 1990s, operations Hold the Line (El Paso, Texas), Gatekeeper (San Diego, California), Safeguard (Nogales, Arizona), and Rio Grande (southeast Texas) poured billions of dollars into fences, lights, surveillance cameras, and manpower to stop these sojourners. After September 11, 2001, the federal government struggled to expand these local lockdowns along the entire border. The new U.S. Department of Homeland Security whisked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) away from the Justice Department and rechristened it the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This functioned alongside an ever-growing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The 2006 Secure Fence Act promised literally to steel the line for some 700 border miles, while the Secure Border Initiative pledged sophisticated technology to defend the other roughly 1300 miles. The same year, Operation Jumpstart sent six thousand National Guard members to the southwest. Over the next four years, U.S. Border Patrol agents more than doubled to twenty thousand, and the annual budget rose to over US$3 billion.8 By 2010, the federal government even deployed Predator drones—the type used in Iraq and Afghanistan—to patrol the southern frontier.¶ What have been the results of all these actions? Apprehensions along the southern border rose in absolute terms—to a high of 1.6 million in 2000.9 Government officials heralded the success, but interviews showed that, at this peak, four out of every five migrants still made it across—pretty good odds.10 Those that got caught the first time usually just tried again. Starting in 2005, the number stopped at the border began to fall. By 2010, apprehensions were less than half the 2000 peak, matching numbers last seen in the early 1970s.11 Again the Border Patrol touted the achievement, citing the deterrent effect. Yet the decline seems to match just as directly to the shifts in the U.S. and Mexican economies and societies. Surveys of crossers suggest that those who try to get across generally do, even with the surge in manpower, technology, and steel.12 David Aguilar, former head of the Border Patrol, admitted that the fence only slows illegal immigrants by three or four minutes.13 Interviews show that aspiring crossers—well aware of the increased dangers—rarely change their minds. Even those who knew someone who died crossing were not deterred.14

AT: Terror DA---Border Surveillance FailsSurveillance systems are flawed and inefficient---4 reasons Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrAt the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant risks and concerns of their own. Studies indicate that decisionmaking when using computerized systems can be distorted by automation complacency and automation bias ,

two related phenomena in which individuals place too much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they suspect error or malfunction. When these phenomena are at work, individuals may regard these systems as resistant to error, fail to sufficiently monitor their operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and cues they provide.263 These risks may be exacerbated with large, complex networks of interoperable information systems like those used for immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization and maintenance present distinct challenges. As Erin Murphy describes, government databases are the “ultimate collaborative projects,” often involving multiple systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and exchange of information among many different actors over extended periods of time.264In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of information contained in the database systems used for immigration surveillance raise several distinct types of concerns. First, large database systems invariably contain inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant records, particularly as they grow larger and contain greater quantities of information. Fair information principles emphasize that personal data in government databases should be accurate, complete, and current.265 For decades, however, “immigration authorities have been criticized for maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records and inadequately managing their information systems.”266 While some improvements have been made, these concerns have persisted .For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation notices for a significant number of individuals, including both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work.267 Similarly, a GAO analysis of Secure Communities found that ICE had no record of the criminal arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under the program during 2011 and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates that a significant number of individuals are detained and placed into removal proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to be deportable.268 More recently, over one million immigrant families have experienced difficulties applying for health care coverage and insurance

subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with verification of their immigration or citizenship status.269Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible to large numbers of actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and quickly and can become even more difficult to correct.270 Outside of immigration agencies, other databases that are relied upon for immigration surveillance purposes suffer from similar data quality problems. For example, despite some recent improvements, criminal history records databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and incomplete.271 Improper deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate information in these database records remain common.272 Observers also have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose names have been added to watchlists generated by the TSDB, such as the No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms exist to remove names of innocent individuals from those lists.273Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term “database,” the use of these systems does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance of “factual”

information, whether accurate or otherwise. To the contrary, as discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and relied upon by enforcement actors necessarily incorporates analysis, risk assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human judgments at some stage. Those judgments may have been made directly, such as when individuals are identified for inclusion in the No Fly List, Selectee List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with the automated risk assessments made by systems like the ATS and CAPPS, whose evaluations and predictions are generated using algorithms that invariably embed human judgments, assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases.274 However, in either case, the nature of the data generated and distributed by government database systems—coupled with the opaque nature of the criteria for inclusion—can mask the subjective and evaluative judgments that underlie that information , making it seem more objectively factual to enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which immigration surveillance relies are not foolproof. For example, although automated fingerprint identification systems can be extremely accurate in determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing to technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes, and even the particular demographic groups in which the subjects are members.276 Advanced multimodal biometric identification systems that are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their own.277

Deprivations from fallible surveillance systems are rarely remediedAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrThe nature of immigration surveillance, however, limits the space for these human and institutional layers to function carefully and effectively— and given the enormous scale of immigration surveillance activities, even small error rates can result in very large numbers of individuals facing improper deprivations that are often left unremedied . While intended to eliminate improper discrimination, immigration surveillance mechanisms sometimes merely shift the point at which such discrimination takes place. With E-Verify, for example, employers often decline to hire individuals who receive tentative non-confirmations without properly notifying them— depriving these workers of employment without any opportunity to resolve errors in database records.281 Similarly, even as Secure Communities seeks to preclude police from any direct immigration policing role after individuals have been arrested, it empowers police to arrest individuals for the very purpose of booking them and having their immigration status screened—without regard to whether that arrest leads to any criminal prosecution. Evidence to date suggests that in some jurisdictions, this is precisely what has happened.282 With both of these systems, evidence suggests that these types of errors and deprivations fall disproportionately upon particular communities .283

Moreover, agencies involved in immigration surveillance are typically subject to limited oversight and deferential (if any) review . Accordingly, those agencies have few incentives to ensure that the records contained in their database systems are accurate, complete, and current. In addition, many of these systems are not governed or meaningfully constrained by any framework statutes . While the Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to ensure that government records of personal information are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete, the statute only applies to systems of records about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents .284 Moreover, even for records on those categories of individuals, the statute permits agencies to exempt records concerning law enforcement or national security from its coverage.285 While some individuals have filed lawsuits challenging their

improper inclusion in these database systems, the lack of transparency concerning the criteria and operations of these systems makes those legal challenges difficult . 286 While more accurate database systems would better serve these agencies’ own interests, the incentives for immigration control, law enforcement, and national security agencies to devote the resources necessary to ensure the accuracy and integrity of these databases on their own, without external oversight, are limited.287In short, the combination of database errors, automation-related biases, complex but time-pressured decisionmaking, massive volumes of identification and screening activities, fragmented responsibilities among different authorities, and laws and agency incentives that are misaligned with the goal of ensuring data accuracy and integrity can easily result in large numbers of improper denials of immigration-related authorizations in a variety of different contexts. In many instances, these deprivations fall disproportionately on particular groups.288 Especially given the lack of transparency and oversight mechanisms in these systems, the limited procedural protections and access to counsel afforded to noncitizens at all stages of the migration process, and the limited protections for U.S. citizens who are outside the United States or seeking to enter, the consequences of these fallibilities can be significant and difficult to remedy .

AT: Courts CPCan’t solve--- Court rulings on immigration is ambiguous--- side bias for immigration surveillance Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," In June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Arizona provisions that made it a state crime for immigrants not to carry papers at all times and for illegal immigrants to work, as well as the provision allowing state police to arrest suspected illegal immigrants without a warrant. But it upheld what many see as the most controversial part of the law —requiring law enforcement officers to check the status of anyone they stop or detain if they suspect them of being in the United States illegally. 18

AT: Privacy/Neolib KLink Turn: Border surveillance is rooted from neoliberal restructuring--- Surveillance is used to promote the state's economic freedom and social control--- Aff solves the link James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan, "From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance," Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3481/3435While an exhaustive discussion is beyond this paper’s scope, it is essential to note that globalization involves more than transnational mobilities, flows, and exchanges; it is equally defined by practices of gatekeeping, immobilization and exclusion. For many individuals, rather than ‘flexible citizenship’ (Ong 1999), the most striking trend of the last century has been the growth and increasingly preemptive, punitive, and technologically sophisticated nature of border control and surveillance. Such dynamics have resulted from neoliberal restructuring and the replacement of ‘managed capitalism’ with programs of socioeconomic deregulation and market rationality. Unable to provide safety, security, and certainty through redistributive and market interventions, states increasingly face anxious publics and patterns of social polarization and antagonism. In response, governmental agents have escalated the policing of boundaries, mobility, and ‘placement of people’ (Trouillet 2001) to preemptively identify and neutralize risks and ‘undesirable elements’. According to Garland (2001, 100), this trend has inverted the post-war political principles of ‘economic control and social liberation’ into ‘economic freedom and social control’ .

Perm do plan with privacy perceived as a collective right James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan, "From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance," Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3481/3435Additionally, the group’s agenda incompletely expresses the needs of migrants. Commenting on attempts to reduce questions of surveillance to matters of privacy and non-interference , many scholars argue that an uncritical deference to liberal individualism ignores the importance of substantive citizenship and active, public commitments to justice, egalitarianism, and respect . As observed in John Gilliom’s (2001) study of welfare

mothers, privacy advocates’ attempts to establish an autonomous, inaccessible ‘protected [and] non-public zone around the individual’ (120) risk endorsing ‘an uncaring world of neglect in which the most needy... are cut off from the support ...of a broader community’ (123). For the subjects of this study—poor migrants whose very existence is ‘unauthorized’—commitments to privacy and personal protections have little relevance to their experiences of marginalization and do little to bring about manifest improvements in their life chances.17According to Williams (2007, 31), more than protection from government encroachments, immigrants ‘need a language with which to make a case for their entitlement to...public life’. In this context, to comprehensively address injustice the frameworks of privacy, personal freedom,

and other abstract legal principles must be dovetailed into a broader social approach grounded in positive freedoms and collective recognition and obligations (Lyon 2001; Regan 1995). Absent such connections, merely upholding the freedom to be ‘left alone’ risks further entrenching contemporary patterns of social atomization. As the following indicates faith-based movements articulate a broader, more collective approach as they present spiritually grounded forms of cosmopolitanism rooted in human security and dignity.

Alt doesn't solve. A narrow mindset of surveillance fails to challenge authoritarianism James P. Walsh 10, Professor of Management and Organizations at University of Michigan, "From Border Control to Border Care: The Political and Ethical Potential of Surveillance," Surveillance and Society Vol 8 No. 2, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3481/3435By detailing and analyzing the use of often sophisticated observational practices by border activists, this article has highlighted interventions and actors left unexplored in extant work on surveillance, borders, and mobility. While the administration of territorial borders remains a significant instantiation of state authority central to the exercise and accumulation of political and symbolic power, treating the state as the exclusive agent of border surveillance or assuming that surveillance is inherently repressive endorses a narrow and undersocialized view of observational techniques and practices . Noting there is more to surveillance than initially meets the eye, this paper has advanced a broader definition, recognizing that observing, locating, and classifying may be conducted in the interest of protecting rights, redressing injustices, enabling democratic participation, buttressing moral criticism, and advocating for alternative practices. Further, this paper calls attention to the need to study surveillance as a dynamic and interactive process in which the boundaries between watcher and watched are often indeterminate and where, despite inequalities of power, subordinates are able to contest and challenge gatekeepers, order enforcers, and other formal authorities. Acknowledging this duality allows the researcher to venture beyond the empirically obvious, challenge excessively authoritarian accounts , and, most importantly, advance a publicly engaged brand of scholarship that explores surveillance’s empowering potential.

Visas CP Answers

Solvency DeficitsCan’t pass---The USFG and labor unions are against employment programsMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/These measures have drawn much criticism from the Mexican government and public, straining U.S.-Mexican relations. 217 Furthermore, the passage of these acts reflects Congress's and the U.S. public's perception that immigration from Mexico is a

threat to the national interest of the United States.218 It may be difficult to persuade voters and their representatives that a bilateral immigration agreement would prove beneficial. 219 Many in Mexico believe that "the existence of a powerful U.S. Congress and demands imposed on the U.S. executive by domestic interests still present the largest obstacles to bilateral cooperation. "220 The U.S. president is particularly constrained on immigration issues by labor interests. Labor interests today, including agricultural workers, continue to influence immigration policy-making. As discussed above, a new bilateral guest worker program may enjoy the support of the UFW, a largely Chicano farmworkers' union. 221

Nonetheless, other labor interests are likely to object to an employment immigration program with Mexico. It will be difficult to convince them that more guest workers would not threaten domestic laborers' wages and working conditions . Although unemployment in the general economy is very low,222 agricultural unemployment rates are nearly twice as high. 223 In 1998, 8.3% of hired farmworkers were unemployed. 224 In 1999, that rate increased slightly to 8.9%.225 These are major obstacles to any legalized foreign worker programs.

Bracero BadThe Bracero program attracted illegal immigrants, encouraged inadequate wages, and led to abused human rightsMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Even if circumstances today resemble the circumstances that existed when these bilateral agreements were created and a new bilateral agreement on Mexican immigration can be reached,

virtually all commentators agree that any new guest worker program requires substantial improvements over the Bracero model . 139 Although the 1951 agreement provided more protections for the bracero and domestic workers, the U.S. government did not enforce them adequately.l40 As one commentator put it, "'United States employers benefitted [sic] from a risk-free pool of menial labor.... And they determined all the working conditions, hours, wages, and living accommodations. ", 141 Particularly during the period of direct recruitment, but even after 1951, braceros received insufficient food and substandard housing , and suffered inadequate wages, unsafe working conditions, and unemployment during the contract periods. 142 Many even deserted their employers. 143

The U. S. government also ignored the provisions of the agreements intended to protect the domestic labor market. 144 Although, under Public Law 78, the secretary of labor was to certify

that the importation of foreign labor would not adversely affect wages and working conditions for domestic workers,145 in areas where braceros were concentrated, agricultural wages remained the same or fell . 146 Studies showed that growers deliberately used the Bracero Program to lower farm wages, and research linked the growers' inability to hire willing domestic laborers to the low wages that resulted from the importation of foreign workers. 147 In

addition to the negative effects on domestic laborers and braceros, the Bracero Program also attracted illegal immigrants to the United States . 148 The program also increased permanent immigration to the United States. 149 As many have observed, "there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers."150 If foreign workers are easily available, employers come to depend on them. 151

Human rights abuses and general immigration considerations led to the eventual demise of the Bracero Program as the labor shortage subsided at the end of the Korean War and, as Table 3 indicates, unemployment in the United States was again on the rise in the agricultural sector.

Current guest worker programs are the equivalent to legalized slavery--- employers file lawsuits against reformsSPLC 13, Southern Poverty Law Center, February 13, “Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States,” http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/close-to-slavery-guestworker-programs-in-the-united-statesIn the debate over comprehensive immigration reform, various policymakers and business groups have suggested that Congress create a new or expanded guestworker program to ensure a steady supply of foreign workers for industries that rely on an abundance of cheap labor.

Congress should look before it leaps. The current H-2 program, which provides temporary farmworkers and non-farm laborers for a variety of U.S. industries, is rife with labor and human rights violations committed by employers who prey on a highly vulnerable workforce . It harms the interests of U.S. workers, as well, by undercutting wages and working conditions for those who labor at the lowest rungs of the economic

ladder. This program should not be expanded or used as a model for immigration reform.Under the current H-2 program overseen by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), employers brought about 106,000 guestworkers into this country in 2011 — approximately 55,000 for agricultural work and another 51,000 for jobs in forestry, seafood processing, landscaping, construction and other non-agricultural industries.But far from being treated like “guests,” these workers are systematically exploited and abused. Unlike U.S. citizens, guestworkers do not enjoy the most fundamental protection of a competitive labor market — the ability to change jobs if they are mistreated. Instead, they are bound to the employers who “import” them. If guestworkers complain about abuses, they face deportation, blacklisting or other retaliation.Bound to a single employer and without access to legal resources, guestworkers are routinely:Cheated out of wages; Forced to mortgage their futures to obtain low-wage, temporary jobs; Held virtually captive by employers or labor brokers who seize their documents; Subjected to human trafficking and debt servitude; Forced to live in squalid conditions; Denied medical benefits for on-the-job injuries.Former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel put it this way: “This guestworker program’s the closest thing I’ve ever seen to slavery.”1Congressman Rangel’s conclusion is not mere hyperbole nor the first time such a comparison has been made. Former DOL official Lee G. Williams described the old “bracero” program — an earlier version of the guestworker program that brought thousands of Mexican nationals to work in the United States during and after World War II — as a system of “ legalized slavery .2 On paper, the bracero program had many significant written legal protections, providing workers with what

historian Cindy Hahamovitch, an expert on guestworker programs, has called “the most comprehensive farm labor contract in the history of American agriculture.3 Nevertheless, the bracero workers were systematically lied to, cheated and “shamefully neglected.4

In practice, there is little difference between the bracero program of yesterday and today’s H-2 guestworker program . Federal law and DOL regulations provide a few protections to H-2 guestworkers, but they exist mainly on paper. Government enforcement of guestworker rights is historically very weak. Private attorneys typically won’t take up their cause. And non-agricultural workers in the program are not eligible for federally funded legal services.The H-2 guestworker system also can be viewed as a modern-day system of indentured servitude. But unlike European indentured servants of old, today’s guestworkers have no prospect of becoming U.S. citizens. When their temporary work visas expire, they must leave the United States. They are, in effect, the disposable workers of the U.S. economy.U.S. workers suffer as a result of these flaws in the guestworker system. As long as employers in low-wage industries can rely on an endless stream of vulnerable guestworkers who lack basic labor protections, they will have little incentive to hire U.S. workers or make jobs more appealing to domestic workers by improving wages and working conditions. Not surprisingly, many H-2 employers discriminate against U.S. workers, preferring to hire guestworkers, even though they are required to certify that no domestic workers are available to fill their jobs. In addition, it is well-documented that wages for U.S. workers are depressed in industries that rely heavily on guestworkers.This report is based on interviews with thousands of guestworkers, a review of the research on guestworker programs, scores of legal cases and the experiences of legal experts from around the country. The abuses described here are too common to blame on a few “bad apple” employers. They are the foreseeable outcomes of a system that treats foreign workers as commodities to be imported as needed without affording them adequate legal safeguards, the protections of the free market, or the opportunity to become full members of society.When the Southern Poverty Law Center published the first version of this report in 2007, we recommended reform or repeal of the H-2 program. Unfortunately, even after the enactment of modest reforms in recent years, guestworker programs today are still inherently abusive and unfair to both U.S. and foreign workers.In the past several years, the DOL has proposed two sets of regulations to better protect non-agricultural H-2 workers – one related to wage rate guarantees and one more comprehensive set of

regulations. These regulations also would better protect the jobs and wages of U.S. workers. Unfortunately for workers, neither set of regulations has gone into effect; employers have filed multiple lawsuits challenging them , and Congress has effectively blocked implementation of the new wage regulations. For workers, then, the abuses continue unabated.

Link to Border DA Illegal immigration still occurs with guest worker programsPhilip Martin 2000, professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, Davis, April 2000, “Guestworker Programs for the 21st Century,” http://cis.org/GuestWorkerProgramReformThe United States has had two agricultural guest worker or Bracero programs with Mexico, and one program, H-2 and H-2A, that permits U.S. farmers to recruit foreign farmworkers in any country, although most come from the Caribbean and Mexico. None of these programs fulfilled their stated purpose: to add workers temporarily to the U.S. work force without adding permanent residents to the population, and to do so in a manner that does not adversely affect U.S. workers. Instead, the Bracero programs laid the groundwork for one of the world's great mass migrations — that from Mexico to the United States — and the H-2A program has been wracked by costly disputes.The first Bracero program was an exception to U.S. immigration law. The 1917 Immigration Act prohibited the entry of immigrants who were "induced ...to migrate to this country by offers or promises of employment," imposed a head tax, and excluded immigrants over 16 who could not read in any language. However, with "Food to Win the War" as a motto, farmers and railroads persuaded the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to suspend until 1921 the head tax and the literacy test for Mexican workers coming to the United States with contracts for up to 12 months. Many of these first Braceros did not return as scheduled — there was no Border Patrol to regulate crossings until 1924 — and some U.S. employers did not pay Braceros the wages promised.The second Bracero program was a series of agreements between Mexico and the United States under which some 4.6 million Mexicans were admitted to work on U.S. farms between 1942 and 1964. It is often argued that a legal guest worker program reduces illegal entries, but 4.9 million Mexicans were apprehended during the Bracero years (both Bracero entries and apprehensions double count individuals

admitted or caught several times). The Bracero program was small during World War II — admissions peaked at 62,000 in 1944 — and rose to 445,000 in 1956, primarily to harvest cotton and other commodities in surplus.

The Mexican and U.S. governments recognized that the Bracero program also facilitated illegal immigration . Mexico pressed the United States to adopt employer sanctions to discourage illegal emigration, and the 1951 Bracero program was approved for only six months in order to put pressure on Congress to approve sanctions. The "Texas Proviso" in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, however, specifically exempted the knowing employment of unauthorized workers.The H-2 program operated alongside the Bracero program, allowing farmers along the eastern seaboard to import Jamaican and other workers to hand cut sugar cane in Florida and pick apples in the Northeast. Like the Bracero program, farm employers who wanted to employ H-2 workers had to convince the U.S. Department of Labor that U.S. workers were unavailable at government-set wages and to provide the foreign workers with free housing and contracts that spelled out their rights and responsibilities.The U.S. experience with foreign farm workers leads to three major lessons: There is nothing more permanent than temporary workers.   After farm employers and foreign workers become dependent on each other, the farmers do not think about alternatives to Bracero or H-2 workers, and the migrants need U.S. earnings to maintain their families.

Link to Politics DACP links--- Despite some Republican support, immigration reform will always be contentiousMark Z. Barabak 14, reporter for the LA Times and former reporter from the White House during the Clinton Administration, 11-21-2014, “Immigration debate explodes despite voter desire for change,” http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-ff-immigration-politics-reaction-20141121-story.html#page=1Far from settling matters, President Obama’s unilateral action on immigration all but ensures at least two more years of fierce and angry debate over one of the most contentious and polarizing issues facing the country.It is a debate that presents opportunity and political risk to both parties, but especially Republicans , who are deeply divided among themselves and badly need to

mend relations with a Latino and Asian American population growing bigger and more politically powerful each day.And, with the loudest, most strident voices likely to dominate the discussion, it is a debate that will continue to mask a broad consensus among Americans, who want compromise and a fix to a decades-old problem — fashioned by Congress and the president working in tandem — rather than more of the partisan brick-throwing that has escalated over the past several days.Exit polls this month found that nearly six in 10 voters supported legislation that would go further than Obama’s plan by establishing a path to citizenship for the roughly 11 million people in the country illegally — a striking ratio for a largely white, GOP-leaning electorate that swept Republicans to power across the country on Nov. 4.Even here in Arizona, a state known for taking one of the hardest lines on illegal immigration, there is a strong desire to see the political skirmishing end.“People want a solution,” said Chuck Coughlin, a GOP strategist who has advised two of the state’s top Republicans, Sen. John McCain and Gov. Jan Brewer, who have sometimes worked at cross-purposes on the issue. “They’re tired of the partisan stalemate and the finger-pointing by both sides.”Immigration is a uniquely difficult and emotional issue, freighted with the weight of family ties and two broad, sometimes conflicting impulses. The United States, as the president suggested in his speech Thursday night, is both a land of laws and a nation of immigrants; squaring that circle and finding agreement somewhere in the middle has exceeded both the imagination and capacity of elected leaders for a generation.Obama was never going to placate all sides by going it alone, a move he says was forced upon him by hostile, intransigent Republicans in Congress . What he has done, though, has heightened tensions in the short term and cast the conflict forward into the race to succeed him, placing every White House hopeful on the spot for the next two years.About half of the undocumented aliens are here temporarily to earn some money to return to their homeland with. POTUS has not offered a path to citizenship with his executive order. He said that only Congress can authorize that.Because Obama’s actions are not binding on his successor “the next president is going to have to decide whether to continue these policies after 2017,” said Matt Barreto, a University of Washington political scientist who conducts extensive polling among Latinos nationwide. “Whether it’s Hillary Clinton or Chris Christie or Marco Rubio, they’re all going to have to take a position, because it’s a policy that the next president, through his or her executive power, will be overseeing.”The danger Democrats face is alienating the white working-class voters who have never much cared for the president and who could view the influx of newly hirable immigrants as unwelcome job competition.

CP links--- Republicans resistant to reformCaren Bohan 13, president of the White House Correspondents Association, 5-6-2013, “Lawmakers struggle over guest workers in immigration bill,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-usa-immigration-congress-idUSBRE9420W920130506

As the Senate gets ready to debate the details of a broad U.S. immigration bill, a group of House of Representatives lawmakers is still struggling to write its own legislation, hung up in part over guest worker programs sought by businesses.Programs allowing employers in high-tech, agriculture, construction and other industries to hire foreign workers were also a stumbling block for senators who introduced a separate immigration bill last month.In the end, the four Republicans and four Democrats in the Senate "Gang of Eight" group incorporated into its bill a deal reached between the AFL-CIO labor organization and the Chamber of Commerce, the huge U.S. business lobby.Immigration reform is Democratic President Barack Obama's top domestic priority. Although the Senate is controlled by Democrats, the bill will need some Republican support to meet the minimum 60-vote threshold for passage.

Still, passage of the bill in the Republican-led House is seen as the biggest challenge .

Although many Republicans view immigration reform as a way to help repair their party's weak standing

with Hispanic voters, many others are resistant to comprehensive reform that includes a path to citizenship. Conservative critics of that provision view it as a form of amnesty.

Border DA Answers

No UQSurveillance systems are flawed and inefficient --- 4 reasons Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrAt the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant risks and concerns of their own. Studies indicate that decisionmaking when using computerized systems can be distorted by automation complacency and automation bias , two related phenomena

in which individuals place too much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they suspect error or malfunction. When these phenomena are at work,

individuals may regard these systems as resistant to error, fail to sufficiently monitor their

operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and cues they provide.263 These risks may be exacerbated with large, complex networks of interoperable information systems like those used for immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization and maintenance present distinct challenges. As Erin Murphy describes, government databases are the “ultimate collaborative projects,” often involving multiple systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and exchange of information among many different actors over extended periods of time.264In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of information contained in the database systems used for immigration surveillance raise several distinct types of concerns. First, large database systems invariably contain inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant records, particularly as they grow larger and contain greater quantities of information. Fair information principles emphasize that

personal data in government databases should be accurate, complete, and current.265 For decades, however, “immigration authorities have been criticized for maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records and inadequately managing their information systems.”266 While some improvements have been

made, these concerns have persisted .For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation notices for a significant number of individuals, including both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work.267 Similarly, a GAO analysis of Secure Communities found that ICE had no record of the criminal arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under the program during 2011 and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates that a significant number of individuals are detained and placed into removal

proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to be deportable.268 More recently, over one million immigrant families have experienced difficulties applying for health care coverage

and insurance subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with verification of their immigration or citizenship status.269

Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible to large numbers of actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and quickly and can become even more difficult to correct.270 Outside of immigration agencies, other databases that are

relied upon for immigration surveillance purposes suffer from similar data quality problems. For example, despite some recent improvements, criminal history records databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and incomplete.271 Improper deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate information in these database records remain common.272 Observers also have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose names have been added to watchlists generated by the TSDB, such as the No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms exist to remove names of innocent individuals from those lists.273Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term “database,” the use of these systems does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance of “factual” information, whether accurate or otherwise. To the contrary, as discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and relied upon by enforcement actors necessarily incorporates analysis, risk assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human judgments at some stage. Those judgments may have been made directly, such as when individuals are identified for inclusion in the No Fly List, Selectee List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with the

automated risk assessments made by systems like the ATS and CAPPS, whose evaluations and predictions are generated using algorithms that invariably embed human judgments, assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases.274 However, in either case, the nature of the data generated and distributed by government database systems—coupled with the opaque nature of the criteria for inclusion—can mask the subjective and evaluative judgments that underlie that information , making it seem

more objectively factual to enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which immigration surveillance relies are not foolproof. For example, although automated fingerprint identification systems can be extremely accurate in determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing to technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes, and even the particular demographic groups in which the subjects are members.276 Advanced multimodal biometric identification systems that are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their own.277

Estimates on border control success is based on flawed metricsSuzy Khimm 13, reporter for Washington Post, 1-30-2015, “Is our border security working? It’s far from clear,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/is-our-border-security-working-its-far-from-clear/We've enacted almost all of the border security that the Bush administration had wanted in 2007, dramatically ramping up personnel, detention facilities, border infrastructure, and technology.Legislators now want to ramp up these efforts even further as part of comprehensive immigration reform. But is our border really more secure because of these additional measures? It's a question that's actually quite difficult to answer , as the American Immigration Lawyers Association lays out in a new report.The Obama administration has touted success by pointing to the numbers of apprehensions along the southwest border dropping to the lowest level in 40 years in 2010. Violent crime in border cities has also dropped steadily in recent years.The problem is, the decline in the sheer number of apprehensions doesn't necessarily mean that border security is more effective . Experts point out that illegal immigration as a whole has plummeted since 2007 in significant part because of our economic downturn. Border arrests in 2012, in fact, are up to 356,873 from 327,577 in 2011, the AP reported this week, which could suggest that the number of apprehensions has been contingent at least in part on the economy.Despite our limited ability to measure success, however, lawmakers have continued to ask for more and more resources. Immigration advocates and experts believe that better metrics are necessary to evaluate whether these additional resources are actually helping. "Missing from these proposals is a proven way to measure when the border is reasonably secure," AILA writes in its new report, arguing that policymakers "need to identify clearer goals for border security and ways to measure success rather than simply increasing resources."

No Link*SPICY* The border is not an ideal terrorist breach and terrorists always enter legally anywaysDaniel Griswold 04, director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-1-2004, “Securing Our Borders Under a Temporary Guest Worker Program,” http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/securing-our-borders-under-temporary-guest-worker-program-0Long-time opponents of immigration seized on September 11 to argue against legalization of Mexican migration, and in favor of drastic cuts in existing levels of legal immigration. But any connection between the September 11 attacks and illegal immigration from Mexico is non-existent. None of the 19 hijackers entered the country illegally or as immigrants. They all arrived in the United States with valid temporary nonimmigrant tourist or student visas. None of them arrived via Mexico . None of

them were Mexican. Sealing the Mexican border with a three-tiered, 2,000-mile replica of the Berlin Wall patrolled by a division of U.S. troops would not have kept a single one of those terrorists out of the United States .

The problem is not too many immigrants. Immigrants who come to the United States to work and eventually settle are but a small subset of the tens of millions of foreign-born people who enter the United States every year. In fact, on a typical day, more than

1 million people enter the United States legally by land, air, and sea through more than 300 ports of entry. In a typical year, more than 30 million individual foreign nationals enter the United States as tourists, business travelers, students, diplomats, and other temporary, nonimmigrant visa holders.[1] Of those, perhaps 1.3 million will eventually settle here as permanent immigrant residents. In other words, less than 5 percent of the foreigners who enter the United States each year intend to immigrate in any sense of the word. The rest plan to stay here only a short time.Yet up until September 11, 2001, the overriding focus of our border security policy was to keep people out who might stay beyond their visa or enter illegally in search of employment. If you recall, some of the September 11 hijackers were granted a visa without even being interviewed by our consulate personnel. Why? Because they were deemed to be low risk for staying in the United States to seek employment.Our focus, one might say our obsession, with keeping Mexicans from crossing our Southwester border illegally has not served our national security interests. It has diverted resources and attention away from efforts to identify and keep out people who truly intend to do us harm.

The Southwest border is not a frontline on the war on terrorism. First, Mexicans themselves

are not a national security threat. No Mexican national to my knowledge has been connected with Al Qaeda or any other international terrorist network. Mexicans almost universally come here to work.

Second, international terrorists have not viewed the Southwestern border as a preferred means of entry. The Canadian border is more attractive . It’s twice as long, with far fewer border patrol personnel per mile. Middle Eastern nationals tend to stand

out more in Mexican society than in Canadian society or at a typical international airport. Recall that it was at a port of entry at the Washington state/British Columbia border in 1999 that U.S agents apprehended Ahmed Ressam, one of the so-called millennium bombers.

Why would potential terrorists incur the risks of sneaking across our Southwest border when other doors are more attractive? A special investigation by the Associated Press last November found that not a single terrorist suspect had been arrested trying to enter the United States across the Mexican border since the September 11 terrorist attacks. As border patrol agent Matt Roggow told the AP, “The people who are coming across [the Mexican] border are people who can only pay $1,500 to a

smuggler. A terrorist can pay $30,000 or $40,000 and go to the northern border where we don’t have the resources to stop them . ”[2]

While we were guarding the back door in 2001 to make sure no Mexican immigrants entered our country illegally, we were neglecting the far larger barn door of temporary non-immigrant visas through which all the September 11 hijackers entered.

ISIS Terrorist claims are not supportedKVIA 15, 4-15-2015, "U.S. Rep. O'Rourke refutes latest ISIS in Mexico rumors, shows decades-long rumors of terrorists in Mexico," http://www.kvia.com/news/us-rep-orourke-refutes-latest-isis-in-mexico-rumors-shows-decadeslong-rumors-of-terrorists-in-mexico/32382904Is Isis in Juárez?Some have shared stories on social media suggesting that is the case. Others have contacted my office to see if it's true.Today I reached out to the Mexican government, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Northern Command. None of them have found any evidence, credible or otherwise, that Isis is in Juárez.

Stories like these are good at scaring people and getting attention for those who spread them. But they are terrible for the country's image of the border, for El Paso's ability to recruit talent, and for our region's opportunity to capitalize on the benefits of being the largest bi-national community in the world.

Stories like these have come up before. The 1981 story about Libyan hit squads in Juárez. The fears that Al-Qaeda was going to invade after 9/11. The claims about Isis crossing the border last year.As a member of the House Homeland Security committee in the 113th Congress, I asked the director of the FBI, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center and the Secretary of Homeland Security if there was currently any terrorist threat on the Southern border. They answered that there was not, nor had there ever been, any terrorist, terrorist plot, or terrorist organization that was able to exploit our border with Mexico.Beyond hurting our image nationally, these kinds of false stories could lead us to take our eye off real threats to the homeland. While we should always remain vigilant at our borders -- and we currently spend $18 billion a year to do so -- the greatest proven homeland threats have been at our airports and with homegrown terrorists radicalized over the internet. Not in El Paso, the country's safest city 4 years in a row.

No evidence of terrorists in the border--- air travel more likelyDan Friedman 14, reporter for the Washington bureau of the NY Daily News, 9-10-2014, “ISIS terrorists won't sneak into U.S. across loose Mexico border: Homeland Security officials,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/isis-terrorists-won-sneak-u-s-loose-mexico-border-homeland-security-officials-article-1.1935224Despite some Twitter chatter, there is no evidence ISIS terrorists are trying to slip into the United States from Mexico, Department of Homeland Security officials told Congress Wednesday.Administration officials said they are more concerned about jihadists entering the U.S. legally on commercial airline flights.Administration higher-ups testifying at a House hearing Wednesday threw cold water on scary border scenarios cited by conservatives such as Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas."We don't have any credible information, that we are aware of, of known or suspected terrorists coming across the border," Jennifer Lasley, a senior official in the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence and analysis office, told the House Homeland Security border security subcommittee.Across the Capitol another top DHS official acknowledged that the agency has tracked online talk by ISIS backers about infiltrating the U.S. via the border."There have been Twitter, social media exchanges among (ISIS) adherents across the globe speaking about that as a possibility," Francis Taylor, DHS undersecretary for intelligence, told Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.) after he pressed him on the issue during a Senate committee hearing.

"Any infiltration across our border would be a threat," Taylor agreed, but said he is "satisfied we have the intelligence and capability on the border that would prevent that activity.”Lawmakers from border states, including Cruz and McCain, have said the threat from ISIS requires beefing up border security. Texas Gov. Rick Perry has said ISIS terrorists may already have crossed into the U.S.Administration officials at the House hearing, which focused on ISIS fighters who hold western passports, said it is far more likely an extremist sympathetic to the group will try to enter the country by air.

The terrorist claims are all hype--- conservatives have been using them as campaign fodderZeke J. Miller 14, political reporter for TIME an graduate of Yale University, 10-7-2014, “GOP Ad Claims ISIS Plot to Attack U.S. Via ‘Arizona’s Backyard’,” http://time.com/3478254/isis-nrcc-border-plot-gop-2014/The National Republican Congressional Committee ad opens with grainy footage of black flags and fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) holding rifles on military vehicles. “Evil forces around the world want to harm Americans every day,” an ominous voiceover states. “Their entry into our country? Through Arizona’s backyard.” The spot goes on to recount how Rep. Ann Kirkpatrick (D-AZ), locked in a close re-election fight with Arizona House Speaker Andy Tobin, has voted against border security legislation, suggesting that she “leaves Arizona vulnerable.”The claim is clear: The same terrorists targeted by U.S. bombers for destruction in Syria and Iraq are coming to the U.S. to attack the homeland through the Mexican border. Yet federal law enforcement officials have repeatedly stated that there is no active plot against the U.S. from ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, and no intelligence to suggest incursions on the Southern border .

To make the claim, the ad relies on a Sept. 10 writeup of a congressional hearing by the conservative Washington Free Beacon in which a Department of Homeland Security official was understood as telling lawmakers that ISIS “supporters are known to be plotting ways to infiltrate the United States through the border.”But a review of the testimony by DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Francis Taylor tells another story. Instead, he said, “there have been Twitter, social media exchanges among [ISIS] adherents across the globe speaking about that as a possibility.” But that is a far cry from a direct threat, and light years away from a direct plot against the homeland.Other national security officials have since offered more detail refuting the claim. “We see no specific intelligence or evidence to suggest at present that [ISIS] is attempting to infiltrate this country though our southern border,” Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson told the House Homeland Security Committee a week after Taylor’s testimony. Matt Olsen, the outgoing director of the National Counterterrorism Center told lawmakers at the same hearing, “There have been a very small number of sympathizers with [ISIS] who have posted messages on social media about this, but we’ve seen nothing to indicate that there is any sort of operational effort or plot to infiltrate or move operatives from [ISIS] into the United States through the southern border.”When asked about the sourcing for the ad’s claim, a spokesman for the NRCC did not back down. “ISIS presents an imminent and dangerous threat to the United States,” says Daniel Scarpinato, a NRCC spokesperson. “Anyone who doesn’t believe that having a porous border made of chicken wire is leaving our country at risk, should go explain that to people in Arizona who actually have to live with this problem and are upset that politicians like Ann Kirkpatrick are ignoring it.”By juicing the threat of ISIS, Republicans are hoping to take advantage of global volatility and the understandable fear surrounding it for their own electoral purposes. ISIS has been used as campaign fodder since at least the summer ,

as the terrorist group took control of major cities in Iraq and started beheading Westerners.

No ImpactTerrorists obtaining nuclear weapons is incredibly implausible--- too many steps that need to be perfectSteve Chapman 12, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, 5-17-2012, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorismEver since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands.The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war.Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable."But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.Given their inability to do something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small."The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing.Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use.As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp.Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces."Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it.Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he

says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.

Immigration Neg

Topicality

StatesImmigration is handled at local and state level not entirely by the federal governmentHarvard Law Review 2015, “Policing Immigrant Communities,” Harvard Law Review, 4/10/ 15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771Enforcement by Federal Delegation. — Immigration enforcement is the prerogative of the federal government, but Congress has defined circumstances under which the federal government may delegate immigration-enforcement authority to state and local police. The biggest federal delegation program, the 287(g) program, allows the Attorney General to grant immigration enforcement authority to state and local police departments that sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These MOUs allow state and local police to enforce civil immigration laws so long as they participate in ICE training, agree to ICE supervision, and abide by certain ICE rules.

States have their own laws for immigration independent of the federal government.Harvard Law Review 2015, “Policing Immigrant Communities,” Harvard Law Review, 4/10/ 15, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1771(b) Enforcement by State Authority. — States and cities often enforce federal immigration laws — and their own immigration policies — without federal authority. States, at times joined by the federal government, claim an “inherent authority” to enforce federal criminal laws. The purported authority stems from the Tenth Amendment: one sovereign has the authority to assist another sovereign in arrests and, since states retain their sovereignty under the Constitution, they have the power to arrest for violations of federal criminal law. Additionally, states often enact laws that target immigrants and allow officers to regulate immigration. For instance, many states have “human smuggling” laws that prohibit transporting consenting unauthorized immigrants into the state. Others restrict undocumented-immigrant employment. Arizona, for instance, amended its identity theft laws to criminalize the use of false information to get a job, whether the identity belonged to a “real or fictitious person.” And some states and cities target the jobs that immigrants can get. Together, inherent arrest authority and independent state laws mean police target and detain suspected immigrants and their communities without the authorization or oversight of the federal government.

Federalism Answers

Immigration Federalism BadCurtailing the States power to make immigration laws goodStella Burch Elias 2013, Associate Professor of law, University of Iowa, “The New Immigration Federalism,” Ohio State Law Journal, 12/06/2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/6-Elias.pdfThe Supreme Court’s recent immigration preemption doctrine effectively precludes states passing their own anti-unauthorized-immigrant “immigration” laws. Although some state legislators may fear that this curtailment of their lawmaking powers will herald a permissive era of amnesty and laissez-faire acceptance of undocumented immigrants , all available evidence suggests that the opposite is true . Under the Obama Administration, federal immigration authorities have carried out record numbers of deportations, with over 400,000 immigrants removed from the United States in 2009 and 2010, and with the Department of Homeland Security set to deport two million immigrants by 2014—approximately the same number of immigrants who were deported in the 105 years from 1892 to 1997.109∂ Despite this extraordinary record of immigration enforcement activity, since President Obama took office, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, a record number of immigration-related laws were passed by state governments, including thirty-seven pertaining to state participation in immigration enforcement.110 State engagement with the enforcement of federal∂ immigration laws excluding individuals from entry to the United States is not a new phenomenon,111 but state involvement grew exponentially in the early years of the twenty-first century.112 This growth involved a plethora of state laws authorizing direct enforcement of federal “immigration laws,” whether under so-called 287(g) agreements with ICE delegating authority to do so,113 or under independent state initiatives such as Arizona’s S.B. 1070.114 At the same time a wide range of exclusionary “alienage” laws pertaining to the treatment of immigrants were introduced, limiting immigrants’ access to housing, employment, or language, and effectively serving an indirect enforcement function.115

Solvency deficit--- States strongly support anti-immigrant lawsRaquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf Since the events of 9/11, anti-immigrant groups like the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the U.S. English-Only, Inc. have been supporting or promoting local efforts to pass anti-immigrant ordinances or include them as propositions in key local elections.256 In 2006 alone, at least seventy-eight state immigration related bills were approved in thirty-three states .257 These ordinances range from denying the undocumented basic worker protections to restricting their access to higher education and other state benefits , such as denying them driver’s licenses, barring them from congregating as day laborers, and prohibiting them from speaking Spanish.258 The ordinances also include housing and employer restrictions, such as the 2006 Hazleton, Pennsylvania anti-immigrant ordinances that sought to bar the undocumented from taking jobs, renting apartments, or engaging in other commercial transactions. These housing and employer ordinances would have required employers, landlords, and businesses to monitor the immigration status of workers

and tenants. They also sought to impose both civil and criminal penalties on employers, landlords, or businesses that violated the restrictions.

Local communities plan to add more officers in immigration raids Raquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf One thing is certain: like federal enforcement, local immigration enforcement will be characterized as regulatory in nature, particularly when the consequences continue to be nonpenal. In Hazleton, undocumented tenants and workers will be forced

out of workplaces and homes, and possibly reported to immigration agencies , but not

prosecuted per se. Nevertheless, these consequences are all extremely harsh, and criminal prosecution, as in the federal immigration enforcement context for such crimes as identity theft and fraud, remains a strong possibility.An interesting parallel exists between these new anti-immigrant ordinances and attempts by local police to regulate disorder among the homeless and poor. For many generations, local police enforced laws criminalizing public order offenses, such as vagrancy, loitering, and public drunkenness, until the courts stepped in to declare them unconstitutional under doctrines such as the prohibition against status crimes.300 These legal challenges, however, encouraged the proliferation of order-maintenance policies that replaced criminal with administrative enforcement, namely through property regulation tools like zoning laws.301 Here again, the relaxed criminal safeguards in the context of administrative law enforcement has made it possible for these measures to survive judicial scrutiny at a significant “cost of rights.”302 Local anti-immigrant ordinances, such as those in Hazleton, if successful, have the potential to exponentially multiply the number of law enforcement officers involved in immigration raids , and are likely to suffer from similar “costs of rights,” including to the Fourth Amendment.

Despite public backlash states strongly support restrictive immigration lawsShannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," States took up the call—most vocally in Arizona. Facing a tough reelection fight in 2010, Governor Jan Brewer did not hesitate as she signed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, or Arizona SB 1070. The law required police officers to check people’s immigration status if there was a “reasonable suspicion” that they might be here illegally, and made it a crime not to have official identification on hand. In defending the bill, Brewer assured constituents that it would protect U.S. citizens “against a relentless and daily barrage of narco-terrorist drug and human smugglers.” 16 Public outrage immediately spilled forth . Rallies around the country denounced the bill, with protesters carrying signs saying “Stop the hate” and “What does illegal look like?”

Opponents warned that now WWH— “walking while Hispanic”—would be a crime. Yet counter rallies also occurred , with placards declaring “Arizona got it right” and “Adiós illegals.” Opinion polls revealed strong backing for the law, and similar initiatives began to work their way through other state legislatures across the country, passing in Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and South Carolina. 17

State Flexibility NowImmigration federalism curtails the states’ ability to make immigration lawsStella Burch Elias 2013, Associate Professor of law, University of Iowa, “The New Immigration Federalism,” Ohio State Law Journal, 12/06/2013, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/6-Elias.pdfState and local “alienage” laws designed to welcome, integrate, and include immigrants play an increasingly important, but hitherto underexplored role in U.S. immigration law and policy. While some states have developed exclusionary statutes and regulations pertaining to immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, other states and localities—including individual localities within immigrant-exclusionary states—have promulgated laws designed to foster the inclusion and integration of all immigrants into their local communities.194 It is not possible to discuss in this Article all of the myriad inclusionary measures adopted in different locales throughout the United States. This Part therefore focuses on two examples of local and state immigrant- inclusionary provisions that have proliferated since the mid-1990s: (1) so-called sanctuary laws, designating areas (usually cities) as “sanctuaries” from immigration enforcement and providing all residents, regardless of immigration status, with equal access to local governmental services; and (2) in-state tuition initiatives and other measures designed to provide immigrant youth with equal access to higher education. This Part argues that while the new immigration federalism curtails states’ and localities’ ability to engage in immigrant- exclusionary lawmaking, it simultaneously creates opportunities for states and localities to promulgate laws designed to foster immigrant inclusion.

Econ Answers

Immigration Bad for Mexican EconImmigration steals innovation and economic benefits from Mexico Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," Mexican immigrants’ time in the United States has helped to debunk the facile stereotypes of the PRI days, including views of Mexico’s northern neighbor. Nearly six in ten Mexicans see life as better in the United States ; for those with friends and relatives up north the number is even higher. Today over half of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the United States, near Spain and Britain.83Yet Mexico’s widespread and long-standing migration to the United States has had its drawbacks as well. Over six hundred thousand (or about a sixth) of all Mexican college degree recipients and roughly half of all PhD holders reside in the United States.84 Here, U.S. gains are Mexico’s losses , as these professionals make their careers, start their businesses, and contribute to communities far away from their native land. Economists call this phenomenon “ brain drain ”—an exodus of talent from the very countries that need it most.Remittances too are not an unqualified benefit. The money sent back to families divides small towns between the haves and the have-nots. The influx of dollars to migrants’ hometowns can drive up local prices , making it harder for those that remain to make ends meet. This pushes even more to migrate, perpetuating a cycle that ensures survival, but not development .

Open borders hurts Mexican EconomyNonie Darwish 2013, “IS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION GOOD FOR MEXICO?,” Frontpage Magazine, 6/18/2013, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/193700/illegal-immigration-good-mexico-nonie-darwishIf the huge number of illegal immigrants from Mexico was good for Mexico as a nation, then how come its economic, political and security conditions have not improved over the years, but instead have steadily deteriorated? The steady absorption of the bottom of Mexican society by the US has deprived Mexico of its motivation to improve its economy and to become a government that serves the welfare and living conditions of its poor and unemployed. Why should Mexico work hard on improving conditions for the poor and unemployed if America is doing the job for them? ∂ It is not easy for any nation to be located on the border with a giant economic super power like the United States. This situation tempts smaller nations to exist like small fish living off the crumbs and leftovers of a giant whale.∂ The situation in both Mexico and the US is unnatural and self-defeating, leaving Mexico stagnant and unmotivated to improve and meet the needs of its citizens. Groups in America who claim moral superiority for being on the side of open borders and absorbing all illegal aliens because they have big hearts are in fact absolving the Mexican government of its duty toward its citizens and economy and are contributing to the internal problems of Mexico and the United States. In the long run, we are not doing Mexico a favor with our open borders, but we are crippling them and robbing them of the healthy functioning of their nation .∂ The US should immediately end the politicization of the immigration issue not only for the sake of

America, but also for the sake of Mexico. We need a sane immigration policy that respects US sovereignty and that helps Mexico become more responsible as an independent nation to end its sluggish economy and political corruption. ∂ The sovereignty of both the US and Mexico has been compromised under the status quo, which is unsustainable. Either we control the US border or say goodbye to both US and Mexican sovereignty as two separate nations.

Immigration prevents Mexico from improving its economyBill Ong Hing 2011, Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco, “Mexico's Economy Is the Problem That Anti-Immigrant Laws Won't Solve,” Huffington Post Politics, 05/ 25/ 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/mexicos-economy-is-the-pr_b_829377.htmlEveryone agrees that we need immigration reform. For years, Congress has attempted to strike a principled balance between greater enforcement and a fair way to adjust the status for the 10 to 12 million undocumented immigrants in the country. However, even immigrant rights advocates must acknowledge that legalization will not solve undocumented migration permanently. An expansion of visas will certainly help, but if the package does not include at least the first steps toward helping Mexico improve its economy and infrastructure, undocumented Mexican migration will continue, and the tension over undocumented migration will resurface down the road. To truly understand undocumented migration, we have to do what Americans have thus far been unwilling to do: Look beyond the simple explanation that migrants cross the border in search of work. We have to ask why they cannot find what they want in Mexico. In 1994, we were told that NAFTA would solve the undocumented problem because new jobs would be created in Mexico. But NAFTA ultimately contributed to huge job losses in Mexico. Mexican corn farmers could not compete with heavily-subsidized U.S. corn farmers, and now Mexico imports most of its corn from the U.S. Because of globalization, 100,000 jobs in Mexico's domestic manufacturing sector were lost from 1993 to 2003. Where do those unemployed workers look for work? El Norte.∂ An economic turnaround in Mexico is central to solving the undocumented migration challenge in the United States. Conservatives should understand that. And liberals should recognize that reducing undocumented migration is in Mexico's interest as well; the persistent loss of able-bodied workers needed to build its infrastructure and economy only hurts Mexico. All of us understand that economic investment in Mexico will not and, probably, should not be done without close monitoring.

Relations Answers

Relations HighUS/ Mexico relations high now --- NAFTA provesEnrique Peña Nieto 2015, President of Mexico, “Why the U.S.-Mexico Relationship Matters,” Politico, 1/ 06/ 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexico-relationship-enrique-pea-nieto-113980.html#.VaqtpCpVikoOur countries have an intense economic relationship that is spread over a myriad of areas. Since the beginning of my administration, I have worked with President Barack Obama to create bilateral mechanisms that harness the full potential of our relationship. We are already seeing concrete results from the High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), the Mexico-U.S. Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation and Research (FOBESII), the Mexico-U.S. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council (MUSEIC) and the 21st Century Border Action Plan of 2014. ∂ We are steadfast in our belief that the continuous promotion of bilateral trade is a win-win situation for both our countries. Mexico is the third largest trading partner of the U.S., just behind China and Canada. Total bilateral trade between us amounted to more than $500 billion during 2013. Our exports to the U.S. have increased significantly since NAFTA entered into force, with roughly 80 percent of them coming to this country. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Mexico in 2013 were $226 billion, up 443 percent since 1993. In fact, Mexico buys more U.S. goods than all of the BRICS combined—and nearly as much as the entire European Union . Moreover, 5.9 million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico. Even Mexican exports benefit the American economy: 40 percent of the value of Mexican exports to the U.S. contains American inputs. By 2020, Mexico will have the capacity to build one in every four vehicles in North America, up from one in six in 2012. Additionally, Mexico has begun to invest in high technology exports; we have become the leading exporter of flat screen televisions in the world, the fourth largest computer exporter and a growing pioneer in the aerospace industry. We are interlinked.

The Mexican population's approval rate of the US is at its highest since '09Juliana Menasce Horowitz 13, Senior Researcher at Pew Global Attitudes Project, 5/1/2013, "How Mexicans See America," http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/01/how-mexicans-see-america/When U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico this week, he will encounter a Mexican public that has far more positive attitudes about the United States than at any time in the last several years.America’s image south of the border fell sharply in 2010, when Arizona passed a “show me your papers” law aimed at identifying, prosecuting and deporting immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally. But Mexican views have rebounded since then, and U.S. favorability ratings are now at their highest point since 2009 . The prospects for U.S. immigration reform may be, at least in part, the source of renewed Mexican approval of their neighbor to the north.A new Pew Research Center poll found that 66 percent of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. , up 10 percentage points from a year ago and up 22 points from May 2010, immediately following the enactment of Arizona’s immigration law. The last time America’s image was as strong among Mexicans was in 2009, when 69 percent said they had a favorable opinion.

Drug War Alt CauseAlt cause drug wars--- plan can’t solve--- fuels bad relations and misunderstandings between the two governments David Shirk 13, Associate Professor at University of San Diego and Director of the Justice in Mexico Project, 5-4-13, “U.S.-Mexico Relations Complicated, Conditioned By Drug War,” http://www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053775/u-s-mexico-relations-complicated-conditioned-by-drug-warSCOTT SIMON, HOST:In many ways, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is c omplicated and conditioned by the long and the bloody war on drugs . It's difficult to say exactly how

many people have been killed in that war, but Mexican media have estimated that around 70,000 people have died since 2006; many thousands more have been disappeared. The United States has been closely involved, providing money, technology and intelligence to the Mexican government.

But Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has begun to back away from the U.S . And this week, his administration said they would limit its contacts with American agencies . David Shirk is an associate professor at the University of San Diego. He studies the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and joins us in our studios. Thanks so much for being with us.DAVID SHIRK: Thank you for having me.SIMON: How closely has the United States been involved?SHIRK: In the last 12 years, and especially the last six years, have really been a high-water mark in U.S.-Mexico collaboration, particularly on security issues. Levels of trust are so high that we have had the opportunity to fly drones in Mexico, we have agents operating in direct collaboration with their Mexican counterparts, we've seen record levels of extradition. So, the collaboration is at a much higher level of intensity than we've ever seen before - or has been, at least over the last six years or so.SIMON: And has U.S. involvement been helpful?SHIRK: That's a great question. I think it has been, depending on what you consider to be success. We have not seen violence go down . We have not necessarily seen the flow of drugs diminish. We have not seen necessarily an overall reduction in corruption in Mexico. But you can look at tactical successes. The dismantling of major organized crime groups, the target of specific organized crime figures has been accomplished over the last several years, thanks to this very high level of collaboration.SIMON: So, why would President Enrique Pena Nieto be eager to reduce that cooperation?SHIRK: Well, I'm not sure that the idea is necessarily to reduce collaboration so much as to reshape the dynamics of collaboration. I think that's probably how the Pena Nieto administration would portray this. For one thing, the Pena Nieto administration is trying to move away from the security policies that were employed by the Calderon administration. So, these efforts to go after high-level targets and to dismantle drug-trafficking organizations is diminishing as a priority of the Mexican government. And what they have emphasized instead is promoting citizen security.I think that the Pena Nieto administration thinks that you had a real problem with the lack of coordination under the Calderon administration. And their idea, in the Pena Nieto government, is to try to tighten up and centralized the mechanisms of coordination and cooperation with the United States. And I think that's a deliberate attempt to vet and control whatever types of cooperation we're going to see between the U.S. and Mexican government.SIMON: Well, that raises an issue that I think you've even touched on in some of your writings. Has this been, in many ways, a drug war that's been an American war conducted over the border?

SHIRK: I think that there are a lot of people who would agree with that idea. And in some ways, you can see that the drug war, as it's played out over the last 34 years, in particular as a U.S. proxy war . That said, over the last six years, working with Mexico, U.S. officials have consistently tried to let Mexico set the agenda. U.S. officials that I spoke to, repeatedly - and Mexican officials - repeatedly expressed the understanding that Mexico and the United States were working together because they had a shared responsibility to deal with the problem of drug trafficking and organized crime. But I think U.S. officials are really waiting to see whether they will be able to cooperate with the Pena Nieto administration and in what areas. Because there is some sense that the trust and collaboration that was built up over the last six years is at least on hold, if not in recession .

SIMON: It seems to me - I've spoken with Mexicans, who, to deal in shorthand, are sick of the drug wars and sick of the cartels and blame them for thousands of deaths, and yet at the same time, in some ways, they blame Americans for being the market for those drugs.SHIRK: Yeah, I think that's true. I mean, first of all, I think many Mexicans are tired of having their country portrayed as a lawless, violent and corrupt place. That said, I also think that, for many Mexicans, this incredible fight that they've made over the last six years to try to take on organized crime has not yielded major gains in stopping the flow of drugs in even necessarily breaking down some of the major cartels that operate in Mexico. So, there is a sense that they've made all of this effort and it's primarily to prevent U.S. drug consumers in engaging in an illicit market activity. I think some Mexicans may simply say this is not worth the effort. This is not our fight. Let's let the drug traffickers get back to business as usual and we can get on with our lives.

Other/Random

AT: Cartels ImpactMexico is resilient--- drug cartels can't make a failed state Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35This suggests that violence and insecurity on the Mexican side of the U.S. southern border will persist in the years ahead and occasionally spill over into American territory. That does not mean, however, that Mexico is likely to become a “failed state” as many have recently argued. The Mexican state is relatively strong , albeit with important pockets of profound institutional weakness. The reach of the federal government—from tax collection to poverty programs—is felt throughout the country. Unlike the Taliban, the Mexican cartels have no interest in overthrowing the Mexican state but instead, like any businessmen, simply want to reduce state intervention in their economic enterprise. And unlike Pakistan, Mexico lacks the sharp regional, ethnic, and religious divides that feed the formation of anti-state political actors . This balance of power obviously has not prevented the crime syndicates from controlling a large number of municipalities; corrupting politicians and law enforcement officials; killing policemen, state prosecutors, and federal police officials; and sowing fear and insecurity in several key border towns. Nor does it preclude the possibility of occasional unpleasant surprises, like the assassination of high ranking government officials. But it limits the likely reach of their influence and thereby suggests that while the violence will persist in the years ahead, the cartels are not well positioned to threaten the stability and survival of the Mexican state.

Offcase

DA Link---Surveillance K2 Border ControlSurveillance and interoperable databases are key to extensive border controlAnil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrFar from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide, pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points , both fixed and mobile . New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this reconfiguration of the migration border possible. To police this deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database systems help to create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration governance.248

Disease DAImmigration control conducts medical examinations for immigrants and prevents the introduction of diseases into the U.S. Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrPublic Health Surveillance. Public health officials have also implemented systems to conduct disease surveillance on noncitizens who have entered the United States. Individuals long have been inadmissible on certain public health-related grounds, and Congress has required individuals seeking admission to undergo medical examinations in their countries of origin before being issued immigrant visas or being admitted as refugees. Individuals seeking to enter as nonimmigrants can be required to undergo medical examinations upon arrival at ports of entry. 211 To implement these inadmissibility provisions and the statutory obligation to prevent communicable diseases from being introduced and transmitted within the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has established the Electronic Disease Notification system, which collects and stores health information on these individuals and transmits that health information to state and local public health authorities and refugee resettlement authorities when noncitizens with certain specified health conditions enter their jurisdictions.212

The US-Mexico border is a gateway for contagious diseases--- curtailing surveillance sends Michelle Weinberg 03, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, January 2003, "The U.S.-Mexico Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project: Establishing Binational Border Surveillance," http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/1/02-0047_article#commentThe 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border is one of the world’s busiest international boundaries. An estimated 320 million people cross the northbound border legally every year (1). The U.S.-Mexico border is a unique region where the geopolitical boundary does not inhibit social and economic interactions nor the transmission of infectious diseases among residents on each side of the border. Some border cities (such as El Paso and Ciudad Juarez) are separated by a short distance and serve as one large metropolitan area for the local community (Figure 1). From an epidemiologic perspective, the border population must be considered as one, rather than different populations on two sides of a border; pathogens do not recognize the geopolitical boundaries established by human beings. The border region has a population of approximately 11 million people (2), many of whom cross the border daily to work, shop, attend school, seek medical care, or visit family and friends (3,4). The border population also includes persons who pass transiently through the region and others who come the area to work in maquilas, the border factories. The region has experienced tremendous population growth. During 1993–1997, the U.S. border population grew by 1.8% annually, more than double the national U.S. average of 0.8%, while the Mexican border population has grown by 4.3% per year, almost three times the national Mexican annual growth rate of 1.6% (2,5). Population growth has been spurred by increased economic opportunities after the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented in 1994. Currently, an estimated 3,300 maquilas, employing >1 million workers, are located along the border (6,7). The proliferation of border factories has generated a wave of internal migration of persons from other regions of Mexico and Central America toward the border (8).From Mexico’s perspective, the border encompasses some of the country’s most economically prosperous states. In contrast, the U.S. border region is among the poorest areas in the United States, with >30% of families living at or below the poverty level (8). Along the Texas border, an estimated 350,000 or more

people live in 1,450 unincorporated areas known as colonias, which lack adequate sanitation infrastructure (8).The large population movement, limited public health infrastructure, and poor environmental conditions contribute to increased incidence of certain infectious diseases (8–11) Analysis of data from the U.S. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System for 1990 through 1998 showed increased risks for certain foodborne, waterborne, and vaccine-preventable diseases in U.S. counties within 100 kilometers of the border, compared with nonborder states. These data show a two- to fourfold greater incidence of hepatitis A, measles, rubella, shigellosis, and rabies and an eightfold greater incidence of brucellosis in border counties than in nonborder states (11). Studies have identified the importance of cross-border movement in the transmission of various diseases, including hepatitis A (12,13), tuberculosis (14–18), shigellosis (19), syphilis (20), Mycobacterium bovis infection (21), and brucellosis (22,23).Despite the high prevalence of infectious diseases and increasing movement of people across the borders, no surveillance system had been established to assess the border population as a geographic unit. Gaining an accurate picture of public health needs was limited by the following factors. First, the surveillance case definitions used for public health reporting in Mexico and the United States are different. Also, laboratory confirmation is often unavailable in the Mexican border states, and therefore reported cases of infectious diseases are defined primarily by clinical findings. In contrast, for the many notifiable diseases in the United States, laboratory confirmation is required, and U.S. surveillance is heavily based on laboratory reporting. This system likely underestimates the true incidence rates. In the past, the two countries have exchanged limited border surveillance data. However, these differences diminish the usefulness of national surveillance data for developing a comprehensive, regional understanding of infectious disease epidemiology in the border areas. A consistent binational perspective is essential to effectively control and prevent the transmission of infectious diseases that move easily through the geopolitical boundary.The Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project was designed to bridge this surveillance gap by forming partnerships among institutions in both countries serving the region and bringing together each country’s complementary experiences in syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance. This report describes the establishment of a binational surveillance system for hepatitis and febrile exanthems along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Illegal Immigration DABorder Security Reduces illegal immigration Manuela Angelucci 11, Ph. D development economist, 7/29/11, “U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration” http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mangeluc/EDCC-enforcement.pdfThis paper contributes to the existing literature on Mexican illegal migration to the United States and its border enforcement by estimating the effect of enforcement on the net flow of undocumented migrants. Border enforcement increases migration costs, reducing the inflow of illegal migrants and increasing their human capital. The marginal effect of enforcement is a positive function of enforcement for the inflow but a constant or decreasing one for the outflow. Thus, as enforcement increases in the time period considered, it becomes more effective at reducing the net flow of illegal migrants. This evidence of high and rising migration costs that select a better pool of illegal migrants provides a rationale for Chiquiar and Hanson’s findings that Mexican migrants who live in the United States in the 1990’s and 2000’s are not negatively self-selected: as the costs get higher, low human capital individuals are prevented from migrating.

Visas CPVisa programs like the CP solve and provide remittancesMelissa MacNeil 8, Discussion of the Validity of a Guest Worker Program in the United States, “Discussion of the Validity of a Guest Worker Program in the United States”, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc86950/m2/1/high_res_d/macneil-melissa.pdfMigration flows follow certain patterns, and governments develop policy responses based on the type and duration of migratory flows. The aim of most new immigration policy implemented in Western

countries is to curb illegal migration. Several authors have outlined plans that would curb illegal migration and are pertinent to the discussion of a guest worker program because most involve provisions that could be remedied by such a program .

Martin and Straubhaar argue that to slow migration, governments on both sides of the issue must maximize the migration experience by ensuring payoffs with the “three R’s,” which are

recruitment of workers, remittances to family members in emigration areas, and a return to the country of origin when the migrant has earned his targeted amount (Martin & Straubhaar, 2002). These three factors ensure that the migrant maximizes savings potential, and rather than settle in the immigration area they return to their country of origin with more social capital and thus power within the community. As remittances are an important component of ensuring that the rotation model of migration functions effectively, the benefits of remittances must be maximized. Currently, emigrant communities are not benefiting up to their potential from the remittances sent by migrant workers because there is not enough competition from money transfer agencies, which keeps the costs of transfer low. Countries with high rates of emigration have not effectively implemented programs to encourage small investments of remittance money, and the governments themselves do not effectively appropriate remittance revenue into long-term investments (Martin & Straubhaar, 2002).

Trade CP---1NCThe United States federal government should decrease restrictions on trade between the United States and Mexico

Releasing protectionist policies boosts the Mexican economy--- motivates Mexicans to stay Pamela K. Starr 09, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and Associate Professor of International Relations at USC April 2009, "Mexico and the United States: A Window of Opportunity?," http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35Evidence of dysfunction in the U.S. immigration system is so bountiful and varied that policymakers and advocates from all points of view agree that the current system is broken . An effective, multifaceted reform of immigration law is obviously the ideal longterm response despite the disagreements over detailed provisions and sequencing that produced a stalemate in 2007. Despite President Obama’s promise to take up the issue before the end of 2009, however, it remains unclear that a broad legislative effort on immigration will rise to the top of Washington’s agenda in 2009 or even 2010, given competing priorities in domestic policy, such as health care, and the need to address the economic crisis. But that does not mean nothing can be done . If the United States is serious about reducing migration from Mexico, it should help Mexico create the 500,000 new jobs needed each year to employ new entrants into the Mexican job market. This effort should target the above mentioned aid programs to the regions in Mexico that have only recently begun to send migrants to the United States. Since the culture of migration is apt to be less well-developed in these new sending regions, job creation can be a more powerful motivation to stay home than in regions where migration has already become a way of life. This effort could also include expanded loan guarantees provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The most important U.S. policy tool for helping to create jobs in the Mexican economy, however, is not aid but fairer trade . Although reducing existing protection in the midst of an economic crisis is evidently not feasible, new protectionist impulses must be averted . Keeping the U.S. economy open to competitive Mexican exports and reducing subsidies on U.S. exports to Mexico, meanwhile, are essential medium-term policy reforms. And while trade alone is not a development or an anti-poverty program, it is hard to imagine how a country such as Mexico, where trade accounts for 30 percent of national production, can prosper in an increasingly protectionist environment. The United States must internalize the reality that if Mexico cannot export its goods to its main trading partner, it is destined to continue exporting labor instead .

Trade CP---Solves ImmigrationTrade and economic relations stop negative immigration and foster effective ties between the US and MexicoOscar Montealegre 13, M.A. in International Relations at University of Westminster and contributing writer at Diplomatic Courier, 1/25/13, " U.S.-Mexico Relations: Love Thy Neighbor," http://www.diplomaticourier.com/u-s-mexico-relations-love-thy-neighbor/It is not common knowledge that Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner , behind Canada and China. Every day, at least a billion dollars of goods flows across the border . Yet, Mexico is frequently negatively caricaturized, primarily with images of migrants illegally crossing the border into the U.S. and stealing U.S. jobs. Instead of viewing Mexico as a valuable partner that can benefit the U.S. in many facets, it is perceived as a liability, a region that cultivates corruption and violence and is the root of the current U.S. immigration ‘problem’ that has spurred controversial rogue measures like Arizona’s SB 1070.In matters of foreign policy, Mexico is an afterthought—our attention and resources are diverted to the Middle East or to grand strategies based on ‘pivoting’ our geopolitical and economical capacity towards Asia. With the U.S. economy performing at a snail-like pace, an emphasis on exports has re-emerged, but the bulk of the exporting narrative revolves around Asia. This is unfortunate, because our neighbor to the south has quietly positioned itself to be the next jewel in the emerging markets portfolio .For example, Market Watch (a Wall Street Journal subsidiary) recently published a bullish article on Mexico with the following headline: “Mexico: Investor’s New China”. The Economist published an opinion piece titled “The Global Mexican: Mexico is open for business”, highlighting Mexican companies that are investing locally and in the U.S. and arguing that Mexico is fertile ground for more investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. And according to The Financial Times, BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are no longer the flavor of the month; Mexico is now taking over that distinction.In essence, immigration and the drug trade will no longer anchor the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico; instead, economics, finance, trade, and commerce will dictate the terms between the neighboring countries.However, in order to move forward, undoubtedly the elephant in the room must be addressed promptly. Immigration—although the topic is polarizing, it is imperative that President Obama tackles this issue steadfastly and in the most bi-partisan manner possible. It can be seen as one-sided that the onus is on the U.S., while Mexico gets carte blanche in its contradictory policy with their border patrol methods towards Central American migrants entering through Guatemala. True, but when you are world’s super power, not all is fair in love and war.Fortifying borders, beefing up security, creating walls that divide the two countries that mimic uncomfortable parallels between Israel and Palestine should not be the main focus. With the world becoming more flat, the emphasis in tackling the immigration quagmire should be trade and commerce . Engagement, interaction, and

the exchange of ideas should be the picture we want to paint. We should not foster the argument that an open border policy and a global business paradigm will compromise American jobs and bite into our distinctive American competitiveness.The reason Mexicans cross the border illegally into the U.S. is because of one desire: opportunity . If Mexico develops a lasting robust economy, Mexicans will no longer desire to come to the U.S. in such droves . According to Nelson Balido, President of the Border Trade Alliance, this already occurring: “Mexico’s economy has, for the most part, weathered the worst of the economic downturn, meaning that more young Mexicans can reasonably seek and find work in their patria rather than heading north.”A strong American economy is extremely favorable for Mexico. Turn the tables a bit, and ponder what it means for the U.S. when a Mexican economy is robust and stable—more export

possibilities for the U.S.; more investment from the U.S. to Mexico, and vice versa, creating a win-win situation . Less need for Mexicans to leave their homeland and look for jobs in the U.S.Sounds familiar? The characteristics of many vibrant emerging markets such as China, Indonesia, Brazil, and India, are occurring right next door. Why go East when we can venture South? Or perhaps, approach both simultaneously. According to a Nomura Equity Research report, Mexico in the next decade will surpass Brazil in being Latin America’s largest economy. When comparing Mexico on a GDP per capita basis, Mexico happens to be less developed than Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. This might sound negative, but in actuality it should be music to investors’ ears: more catching up for Mexico, meaning more investment and business activity.Moreover, Mexico’s economy is highly interconnected with the U.S. economy. Currently, Mexico sends almost 80 percent of its exports to the U.S., and roughly 50 percent of its imports are from the U.S. Manufacturing costs in Mexico are once again competitive compared to China. Ten years ago, China’s labor costs were four times cheaper

than Mexico, but with labor wages in China inflating, Mexico now has a comparative advantage because its proximity to the U.S . Shipping cargo across the Pacific can be more expensive and arduous, versus trucking cargo from northern Mexico and delivering to Wisconsin in a matter of days.However if the U.S. administration continues to close the borders, the exchange of commerce between Mexico and the U.S. will suffer due to setbacks of just getting goods to cross the border . Luckily, NAFTA is already in place, but both parties (and Canada) can do more to cut red tape and streamline the movement of trade and commerce.

States CPBanning state immigration laws relieves the economy Shannon K. O’Neil 13, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, 2013, " TWO NATIONS INDIVISIBLE MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD," Local laws too have had deleterious effects . Early in 2011, Georgia passed a strict new immigration law to “relieve” it of the burdens of illegal aliens. As the start date approached, immigrant farm workers fled Georgia ’s famous peach orchards and

Vidalia onion fields. Searching for a solution, the governor asked farm owners to hire parolees. 34 The experiment ended almost as soon as it started, as nearly all quit within the first day, claiming the work was too hard . One participant observed, “Those guys out here weren’t out there thirty minutes and they got the bucket and just threw them in the air . . . They just left, took off across the field walking.” By mid-June, Georgia farmers were desperate for help; there were eleven thousand vacant field-hand positions, and the economy had already lost hundreds of millions of dollars . 35 More comprehensive studies reaffirm this anecdotal evidence. A study by University of Alabama researcher Samuel Addy estimates the combined effects of lost sales and income taxes (somewhere between US$80 million and US$350 million) and the fall in aggregate demand from lost consumers (eighty-five thousand unauthorized immigrants, roughly 5 percent of the state’s workforce) from Alabama’s restrictive immigration laws could shrink the state’s annual GDP by up to US $11 billion (6 percent). 36 Studies by the Center for American Progress and the University of Arizona have found that deporting unauthorized immigrant workers would have a similar effect in California and Arizona respectively. 37 A different study by the Americas Society / Council of the Americas suggests that restrictive laws hurt rather than help local employment in the long run. 38

Privacy K LinksThe problems of immigration surveillance revolve around the right of privacy and individual interests Anil Kalhan 14, Associate Professor of Law at Drexler University and chair of the New York City Bar Association's International Human Rights Committee, “Immigration Surveillance,” 74 Md. L. Rev. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlrImmigration surveillance demands reassessment of the interests at stake when personal information and travel history are collected, maintained, analyzed, and disseminated for purposes related to immigration control and the mechanisms to protect those interests .304 The proliferation of zones where immigration control activities take place—and where detailed information on individuals and their migration and mobility histories is collected and subsequently aggregated, stored, and disseminated—carries a range of social costs.305 While it is entirely appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for immigration control purposes in some contexts and subject to certain constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in which these immigration surveillance activities do not take place and in making sure that when they do take place those activities are appropriately limited and constrained.To some extent, those interests are individual interests, stemming from the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more generally and the individual harms that can result when individuals’ migration and mobility are routinely tracked and detailed information is maintained.306 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power —often have less to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and information management.307 In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to give greater weight to these kinds of interests than they have traditionally received.308

Their Aldana evidence recut says privacy rights for immigrants should be recognizedRaquel Aldana 08, Willam S. Boyd School of Law and University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2008, Vol 41, No. 3, http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/3/rights-remedies/41-3_Aldana.pdf Finally, privacy rights for immigrants should be recognized , despite their constructed illegality, because there are compelling policy reasons for protecting privacy in certain spaces .331 In the workplace, for example, immigration raids have devastated employers, the wellbeing of small towns, and the economic well-being of the entire nation.332 The reality is that immigrant workers dominate certain industries, including agriculture and meatpacking plants like that of Swift & Co. “Ridding” the country of twelve million undocumented workers through raids is not only unrealistic but incredibly disruptive.

Border DA

1NC ShellBorder Patrol is effective in keeping illegal immigrants outLynnette Curtis 10, 9-5-10, "Border Patrol finds success in curbing illegal immigration, targets Las Vegas," http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/border-patrol-finds-success-curbing-illegal-immigration-targets-las-vegas For some Border Patrol agents, boredom has replaced illegal immigration as Public Enemy No. 1. That is a good thing, said Chris Van Wagenen, a supervisory agent, as he steered his SUV past cotton fields near the Colorado River in late August."It's been a very hard battle to get where we are," he said. "We've gone from getting killed to having things handled."

In the last several years, the Yuma sector's border with Mexico has transformed from one of the busiest, most dangerous hot spots for illegal crossings to practically sleepy.The U.S. Border Patrol now considers the sector, which includes 126 miles of U.S.-Mexico border, to be under "operational control," and it is a model for other sectors that line the border.This unprecedented level of control has allowed Yuma to branch out and focus more of its efforts on areas within its sector but farther from the border, including a city 300 miles away that officials say has become a hub for human and drug smuggling from Mexico.U.S. Border Patrol agents recently descended upon that city -- Las Vegas -- where they raided several bus stations, arrested 31 suspected illegal immigrants and angered some in the Hispanic community.

Curtailing border control allows criminals to enter the U.S.Albaro Tutasig 14, Worker's Institute Research Fellow at Cornell University, 9-8-2014, " IMMIGRATION: A NATIONAL SECUIRTY THREAT?," http://cuslar.org/2014/09/08/immigration-a-national-secuirty-threat/The argument that undocumented immigration is a threat to the security of the United States is also supported by the criminal activities that accompany the increasing number of people immigrating to the United States—in particular the rising

numbers of individuals crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. According to a Congressional Research Service report released in August 2012, revealed that over a 33-month period, about 159,000 undocumented immigrants were arrested by local authorities, but released shortly after. The

report also showed that nearly one-sixth of previous detainees were arrested for crimes, mostly drunk-driving offenses, drug-crimes and felonies. In 2012, Republican Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas, then chairman of the House judiciary committee, criticized of what detractors have called a “catch and release” immigration policy: “Rather than protect the American people he was elected to serve, President Obama has imposed a policy that allows thousands of illegal immigrants to be released into our communities.” ICE claimed the policy was aimed at focusing limited resources on apprehending dangerous criminals.

ISIS terrorists reside in Ciudad Juarez Lauren Carroll 14, PolitiFact staff writer and major in Political Science from Duke University, 9-17-2014, "Is ISIS in Mexico and planning to cross the border?," http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/sep/17/trent-franks/isis-mexico-and-planning-cross-border/With the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria growing in the Middle East, nearly half of Americans think the country is less safe than it was before Sept. 11, 2001, according to a recent poll.

Some Republicans have expressed concern that the southern border is so porous, members of the extremist group could slip into the United States from Mexico. And a few have said such a plot is already in the works -- but federal agencies don’t agree.

Rep. Trent Franks, a Republican from Arizona, said his state faces an imminent threat in a recent phone conference with conservative nonprofit Staying True to America’s National Destiny. BuzzFeed picked up Franks’ comment, and it made its way around the Internet."It is true, that we know that ISIS is present in Ciudad Juarez or they were within the last few weeks," Franks said. "So there’s no question that they have designs on trying to come into Arizona. The comment that I’ve made is that if unaccompanied minors can cross the border then certainly trained terrorists probably can, too. It is something that is real."Several other politicians have made similar claims, including Texas Gov. Rick Perry, Rep. Lou Barletta, R-Pa., and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla. And the claims are spreading around conservative online media, like the Daily Caller, Breitbart News and pundit Sean Hannity at Fox News.

Drug cartels export terrorists across the border Judicial Watch 2015, non-partisan educational foundation promoting transparency, accountability and integrity in government, politics and the law, 4-14-2015, "ISIS Camp a Few Miles from Texas, Mexican Authorities Confirm," http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2015/04/isis-camp-a-few-miles-from-texas-mexican-authorities-confirm/ISIS is operating a camp just a few miles from El Paso, Texas, according to Judicial

Watch sources that include a Mexican Army field grade officer and a Mexican Federal Police Inspector.

The exact location where the terrorist group has established its base is around eight miles from the U.S. border in an area known as “Anapra” situated just west of Ciudad Juárez in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. Another ISIS cell to the west of Ciudad Juárez, in Puerto

Palomas, targets the New Mexico towns of Columbus and Deming for easy access to the United States, the same knowledgeable sources confirm.

During the course of a joint operation last week, Mexican Army and federal law enforcement officials discovered documents in Arabic and Urdu, as well as “plans” of Fort Bliss – the sprawling military installation that houses the US Army’s 1st Armored Division. Muslim prayer rugs were recovered with the documents during the operation.Law enforcement and intelligence sources report the area around Anapra is dominated by the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Cartel (“Juárez Cartel”), La Línea (the enforcement arm of the cartel) and the Barrio Azteca (a gang originally formed in the jails of El Paso). Cartel control of the Anapra area make it an extremely dangerous and hostile operating environment for Mexican Army and Federal Police operations.According to these same sources, “coyotes” engaged in human smuggling – and working for Juárez Cartel – help move ISIS terrorists through the desert and across the border between Santa Teresa and Sunland Park, New Mexico. To the east of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, cartel-backed “coyotes” are also smuggling ISIS terrorists through the porous border between Acala and Fort Hancock, Texas. These specific areas were targeted for exploitation by ISIS because of their understaffed municipal and county police forces, and the relative safe-havens the areas provide for the unchecked large-scale drug smuggling that was already ongoing.Mexican intelligence sources report that ISIS intends to exploit the railways and airport facilities in the vicinity of Santa Teresa, NM (a US port-of-entry). The sources also say that ISIS has “spotters” located in the East Potrillo Mountains of New Mexico (largely managed by the Bureau of Land Management) to assist with terrorist border crossing operations. ISIS is conducting reconnaissance of regional universities; the White Sands Missile Range; government facilities in Alamogordo, NM; Ft. Bliss; and the electrical power facilities near Anapra and Chaparral, NM.

Nuclear terror is feasible and likely – high motivationMatthew Bunn 15, Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, “Reducing the risks of nuclear theft and terrorism,” from Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy ed. Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Busch, 5/15/15, pp. 419-420But we now live in an age that includes a few groups intent on inflicting large-scale destruction to achieve more global objectives . In the 1990s, the japanese terror cult Anni Shinrikyo first sought to buy nuclear weapons in Russia , then to make them themselves, before turning to biological weapons and the nerve gas they ultimatelv used in the Tokyo subways.¶

Starting also in the 19905, al Qaeda repeatedly sought nuclear materials and the expertise needed to make them into a nuclear bomb. Ultimately, al Qaeda put together a focused program reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri (now head of the group), which progressed as far as carrying out crude but sensible conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of Afghanistan.‘ ¶ The killing of Osama bin Laden and the many other blows against al Qaeda have surely reduced the risk that al Qaeda could put together and carry through a nuclear bomb project. But by how much? The core organization of al Qaeda has proved resilient in the past.There is every reason to believe Al-Zawahiri remains eager to inflict destruction on a nuclear scale . Indeed, despite the large number of al

Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured, nearly all of the key players in al Qaeda’s nuclear program remain alive and at large - including Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert who was al Qaeda’s “nuclear CEO." No one knows what capabilities a secret cell of al Qaeda may have managed to retain or build. And regional affiliates and other groups in the broader violent Islamic extremist movement — particularly some of the deadly Pakistani terrorist groups — may someday develop the capability and intent to follow a similar path .¶

North Caucasus terrorist groups sought radiological weapons and threatened to sabotage nuclear reactors.There is significant , though less conclusive, evidence that they sought nuclear weapons as well — particularly confirmation from senior Russian officials that two teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear weapon storage sites , whose very locations are a state secret.¶ More fundamentally, with at least two, and probably three, groups having gone down this path in the past twenty-five years, there is no reason to expect they will be the last . The danger of nuclear terrorism will remain as long as nuclear weapons , the materials needed to make them,

and terrorist groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist.

Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are keyNathan Myhrvold '13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdfSeveral powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion . That , coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility . Either way, stateless groups are

forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of tech nology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power . Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower . Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades .

Add-OnsThe US-Mexico border is a gateway for contagious diseases--- curtailing surveillance allows for disease breakout in the U.S.Michelle Weinberg 03, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, January 2003, "The U.S.-Mexico Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project: Establishing Binational Border Surveillance," http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/1/02-0047_article#commentThe 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border is one of the world’s busiest international boundaries. An estimated 320 million people cross the northbound border legally every year (1). The U.S.-Mexico border is a unique region where the geopolitical boundary does not inhibit social and

economic interactions nor the transmission of infectious diseases among residents on each side of the border. Some border cities (such as El Paso and Ciudad Juarez) are separated by a short distance and serve

as one large metropolitan area for the local community (Figure 1). From an epidemiologic perspective, the border population must be considered as one, rather than different populations on two sides of a border; pathogens do not recognize the geopolitical boundaries established by human beings. The border region has a population of approximately 11 million people (2), many of

whom cross the border daily to work, shop, attend school, seek medical care, or visit family and friends (3,4). The border population also includes persons who pass transiently through the region and others who come the area to work in maquilas, the border factories. The region has experienced tremendous population growth. During 1993–1997, the U.S. border population grew by 1.8% annually, more than double the national U.S. average of 0.8%, while the Mexican border population has grown by 4.3% per year, almost three times the national Mexican annual growth rate of 1.6% (2,5). Population growth has been spurred by increased economic opportunities after the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented in 1994. Currently, an estimated 3,300 maquilas, employing >1 million workers, are located along the border (6,7). The proliferation of border factories has generated a wave of internal migration of persons from other regions of Mexico and Central America toward the border (8).From Mexico’s perspective, the border encompasses some of the country’s most economically prosperous states. In contrast, the U.S. border region is among the poorest areas in the United States, with >30% of families living at or below the poverty level (8). Along the Texas border, an estimated 350,000 or more people live in 1,450 unincorporated areas known as colonias, which lack adequate sanitation infrastructure (8).

The large population movement, limited public health infrastructure, and poor environmental conditions contribute to increased incidence of certain infectious diseases (8–11) Analysis of data from the U.S. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System for 1990 through 1998 showed increased risks for certain foodborne, waterborne, and vaccine-preventable diseases in U.S. counties within 100 kilometers of the border, compared with nonborder states. These data show a two- to fourfold greater incidence of hepatitis A, measles, rubella, shigellosis, and rabies and an eightfold greater incidence of brucellosis in border counties than in nonborder states (11). Studies have identified the importance of cross-border movement in the transmission of various diseases, including hepatitis A (12,13), tuberculosis (14–18), shigellosis (19), syphilis (20), Mycobacterium bovis infection (21), and brucellosis (22,23).

Despite the high prevalence of infectious diseases and increasing movement of people across the borders, no surveillance system had been established to assess the border population as a geographic unit. Gaining an accurate picture of public health needs was

limited by the following factors. First, the surveillance case definitions used for public health reporting in Mexico and the United States are different. Also, laboratory confirmation is often unavailable in the Mexican border states, and therefore reported cases of infectious diseases are defined primarily by clinical findings. In contrast, for the many notifiable diseases in the United States, laboratory confirmation is required, and U.S. surveillance is heavily based on laboratory reporting. This system likely underestimates the true incidence rates. In

the past, the two countries have exchanged limited border surveillance data. However, these differences diminish the usefulness of national surveillance data for developing a comprehensive, regional understanding of infectious disease epidemiology in the border areas. A consistent binational perspective is essential to effectively control and prevent the transmission of infectious diseases that move easily through the geopolitical boundary.The Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project was designed to bridge this surveillance gap by forming partnerships among institutions in both countries serving the region and bringing together each country’s complementary experiences in syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance. This report describes the establishment of a binational surveillance system for hepatitis and febrile exanthems along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Tuberculosis can breakout between the borders and develop resistant formsBetsy McKay 13, Atlanta Bureau Chief for The Wall Street Journal, 3-8-2013, "Risk of Deadly TB Exposure Grows Along U.S.-Mexico Border," http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323293704578336283658347240To be sure, the actual number of cases in the U.S. and Mexico is still small and the rates of multidrug-resistant TB—or MDR—are nowhere near as severe as India, China, or Eastern Europe, where drug-resistant TB is at epidemic proportions. In 2011, the most recent year available, Mexico had 467 MDR-TB cases, the World Health Organization estimates, while the U.S. had 124, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Almost half of the U.S. cases came from California and Texas. Health officials say it is crucial to jump on prevention now, because the disease is transmitted airborne and can spread quickly."We're all connected by the air we breathe," said Thomas Frieden, director of the CDC, and a TB expert who successfully battled a major outbreak of multidrug-resistant TB in New York City in the 1990s, then spearheaded India's TB-fighting program for the World Health Organization.Gonzalo Garcia has struggled with drug-resistant tuberculosis while living in Tijuana. He doesn't know when he contracted the disease. In its drug-resistant forms, TB can still be fatal, and the treatment may be painful, requiring up to two years or more of medication and potentially months of isolation. Costs are steep too; according to a recent CDC study, treatment on average in the U.S. was about $140,000 and ran as high as $700,000.For health officials, the challenge of trying to control an airborne disease along an area as large as the U.S.-Mexico border is enormous. More than 150 million people cross the border each year. Many, like Mr. Garcia, go back and forth to work, or to play, with visas that allow short trips in the border region. Two CDC quarantine stations sit along the border to deal with health concerns. "TB is the most common disease we get called about," said Steve Waterman, chief of the CDC's U. S-Mexico unit in the agency's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine.The U.S.-Mexico border is "not like the Berlin Wall," said David Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego. "It's one region." That means people live on one side of the border and run a business on the other, and shoppers from both countries frequent the same malls, he said.In the Mexican state of Baja California, officials are treating three cases of XDR-TB, a rare but severe form of the disease in which a patient's TB is resistant both to the two most potent drugs for treatment as well as some drugs used to treat drug-resistant TB, said Dr. Laniado-Laborin. Six new cases of this type were reported in the entire U.S. in 2011.North of the border, in San Diego, the overall TB rate is around twice the U.S. national average. Los Angeles is grappling with its worst TB outbreak in a decade, and police have been reminded to use face masks when encountering those who are sick. "You can learn from San Diego how things could play out in the heartland of America," says Richard Kiy, chief executive of International Community Foundation, a public foundation that supports treatment of drug-resistant TB patients at Dr. Laniado-Laborin's clinic and elsewhere in Baja California.Officials say that when drug-resistant cases show up in the U.S., there is often a Mexico connection. Of San Diego's 14 multidrug-resistant TB cases between 2007 and 2011, half were either from Mexico or had a Mexico link based on the particular strain of the disease, said Kathleen Moser of the county's Health & Human Services Agency, which sees many patients who live and work on both sides of the border.

Part of the problem, of course, is that Mexico's rate of TB infection is much higher—in some cases 10 times higher. The resistant strains begin to breed, experts say, when doctors there give patients similar drug regimens over and over. Other times, patients who aren't supervised closely abandon treatment before they are cured.

UQBorder security is effective--- 84% of illegal crossings are preventedBrad Plumer 13, Senior Editor at Vox and former reporter for the Washington Post, 6-21-2013, “Border security is the key to immigration reform. So how do we measure it?,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/21/border-security-is-the-key-to-immigration-reform-so-how-do-we-define-it/1) At the moment, the U.S. government considers border security in the Southwest about 84 percent "effective."It was only last year that the nine Border Patrol sectors along the Southwest border finally standardized their metrics for how effectively they were securing the border. The results are laid out in a 2012 report from the Government Accountability Office:Each sector measures three things: "Apprehensions" are the portion of border-crossers who are caught and detained. "Turn backs" are people who had either climbed a fence or crossed the border but were sent back to Mexico. "Got aways" are, well, border-crossers who made it through without getting caught.

These numbers are thought to be reasonably accurate , says Rebecca Tallent, the director of

immigration policy for the Bipartisan Policy Center. The Border Patrol will use cameras and other evidence to get a rough count for "turn backs" and "got aways." Workers at the Yuma sector, for instance, will comb the desert every morning and count footprints in the sand to see who slipped through in the night. That said, they're still rough estimates. It's very possible that other border-crossers are slipping by undetected.In 2011, the GAO reports, border security along the Southwest was thought to be about 84 percent effective. That is, 16 percent of attempts to cross the border were successful — which amounted to about 85,000 people getting through. Another 61.3 percent resulted in apprehensions. And 22.7 percent of attempts were turned back.Now, effectiveness varied by sector — the Yuma sector, which is very well-staffed , had an effectiveness rate of 93.7 percent . By contrast, border security in the Rio Grande Valley sector was just 70.8 percent effective. Here's a map of the sectors, via the BPC's Matt Graham:

LinkTerrorists will exploit open entrances in the border. Todd Steinmetz 11, Homeland Security Analyst at EWA/IIT, Fall 2011, “Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations,” http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=jssHistory demonstrates that terrorists search for security gaps and invent creative ways to exploit them. In fact , terrorists rely on security weaknesses to operate effectively . International terrorist groups know that criminal organizations in Central and South America maintain well-established networks that enable them to smuggle large quantities of narcotics and people across America's southern border. Terrorists could use these illicit criminal networks to smuggle weapons, chemicals, biological contaminants, and/or explosives into the United States. As Zapata County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez observed:"If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one time and can smuggle twenty–thirty persons at one time, one can just imagine how easy it would be to bring in two to three terrorists or their weapons of mass destruction …chances of apprehension are very slim."31 Terrorists also know that large segments of both the northern and southern border remain relatively unsecured. It is a known fact that several radical international Islamic groups maintain significant operations in Central and South America and engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, arms dealing, and other legitimate and illegitimate means to funnel millions of dollars every year into the hands of transnational terrorists.32

Drug cartels in the border practice terrorist tactics--- decapitations and skinning Carrie F. Cordero 13, Director of National Security Studies in the Georgetown University Law Center, “Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security Challenge for the Next Four Years,” http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2211&context=facpubThe homeland security community has been forced to steadily increase its engagement on the issue of how the U.S. legal and policy framework should address the Mexico Situation. The traditional view has been to treat the Mexican drug cartels4 like criminal

organizations—that is, primarily as a law enforcement issue. But, in recent years, the drug cartels have stretched beyond the Italian mafia model; their activities increasingly are more similar to those of international terrorist organizations and insurgencies as defined by the laws of war. According to Steven C. McCraw, Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety and

a former FBI Agent, the Mexican Situation is both a public safety and national security issue:5

[The cartels] use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry . . . They employ horrific tactics to intimidate their adversaries and the public such as decapitations, acid baths, skinning people alive, torture and Improvised Explosive Devices and they have expanded their criminal operations to profit from kidnappings, robberies, human

trafficking, extortions, and theft . . . . We continu[e] [to] see multi-ton drug loads seized throughout Texas.6 In line with McCraw’s description, events of recent years have made clear that the citizens of Mexico live in terror. Murder, torture, kidnappings, and extortion are the daily

goings-on in Mexico at the direction of the cartels.7 The average Mexican citizen, law enforcement official, or local public official, may no longer have a choice whether or not to cooperate with the cartels. When the choice is to cooperate, or face death of oneself or one’s family, there really is no choice .8

The frightening security situation is not limited to the Mexican side of the border. Americans are at risk , too . Sigifredo Gonzalez, the Zapata County, Texas Sheriff, described in May 2011 how

families on the United States side of the border have bullet holes in their homes and periodically need to hide or evacuate to avoid cross-border gunfire.9 U.S. citizens have been killed, including some on official duty (e.g., the February 2011 killing of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Agent Jaime Zapata by Los Zetas), and others innocently visiting Mexico (e.g., Agustin Roberto “Bobby” Salcedo).10

Once terrorist groups obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, bombs can be sent to the US through smuggling tunnelsEben Blake 15, intern covering general affairs at IBTimes in New York City and currently pursuing a degree in English and History at Brown University, 6-3-2015, “Islamic State Nuclear Weapons: ISIS Claims It Can Smuggle Devices Through Nigeria, Mexico To The United States,” http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-nuclear-weapons-isis-claims-it-can-smuggle-devices-through-nigeria-1950280The Islamic State group claims it could purchase a nuclear device from Pakistan and transport it to the United States through drug-smuggling channels . The group, also known as ISIS and ISIL, would transfer the nuclear weapon from Pakistan to Nigeria or Mexico, where it could be brought to South America and then up to the U.S., according to an op-ed allegedly written by kidnapped British photojournalist John Cantlie and published in Dabiq, the group's propaganda magazine.The op-ed said that Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadist group that announced its formal allegiance to ISIS in March, would make their efforts to transport a weapon to the U.S. much easier, reported Nigerian newspaper Premium Times. ISIS claims the Nigerian army is in a "virtual state of collapse" because of its war against Boko Haram. While U.S. officials have dismissed the ability of the group to acquire or transport a nuclear weapon, Indian Minister of State Defense Rao Inderjit Singh said at the Shangri-La regional security conference in Singapore last weekend

that "[w]ith the rise of ISIL in West Asia, one is afraid to an extent that perhaps they might get access to a nuclear arsenal from states like Pakistan ," Bloomberg reported. Cantlie describes how ISIL would hypothetically call on supporters in Pakistan to "purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region," after which it would be "transported overland until it makes it to Libya" when "the mujahedeen move it south to Nigeria." It would then be moved to South America in the same method that "drug shipments bound for Europe pass through West

Africa," according to Premium Times. After transporting the device through the " porous borders of South America " to Mexico, it would be "just a quick hop through a smuggling tunnel" to bring the nuclear bomb into America. Since his abduction in 2012, Cantlie has appeared in multiple ISIS propaganda videos, including the series "Lend Me Your Ears."

Visas CP

1NCCP Text: The USFG should create a program, reminiscent of the Bracero Program, giving immigrants temporary visas to come work in the US as agricultural laborers with “visa portability”. Monetary sanctions will be utilized to assure cooperation.

That solves the cseAlex Nowrasteh 13, Immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, 3-5-2013, “Guest Workers Key to Reform,” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/guest-workers-key-reformThe U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO reached a tentative agreement to support increasing lawful migration through a guest-worker program for lower-skilled migrants . The details are obscure, but this agreement is an essential first step for successful immigration reform — a step so far ignored by the Obama administration.

Without a guest-worker program, quite simply, immigration reform will fail .

Overwhelmingly, immigrants come to the United States because they want jobs, and American businesses have jobs to give. Legalizing the unauthorized migrants already here is a sound

policy, but without a legal channel for workers to come, others will continue to enter the country illegally.

Policymakers seem to forget that there is recent evidence to this effect. Ronald Reagan instituted an amnesty in 1986, but unauthorized immigration continued unabated. Increased border and immigration enforcement — and it did increase — couldn’t stem the tide.It is foolish to expect legalization and enforcement alone to stop unauthorized immigration . The demand is too strong on both sides of the labor equation. We need reforms

that adapt to that reality.Why is President Obama ignoring a guest-worker visa program? Because unions — one of the president’s most valued constituencies — have historically opposed guest workers.A 2007 immigration reform effort largely failed because of union efforts to kill it. Late in the game, Senate Democrats amended the bill to end its guest-worker program after five years. The amendment passed 49-48 — with then-Sen. Obama, ominously, voting in favor. As a result, Republicans and business interests that supported increased lawful immigration withdrew their support, and the reform effort collapsed.At the time, the leaders of the AFL-CIO, the Teamsters, and other unions all wrote letters opposing the guest-worker program.

James P. Hoffa of the Teamsters opposed a guest-worker program because it would “[force] workers to toil in a truly temporary status with a high risk of exploitation and abuse by those seeking cheap labor.”

But the employer abuse issue is a straw man. There is a rather simple remedy: visa portability, which would allow guest

workers to easily switch jobs. The ability to quit a job without the legal risk of deportation would give guest workers the ability to effectively enforce their own labor standards: They could depart an abusive employer without fear of deportation.

Instead of more migrant freedom, labor leaders are supporting more regulations for guest-worker visas. The Obama-endorsed blueprint wants reform to “protect workers by ensuring labor protections.” But those so-called protections have already made current lower-skilled guest-worker visas too costly for American employers — a by-product unions favor.To their credit, unions support legalization of current unauthorized immigrants and family reunification. But from the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 through the race-based quotas of the 1920s to today, unions have supported every migrant-worker restriction.César Chávez’s United Farm Workers (UFW) lobbied hard to end the Bracero Program, a 1940s guest-worker program created to address an agricultural labor shortage created by World War II. UFW members beat up unauthorized migrants, formed a “wet line” (their words) on the border to stop migrants, and reported unauthorized immigrants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

If there is a model for a successful guest-worker program, however, the Bracero Program is it . Under Bracero, immigrants could work temporarily, but they had to leave the United States every season. American farms got the labor they demanded, immigrant workers made money, and agricultural production increased . The program was so successful that it was extended until 1964. It combined enforcement that funneled migrants into a legal system with an unlimited temporary migration system. Often, Border Patrol agents enrolled unauthorized immigrants they arrested in the Bracero Program and let them return to work — this time lawfully.Mexican workers thinking of entering the United States illegally overwhelmingly chose the legal Bracero option instead. Throughout the 1950s, unauthorized immigration declined by 95 percent. If a Bracero-type guest-worker visa existed today, one that allowed migrants to switch jobs and work in nonagricultural areas, unauthorized immigration would dramatically decrease .

Internal NB: Mexican EconomyThe past Bracero program alleviated the Mexican economy Maria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Despite these concerns, the Mexican government recognized the advantages of the program. 76 They had been assured that it would be a government-to-government program in which Mexico would have a strong voice. 77 By working on American farms, the braceros would acquire technical skills that could benefit Mexican agriculture .

78 The braceros would also have the opportunity to earn substantial money for themselves, their families , and their country, thus alleviating rural poverty and providing a safety valve to deal with a politically explosive underemployed population. 79 Finally, it was a chance for Mexico to contribute significantly to the war effort, and refusing the American request risked "antagoniz[ing] the consumer of a potentially large amount of Mexican raw materials during the war. "80 Mexico decided that overall the positive effects of the program outweighed the negative. 81

More Solvency MechanismsThe guest-worker program establishes a bilateral relationship that improves the US’ overall relations with MexicoMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Last year Mexican Labor Minister Jose Antonio Gonzalez Fernandez expressed his government's intention to ask the United States to join Mexico in examining the possibility of a worker exchange program when the NAFTA labor side-accord comes up for review

in the future. 4 Such a bilateral effort, the Bracero Program was executed in the 1940s and 1950s.5 Under this program Mexican agricultural workers were legally permitted to temporarily enter the United States to work. The Bracero Program remains the only example of a bilateral immigration program between the United States and Mexico. 6 Since then, the U.S. government has made little effort even to discuss a new bilateral program for Mexican immigration to the United States. 7 This Note will examine the bilateral nature of the Bracero Program, and the various factors that made the program possible from 1942 until 1964. That is, what brought about the air of cooperation, what drove it away, and what was accomplished in the interim. Ultimately, this examination will demonstrate that the economic and political conditions that exist today are similar to those that existed when the Bracero Program was established , providing hope that a new bilateral labor agreement between Mexico and the United States may be forthcoming.

A bilateral immigration program could provide significant advantages over unilateral immigration policy. First, the two countries could more effectively achieve their migration goals through a cooperative effort since the policies of either nation can influence migration patterns. 8 Additionally, cooperation and compromise in the area of immigration can improve overall relations between Mexico and the United States so that cooperation will continue in other fields, such as trade. 9 However, differences in the sociopolitical atmosphere of the two countries and weaknesses in the Bracero Program itself indicate that a new agreement would not and should not follow the Bracero model. Nonetheless, the failures in cooperation and the weaknesses of the earlier program can provide some of the best insight on how any future bilateral immigration program should be structured.

Different card: Current immigration enforcement failsMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Finally, the perception that Mexican labor migration to the United States was not amenable to control through unilateral efforts by either government, the perception that led to the

creation of the Bracero Program, has been reaffirmed since the termination of the program. I83

Unilateral steps taken by the United States, for example, to stem the tide of illegal immigration have proven ineffective . 184 In fact, the United States experienced a significant increase in

the pace of Mexican immigration in the 1970s and 1980s.185 In the 1990s, approximately 200,000

Mexican immigrants (legal and illegal) came to the United States each year ,186 and one to two million additional Mexicans (legal and illegal) worked at least seasonally in the United States each year. 187

The U.S. response to the massive flow of unauthorized migration has focused on apprehending those attempting illegal entry. 188 Yet, instead of deterring attempted illegal entries, the U.S. strategy has only caused migrants to pay professional smugglers higher fees and to attempt crossing the border several times before successfully entering. 189 There has, in turn, been a significant increase in the number of migrants who have died while attempting to gain unauthorized entry.19O The U.S. strategy has also created an unintended incentive for unauthorized migrants to remain in the United States once they have entered since re-entry is ever more difficult. 191 Cooperation with Mexico has advantages that improve the chances of having greater success in achieving the migration goals of both countries. 192 Although in the long run, both governments expect NAFTA to create jobs in Mexico for people who might otherwise immigrate to the United States,193 reduced migration is an unrealistic expectation in the near- to medium-term future. 194 Conditions in both countries will continue to influence immigration decisions. 195 Conditions pulling Mexicans to the United States include the demand for immigrant labor by U.S. employers, opportunities and higher wages, and family connections in this country. 196 Conditions pushing Mexicans to leave Mexico include demographic population growth, urban and rural insecurity, economic restructuring disruptions, and severe degradation of the environment in Mexico. 197

A2: Solvency DeficitsMigration goals between both governments mean that the program will passMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Any plan for a bilateral legalized worker program would have to address the human rights and illegal and permanent immigration problems of the Bracero Program. It would also have to overcome the fears of domestic labor and persuade American workers that such a program would not adversely affect the domestic job market. Additionally, it would have to overcome the extreme anti-immigrant attitude that has dominated U.S. public opinion in recent

years. Nonetheless, it appears that conditions are quite favorable for a new immigration agreement with Mexico in light of the atmosphere of cooperation that exists, the

confidence that the United States is enjoying with a booming economy, and the existence of common migration goals between the two countries .

Monetary sanctions and legalization protects the laborers and the bilateral agreementMaria Elena Bickerton 01, founding member of Bradshaw & Bickerton PLLC, 2001 “An Agricultural Law Research Article: Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program,” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-prospects-for-a-bilateral-immigration-agreement-with-mexico-lessons-from-the-bracero-program-79-texas-l-rev-895-919-2001/wppa_open/Many in Mexico have suggested that a new bilateral guest worker program, "operat[ing] within

currently existing migratory labor markets," could satisfy the migration goals of both Mexico and the United States by replacing "highly exploited undocumented migrants" with regulated guest workers. 226 Legalizing migrant laborers on a bilateral basis allows both governments to ensure adequate safeguards for labor. With such protections, Mexican workers

would have an incentive to remain within the program, the Mexican government would have assurances that their citizens' human rights would not be violated , and U.S. labor

would be more likely to support the use of foreign labor. 227 U.S. growers should support the program, even with safeguards for the laborers, because it would help satisfy their need for a "just-in-time labor force."228 For both countries, such a program would also promote the return of Mexican immigrants to Mexico, minimizing "brain drain"229 so that Mexico can benefit from the migrants' new skills and conform to the seasonal fluctuations of the U. S. growers' demand for labor. 230

Of course, both countries must insist that enforcement of the safeguards be taken seriously to avoid a repetition of the worst aspects of the Bracero Program. Any bilateral migration

agreement should contain mechanisms that provide serious incentives for enforcement of workers' rights under the agreement. 231 For example, commentators have argued that

automatic monetary sanctions for breaches of rules in international agreements can significantly strengthen the rights and obligations created by the agreement. 232 Including this type of sanctions provision in any new bilateral migration program would penalize the United States if it were

to ignore its obligations under the agreement as it did under the Bracero Program. Thus, the experience with the Bracero Program, while teaching us what mistakes to avoid, demonstrates that there are good prospects for a new bilateral program today.

CP Shields Link to PoliticsRepublicans pushing for guest worker programsYaël Ossowski 15, national investigative reporter for Watchdog, April 2, 2015, “Conservatives push guest worker program to halt illegal immigration,” http://watchdog.org/209762/guest-worker-program/An easy way to fix the convoluted immigration system in the United States entails making it easier for foreigners to be hired, without a lot of red tape in their way.Even the 8.1 million illegal immigrants now in the workforce.That, at least, was the consensus of the five witnesses convened to present at the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs last week.“I worry about a government that would criminalize the rational activity of someone selling their labor to improve their condition, and another who buys labor in order to make a profit — which is what our current immigration law does,” said Daniel Garza, executive director of the LIBRE Initiative, a free market organization representing Latinos. “I fear a growing government that hinders economic growth, that restricts opportunities.”He was joined by experts from Pew Research Center, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Enterprise Institute and the Migration Policy Institute, who were all united behind the idea of expanding the existing guest worker program as a means to trigger economic growth and fix the nation’s immigration problems.The committee hearing chaired by Sen. Ron Johnson, a Republican from Wisconsin , was called “Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and Addressing Future Flows.” It focused more on reforming the visa programs than border controls, demonstrating a shift in the conservative examination of immigration.The meeting was marked by a united front by the conservative-leaning panel of witnesses, coming from industry, academia and activism.Asked what was needed for Congress to solve the illegal immigration crisis, Randel Johnson, a vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, pulled no punches. “It’s a combination of an expanded temporary worker programs and a sensible pathway to legalization,” he testified.He emphasized that it must be easier for companies to hire immigrants to provide for the best educated and skilled employees to compete in the global marketplace.The U.S. has the largest guest worker program in the world, made up of the H-2A and H-2B visas, which allow employers to temporarily hire foreign workers.But even with the largest guest worker program in the world, the U.S. also has the distinction of having the largest illegal immigrant population in the world, according to the Migration Policy Institute, which makes for an interesting paradox.That’s made worse by the fact there has been no significant immigration reform since at least 1996, when stricter policies were enacted and helped bulk up immigration enforcement instead of solving the problem of the growing population of undocumented immigrants.“Immigration enforcement has cost the U.S. government over $208 billion since 2001,” Marc Rosenblum, deputy director of the Migration Policy Institute, said at the committee hearing. “It spends more on immigration enforcement than any other federal criminal law enforcement activities combined.”Senator Johnson, the committee chairman, generally agreed with the witnesses, but he remained skeptical about whether accepting larger numbers of immigrants and legalizing those already in the country would hurt the native workforce.“There is a dispute as to whether undocumented workers have or haven’t depressed wages,” said Johnson, citing a case from a California energy company looking to hire technicians from outside the United States.His question was immediately addressed and downplayed.“The bulk of studies unquestionably find that there is almost no effect,” said Madeline Zavodny, economics professor at Agnes Scott College and an adjunct scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “There is no zero-sum number of jobs. When immigrants come, jobs also get created.”She was unequivocal in her support for expanding a guest worker program to help not just immigrants but also native workers themselves.“To protect native workers from unfair competition, we need to allow guest workers to move to employers who want to hire them and want to offer higher wages to have them,” said Madeline Zavodny, economics professor at Agnes Scott College and an adjunct scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.This positive take on immigration reform is rising not just among conservative economists and activists but also among the potential top GOP candidates for president, including Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Scott Walker of Wisconsin.

Republicans pushing for non-border immigration reformPaul Dupont 15, reporter for American Principles Project, 1-2-2015, “Republican-Led Immigration Proposals Taking Shape For New Year,” https://americanprinciplesproject.org/blog/republican-led-immigration-proposals-taking-shape-for-new-year/However, as I have argued in the past, bolstering border security and enforcement in other areas will not fix America’s immigration system on its own. There is also a need to improve U.S. guest worker programs in order to address the increasing demand for foreign workers to fill high- and low-skill positions for which American workers cannot be found. Fortunately, some in Congress also seem keen to tackle this issue:

Other Republicans are preparing legislation to address additional aspects of the immigration system. Rep. Raúl Labrador (R., Idaho), a onetime immigration attorney, plans two bills, an aide said.

One would create a temporary worker program that would allow as many as 350,000 foreigners to enter the country each year for construction, restaurant and other low-skilled jobs. These workers would have most of the labor rights afforded in a broad immigration bill that passed the Senate last year, such as the right to change jobs.

Meanwhile, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R., Utah) plans to introduce legislation making more visas available for high-tech workers, a spokesman said.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) is working on a bill revamping the agricultural visa program, based on provisions in last year’s Senate bill. Her staff is in talks on the measure with Republicans including Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, who helped work out a compromise on this issue in 2013.Of course, many details remain to be settled before any of these proposals can be fully evaluated. However, given the need for major reforms in these areas, news of such developments may give proponents of a truly conservative immigration policy reason to feel cautiously optimistic.

CP Shields Link to Border DALegalization of workers reveals terrorists from the migrating populationDaniel Griswold 04, director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4-1-2004, “Securing Our Borders Under a Temporary Guest Worker Program,” http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/securing-our-borders-under-temporary-guest-worker-program-0Indeed, legalizing and regularizing the movement of workers across the U.S.-Mexican

border could enhance our national security by bringing much of the underground labor market into the open, encouraging newly documented workers to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials, and freeing resources for border security and the war on terrorism .Real immigration reform would drain a large part of the underground swamp that facilitates illegal immigration. It would reduce the demand for fraudulent documents, which in turn would reduce the supply available for terrorists trying to operate surreptitiously inside the United States. It would eliminate most of the human smuggling operations overnight. The vast majority of Mexican workers who enter the United States have no criminal record or intentions. They would obviously prefer to enter the country in a safe, orderly, legal process through an official port of entry, rather than put their lives in the hands of unscrupulous smugglers. By entering legally through a temporary worker program, they could travel freely across the border for multiple visits home rather than incurring the risk and expense of re-crossing the border illegally. As a consequence, legalization would drain the underground channels through which terrorists might try to enter the country .

Just as importantly, legalization would encourage millions of currently undocumented workers to make themselves known to authorities by registering with the government, reducing cover for terrorists who manage to enter the country and overstay their visas. Workers with legal documents would be more inclined to cooperate with law enforcement and provide evidence if they do not fear deportation. Furthermore, we would free up enforcement and border-control resources to focus on protecting the American homeland from terrorist attack. Our Department of Homeland Security should concentrate its limited resources and personnel on tracking and hunting down terrorists instead of raiding chicken processing plants and busting janitors at discount stores.