Description of document: Four (4) Department of Energy (DOE) Inspection Reports, 1999-2005

Requested date: 2016 Released date: 19-September-2016 Posted date: 26-September-2016 Source of document: Department of Energy

FOIA Requester Service Center 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Mail Stop MA-90 Washington, DC 20585 Fax: (202) 586-0575

The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.

,Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585

SEP 19 2016

Re: Freedom oflnformation Act Request HQ-2016-00958-F

This is the Office of Inspector General (OIG) response to the request for information that you sent to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. You asked for a copy of the following documents:

"INSPECTION REPORT: S051S022, March 21, 2005, Review of Possible Inappropriate Job Solicitation

Report IG-0671: Concerns Regarding the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Inspection Program (U)

SPECIAL REPORT: OAS-SR-05-01, October 1, 2004, Department's Process of Responding to a Congressional Information Request

INSPECTION REPORT: S99IS022, December 1, 1999, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Domestic Partner Travel

INSPECTION REPORT: S99IS025, May 1, 1999, Inspection Report of Management on Unauthorized Release of Internal Report"

The OIG has completed the search of its files and identified six documents responsive to your request. A review of the responsive documents and determination concerning their release has been made pursuant to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Based on this review, the OIG determined that certain material has been withheld from the responsive documents pursuant to subsections (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7)(C) (referred to as Exemptions 3, 5, 6, and 7(C) respectively). Specifically the OIG review determined:

• Documents 1 and 5 are being released to you with certain material withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

• Documents 2 and 4 are being released to you in their entirety.

• Document 3 originated with the DOE's Office oflntelligence and

Counterintelligence (IN). This document has been forwarded to IN for a determination concerning its releasability. IN will respond directly to you concerning the document.

• Document 6 is being released to you with certain material withheld pursuant to Exemptions 3, 5, 6, and 7(C).

If you have any questions about the processing of Document 3, you may contact the following:

Mr. Alexander C. Morris, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585 or on (202) 586-5955

Exemption 3 protects information included in OIG's records specifically exempted from disclosure by another Federal statute; in this case the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l). Pursuant to this statute, certain information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods is protected.

Exemption 5 exempts from mandatory disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency .... " Exemption 5 incorporates the attorney-client privilege, which protects confidential communications related to a legal matter for which a client has sought professional advice. The privilege protects a client's disclosure to an attorney, the attorney's opinions regarding the information disclosed, and communications between attorneys regarding the information.

The information withheld under Exemption 5 includes confidential communications between DOE attorneys and DOE staff. Releasing this information could have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to make honest and open recommendations to their clients in the future and harm the integrity of the governmental decision-making process. Therefore, information is being withheld pursuant to the attorney-client privilege.

Exemption 6 protects from disclosure "personnel and medical and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy .... " Exemption 7(C) provides that "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" may be withheld from disclosure, but only to the extent the production of such documents "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy .... "

Names and information that would tend to disclose the identity of certain individuals have been withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Individuals involved in the OIG enforcement matters, which in this case include subjects, witnesses, sources of information, and other individuals, are entitled to privacy protections so that they will be free from harassment, intimidation and other personal intrusions.

In invoking Exemptions 6 and 7(C), we have determined that it is not in the public interest to release the withheld material. In this request, we have determined that the public interest in the identity of individuals who appear in these files does not outweigh these individuals' privacy interests. Those interests include being free from intrusions into their professional and private lives.

2

To the extent permitted by law, the DOE, in accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R) § 1004.1, will make available records it is authorized to withhold pursuant to the FOIA unless it determines such disclosure is not in the public interest.

As required, all releasable information has been segregated from the material that is withheld and is provided to you. See 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(3).

This decision may be appealed within 30 calendar days from your receipt of this letter pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8. Appeals should be addressed to the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, HG-1/L'Enfant Plaza Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585-1615. You may also submit your appeal by e-mail to OHA.filings@hq.doe.gov, including the phrase "Freedom oflnformation Appeal" in the subject line.

Thereafter, judicial review will be available to you in the Federal district court either (1) in the district where you reside, (2) where you have your principal place of business, (3) where the Department's records are situated, or ( 4) in the District of Columbia.

Enclosures

Sincerely,

~D- .for

Jc r.q 4 /4/J "'\ Sarah B. Nelson Assistant Inspector General

for Audits and Administration Office of Inspector General

3

Document Number 1

MEMORANDUM FOR. T

FROM:

Department of Energy Washinglon, DC 20585

Mal'.'ch 21, 2005

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Report 011 Review of Possible Inappropriate Job Solicitation (S05IS022)

Based upon a re uest from our office, the Office of Inspector General initiated a review of an (b )(6),(b )(7) altcgationJhat ~6),(b)(?)- ~anage~en~b~r-o-ac~h-ed~th_e_p_o_ss~ib~i~li~~o~f~~-~-r-c-cm~p-lo-~~en_t_w_i-th~~~~~~~--~-~ . (b)(6),(b)(7)

~c? I lof Washington Group Intematjonal. "if.ashington Group International is one of (C)

(~)(S), (b)(?) the entities competing for a contract for which I ] is the Source Selection Offidal.

(b)(S),(b)(?) A f · . . d. d' 'd l h 'd 'fi d . 11 h . (C) ··· ··.··: s-part" OUUOYI eW, W.• .. mt"."'.1~.\V: __ In '.VI ua S W 0 were I ent1 e as c tent1a j av mg ·

(b)(6),(b)(7) mfonnatton relevant to this matter, mcludihgl land I I .and____ (b)(6)_~b)(7) (C) ··· ···· I !acknowledged having two telephone conversations within the ast several weeks. """\CJ (~(S) ,(b)(7) However,.when .interviewed.·bothl I andl ... lstated-that during theirmmm m•••m•m••• .... (b)(6),(b)(7)

( ) conversations I ldid not solicit employment at Washington Group International. (C) (b)(6),(b)(7) -·-· -- ~ .... __ _._

(C) The source of tbe original allegation, a.person outside the Department of Energy, told us0 had (b)(6),(b)(7)

(b)(6),(_b) (7) heard-thatcl I had giv-en-1 - lthe impression tbaGvas seeking ernpl.o)'.IJ].ent with f51(6),(b)(7)

(C) Washington Group International. This person told· us thac(Jbad heard .this fromon~QfJW.Q .. . .... (~?),(b)(7) individuals at Washington Group International. However, when interviewed1 both individuals (C)

denied having made the comment. Further, the ori~inal source told us that Bha .. dnofusthand ... jb)(~) . (b) (7 ) (b)(6),(b)(7) .knowkdgeoftheconversationhetweenl Jandl . l nor did , b~ve other (C)

(C) .evidence to substantiate the allegation. (b)(6);(J:>)(7)(C) (b)(6) ,(b)(7) (C) '

Absent any new information, we are concluding our inquiry into this matter. The results of our review were shared with the Department's Assistant General Counsel for General Law.

Please contact me if I may be of any further assistance.

This report is the property of the Office ofln.~pector General and is/01 OFFlCJAL USE ON£J~ App,.~1·ittte :utfeg=ut11sds she1:1M bep1'8videdf01· t.~e 11cpBrt aml aeeefJfJ eheuld he lfrnited te

JJepRrtment efEnerfJo' e{fl6il11& 11l/.i9 .~t:1l1t1 " n"tl-d U> kmm1., .4~' Gepi~ ef ih" ><iport sho11/.d be · !y b ri ~ ' 'rib . · ly " ' ' . . ' P bl' d. I . tmu1ue• mm1 e1 e am ;rnome appi op1 zarer cunt! unea ana mamzamea. u zc isc os1we zs

determined by the Freedom of Information Act, Tille 5, U.S. C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, Title 5, U.S.C. § 552a. TJie 1 epult may not be tlisdmed uaiside the Dtpt11hnent1vit{wutp1 io1 lWitte'l'I i'i'fiPI B'fflf B/the Ofjiet! ofllrspectfJ1 G~neJ al.

OFFICIAL USE O:NL Y

@ Ptinltd w~h •oy In~ on 1acyc!td oai>e1

Document Number 2

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries

I11spectio11 Report

Concerns Regarding the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Inspection Program

' ...... . : '.:.' .. . : ' '·. :·.· . . " ','. •'

' ' ,•I ' ' • •,'',•

•• -:·:: • J •.

'. i • • ~ i

:• .. ·,, '

..--··

OFFICIAL USE or~t'(

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585

January 18 1 2005

MEMORAf.~UMFORT~~~~~y

FROM: cfu~~ ·· -- - -··- · Inspector Ge11eral

--suBJRCT:-

RACK GROUND

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Concerns Regarding the · Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Inspection Program"

The Oilicc of Inspector General (OIG) recently completed a review of allegations regarding the Depm1ment of Energy's (DOE) counterintelligence inspection program (Inspection Program). Specificully, a confidential complainant nlleged that: the cost of the Inspection Program was excessive; tbe Inspection Program lacked Federal management; inspection reports were biased against National Nuclear Security Administration facilities and activities; inspections were not conducted i.n compliance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards; and, inspection repo1ts were not timely.

The objective of our review was to dctcnnine the facts surrounding the allegations. The OIG did not attempt to assess the overall quality of the Inspection Program. This report contains infonnation from documents marked by the program office as "Official Use Only." Accordingly, this report is marked "Official Use Only."

RESULTS OF INSP.ECTION

We were unable to substantiate the allegations regarding the Inspection Program.

One of the allegations provided to the OIG was that the cost of the Inspection Program was excessive. Because we could not identify a comparable program at another agency, we ha<l no meaningful benchmark against which lo compare the cost of the DOE eff01t. Thus, we were not in a position to opine conclusively on the excessive cost question.

Tn evaluating the cost issue, however, we fouod that neither Federal officials nor Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Pacific Northwest) officials, who were responsible for managing the Inspection Program, could initially provide complete and detailed data o'n the specific cost of individual inspections. While this complicated our work, it did not affect the conclusions noted above.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Further, during the course of our review, certain other matters came to our attention and we provide the following observations:

• The use of Pacific Northwest to procure the services to conduct countcrintclligcncc inspections was inconsistent with DOE policy on purchasing by management and operating contractors; and, .

• There were philosophical differences between Office of Counterinte11igence and Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence officials, resulting in part from the Dcpa1tment's hifurcated counterintelligence program. We believe these differences have the potential to undennine lbe effocti vcncss of the overall counterintelligence efforts of the Department.

We made recommendations to management to address the issues raised in this r~port.

MANAGEMENT REACTTON

Management took issue with certain reconunendations, observations, and statements in our report. ·Management's comments are provided in their entirety in Appendix B. Where appropiiate, we revised our report based on management comments.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Secretary Administrator', National Nuclear Security Administration Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Director, Office of Counterintell igence Director, Office of Intelligence Director, Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation Chief, Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence Director, Office of Program Liaison and Financial Analysis (ME-100) Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management (NA-66)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL usr: ONLY

CONCERNS REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSPECTION PROGRAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective ............. ... ... ........ 1

Background ............ ............... ................. .. 1

Observations and Conclusions ............ ......... 2

DETAILS OF FINDINGS

Cost of the Inspection Program ..................... 3

Federal Management. .......... ................ ...... 3

Bias Against NNSA. .. ................................. 5

Auditing Standards...... . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . 5

Timeliness of Reports........ . ....... ..... ............ 5

Observations.. ...... ..... . .. ........ ..... ............... 5

RECOMMENDATIONS ................... ... ......... 6

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS . ..................... 6

INSPECTOR COMMENTS ........................ .. 6

APPENDIX

A. Scope and Methodology .. ... ............... ..... 8

B. Management Comments.... ........ ............ 9

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overview

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

BACKGROUND

Page 1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Office oflnspector General (OIG) recently completed a review of allegations regarding the Department of Energy's (DOE) counterintelligence inspection program (Inspection Program). Specifically, a confidential complainant alleged that: the cost of the Inspection Program was excessive; the Inspeclion Program lacked Federal management; inspection reports were biased against National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facilities and activities; inspections were not conducted in compliance with Generally Accepted Govcrruncnt Auditing Standards (GAGAS); and, inspection reports were not timely.

The objective of our review was to determine the facts surrounding the a!legations. The OIG did not attempt to assess the overall quality of the Inspection Program.

Presidential Decision Directive-61 (PDD-61), "U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program,'' issued in 1998, required DOE to establish a fonnal Inspection Program to identify deficiencies in and to improve operations of DOE 's counterintelligence functions. Histori.cally, both defense and non­defense counterintelligence activities were managed within the Department by a single, unified countcrintclligcncc office. ln accordance with PDD-61, the Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) was created for this purpose, reporting directly to the Secretary of Energy. However, in the FY 2000 National Defense Autho1ization Act, DOE's counterintelligence operations were bifurcated by the creation of a separate Office of Defense Nuclear Cou11tcrintclligcncc (ODNCI) responsible for NNSA counterintelligence activities. While the Department now has two separate counterintelligence offices, the OCJ Director retai.ncc.I responsibility for the Tnspection Program both for NNSA and non­NNSA operations. The Inspection Program is administered for the OCI Director by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Pacific Northwest), a DOE management and operating (M&O) contractor. Pacific Northwest subcontracts with individual inspectors who conduct the counterintelligence inspections.

Concerns Regarding the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Inspection Program

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Page 2

Ol'FICIAL US!! ONLY

We did not substantiate the allegations regarding the Inspection Program. However, we found that:

• Neither Federal program officials nor contractor officials responsible for managing the Inspection Program could initially provide detailed data on the specific costs of the individual inspections conducted under the program. During our review, Pacific Northwest provided changing cost figures regarding the cost of individual inspections.

Although not directly related to the scope of our review, we made the following obse1vations: ·

" The use of .Pacific Northwest to procure the services of inspectors to conduct counterintelligence inspections was im;onsistent with DOE policy on purchasing by M&O contractors; and,

• There were philosophical differences between OCI and ODNCI officials, resulting in part from the Department's bifurcated counterintelligence program. We believe these differences have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the overall counterintelligence efforts of the Department.

Observations and Conclusions OFFICIAL USE O~~LY

Details of Findings OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COST OF THE INSPECTION PROGRAM

FEDERAL MANAGEMENT

Page 3

We could not determine if the costs of the Inspection Program were excessive. We attempted to contrast the costs of the Inspection Program with similar efforts in other agencies. However, we were unable to find a comparable program to serve as a henchmark. Responsible officials advised that the Inspection Program was modeled after the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) field office inspection program. A senior FBI Inspections Division official identified significant differences between the · Inspection Program at DOE and the FDI's program. Therefore, we could not compare the two programs.

We found that Federal managers provide direct oversight of the Inspection Program. However, responsible I'cdernl officials could not provide data regarding the specific costs of the individual inspections conducted under the Inspection Program. Also, during our review, Pacific Northwest provided changing cost figures regarding the cost of individual inspections. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that Federal managers have adequate assurance that the costs for the Inspection Program are being properly managed.

When we asked Federal officials for the costs of the individual inspections, they referred us to Pacific Northwest. Initially, Pacific Northwest could not provide detailed cost data for individual inspections. Subsequently, Pacific Northwest provided us different cost data on several occasions between July 2003 and December 2004.

Based upon the latest data provided by Pacific Northwest in December 2004, approximately $7.8 million was spent on labor and travel costs for specific inspections between the start of the program in 1999 and late 2003, and approximately the same amount was spent on other Inspection Program costs, including overhead costs. The otbcr Inspection Program costs include Pacific Northwest's cost to manage/administer the Inspection Program, \Vhich was approximately 9 percent of the yearly total inspection cost. Pacific Northwest officials said that the 9 percent consisted of labor/travel hours associated with managing the project (client interface, monthly/quarterly reports, etc.), and the costs associated with administering the inspector subcontracts.

Using the cost data provided by Pacific Northwest in December 2004, we calculated that approximately $15.6 million was spent on the Inspection Program between 1999 and late 2003, of which the

Details of Findings OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL us~ 0"1LY

average labor and travel costs for a full inspection of a counterintelligence office were approximately $131,300. However, when a pro rata allocation of the overhead and other Inspection Program costs was added to the Jabor and travel' costs, the total average cost of each inspection was approximately $262,600. 1 Similarly, special inspections, which are limited scope follow-up inspections conducted when a site receives a rating of marginal or below in any of its activities, bad average labor and travel costs of approximately $75,000, and average total costs of about $150,000. As an example, the counterintelligence activities at the Oakland Operations Office, which were managed by a Federal official, were inspecterl on April 15-26, 2002. The counterintelligence inspection team consisted of 6 inspectors, l technical advisor, and 2 administrative staff. The labor and travel costs for this inspection were $192)783. The total cost, including labor, travel, and the pro rata amount, was $385,566.

In bis management comments, the OCI Director provided similar figures for the average cost of individual inspections. He stated that the average full inspection is approximately $135,924 (unburdened) or approximately $266,752 (with costs pro rata), while a special inspection is approximately $76,244 (unburdened) or approximately $149,628 (with costs pro rata). We could not account for the differences in the inspection costs.

Also, the OCI Director stated that a 48 percent reduction in expenditures from Fiscal Year 2002 ($3.97 million) to Fiscal Year 2004 ($2.09 million) demonstrates that the costs of the Inspection Program arc being sufficiently managed. Although it appears that management has taken steps to reduce the costs of the Inspection Program, we note that the decrease in expenditures was not solely the result of cost reduction efforts. A Pacific Northwest official stated tbat the decrease in expenditures was achieved by reducing project management and financial administration time, streamlining administrative processes, decreasing the number of personnel involved in each inspection <1nd decreasing the frequency of inspections from every 2 years to every 3 years for programs rated as Satisfactory. However, we note that the number of sites reviewed decreased from 14 in Fiscal Year 2002 to 9 in Fiscal Year 2004, and the number of inspection reports issued decreased from 11 in Fiscal Year 2002 to 7 in Fiscal Y car 2004.

1 These figures do not include the Headquarters inspection that was conducted during February l 0-21,

2003, and March 24-April 1J, 2003. The cost of the Headquarters inspcclion, including labor, travel and the pro rata amount, was approximately Sl,803,600.

Page 4 Details of Findings OFFICIAL USE ONL¥

BIAS AGAINST NNSA

AUDITING STANDARDS

TIMELINESS OF REPOR'fS

OBSERVATIONS

Page 5

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We did not identify a bias against NNSA-related offices by the Tnspection Program. We reviewed a sample of inspection reports for both OCI and ODNCI offices. We noted that the repo1ts were written in a ma1U1er that singled out individuals for criticism in both offices. Also, we did not identify a meaningful difference between the ratings given to OCI offices and the ratings given to ODNCT offices.

We found that the Inspection Program is not required to follow GA GAS. GA GAS are standards for Federnt auditors contained in the Government Auditing Standards (Yellow Book) promulgated hy the Government Accountability Office. PDD-61 required DOE lo establish an inspection program for its counterinletligence activities, but did not contain a requirement that the inspection program follow GAGAS. Also, an FBT official advised that the FBI field office inspection program does not follow GAGAS.

We found that inspection reports were typically being issued within 60 days of the site visit. A responsible official told us thal early in the Inspection Program reports were issued three to six months after the completion of fieldwork. However, in May 2003, the Inspection Report for the OCT/ODNCI Headquarters inspection stated that reporls were being "delivered too late after completion of an inspection." It also stated an objective to issue future inspection reports within 60 days of the end of the site visit. We reviewed a sample of seven inspection reports issued since May 2003, and found that all seven were issued within 60 days of the site visit.

We observed that the use of Pacific Northwest to procure the services of inspectors to conduct countcrintclligcncc inspections was inconsistent with DOE policy on purchasing hy M&O contractors. We dctcnnincd that under DOE policy, Headquarters offices, such as OCT, are not to subcontract through M&O contractors for services that could be directly contracted by Federal Procurement managers. DOE procurement officials opined that by administering the counterintelligence inspection program, Pacific Northwest was directly supporting a Headquarters mission that was not within the scope of its M&O contract. Although OCT officials advised us that they have explored other procurement options for obtaining support for the Inspection Program, OCI continues to use Pacific Northwest for this purpose. Doth DOE procurement and ocr officials opined that it may be more cost effective to procure a support services contract for the inspections program directly through OCI Headquarters.

Details of Findings OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We also observed that there were philosophical differences between OCI and ODNCI officials, resulting in part from the Department's bifurcated counterintelligence program, which has the potential to undennine the effectiveness of the overall program. We detennincd that the relationship between the personneJ of these two offices was not as collegial, particularly regarding the Inspection Program, as would have been expected given the importance of the Department's counterintelligence efforts and the need for a cooperative effort complex-wide. Within the last year, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator ofNNSA, and the National Counterintelligence Executive expressed concern that the bifurcation of the Department's counterintelligence function could impede efficient counterintelligence activities at DOE. Our observations during this review tended to support this concern, and we believe that the Department should continue ils efforts to consolidate counterintelligence activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that tbe Director, Office of Counterintelligence:

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

INSPECTOR COMMENTS

Page 6

I . In coordination with the Director, Office of Management, Budget, and EvaJuation, identify the most appropriate mechanism for procuring support for the counterintelligence inspection program; and

2. Enhance efforts to manage the costs of the counterintelligence inspection program.

Management took issue with certain of the recommendations, observations, and statements in the report. Regarding the first recorrunendation, management stated that they bad undertaken consultations with the Director, Office of Procurement and Assistance Management, to detenninc if the use of Pacific Northwest to procure services of inspectors to conduct counterintelligence inspections is consistent with DOE policy. Management disagreed with the second recommendation. Management stated that the problems leading to the recommendation were addressed prior to our review. Management's comments arc provided in their entirety in Appendix B.

Where approp1iate, we revised our report to address management's comments. Although management stated that Pacific Northwest had implemented a system for tracking the costs of individual inspections starting in the middle of Fiscal Year 2003, Pacific Northwest officials told us that there had been no attempt to track

Recommendations Management and Inspector Comments

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page 7

OFPICIAL US!! ONLY

individual inspection costs p1ior to our request for this data. Data provided by Pacific Northwest in response to our request for the cost and staffing levels fqr individual inspections continually changed during our review. Our report includes the latest data from Pacific Northwest, which was provided in December 2004. We believe the changing cost and staffing figures provided by Pacific Northwest officials confirms our belief that Federal and contractor officials need to enhance their efforts to manage the costs of the Inspection Program.

Inspector Comments OFFICIAL USE ONLY

...... --·--- ----- ·--··--··-·--··-··--------------------;---------------

Appendix A

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Page 8

Of't1'1CIAL USE Of~LY

As part of our review, we interviewed Federal and contractor DOE and NNSA officials at headquarters and the following field locations; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland Operations Office, Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory, Livermore Site Office, and Sandia National Laboratory in California. We also reviewed documents relevant to the counterintelligence inspections program and DOE procurement policy.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Cotu1cil on Tntegtity and Efficiency.

Scope and Methodology OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Document Number 4

FROM:

SUBJECT:

INTRODUCTION

200'1-0lCOlS

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585

Octobe:c 1, 2004

regory I-1. Friedman Inspector General

INFORMATION: Special Report on the "Department's Process for Respondiflg to a Congressional Information Request" OAS-SR-05-0 l

On January 15, 2004, members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, acting under the "Seven Member Rule" (5 U.S.C. 2954), requested that the Department of Energy provide copies of all communications relating to HR. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2003, coveting the period November 21, 2003, to January 15, 2004. The members requested all w1itten, electronic, or oral communications between the Department or other executive branch officials and industry lobbyists, representatives of trade associations or interest groups, or other persons outside of the executive branch re lating to H.R. 6. This request was preceded by a similar request, dated December 22, 2003, from Representatives Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell that raised concerns about the Dcpm1mcnt's compliance with prohibitions against lohhying contained in 18 U.S.C. 1913, to which the Department responded on fanuary 6, 2004. According to Cornmiltee membe1s, 1hc Department's initial response did not provide rhe information requested and rhey were prompted to make the second request under the "Seven Member Rule." On February 4, 2004, the Department responded to the Conunittcc member's second request for information.

Subsequently, the Ranking Minolity Member and 13 other members of the Committee asked the Office of Inspector General to review the veracity and completeness of the response that the Depa1tment sent to members of the Committee. Committee members also requested that the Office of Inspector General examine how the Department's response was researched and re viewed. The Office of Inspector General conducted a fact-finding review, the objective of which was to determine the Depmtment's process for developing its February 4, 2004, response to the congressional request for information.

OBSERVATIONS

Responsible officials indicated that the Department followed its no1mal process when prepaiing the Febrnary 4 , 2004, response to the members of the Committee. Officials in the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the Executive Secretariat (ES) indicated that they took the request seriously and that they expended a good deal of effort to collect

@ Priolll<I 11i1h ooy In~ on iecycfed popct

infur1nalio11 and respond in a Lhnely n)anner, Ho\vever, the Departn1ent does not have a requiren1ent to tnaintain docu1ncntation of research efforts cornpleted in response to congressional data requests. Thus, hy necessity, our revie\v \Vas bnscd largely on the recollections of officials involved \Vith the response. '!'hose officials explained that, due to the passage of t!1ne, they had only lirnited recollection of the actual procedures pr:'-rforn1ed. They told us that, to the best of their kno\vledge, they followed their stnndard practice when responding to this congressional inquiry. As explained, the process in this case: (i) \Vas litnited to searches of certain written and clcctro11ic con11nunications for high~lcvcl Department officials; (ii) did not include inquiries of lo\ver"level officials outside the offices detern1ined to be the 1nost likely to have inforn1ation responsive to lhe request, or other executive branch officials; and, (iii) \Votild not have included direct inquiries of nil highwlcvcl Dcµartrncnt officials to <leter1nine \vhether any contacts \Vere 1nade that \Vere not docun1ented in hard copy or ele.ctronic files.

Resernch and Revic\v Process

Officials told us that nor111a!Jy ES serves as the focal point for directing info1111ation requests to the approp1iate offices for response. In this case, BS directed the request to OUC because it was closely related to the Decen1ber 22, 2003, congressional requesl regarding the Departmenes co1npliancc 'vi th the prohibitions against lobbying. According to OGC officials, they received info11l1ation subtnitted by Viu·ious offices and prepared the response that \Vas sent to Co1nn1ittee members on Peb1uary 4, 2004.

ES and OGC told us that, 'vhile they could not recall who made the dete1111ination, a decision was n1adc that the Offices of the Secretary; Deputy Secretary; Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and I~~nviro111nent; Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovern1nental Affairs; Scheduling and Advance; and ES \Vere n1ost likely to have information responsive to the request. The Depart1nent's response to the Co1nmittee memhers identified the offices that \Vere searched for responsive docun1enls. ES and OGC officials indicated that the Con1rnittee me1nhers' request letter \Vas provided to these offices with either an oral or c-tnail request. Officials sti"lte<l that responding offices \Vould typically 5earch their phone logs, e-1nails, correspondence and subject files 1 and daily calendars. ES and OGC officials also indicated that it \Vas not their general process to provide specific guidance on how to conducl searches. Ilo\vever, OGC officials stated that they discussed \Vith the Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs \Vhat types of records should be searched to respond to this specific congressional request.

Scope of Research and Itevie\V Process

According to RS and OGC officinls, they routinely make judgments regarding the scope· of their research and revie\v process because of the volu1ne of requests the Dcpatirncnt receives nnd the level of effort required to I'eSpond to thern. They added that searches for infor1nation 1nust be made in a manner lhat provides thncly responses, For these reasons 1

officials acknowledged that they decided to lin1it their review to the Departn1ent elen1ents n1ost likely to have infor1nation tesponsivc to the request. It~ particular, officials who prepared the response advised us that:

2

• Program office:'\, such as the Offices of Possil Energy and Nuclear Energy, \Vere not included in the information search because the request was directed to offices n1ost likely to have contacts on legislative 1nattcrs.

• Other executive hranch officials outside the Dcpart111cnt \Vere not asked about their contacts \Vith indu,stry officials because, according to Depa1t1nent officials, such a search would be outside the Dcpart1ncnt's capabilities and \Vould be logistically unreasonable. They noted, ho\vever, that if other executive branch officials had any co1n1nunications \Vith outside entities regarding II.R. 6 and had '1carbo1i copied" the Secretary, a recOrd of that con11nunication \Vould likely have been identified in lhe Departtnent's search of its correspondence files.

• The Depa1tmcnt's \Vcbsitc was not researched because it \Vas publicly available and infortnation about any relevant contacts \Vould already be available· to the congressional requesters. Officials asse1ted that searches of the calendars for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary should have identified all speeches related to II.R. 6. flowever, ES and OCIC indicated that the subject of a ineeting or speech is not al\vays Hsted on the calendar and that this lack of specificity might account for missing the t\VO secretarial spc,eches previot18ly identified by Comntlttee metnbers as 1'espol'1sive to questions raised about H.R. 6.

• WhHe those preparing the February 4, 2004, response directly questioned the Deputy Secretary about industry contacts related to H.R. 6, the Secretary and the Under Secretary were not specifically consulted about such contacts. Rather, the Dcporttncnt's response lo the conlll1lttee 111en1bers \Vas based on a review of hardcopy and ele<'.tronic files, J:'ina!ly, officials toJd us, and available documentation indicated, that none of the offices other than the Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergove1nrnental Affairs revie\ved or concurred in the final response to the Corn1nittec 1nc1nbers' request.

• Contact.c: \Vith, or initiated by, congressional officials \Vere otnitted because OGC decided that the thrust of the request was that the Departn1c11t possibly had not co1nplicd with prohibitions against lobbying and contacts with Congress as set forth iii 18 lJ.S.C. 1913. Additionally, OGC asserted thal n1embers of Congress \Votlld not always \Vant their contacts \Vilh the Depa1tn1ent n\adc public. fu1thcr, the l)epartment discussed its decision to exclude coinmunications between rne1nbers of Congress and the Departn1ent of Energy related to H.R. 6 in its Pcb1uary 4, 2004, response to the Committee membet~.

Doctunentation of H.escarch and Rcvic\v Process

According to ES and OGC officials, the Dcparllncnt's process docs not require that detailed records be rnaintained supporting the sources that \Vere searched i:utd the specific n1ethodologics used. As a consequence, Depart1nent officials involved in the subject search told us that they found it necessary to rely prir11arily on their recollection regarding the processing of the response to the Committee n1embers. They ackno\vledged, as \Veil, that their recollections, after the passage of about eight i11onths, m;.1y be incomplete. Ft1rther1 as previously noted, little documentation \Va~ availahle to support the oral descriptions of the process cn1ploycd in this case. For exa1nple, \Ve did not find evidence of con1plete responses provided to OGC, which would have explained which files \Vere searched and \Vhich <;:.ould have confirmed \vhether or not relevant contacts had been identifi.ed. Docutnentation to suppo1t reported c-1nail searches in the Offices of the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary \Vere not available, and officials \VC contacted in these offices could not rccnll scarc.hing for ;;1ny corn1nunications related to the request of the Com1nittee members. However, OGC officials advised us that a senior official in the Office of the Depuly Secretary had searched that office for relevant con1munications in response to the Committee members' request. Additionally~ officials could not provide docu1nentation supporting the reported detailed reviev.1 of the Secretary's calendar since November 21, 2003. While an Office of Scheduling and Advance official recalled searching the Secretary's calendar for information on energy~related contacts, the official could not recall if anything \.Vas found.

In su1n1nary, as described by ooc: and ES, the Department follo\ved its nor1nal piocess in responding to the Committee n1e1nbers' information request. I-Io\vcvcr, \Ve \Vere unable to independently confirm the dcsc1ibed process because of the lack of detailed !'ecords and the incomplete recollection of these officials caused by the passage of liine.

We discussed the facts contained above \Vith De.part1nent officials \Vho prepared the congressional response and included relevant co1n1ncntsi where approptiate. Our revie\v 111cthodology is described in an attachn1ent to this teport.

V./e appreciate the cooperation of the l)epartn1ent1s staff during this rcvie\V, If you have any questions rcgal'ding the 1natters discussed in this report, please do not hesitate to contact 1ne.

cc: Deputy Secretary Under Secretary fur Energy, Science and Environi:nent Assistant Secretary for c:ongrcssional and Intergovern1nental Affairs General Counsel Director, Office of the Executive Secretariat

Attachment

4

Attachntent

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

'fo accon1plish our objective \Ve:

• Revie\ved the congressional request dated Deccinbcr 22, 2003, fro111 Congrcss1ncn Henry Waxinan and John Dingell; and the January l 5, 2004, request from nlen1bers of the Con:unittee on Govcrnmcnl Reforn1:

• llcvicwcd the Departn1ent's responses dated January 6 and February 4, 2004, respectively 1 from the General Counsel and the January 15, 2004, response fron1 the Acting General Counsel;

e Interviewed officials fro1n the Offices of General Counsel and Executive Secretariat involved in coordinating the re~pnnse to each request;

• Tntervie\ved officials fron1 the Offices of the Deputy Secretary; Under Secretary for Energy, Science a11d Envil'onrnent; Congressional and lntcrgavcr11n1cntal Affairs; and Scheduling and Advance to detennine the proce~ses they u~ed to respond to the request; and,

• Rcvicv.'cd documents of comn1unications regarding energy related contacts p!'ovided by various offices.

'I'his \Vas a special rcvic\v of the Deparln1enl's process for responding to a pa1ticular inquiry from congressional sources and did not include tests of inten1a1 controls and con1pliance \Vith la\vs and regulations applicable to audits.

Document Number 5

INSPECTION REPORT

TO MANAGEMENT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

LA WREN CE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

DOMESTIC PARTNER TRAVEL

89918022

DECEMBER 1999

INSPECTION OF LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY DOMESTIC PARTNER TRAVEL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview

Introduction and Objective...... . .. .. . .. .. .. ...... .. .. .. ... .. ... 1

Observations and Conclusions..................... .. . .. .. .. .. 2

Oetaits of Finding...... .. . . .. ... . .. ... . .. ... .. . .. . ... . .. .. . ... . 3

Recommendations.............................................. 6

Management and Inspector Comments.................. 8

Overview -----··-···-·----· ------------INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

Page 1

On February 10, 1999, the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), initiated an inspection of allegations regarding inappropriate travel by certain employees of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore). Specifically, information provided to the Office oflnspections alleged that Livermore has inappropriately funded vacations and personal business in conjunction with official travel for I 0 employees (five couples) who were identified as domestic partners.

The objective of this inspection was to determine if the five couples employed by Livermore traveled together to the same business locations on the same dates without an appropriate business purpose. Our inspection was conducted from March through August 1999, and included a review of 136 travel expense reports for the I 0 Livermore employees, as well as interviews with several of the Livermore travelers and their supervisors concerning the purpose of specific trips and the expenses authorized. We also interviewed Livermore management officials regarding the practices generally used by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in managing, administering, and funding the Livermore travel program.

This inspection report has been prepared in part to accomplish the purposes of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 by documenting methods of decreasing waste and improving etftciency in Federally-funded programs. This inspection was conducted in accordance with "Quality Standards for Inspections)> issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

I nspeciion of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Domestic Partner Travel

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Page2

Our inspection did not find widespread evidence that the five couples named in the allegations traveled together without an appropriate business purpose, or that vacations and other personal business were inappropriately funded in conjunction with official travel. The five couples included in this inspection traveled together 48 times (for a total of96 trips) from Fiscal Year 1994 through Fiscal Year 1998. For 93 of the 96 trips reviewed, we found no direct evidence that the business purposes of the trips were inappropriate, or that Livermore inappropriately funded vacations and personal business in conjunction with the official business of these trips.

However, for three of the 96 trips, we did find that the use of Department funds to finance all or part of these three trips was inappropriate, and that recovery of funds is warranted. In the case of two of these trips, a couple employed by Livermore traveled together by car to Colorado to discuss fossils and the human exploration of the planet Mars as part of two independent research projects, and charged their time and travel costs to the Department. In the case of the third trip, a Livermore employee filed a false Traveler's Expense Report and a false Foreign Tlip Report which stated that he was on official business in Berlin, Germany, when he was actually on vacation in Southern Germany, Austria, and Italy for a portion of the period claimed.

Inspection of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Domestic Partner Travel

Details of Findings

Vacation and Personal Business Combined with Official Travel

Independent Research Funded Through Official

{b )(6),(b )(7l'ravel (C) .

(b)(6),(b)(7) .... (C) . ····· ··

.......... -(b )(6),(b )(7) (C)

(b)(6),(b)(7L .

(b)(6),{b)(7) (C)

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) .....

(C) .

Page 3

The 10 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory employees who were alleged to have combined vacations and personal business with official travel, traveled together a total of 48 times (for a total of96 trips) from Fiscal Years 1994 through 1998. Generally, the business purpose of these trips included attendance at conferences, programmatic meetings, and invitations to give presentations or talks. We found that for 34 of the 96 trips, the travelers took 113 personal days where vacations and/or personal business were constructed around the official business of the trips, often at locations distant from their temporary duty locations. We note that one couple traveled a total of25 times together (50 trips), or about one-half of the total trips we reviewed, and took a total of 46 personal days in conjunction with their official travel.

We did not find direct evidence that the five couples named in the allegations traveled together without an appropriate business purpose, or that Livermore inappropriately funded vacations and personal business in conjunction with official travel for 93 of the 96 trips reviewed. For the three remaining trips though, we did find that the use of Department funds to finance all or part of these three trips was inappropriate, and that recovery of funds is warranted.

p~::::::....::::.r::..::::::.:.:.:.:::.:::.:..:J:.!!:::========~---1 ~~)(?) . (b)(7)

.___-.Jat Livermore, traveled by car from Livennore to Fruita, Denver, and Boulder, Colorado, from Sunday, August 9, 1998, through Monday, August 17, 1998, accompanied by their I . ___. 11 lsaid the official business purpose of fraveling to Fruita, Colorado. on August 10 and 11 was to visit the Dinamation International Society. I lsaidthatan . . mm _ ((~)(§)_. (b)(7) appointment had been arranged to discuss Livermore technology for gamma labeling of fossils and the use of lasers to remove the rock matrix that surrounds fossils without damaging them. o m ········· ... ((~)..(?) . (b)(7) I ~lso said that a visit to the Denver Museum of Natural History on Wednesday, August 12, 1998, was for a similar -purpose~ I lsaid that Thursday, August 13, through Sunday, August 16, 1998, was spent at the first Mars Society Conference, in Boulder, Colorado, where O made three _ (b)(6),(b)(7) speeches regarding human settlement of the planet Mars. The (C)

two Livermore employees were reimbursed a total of $2, 131 for

Details of Finding

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C) ........ . .. .

Falsification of a Travel Expense Report

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) .. ·· - .....

(b)(6),{b)(7) (C) . .

(b)(6),(b)(7) (9)\:6),(b )(7) ___ _ (C) .. .

Page 4

travel-related expenses, and were paid $8,8 l 1 in wages while on this trip. The total cost incurred by Livermore was $10,942.1

The DOE Oakland Contracting Officer for Livermore said that D was unaware of any DOE programmatic guidance, Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program1

Work-For-Others Program, or any other allowable reason for spending DOE funds for fossil or Mars settlement issues. D . ! l:>)_(6),(b)(7) said these activities appeared to be independent research work (C) ____ _

on the part of the travelers. Similarly, a Livermore Deputy Associate Director said that the use of lasers for fossil excavation or gamma labeling teclmology was not specifically approved at the time of travel by anyone from the Department of Energy.

Section ( e), "Examples of items of unallowable costs." Clause 3.2, "ALLOW ABLE COSTS," of the DOE Management and Operating Contract (M&O Contract) with the Regents of the University of California for the Management of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Contract No. W-7405-ENG-48, effective October 1, 1997) states that the costs of independent research and development, excluding Laboratory Directed Research and Development, are unallowable unless specifically provided for elsewhere in the contract. Our inspection was not able to identify any DOE programmatic guidance, Laboratory Directed Research and Development, or Work-For-Others Program related to this trip. As such, the amount of$10,942 represents an unallowable cost under the M&O Contract and should be recovered.

A Livermore employee made a claim of official business on a travel expense report for a portion of a tri that was actually vacation time. S ecificall , ...._~~~~~~~~~~....J

for the Livermore aser ..E!2gram, filed a travel expense report and a trip report, claiming

··LJwas on official business from June 19, 1998, to July 14, 1998, when the evidence shows thatO began a vacation in Genna~

n July 11, 1998. Travel documents show that U · · traveling with ·-­ivermore, attended conferences and meetings in

Russia and Berlin, Germany, from June 19, 1998, to Friday,

1 This figure was revised from $7,855 in the draft report to $10,942 in Lhe final report to re flee I Livermore's recalculation of lhe labor cost using the standa!d salary, payroll burden, Organizational Personnel Charge, and the Organizational Facility Charge.

(b)(6),(b)(7) - ,c::r -

(b )(6), (b )(7) ~b)(7)

{~(6), (b)(7) (C) ······

Details of Finding

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C)

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C)

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C)

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C)

(b)(6),(b)(7L (C) _-

(b )(6), (b)_(!J .. (C) ······

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C) ..

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C) - .

(b)(6),(b)(7) ... (C) ..

(b)(6),(b)(7)

July lO, 1998, when the Berlin conference ended. At this point in their trip, went on vacation ~~{6»Sb)(7) together in Germany, Austria and Italy. (b)(6),(b)(7) ,,./

............ - (C) . . . . . ·

..__ __ __.I t .old us that O was.oii p~~~~~~l leave in Ge_rmany, ~~)>(6 ) •. (b)(7

>

,.....w.w.u...-..i~....("taly beginning July 11, 1998, and thatD .. / --- · · · as traveling with 0 the-ent-ire-time, and that O -· (b)(6),(b)(7)

never left D said that, after their official business at a · {C) ··· · -·-·-· mm ..... sCientjfic wqrkshop concluded on July 10, 1998,0 andD · ((. ~~.Ub)(7)

I J were on "pure vacation," and that no official ' business was conducted. O stated that~-am accurate_o.nthis." _____ ( b)(_?..),(b)(7)

However, on his Traveler's Expense Report, and on a separate (CJ Foreign Trip Report, I · lciairned that his offi'.Cial (b)(6),(b)(7)

business meetings continued in Berlin until July 14, 1998. (C)

I I initially told us that O nevcr left the-suburbs of..... (b)(6),(b)(7)

Berlin during the weekend of July 11 and 12, and that0 had J~~). (b)(7) business meetings in Berlin on Ju1;£. .. p and 14. However, after (C)

some discussion. O admitted thatLJleft Berlin on Friday~ July (b)(6),(b)(7)

..JQ.,.J .298, with! I and traveled with ~Mitten~atd:--icr ················································· ······················ ············· ··· a town located near the German-Austrian border. Oth~n said ~g)pn~. ( b)(7)

that he drove 690 kilometers (428 miles) from Mittenwald, ............ Germany, back to Berlin on the morning of Monday, July 13, -~~)(5).(b)(7)

(C) ........ . ..... . ················i1;:~~-~~~-~~i~u!~~~~:t!~o ~~~rt:e~~~egc,tDor ~!t~~:;::~ LJ '•m ... ...... ((g))(?.) ~(b)(7) .. Mitt~nwald to joinl I. OsaidJhat_t.~e driving time

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C)

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C)

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) mm••

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C) - -

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) . .

(b)(6),(b).(7). (C) ....

Page 5

from Mittenwald to Berlin was about four to five hours:--·-· .. However, we note that the one-way driving time from Mittenwald to Berlin is estimated to be seven hours and fifteen

___ (p)(6), (b )(7) (C)

mjn11tes as s~own on a German travel service document. D ...... (p)(6),(b)(7)

I !continued to receive per diem until July IS, 1998, (C} ..

and was reimbursed for hotel costs on July l 1, 12, and 13. (b)(6),(b)(7)

(b )(6), (b )(7)(C) !C) .. . ..... ········· ....... LJofthe German insti~ute wro allegedly rn~ ithO .. (~(6),(b)(7)

?•July 1n. 199;

1 said thai[]knows who (b)(~).lb)(7)

--~ ---- - - is. The ·satd thatCThad met with · . --..... .... {C) during a works op in Berlin that the . had' .. . (b)(6),(b.)(7)(C)

chaired during the week of July 6 through July 10, 1998:., ', .... ···· ·····- ·-·- · However,-the1 ··· lsaid that O did not meet with 0 .>-. (~)(6).(b)(7)

. ..J · · I after the Berlin workshop concluded on Friday,".tuly.._< ) 10, 1998. The I lsaid that after ~he workshop concluded ..... ~~)t)i(b)(7)

/ (b )~~),.(b )(7) (b )(6),,(b )(7) (b)(6),cb)(7) (C) ·. (C) . (C) .

Details of Finding

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C)

(b)(6),(b)(7) (S)\:6),(bj(i) . (C) -· -

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C)

· Recommendations

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C)

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) - - .

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C) ..

Page6

on July to, 1998,1 lieft Berlin and trav~ Southern Germany to be at home with his family. Thel___J said thatDwa~ositive that, after the wofkshop concludeq on July 10, 1998,LJdid not meet again with I _____ ..... A rcvi-ew orl hravel expense report shows that $502.12 in hotel and per diem costs were inappropriately paid and should be recovered. Additionally, an estimated salary adjustment equal to 2 days of salary or $889 plus benefits, should also be recovered, for. a total of $1 ,391 .

Considering the evidence of inappropriate use of Department funds to finance all or part of these three trips, we recommend the following:

For the Manager, Oak.land Operations Office:

Recommendation 1: Take appropriate action to recover $10,942 in ~ages and travel exoenses for the trip taken byl .... _________ _,I ·-··-· . -where Department funds were used to conduct independent research projects.

(!> )(6), (b )(7) (C)

(b )(6), (b )(7) ··(er ·

(b )(6), (b )(7) ·(c )

Recommendation 2: Take appropriate action to recover an estimated $1,391 in wages plus benefits and travel expenses for the trip taken by l lwhereO claimed[h_as in an _____ (b)(6),(b)(7)

official business status when, in fa~-was on --·- ~6),(b)(7) vacation for a portion of the trip. - (C)

In addition, we are also recommenf ing that appropriate personnel actions be taken against_ 1-----~ ___ {_1:>)(6),(b)(7)

Specifically, based on the results of our inspection, we found (C)

·· that·! I (1) falsified a LLNL Traveler's ExP.ense Report which resulted in reimbursement for expenses thatO · .. _ . ...()?)J6),(b)(7)

was not entitled to; (2) falsified a Foreign Trip Report which (C)

·indicated·thatO was on official business when in fact O was on .......... J~)(?). (b)(7) personal business for a portion of this trip; and (3) made false (C)

and misleading statements to representatives of the Office of Tnspector General during the conduct of this inspection in an effort to conceal the true nature of0 activities. . -- · ... _ -{~)(6), (b)(7)

Recommendations

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C)

Page 7

For the Manager, Oakland Operations Office:

Recommendation 3: Consistent with the findings of this report, recommend that Livermore take appropriate personnel action

..... against! m lin accordance with Section E II.5.2., "Other Corrective Action," of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Personnel Polices and Procedures Manual for falsifying two travel related documents and for providing false and misleading statements to the Office of Inspector General.

Recommendation 4: Direct Livermore to conduct a review of other trips taken by[ I over the past five years to determine if there arc any other instances where0 has·been -----~­inappropriately reimbursed travel related expenses as a result of falsified travel documents, and, if so, take appropriate action to recover these amounts.

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C) --

(b)(6},(b)(7) ----(C)

Recommendations

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C) . . ...... .

Recomrnendation 1: The DOE Oakland Operations Office (Oakland) ''concurred in principle" with the finding and recommendation. Livermore's DOE Oakland Contracting Officersaid 0 has decided to issue a "Notice oflntent to Disallow" $10,942 for inappropriate travel. ·

Recommendation 2: Oakland "concurred in principle" with the finding and recommendation, stating that Oakland will take appropriate action. Oakland also stated that a referral has been made to the Livermore Office ofinvestigative Services, who will conduct an investigation regarding the falsification of a travel expense report and that this investigation will be compJeted by December 31 , 1999. Oakland will review the results of the Livermore investigation and make allowability determinations by March 30, 2000.

Recommendation 3: Oakland "concurred in principle" with the finding and recommendation, stating that Oakland agrees with Livermore's proposed action of referring the Office of Inspector General's finding to the Livermore Office ofinvestigative Services> for Livermore's own investigation of the matter. Oakland stated that Livermore will complete their review by December 31, 1999, and that Oakland will validate Livermore's findings and respond to the Office of Inspector General by March 30, 2000.

Recommendation 4: Oakland concurred with Livermore's proposed action to have the Livermore Office of Investigative Services conduct a review of travel by the subject employee for the past five years. Oakland stated that Livermore will complete their review by December 31, 1999, and that OakJand will validate Livermore's findings and respond to the Office of Inspector General by March 30, 2000.

INSPECTOR COMMENT We consider management's comments to the recommendations to be responsive.

Page 8 Management and Inspector Comments

Document Number 6

, \

INSPECTION REPORT

TO MANAGEMENT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

Copy 13

TITLE: "Unauthorized Release of Internal Report" (~9918025)

MAY 1999

----:-.. -REPORT OF INSPECTION ON

"UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF INTERNAL REPORr

(S991S025)

OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 1

Introduction and Objective .................................................................................... 1

Observations and Conclusions ................................................................ ............. 2

DETAILS OF FINDING ......................................................................................... 3

CONCLUSION ........................................................... ........................................... 8

INSPECTION REPORT TO MANAGEMENT ON

"Unauthorized Release of Internal Report"

(S99IS025)

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective

On March 23, 1999, the Office oflnspector General, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), initiated an inspection into the facts and circumstances surrounding the unauthorized release to an individual outside DOE ofa document entitled "INTERNAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, SPECIAL SECURITY REVIEW, PHASE 1, JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 1998" (Internal Report). Information from the Internal Report appeared in an article by Mr. Peter Eisler (hereafter referred to as the reporter) published in.the March 17, 1999, issue of USA Today. The inquiry into the unauthorized release of the Internal Report was requested by the Secretary ofEnergy in a March 19, 1999, memorandum to the Inspector General.

. I lb)(6),{b)(7) · Th I t al Report was prepared by a review team led by e)' ··

~~\(S) , (b.)(7} .... National Security Programs, Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia). Fonner Secretary o e gy Federico Pena tasked the review team to develop an approach to review and evaluate security roles, responsibilities, and methodologies as they might impact changes in DOE safeguards and security policy and guidance. The review team consisted of members from six DOE sites as well as six Senior Advisors and two consultants.

The document was marked with the following warning: "UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION.'' Unauthorized dissemination of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is subject to civil and criminal sanctions under Section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA) ( 42 USC 2168). This statute is implemented througq a regulation, I 0 C.F.R. Part I 017, and DOE Order 471.1. Any person who violates any regulation or order of the Secretary issued under 42 USC 2168 with respect to the unauthorized dissemination of information shatt be subject to a civil penalty, not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation~ and subject to a criminal penalty, under Section 223 of the AEA (42 USC 2273), of $5,000 and/or two years imprisonment.

The objective of this inspection was to detennine who was responsible for the unauthorized release of the Internal Report to an individual outside DOE.

This inspection was conducted in accordance with "Quality Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

Observations and Conclusions

--W~-wer~ unable to conclusively determine who released the Internal Report outside DOE. _ Thirty. original copies of the Internal Report were printed by Sandia on January 21, 1999. These original copies were distributed at DOE Headquarters, the Albuquerque Operations Office, and Sandia. We determined that at least 31 additional copies. of the Internal Report were reproduced. We also determined that in excess of 125 DOE and DOE contractor employees had access to the Internal Report, but this number could be substantially higher because of the large number of copies available throughout the Department. We interviewed over 60 DOE and DOE contractor employees, including the. principals and key senior staff of the DOE offices that received an 9riginal copy of the Internal Report. Everyone interviewed denied releasing the Internal Report outside the Department of Energy.

The results of our inspection, based on extensive interviews, document searches, and reviews of telephone records, do not provide conclusive evidence as to the individual, or individuals, who inappropriately released the Internal Report. There were i'ndications, however, that the Internal Report was released by someone within, or closely conneeted to, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN). Specifically, the USA Today article included information from two issue papers that were prepared by the Office of Safeguards and Security (NN-51 ), and we found no evidence that these two issue a ers were ever distributed outside NN prior to publication of

(b)(6) , (~H7L Jhe r icke .. Further, Office of Public Affairs said the reporter (C) t_old hat he had copies o mtema trac mg sheets for annual reports to the President on (b)(6) .(~.l(.7) · the status of safeguards and security at domestic nuclear weapons facilities for 1994 through (C) 1997. DOE officials believed the documents in question were internal tracking sheets used by

the Office of Security Affairs (NN-50), the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security (NN-1), and the Office of the Executive Secretariat. We detennined that the NN-50 and NN-1 tracking sheets would not normally leave NN; and the Executive Secretariat tracking sheet would normally only pass between NN and the Office of the Executive Secretariat.

Using information available through DOE's Office of Chief Information Officer, we examined all outgoing and selected incoming telephone records for the periods associated· with the release of the InteJ al Renert We determined that f1ur telep~one calls were m.ade from telephones ·

(~))(S) , (b)(?) .assigned t · Office of Safeguards and Security (NN-51), to the ( reporter's direct office phone number from January 1998 until publication of the article. These (b)(6),(b)(7)_ .. phone calls.are notable sincel · ltotd us in two interviews that0 had no recollectiori~(6),. (b)(7) (C) of ever having spoken to the reporter prior to publication of the article. Two telephone calls { )

were placed to the reporter's direct office phone number on January 22, 1998 and · January 23, 1998. On January 23, 1998, the Deputy Secretarv issued a memorandum to DOE Heads of Departmental Elements announcing that( · ······ !would be heading a team to . (~(~)~~b)(?) review and evaluate DOE security. Two additional telep·hone calls were placed to the reporter d ) and 13 days, respectively, before the article was printed in March 1999. A complete discussion of all Departmental telephone calls to the reporter just prior to the publication of the article are presented in the "Details of Finding" section of this report.

2

Finally, i~ a memorandum dated March 18, 1999,1 ( Office of ~~)(6), (b)(7) Security Affairs, stated thaQad received information that indicated that the unauthorized

· - releiw; .of the Internal Repo ay have come from within the Office of Security Affairs or the

(b )(6), (b )(7) (C)

(b)(6),(b)(7) (C)

Office of Safeguards· and Security.

PET AILS OF FINDING

Printing and Distribution of the Internal Report

On January 21, 1999, 30 original copies of the Internal Report were printed by Sandia in Albuquerque,' New Mexico. Twelve of the original copies were hand delivered to DOE Headquarters and provided to certain attendees at a January 25, 1999, DOE Security Council (Council) meeting. Eleven copies were hand delivered to Sandia's office in ·Washington, D.C., and seven copies remained at Sandia in Albuquerque, New· Mexico, and were distributed to individuals at Sandia who participated in the review and to the Manager of the Albuquerque Operations Office. ·

The Council is chaired by the Under Secretary of Energy. At the January 25, 1999, meeting of the Council, the Internal Report was provided to officials from the Offices of Nonproliferation and National Security; Defense Programs; Environmental Management; Field Management; and Environment, Safety and Health. The Under Secretary advised the recipients that the document was very sensitive and must be tightly controlled. Recipients of the Internal Report were to prepare comments on the report and provide their comments to the Under Secretary.

Prior to the Council meeting, the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, was provided a copy of the Internal Report. The Director, Office of Counterintelligence, was also provided a copy of the Internal Report subsequent to the Council meeting. Certain members of the review team that prepared the Internal Report and the Senior Advisors to .the review team were also provided copies.

We determi1_1ed that the Internal Report was widely distributed within DOE. In excess of 125 DOE and ~OE contractor personnel had access to either original or reproduced copies of the Internal Report. In addition to the 30 original copies of the Internaf Report, we are aware of 31 reproduced copies that were made. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security reproduced at least 25 copies; and the Office of Environmental Management and the Albuquerque Operations Office reproduced three copies each. Twenty-one of the 25 copies reproduced within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security have been destroyed by the Office of Safeguards and Security.

Documentation in the Possession of USA Todgy

Just prior to publication of the article the reporter called I I Office~~~(6). (b H7)

of~ublic Affairs. According to( ; 1 the reporter said he was working on an article and had in his possession a copy oh e Internal Report, internal DOE memoranda, and DOE internal tracking reports which showed that DOE was late in providing annual reports to the President on the status of safeguards and security at domestic nuclear weapons facilities for 1994

3

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1 ) (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)

··, · ....... ........

through i 997. When the>arti.cle appeared in USA Today, the Office of Security· Affairs, NN-50, detennined that information from two issue papers re ared b the Office of Safe ards and

- --Securit NN-51 was also uotellnthe article.

Information Included in the USA Today Article

The USA Today article, entitled "Feds sought 19 nuke probes: Agency cites 'alarming' security lapses," quoted information contained in a letter froml ko the Secretary of fgl)(?),(b)(7)

Energy that transmitted the Internal Report. The transmittal letter was included as part of the Internal Report. The entire document, including the transmittal memorandum, was stamped UCNI. (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § '3024(i)(1)

\

I las follows: "There has bee·n an alarming increase of instances where nuclear weapons design, intelligence and other national defense information has been either compromised or placed at (b)(3) :5~ u.s.c. risk" and "some of the cases involve 'disclosures of classified and/or sensitive unclassified § 3024(1

)(1)

information includin otential nuclear com uter codes, to forei n natiqoa.ls'~ .... '..' ... The article" (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)( 1) stating that "Other problems noted in the briefing material and other internal reports

... ····· obtained by USA Today include a backlog of 4,000 'reinvestigations' that need to be done on DOE personnel whose security clearances are beyond their five-year re-examination date."

Distribution of the Two Office of Safeguards and Security Issue Papers

Although several officials told us they thought the two issue papers were forwarded to the Office of the Secretary, we were unable to confirm that the issue papers were distributed outside the Office of Nonproliferation and National Secprity orior to nub!jcatjon of the artic!; . Office of

~~\(6) , (?)(!) . Security Affairs documentation showed tha~ JNN-50, hand-carrjed the issue papers to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National

~~)(6) , (b)(7L Security (NN .. .I). However, I lcould not specifically recall providing the issue papers to NN-1. NN-1 officials did not recall ever seeing or receiving the issue papers; and there was no record of the issue papers in the NN-1 correspondence tracking system. In addition, the Office of Congressional, Public, and Intergovernmental AfTaifs and the Office of Executive Secretariat h d d f h · · ed h · · d I h d' a11 (b)(6) (b)(7) a no recor o avmg rece1v t e issue papers, an w o ooor tnates mm . • (C) ~

briefing materials for the Secretary, did not recognize the issue papers and had no record of having received them.

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § ....... . 3024(i)(1)

4

(C) ... . which · mJune 1998. told us that this ts t e on y issue paper T · (b)(6),(b)(7) . (b)(6) (b)(7) . . ·-~ . . h I . ~)(6),(b)(7 )

that cited t_he 19 FBI investigations ecause e number of FBI investigations cited was no (b ) (6) , (~)(!C 1ccuiite: After! . · lsaidn realized .. thatthe actuaLnumberoi(b) (~). (b) (t.) (C) FBI investigations was 12 but never notified anyone of this discrepancy. In fact, O recently J bY(?).(b)(7)

detennined that only eight incidents were actually referred to the FBI. (C)

Distribution of Internal Tracking Sheets

As noted previously, just prior to the publication of the article, the reporter called I .. · · ... · (~f ?1.~ ~b )(?) (b) (6) , (.~)(?L . 1ndtoldl=lamong other things, that he had copies of DOE internal tracking sheets for annual (C) reports t~ President on the status of safeguards and security at domestic nuclear weapons

facilities for 1994 through 1997. Officials we interviewed said they believed that the documents the reporter had were internal tracking sheets used by NN-1, NN-50, and the Office of Executive Secretariat. We determined that the NN-1 and NN-50 tracking sheets would not normally leave NN~ and the Office of Executive Secretariat tracking sheet would normally only pass between NN and the Office of the Executive Secretariat.

Office of Security Affairs Memorandum on Release of Security Information

~~)(6) · ~~~?LJ.. ~nfonned us ·thatn initially believed that the unauthorized release of the Internal Report occurred from within tfie-Office of Security .Affairs, which includes the Office of Safeguards and Security. The day after the article appeared, 'ssued .. a-memorandua{~~?)~ (b)(7) to all Federal and contractor employees in these two offices stating that had·!!received... . .. Jl:'.l\?)~(b ) (7) information that indicates that a person or persons working in the Office of Security Affairs or (C)

the Office of Safeguards and Security may have released, or caused to be released, internal drafts and other information concerning the Department's security operations to persons outside the De artm n w· · need to know of this information." However, in an interview with

(b)(8) , (~,)JZJ , ....... · ... · ·· · ··················· saidO was no longer sure that the information was leaked from [Jc~(~)~ ~b )(7) ~~5) . (?)(!L orgamzat1on; ut ·· cknowledged that the reporter's possession of the issue papers and the ( )

(b)(5),(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

internal tracking sheets did seem to point to NN.

·········-. ......

(b)(5),(b)(6), lhad employees sign a (b)(?)(Cf statement that read: "I hereby attest to my understanding fully my responsibilities, under law

and Department of Energy regulation and directives, to protect classified, controlled, proprietary and sensitive information entrusted to me."

5

OIG Interviews of DOE and DOE Contractor Employees

-1'.he.Qffice. of Inspector General interviewed more than 60 of the DOE and DOE contractor employees who had received either an original or reproduced copy of the Internal Report or who had access to a copy of the Internal Report. This included principals or key senior staff of the organizations that received an original copy of the Internal Report, including the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; the Office of Defense Programs; the Office of Environmental.Management; the Office of Environment, Safety and Health; the Office of Field Management; the Office of Counterintelligence; the Albuquerque Operations Office; and Sandia. Everyone interviewed denied releasing the Internal Report to any indivldual(s) or entity(ies) outside the Department of Energy or its contractors. In addition, everyone interviewed who acknowledged having access to the two issue papers denied releasing the issue papers to any individual(s) or entity(ies) outside the Department of Energy or its contractors. We found no evidence during the course of these interviews that anyone outside the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security had ever seen these issue papers prior to publication of the article.

OIG Review of Telephone Records

DOE, through the Office of the Chief Information Officer, had access to the telephone numbers for incoming and outgoing calls on assigned cellular phones and for outgoing calls from assigned desk phones. Records of all telephone calls made from Germantown and Forrestal Government desk phones, from June 1998 to April 1999, were reviewed to determine whether any calls were made to the reporter' s direct phone number at USA Today. We also examined records of all Government issued cellular calls made by certain DOE employees who had access to the Internal Report and issue papers during the same time period.

A review of the June 1998 to April 1999 phone records showed that 10 calls were placed to the reporter's direct phone number at USA Today prior to March 17, 1999. Seven calls were from DOE's Office of Public Affairs, onl :.I w~n~re Office of the Under Secret!!!}'., and two

~~)(6) . (~)(?L. callswei:eft.om .phonesassignedto ···· One call was made from I ···· L C9J(?) ~ (b)(7) desk phone on March 4, 1999, at 6: 1 p.m. e c I lasted about 3.5 minutes. Another call was (C)

made to the re~orter on March S, 1999, at 10:22 a.m. from the cellular phone assigned to (b)(6) ,(~HD ... I The call originated from Reston, Virginia, and lasted approximately two (C) minutes. These calls were placed to the reporter 12 and 13 days, respectively, before the USA

Today article was published. ·

Based on the results of a review of these phone records, we also obtained the desk and cellular ~~)(6) , (?)(!) . phonerecordsfor~ ...... - ror January 1998 to May 1998. A review of these records

showed that two c Is, of approximately one minute each, were made from I . . ·-·Im• mm~~))(?)~_(b)(7) cellular phone to the reporter's direct phone number at USA Today on January 22, 1998, and January 23, 1998. On January 23, 1998, the Deputy Sey etarv had issued a memorandum to DOE Heads of Departmental Elements announcing that - l .. J~)(?} '. (?)(?)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(?L.l .. -m .... ·· lreview and evaluate DOE security (C) ········ . . .

6

(b )(6),(b )(7) (C)

Calls to the Reporter from the Office of Public Affai*s and the Office of the Under Secretary ---·- '. . \ (b)(6),(b')'(7)

(b)(6),,(b)(7) Individuals in the Office of Pu~lic Affairs made seve~ calls to the reporter just prior to (C)," (C) ·· · .. p_~~lication of the article. On Mar~h 11, 1999, I 1 lplac~d two caJls to the_r:Orter.

One call J.asted 18 seconds, and the other call lasted almost four mmutes. I ' ~also (b)(6),(b)(7) called the re))ortefJour times on March 16, 1999. The first call lasted 14 seconds; the second (C) ··. call lasted almost 9 and one-half minutes; the third call lasted almost 5 minutes; and the fourth

" . call lasted 33 seconds. I · · I Office of Public Affairs, also placed a call to the "reporter on March 16, 1999. This call lasted approximately one ~nd one-half minutes.

·,, (b )(6),(b )(7)(C) ,__ ___ __.!said t~de calls were all pursuant to official business and D id·not provide the. ~g\(6) ~ (b)m reporter. · · · · ·on from the Internal Report, the issue papers, or the internal tracking

(b )(6) , (~)(.?L . sheets. . also Sa.id that O sawa cover of the Internal Report prior to the article but (C) . t~~t I not ave a copy of the report itf elf nor the ti o is r e r apers and the internal tracking (b)(6),(b)(7)· · sheets until after the article was published. _ _ said h~ never had access to the (C) ·· Internal Report or the issue papers. (b)(6),(b')(7) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(C) "

(b )(6),(_b )(7) ...... The. ph.one .. recards.also showed that.th~ m mm ·· · !phone was used to place a 22-second {~6),(b)(7) .. ~!!Jo the. reporter on March.16,19.99,.j .. ·· ······················ . ldid not recall this telephone (ij:6),(b)(7) . call .but[Jsaid it might have been related to an official interview about safeguards and security (C) issues that the reporter was scheduled to have with[3 ·The interviewoccun::ed on (b)(6),(b)(7)

March 17, 1999. (C)

~~)(6) , (~ ),\7.1.. " Interviewr orl (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b\,(7)(C)

~~))(5) . (b)(7) In ·an initial interview with I Ion March 24, .... e O~ce oflnspector General's receipt of the Department's telephone records, aid-CJ did not recall having any conversations with the reporter and that calls receives from the press are usually referred to DOE's Office of Public Affairs. Further, . ~nieddlscus·sihSthe ·· ··· . (b)(6),(b)(7)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(C) lnternal..RepQ!1~ith an one outside NN or its contractors. Based on our.revie~ of the t~Jephone(C) (b)(6),(b)(7.)(Q), .re.q9~ds we obtained, was interviewed again on April 14, 1999. I r (o.H5J,(b)(7) (b)(6),(b)(7).(CL .. again sa1.d0h~Qno reco ectton o aving talked to the reporter prior to our March 24, 1999; ··· . _(C) (b)(6) , (b)(7)(C). jn~erYiewwith[jmH:owever, 1 lsaid that within a couple of days after the ~~))(6.) , (b)(7 ) (b )(6), (b). (7)(q .. M ....... arch.24:.JCJ99Jntel'View, O called the reporter. C)advised.usJhatJb.e,r~P"'!er \V~~ld confirm (b)(6),(b)('l)(C) Jhatl _ · I was not the source who h r vided the r~~~rte~ with.the Internal 'Report: ~~f~) ! \b)(7) (b)(6),(bH?)(C) ... The ~~lep 9n~ call made.to there ~~er after .m~t1al mterv1ew does not .aPJ>ea': (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6) (b)(7)(G) m·on .. ~.he. PQf:Jelepho~. rec. ords, . as as e ag~m afn had any.conversa~1onsw1th(cr

' th: ~~P~~er ~~fo.~~ t.h1s calL . replied "not particularly,\• O sa1d O!~~e1ves calls (b )(6 ) , (b)(?){~~ - ~olll .. ~~~ pres,s. ~IJ theJ irne1 an .·· .a mos a ways refers th~se calls to DOE's Office of'PUbli~ -~ J~){€))! ~b)(7 ) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) .. ~~1rs: I !further saa~ that there have been times that0hat.~~~ fe11ar talks w1th((~){tl)Jb)(7) (b)(6),(b)(T){C) the press, but th~y have n_ot been with_ t~e f!SA TO<J_ay reporter. When aske~ af]=-:J?ad. .. ~y~~ sent (C) · ..

the reporter any information over a facs1m1le machine, I lrephed no~ that I .. (b)(6},.(b)(7)(C) remember." . .... \

(b )(6),(b j(?)(C)

(b )(6),(!5)(7)(C)

7

.. • (b)(6),(b1)(7)(C) (b)(6),(p.)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) . ~~r), (b)~7.~ \ . - (b)(6),(b?(.7)(C) (b)(6) , (bt('.)~~) "...... (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6).(?)(7) -- .. . _ . . sai~Osecretary keeps a telephqne log of.all incoming calls when D is not in n (b)(6).(b)(?) (C) - -0 .. !~e or w en 1s on another telephone call. D also sa1dl1~!l.lffi$Jhe calls b usm - d~(C) i~i6),(b)(?l~~~&l~~~o~~h::~3f. t~.~~:1~Yk/~ec~d1n t e te ~ ~.~~ -~~;'~),lbK71 (b)(6),(b)(7) on.Mai:chA~ ... . . id th · as at a . in (b)(6),(b)(7)

(b~~) , (b)~?)(~t~~~h_i.~~~~'- ::': . ~~. ~y. said often returns t o 1celate .. m !he. daytor~mO::., .. ~~fJ;;(~)(?)(C)

i&\~;~~1 :1~:.~:~~r~~~~ ~:rr::~~!~:~:ro;.i:~:~~~~-~:i:n':~~.- ·-~~~~ ---·····(-~:.~:;·;~~-)~:;~~/ (C) ' ·· · said that LJwas m possession ofLJ~U~lar phone on that day, but n~_oes not (C) '

(b)(6) (b)(?.)· -r~mem er p acmg a call to the. reporter. (b)(e);(b)(7)(C) tsJt6) "(b)(7)(C) (C) ' · .. ,...- (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) '

(b)(6),(l?.)t7) Subsequent to the second interview, the Office oflnspector General obtai.ned telephone records . (C) ' that showed two telephone calls were made from I !cellular phone on .... .. ............. {g))\?)~(b)(7)

January' 22 1998 and Ian11, ry 23 1998 to the reporter's office phone. Howo r we did not (b)(6),(b)(7) . . . . ·1 • o· . . · (C) ... -remterv1ewbecause had already tol~e. veral times that had no.. .. .. ?g))(6),(b)(7)

recollection of having talked to th~· reporter except for .. 11 to the reporter er our initial • • I "·~ ....... .

mterv1ew. · (b)(6),(b)(?)(C) (b)(6};\b)(7)(C)

Office of Safeguards and Security Telephone Log

We reviewed the current telephone Jog maintained by I !secretary, and we noted i~~)(5) . (b)(?) contained incoming calls from January 27, 1999, to April 13, 1999. There were no incoming telephone calls listed from the reporter. The secretary assigned to the Deputy Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, also made entries on the telephone Jog. Both s er · id they have no recollection of ever talking to the reporter or taking a message for ~lnilomlailiwfrllio~mrJ .. tL.he . ~~))(?J~(b)(?) reporter. Both secretaries also said they have never sent the reporter any m facsimile machine. We obtained the records for two facsimile machines in ......,,__.....,_ __ _, ~~))(6 ) , (b)(?) office area for the time period June 1, 1998, to April 14, 1999. The records show that no facsimiles were sent to the reporter' s office from those machines.

CONCLUSION

·our inspection determined that numerous copies of the Internal Report existed, including 30 original copies and at least 31 reproduced copies, and that in excess of 125 DOE and DOE contractor employees had access to the Internal Report. We interviewed over 60 key DOE and DOE contractor employees who had access to the Internal Report and· everyone interviewed denied releasing the Internal Report outside the Department.

However, as discussed earlier in the report, there were indications that the Internal Report was released by an individual, or individuals, within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. However, these indications notwithstanding, we were unable to conclusively determine who released the Internal Report outside the Department of Energy.

8