Frederick List and Political Economy

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Reviewof InternationaloliticalEconomy :1 Spring1997:154-178

Friedrich List and the political economyof the nation-stateDavid Levi-Faur

Departmentof Political Science, University of Haifa

ABSTRACTIn an era of global changesthe fate of the nation-state s of crucialimport-ance for every student of political economy. This much is indeed reflectedin the wide attentionrecently paid to the implicationsof globalizationonthe nation-state.Unfortunately, he point of view of the political economyof nationalism is largely unexploredin this discussion. Thus, this articlediscusses FriedrichList's political economy in order to shed light on theeconomic role of the state. List is recognized today worldwide as one ofthe most influential trade theorists and as one of the first to popularizethe theory of 'infant industries'.Yet this recognition only partly reflectshis significance as a political economist. The main assertion of this articleis that in order to discuss the fate of the nation-statewe mnustirst be ableto clarify its economic roles. This, in tum, may lead us to the conclusionthat current assertionsconcerningthe so-called 'diminishing autonomyofthe state' as well as the 'imperative of globalization' are over-stressedunder the influence of laissez-faireonceptionsof political economy.

KEYWORDSFriedrich List; political economy; nation-state; mercantilism; economicnationalism.

Et la patrie et l'humanite.(FriedrichList)

In an era of global changes the fate of the nation-state is of crucial import-ance for every student of political economy. This much is indeedreflected in the wide attention and extensive discussion of the nation-state and the process of globalization. Unfortunately, the point of viewof the political economy of nationalism is largely unexplored in thisdiscussion.' It is only rarely acknowledged that nationalism is a primarysource of legitimacy and guidance for the management of the economyof the nation-state. Not much has changed since the British economist,

(? 1997Routledge 0969-2290


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FRIEDRICH LISTJoan Robinson,argued that 'in the midst of all confusion, there is onesolid unchanging lump of ideology that we take so much for grantedthat it is rarely noticed - that is, nationalism. The very nature ofeconomics is rooted in nationalism'(Robinson,1962:124).Notwithstand-ing the importance of Robinson's assertion, no 'positive' theory ofeconomicnationalismhas since emerged.Ourstudents may know muchabout economic liberalism and economic socialism, but they usuallyknow very little, if anything, about economic nationalism.2This, ofcourse, is hardly the fault of the students; very little has been writtenon the subjectof the politicaleconomy of nationalismand, in thisrespect,teachers are facing a similar problem to that of their students.For more fertile and productive political economy, the interactionbetween economy and nationalismshould be explored. Indeed, this is amost pressing issue. In an era of 'cascading nterdependence' readglob-alization), the neglect of nationalism- its interactionwith the economyand its effects on policy making - impairs our ability to grasp the fullsignificance of the notion of the nation-state and to analyse the currentchanges in its economic roles. The main assertions of this articleare thatin order to discuss the fate of the nation-statewe must be able to clarifyits economic roles and that this can be done by discussion of FriedrichList'spoliticaleconomy. This, in turn, may lead us to the conclusionthatcurrentassertionsconcerningthe so-called'diminishingautonomyof thestate' as well as the 'imperativeof globalization'are over-stressedunderlaissez-faireconceptions of political economy. The economic roles of thenation-stateshould be clarifiednot only fromthe marxistand laissez-fairepoints of view (as commonly found in every textbook of political econ-omy). Afterall, in termsof ideological influences,the nation-state s def-initely more a product of nationalism than of its paradigmatic andideological rivals- whether socialism or liberalism.Therefore,this article deals with the works of FriedrichList, one ofthe first heralds of the political economy of nationalismand one of themost influentialfiguresamong its proponents in Germany and Europe.3FriedrichList's life is a fascinatingsubjectand his political activity andlife experienceopen the window not only onto Germanliberalnation-alism but also onto American economic history in the first half of thenineteenth century.It should be emphasized, however, that the discus-sion in this articleshould not lead the readerto uncriticaladherence tonationalismor blind us fromcriticalexaminationof FriedrichList's polit-ical activity and,especially,of his moralstand in issues of war and peaceand his pan-Germanism.4A comprehensivepicture of List and a discus-sion of List'spolitics areunfortunatelybeyond the agenda of this article,which is confined to the implications of his writing for the politicaleconomy of the nation-state. However, an excellent presentation ofFriedrichList'sideas and politicalactivities in the name of a unified and

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ARTICLESliberal Germany is available to the readers in FriedrichList;Economistand Visionary Henderson, 1983).FriedrichList (1789-1846)was born at Reutlingen in south Germanyand served as a civil servant in his native state of Wuirttemberg.By 1817he had been appointed Professor of Administrationat the University ofTubingen.List took an active part in the movement favouring the aboli-tion of internal duties in Germanyand was elected to the lower chamberof the Wurttemberg Diet. His dissident political views caused hisdismissal from the university,his expulsion from the Diet, and then alsoan accusationof treason. Listwas sentenced to ten months' hard labour;but after serving six months he was released on condition that heemigrate to America. His Americanperiod (1825-30) culminated in hisnomination to the position of American consul in Leipzig, where hecontinued to work for German economic and political unification.Economic difficulties, political disappointments and iUness brought ona deep depression and resulted in his suicide. List's influence on policymakers and development theory is widespread (Wendler,1989).5There are many forms of nationalismand even more interpretationsof nationalism;thus it is very unfortunatethat Nazi, fascist and conser-vative versions of nationalismarewidely perceived today (mainly in theAnglo-Saxonworld) to representthe ideal type. Fromhistorical, analyt-ical and scholarly points of view, nationalism has always been morethan those dangerous ideologies of hate, and if we strive to understandnationalism adequately, this fact must be taken into account. Rational,benevolent versions of nationalism were always part of human historyand this is so obvious that it seems redundant to supply examples. Inaddition, that nationalism can be based on an enlightened philosophicalargument was convincingly argued by many (i.e. Tamir, 1993). More-over, if we deny nationalism, we must also deny the right of nationalself-determination- be it Palestinianor Jewish, Chechen or Russian. Ifone takes nationalism, as I do, as a kind of 'imagined' yet importantcommunal identity, multiculturalism and nationalism reinforce ratherthan contradicteach other.Asserting the existence of a 'positive' and enlightened nationalism,without denying the existence of malignantversions (or even malignantaspects) of nationalism,this articlesuggests that the ideology of nation-alism has its own economic imperatives;acknowledging the existence ofthose imperatives should enable us to shed light on the ways in whichthe economic roles of the state were shaped in the past and may continueto be shaped in the future.Thus, the first part of the articlewill discussthe notion of national productive powers and their relationship to theconcept of globalization.Two views of globalizationwill be offered.Thefirst emphasizes the material aspects of economic activity and derivesfrom Adam Smith'snotion of development,while the second emphasizes

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FRIEDRICHLISTthe political and human capital aspects of economic activity and relatesto List'sconcept of development.Part IIof the articlewill focus on fourcharacteristics f 'developed economies'. Part IIIwill use these character-istics to discuss the role of the state in List'spoliticaleconomy. The con-cluding section will argue that the role of the state has not substantiallychanged in our 'eraof globalization'.Thus,it is maintained thatmany ofthe currentassertionsconcering the so-called'diminishingautonomy ofthe state' as well as the 'imperativeof globalization'are over-stressedunder the influence of laissez-faireonceptionsof politicaleconomy.

I PRODUCTIVE POWERS AND THE PROCESSOF GLOBALIZATION

List is recognizedas one of the forefathersof the theoryof 'infant indus-tries'. Nevertheless, this recognitioncan hardly testify to the full extentof his significanceand contributionto the study of political economy. Amore comprehensivepicture of his political economy can be portrayedby referenceto his use and elaborationof the conceptof nationalproduc-tive powers.6The term 'productivepowers' was firstused by List in his'Outlines of Americanpolitical economy' (1827).7The term was furtherelaboratedin The NaturalSystemof PoliticalEconomy 1838)8as well asin his magnum opus titled TheNationalSystemofPoliticalEconomy1841).List's concept of productive powers is first based on a distinctionbetween the causes of wealth and wealth itself.9According to List,a person may possess wealth, i.e. exchangeablevalue; if, however,he does not possess the power of producingobjectsof more valuethan he consumes, he will become poorer.A person may be poor;however, if he possesses the power of producing a largeramountof valuable articles than he consumes, he becomes rich.(List, 1841: 133)Productive,powers consist of three types of capital: the capital ofnature (or naturalcapital),the capitalof matter(ormaterialcapital)andthe capital of mind (or mental capital).The capital of naturecomprisesland, sea, rivers and mineralresources. The capital of mattercomprisesall objects,such as machines, utensils and raw materials,that are used

directly or indirectly in the production process. Finally, the capital ofmind includes skills, training,industry,enterprise, armies,naval powerand government (List, 1827: 193-4).10The creation of wealth is theoutcome of the interactionbetween human skills, industry and initia-tives on the one hand, and the naturaland materialworld on the other.According to List, these three types of capital are distinguishableaccordingto their relative importanceto the creation of wealth:naturaland material capital are inferior to mental capital. Economic policy157


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ARTICLESmaking that is aimed at the development of mental capital, all otherthings being equal, will result in better performances than economicpolicy that aims to enlarge the development of natural and materialcapital. In order to clarify this point, List offered the example of twofamilies, each with a farm and five sons. The father of the first familydeposits his savings in thebankand maintainshis sons in manual labour.In contrast, the father of the second family exploits his savings for thesake of his sons' education and grants them both time and encourage-ment for their own personal cultivation. Two of his sons receive trainingaimed at turningtheminto competent landowners,while the otherslearntrades and otherprofessions. Upon the death of the fathers, argues List,the future of these two families will be different due to the two fathers'distinct policies. The decline of the fortune of the first family seems tobe an inevitable prospect, as its estate will have to be divided into fiveparts and tended just as before. The area for cultivation that formerlysupplied the needs of one family will now have to supply those of five.The fate of the first family will thus be that of poverty and ignorance.By contrast, upon the death of the second father, his estate will be splitonly into two, and due to the good husbandry of these trained heirs,each half will be able to yield as much as the whole yielded before. Theother threebrotherswill alreadyhave obtainedsecureincomes for them-selves in whatever professions they have. Due to the education of thesons (List did not mention any female family members) their diversemental forces and talents will have been cultivated and will probablyincrease over time and generations.Although in both cases it was the well-being of the family that thefathers had in mind, they had differentconcepts of wealth that yieldeddifferent outcomes. The first father identified wealth with materialcapital and hence neglected the cultivation of his sons' mental abilities.The second identified wealth with mental capital and therefore investedin his sons' education. This story exemplifies List's strong convictionthat the various types of capital have a hierarchicalorder, and thatmental capital is the most important. This distinction further enabledhim to argue that the first father acted according to the materialistconceptions of Adam Smith'sfollowers, whereas the second fatheractedaccording to a human capital-oriented theory of policy making. Theexample gives us the opportunity to examine critically the notion ofhuman capital in classical economics and its distinction between wealthand the causes of wealth. I contend that following Adam Smith classicaleconomic theory failed to identify properly the causes of wealth.Indeed,AdamSmithmade the distinctionbetweenwealth and causesofwealth a central point in his criticism of the mercantilists' perceptionsof the role of silver and gold as sourcesof wealth. As alternatives o goldand silver, Smith offered the division of labour and the accumulationof

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ARTICLESthe state and nationalistmovements in building a mass system of educa-tion - not as a response to individuals, or to a market-drivendemandfor education, but as an elite effort to educate (and mobilize) themasses.14 On the basis of the concept of productive powers, List wasable to offeran analysis that connectedgovernrmentducationalpoliciesand the notion of human capital with the desired outcome of economicdevelopment. Listwas able to distinguish between the characterizationsor outcomes of development and the causes of development. The trans-formationfrom one stage of development to another is characterizedythe division of labour and by the quantity of capital manifested in it.Nevertheless, materialcapital and the division of labour should not beidentified as the causes of economic development. It is mental capitalthat is more importantand thus should be considered the most impor-tant cause of development, and it is the government that is responsiblefor the education of its citizens and therefore for the augmentation ofhuman capital.It is the extent and amountof human capitalthat distin-guishes between developed and underdevelopedeconomies.At the mostprimitive stages of an economy, mental capital is very limited while inlater stages of development the constraints on the augmentation ofmental capital are removed. This in tum makes the division of labourand the accumulationof capitalpossible.It is possible thereforeto identify two concepts of economic develop-ment, one that stresses material factors and another that emphasizespolitics and human capital. These two concepts are embedded in thecurrentpopularnotion of globalization.Globalization,while rarelyprop-erly defined, implies that certaineconomic processes, often understoodas unavoidableimperatives,carryhuman society towards economic andpolitical reorganizationon a global scale. This interpretationof global-ization is materialistic - it neglects human capital and the role ofgovernrmentn economic development. It is a Smithian or a laissez-faireconcept of globalizationas it associatesglobalizationwith the economicprocesses of accumulationand the division of labour.Accordingto thisview we are now in a new stage of economic development, where themovement towards a more efficient (i.e. global) accumulationof capitaland division of labour will create favourableconditions for the settingof a new global-political order. This new order will then diminish (orat least minimize) the economicroles of the state and will also reinforcethe laissez-faireonceptions of the economic role of government.A second notion of globalization,Listian or that of economic nation-alism, may also be introduced. This notion stresses that the forces ofglobalization are products of the augmentation of mental capital, alearning process which includes the creation of new forms of knowl-edge as well as the products of new forms of political organization.Thenation-state n this interpretationhas a crucialrole in promoting,guiding

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FRIEDRICH LISTand regulating the process of globalization.The nation-stateis crucialto the process of globalizationas it nurturesit, protects it and gives itmeaning. Indeed, it is possible to argue that for List protectionismas astate policy is a transitionalpolicy on a road which will lead eventuallyto free trade. But his definition of the role of the state primarily restson the concept of productivepowers and not on the theory of trade (asthe next part of the article demonstrates), and thus it is possible tocontrastan argumentin favourof the indispensabilityof the state to theprocess of economic development on the basis of List'sarguments.Thenation-stateand the national economy as the intermediateinstitutionsbetween the individual and humankind have, in this interpretationofglobalization,a crucial role that is not transitorybut everlasting.

II CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT: LIST'S POINT OF VIEWFour characteristicsof the process of economic development make therole of the state indispensable to List's political economy. These four,which will be examined in this part of the article,include the collectivenature of economic activity,the fragmentationof interests and identitiesin a developed economy, the need for long-term investments,and theculturalnature of productivepowers.15

The collective16 nature of economic activity in adeveloped economyThe concept of the division of labour was used by Adam Smithin orderto assert the claim that interdependenteconomic interactionsgenerateastrong rationale for harmonious social and political relations. However,by suggesting that a distinction should be made between objective ndsubjective ivisions of labour List highlights a more complex picture:

It is a division of labour if one savage on one and the same daygoes hunting or fishing, cuts down wood, repairs his wigwam,and prepares arrows, nets, and clothes; but it is also a divisionof labour if (as Adam Smith mentions as an example) ten differ-ent persons share in the different occupations connected withthe manufacturingof a pin: the former is an objective,and thelattera subjectivedivision of labour;the formerhinders, the latterfurthersproduction. (List,1841:149)The essential differencebetween the two types of division of labour isthat whereas in the former a single persondivides his own working

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ARTICLESpowers so that they will yield variousproducts, in the latter, severalpersons hare in the productionof one single product. The importanceofthis distinction between the objective and the subjective forms of thedivision of labour derives from the fact that the more meaningful type- i.e. the subjective- entails a greaterneed for cooperationor, as he putit, 'a confederationr unionof variousenergies, ntelligence, nd powersonbehalfof a commonproduction.The cause of the productiveness of theseoperations is not merely that division,but essentially the union' (List,1841:149-50).Thus,Listoffersa collectivistinterpretationof the produc-tion process, which is the union of human efforts towards a commongoal of development.The increasingspecializationof the productionprocess makes efficientcommunication ncreasinglycrucialfor the success of productionefforts,since 'the one who makes the heads of the pins must be certain of thecooperationof the one who makes the points if he does not want to runthe risk of producing pin heads in vain' (List, 1841:150). Without anadequate measure of cooperation,the cost of the product will increase,and consequently the advantagesof the division of labourwill diminishand may eventuallyeven turninto a sourceof conflict.Thus, the fragilityof the modem productionprocess is enhanced by the fact that any indi-vidual's refusal to cooperatemay suffice to 'throw all the others out ofwork'. The division of labourentailsnot only an increasein the numberof participants n the productionprocess of any single product but alsoa diffusion of its geographicalscope; this in turn will deepen its depen-dence on better communicationand cooperation.The story of the Towerof Babel may illustrateour point. The success of this ambitious projectdepended on both the cooperationand the communicationbetween thebuilders. In the biblical story it was made clear that it was due tothe poor communicationbetween the builders that theircooperationwashindered. In a developed economy, where every product is a Tower ofBabel in terms of complexity, we must find ways to supply adequatemeans of communicationand cooperation.The threatembedded in anypotential failure to cooperate should be our first concern in structuringan effective system of political economy.

Societal conflict in a developed economyAlthough the division of labour significantly enhances the need andrationalefor cooperation,the fact that it also createsnew interests,newsocial and personal identities, and new professions- each with its ownlogic, perspective,concerns,experienceand outlook - was hardly takeninto account.17 The deeper the specialization becomes, the greater thefragmentationof interests and identities that will follow. Thus, a divi-sion of labour does not merely strengthenthe rationalefor cooperation

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FRIEDRICH LISTbut also broadens the potential sphere of conflict. Within the socialsphere, the division of labour will make ever more clear the distinctionsbetween various social interests (e.g. commercial,industrial and agri-cultural interests).In contrastto David Hume, Adam Smith and DavidRicardowho pointed to the mutual benefits of trade between agricul-tural countries (like Portugal)and industrial countries (like Britain),aswell as in contrast to the classical economic theory, List was sensitiveto the implications of economic specialization on a country's society,politics, culture and militarymight.'8The need to coordinatethe inter-ests of commerce,agricultureand manufacturingwas the social conflictList was primarilyconcernedwith. If we take into account List'sexten-sive involvement with German and North Americanpolitics, as well ashis study of British history and politics, his concerns are completelyunderstandable.What is common to these historicalsettings is that themanufacturing ectorhad to overcome politicalresistance romopposingsocial groups before it could flourish and prosper.In the Britishcase, the public debate during the first half of the nine-teenth centurywas largely focused on the Corn Laws, the tariff on grainimports.In this debateit was the landlordswho resisted foreigncompe-tition, opposing the representatives of manufacturing interests whoprotestedagainstthe high tariffs.Accordingto the manufacturers,highertariffs meant higher food prices and accordinglyhigher costs of labour(which reduced their ability to compete abroad).A similar conflict ofinterest, which was the outcome of an increasingnational fragmenta-tion, was experiencedby List while he lived in the United States:thiswas the conflictbetween the industrialnorthand the agricultural outh.Again, at stakewas the futureof economicand social progress in NorthAmerica,which depended on the victory of the manufacturers.But itwas primarilyagainst the backgroundof Germany in the first half ofthe nineteenthcenturythat List's ideas were shaped.Listwas very activein the politicaldebateregardingtheGermancustomsunion, which even-tually resulted in the formation of the Zollverein (1834). During thepromotionof the idea of Germancustomsunion, Listbecameawarethatthe interests of manufacturingwere not the only social interestsat play,and that despite their importanceto furthereconomic developmentandthe future of the German nation, they were not necessarily the mostpowerful. A developed economy implies thereforenew forms of socialconflict, and this should be taken into account in the formation ofnationalpolitical institutions. Moreover,those institutionsshould struc-ture the national economy to promote the national interests and toovercome obstaclesand constraintson the operationof those economicsectors that are most beneficial to the national interests. Here, Listdemonstrateshis awarenessof the importanceof the state to the processeconomic development by overcoming societal opposition in the same

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ARTICLESvein that was one century later presented by Karl Polanyi's classicThe GreatTransformation1944). Markets and industrialization in thisapproach are to a large extent state-created nstitutions rather than anautonomous sphere of human action.

Time preferences in a developed economyEconomicactorscan take either a short-termor a long-termview in theirexpectationsabout harvestingthe fruits of their labour. However, for aneconomy to develop, it is a necessary conditionthat the economic actorsadopt the long-term view. In a hunting society, in contrast to an agri-cultural society, the products of a day's work will take the form of thehunted beast hanging over the hunter's fire. On a bad day, whenthe hunter returns empty-handedto his encampment,he can do no morethan sleep with an empty stomach and hope that the next day will bebetter. On both the fortunateand the unfortunatedays the results of thehunter's work are immediately visible. In this kind of society, there isno need to distinguish between the long and the short term, since theability to store the meat is very limited and there is no rationale forlong-term efforts.In agriculturalsocietieS,however, at least one seedingcycle needs to pass, from ploughing to harvesting,before a person canenjoy the fruits of his work. This waiting period necessarily broadensthe farmer'stime horizon and so makes long-term calculationnecessary.In a manufacturingeconomy, an even longer view is required. Here, theproducts of any single day of work will only be ready for consumptionafter a long period of investment. For instance, inventors' work, whichrequirescontinuous investment of materialand mentalcapital, will, afteryears of efforts, hopefully yield the knowledge and skills required forinvention. We therefore can characterizea developed economy by itslonger time horizons and argue that the more developed the economy,the more the economic actorswill be required to adopt the longer view.As developed economies requirelonger periods of fruition we get tothe crucial question: 'How should time preferences be determined?'What we need is a theory that will account for the motivation to investin the future; such a theory will have to account systematically for thewillingness to sacrifice certainamounts of present goods for the attain-ment of greateramounts of future goods.19Startingwith the question,'Whatspurs men to make something?'List offers the following answer:'We always find that there is some inner urge which sets the humanbody in motion' (List, 1841: 185). As will be demonstrated later, this'inner urge' is liable to be influenced by four distinct social conditions,each of which has the potential to stimulate the propensity to invest inthe future.

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FRIEDRICH LISTCulture and the productive powers in a developed economy

Productive powers are both culturally grounded and nationallybounded. They are culturally grounded because they thrive against acertain cultural background and languish with its decline. Hence thereis a causal connection between the prosperityof the arts, the sciences,and social and personal ethics on the one hand, and the productivepowers of that culture and nation on the other. Theagents of the produc-tive powers in List's theory include teachers, clergy and artists,as wellas blue-collarworkers. The political and cultural institutions of societygreatly influence the state of its productivepowers:The publicity of the administrationof justice, trial by jury, parlia-mentary legislation, public control of the state administration,self-administrationof the commonalties and municipalities,libertyof the press, liberty of association for useful purposes ... we canscarcely conceive of any law or any legal decision which wouldnot exercise a greater or smaller influence on the increase ordecrease of the productive power of the nation. (List, 1841: 139)

Other potential sources of productive power include the abolition ofslavery, the invention of printing, and freedom of the press. In partic-ular, it is mental capital that depends on cultural and politicalinstitutions, whereas materialcapital is relatively free from such influ-ences. It is this culturalpropensityof the productive powers which givesmeaning to the notion of nationaleconomy.20Productive powers are nationally bounded because they are codifiedin laws, norms and morals, and thus are not as easily transferableaslaissez-faireheories tend to assume. Moreover, it is the least importantcomponent of the productive powers, the material capital, that isdiscussed in laissez-faireheories of growth and trade. Indeed, capitaland technology may move from one side of the globe to the other, butthis is not true of mental capital, which is carriedby human beings andis subjectto restricted rules of immigration(which are themselves legit-imized by national values). Since the productive powers are nationallyand culturally grounded, List's notion of national conomys not deter-mined by the physical borders between states or by customs barriersor by any other kind of political machinery. Instead, national economyis viewed by List as the outcome of national ideas, national institutionsand people's desire to belong to a nation. This is the historicalorigin onwhich customs barriers and state institutions have been built. Theculturaland national characteristicsof the developed economy, as wellas the other three characteristicshatwere presented, guide our analysisof the role of the state in List'spolitical economy.

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ARTICLESIII THE ROLE OF THE STATE: NURTURING THEPRODUCTIVE POWERS OF THE NATION

The four characteristicsof developed economies discussed above arethose that eventually account for the role of the state in List's politicaleconomy.21The role of the state in List's trade theory is that of theprotector of the national productive powers. List's analysis of the impli-cations of the wool and cotton trade between the United States andBritain gives adequate expression to his views of productive powers(List, 1827: 187-202). In the first half of the nineteenth century the bilat-eral trade between those countriesconsisted of the export of cotton andwool from the United Statesin exchange for Britishmanufacturedgoods.According to List, this kind of trade could not allow for equal gains onboth sides (although, following Ricardo's theory of trade, free-tradersclaimed that it is precisely such a policy which would result in equalbenefits forboth sides). On thebasis of his concept of productive powers,List raised an interestingand important argument directed at the advo-cates of unregulated free-tradepolicies. According to List, the exchangebetween the United States and Britaininvolved two forms of capital:materialand mental. While free-tradetheorists restricted themselves todiscussing the exchange of matterfor matter (i.e. material capital), Listclaimed that in fact one should take into account the other and the mostimportantform of exchange between the United States and Britain: heexchange of mental capital.Although the division of labourbetween the Americans and the Britishwas seemingly equal, in fact it enabled the British to maximize theirnational productive powers while putting constraints on the Americanproductive powers. Under these conditions, the trade between the twocountries confined the Americans to the productionof agriculturalprod-ucts, which impeded intensiveaugmentationof their mental capital.Thisstate of affairs reinforced the economic and military inferiority of theUnited States and the superiorityof Britain.Protection,in certaincases,is thereforerecommended and justified as an education tax that wouldeventually enable the Americans to engage in an equal exchange withthe British,i.e. exchange not only of matter or matterbut also of mentalcapital for mental capital. Manufacturing involves many domains ofknowledge and science, and presupposes much experience, skill andpractice.The extensive employment of the British n manufacturinggavethem the opportunity to develop their productive powers and constrainthe opportunitiesof the agriculturalUnited States. According to List,therole of the state in such a case was to create adequate conditions for thedevelopment of American mental capital. These conditions, however,could not be provided unless a managed trade policy was implemented.In addition, long-termconsiderationsshould be also taken into account

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FRIEDRICH LISTby policy makers, and current sacrifice of materialcapital for the sakeof future returns is recommendedby List:

A nation which has an agrarianeconomy and is dependent uponforeign countries (forits manufacturedgoods) can ... stimulatetheestablishmentof industriesby means of a protectivetariff.Such acountry may well sacrifice much 'exchange value' [i.e. materialcapital] for the moment, if its new workshops produce expensivegoods of poor quality. But it will greatly increase its productivepower in the future. ... This is our main argument in support ofa protective tariff and in opposition to the doctrine of free trade.(List, 1838:35-6)

Tradepolicy that will support the augmentationof nationalproductivepowers should be constructed very carefully since the erection ofeconomic bordersinvolves potential losses in materialcapital.List thusmaintained that 'any exaggerationor hastening of protectionpunishesitself by diminished national prosperity'.22The principle of increasingthe productivepowers of the nation should guide the nationaleconomicpolicy. A nation should thus be evaluatednot by its self-sufficiency,norby its trade balancebut, according to List, by the degree to which 'itsindustry is independentand its productivepowers are developed' (List,1827:189).Another issue thatmay shed light on the role of the state in List'spolit-ical economy is the role of the statein the sphereof education.List'scon-viction of the economicimportanceof educationis reflected n his notionof mental capitaland the superiorstatushe attributesto it. His study ofthe linen industriesin France,Germanyand Englanddemonstratesthis.List claimed that the attemptsof the British to monopolize the produc-tion of linen throughout Europe were rathersimilar to the manner inwhich they managed to monopolize the cotton marketduring the pre-ceding half-century.Indeed, the future of linen industries was a subjectof greatconcem in France,since the Frenchmachinistsand manufactur-ers who previously enjoyed considerableadvantagesin this trade faceda realdangerof losing theirmarket o the British.Thesource of theBritishtradesuperiority,argued List,was the Britisheducationalsystem:

Before the time of EdwardIII,the Englishwere the greatestbulliesand good-for-nothing characters in Europe; certainly it neveroccurred to them to compare themselves with the Italians andBelgians or with the Germansin respect to mechanical talent orindustrial skill; but since then, their Governmenthas taken theireducation in hand, and thus they have by degrees made suchprogress that they can dispute the palm of industrial skill withtheir instructors. (List,1841:386-7)

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ARTICLESEducation is indigenous rather than exogenous to List's politicaleconomy. In the notion of productive powers, education is an impor-tant factor in national economic performance.A nation has to develop

its educational system in accordancewith its economic progress:As a nation becomes more industrialised,it becomes more neces-sary to secure the service of suitable,trainedpeople in the factoriesand workshops. Such people are now able to command highersalariesand wages than was formerlypossible. It will be easier forthem to devote themselves entirelyto a particularbranch of knowl-edge, provided that they have the necessary natural aptitude andthe good preliminary training. Knowledge is becoming morespecialised. (List, 1838:67)23If we now go back to consider the first characteristicof the produc-tive powers, namely their cooperative and communicative nature indeveloped economies,we may see why the coordinatingrole of the stateis an indispensable one. As the division of labourdeepens and as moreand more individuals become involved in the production of any single

product, and as more and more products are produced, coordinationbecomes increasingly crucial. It is with correspondenceto this processthat the management and the coordination of the social compositionbecome ever more complex. The public interest in each citizen's social-ization and education increases,and with it, its interests in each citizen'simproved capacity to cooperate.The economic fate of each member ofthe nation becomes increasingly dependent on that of others; after all,the break of any link in the long chain of production will eventuallyaffect all others.The cultural characteristicsof the productive powers are the secondfactor that shapes the role of the state in List's political economy.According to List, there is a significantdifferencebetween agriculturaland industrial societies. While he perceives industrial activity as the'motherand father'of science, as well as of the arts and enlightenmentin general, agriculturalsocieties are perceived by him as ignorant, intol-erant and parochialist:The intellectualpowers of such a people [in agriculturalsocieties]are hardly awakened and are put to little use. There are no oppor-tunities for latent talents to be developed. Only physical exertionsecures rewards and they are poor enough since the landownersmonopolise the labour of the workers on their land. ... Moralstrength never makes its mark and never triumphs over bruteforce. (List, 1838:54)

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FRIEDRICH LISTIndustrial development is hence perceived as both a cultural and anational imperative. Raising vines, profitableas it could be in terms ofmaterial capital,cannot satisfy a nation's desire for cultural prosperity.It is an argumentsuch as the latter thatenables us adequately to under-stand the following claim of List: 'A nation should not regard theprogress of industries from a purely economic point of view.Manufacturingbecomes a very important part of the nation's politicaland culturalheritage' (List,1838:39).A developed economy is also characterizedby the creation of newsocial identities and interests. In this context, List mentions two dis-tinct conflicts that are products of the developed economy: new kindsof conflicts between the interests of the individual and society, andthe segmentation of society into different economic sectors, such ascommerce, agriculture and manufacturing.In regard to the conflictbetween the individual and society,Listarguesthatalthoughthe produc-tion of many goods increases the materialcapital of both the individualand the nation, it may also weaken the nation's mental capital. Theproduction of alcoholicbeverages, for instance,may increase the profitof the individual and the materialwealth of the society, but it decreasesits mental capital. In such cases of conflict between the individual'sinterests and those of society, the principle of nurturing the nation'sproductive powers should guide the state to limit the production or thedistribution of alcohol (List, 1838: 35). The state's action is crucialnot only in cases of conflict of interestbetween the individual and thecommunity, but also in cases of conflict between various social andeconomic groups. For instance, because the national interest requiresindustrialization, t is the state that is supposed to support the interestsof industry vis-ai-visagriculturaland commercialinterests. In his polit-ical activity in Germany,List made huge efforts to present the benefitsof collaborationto all segments of society, yet as an experienced polit-ical analyst he knew that an autonomous state is crucial for thepromotionof reformsthat will pave the way towards a more developedeconomic structure,and List argues that this role is functional to theflourishingof the productive powers.A developed economy necessitatesa long time horizon, and the statemay play an importantrole both in acting towards the attainmentoflong-term goals and in expanding the time horizons of individuals andfacilitatingtheir willingness to invest in the future.First, the state maydecreasethe insecurityand uncertaintiesconfronting individuals. Wars,crimes and other threats to private property all curb the individual'sability and propensity to plan and invest in the future. Second, arguedList, it is the open society that encourages individuals to invest in thefuture. Social mobility, an open society and social rewards are crucialto the tendency to invest in the future:

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ARTICLESWhere it is not possible to raise oneself by honest exertions andby prosperity from one class of society to another,from the lowestto the highest ... where persons engaged in trade are excludedfrom public honour, fromtaking partin administration, egislation,and juries; where distinguished achievements in agriculture,industry, and commerce do not lead also to public esteem and tosocial and civil distinction, there the most importantmotives forconsumption as well as for production are wanting.(List, 1841:306-7)

Another formof social reward thatListemphasizes is the prizes to inven-tors: 'It brings honour to the inventive mind in society, and roots outthe prejudiceforold customsand modes of operationso injuriousamonguneducated nations' (List, 1841:307).In addition to honour for inventors, materialrewards should also beassured. This is a thirdway in which the state may expand the time pref-erences of individuals.Listwas extensivelyactivein thepromotionof leg-islationthatwould ensure German nventorsthe fruitsof their nventions.Thus,he called for a patentslaw that 'providesthe man who merely pos-sesses mental faculties for new inventions with thematerialmeans whichhe requires, nasmuchas capitalists are thus incited to support the inven-tor,by being assuredof participation n theanticipatedprofits'(List, 1841:307).Thefourth factorthatmay motivatelong-term nvestmentcomprisesshared aspirationsand a people's sense of national solidarity. For List,an individual is not simply a producer or a consumer;he is a memberof a national community and this fact has a crucial significance to hiswillingness to invest in the future. Individuals who are not members ofsuch communitiesaremore liable to make short-termdecisions, since

mere individuals do not concern themselves for the prosperity offuture generations - they deem it foolish ... to make certain andpresent sacrificesin order to endeavour to obtain a benefit whichis as yet uncertainand lying in the vast field of the future (if eventspossess any value at all); they care but little for the continuance ofthe nation. (List, 1841:173)Thus for List national identities have a functionaland positive role ofstretchingindividuals' time horizons.Could it be that List's expectationsof the state were naive? Could itbe that that he overlooked the potential problems of power abuse bypoliticians, as well as the inefficiencyof public bureaucracies? believethe answer to these questions must be negative. As a bureaucratas wellas a Professor of Public Administration,List was well aware of thesepotential problems (see also Backhaus,1992).He was careful to avoid

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FRIEDRICH LISTsuch abuses and argued that 'it is bad policy to regulateeverythingandto promote everything by employing social powers, where things maybetter regulate themselves and can be betterpromoted by private exer-tions' (List, 1827:213). In addition, List knew very well that 'every law,every public regulation, has a strengthening or weakening effect onproduction or on consumption or on the productive forces' (List, 1841:307). Despite his awareness of those possible negative implications ofgovernmentalintervention he did not hesitate to recommend, and evento require,political and economic entrepreneurship rom government.

IV CONCLUDING REMARKSMorethan 150yearshave elapsed since FriedrichList firstpublished hisNationalSystemofPoliticalEconomy.Yet his ability to analyseand predictthe practicesof the state's economic role is still remarkablyrelevant toour present political and economic analysis. Much of what is nowperceived worldwide as a 'pragmatic'conception of the state'seconomicrole was alreadypredicted,analysedand justifiedby List.The regulatedsystem of trade in the form of the GeneralAgreement on Trade andTariffs,the investment in infrastructure, nd the emphasis on educationwere all suggested by List as key policy objectives for any nationaleconomic policy making and are now visible in the internationalecon-omic system. Currentkey political economy concepts, such as those ofnational product, national product per capita, national accounts andnational balance of trade, also reflect the fact that our economic termi-nology and perspective on economic matters today are still tied tonational erms. All these are importantand sufficient reasons to attractattention to the political economy of nationalism.This in turnmay leadus to a more fruitful discourse regarding the economic roles of thenation-stateand the meanings of national economy.On the basis of this discussion it is possible to offer two insights intothe future economic roles of the nation-stateand economicnationalism.First, the current discourse overlooks the intertwined relationshipbetween the ideology of nationalismand the currentroles,practicesandfunctions of the state. Bothliberals and marxistsoften treatnationalismas a widespread type of 'politicalanomaly'.This does not help to attractattention to the study of the political economy of nationalism.24 Laissez-faire theories,which always regardedthe state as a dysfunctional factorin the conduct of economic affairs, are now reasserting themselvesagain in the currentterminologyof globalization.25 he facts are, how-ever, that nation-statesalways faced economic challenges and usuallyovercame them (of course with differentdegrees of success in differentcountriesand periods).It is reasonable o doubtthe assertionthatglobal-ization leads to a diminishing of the nation-state.There is no reason to

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ARTICLESbelieve that the economy can regulate itself on an internationalscale bet-ter than on a national scale.Economicdevelopment on a global scale willonly make the need for bettercoordinationand cooperationmore urgentand clear,new forms of conflict will emerge and the need to create socialconditions thatareadequatefor long-terminvestment will become moreevident than everbefore.26ndeed, globalization s increasinglyremovinglimitations on trade and capital, but to concentrateon those aspects ofeconomic activity is to repeat the mistake of materialist conceptions ofeconomic development of neglecting the importanceof human capital.Human capital is less likely to be subject to globalization and is nation-ally bounded as labour marketsall over the world are becoming moreand more closed to immigration.If it is possible to speak reasonably ofglobal capitaland trade,it is meaningless to speak of global labour mar-kets. As the importance of human capital is increasing rather thandecreasing, one may even point to the increasing importance of thenation-statein nurturingthe national productive powers. Trade barriersmay collapse and materialcapitalmay be dispersed in all directionsbutperceptions of the nation-state as the protector and nurturer of thenationalproductive powers are still valid.

This brings us to a second issue which has to do with the practicalityof nationalism in economic development. In this respect FriedrichListwas one of the founders of the political traditionthat perceives nation-alism as a rational and universal force. Economicnationalism,one hasto remember,had an important role in the elimination of the particu-laristicpoliticaleconomies of pre-modernEurope.Nationalism was thenclosely intertwined with the imperative of industrialization (Gellner,1983), and for the peripheral nations of Africa, Latin America, EasternEurope and the Middle East it was closely connected with the idea ofprogress. Since this is true for the past in industrial societies as well asfor the present and future in developing ones, there is no reason toassume that it will not be the same in the future. As was well arguedby JamesMayall,nationalism and globalizationare more interconnectedwith than contradictoryto each other, since they always appeared 'inthe world togetherand constantlyreinforcedone anotherever since. Therise of nationalism was a response to a globalization process, just asglobalization itself, or rather what kept the process going, was largelya consequence of nationalist competition' (Mayall, 1997). Nationalismand globalization,'like a bickeringold marriedcouple', predicts Mayall,will remain mutually dependent. If nationalismis to survive - in eitherits Gandhian or its Nazi versions - it will have some important impli-cations for the way in which economic structures are shaped andeconomic policies are enacted. If this is the case, we cannot continue toavoid nationalism and its implications; indeed, we must give properattention to the political economy of nationalism.

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FRIEDRICH LISTNOTES

The author wishes to thank the Departmentof InternationalRelations at theLondonSchool of Economicsand ProfessorJamesMayallfor thehospitalityfromwhich this researchhas profitedand the BritishCouncil for its financialsupportduring my visit in London. I would also like to thank the anonymous refereesof this article for theirhelpful comments.1 Economicnationalismwas a popular subjectof study in the interwarperiodand thus it was thenan integralpartof most textbookson international ela-tions. However, due to the prominenceof the Cold Warand the interrelateddominance of the liberal-marxistdebate, this situation has changed andeconomic nationalismhas since been pushed to the peripheriesof scholarlyattention.It has acquireda pejorativetone, which accounts for the fact that

nowadays we can hardly find scholars,politicians or regimes which willopenly and directlyconfess to being economicnationalists.Economicnation-alism has been customarilydescribed as a narrow-minded and aggressivepolitical view. BertrandRussell, for one, described it as one of the mostharmful ideas to mankind- putting it alongside sadistic impulses, religion,superstition,envy, pride, racism and sex superiority (Russell, 1946). Thus,even when economicnationalismdoes attractattention,it is often tinted byan ideologically hostile approach.2 Take for example RobertGilpin's ThePoliticalEconomyofInternationalRelations(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987).This is one of the rare cases(especially n theUS)in which economicnationalism s presented alongsidemarxismand economic liberalism as a theory of political economy. How-ever, Gilpin's characterization f economic nationalism is based largely onsecondarysources,and even these are notones thatwere originallyor specif-icallydevised for the study of economic nationalism.Furthermore,t is strik-ing to noticethateven the work of mostprominent igures n the developmentof economic nationalism- such as FriedrichList - is absent from the bibli-ographyof Gilpin'sbook.3 Misunderstandingand misinterpretation f List'stheoryare not uncommon.It seems that List's German ationalismmay account for the biased evalua-tion of the man and his theory.Anotherpossible reason is his unrestrainedattacks on classical economy - which were then answered by economicliberals in much the same tone and approach.Despite recent contributionsto the study of List's politics by Szporluk (1988) and Backhaus (1992)some important ssues still call for furtherdiscussion and explorationwhichmay be able to cast more light on the political economy of the nation-state.In addition, the neglectof FriedrichList should be seen in the context of thelittle attention that Cameralism receives in the Anglo-Saxon world.Cameralism s the German and Austrianversion of mercantilism.The termwas derived fromthe Latincamera enoting the treasury.Cameralist hink-ing developed in the context of the administrativeroutines and problemswhich faced the Germanstates' bureaucracies.See Bell (1953: 106-20) andRiha(1985).The mostcomprehensivediscussion available n English s prob-ably still that of Small(1909).4 This issue is very interesting because his political theory supplied theeconomic rationale for the unificationof Germany. The current literaturepresents diverse interpretations nd evaluations of List's views. On the onehand there are studies such as Earle's (which was published during theSecond World War) where List is presented as a pan-German advocate

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ARTICLES(Earle,1941). On the other, there are those studies where he is presented asthe forerunnerof the EuropeanUnion (Roussakis,1968).5 Understandingthe context in which List worked requires some familiaritywith the history of Germanyand of the German HistoricalSchool.Chapter11 of Oser and Blanchfield 1975) s very useful to that end. For furtherback-ground regardingthe economic unificationof Germanysee Price (1949).Seealso the two English biographiesof List (Hirst, 1909; Henderson, 1983).6 On the origins of the concept of productive powers see Henderson (1982).One of the referees of this article suggests that important exponent ofeconomic nationalism,Heinrich Luden (1778-1847),expressed the conceptof productive powers in a similar way to List in his HandbuchderStaatsweisheitderderPolitik Jena:Frommann,1811).Unfortunately,I couldnot locate a copy of this book.7 'Outlines of Americanpolitical economy' is a set of letters originally pub-lished as articlesin the Philadelphia ational ournal.The letterswere writtento Charles Ingersoll, the vice-presidentof the PennsylvaniaSociety for thePromotionof Manufactures& MechanicArts, during List'sexile in America.More about List's Americanperiod is to be found in his biographies(Hirst,1909;Henderson, 1983)as well as in Notz (1925).8 The NaturalSystemof PoliticalEconomywas written during the autumn of1837 for a contest of the French Academy of Moral and Political Science.The manuscriptwas finally submitted to the French Academy in the firstweek of 1838.The Academy decided that none of the twenty-seven manu-scripts submitted was worthy of its prize although it did mention threemanuscriptsas 'ouvragesremarquables'; ne of those three was thatby List.Themanuscriptwas discoveredin the archivesof the Institut de Franceonlyin 1925 and was translated into Englishby ProfessorHenderson in 1983.9 Marx, unsuccessfully in my view, tried to invalidate this distinction byinsisting:But if the effect is different from the cause, must not the nature of theeffect be contained already in the cause? The cause must already carrywith it the determiningfeaturethat is manifested later in the effect. ...The cause is in no way superior to the effect.The effect is merely theopenly manifestedause. Listpretendsthat he is everywhere interestedinproductiveforcesfortheirown sake, quiteapart frombad exchangevalue.(Marx,1845: 285-6)

10 My referencesare to the text which is the most accessibleand was includedin Hirst's biographyof List. Yet Hirst's text (1909)includes a proofreadingmistake: 'capitalof the matter'was printed instead of 'capitalof the mind'(see p. 197 in Hirst'stext, seventh line from the bottom);comparewith List'soriginal text (p. 21) to be found at the BritishLibrary.11 The process of accumulation of capital and the process of the division oflabour are constrainedby the size of the market.A free and open marketiscrucial for any economic development and thus trade is not a cause ofeconomic development: 'The carrying trade is the natural effect andsymptom of great national wealth; but it does not seem to be the naturalcause of it' (Smith,1776:354).12 See List's emphasis on the importanceof human capital and his criticism ofAdam Smith and his followers:the popular school has fallen in making material wealth or value ofexchange the sole object of its investigations, and by regarding merebodily labour as the sole productive power. The man who breeds pigs

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FRIEDRICH LISTis, accordingto the school, a productive member of the community,buthe who educates men is a mere non-productive..-. The physician whosaves the lives of his patientsdoes not belong to the productiveclass but,on the contrary,the chemist'sboy does so. (List, 1841: 142)

13 Compare:'Neither [Smith]nor later classical writers followed this path toany extent or examined the variety of related phenomena considered bymodem economicsunderthe headinghumancapitaltheory' (Bowman,1990:239). An interesting criticism to the same effect was raised also by theScottish-Canadian olitical economistJohnRae (1834).14 On the interaction between nationalism,education and industrial society,see Gellner (1983).15 I chose not to deal with the economic role of the state in the context of secu-rity problemsbecause economicliberalsand economicnationalistshave quitesimilarpositions in this regard.See Earle(1943).16 Collectivisthere does not imply any socialistvalues. Instead, similar to themodem communitarism,List points to the fruitfulnessof national coopera-tion and the convergence of interests between different members of thenation.17 On Smith's neo-pluralist perception of the Britishpolitics of his time, seeReisman (1976: 198-211).For similar criticism of Adam Smith's analysis ofthe social implicationsof the division of labour,see Arrow:Smith is touching upon a very deep point. There is more to the storythan he has stated, and there are more problems that the division oflabour createsthan he has indicated for the working of the economy andsociety. Division of labour increases the value of co-operation,but it alsoincreasesthe costs of co-operationand can give rise to conflicts. ... Eachindividual thus has a differentoutlook on the world, a different assess-ment of the way things are - his experienceshave been unique.(Arrow, 1979: 160)

18 Classical economic theory as well as the economic discipline are largelypower-ignorant On power-ignorance in the discipline of economicssee K. W. Rothschild(ed.) PowerIn EconomicsLondon, 1971). Tullock, forexample, argued that: 'Economics traditionally has been essentially astudy of co-operative behaviour,not interpersonalconflict'. See G. Tullock,'The economicsof conflict', n G. Radnitzkyand A. Weinberg (eds) UniversalEconomics: ssessingthe Achievementsf the EconomicApproach New York,1992), p. 301. See also S. Strange, 'What is economic power and who hasit?', Internationalournal 0 (1975):222-3.19 Since the problem s farfrombeing adequatelyresolvedeven today,it wouldbe unfair to expectList to provideus with a definitive answer to it. Compare:Among the many questions concerningthe accumulationof capital thefollowing has been said to be the most important.According to whichrules should choicesbetween directand indirectprocesses of productionbe determined,that is, when can we say that it is efficient to save todayin order to increasefuture consumption? (Malinvaud, 1953:233)Economic theory supplies practical criteria to investment decisions, forexample the rate of return on capital, but still there are big gaps in theunderstandingof investmentprocessesand the moraldecisions they involve.

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FRIEDRICH LISTArrow, J.K. (1979)'The division of laborin the economy, the polity, and society',in G. P. O'Driscoll(ed.) AdamSmithand ModernPoliticalEconomy, owa:IowaState University Press, pp. 153-64.Backhaus, J. G. (1992) 'FriedrichList and the political economy of protective

tariffs', in T. Lowry (ed.) Perspectives n the History of EconomicThought,Vol. VII,Vermont:EdwardElgar for the History of Economics Society, pp.142-56.Becker,S. G. (1975) HumanCapital,New York: National Bureau of EconomicResearch,2nd edn.Bell, J. F. (1953) A History of EconomicThought,New York:The Ronald PressCompany.Blaug, M. (1975) 'The economics of education in English classical politicaleconomy: a re-examination', n A. S. Skinnerand T. Wilson (eds) EssaysonAdamSmith,Oxford: ClarendonPress.Bowman,S. R. (1990) 'Smith, Mill, and Marshall on human capital formation',Journal f PoliticalHistory22: 239-59.Burnell,H.P. (1986)Economic ationalismn theThirdWorld,London:Wheatsheaf.Connor, W. (1972) 'Nation-building or nation-destroying?',WorldPolitics24:319-55.Dogan, M. (1994) 'The decline of nationalisms within Western Europe',Comparativeolitics26: 281-305.Earle,M. E. (1941) 'FriedrichList, forerunnerof pan-Germanism',TheAmericanScholar10: 430-43.(1943) 'Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: the economicfoundationsof militarypower', in E. M.Earle(ed.)Makers fModernStrategy;MilitaryThoughtfromMachiavellioHitler,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, pp. 117-54.Gellner,E. (1983)NationsandNationalism, thaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press.Gerschenkron,A. (1989) [1943] Breadand Democracyn Germany, thaca, NY:Comell University Press.Gray,A. (1980)TheDevelopmentf EconomicDoctrine,London: Longman.Henderson, 0. W. (1981) 'Friedrich List and the social question', JournalofEuropeanEconomicHistory10:697-708.(1982) FriedrichList and theFrenchprojectionists',Zeitschriftfur iegesamteStaatswissenschaft38: 262-75.(1983)FriedrichList;Economistnd Visionary,London: FrankCass.Hirst, M. (1909) Life of FriedrichList and SelectionsFromhis Writings,London:Smith,Elder & Co.Hutter,M. (1994) 'Organismas a metaphor n Germaneconomic thought', in P.Mirowski (ed.) NaturalImages n EconomicThought,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 289-321.Kiker,B. (1966)'Thehistoricalroots of the concept of human capital', TheJournalof PoliticalEconomy 4:481-99.Kitchen,M. (1978)The PoliticalEconomy f Germany 815-1914, London:CroomHelm and McGill-Queen'sUniversity Press.List, F. (1827) 'Outlines of American political economy', in M. Hirst, Life ofFriedrichList and Selectionsrom his Writings,London: Smith, Elder & Co.,1909, pp. 147-272.(1838) The Natural System of Political Economy,London: Frank Cass(Henderson's translation,1983).(1841) The NationalSystemof PoliticalEconomy,New Jersey:Augustus M.Kelly, 1991 edition.

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ARTICLESMalinvaud,E. (1953) 'Capitalaccumulationand efficient allocation of resources',Econometrica1: 233-68.Manoilesco,M. (1931)TheTheory fProtection nd International rade,London: P.S. King & Son.Marx, K. (1845)'Draft of an articleon FriedrichList'sbook Das nationaleSystemder politischenOkonomie',n K. Marx and F. Engels, CollectedWorks,vol. 4,New York:InternationalPublishers,pp. 265-93.Mayall, J. (1997)Globalisationnd the Futureof Nationalism, orthcoming.Milward,S. A. (1992)TheEuropean escue f theNation-State, erkeley:Universityof Califomia Press.Milward, S. A. et al. (eds) (1993)TheFrontier f NationalSovereignty:HistoryandTheory1945-1992,London and New York:Routledge.Niehans, J. (1990)A Historyof EconomicTheory;ClassicContributions, 720-1989,Baltimore,Md., and London:Johns Hopkins University Press.Notz, W. (1925)'FredrickListin America',AmericanEconomicReview16: 249-65.Oser, J.and Blanchfield,D. (1975)TheEvolution f EconomicThought,New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich, 3rd edn.Price, H. A. (1949) The Evoluition f the Zollverein,Ann Arbor: University ofMichiganPress.Rae, J. (1834)'Statementof some new principles on the subjectof political econ-omy', in J. Warren,RaeJohn;PoliticalEconomist,Vol. II,Toronto:Universityof TorontoPress.Reisman,D. (1976)AdamSmith'sSociological conomics, ondon:Croom Helm.Riha,T. (1985) Germanpoliticaleconomy',InternationaloLurnalf SocialEconomics12: 10-154.Robinson, J. (1962)Economic hilosophy,London:C. A. Watts.Roussakis, E. N. (1968) FriedrichList, the Zollverein,and the Uniting of Europe,Bruges: College of Europe.Russell, B. (1946)IdeasThatHaveHarmedMankind,Kansas:E. Haldeman-Julius.Seers, D. (1983) The PoliticalEconomyof Nationalism,Oxford and New York:Oxford University Press.Silberner,E. (1946) TheProblem f War n Nineteenth-CentLuryconomicThouight,Princeton, NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press.Small,A. W. (1909)TheCameralists, hicago: University of Chicago Press.Smith, A. (1937) [1776]An Inquiry nto the Nature and Caulses f the WealthofNations,New York:The ModernLibrary.Szporluk,R. (1988)Communismnd Nationalism;KarlMarxVersusFriedrichList,Oxford:Oxford University Press.Tamir,Y. (1993)LiberalNationalism, rinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press,.Tribe,K. (1988) 'FriedrichList and the critique of "CosmopoliticalEconomy"',TheManchester chool56: 17-36.Tribe, K. (1995) Strategiesof EconomicOrder in GermanEconomicDiscourse,1750-1950, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Wendler, E. (1989)FriedrichList;PolitischeWirkungsgeschichtees Vordenkersereuropaischenntegration,Munich:R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

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Frederick List and Political Economy