Frege_The_Basic_Laws_of_Arithmetic__1965.pdf

8/11/2019 Frege_The_Basic_Laws_of_Arithmetic__1965.pdf

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of human beings or

of

time. The latter is a law

of

truth,

the

former a law

of

people's taking-to-be-true. The

content

of the

two is wholly different and they are independent

of

one another;

neither can

be inferred

from

the other.

Hence it

is

extremely

confusing to

designate

both by the

same

name, "Principie

of

Identity". Thesc mixings-together

of

wholly di fferent thi ngs

are to blame for the frightful

unclarity

that we encounter among

the psychological logicians.

The question why and with what right we acknowledge a law

of logic to be true, logic can answer only by

reducing it

to an-

other

law of

logic.

Where that

is not possi

ble,

logic

can gi v

no answer.

f

we step away from logic, we may say: we are

compelled

to make

judgments by our

own

nature

and by externa

circumstances; and if we do so, we cannot

reject

this law-of

ldentity, for example; we must

acknowledge

it unless we wish

to

reduce

our

thought

to confusion and finally

renounce

all judg-

ment whatever. 1

shall

neither dispute nor support this view; 1

shall merely remark

that

what we have here

is

nota logical con-

sequence.

What

is

given

is

not

a

reason

for

something's

being

true, but for our taking it to be

true.

Not only

that:

this impos-

si bility

of

our

rejecting

the law in question

hinders

us not at al

in supposing beings who do reject it;

where

it hinders us

is

in

supposing that

these

beings

are

right in so doing, it hinders us

in having

doubts

whether we or

they

are

right.

At

least

this

is

true

of myself.

f other persons presume to acknowledge and

doubt a law in the same breath,

it

seems to me an

attempt

to

jump

out of

one's

own

skin

against

which 1

can

do no more

than

urgently warn them. Anyone who

has

once

acknowledged

a law

of truth has by the same token acknowledged a law that pre-

scribes

the

way in which one

ought

to

judge,

no

matter

where,

or when, or by whom

tho judgmont

s mado,

Surveying the whole question, it

seems

to me that the

source

of

the

dispute lies

in a difference in our conceptions of what is

true.

For me, what is

true

is something

objective

and inde

pendent of the judging

subject;

for psyc;:hological

logicians

it

xviii is not. What Herr B. Erdmann calls 'objective certainty' is

merely a

general

acknowledgmenton the part of

the

subjects who

judge, which is thus not independent

of

them but

susceptible to

alteration with the constitution of

their

minds.

We can generalize this still further: for me there is a domain

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Documents

Frege_The_Basic_Laws_of_Arithmetic__1965.pdf