FROM REALIGNMENT TO DEALIGNMENT: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND CHANGING DIRECTIONS IN REDISTRIBUTIVE DEMANDS

Linda Pryor

Recent years have witnessed many indications that party is no longer as salient to the American electorate as it was in the past. Perhaps t h e most telling of these indicators is the increase in the numbers who identify themselves as independent-an increase from 22 percent in 1952 to over a third in the early 1970's. And the number of those calling themselves independents continues to rise. This increase is especially evident among the young, but it is apparent in all age c0horts.l Also, t h e rise of split-ticket voting and the large party defections among presidential voters would seem to indicate that for those who hold on to party identification, i t is more weakly held than for previous generations. This points to the possibility that these people are ripe for either realignment or dealignment. They may easily transfer loyalty from one party to another, or they may come to see parties as totally irrelevant to the resolution of political conflict. The latter possibility is supported by Burnham whose observations of the recent behaviors of the electorate led him to predict the demise of the party system in a work rather colorfully entitled "The Onward March of Party Decomposition".

This paper was the winner of t h e 1982 McBrayer Award at the GPSA annual convention.

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Although there are those such as Shively3 and Campbell4 who argue t h a t we are witnessing a temporary phenomenon tha t will be ended by a return to partisan identification for most of t h e electorate , I find the dealignment ' argument most convincing. Campbell and Shively base their optimistic predic- tions on the fact tha t par ty identification provides an information function for voters facing an increasingly complex, and perhaps increasingly obfuscated, politi- cal agenda. While i t is t r u e t h a t par ty has served as t h e main voting cue in t h e past, i t is not likely to continue'to do so because the focus for redistributlve demands has become the Presidency rather than the Congress. So long as the focus for redistributive demands was the Congress, par ty was important because t h e necessity was for seeing tha t one's preferred par ty enjoyed a majority in the Congress. But if Congress is not seen by t h e electorate as being responsible for economic policy, then the issue of which party has a Congressional majority is moot.

Burnham argued t h a t realignments occur when there is a crisis in the social or economic milieu which causes people to switch par ty identifications so t h a t the majority par ty becomes t h e minority party and vice versa. Obviously, in order for the switch to occur there has to have been a change in the m a k e up of the coalitions supporting each party. (Pomper identifies an election in which the re is a change in the coalitions supporting t h e parties, but no switch in t h e majority-minority relationship, as a converting election.) The election in which t h e realignment is forged is called a cr i t ical election. Campbell calls t h e cr i t ical election a realigning election. H e also discusses maintaining elections-ones in which the partisan a t tachments prevailing in the preceding period persist; and deviating elections-ones in which the basic division of par ty loyalt ies is not seriously disturbed, but t he influence of short-term forces on t h e vote is such that it brings about the defea t of t h e majority party.5 The most re levant for the present

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discussion are critical and deviating elections.

Burnham has noted further that critical elec- tions have occurred at approximate thirty-year in- tervals in our history with our first realignment over the slavery issue in 1862, a second realignment in 1896, and a third realignment in which the policies of the New Deal were forged in 1936.6 Based on Burnham's time line, we should have had another realignment in the early sixties. Indeed, some have argued that the election of 1964 was a critical realigning election, but that turns out to be true only for blacks.

The failure of the predicted realignment to materialize points to one of the weaknesses of realignment theory to date. This failure lies in the lack of a satisfactory explanation of how the stimulus (crisis) interacts with institutional-level variables such as decision-making in the Congress or in the presidency to maintain the realignment that has been created in the critical election. The emphasis has been on realignment as a constituent act-constituents moving from one party to the other-with vague discussions of crises and issues as stimuli of decom- position and subsequent realignment. The assumption seems to be that the new majority in government will be responsive. However, if it is, and if it continues to be responsive to the new majority, what provokes the next realignment? In other words, why has realign- ment been cyclical, and why has the predicted fourth realignment failed to materialize?

We get some insight as to why t h e electorate is ripe for realignment at thirty-year intervals from socialization research. Beck argues that the realign- ment generation has a party identification that has been forged under crisis conditions. Therefore, it will be strongly held and successfully passed down to the next generation. However, this second generation is removed in experience from the realignment, and whereas their party identification is strong, it is

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weaker than that of their parents because they did not experience the realignment. The children of this second generation, the children of normal politics, have even weaker party identifications than do their parents.* This third generation, then, holds party identification more lightly; they are more malleable, more subject to change. In other words, they can switch to the other party or to independent status with little conflict and relative ease.

Thus, we have a necessary condition for r e alignment with this malleable generation, but we do not have sufficient conditions because the nature of the stimulus is still unclear, especially as to its interaction with policy of post-realignment govern- ments. This becomes a major theoretical gap when we have reached and almost passed through the third generation since realignment and no realignment has occurred. What happened?

To know what happened, we need a better understanding of realignments that have occurred. This understanding can be enhanced by an identifi- cation of the kind of policy demands that led to past realignments. Lowi classifies olicy as regulatory, distributive, and redistributive.8 Demands for both regulatory and distributive policies are seen as com- ing from special interests in the society. I t is only the demand for redistributive policies that involve major sectors of the electorate. Thus, it is only demands for redistributive policies that can cause a realignment. According to Lowi, redistributive poli- tics are indeed characterized by many of the same features as realignment periods. To wit, categories of impact are broad; conflict is intense; demands are ideological; benefits conferred on one group are taken away from another; and demands and decisional structures are integrated.9

In the past, demands for redistributive policies have been made to the United States Congress. However, Congress was not about to make far-

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reaching redistributive policies because of the elec- toral costs involved. Because of its zero-sum nature, redistributive policies would always be alienating to some groups. Therefore, in order to vote for such policies, Congressmen would have to violate their own main motivation-to get reelected.1° Therefore, past realignments have occurred in a cyclical fashion because the policy demands that forged them were never really met. Following a realignment, Congress may engage in symbolic politics or even pass a few redistributive measures. If such measures are passed, however, they will be accompanied by side payments to those groups who lose. And, apparently as soon as the constituents are safely voting on the basis of party identification forged in the realignment and thereby maintaining t h e majority, Congressmen return to business as usual. Business as usual consists of distributive policies among parties privy to the game and the passing of vague legislation that leaves i t to the bureaucracy to make policy. This last contention seems to be sup orted by the findings of Barbara Deckard Sinclairfl that following the New Deal realignment there was a flury of legislation that might be considered redistributive, but this period was short-lived. The committment to New Deal legislation was never as widespread as it seemed during the 1935-38 period, and once the crisis had passed, t h e policy dynamism of the N e w Deal was spent.

Since t h e depression years which saw broad delegations of power from Congress to the executive and with the aid of specific legislation like the Full Employment A c t of 1946, Congress has removed itself as the focus of the peoples' discontent with economic conditions. Specifically designated by t h e 1946 law as t h e person responsible for full employment, t h e President has become, in Rossiter's words "the guar- antor of prosperity". 1 2

With voters looking to the President for redis-

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tributive policies, it makes no sense to change Congressional majorities. Further, if the President is seen as the primary policy-maker, party identification becomes less important and is replaced as a voting cue by short-term issue concerns and candidate image. The successful candidate for the Presidency during such a period is the one who can promise the most and make the public believe they are better off than they really are. The main task of government at our present level of economic development is to keep conflict between the groups demanding shares of the economic pie, which is no longer growing, at a manageable level. Again, the electorate's desire for redistributive policy makes everything a zero-sum game so that the President can do nothing without alienating large groups of needed supporters. His dilemma is that he can not force Congress to act even if they are of his own party because they do not dare be associated with major redistributive policy initiatives. Instead they have turned from national policy-making to those district activities that will get them re-elected.l3 The President cannot act without invoking his emergency powers, and such an invo- cation would alienate too many groups that are important to him politically.

The obvious result is a series of oneterm presidents. The candidate who is the best actor is the one who can get elected on the basis of his rhetoric and superior presentation of self. This contention has support on the basis of the reactions to the Reagan-Carter debate in which Carter used data related to specific issues while Reagan appeared "presidential" and spoke in generalities. Reagan came across well; he made the people feel good about future prospects. But presidents elected on the basis of their ability to make the people feel hopeful can only lose the next time around. Since the President cannot solve the problems, and Congress refuses to. touch them, disillusionment soon sets in. The President's popularity declines precipitously after a

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short "honeymoon". And by the time of .the next election, the voters are ready for a change-any change. Voting then becomes primarily negative voting. In such a time, any candidate who can make believable promises and inspire hope in t h e electorate can beat the incumbent who has to run on a "do- nothing" record.

This continuing cycle produces increasing and continuing disillusionment among generations who are becoming farther and farther removed from a re- alignment. Based on socialization theory, the at- tachment to party becomes weaker with each suc- ceeding generation. Also, turnout will decline wi th every election as more and more people realize there is nothing to be decided.

Seeing that neither the Democrats nor the Republicans are able to hold their identifiers, third parties offer candidates from time to time. But since the system is biased against them and is likely to stay that way so long as the two major parties make the rules, no third party elects a President.

This bleak scenario can have two possible outcomes. First, so long as either party can elect a president and order can be maintained in the society, the one-term presidents will continue. The policy stalemate will be increasingly severe. A t some point, order will break down, and t h e electorate will force a change through t h e formation of a mass movement or through a constitutional convention to change the rules. A second possible outcome is that a leader will emerge who is so capable that he (or she) can actually get t h e Congress to make redistributive policy. This outcome is not likely to occur, however, until people are willing to put aside particularistic group claims, support true redistributive policy, and reward the legislators a t elections for making such policy.

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The 1980 Election And Aftermath

Many followers of t he Grand Old Party saw in the Reagan victory of 1980, if not the realignment itself, t h e election beginning the process tha t would be consolidated with a Republican sweep in 1984. There was indeed some evidence for claims tha t 1980 was, like 1932, the start of a realignment tha t would be consolidated four years later. These claims would be validated, i t was predicted, by a switch in the majority-minority positions of t h e parties in t h e House to match tha t which had occurred in the Senate. The mid-term election of 1982 would see the Republicans winning big, and these victories would have to be joined by Republican gains in State governments. This continued Republican resurgence would be followed up by another Reagan landslide in t h e 1984 Presidential election-this t ime without any third party effects.

If t h e election of 1980 were in fact t h e beginning of a realignment, i t should have been followed by t rue redistributive policies. At f i rs t glance, policy outputs of t h e 1981 Congress appear to be ._ at . . . - least - . .. partially . redistributive. .- ~

Funding for . . . social programs was cu t drastically, and' t axes were decreased giving . . . . .- ~ t h e - . appearance of a redistribution ---.--. from t h e poor to the squeezed middle class. How- ever, t h e administration was soon forced by the necessity of political considerations (too many Con- gressmen were hearing complaints back home) to back down on cut t ing the minimum Social Security benefit. By the end of the year, t h e administration w a s contemplating a tax increase to reduce t h e threat- ened triple digit deficit. The lines were not holding. The backing off from redistributive policies was accompanied by a worsening economic situation which culminated in a deep recession.

Meanwhile, the chief executive continues to

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rractrf in the manner required by politics at our present level of deve10pment.l~ As previously dis- cussed, t h e need in our "post-industrial" society is for political leaders who can reduce conflict through persuasion and soothing rhetoric. In this stage, resources have been discovered to be finite, and economic growth has been found to have its limits. Yet, at a time when the need is for fewer demands from the populace, demands enter the system from more sources than ever before. The high levels of economic output characteristic of the preceding stage have been accompanied by increasing levels of edu- cation and awareness among the people. As more and more groups have entered the clamor for additional political inputs, accompanied by demands for their fair share of the economic pie, the system has become increasingly strained. The growth of the economic pie has not matched t h e increase in demands for portions of it. This leads to the necessity for leadership which can make people "feel good" about their current situation and hopeful about the future.

Having run on a strategy designed to appeal to feelin s--"Are you better off than you were a year

ask t h e people to hold on a little longer while assuring them that they are "better off than they would have been if we had not been electedf1.16 The people are being asked to believe, to hold on; indeed, t h e administration's pollster has now incorporated something called the "patience factor" in estimates of the President's rating with the people.

The policy initiatives of the administration have not been consistently redistributive, and further ef- forts toward passing slices of the pie from the poor to the middle and upper classes are not likely to sail by the Democratic opposition as did early legislation. The consolidation of Reagan's victory as a realign- ment would seem to require solid and ongoing

ago?" B 5-the administration finds itself still having to

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Republican support for policy accompanied by a Republican sweep in the 1982 Congressional elections. But Republican solidarity seems to be disintegrating while Republican Congressional victories are looking less likely.

Many Republicans, including Senator Dole, wanted a tax increase. Vermont's Republican Gover- nor Richard Snelling calls Reagan's plan "an economic Bay of Pigs".17 The Disintegration of Republican solidarity is matched by pessimism regarding the 1982 Congressional races. Outgoing White House political advisor Lyn Nofziger confesses it's all but impossible for the Republicans to capture control of the House of Representatives in 1982, which means that it's far less likely than previously thought that Ronald Reagan will be the FDR of the 1980'~.~~

The Reagan election followed the basic credo of the country: that the President can solve our problems, not Congress, not the Supreme Court. When one President fails to deliver, elect t h e next. The trend of one-term Presidents is likely to con- tinue. An ongoing lack of success by the Republican administration in turning the economy around prac- tically assures victory for the Democrats in 1984. However, voting will again be negative-so far, the Democrats have offered no innovative alternatives, so t h e issue will be Ronald Reagan-rather than a positive endorsement of policies. Voters are not likely to go for traditional Democratic solutions because there is too much disillusionment wi th "big government-big spending". Thus, t h e Democrats will have nothing to offer but an alternative candidate. They will campaign on the failure of the Reagan administration. And the weary electorateturning out at the lowest rate in history -will turn to a new President for new solutions.

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l N o r m a n Nie, Sidney Verba and J o h n Pe t roc ik , T h e Changing Amer ican Voter (Cambr idge , MA: H a r v a r d Universi ty Press, 1976) and Niemi a n d Weisberg, Con t rove r s i e s in Amer ican Voting Behavior . 1976.

2Wal te r Dean Burnham as r e p r i n t e d i n Niemi a n d Weisberg, Con t rove r s i e s in Amer ican Voting Behavior , 1976.

3Shively, Amer ican Pol i t ica l Science Rev iew, 1979.

4Bruce A. C a m p b e l l a n d R i c h a r d S. Tri l l ing, R e a l i g n m e n t in Amer ican Pol i t ics : T o w a r d A Theory (Aust in: Universi ty of Texas Pres s , 1980).

5Angus Campbe l l , et. - al., E lec t ions a n d t h e Po l i t i ca l Order (New York: John Wiley a n d Sons, Inc., 1967) C h a p t e r 4.

6Wal t e r Dean Burnham, C r i t i c a l E lec t ions a n d t h e Mainsprings of Amer ican Pol i t ics (New York: Norton , 1970).

7Bruce A. Campbel l , "Patterns of Change in t h e Par t i sanship Loyal i t ies of N a t i v e Southerners : 1952-1972,'' Jou rna l of Politics 39, 3.

8Paul Allen Beck , "A Genera t iona l T h e o r y of Pol i t ica l Social izat ion," r ep r in t ed in Niemi and Weisberg, Cont rovers ies in Amer ican Voting Behavior.

9Theodore Lowi, T h e End of Libera l i sm (New York: Nor ton , 1969).

l o D a v i d R. Mayhew, Congress: The E l e c t o r a l Y a l e Univers i ty P res s , Connection (New Haven, CT:

1974).

l l B a r b a r a Decka rd Sinclair , "Pa r ty R e a l i g n m e n t a n d t h e Transformat ion of t h e Pol i t ica l Agenda: T h e

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House of Representatives, 1925-1938," American Political Science Review, September , 1977.

12Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency ( N e w York: Harcourt , Brace, and World, Inc., 1957).

13Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of t h e Washington Establishment.

14Han S. Park "Human Needs and Polit ical Development: A Dissent to Utopian Solutions'' Paper presented at the Inter-University Consortium, Dbrovnik, Yugoslavia, 1977.

l5Ronald Reagan, 1976 President ia l Debate.

16Ronald Reagan, State of t h e Union Address, January 26, 1982.

l7New Republic, January 6 & 13, 1982.

18Lyn Nofiger as quoted in New Republic, January 6 & 1 3 , 1982.

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