From the Editor - Federation of American Scientists · Dr. Thomas Kane offers a frank discussion of the challenges facing today’s strategic analysts.! MAJ Chris Tatarka looks at

This issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) focuses on the intelligence analyst, theindividual soldier who works tirelessly to make overwhelming amounts of often-conflicting data clear and conciseand later provides predictable intelligence for commanders and soldiers throughout the Army. Through the expe-riences of several of these soldier-analysts serving in a wide variety of assignments throughout the world, we willexamine the role of the intelligence analyst within the context of Military Intelligence doctrine and related tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Today’s intelligence analyst, whether a newly assigned Private or a veteran Colonel, must be prepared to supporthis commander and fellow soldiers by conducting analysis on a multitude of threats in a variety of environmentsand circumstances. The analyst must integrate significant facts while constantly searching for subtle and fre-quently contradictory details within ever-increasing amounts of information. Through the use of multiple collectionand analysis resources, the intelligence analyst searches for these crucial “nuggets” of information, the proverbial“needle in a haystack,” to produce the coherent intelligence product that enables the commanders and fellowsoldiers not only to see but also to understand the environment, threat, and situation within their area of operation.

The intelligence analyst does not have an easy job. He or she must be a jack of all trades. Not only knowledgeablein the processes of analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the analyst should also exhibit anunderstanding of the environment, weather, military policy, governmental and threat infrastructures, and numerouscultural and religious aspects of the host nation and locale. Furthermore, the analyst must not only understandthese subjects within the context of ground operations but also as they relate to air and amphibious operations.

Today’s intelligence analysts increasingly find themselves challenged by situations for which there is little legacyexperience, procedures, or doctrine. They often find themselves in positions where, given a lack of lessons learnedor doctrine, they must rely on their own experiences while at the same time learn how best to employ the latest inhighly technical battlefield processing systems. However, if the analysts have not received sufficient training, or lackexperience, they may find themselves struggling to provide the required support their commanders need. Mostshould have received the requisite training and gained experience through exercises and in garrison training.Those few who fail, however, may do so with devastating results. Therefore, the intent of this issue is to help “sharethe wealth,” so to speak, and to allow others to share their experiences and learn from them. With our insights andknowledge, we must ensure that we, the intelligence analysts, continue to provide the Army and our fellow soldierswith the best possible intelligence support.*

Included in this issue are a number of articles that address problems faced by today’s intelligence analysts.! Dr. Thomas Kane offers a frank discussion of the challenges facing today’s strategic analysts.! MAJ Chris Tatarka looks at common errors in analysis and decision-making.! MAJ David Shin discusses development of the criteria necessary to commit U.S. military forces.! CW3 Del Stewart focuses on the need to develop new methodologies or adapt existing ones and tactics,

techniques, and procedures when analyzing the terrorist threat.! MAJ Paul Shelton shares lessons learned from U.S. Marine Corps operations in Monrovia, Liberia.! CW4 Thomas Quedensley focuses on the impact of the proliferation of space-based, commercial, multispec-

tral imaging systems, their use by nations and organizations that previously lacked such access, and theincreased imagery intelligence threat we face.

! CPT Fred Hoffman focuses on the intelligence implications of President Carter’s decision to withdraw U.S.troops from South Korea.

! CPT John Bento provides a discussion on maximizing the effectiveness of National Guard units through theirincorporation with Active Component units during exercises.

! Mr. Michael Varhola addresses intelligence oversight and AR 381-10.Taken together, these articles provide a rich overview of various aspects of the problems facing the U.S. Army’s

Intelligence analysts and their potential solutions.

*Additional information about the roles, TTP, and other aspects of the work of intelligence analysts is available throughcontact with the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), through its website at http://usaic.hua.army.mil/DOCTRINE/dlbs.htm.

FFFFFrrrrrom the Editorom the Editorom the Editorom the Editorom the Editor

Michael P. Ley

4 Strategic Analysis: To Hear the Thunderby Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D.

8 Overcoming Biases in Military ProblemAnalysis and Decision-Makingby Major Christopher J. Tatarka

11 Use of Standing Criteria for Deciding to Commit U.S.Forces in Conflict Resolutionby Major David Shin

15 Conventional Approaches to Unconventional Problems: Analyzing Terrorism

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Del Erin Stewart

21 Cities in Chaos: An Intelligence Challengeby Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC

24 The Commercial Satellite Multispectral Imagery (MSI) Threatby Chief Warrant Officer Four Thomas J. Quedensley, NE ARNG

28 The Role of Intelligence in President Jimmy Carter’sTroop Withdrawal Decisionsby Captain Fred Hoffman, USAR

31 Incorporating National Guard Divisions into ExercisesHave We Established an ARNG Trend?by Captain John C. Bento, CA ARNG AGR

STAFF:Commanding GeneralBrigadier General James A.MarksRequirements, Develop-ment, Determination, andIntegration DirectorColonel Charles AtkinsSupervising EditorMichael P. LeyEditorElizabeth A. McGovernAssociate EditorJoNell M. ElkinsOperations SupervisorCaptain Brett W. VanHooseDesign DirectorSpecialist Ernesto A. BolañosAssociate Design DirectorStaff Sergeant Sharon K. NietoContributing DesignerSharon A. UpchurchAdministrationSpecialist Maurice N. HartleyPrivate Misty L. SimpkinPurpose: The U.S. Army Intelli-gence Center and Fort Huachuca(USAIC&FH) publishes the Mili-tary Intelligence ProfessionalBulletin quarterly under provi-sions of AR 25-30. MIPB dis-seminates material designed toenhance individuals’ knowledgeof past, current, and emergingconcepts, doctrine, material,training, and professional devel-opments in the MI Corps.Disclaimer: This publication pre-sents professional information,but the views expressed hereinare those of the authors, not theDepartment of Defense or its el-ements. The content does notnecessarily reflect the officialU.S. Army position and does notchange or supersede any infor-mation in other U.S. Army publi-cations. We reserve the right toedit any submitted material.

DEPARTMENTS

By order of the Secretary of the Army:Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKIGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff 0129209

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

PB 34-02-1Volume 28 Number 1January-March 2002

FEATURES

ILITARY NTELLIGENCEM Professional BulletinI

2 Always Out Front3 CSM Forum33 Enduring Freedom45 AIMP47 Doctrine Corner

51 TSM Notes54 Distance Learning55 Professional Reader56 From Out Front57 Unit Profile

2 Military Intelligence

By Brigadier General James A. MarksCommander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Always Out Front

Let me continue the dialoguefrom the previous MIPB withall of you in the field. In thelast edition I mentioned thatintelligence professionals“must stand ready to inte-grate intelligence within full-spectrum operations….”Now more than ever our waragainst terrorism makes thisrequirement a little more per-sonal for all of us. Make nomistake, this war will be along and complex campaignnot simply in Afghanistan butacross the globe and, mostimportantly, leveraging all ofus in our Intelligence Corps.This is your fight; you will, ifnot already, be involved. Stepup, raise your hand. Echo thewords of those professionalsbefore us, “Send Me.”

We all are analysts. It is core to what we are. In fact,all of our skill sets directly contribute to some form ofanalysis. I like to describe “analysis” akin to painting apicture. Depending on the subject (weather, enemy,terrain) and the audience (the warfightingcommander…battalion, brigade, etc), the picture is ei-ther complex with many colors, hues, and shadows, orit is rather simple using black and white stick figures.You, the analyst, must know both the subject and theaudience…know the enemy; know your boss.

Now, with that as a foundation, what are our (MilitaryIntelligence) core competencies? Well, the answer issimple. Our core competencies must support our fun-damental requirement to analyze. We have five corecompetencies:

! ISR Integration! Collection! Analysis! Presentation! Protection

This is what I call ICAP2, the acronym for our corecompetencies.

Good analysis results from ag-gressive integration of the totalISR effort and directed, precisecollection throughout all ech-elons of command and acrossall battlefield functional areas(BFAs). You must then presentthe results to include our coun-terintelligence efforts which helpprotect the force. Your analysisshould “scratch your bossesitch…not scratch yours.” Re-member, know your boss; an-swer his/her priority intelligencerequirements (PIR). This is his/her read of the enemy, not yours.Intelligence is for the Com-mander!

Good analysis results fromhard work. (I don’t think I’ve everexperienced truly great analysis.Good analysis is 1-½ hours of a

2-hour JRTC post mission AAR on how screwed upthe S2 is; great analysis is a 1-hour critique of a 2 hourJRTC post mission AAR on how screwed up the S2 is.I never experienced such largess!) You must apply andmodify doctrine and your tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures (TTP). You must know how to collect…whatis available to you in your formation and what is avail-able from higher and adjacent units. You must knowhow “to reach” to other knowledge centers to flush outyour analysis with theirs. You must know how to rec-ognize and assess seams and gaps in your collectionso you can cover down. You must train those aroundyou; educate your battle staff on your core competen-cies and how to apply them. Be the acknowledgedexpert. Be the “go to” soldier. Step up; raise your hand.Tell all around you “Send me.”

In later issues I will get into the details of all of ourcore competencies, but I need your thoughts. Tell mewhat you think about what is “core to your corps.” Wehave never been more relevant. We need to share yourthoughts to ensure continued relevance. Our nation,our leaders, our soldiers need you.

Step up; Send me!

3January-March 2002

By Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. HaubrichU.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps

CSM Forum

With the attacks on our home-land on 11 September 2001and the war on terrorism, theseare busy times for our greatnation. More than anything,communications with eachother and our families are soimportant. NoncommissionedOfficers (NCOs) are the key togetting on with life and keep-ing the soldiers informed. Wemake it happen!

Our soldiers must know whatthey will be doing to supportthis on-going war against ter-rorism and our soldiers’ fami-lies and loved ones need toknow as well. We must ensurethat our leaders are involved and have their fingerson not only the “pulse” of the soldiers but also thecommand information program, family resourcegroups, and quality of life for our Army and soldiers.

The mobilization of the 5th of the 104th Reserve MIBattalion at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the 321st Re-serve Corps Support Battalion-war traced to the 504thMI Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; and the 325th Re-

serve Corps Support Battalion-wartraced to the 525th MI Brigade atFort Bragg, North Carolina, intothe Active Army shows the worldhow strong our “Army of One” trulyis. It also reinforces our determi-nation to win this war against ter-rorism.

We must remember this is a waragainst terrorism, not a religion oran ethic group. Many U.S. citi-zens are understandably angrywith the terrorist attacks on ournation, but we must not give in tohatred and stereotyping. I ask thatyou all remember our Pledge ofAllegiance to our flag and to theUnited States of America.

We are one nation, a great nation where no attack onour homeland will create divisiveness among us, for weare “indivisible.” I ask you all to stay focused and keepthe faith. The road ahead will be long. We must ensurewe take care of each other and our families. Our nationdepends on us for we are her defenders. As always, youtrain hard, you die hard, you train easy, you die easy.Peace needs protection.

A LW AY S O U T F R O N T !

“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the UnitedStates of America and to the republic forwhich it stands, one nation under God, indi-visible, with liberty and justice for all.”


by Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D.

Those who study history knowthe importance of thorough mili-

tary preparation and clear-sightednational policy. Nevertheless, eventhe most prudent observers of worldpolitics often have trouble knowinghow to prepare for what we may face.Both military technology and politi-cal alignments are changing rapidly,and it has become difficult to distin-guish between truly significant de-velopments in strategic affairs andmomentary crises that merely hap-pen to dominate the headlines.

The distinction is critical. Those whoformulate defense policy and militarystrategy must learn to see beyondthe immediate and the obvious. If webase future plans on recent events,or even ongoing trends, we risk find-ing out that we have prepared for theproverbial “last war.” Furthermore, wemust keep in mind that our mostdangerous opponents may not be themost belligerent ones. Indeed, ourmost dangerous foes may not evenappear particularly successful. If weare to identify our most significantpotential opponents in this century,we must learn to see not only whatother countries or groups are doingbut also what they are putting them-selves in a position to do.

The Crisis of StrategicAnalysis

Even as the importance ofsound analysis and prepara-

tion increases, the gap between stra-tegic thought and the daily realitiesof international affairs has begun to

widen. In military journals, theoreti-cal writings have become increas-ingly futuristic and increasinglydevoid of political context. Even morepractical studies such as the recentBritish and U.S. defense reviewsoffer frustrating generalities on theissues where strategists need spe-cifics.

How can strategic analysts regaintheir focus? There is no certain for-mula for success. Ultimately, all as-sessments of future militarychallenges depend on informed judg-ment, and this means that even themost highly skilled analysts willoccasionally be wrong. There are,however, things which discerning ob-servers might seek. Some of thesame principles that govern opera-tional planning apply at the level ofgrand strategy as well, and one canuse them to gain insight into the stra-tegic significance of various trendsand developments around the world.

The U.S. Army’s official history ofWorld War II notes that if the AlliedHigh Command had been compelledto approach its campaigns withoutprior material preparation, the inva-sion of North Africa in November 1942could not have taken place until1944.1 Although the Allied command-ers were able to develop a strategyfor this campaign in a matter ofmonths, their logistical preparationsconsumed almost two years.

The Army historians went on to notean important fact:

The process of fashioning, mo-bilizing and distributing the tools

of warfare had to begin . . . longbefore the specific purposes forwhich the tools were to be usedcould be known.2

This observation applies as well tolong-term state policy as it does toindividual campaigns, and it is as validin peace as it is in war. Countries thatwish to develop modern armed forcesin this century may require decadesto acquire the necessary equipmentand learn how to use it. States thatwish to enjoy military power in the fu-ture will have to prepare now, whethertheir leaders have clear ideas abouthow to use that military power or not.

The principle that lead-time exceedsplanning time is as useful for analyz-ing other people’s actions as it is forcarrying out one’s own. Just as onemust fashion military tools in advance,future allies and opponents must dothe same. If one can acquire informa-tion about the types of political andmilitary “tools” which other countriesare developing, mobilizing, and distrib-uting, one can gain insight into boththeir current intentions and their prob-able courses of action in unforeseencrises.

Taken singly, such insights are gen-erally rather straightforward. The factthat the People’s Republic of China(PRC) discusses the purchase orconstruction of aircraft carriers, for in-stance, provides one with some indi-cation of the types of operations theChinese Navy will be able to under-take in the future. One can proceedfrom that point to ask why Chineseleaders might be interested in devel-oping force projection and other re-lated capabilities, and how othercountries might respond. Further-more, as one collects numerous in-sights of this nature, one canassemble these findings into a pat-tern, which reveals more in its totalitythan any number of discoveries mightreveal in isolation. The rest of this ar-ticle consists of tips on how strate-gists can use these principles toextract the maximum amount of use-

January-March 2002 5

ful knowledge from the informationavailable to them.

Purpose and Potential

The fact that states must de-velop the tools of national

power before they have decided howto use them means that one mustinterpret the actions of other coun-tries not only in terms of their pur-pose but also in terms of theirpotential. In the last decade, for in-stance, the PRC was building up itsarmed forces. Some fear that theChinese Government hopes to intimi-date its neighbors, whereas othersbelieve that leaders of China merelywish to protect their country andachieve recognition within the inter-national community. For purposes oflong-term planning, it may not mat-ter which set of analysts is right.

By expanding their forces now, theChinese leaders of the present aregiving the Chinese leaders of the fu-ture new options and a collection oftools that they will be able to use inany way they desire. Other countrieswill have to consider the possibilitythat China might exercise these op-tions and shape the course of worldpolitics. The Chinese regime will havereaped the rewards of an aggressivepolicy even if its current regime iscompletely Pacific based.

One cannot, however, view all ris-ing powers as identical. The possi-bility that North Korea may havedeployed a few nuclear weapons dis-turbs U.S. policy-makers more thanthe certainty that Britain has de-ployed more powerful weapons in fargreater numbers. They assume thatNorth Korea is more of a threat toour interests than is the United King-dom; not only are such assumptionsnormally valid they also are alwaysnecessary. Policy-makers must dis-tinguish between relatively hostilestates and comparatively friendlyones, if only because no nation couldafford to prepare for simultaneouswars against all the countries thathave the physical ability to harm it.

Although one should never assumethat a nation’s current political align-ment will last forever, one should notignore politics either. Therefore, whenanalysts assess another country’sintentions, they must try to distin-guish its momentary political anddiplomatic posture from the endur-ing principles that will guide it throughdecades. This requires extensiveknowledge of that country’s history,geography, economy, and govern-ment. Material factors such as ge-ography can shape a country’slong-term interests; traditions anddeeply held philosophical beliefs cando the same. The tangible fact thatBritain is an island shapes both itspast and future in undeniable ways,but intangibles such as the Serbianpeople’s undying resentment of theirdefeat on the “Field of Blackbirds” in1389 have equally profound effects.

Even when analysts have identifieda nation as both a rising power anda potential threat, they must pay at-tention to the specific ways in whichits military power is developing. Thefact that China is expanding its fleet,for instance, raises different concernsthan those that would arise if theChinese regime was assemblingland armies in Central Asia. By look-ing at the types of forces a particu-lar country is developing, one candetermine the opponents that coun-try will best be suited to challenge.One can gain a sense of how long itwill take that country to completewhatever programs it has underway,and thus an idea of how quickly itsleaders hope to realize the benefitsof their preparations.

Beyond Jane’s

The acquisition and demobiliza-tion of military assets are only

the most obvious signs of change ina nation’s strength. The economicresources of a country or group canplay as large a role in determiningits capabilities as does the forces itdeploys. For a classic example ofthis principle in action, one mightrecall the way in which the United

States expanded its tiny peacetimeforces of the 1930s into a militaryorganization that was able to play adecisive role in World War II.Whereas it would be unwise for usto assume that we will always beable to recover from militaryunreadiness so handily, it would beequally unwise for anyone to assumethat other nations are incapable ofturning their industrial capacity tomilitary purposes on similarly shortnotice. Thus, developments that ap-pear purely domestic and civilian canhave profound effects on internationalrelations and military affairs.

Those who wish to understand thestrategic significance of economicdevelopments must pay attention tosubtleties. Not only is it hard to tellhow readily a country will be able touse its resources to build capablemilitary forces it also can be hard toascertain what resources a govern-ment actually has at its disposal.States can use the complexities offinance and corporate ownership toacquire commodities they need,deny such commodities to others,avoid treaty restrictions on their ac-tivities, and conceal their activitiesfrom potential rivals.

Germany used such tacticsadeptly following the First WorldWar. In December 1917, even beforethe war had ended, Krupp began toopen branch factories in Switzerland.These preparations later helped Ger-many avoid restrictions on Germanarms production. The Zeiss corpo-ration used similar techniques ofinternational diversification toproduce regulated optical devices inthe Netherlands, and the putativelyDanish firm Daugs and Companyalso served as a front for German re-armament.3

Not only do economic resourcesand national infrastructure affect thequality and quantity of forces a na-tion can field, they also shape theways in which they can use them.The leaders of 19th century Prussiademonstrated an awareness of this


fact when they designed theircountry’s railway system to supporttheir military preparations againstFrance and Russia. Roads, airfields,harbors, and rail networks are amongthe things that determine a nation’smilitary possibilities, and analystsshould consider them in those terms.Transportation and communicationare as integral to commerce as towarfare, and the patterns of one canbecome the patterns of the other.

Even the most lavishly equippedand technologically oriented armedforces still incorporate civilian re-sources into their logistical systems.In 1978, the International Institute forStrategic Studies observed thatNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) forces would have to rely oncivilian facilities for 82 of the 100airbases they would have at their dis-posal in the event of a major landwar with the Soviet Union.4 In Op-erations DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM, the U.S. militaryused both the Civilian Reserve AirFleet (CRAF) and Ready ReserveFleet of civilian cargo vessels to de-ploy forces into the war zone. Onemay assume that other countries willdraw even more heavily upon sup-posed civilian assets for their mili-tary efforts. Commercial ships andaircraft can carry troops and heavyequipment, while fishing boats canserve as auxiliary patrol vessels.Therefore, one must consider suchresources when analyzing their mili-tary potential.

The principle that the long-termpotential of a national asset is moreimportant than its initial purpose isdoubly true when one analyzes thedevelopment of a country’s transpor-tation infrastructure. Few wouldclaim that U.S. industrialists werethinking in military terms when theybuilt this country’s railway system,but their work still affected the courseof the Civil War. Just as China’s na-val buildup is significant even if theChinese Government has only themost peaceful intentions, the fact

that China is helping Burma to im-prove its roads and harbors is sig-nificant even if both sides hope onlyto trade and grow rich.5 Again, onediscovers the possible meanings ofsuch developments only when con-sidering them in their full political andgeographical context. Building aroad is not an inherently aggressiveact, but when one combines the factthat Burma is between China andIndia with the fact that there havebeen considerable tensions betweenthe Chinese and Indian Govern-ments, one may decide that road-building in this particular location isa cause for concern.

There are similarities between high-technology resources and more fa-miliar types of infrastructure. Just asnations may press commercial ship-ping into military service, they maypress commercial satellites into mili-tary service as well. To stretch theanalogy further, one might compareinformation technology to roads andrailways. One can redirect elec-tronic data flow far more easilythan one can lay tracks along newroutes. However, a nation’s accessto space-based assets and tele-communications networks maydramatically affect its military op-tions. In the Gulf War, for instance,one of the major reasons the Coa-lition armies were able to carry outtheir war-winning flanking maneu-ver was that the satellite-basedGlobal Positioning System (GPS)allowed them to operate in partsof the desert where Iraqi forcescould not.

Forage and Conquest

Analysts must also remember that economic resources may

not remain with their original owners.When Warsaw Pact commandersplanned for hypothetical invasions ofWestern Europe, for example, theytook it for granted that they wouldbe able to seize food and fuel alongthe way. Irregular forces can rely evenmore heavily upon captured sup-plies. When guerrilla forces grow

strong enough, they can force civil-ians to fund and equip them, thusturning part of the region’s economyto their own purposes. If computernetworks are to play as large a rolein future warfare as some have sug-gested, hackers might accomplishan electronic version of the samegambit.

Just as forage continues to playa role in warfare, conquest contin-ues to play a role in internationalrelations. The fact that the RussianNavy still operates from port facili-ties which the U.S. armed forcesbuilt at Cam Ranh Bay during theVietnam War serves as a reminderthat countries can still win and losestrategically valuable territory inbattle. Thus, when one analyzesthe significance of economic de-velopment in a particular region,one must consider not only theways in which its initial ownersmight use it but also the ways inwhich it might be vulnerable.

The Logistics of Ideas

Many of the principles that ap-ply to material preparations for

war, apply to political positioning aswell. Indeed, for those who acceptClausewitz’s statement that war ismerely “the continuation of politicalintercourse, carried on with othermeans,” it is impossible to draw aclear line between the two.6 Just asone cannot carry out military opera-tions without building up stockpilesof materiel, one cannot put politicalprograms into effect without secur-ing support from potential allies andundermining the arguments of poten-tial opponents. These requirementsare most obvious in the domesticpolitics of democracies, where poli-ticians must win the consent of thepeople in order to keep their jobs,but they exist even in the most dic-tatorial regimes. Leaders of despo-tism may have to work with membersof a select elite rather than the pub-lic, but they must still go through thesame steps of building coalitions andpreempting their opposition.


This form of “politicking” operatesacross national borders and shapesstrategic affairs in much the sameway that it shapes other public policydebates. During the Vietnam War,for instance, the North Vietnameseregime carried out an open campaignto “[win] the war on the streets ofNew York and the campuses of NewEngland.” 7 Lobbying firms in Wash-ington, D.C., routinely represent for-eign governments to the U.S.Congress. In an age when Westerncountries typically attempt to justifytheir use of armed force by seekingapproval from international organiza-tions and going to war as part of largecoalitions, transnational public opin-ion will play a crucial role in deter-mining when and how these nationsfight.

Just as countries can gain a widerrange of military options by develop-ing their armed forces, countries cangain a wider range of political optionsby advancing useful ideas. Politicalpersuasion takes place largely in therealms of words and images. Theseare often ambiguous and difficult tointerpret. Nevertheless, one can gaininsight into a country’s political in-tentions in the same way as one cangain insight into its military inten-tions, by looking at the actions ittakes or advocates and asking whatthose actions could allow it to do.

Not only must one look at the typesof issues other political actors raise,one must look at the way in whichthey portray those issues. The wordspeople use often reveal a great dealabout the political effect they hopeto achieve. Not only can one useemotionally charged language toarouse people’s feelings (or emotion-ally neutral language to achieve theopposite effect), one can use care-fully chosen expressions to conveyspecial messages to a select audi-ence.

Soviet spokespersons, for in-stance, occasionally proclaimedtheir desire for “peaceful coexist-ence” with the West. To many, this

language undoubtedly soundedrather benign. Those who were fa-miliar with the writings of Lenin andthe speeches of Khrushchev, how-ever, would have known that the con-cept of peaceful coexistence wenthand in hand with the concept of“peaceful competition,” in which thesocialist countries would supposedlycrush their rivals through superiorindustrial production and superiorpolitical appeal. Thus, the spokes-person could send different mes-sages to different audiences. Tosome, their words were a reassur-ing promise; to others, their wordswere a call to action; and to others,perhaps, their words were a blatantthreat.

When applying these principles,never forget that politics is a slipperybusiness. Not only will nations, par-ties, leaders, and pressure groupsattempt to affect the way people per-ceive issues, they will try to keeppeople from realizing how they aregoing about it. They may advancecontroversial ideas bit by bit, in or-der to avoid alerting their audienceto their full intentions. Alternatively,they may demand far more than theyactually want, so they appear to“compromise.” In all cases, they willcover the more significant state-ments with a glaze of platitudes andrhetoric. One takes these things forgranted in domestic politics, and onemust remember them in the analy-sis of international affairs as well.

Conclusion: On GettingIt Right

This method of analyzing inter-national relations is based on

the idea that, although foreign lead-ers may not always plan their futurepolicies in much detail, they do at-tempt to put themselves in a posi-tion to secure various political andmaterial objectives. They also at-tempt to take advantage of whateveropportunities they manage to createfor themselves. In other words, thisarticle assumes that foreign leaderspractice at least a rudimentary level

of grand strategy. Those who applythis principle thoughtlessly can eas-ily lapse into paranoia. The fact thatsomething happens does not meanthat anyone planned it, and the factthat a country is capable of aggres-sion does not necessarily mean thatit will commit it. In order to use theideas in this article successfully, onemust be careful not to take them toofar.

Endnotes

1. Leighton, Richard M., and Coakley,Robert W., Global Logistics andStrategy 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955),page 711.

2. Ibid.

3. Rood, Harold W., Kingdoms of theBlind: How the Great DemocraciesHave Resumed the Follies That SoNearly Cost Them Their Life (Durham,North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press,1980), pages 22 and 31.

4. International Institute for StrategicStudies, IISS Strategic Survey 1978(London: IISS, 1979), page 32.

5. Malik, Mohan, “Burma Slides UnderChina’s Shadow,” Jane’s InternationalDefence Review, Volume 9, Number 7, 1July 1997, page 319.

6. Von Clausewitz, Carl, translated byMichael Howard and Peter Paret, On War(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1976), page 87.

7. Le Lanning, Michael, and Cragg, Dan,Inside the VC and the NVA: The RealStory of North Vietnam’s ArmedForces (NY, New York: Ivy Books, 1992),page 201.

Thomas Kane, Ph.D., is a lecturer at theUniversity of Hull, United Kingdom, spe-cializing in strategic studies. His pub-lished research includes studies of theoverarching strategic assumptions in theUnited States Quadrennial Defense Re-view of May 1997, a historical study ofNapoleon’s overall strategy, reports onmergers in the U.S. defense industry, andmore general articles on the economics ofnational defense. His book with FrankCass, Military Logistics and StrategicPerformance, is in print, and his bookMaritime Power and the Grand Strat-egy of China, will appear early in 2002.Readers may contact the author [email protected].


by Major Christopher J. Tatarka

I don’t care what that report says, theenemy has to be traveling downavenue of approach #1…becausethat is what my IPB [intelligencepreparation of the battlefield] sayshe’ll do.

—Battalion Task Force S2 at the JointReadiness Training Center, 1996.

Although we added the commentabove for humor, many Military Intel-ligence (MI) professionals are con-tinually in danger of making an errorin analysis similar to that shown bythis quote. This danger is not theresult of a failure in attempting to in-terpret enemy activities correctly, butrather from analytical errors psycho-logically inherent to human decision-making and analysis. This article willdiscuss the two most serious errorsin analysis and decision-making, aswell as present methods to combatthese potentially disastrous lapses.1

Heuristics and Biases inProblem Solving

Intelligence analysis, by its nature,requires individuals to be decision-makers; despite recent advances intechnology and decision-support sys-tems (e.g., the All-Source AnalysisSystem), the primary tool for intelli-gence analysis is still the human brain(see Figure 1). MI professionals of-ten have difficulties making choicesbecause the human brain has limitsin its capacity to process informa-tion, and then make decisions basedon that information using all aspectsof the available data. Because ofthese inherent limitations, there isa natural tendency for people toattempt to take mental shortcutsin problem analysis and decision-making. Behavioral scientists havebeen studying these shortcuts, orheuristics, extensively for years.

Heuristics are not inherently badas they often prove helpful inmaking decisions by simplifying thedecision-making process. For ex-ample, if at your second Joint Readi-ness Training Center (JRTC) rotation,you notice a trend in enemy activitysimilar to that at your previous rota-tion, then you are likely to rely onthe previous solution to determine theenemy intentions. In this case, youwould not have to make a completelynew hypothesis about enemy inten-tions because this scenario is rep-resentative of a previous experience.This heuristic, referred to as “repre-sentativeness,” may have aided youin quickly making an analysis of theenemy situation.

Unfortunately, however, a wide bodyof research has shown that in manysituations, these heuristics oftenlead to errors in decision-making,analytical thinking, and problem solv-ing. That is, humans have a psycho-logical tendency to make certainanalytical errors or apply biaseswhen analyzing situations. In intelli-gence analysis and military decision-

making, these biases can be ex-tremely problematic since theyfrequently lead to incorrect assess-ments and poor analysis, which canlead to disastrous results.

AnchoringOne of the most dangerous biases

for intelligence professionals resultsfrom limitations in human workingmemory. Due to the limitations inhow much information humans canuse at any given time, we tend tomentally limit, or screen, the amountof external information we employ toanalyze a situation.2 One of theproblematic tendencies is for indi-viduals to emphasize informationbased on when they received it,rather than on the strength or meritof the information.

Anchoring is the most commonbias of this type. It occurs when anindividual places too much impor-tance on the first or early reports ina series of information collection (i.e.,people become “anchored” on theinitial information). For example, inthe situation at the beginning of this

Do You Think You Are a Good Intelligence Analyst?! Higher headquarters has various sources that strongly suggest a

dismounted enemy unit’s most likely course of action (COA) is tomove along avenue of approach #1. You consider this informationreasonable, given the situation. After you complete the IPB, youbrief your commander that this is the likely enemy course of action(ECOA).

! As the situation progresses, the first three incoming intelligencereports from solid, trustworthy sources strongly support your pre-dicted ECOA.

! If the next report, also from a trustworthy source, refutes your pre-dicted (and publicly stated) ECOA, what decision will you likelymake?

! What if you receive a second “disconfirming” report? A third? Atwhat point might you change your previous prediction and explainto your commander that you were wrong?

Figure 1. Are You a Good Intelligence Analyst?

Overcoming Biases in Military ProblemAnalysis and Decision-Making


article, there would be a strong ten-dency to place much greater impor-tance on the early reports than onthose that came later in the scenario(despite any indications that neitherreport was more valid than the other).

A large amount of anecdotal evi-dence from participants and ob-server/controllers (O/Cs) at theNational Training Center (NTC) andJRTC suggest anchoring is a prob-lem for many intelligence (and op-erations) sections when determiningECOAs. Likewise, historical in-stances of anchoring are equallycommon. For example, during theCivil War Battle of Chancellorsvillein May 1863, General Oliver O.Howard, Commander of the UnionArmy’s 11th Corps, likely became avictim of anchoring. General Howardreceived a number of initial reportsearly on 2 May, suggesting that theConfederate forces opposite his po-sition were a covering force for aConfederate retreat.

These initial reports included a re-port from General Joseph Hooker,Howard’s superior, who stated thatthe Confederate forces were clearlyin retreat. As the day progressed,however, General Howard received avariety of eyewitness reports thatindicated the Confederate forceswere instead massing for an attack.Despite a large number of these re-ports, General Howard apparentlyanchored on the earliest reports. Al-though he was aware of eyewitnessinformation, he apparently placedmore emphasis on the earlier reports.At 5:15 p.m. on 2 May, Confederatetroops stormed through the com-pletely surprised 11th Corps, turnedthe Union flank, and eventually wonthis battle.3 Although it is difficultto completely recreate GeneralHoward’s thoughts, it does seemlikely that anchoring played a vitalrole in this defeat.

Confirmation BiasThe second major bias that can

hinder the intelligence analysis and

decision-making processes is theconfirmation bias. After a person hasdeveloped a hypothesis about anevent (e.g., an ECOA), confirmationbias leads the individual to—! Seek out only evidence that con-

firms the hypothesis.! Disregard evidence that does not

confirm the hypothesis.! Fail to use the absences of in-

formation about the hypothesisto develop alternate explana-tions.

For example, once an intelli-gence section develops an ECOA,the psychological tendency is tolook for information or reports thatonly support that ECOA. There-fore, if they deploy reconnaissanceand surveillance (R&S) assets onlyalong the most likely enemy axisof advance, this is likely to be aconfirmation bias. Similarly, re-search suggests that humans willnaturally tend to either forget ormentally ignore information thatdisconfirms the ECOA. In threeJRTC rotations, I have been in in-telligence sections that simply dis-counted reports because they didnot fit the proposed ECOAs. Like-wise, if there is not any substan-tial information about the mostlikely ECOA, we tend to assumeit is valid, despite that lack of in-formation. For example, when thereare no significant negative R&Sreports, individuals are prone toassume that the ECOA is accurateand do not consider that the en-emy might possibly be coming froma location where there are no R&Sassets.

Perhaps most significant aboutthe confirmation bias is that thedoctrinal military decision-makingprocess (MDMP) lends itself to itsoccurrence. Doctrine requires in-telligence personnel to generatehypotheses about enemy activities(e.g., the most likely and mostdangerous ECOAs) and psychol-ogy suggests that we are likely tobias ourselves mentally to confirm

these COAs at the risk of moreanalytical thought. Although impor-tant in the MDMP, creating themost likely and the most danger-ous ECOAs inherently adds to theodds of analysts injecting a confir-mation bias into intelligence analy-sis and the intelligence cycle. Thatis, intelligence personnel spend agreat deal of effort generating whatthey believe is the best possiblehypothesis about enemy activities;once they complete these hypoth-eses, research suggests there willbe a very strong psychological ten-dency for these individuals to seekout or note only information thatsupports their hypotheses. Evenmore troublesome is that this “cog-nitive tunnel vision” mentality iseven more pronounced under con-ditions of high stress and mentaloverload,4 (which is the primaryenvironment for Army operations).

Examples of confirmation bias inmilitary history are widespread andsimilar to the evidence from JRTCmentioned above. An excellent ex-ample is General Ulysses S.Grant’s actions in the Battle ofShiloh in 1862. Grant’s assess-ment was that the Confederateforces under General PierreBeauregard were preparing de-fenses and were “heartily tired”.5

Despite information from frontlineunits, and one colonel who re-ported “thousands of rebels outthere in the woods,” 6 General Grantrefused to alter his initial hypoth-esis about the enemy. When hecontinued to receive reports aboutenemy movements, his assess-ment was that it was, at most, asmall attack against an isolateddivision, but clearly not a large-scale offensive. The next morning,as Grant was eating breakfast,thousands of Confederates begantheir attack. Although later able toobtain a costly victory at Shiloh,Grant’s confirmation bias nearlyled to a stunning defeat for Unionforces.


Overcoming the Anchoringand Confirmation Biases

The tendency to commit thesetwo biases in analysis and decision-making is inherent in human thought.These biases can lead to disastrouserrors, making it imperative that in-telligence analysts and decision-makers take steps to overcomethem.

The literature in decision-makingand human performance suggestsimplementation of three methodsthat can help prevent these biases.They are the use of decision-supporttools, training, and employing a“devil’s advocate” to validate or invali-date hypotheses.

Decision-Support Tools. One ofthe best ways to overcome biases,most notably anchoring, is use ofdoctrinal and situational decision-support tools. For example, an or-ganized, updated situation map ordisplay—which graphically portraysunit reports—aids people in weigh-ing incoming reports in a less se-quential order. If accurate, organized,and updated in a timely manner,these graphic displays are likely tohelp analysts overcome anchoringon earlier reports. Since these re-ports show information graphically,not sequentially, they may alleviatethe anchoring tendency. Although de-cision-support tools are common forintelligence professionals, it is im-perative that analysts actually usethem when analyzing threat activi-ties.

Training. Although overcomingthese biases can be difficult, anotherexcellent method suggested by theresearch on decision-making is train-ing individuals to overcome thesebiases. For example, training intelli-gence professionals and sectionsabout these two biases is likely tomake them more aware of their ownthought processes, and therefore lesslikely to make these errors. Likewise,training individuals on the importanceof considering all information that con-

firms or disconfirms an ECOA equallyand impartially is also likely to provebeneficial. Research also suggeststhat training in these areas needs tobe specific to the scenarios and envi-ronments in which these biases oc-cur. That is, specific training on likelyscenarios and procedures encoun-tered by a particular intelligence ana-lyst or section is more helpful inreduction of these biases than is lessfocused, broader scope training.

Devil’s Advocate. Assign a “devil’sadvocate” to find errors in analysis orto generate alternate hypotheses con-cerning enemy activities. One pos-sible technique is to assign anindividual to evaluate each enemyCOA critically, and then task thatindividual to “disconfirm” the statedmost likely ECOA. One may alsohave this devil’s advocate create al-ternate ECOAs and graphically dis-play (or list) all reported informationthat disproves the most probableECOA. On occasion, they can alsopresent their arguments against themost probable ECOA to the analystsin a section. Since time is critical inmost intelligence settings, this pro-cess does not need to be exhaus-tive nor time consuming. Having oneindividual search for refuting evidenceis a quick, efficient method, likely tolead to better analysis.

ConclusionThe three methods mentioned above

provide a framework for overcomingtwo of the most prevalent and danger-ous biases that exist in military prob-lem analysis and decision-making.Although not “cure-alls” for every ana-lytical and problem-solving bias inhumans, these methods may helpfoster better, more accurate, and morerelevant intelligence analysis. Theymay also help prevent the problemsthat exist when analysts and decision-makers anchor on early informationor focus too much on confirming theirown hypotheses.

Special thanks to Mike Matthews,(Ph.D., Department of Behavioral Sci-

ences and Leadership, United StatesMilitary Academy) for his input on thisarticle.

Endnotes

1. The primary reference for this articlewas Wickens, Christopher D., Gordon,Sallie E., Yili, Liu, An Introduction toHuman Factors Engineering (NYC,New York: Longman Books, 1998).More detailed information is availablefrom this text, or other psychologytexts, especially those involvingcognition and problem solving.

2. “Working memory” is a psychologicalmodel to describe one of the “systems”that humans use in thought andmemory. Simply put, this model statesthat working memory comprisesprimarily what a person is thinking of atany given moment. The following taskillustrates the limitations of workingmemory.

Study the words below for 15 seconds.

orange cat paper house fish bucketpear cup key pencil tape

Now cover up the words, and attempt tolist them in order:

The fact that very few people can recallall eleven words evokes the limitations ofworking memory. Although a simplisticexample, studies suggest that morecomplex cues that may be important toproblem solving are “forgotten” in amanner similar to the words in this list.

3. McPherson, James, L., Battle Cry ofFreedom: The Civil War Era (NYC,New York: Ballantine Books, 1988).

4. Wickens et. al., page 195.

5. McPherson, page 409.

6. McPherson, page 408.

Major Chris Tatarka received his com-mission from Gonzaga University. He iscurrently serving as an Instructor in theDepartment of Behavioral Sciences andLeadership at the U.S. Military Academy.He has served as an infantry officer inthe 25th Infantry Division (Light) inHawaii, and as an MI officer in the 172dInfantry Brigade (Separate), Fort Wain-wright, Alaska. A graduate of the MI Of-ficers Transition and Advanced Courses,he holds Bachelor and Master degreesin Psychology, a Master of Public Ad-ministration, and is currently complet-ing another Masters in ManagementInformation Systems. Readers can con-tact him via E-mail at [email protected].


by Major David Shin“The lessons I absorbed from Panamaconfirmed all my convictions over thepreceding twenty years, since the daysof doubt over Vietnam. Have a clearpolitical objective and stick to it. Useall the force necessary, and do notapologize for going in big if that iswhat it takes. Decisive force ends warsquickly and in the long run saveslives. Whatever threats we faced inthe future, I intended to make theserules the bedrock of my militarycounsel.” 1

General Colin Powell

Some of our senior military leaders,as evidenced by General Powell’sstatement, are convinced that theUnited States’ past conflicts haveshown that general rules for militarysuccess exist. The nation must fol-low these rule to achieve the maxi-mum results with minimum risk andexposure. Should we commit to a listof standing criteria for committing themilitary forces of the United States ofAmerica? After all, someone couldargue, “wait a minute, you did not fol-low one of the rules.” In fact, criteriathat amount to rules could becomepolicy and cause the nation to be tooreluctant and averse to use her mili-tary forces. General Powell sharedthese concerns; however, he believedin the spirit of such rules rather thanbeing ruled by them. He argued at hisconfirmation hearing as Chairman,Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the setof criteria Secretary of DefenseCasper W. Weinberger proposed forthe use of U.S. military power was auseful guideline. However, GeneralPowell never viewed these criteria tobe a series of steps that circum-stances must meet before the JCSwould recommend the use of militaryforce.

Criteria for CommittingForces

I share General Powell’s view onthis issue but think that we should

Use of Standing Criteria for Deciding to CommitU.S. Forces in Conflict Resolution

reevaluate these criteria as the na-ture of conflict continues to evolve.As we are aware, war is a seriousbusiness and its consequences maydetermine whether a state and itspeople will endure or perish. I believethis realization alone requires a moresystematic approach to conflictresolution, rather than our relianceon what some would call ad hoc re-sponses to crises. Furthermore, ourreligious values promote the primafacie obligation not to kill or injureothers unjustly, and that value setacts as a constraint in determiningthe use of force. In brief, the veryserious nature of war and our moralobligations demand the mostweighty and significant reasons forgoing to war. The formulation ofstanding criteria for committing U.S.military forces would be very helpfulin our attempts to wage just wars.The question is what our standingcriteria should be and why? I willexamine several views ranging fromthe just-war (moralist) argument tothose promoted by SecretaryWeinberger and synthesize themto posit my own views on the is-sue. I will begin by examining Sec-retary Weinberger’s criteria, theWeinberger Doctrine, regarding thecommitment of U.S. forces.

The genesis for the formulation ofthe Weinberger Doctrine was his re-alization that there was a growingsentiment in the United States ad-vocating a return to the isolationismthat was prevalent in this countrybetween the World Wars. He firmlyopposed this view because it woulddetach the United States from theworld community and seem to be arenunciation of its responsibilities asa world leader. Simultaneously, hechallenged the view that military forcecould be brought to bear on any cri-sis. He feared the indiscriminate useof force would bring about domestic

turmoil similar to that experiencedduring the Vietnam War, and wouldeventually threaten our ability to builda national consensus for a commonpurpose. In the end, he believed thiswould lead to low morale in the U.S.Armed Services and eventually re-duce the effectiveness of our abilityto wage war. Therefore, SecretaryWeinberger was in search of a moreflexible and effective response to dealwith the use of military force. On 28November 1984, he outlined six cri-teria for committing U.S. militaryforces to include—! When its vital national interests

were at stake.! With the intent to win.! When we have established

clearly defined political and mili-tary objectives.

! Should have the support of boththe citizenry and the Congress.

! Use of military force should bethe last resort.

! We should continuously reas-sess and modify the decisionsto conduct military operationswhen required.

Most of the above criteria are self-explanatory; however, some mayneed further clarification. For in-stance, what does SecretaryWeinberger mean by vital and whatare the national interests involved?In short, how do we know if the con-flict is in our national interest? Next,what does it mean to have the sup-port of the our Nation’s people andthe Congress? Finally, do we needto modify the Weinberger Doctrinesince the international environmenthas changed so significantly sinceNovember 1984?

Evaluating NationalInterests

I will address the first issue by high-lighting Donald E. Nuechterlein’swork on U.S. policy national inter-


ests in a new security environment.2It helps us to better understand whatour national interests are and to whatdegree of intensity they are at stakein a specific crisis. First, he arguesthat there are four enduring nationalinterests:! Defending the United States and

its way of life.! The economic well-being of the

United States.! Maintaining a favorable world

order.! Promoting our values (democ-

racy and the free market sys-tem).

Second, and more importantly, heargues that our ability to assess theintensity of interest during crises willhelp us to correctly determine whatour national interests are. In otherwords, it will be relatively easy todetermine which of the four nationalinterests are at stake. The criticalelement in the decision-makingprocess is to what level of intensitywe should assess them. He arguesthat in addition to the four enduringnational interests, there are four dif-ferent levels of intensity: survival, vi-tal, major, and peripheral interests.

According to Nuechterlein, sur-vival interests are at stake whenone’s homeland is threatened if anenemy state’s demands are not dealtwith quickly. For instance,Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939and the North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea in 1950 are clear sur-vival interests for both affected coun-tries.

Vital interests are similar to sur-vival interests but the main differenceis the amount of time a nation hasto respond to the threat. In short, thedanger is not imminent and the na-tion has time to consult with allies,negotiate with the enemy, or to em-ploy other instruments of nationalpower. In the end, the nation is will-ing to use military force when theenemy refuses to compromise afterreaching a certain point. For ex-ample, President Harry S. Truman’s

decision to intervene in South Koreaand President John F. Kennedy’sdecision not to allow Soviet missilesin Cuba are crises in which our vitalinterests were at stake.

Major interests are those not cru-cial to a nation’s well being but arestill considered important. Normally,it involves interests the country cannegotiate with its adversary. Althoughthey are of serious concern to ourpolicy-makers, negotiation and com-promise are the policy of choicerather than confrontation. For in-stance, the Arab oil embargo in 1973caused significant damage to theU.S. economy but it was not a seri-ous long-term threat to that economy.Likewise, the Soviet Union’s 1979invasion of Afghanistan threatenedour interests but we determined thatwe could still live with the unsatis-factory outcome without the commit-ment of our troops. In brief, thedifference between vital and majorinterest is what our policy-makersbelieve to be tolerable or intol-erable.

Finally, a peripheral interest isone that does not seriously affect thewell-being of the United States as awhole, even though it may be detri-mental to the private interests of U.S.citizens and companies conductingbusiness abroad. We may need tomonitor the situation but the con-cerns are at a lower order of magni-tude. Examples are U.S. citizensimprisoned overseas on drug or othercharges and violations of our busi-ness interests operating abroad.Again, the point is that correctly dif-ferentiating the levels of intensityranging from peripheral to survivalcan provide policy-makers with aclear choice when deciding whichnational interest is at stake duringcrises.

Garnering SupportHow do the President and his cru-

cial advisors attempt to gain the sup-port of the Congress and thecitizenry? Must they have public sup-port? Should Congress declare war

before committing our troops to com-bat? These questions are quite diffi-cult to address since the end result,whether one has the people’s sup-port, can be very difficult to deter-mine. However, the determination ismore obvious with either mass pub-lic opposition (for example, the Viet-nam anti-war protests) oroverwhelming support (such as wasobserved during Operation DESERTSTORM). A good example of howsubjective this issue can be was inthe debate over the North AtlanticTreaty Organization’s (NATO) bomb-ing of Serbia during the Kosovo cri-sis. A number of Senate Republicansaccused President Bill Clinton ofmisleading the nation while othersclaimed that for him to go to war with-out a formal declaration of war fromCongress was to abrogate his con-stitutional duty and violate his oathof office. Others argue that theClinton Administration lacked anoverarching national strategy andappeared to be responding to crises,as if it intentionally promoted incre-mentalism and “ad hoc-ism” in ournational strategy. In the end, how-ever, Congress voted to support thePresident’s decision to bomb theSerbs.

It is also understood that the lasttime Congress declared war wasduring World War II. Since then,Congress has been unable to pre-vent our Presidents from committingU.S. forces to combat without a for-mal declaration of war to includeKorea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama,and DESERT STORM. Furthermore,in the case of Kosovo, PresidentClinton appeared to have used all ofhis diplomatic options in order to gainthe support of the people. Evidently,as a last resort, Secretary of StateMadeleine K. Albright convinced himto send his Balkan envoy, RichardC. Holbrooke, to Belgrade one lasttime before committing our militaryforces. At the same time, PresidentClinton worked hard for severalmonths to gain the support of ourNATO allies for the bombings if and


when the Balkan peace attemptfailed.

However, there are also indicationsthat President Clinton wanted to useforce as early as the previous win-ter, not as a last resort. Apparently,representatives from several NATOcountries as well as those within hisown administration who wanted onemore political effort at settling thecrisis forestalled this action.

Was President Clinton wrong whenhe wanted to use force? Does mili-tary force have to be used as a lastresort? According to LieutenantColonel Robert R. Leonhard, ourlast-resort tradition was an expres-sion of our desire to avoid total war.3

In today’s environment, policy-mak-ers should consider the military in-strument of power a full-timecomponent to our strategy, possiblycombined with the other elements toresolve all levels of crisis. I believethat in cases where our survival orvital interests are at stake (as de-fined by Neuchterlein), we may nothave the time to exercise all of ourinstruments of power before the useof military force. Furthermore, the si-multaneous application of all our in-struments of power may be exactlywhat is necessary to deal with a cri-sis, where the danger is imminentand the enemy clearly does not wanta peaceful resolution to the conflict(as in our post-September 11th ac-tions). We must sometimes be will-ing to use military force when theenemy refuses to compromise, evenif it is not the last resort.

I recognize the enduring qualitiesof Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity of warconsisting of the government, themilitary, and the people. The govern-ment provides the political aim; themilitary, the means to achieve thepolitical aim; and the people providethe national will. Nevertheless, as wehave seen, the support of the popu-lace is sometimes very difficult todetermine and in the end leadersmust do what they believe is right.They must convince the citizenry

that military force is sometimes thecorrect instrument of policy. Oneshould always attempt to garner thesupport of the public but leaderssometimes do not have the luxury ofdetermining whether they will attainunambiguous public support beforecommitting military forces. In thissense, I believe President Clinton’sbombing of Serbia to have been quitebold simply because of its politicalrisk. According to Max Boot, the re-cent crisis in Kosovo may be “a newchapter in the history of Americanforeign policy.”4 He believes that ouractions in Kosovo are a clear act ofcharity and highlight our altruism atits best. Arguably, we are willing torisk our national prestige and thelives of our soldiers even though ournational interests are not seriouslyat threat. This begs the question ofhow morality influences our decisionto commit military forces?

According to U.S. Catholic bish-ops, governments threatened byarmed, unjust aggression must de-fend their people. In their eyes, properdefense would include military forceif all attempts at peaceful resolutionhave failed, the cause is just, anduse of military force is only as a lastresort. Additionally, the situationmust meet the following criteria:! A competent authority must de-

clare war.! A nation should use only the

minimal amount of force toachieve objectives.

! One’s intent must be peace andreconciliation.

! There must be some probabilityof success.

! Damage caused by conflict mustbe proportionate to the goodexpected from waging war.

The United States Government,however, has not always been per-suaded by the moralist argument toprotect the innocent and the help-less with military force. For example,Washington chose not to commitU.S. military forces to Bangladeshin 1971 to prevent the genocide of

more than one million Bengalis. Thesame held true for the estimated 1.5million Cambodians slaughtered inthat country from 1975 to 1979. Fi-nally, The United States troops didnot respond to the extermination ofsome 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in1994. The Clinton Administration nev-ertheless appeared to use the mor-alist argument to wage war againstthe Serbs. Although we have notbeen consistent, our religious valuesdo have some influence in our deter-mination of what is and is not a justwar. Finally, how valid is theWeinberger Doctrine today and whatshould be our standing criteria for ajust war?

Validity of the WeinbergerDoctrine

I believe all six of the criteria fromthe Weinberger Doctrine remain validtoday, but there are other criteria,such as the moralist argument, thatwe should consider. Moreover, wecannot view them as a simple check-list in which all the steps must bemet before the United States wouldconsider the use of military force. Inother words, the Weinberger Doc-trine is a useful guide for determin-ing the rightful use of U. S. militarypower, but dogmatic application ofthe rules may cause our foreignpolicy to be impotent. At every turn,someone could argue that policy-makers ignored a rule. As shown,leaders may not always have thetime to determine whether unam-biguous public support is attainablebefore committing our country’sarmed forces to a conflict. Moreover,situations may even require the useof force, not as a last resort, but earlyon in a crisis or as a complement toother instruments of power.

In the end, leaders must do whatthey believe is right and convince thepeople that military force is some-times the correct instrument ofpolicy. Furthermore, it is not enoughto simply state that the United Statesshould only commit forces when itsvital interests are at stake; rather,


one must offer some methodologyto determine what our national inter-ests are and when they are at risk.As shown above, correctly differen-tiating the levels of intensity rangingfrom peripheral to survival can pro-vide policy-makers with a clearchoice when deciding what nationalinterest is at stake during a crisis.

In addition, our religious valuesdo have some influence in our de-termination of just war. We haveno authoritative doctrine for a justwar in the military and we have notalways defended the innocent andthe helpless. Nevertheless, we arestill moved by the need to protectthe innocent from unjust attack, torestore rights wrongfully denied, orto reestablish a just order. Argu-ably, our recent involvement inKosovo is the ideal case for supple-menting the Weinberger Doctrinewith the moralist just-war criterialisted above. Therefore, the crite-ria outlined by the Catholic bish-ops and other moralists must bewell understood by our decision-makers, and they should considerit before committing U.S. forces.Finally, we must also anticipategreater participation in future con-

flict from our allies as well as na-tional and international nongovern-mental organizations. This wouldrequire our cooperation with orga-nizations such as NATO, the RedCross, and Doctors Without Bor-ders. As in the case of Kosovo, ourleaders will have to work long andhard to win the hearts and mindsof not only the populace but alsoof our allies and the rest of the in-ternational community. As a leaderof the free world, we—unlike anyother nation before—must extendClausewitz’s trinity of war and con-vince the rest of the world (not justourselves) that just wars are mor-ally and politically justified.

ConclusionIn summary, the serious nature

of war and our moral obligation towage just wars demands the mostweighty and significant reasons forcommitting military forces. There-fore, the application of standing cri-teria (a hybrid of the WeinbergerDoctrine and the moralist posi-tions), with a methodology to dif-ferentiate the levels of intensity, willassist our decision-makers. Rang-ing from peripheral to survival in-terests, it will help them to correctly

apply our military instrument ofpower in times of crises.

Endnotes

1. Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Perisico.,My American Journey (NY: RandomHouse, 1995), page 434.

2. Nuechterlein, Donald E., AmericaRecommitted: United States NationalInterests in a Restructured World(Lexington, KY: The University Press ofKentucky, 1991), pages 17-18.

3. Leonhard, Robert R., The Principlesof War for the Information Age(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998),pages 223-224.

4. Boot, Max, “When War is an Act ofCharity,” The Wall Street Journal, 25March 1999, page A-22.

Major David W. Shin is an Assistant ArmyAttache, U.S. Defense Attache Office,Seoul, Korea. He received a B.S. from theVirginia Military Institute, an M.S. from theJoint Military Intelligence College, and anM.A. from the University of Washington; heis a graduate of the U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College. He has servedin a variety of command and staff positionsin the continental United States, Korea, andJapan, to include counterintelligence of-ficer, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne),Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Staff Officer,United Nations Command Military Armi-stice Commission, Seoul, Korea; and Chief,Security Liaison Detachment, Tokyo, 500thMilitary Intelligence Group, Japan.

Nato, U.N. Forces working together.

U.N. convoy with U.S. Forces.


by Chief Warrant Officer ThreeDel Erin Stewart

Considering the implications of the11 September 2001 attack on theUnited States, many changes mustoccur in how the U.S. Army conductsits counterterrorist operations. Newmethodologies and tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TTP) mustemerge if the Army is to address thisnew threat. Based on experience,the following methodology is onepossible interim fix.

The theory is simple: if you knowyour enemy’s capabilities, vulner-abilities, methods, and thought pro-cesses, you are more likely tosuccessfully predict when, where,and how he will attack and be ableto plan countermeasures. While weused the following methodology ex-perimentally at an analytical cell ata numbered Army level, the tools andtechniques discussed below may beuseful for other echelons.

When predicting traditional or con-ventional military threats, the U.S.Army employs analytical methodolo-gies such as intelligence preparationof the battlefield (IPB) and relatedtools. The terrorist threat, however,is unique in that its nature and sur-vival require it avoid direct engage-ments with main force units.Terrorists are exceedingly mobile,have mastered the art of blending intothe surrounding population, and em-ploy harsh measures to ensure se-curity.

On the other hand, our nationalcollection assets provide so muchdiverse information that makingsense of it all is a daunting task.Reports on terrorist activity originatefrom all intelligence disciplines, to

include open source. The informationthat surfaces is usually of limitedscope, fragmented, and can addressanything from financial issues tothose focused on training or opera-tions. Currently approved doctrinalsymbols do not reflect terrorist op-erations types of data, nor is theregenerally a doctrinal method forgraphically portraying such activi-ties. The question is, then, how canan analyst take the disparate, seem-ingly unrelated data points, and moveforward toward accurate predictiveanalysis? One thing is certain: theeffort will involve all intelligence dis-ciplines.

We rethought and revisited thesemethodologies because the com-mander was very unhappy with de-tailed, multicolored charted andgraphed after-the-fact analysis; hewanted reasonably accurate predic-tions to help in his decision-making

process for recommending counter-measures. First, it is useful to lookat existing tools and methodologiesfor analysis, then additional areas offocus, and recommending counter-measures.

Existing Analytical Method-ologies Applied Against Ter-rorist Operations

The following analytical tool de-scriptions and examples are fromFM 34-60, Counterintelligence,Section VI, Counter-Human Intel-ligence Analysis, to Appendix A,Counter-Human IntelligenceTechniques and Procedures. Wemodified the wording slightly for easeof use in this forum. This section dis-cusses a chronological record andthree analytical techniques.

Time-Event Charting. The time-event chart shown in Figure 1 is achronological record of individual or

Conventional Approaches to Unconventional Problems:

Analyzing TerrorismAnalyzing TerrorismAnalyzing TerrorismAnalyzing TerrorismAnalyzing Terrorism

Figure 1. Sample Time Event Chart.


group activities designed to store anddisplay large amounts of informationin as little space as possible. Thistool is easy to prepare, understand,and use. Symbols used in time-eventcharting are very simple. Analystsuse triangles to show the beginningand end of the chart and to showshifts in methods of operation orchanges in ideology. Rectangles ordiamonds indicate significant eventsor activities.

Analysts can highlight particularlynoteworthy or important events bydrawing an “X” through the eventsymbol (rectangle or diamond). Eachof these symbols contains a chro-nological number (event number),date (day, month, and year of event),and may contain a file referencenumber. The incident description isa very brief explanation of the inci-dent, and may include the team size,type of incident or activity, place andmethod of operation, and duration ofincident. Arrows indicate time flow.

Analysts also use a variety ofsymbols, such as parallelograms,pentagons, and others, to depictdifferent types of events and ac-tivities. Using these symbols andbrief descriptions, an analyst cananalyze the group’s activities, tran-sitions, trends, and operationalpatterns. Time-event charts are

excellent briefing aids as well asflexible analytical tools.

Association Matrix. The associa-tion matrix delineates the existenceof relationships between individuals.The part of the problem deserving themost analytical effort is the group it-self. Analysts examine the group’selements (members) and their rela-tionships with other members, other

groups and associated entities, andrelated events. Analysts can showthe connections between criticalplayers in any event or activity in anassociation matrix (see Figure 2),which shows associations within agroup or similar activity, and is basedon the assumption that people in-volved in a collective activity knowone another.

The construction of this type ofmatrix is in the form of a right tri-angle, and analysts list personalitiesin exactly the same order along boththe rows and columns to ensure thatall possible associations appear cor-rectly. The purpose of the personal-ity matrix is to show who knowswhom. Analysts determine a knownassociation by “direct contact” be-tween individuals; a number of fac-tors determine direct contact,including face-to-face meetings, con-firmed telephonic conversation be-tween known parties, and all themembers of a particular organiza-tional cell.

Analysts indicate a known asso-ciation between individuals on the

Figure 2. Sample Association Matrix.

Figure 3. Sample Activities Matrix.


matrix by a dot or filled-in circle. Theyconsider suspected or “weak” asso-ciations between persons of interestto be associations that are possibleor even probable, but they cannotconfirm it using the above criteria.When a person of interest dies, adiamond next to his or her name onthe matrix relays that fact.

Activities Matrix. The activitiesmatrix helps to determine connec-tivity between individuals and anyorganization, event, entity, address,activity, or anything other than per-sons. Unlike the association matrix,the construction of the activity ma-trix is in the form of a square or arectangle (see Figure 3). The ana-lyst can tailor rows or columns to fitthe needs of the situation at hand oradd them later as the situation de-velops. The analyst determines thenumber of rows and columns by theneeds of the problem and by theamount of information available.

Analysts normally construct thismatrix with personalities arranged ina vertical listing on the left side ofthe matrix and activities, organiza-tions, events, addresses, or anyother common denominators ar-ranged along the bottom of the ma-trix. This matrix can store anincredible amount of informationabout a particular organization orgroup, and can expand on the infor-mation developed in the associationmatrix.

Link Diagram. The third analyti-cal technique is link diagramming.Analysts use this technique to de-pict the more complex linkages be-tween a large number of entities, andcan include persons, organizations,or almost anything else. Analystsuse link analysis in a variety of com-plex investigative efforts includingcriminal and terrorist investigations,analysis, and even medical research.Several regional law enforcement

training centers are currently teach-ing this method as a technique incombating organized crime. The par-ticular method discussed here is anadaptation especially useful in coun-terintelligence (CI) investigativeanalysis in general and terrorismanalysis in particular.

In link analysis, a number of differ-ent symbols identify various items.Analysts can easily and clearly dis-play obstacles, indirect routes orconnections, and suspected con-nections. In many cases, the viewercan work with and understand thepicture more easily than the matrix.Link analysis can present informa-tion in a manner that ensures clar-ity.

As with construction of associationmatrices, analysts should follow cer-tain rules of graphics, symbology,and construction. Standardization iscritical to ensure that everyone con-structing, using, or reading a link dia-gram understands exactly what thediagram depicts. The standard rulesfollow:

Show persons as open circleswith the name written inside thecircle.Show person known by morethan one name (alias, alsoknown as [AKA]) as overlappingcircles with names in eachcircle.Show deceased persons with adiamond next to the circle thatrepresents that person.Show nonpersonal entities (or-ganizations, governments,events, locations) by squares orrectangles.Show linkages or associationsby lines: solid for confirmed anddotted for suspected.Show each person or other en-tity only once in a link diagram.

ComplementaryMethodology Developed

The approach used to meet thecommander’s intent for predictive

Figure 4. Sample Link Diagram.


analysis was to use traditional IPB-style graphic overlays, but thenmodify this methodology to specifi-cally monitor the actions of a terror-ist group and its associatedelements. The use of overlays ontraining, organizations, finances, andwarnings can be effective.

Training. The first overlay (Train-ing) may contain all the available in-formation on training camps andlocations, by country, which this or-ganization and its associated ele-ments reportedly use. This data willprimarily come from imagery intelli-gence (IMINT), human intelligence(HUMINT), and signals intelligence(SIGINT). There is utility in knowingwhat topics specific camps train, andrecognizing changes in what theyare teaching or training. As an ex-ample, if a camp that traditionallyworked on the use of RPGs (Sovietantitank grenade launchers) andsmall arms suddenly changes to oneof hostage taking, analysts wouldnote this radical change as a pos-sible alteration in organizational ob-jectives. Certainly it would be a keyindicator.

Organizations. The second over-lay (Organizations) may contain allof the available information on non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and subordinate or related elements(e.g., branch offices of the same or-ganization, but in a different coun-try). That overlay depicts known andsuspected relationships betweenNGOs (especially those that wereessentially front organizations) andthe terrorist groups. As appropriate,analysts can include other organiza-tions. Information allowing comple-tion of this overlay will mainly comefrom reports issued by HUMINT, CI,and SIGINT sources. Knowing whatsurrogates are available is essentialto understanding the extent of thepotential threat. For example, a le-gitimate mining operation may havesecond- or third-hand ties to a ter-rorist group, which could mean thatindustrial-grade explosives might be

available for the group to use in fu-ture attacks.

Note: A crucial consideration inevaluating this data is to ensure com-pliance with intelligence oversight re-quirements, and not store or depictany data that violates AR 381-10, U.S.Army Intelligence Activities, Ex-ecutive Order 12333, United StatesIntelligence Activities, and relatedregulatory requirements.

Finances. The third overlay (Fi-nances) depicts information availableon finances, business transactions,assets, and related issues. Nearlyeverything costs money and, as themaxim states, “follow the money.”The money trail leads through orga-nizations to people and equipment,which in turn helps provide an un-derstanding of the terrorist’s objec-tives and capabilities. Of particularimportance are reports pertaining tothe transfer of funds for training, ei-ther directly or via NGO surrogates.Again, this will come mostly fromHUMINT and SIGINT sources as wellas foreign and domestic law enforce-ment agencies and other interagencyreporting.

Personalities. The fourth overlay(Personalities) depicts the currentlocation of essential personnel withinthe terrorist organizations. Thesereports will at least include SIGINT,HUMINT, and some measurementand signature intelligence (MASINT)and IMINT (e.g., a photograph or asensor confirmed that a vehicle wasat a particular site at a specific time).When looking at the movement of in-dividuals, analysts should ask“Why?” All movement is risky; some-one can blow a person’s cover andinterdict vehicles, so why is he takingthis risk? Such risktaking can be anindicator in itself, while answering thequestion of “why?” may lead to otherissues and concerns.

Warnings. The fifth overlay (Warn-ings) shows where (by country) na-tional agencies issued warnings andadvisories, where previous attacksoccurred (if the security posture al-

lowed one attack to occur, will oth-ers follow?) and where authoritiesthwarted attacks because the adver-saries clearly intended something.These interdictions could includeconfiscation of arms shipments. Thewarning reports originate from all in-telligence disciplines and may in-clude law enforcement and otherinteragency information.

Convergence. Analysts may cre-ate additional overlays as needed.Because there are no doctrinal sym-bols for most of these overlays, ana-lysts will have to create their ownsymbols, and post a legend to de-fine them. Flexibility is paramount tosuccess. Similar to chess masters,analysts look for convergent lines toindicate the possibility of attack.Despite the adversary’s ability toproject into areas where they havenot previously conducted an attack,normally there are indicators graphi-cally depicted in two or more areas,(for example, to show movement ofimportant personalities, supplies,and funds).

The current doctrinal analyticaltools discussed above work well toexplain how something happened.The critical point, however, is to gobeyond the stage of describing his-tory to the essential point of predict-ing when, where, and how theadversaries will strike next. Gettingthere requires personal skill, time,experience, and dedication. Addition-ally, it will require analysts possess-ing access to all levels of reportingand analysts from different disci-plines who focus exclusively on thisform of analysis.

Other ConsiderationsOpen-Source Data. Regarding

open-source reporting, the ForeignBroadcast Information Service (FBIS)and Cable News Network (CNN) pro-vide some of the most readily acces-sible and timely reporting in theworld. Terrorists have been using pro-paganda, media manipulation, andother similar aspects of information


operations for a long time, as therequirement to gain popular supportis crucial to their success. Terroristorganizations need to “get the wordout” to legitimize their operations,actions, and positions. The trained,experienced analyst can exploit thisfact. For example, if a respected ter-rorist leader were to say somethinglike, “In the course of jihad, manyinnocents may have to be sacrificedfor the greater good of the will of Al-lah.” That could portend an attackwhere mass casualties might occur,and it might also mean that the at-tack might occur in an area whereIslam is a dominant religion.

An experienced analyst will con-sider numerous aspects including–

Timing of the pronouncement. (Isit a significant date, by either thesolar or lunar calendars?)Location. (Is this a culturally orreligiously significant site thatissued the pronouncement?)Important personalities whowere present (which may indi-cate support for the pronounce-ment, an end to differencesbetween the groups, etc.).Other factors.

There may be other similar cues inother public pronouncements, someof them web-based instead of tradi-tional newspaper and radio media.Just tracking the public pronounce-ments and postings, looking at themin detail, cross-referencing the an-nouncements with other data, andso forth, is a full-time job–whichmeans dedicating analysts to moni-tor these sites. There is a differencebetween the “normal” rhetoric andsomething that, in symbolic context,is genuinely a potential indicator.Again, deciphering these cues re-quires analysts who have the req-uisite experience and training, sothat the terrorism analysis sectiondoes not begin to suffer from the“chicken little” syndrome in theeyes of the senior intelligence of-ficer and the commander.

Visual Cues. Graphic aids arenothing more than visual cues tocheck the report details, develop re-quests for further information, andstudy the matter in greater detail. Nosystem or software can begin to dealwith these complex issues. Thegroup synergy and crosstalk derivedfrom experts in different disciplineslooking at the same data is whatmakes or breaks this effort. Addition-ally, having “broken the code” on whatthe adversary might be planning is,in itself, insufficient; the analyst mustpass data to the affected elements.Normally, at the commander andsenior intelligence officer levels, thistransmission will be via securevideoteleconference or similar meth-ods. Behind the scenes, analystsoften highlight a specific set of mes-sages for one another in daily se-cure E-mail crosstalk. Because theamount of reporting is so great, eachechelon has its own set of filters forsorting through the messages.When dealing with more than onethousand messages a day, it is easyfor someone to leave out or overlooksomething inadvertently. Cooperationis fundamental to success.

Because the level of detail requiredinvolves individuals, and may includesingle individuals to squad-sized el-ements (as employed in the 11 Sep-tember 2001 attacks), there isabsolutely no utility in developing tra-ditional decision-support templatesor similar tools. However, dependingon circumstances, location, ech-elon, and other considerations, theremay be utility in devising specificactivity-based templates for depict-ing possible courses of action, etc.Being in the loop for the daily datafeed exceeding one thousand mes-sages a day is an all-consumingbusiness. In my experience, thegraphics aid was an effective cue forconducting deeper analysis for con-verging lines.

When using the IPB-style graph-ics overlays, not only can this be asuccessful methodology, it also has

the additional advantage of servingas a briefing aid. Words alone, andreams of reports alone, can be con-fusing. Today’s senior intelligenceofficers are accustomed to acquir-ing data in visual icon form. Themethodology described herein lentitself to transitioning instantly fromconducting analysis to briefing thatanalysis in a manner in which theG2 was accustomed.

CountermeasuresThe final step is recommending

countermeasures. It is easy to de-velop a siege mentality, such as thatwhich existed throughout U.S. Armyelements stationed in the MiddleEast after the bombings of the Of-fice of the Program Manager, SaudiArabian National Guard (Riyadh) in1995, and the Khobar Towers(Dhahran in 1996) in Saudi Arabia.However, when everything is alwayson “high alert,” it defeats the purposeof the heightened alert status. In-stead of temporarily raising defenselevels, the defense level remained atthreat condition (THREATCON) Delta(now called force protection condi-tion or FPCON) for a prolonged pe-riod.

Such a prolonged state of high alerthad at the minimum the followingeffects:

Left open the potential for com-placency.Created a state where a new(stable) pattern nullified the in-tent of thwarting hostile surveil-lance efforts.Negatively impacted the localeconomy.

Consider the fact that when U.S.forces no longer engage in or stimu-late a local economy, the merchants(and their families, associates, etc.)have no further economic incentiveto having U.S. forces present. Whatmay then develop is a general atti-tude that is at best ambivalent to-wards U.S. forces; for if there is noperceived benefit for the presence of


U.S. forces, then it is a short movetowards resentment of the U.S. pres-ence. Once popular sentiment op-poses the presence of U.S. forces,it is difficult to regain good will. Froman intelligence perspective, it is use-ful to keep these economic consid-erations in mind when evaluating thethreat, the enemy’s ability to blendin with the local populace (will theybe reported for suspicious activity),and related factors.

The fear that “something might hap-pen” was so great in the Middle Eastafter the 1996 Khobar Towers attackthat Army intelligence and CI ele-ments sometimes found it difficult toleave the compound and performtheir missions. In fact, at least oneG2 proposed taking all of his intelli-gence collectors and agents and in-

corporating them into the analysiscell! Analysts, however, will havenothing to analyze if the collectorsdo not collect. To be effective, intelli-gence and CI assets need to leavethe compounds, and commandersmust provide them with the neces-sary freedom of movement as pre-scribed in AR 381-20, U.S. ArmyCounterintelligence. Risk man-agement must not become riskavoidance. Defensive postures andcountermeasures must change ap-propriate to the threat.Final Thoughts

The options and techniques de-tailed above are not radical. Our fun-damental analytical methodologiesare adequate to deal with this un-conventional threat, with only minoradjustments; if we grant ourselves

some flexibility, current doctrine willsuffice. The critical principle of trans-lating intelligence into viable optionsand recommendations for the com-mander to evaluate and implementremains unchanged.

Chief Warrant Officer Del Stewart is cur-rently serving as a Training Senior Writer,Doctrine Division, Directorate of CombatDevelopments, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen-ter and Fort Huachuca. Excluding his 12years of enlisted experience, some of hisassignments have included the 102d MIBattalion, Korea; Chief, Counter-terrorismAnalysis Section, 3d U.S. Army, FortMcPherson, Georgia; and the 501st MI Bat-talion, Dexheim, Germany (with 11 monthsin Bosnia supporting IFOR as the OCE Chieffor 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st ArmoredDivision). Readers can reach him via E-mail: [email protected] and by tele-phone at (520) 533-9968 or DSN 821-9968.


by Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC

Beirut, Mogadishu, Sarajevo,Medellin, and Monrovia are cities thatdraw our attention by their namesalone. The addition of a countryname is unnecessary. At times,these cities in chaos have imploded,ceasing to function as the highly or-ganized urban centers they oncewere, and descended into a bizarreworld of factional violence and war-lords. In the recent past, the UnitedStates has repeatedly called theU.S. Marine Corps (USMC) into ac-tion in these highly uncertain envi-ronments, and the future certainlyholds additional similar challengesas the world urbanizes. The USMChas recognized the growing require-ments for operations in an urbanenvironment and has undertakenconsiderable experimentation to pre-pare for the urbanized littoral of thenear future. This article presents les-sons learned regarding intelligenceoperations in Monrovia, Liberia, dur-ing my two-month assignment as theAssistant Intelligence Officer for the22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)(Special Operations Capable).

Commencing IntelligenceOperations

The starting point for intelligenceoperations in a city in chaos is thatno one—neither the theater joint in-telligence center (JIC) nor the deskofficers at the various national intel-ligence agencies—can tell you whatis going on in “your” city. The popu-lation density and number of fight-ers and factions in a contested majorcity are simply too high to permitaccurate situational awareness fromafar. Our nation’s highly developedtechnical collection capabilities fo-

cus on detecting observable activityand high-level communications.These indicator sets are completelyabsent in the typical city in chaos.The tactical intelligence officer (S2)on the scene is largely on his or herown to determine and “develop” thetactical situation in the city. Whilethis task is daunting, both nontradi-tional and traditional resources offergreat potential if properly exploited.

Initial coordination can provide valu-able knowledge of the situation froma number of people in the city. If youare lucky enough to be working in acity with a functioning United StatesEmbassy, start with the various ex-perts there. They are the DefenseAttaché Officer (DAO), the Chief ofStation (COS), and the RegionalSecurity Officer (RSO). Meet with

these individuals as soon as pos-sible, and listen to them. Establishground rules early to prevent turfbattles and the subsequent souringof these critical relationships. I rec-ommend informing these three offic-ers that they will receive a copy ofall products generated by the S2 andoffering them the opportunity to re-view any crucial outbound messagetraffic before transmission. This al-lays their concerns regarding poten-tially erroneous reporting by the newarrival and allows the S2 to receivethe benefit of their experience in thearea.

CollectionInformation collection in a city in

chaos is a highly challenging situa-tion. The S2 must aggressively pur-

Guinean T-55 of the Economic Community of Western African States(ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force passing in

front of the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. The United Nations ObserverMission in Liberia (UNOMIL) cooperated with the ECOMOG first sent to

Liberia as a peacekeeping force in 1990. (May 1996)

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sue all the numerous unconventionalsources of intelligence as well as themore common ones.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT).This is the best intelligence source inthe city. Tactical units ashore will prob-ably not have the time, resources, orfreedom of movement to develop high-level sources. They should rely on theestablished in-country agencies toprovide this reporting and should fo-cus on the numerous targets of op-portunity including evacuees,refugees, expatriates who were inbusiness (most of whom have exten-sive contacts), journalists, relief work-ers, nongovernmental organizations(NGOs). All of these individuals haveinsight and move around the city inthe course of their daily business.

Casual debriefing, generally pleas-ant with frequent conversation, is thebest way to collect information fromthese sources. A smiling face, a literof bottled water, and genuine interestwill yield extensive information. Mapsand photographs will help enablethese sources to be specific in theirreporting as they respond to questions

such as “Which intersection?” “Whathouse?” and “What bridge?” As theintelligence personnel establish rela-tionships with these people, the S2will establish a net of observers locatedthroughout the city. If the telephonesystem is still functional (and it fre-quently is), the S2 should develop anoverlay showing the locations of thesesources and their telephone numbers.A quick phone call to the trustedsource that lives in a high-rise build-ing in a conflictive neighborhood willyield more information than a hundredE-mail messages to Washington,D.C. Making and maintaining manyfriends is critical to this effort.

Everyone who leaves the compoundshould periodically undergo regulardebriefing. Detecting changes in thecity’s rhythm through its traffic andpedestrian patterns, the mood of thepopulace, and the number of men inthe marketplace should be the focusof these debriefings.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).While SIGINT is a source of greatpotential, this is a fundamentally dif-ferent environment from the classical

high-intensity combat scenario. Themost rewarding signals in a city aretypically from low-power handheld ra-dios and cellular telephones in use bycombatants and the functioning pub-lic services. Surprisingly, fire andambulance services continue to op-erate in extreme conditions, and aidagencies frequently establish commu-nications nets to coordinate their ac-tivities. Collection in an urbanenvironment requires 24-hour accessto these low-power signals, andSIGINT personnel are a critical ele-ment of the force ashore. The vol-ume of traffic and the necessity ofimmediate tactical analysis makethis a particularly intensive and tir-ing task. There must be immediatedissemination procedures in place topermit rapid warning to the force, atopic addressed in detail below.

Open-Source Information. Com-mercial or factional radio broadcastsare a highly important source of infor-mation, and the S2 must quickly iden-tify which faction controls each radiostation, and monitor them at all times.The factions and dissident groups usethese stations to keep their support-ers informed, and we can acquire agreat deal of information from them.Of course, it is only prudent to exer-cise great caution in accepting radioreports. The intelligence officer shouldtreat them as just another source ofinformation, a source to fuse with datafrom others. The careful analyst willnote how often he receives HUMINTreports that are nothing more than rep-etition of broadcast radio reports—classic circular reporting.

Be Aware. Hard work is necessaryto detect critical indicators that es-tablish normal levels of activity. Anessential element of this program isregular personal reconnaissance bythe S2. To the maximum extent con-sistent within the force protection pos-ture, the S2 and essential analystsmust move around the city daily togain familiarity with the ground and thecity’s tempo. Once the S2 attains fa-miliarity, he should escort the various

The author on the roof of the U.S. Embassy. From this position wefused listening to the sounds of the fighting with SIGINT in our initial

effort to associate signals with specific parts of the city and factions.(April 1996)


unit commanders around the city,highlighting the indicators of “nor-malcy,” and the various factional en-claves and friction points in the city.

Everyone Can Help. The great-est collector in the organization isthe individual Marine standing hispost. Encourage all personnel toestablish the norms of activity in theirvicinities and to report anything outof the ordinary. For example, the factthat the women did not make theirusual dawn journey to the well acrossthe street could be a critical indica-tor of impending combat operations.Our snipers and reconnaissanceMarines excelled at this task, as onewould expect of trained observers.By careful observation, one can iden-tify individuals and specific vehiclesof interest. The S2 can then consultthe network of friends to develop across-index of names, faces, andassociated vehicles. Fusing this in-formation with SIGINT to identify spe-cific leaders operating near the U.S.force is the next step. Indications ofsurveillance activity against U.S.forces constitute an immediate re-porting requirement for all observers.Maintenance of detailed observationlogs at all observation posts (OPs)will yield trend data for analysis andensures high standards of vigilance.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).The most useful imagery product inan urban environment is a large for-mat, hard-copy print of the entire city.The S2 shop and the subordinatecommanders’ command posts are illequipped without these prints—theyshould be on prominent display andform the basis of reference for op-erations in the city. One can overlaya grid system on the photos thatmatch the projection of the maps inuse, if gridded reference products arenot available. A further refinement isto establish a standardized number-ing system to label all structures incontested areas. This is a criticalaspect of establishing effective re-porting procedures from OPs. EachOP must have diagrams listing the

reference number for each buildingand overhead imagery to enable theobserver to know what is on the otherside of adjacent buildings out of hissight.

AnalysisI have described some of the

sources of information available inthe city. The volume of reporting gen-erated by an active collection effortis immense. A successful effort willyield a mosaic-like portrayal of thecity with significant gaps in the pic-ture. Sifting through the reports andassembling a coherent understand-ing of the situation in the city is adaunting task requiring the focusedeffort of the best minds in the S2 el-ement. The first place to start pre-paring for this challenge is the library.Analysts must fully absorb culturalinformation, an area in which the in-telligence community rarely excels.Consult popular literature, periodi-cals, social histories, travelogues,and even fiction to develop at least apartial understanding of the culturewithin which the force is operating.The next step is a thorough study ofthe origin of the situation at hand andthe historical precedents for opera-tions in the city in question. One canbe sure that the various factions op-erating in the area have done theirhomework and understand what hashappened in the city in the past. Ouranalyst is playing catch-up and mustturn to the task with great intensity.

The focus of our analytical effortmust be to provide predictive intelli-gence to the supported force and itscommander. The goal is to preventsurprise and promote situationalawareness. Simply put, analyticalduties are extremely important andwe should not frequently rotate ana-lysts in and out of the city. Theyshould be completely immersed andremain committed to the operationuntil its conclusion or the end of theirlong-term rotations. Short-term rota-tion of analytical personnel will re-sult in unacceptable situationalawareness and an increased poten-

tial for missing essential indicators.Finally, do not forget the force multi-pliers available in the various officesof the embassy. Consult with theavailable experts and learn from theirexperiences in the city.

Dissemination: Disseminationmust reach down to the individuallevel. The S2 should issue updatesin written form twice daily, preferablyon a schedule that will support regu-lar updates by subordinate com-manders as part of their dailyroutines. The force must establishprocedures for the rapid dissemina-tion of time-sensitive information.SIGINT indicators of impendingthreats will frequently occur withinminutes of the event; the intelligenceelement must broadcast warningsimmediately to all posts for appro-priate action. Detailed information re-garding the source of the report isunnecessary, and the S2 must ag-gressively employ report sanitiza-tion.

ConclusionIn conclusion, operating in cities in

chaos presents unique challengesfor the intelligence officer. Aggressiveexploitation of nontraditional sourcesof information, cultural awareness,careful cultivation of friendships andrelationships, full coordination within-country experts, and extensive dis-semination to the lowest levels arethe formula for success. Do not ex-pect anyone at the theater Joint In-telligence Center or in Washington,D.C., to tell you what is going onthree blocks away. Getting that in-formation is the S2’s job.

Major Paul Shelton is a Marine intelligenceofficer currently serving with the MarineForces-Atlantic in the G3/5 Future Opera-tions and Plans Section. He is a recentgraduate of the Marine Corps School ofAdvanced Warfighting. He wrote this ar-ticle while attending the U.S. Army Com-mand and General Staff College and basedit on his two-month assignment in 1996 asthe Assistant Intelligence Officer for 22dMarine Expeditionary Unit (Special Opera-tions Capable).


by Chief Warrant Officer FourThomas J. Quedensley,NE ARNGAt one time, the primary imagery in-telligence (IMINT) threat to the UnitedStates was from the former SovietUnion. Now, through the proliferationof space-based, multispectral imag-ing systems for profit, nations and or-ganizations that previously lackedaccess to these imagery products canuse them.

The most important thing toremember is that any nation,organization, or individualwith the means to pay for theimagery may now acquire it.

The commercial space imagerymarket has developed high-resolu-tion imaging technology that hasboth civilian and military applica-tions. This technology has made itlargely unnecessary for many poten-tial adversaries to have their ownimaging capabilities. The Defense In-telligence Agency (DIA) has pub-lished a list of operational andintelligence functions that commer-cial MSI systems can support. TheAgency’s involvement in military ex-ercises has demonstrated the util-ity of MSI and helped define therequirements for multispectral data.DIA applications supported by MSIinclude broad-area search, contin-gency planning, counternarcotics,counterterrorism, current opera-tions, disaster relief, environmentalmonitoring, hydrography, targeting,treaty monitoring, mapping, charting,and resource monitoring.

During the past decade, the U.S.military has acquired commercialsatellite imagery to supplementnational technical means. This

combination has helped place themost current, accurate, and com-prehensive knowledge of terrainand infrastructure quickly into thehands of mission planners. TheU.S. military successfully em-ployed commercial imagery duringthe Gulf War, and support missionsin Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. MSI isgenerally timelier than other com-mercial systems, may be the onlyinformation available in the earlystages of a crisis or emergency,and it is often the fastest way toassess post-conflict damage andplan for reconstruction.

The most important thing to remem-ber is that any nation, organization,or individual with the means to pay forthe imagery may now acquire it. Fora relatively small investment, a some-what unsophisticated organizationcan develop a workable and usefulimagery analysis capability withoutestablishing an expensive and com-plicated infrastructure. This capabil-ity will only improve as costsdecrease and hardware and softwareimprove. “Space imagery is going tobe part of the intelligence trade forthe other 190 countries that haven’thad access to it,” says John Pikeof the Federation of American Sci-entists in Washington, D.C.1

MSI System ReviewMSI’s analytical potential results

from the sensor’s ability to measureboth the visible and non-visible wave-lengths of the electromagnetic (EM)spectrum, and it frequently revealsmore about an object than analyz-ing an image in only one wavelengthband can. Remote-sensing satel-lites often carry one or more imag-ing sensors on-board, eachproviding data with unique charac-teristics and applications:

“ Multispectral scanners (MSSs)sense energy in several narrowspectral bands simultaneously.These bands range from the ul-traviolet to the infrared portionof the EM spectrum.

“ The Thematic Mapper (TM) is anadvanced MSS designed toachieve higher image resolution,sharper spectral separation, andgreater radiometric accuracy incomparison to MSS. Thermalscanners sense only the ther-mal portion of the spectrum.

“ Panchromatic or “PAN” imageryprovides an image in the visibleportion of the spectrum. This im-agery essentially provides ahigh-resolution, black-and-whiteimage of the targeted facility orarea.

“ Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)uses its own emitted energy torecord characteristics of the ter-rain. Because atmosphere andweather have little effect on theseradar systems, SAR imagery pro-vides day-or-night and all-weatherimaging capabilities.

Unlike traditional photographiccameras, MSSs record data in a digi-tal format that we can store, manipu-late, enhance, and print out on film.The resulting imagery products cansupport a variety of imaging applica-tions:

“ Image analysis is helpful for tar-get area studies, broad-areasearch, or other applicationsrequiring wide-area enhancedimagery. Different band configu-rations can enhance variousterrain features. Users can “geo-reference” these images to a spe-cific mapping projection toprovide current mapping datawhere either no maps or out-dated maps are available.

“ Change detection is a spectralanalysis technique that com-pares two reference images and

The Commercial Satellite MultispectralImagery (MSI) Threat


highlights the changes or lackof change between them.

“ Perspective view imaging is athree-dimensional image simu-lating the view of a given pointfrom a specified position, alti-tude, and direction.

“ A mosaic image uses two ormore adjacent MSI images, pro-viding contiguous coverage of aspecific area of interest.

“ Terrain-categorized (TERCAT)imagery is a color-coded imagein which the pixels representvarious spectral groups such asforest, agriculture, water, andurban areas. The resulting im-age is useful in determining ter-rain categories and analyzingthe area for trafficability.

Commercial MSI is available from avariety of space-based sensors. (SeeFigure 1.)

CapabilitiesMost commercial imaging satel-

lites share common orbital charac-teristics, including near-polar andsun-synchronous orbits. Sun-syn-chronous orbits take advantage ofthe early morning skies, which aregenerally clearer than those later inthe day, and provide repeatable sunillumination. With each orbit, the

satellite progresses westward,tracking the sun’s progress. There-fore, the satellite crosses the equa-tor at approximately the same localtime, with slightly later crossings inthe northern latitudes and slightlyearlier crossings in the southern lati-tudes. The French SPOT (SystemProbatoire d’Observation de LaTerre) 2, for example, descendsacross the equator at 10:30 A.M. lo-cal time, while the U.S. Landsat 5crosses the equator at 9:45 A.M lo-cal time.

Landsat 7 orbits the earth every 98minutes, and it requires 16 days forits orbital pattern to progress west-ward to repeat, or revisit, a point ofcoverage. This revisit capability isimportant in two respects—it in-creases the potential frequency ofcoverage of areas where cloud coveris a problem and provides an oppor-tunity for viewing certain areas onsuccessive days. The developmentof sensors that operators can pointenables off-nadir viewing during thesatellite passes. The French SPOT2 has a 103-minute orbital patternthat revisits a given location every26 days. The off-nadir revisit time,using its pointable scanner, is just3 days.

Combinations of collection sys-tems with different resolutions canproduce a more useful product. Forexample, the current Landsat 7 TMsystem has 30-meter resolution andis suitable for an image map at ascale of 1:100,000. If one mergedthe same data with the French SPOTPAN image with 10-meter resolution,the resulting product could serve asa 1:25,000 image map. Today, com-mercial satellite imagery can accu-rately map more than 90 percent ofthe world, with a ground resolutionof 10 meters or less.

The MSI MarketThe commercial imagery market

is likely to continue to grow as ad-ditional countries and private com-panies enter the arena. Accordingto officials of the companies devel-oping the next generation of MSIsystems, the biggest near-termmarket will not be urban plannersand scientists but defense minis-tries. Company officials view thedefense market as one way of mak-ing their investments pay. The pur-chase of increasing amounts ofcommercial data by defense and in-telligence groups “is a given,” ac-cording to the Director of The NorthAmerican Remote-Sensing Indus-tries Association.2

Generally, imagery products areavailable for sale by arrangementsbetween satellite imaging providersand companies which establishground stations for the receipt of rawdata. These companies (domesticand foreign) pay for the exclusiverights to process and sell the datain their respective regions. A clientpurchase of imaging services nor-mally covers a specific number ofimages for an area. All other imagesobtained are then available for dis-tribution by the company to anybuyer.

Any state can negotiate a “sensed-state provision,” giving them the rightto request and receive the raw dataof images at a reasonable fee to pre-

Figure 1. Some Government-Sponsored and Commerical Remote-Sensing Satellites.

SpatialSatellite Owner/Operator Resolution

CBERS Brazilian/Chinese Governments 20-160 meters RADARSAT Canadian Government 8-30 metersERS-1/2 European Space Agency (ESA) 30 metersIKONOS Space Imaging, U.S. Commercial 1-4 metersIRS-1C Indian Government 10 metersEROS-1 Israeli Government 1.8 metersJERS SAR Japanese Government 18 metersSPOT-1/2 French Commercial 10-20 metersAlmaz-2 Russian Government 5 metersResurs-02 Russian Government 27 metersSPIN-2 Russian Government 2 metersLandsat 5-TM U.S. Government 30-120 metersLandsat 7 U.S. Government 15-60 metersOrbView-2 Orbital Image, U.S. Commercial 1 km

SpatialSatellite Owner/Operator Resolution

CBERS Brazilian/Chinese Governments 20-160 meters RADARSAT Canadian Government 8-30 metersERS-1/2 European Space Agency (ESA) 30 metersIKONOS Space Imaging, U.S. Commercial 1-4 metersIRS-1C Indian Government 10 metersEROS-1 Israeli Government 1.8 metersJERS SAR Japanese Government 18 metersSPOT-1/2 French Commercial 10-20 metersAlmaz-2 Russian Government 5 metersResurs-02 Russian Government 27 metersSPIN-2 Russian Government 2 metersLandsat 5-TM U.S. Government 30-120 metersLandsat 7 U.S. Government 15-60 metersOrbView-2 Orbital Image, U.S. Commercial 1 km


clude others from buying them. AsGilbert Rye, President of OrbimageSciences Corporation, explains,“... ifa regional partner has areas it con-siders sensitive and prefers not tohave imagery of those areas widelydisseminated, we’re willing to enter intothat kind of arrangement.”3

In 1994, the Clinton Administration,fearful of foreign economic competi-tion, decided that private companiescould build and launch satellites withhigh-resolution sensors previouslyavailable only to the intelligencecommunity. These companies couldthen provide the resulting imageryon the global market. Several satel-lite imaging firms began developingsatellites with 1-meter or better reso-lution. Recently, Space Imaging,Inc., has successfully launched itsIKONOS satellite capable of 1-meterresolution PAN images.

Other countries are also enteringthe high-resolution marketplace.Russia is already selling 2-meter-resolution images from former mili-tary satellites, and France, Israel,and Japan plan to market high-reso-lution imagery. By 2003, 14 satel-lites capable of producing 1-meterresolution images should be opera-tional (see Figure 2).

Assessment of IMINT RisksForeign intelligence agencies are

among the largest buyers of high-resolution images. “International se-curity issues are serious,” accordingto Ray Williamson, a senior re-searcher at the George WashingtonUniversity Space Policy Institute.“Iraq would be interested in informa-tion about Saudi Arabia. Iran wouldlike to see data about Israel. Indiaand Pakistan would like to have in-formation about each other.”4 If a na-tion had concerns about troopbuildup on its border, it could put ina standing order for the satellite totake pictures every time it passedover the border.

During future conflicts, this greateraccess could lessen the information

advantage the United States now hasover other countries. The U.S. militaryenvisions a much smaller force on theground in the future, and is countingon information dominance to gain thequick advantage and break anenemy’s will to fight. Nations beyondthe first tier of military powers will, forthe first time, have access to viablesatellite imaging capabilities resultingin a decrease in the potential for U.S.military forces to achieve strategic sur-prise and dominance. “It will changeoperations. Tactical surprise will bemore difficult to achieve,” states Mar-tin Faga, former head of the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO).5 Thenew generation of high-resolution sat-ellites can make it possible to iden-tify the exact type of aircraft on anairfield or a specific type of missilesite.

Operational SecurityThe international community, de-

spite its best efforts, finds it in-creasingly more difficult to controland regulate the spread of ad-vanced technologies that have mili-tary and terrorist uses. Theseattempts at regulation, or “shuttercontrol,” mean that the govern-ments reserve the right to prohibitcommercial satellite companiesfrom distributing or gathering im-agery of any area deemed impor-tant to national security. Whenasked to comment on proposed“shutter control” legislation, Cana-

Figure 2. Potential Commerical Satellites withOne-Meter Resolution by 2003.

dian Defense Minister ArthurEggleton said—

As modern remote-sensing sat-ellites can produce imagerywhose quality approaches thatobtained from specialized intel-ligence satellites, we must en-sure that the data produced byCanadian satellites cannot beused to the detriment of ournational security and that of ourallies.6

U.S. commercial imagery provid-ers collect MSI in accordance withan “open skies” principle. Thismeans that other nations can havenondiscriminatory access to datacollected anywhere in the world.The U.S. Government has draftedregulations containing a number ofprovisions that would enable it torestrict, even commandeer, privateimagery sensing capabilities forpurposes of national security, for-eign policy, and international obli-gations. Other nations are alsotaking steps toward legislation thatwould give their governments “shut-ter control.”

ConclusionThe current commercial satellite

imagery industry can provide a po-tentially adversarial nation or groupwith the capabilities to acquire andanalyze MSI and potentially erodeU.S. battlefield information domi-nance. Mission planners and field

Operator Number of Satellites Launched and Planned

Space Imaging (U.S.)EarthWatch (U.S.)OrbView (U.S.)West Indian Space (U.S.-Israel)RussiaIndiaSouth Korea

1999 2000 2001 2002 200312

1 11 1 3 1

111

Operator Number of Satellites Launched and Planned

Space Imaging (U.S.)EarthWatch (U.S.)OrbView (U.S.)West Indian Space (U.S.-Israel)RussiaIndiaSouth Korea

1999 2000 2001 2002 200312

1 11 1 3 1

111


commanders must be aware thatprospective adversaries now haveimagery acquisition capabilitiessimilar to their own and may havecomparable analytical capabilitiesas well.

What can we do to counter thisthreat? First, we must rememberthat the commercial MSI risk isstrategic rather than tactical. MSIallows us to detect activities,study target and terrain character-istics, and monitor equipment andfacilities. MSI gives a potentialadversary the means to conduct amore precise and detailed study offuture areas of operations. Sec-ond, the imagery capabilities ofcommercial MSI alone cannot ful-fill an adversary’s intelligence re-quirements. Commercial MSI cansupport or trigger other information-gathering activity while high-reso-lution commercial imagery will give

Defense News, 30 June-6 July 1997,page 4.

3. Interview with Gilbert Rye, SpaceNews, 29 September-5 October 1997,page 22.

4. Graham, Mary, “High ResolutionUnresolved,” The Atlantic Monthly,July 1996.

5. Holzer, Robert, “Tactical Surprise MayBe Obsolete,” Defense News, 3 April2000, page 1.

6. Berger, Brian and Pugliese, David,“Canada Aims To Control CommercialSpace Images,” Defense News, 12 July1999, page 18.

Chief Warrant Officer Four ThomasQuedensley, NE ARNG, has more than 20years of combined active and reserve duty.He is currently serving as the All-SourceIntelligence Technician (350B) for the3436th Military Intelligence Detachment(Production Group), USAR, Lincoln, Ne-braska. Readers may contact him by tele-phone at (402) 471-4486 or by E-mail [email protected].

other nations a better understand-ing of probable U.S. capabilities.

The introduction of newer, moresophisticated commercial MSI sys-tems will increase the future IMINTthreat. Groups or nations seekingto exploit this newfound informa-tion need only to invest in ground-based processing systems,high-order software, and analyticalskills. We should always be mind-ful that the eyes of passing satel-lites will be watching most of ourfuture operations.

Endnotes1. Hanley, Colleen and Messina, Joe“Commercial Satellite Imaging Helps DODMaintain the Peace,” Defense &Security Electronics, February 1996,page 28.

2. De Selding, Peter B, “Satellite FirmsShift To Military As Market For Images”,

Satellite Imagery, photo of Serbia.


by Captain Fred Hoffman, USAR

In early 1975, candidate JimmyCarter declared that, if elected presi-dent, he would order the withdrawalof all U.S. ground forces from theKorean peninsula. Less than a weekafter his inauguration, PresidentCarter vigorously moved to keep hiscampaign pledge. For two and a halfyears thereafter, in the face of in-creasing opposition, President Carterremained steadfast in his determi-nation to withdraw all U.S. groundforces from Korea by 1981. In July1979, however, after only 3,600 U.S.troops had been withdrawn, Presi-dent Carter grudgingly announcedthe suspension of further troop with-drawals. This article examines therole intelligence played in his sup-port in 1975 for the complete with-drawal of U.S. ground forces, his1977 policy decision as President tocarry out this withdrawal, and hisreluctant decision in 1979 to scuttlethe plan.

President Carter’s intention to with-draw U.S. ground forces from Koreawas first publicly enunciated in Janu-ary 1975, during the early days ofhis candidacy; one should considerit within the context of events andcircumstances during the period be-tween his candidacy and inaugura-tion. In April 1975, communist forcescaptured Saigon. In addition to wres-tling with morale, race, and sub-stance abuse problems, the U.S.military at the time suffered from lowpublic esteem and consequent re-cruiting difficulties. In the wake of theVietnam conflict, the U.S. economycontinued to reel from the long-termeffects of our “guns and butter” poli-cies, a situation exacerbated by the1973 oil crisis. In the mid-1970s,given the sad experience of Vietnamand economic problems at home,most of Congress and the elector-

ate supported a U.S. retrenchmentin Asia. A May 1976 poll conductedby the Foreign Policy Associationrevealed majority support for thegradual removal of U.S. Forces inKorea.1 Six months later, the Wash-ington Post broke the news that theU.S. Government was investigatingan alleged influence-peddling cam-paign conducted by the South Ko-rean Government against electedU.S. officials, further reducing popu-lar support for the U.S. military pres-ence in South Korea.2 “Koreagate,”as the press quickly labeled briberyscandal, only worsened the tarnishedimage of a South Korean Governmentalready repeatedly lambasted forhuman rights abuses.3

Another significant factor contrib-uting to support for reduction of theU.S. military presence was thechanging balance of military andeconomic power on the Korean Pen-insula. After peaking at 360,000 dur-ing the Korean War, U.S. troop levelshovered around 60,000 throughoutthe 1950s and 1960s. During thosetwo decades, rapid growth in SouthKorean economic and militarystrength caused some U.S. officialsto favor reducing U.S. forces there.In 1970, President Richard Nixonwithdrew one of the two divisions thenbased in Korea, reducing U.S. mili-tary personnel from 60,000 to40,000.4

Despite the initiation of an inter-Korean dialogue in 1972, militarytensions remained high on the pen-insula throughout the early- to mid-1970s. North Korea seized a U.S.naval ship, the USS Pueblo, in 1968.In late 1974, the first North Koreantunnel was discovered underneaththe demilitarized zone (DMZ) be-tween the Koreas and a second tun-nel a few months later. In April 1976,intelligence reports revealed that

Chinese officials had cautioned KimIl Sung, then President of the Demo-cratic People’s Republic of Korea(North Korea), against launching anattack on South Korea.5 In August1976, North Korean troops attackedand killed members of a U.S. mili-tary work party in the DMZ.

As Director of Central Intelligence(DCI) in the outgoing Ford Adminis-tration, George Bush made severaltrips to Plains, Georgia, in 1976 tobrief candidate (and then President-Elect) Carter on intelligence issues.Mr. Bush found President Carter tobe attentive, but distrustful of theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA).6

Given the tenacity with which Presi-dent Carter later clung to his troopwithdrawal policy, one might haveexpected him to demonstrate a keeninterest in any intelligence regardingKorea. Surprisingly, this was not thecase. In fact, Don Oberdorfer writesthat President-Elect Carter turneddown a proposed CIA briefing onKorea, and during his administrationrarely attended National SecurityCouncil (NSC) discussions regard-ing Korea.7 Not only did intelligenceplay little or no apparent role in Presi-dent Carter’s decision to withdrawU.S. ground forces from South Ko-rea, neither former President Carternor any of his advisors have ever iden-tified an intelligence basis for thewithdrawal decision.8

Troop Withdrawal DecisionOn 26 January 1977, six days af-

ter his inauguration, President Carterissued Presidential Review Memo-randum 13 (PRM 13) Korea. Inresponse, Richard Holbrooke, Presi-dent Carter’s newly designated As-sistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs, formed theinteragency East Asia InformalGroup (EAIG) to conduct this review.Members of the EAIG were shocked


when Secretary of State Cyrus R.Vance soon passed on guidancefrom the White House that the groupshould not study whether to withdrawground forces, but merely how to doso. William Gleysteen, an EAIGmember who later became Carter’sambassador to the Republic of Ko-rea (ROK), writes:

Angered by this news, we endedthe first meeting with a mutinousagreement about how to deal withthis White House dictate. Someparticipants threatened to refuseto cooperate; others threatenedto publicize the issue, perhapsby way of Congress. The angry,fractious session ended in bu-reaucratic chaos.9

The ripples from the shock first feltby the EAIG quickly extended notonly to dismayed U.S. military andintelligence officials but also to U.S.allies Japan and the ROK. Neithercountry had been consulted by anyU.S. officials before PresidentCarter’s decision.

As a candidate running in the firstpresidential election sinceWatergate, Jimmy Carter clearlybenefited from his independence fromthe Washington establishment. AsPresident, however, his lack of con-nections inside the Washington“Beltway,” in particular among de-fense and intelligence professionals,turned his much-touted outsider sta-tus into a liability. Despite havinggraduated from the U.S. Naval Acad-emy, Jimmy Carter did not haveclose ties to the military establish-ment. Sam Sarkesian observed dur-ing the latter part of the Carterpresidency, “National security re-mains the prime province of militaryexperts and civilian specialists whotend to develop a legitimacy be-cause of their expertise—an exper-tise, it might be added, upon whichmost Presidents depend.”10 Through-out his presidency, he held both hisDCI and the intelligence communityat arm’s length. National Security

Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski effec-tively neutralized President Carter’sDCI, Stansfield Turner, by limiting hisaccess to the President.11 When theCarter Administration announced thewithdrawal plan, Mr. Turner was toair his misgivings about the plan ata special NSC meeting. PresidentCarter was unmoved by his DCI’spleas.12

Despite strong misgivings evenamong his closest advisors, JimmyCarter doggedly pressed ahead withhis troop withdrawal plan.

From the beginning of the CarterAdministration in 1977 untilmid-1979, the conduct of Ameri-can policy toward Korea wasencumbered by fundamentalopposition within the bureau-cracy (both civilian and military)and the Congress (both Repub-licans and Democrats) to thepresident’s efforts to withdrawall U.S. ground forces from Ko-rea.13

Examining President Carter’s de-cision-making style, Vincent Davisin 1979 made three observationsthat partially explain this phenom-enon:14

! He preferred written briefings,which reduced the ability ofstaffers to plead their casesbefore him.

! He tended to rush into deci-sions without any long-termplan or vision.

! He placed a premium on per-sonal loyalty, and preferredworking with just a handful oftrusted advisors.

Carter’s inner circle tightly con-trolled who, and what, the Presi-dent saw. The critical playersinvolved in formulating policy to-ward the ROK during the Carteryears were Secretary of StateCyrus Vance, Secretary of De-fense Harold Brown, National Se-curity Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,and the EAIG. Years later, Secre-tary Vance, Secretary Brown, and

Advisor Brzezinski all professedto have personally opposed thewithdrawal plan, but at the timethey all loyally carried out thepresident’s instructions with re-spect to it.15 By contrast, whenMajor General John Singlaub, theChief of Staff of U.S. Forces inKorea, told a reporter in May 1977that the withdrawal plan would leadto war, President Carter promptlyfired him.16 This event galvanizedcongressional opposition to theplan, opposition which steadilygrew during the next two years.

While his advisors agonized overhow to dissuade the Presidentwithout appearing disloyal, the in-telligence community continued toexploit newly available satellite im-agery capabilities to examine theNorth Korean ground force strengthmore closely. As early as May1975, John Armstrong, a WestPoint graduate and Vietnam vet-eran working as a civilian imageryanalyst at Fort Meade, Maryland,observed the existence of manymore North Korean tanks than hadpreviously been reported.

Within a few weeks, Armstrongidentified an entirely new tank di-vision (about 270 tanks and 100 ar-mored personnel carriers) in avalley about fifty miles north of theDMZ. Before Armstrong’s involve-ment, there had been little effortto compare the overall strength ofNorth Korean units in the latestpictures with those of previousmonths or years. Armstrong’s firstintensive study, completed in De-cember 1975, reported that theNorth Korean tank forces wereabout 80 percent larger than previ-ously estimated. Armed with thisalarming finding, he persuaded theArmy to assign six more full-timeanalysts to his project. During thenext two years, his team docu-mented the development of NorthKorean special forces units—whichwere training on mock-ups of SouthKorean highways and terrain—and


a major increase in the number andforward deployment of North Ko-rean artillery.17

By mid-1978, U.S. imagery ana-lysts had not only concluded thatNorth Korean tank forces were 80percent larger than previously be-lieved but also determined thatNorth Korean maneuver battalionsactually outnumbered South Ko-rean forces by an alarming two-to-one (2:1) ratio. In January 1979,these classified findings wereleaked to the media. Within tendays, Democratic Senators Rob-ert C. Byrd, Gary Hart, and SamuelA. Nunn, Jr., of the Senate ArmedServices Committee, joined withtheir Republican colleagues Sena-tors William S. Cohen and JohnTower to endorse suspension of fur-ther troop withdrawals.18 On 20January 1979, President Carter is-sued PRM 45 U.S. Policy TowardKorea, calling for a new policy re-view of the withdrawal plan. On 20July 1979, he grudgingly an-nounced the suspension of all fur-ther troop withdrawals until thecompletion of a review of the mili-tary balance on the Korean Penin-sula. Ronald Reagan’s defeat ofJimmy Carter in the 1980 presiden-tial election put the final nail in thecoffin of President Carter’s stub-bornly defended troop withdrawalplan.

ConclusionThis case study demonstrates

that even the most timely, accu-rate, and compelling intelligenceinformation can be of limited valueif policy-makers choose to ignoreit. The study also underlines thecritical importance of communica-tions and trust between the Presi-dent of the United States, hisadvisors, and Executive Branchintelligence agencies. If a presi-dent distrusts his intelligence ad-visors and their subordinateorganizations, his receptivity to-ward the information they providewill be limited. An abundance of

intelligence information on Koreawas available to Jimmy Carterwhen he was both President-Electand President. However, due to thecombination of his leadership style,personality traits, outsider status,and innate distrust of the intelli-gence community, intelligence in-formation played a minor role in hisdecision-making on the troop with-drawal issue. The extent of Presi-dent Carter ’s reluctance toabandon his withdrawal plan, andthe depth of his distrust for the in-telligence community, are revealedin a 1999 statement he made tolong-time Washington Post corre-spondent Don Oberdorfer. Fully twodecades after scrapping his plan,Carter voiced suspicion to Oberdorferthat the 1978 intelligence commu-nity findings on North Korean mili-tary strength had actually beenmanipulated by the Defense Intelli-gence Agency.19 Had the UnitedStates removed all ground troops fromSouth Korea during Carter’s presi-dency, especially so soon after theU.S. defeat in Vietnam, it is conceiv-able that North Korean leader Kim IlSung could have interpreted this as agreen light to reunify the Korean Pen-insula by force of arms.

Endnotes

1. Jan, George P. “The United States,China and Japan,” in Defense Policyand the Presidency: Carter’s FirstYears, Sarkesian, Sam C., Editor(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1979), page 293.

2. Oberdorfer, Don, The Two Koreas: AContemporary History (Reading,Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997),page 92.

3. Gleysteen Jr., William H., MassiveEntanglement, Marginal Influence:Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washing-ton, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999),page 3.

4. Bandow, Doug, “Korea: The Case forDisengagement,” Cato Institute PolicyAnalysis, Number 96, 8 December 1987,URL <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa096.html>, accessed 8 January 2000.

5. Davis, Zachary S., et. al., Proceduraland Jurisdictional Questions

Regarding Possible Normalizationof Relations With North Korea,”CRS Report for Congress, 94-933S(Washington, DC: CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Con-gress, 29 November 1994), page 5.

6. Andrew, Christopher, For thePresident’s Eyes Only: SecretIntelligence and the AmericanPresidency from Washington toBush (New York: Harper CollinsPublishers, 1995), page 426.

7. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, page85.

8. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, page85.

9. Gleysteen, page 23.

10. Sarkesian, Sam C. “Introduction,” inDefense Policy and the Presi-dency,” page 13.

11. Andrew, page 430.

12. Oberdorfer, Don, “Carter’s Decisionon Korea Traced Back to January,1975,” Washington Post, 12 June1977, page A15.

13. Gleysteen, page 6.

14. Davis, Vincent, “The President andthe National Security Apparatus,” inDefense Policy and the Presidency,pages 66-67.

15. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas,page 90.

16. Wilson, George C. “House PanelBegins ‘Frontal Assault’ on KoreaPolicy,” Washington Post, 26 May1977, page A1.

17. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas,pages 101-102.

18. Wilson, George C. “Troop With-drawal from South Korea Too Risky atPresent, Senators Say,” WashingtonPost, 24 January 1977, page A3.

19. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas,page 103.

CPT Fred Hoffman, a Human Intelli-gence Officer is assigned to the JointReserve Unit , Defense Intel l igenceAgency, holds a Master of Arts in AsianStudies (Chinese) from the University ofMichigan (’83). He is a recent graduateof the Postgraduate Intelligence Programfor Reservists (PGIP-R) from the JointMilitary Intelligence College. In his ci-vilian capacity, CPT Hoffman works asa contractor providing analytical supportto a Department of Defense agency. Youcan contact CPT Hoffman by e-mail at:[email protected].


by Captain John C. Bento,CA ARNG AGR

Building on their successful“Warfighter ’98 exercise” (WFX 98),the U.S. Army National Guard(ARNG), 40th Infantry Division (ID)Mechanized (M), kicked it up anotch in June 1999 by fighting asthe U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR)Headquarters at “Roving Sands ’99"(RS 99), conducted at Fort Bliss,Texas. This was the first time thata National Guard division partici-pated in an operational level exer-cise as an ARFOR headquarters.With the U.S. Army at its loweststrength in recent years, we mustincorporate National Guard divi-sions into exercises, in part be-cause it provides the Guard unitswith access to the latest technolo-gies. For this reason, it is more ad-vantageous for a National Guardbattle captain to work with thesame intelligence indicators thattheir active duty counterparts use.

Exercise ParticipantsThe 40th ID’s Active Component

(AC) teaming headquarters (IIICorps) and teamed division (4th ID[M]) augmented the division’s ef-forts with several Army TacticalCommand and Control Systems(ATCCSs). The soldiers of the Sun-burst Division’s Analysis and Con-trol Element (ACE) met thechallenge head-on and achieved ahigh level of proficiency on the bor-rowed operating systems.

RS 99 was a Commander inChief, U.S, Atlantic Command-sponsored, U.S. Army ForcesCommand-executed joint theaterair and missile defense field train-ing exercise employing U.S. jointand multinational forces. RS 99,executed 15 through 28 June 1999,

witnessed a successful integrationof both AC and Reserve Compo-nent (RC) members of all the mili-tary services. Unfortunately, due tothe crises in Kosovo, elements ofthe 8th Air Force abruptly pulledout of the exercise. The 8th AirForce and other higher headquar-ters units significantly adjustedtheir commitment to RS 99 bysending response cells. Only the40th ID (M) and 32d Army Air Mis-sile Defense Command (a modifiedtable of organization and equip-ment [MTOE]-structured AC/RCunit) sent a full complement of di-vision-level players.

Support ProvidedIII Corps augmented the ARFOR

ACE with the All-Source AnalysisSystem (ASAS) Remote Worksta-tion (RWS), unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs), and Joint Surveil-lance Target Attack Radar System(Joint STARS) operators. A teamof five officers and noncommis-sioned officers (NCOs) from the104th Military Intelligence (MI)Battalion, 4th ID (M), also sup-ported the 40th ID (M) on the exer-cise. On four different occasionsbefore and during the exercise, theteam trained and guided the 40thID (M) through the growing painsof standing up an ARFOR ACE.This teaming effort closely com-pares to the 1st Cavalry Division’sefforts to prepare the 49th ArmoredDivision, Texas ARNG, for theirBosnian ARFOR headquarters mis-sion early in 1999.

Contractor support at RS 99 wasextensive. During their last WFX,the 40th ID (M) relied exclusivelyon one contractor to help incorpo-rate their Warlord Notebooks(WLNB) into the architecture of theG2 section and makeshift ACE

(seven of eight National Guarddivisions are still missing an ACEin their current MTOEs). In con-trast, during RS 99, the ACE re-ceived contractor support fromseven companies. The Battle Com-mand Training Program (BCTP) Op-erat ions Group D, from FortLeavenworth, Kansas, rounded outthe expertise necessary to preparefor RS 99.

Added Collection andProcessing EquipmentEnhanced Operations

Just before the exercise, the Di-vision received three ASAS RWSsystems that III Corps dedicatedto help the ARFOR ACE receiveand parse the large volume of datait would have to process. The 40thID (M) matched those three SunMicrosystems with three of theirown, modified the architecture froman entirely WLNB configuration,and fielded a complete, RWS-con-figured ACE. WLNBs became asecondary means to process data,which we used as imagery intelli-gence (IMINT) sidebar worksta-tions. The rest of the systemsincluded a Joint STARS Worksta-tion (JSWS), two HUNTER UAVbaseline systems, COLISEUM(Community On-Line IntelligenceSystem for End Users and Man-agers) software, and the AdvanceField Artillery Tactical Data Sys-tem (AFATDS). These added sys-tems were a revelation for most ofthe ARNG soldiers who had notseen them before.

The ASAS substitute system,WLNB, significantly challengesACE battle captains that partici-pate in a typical ARNG divisionWFX. They must rely solely onthese single-source workstations


to sift through the massive vol-ume of text messages and pushthe pertinent intelligence to theal l -source sect ion. By then,hopefully, the battle captain, all-source analysts, and order ofbattle (OB) technicians wouldhave developed an accurategraphical intelligence summary(INTSUM), updated their superi-ors, and adjusted the collectionplan accordingly.

Today’s intelligence communityhas better collection assets at itsdisposal. IMINT has readily be-come one of the customer’s pre-ferred choices for intelligence. Inaddition to human intelligence(HUMINT), time-sensitive IMINTis a necessi ty for dec is ion-maker’s use to adjust their plansor approve targets for engage-ment. The old proverb, “A pictureis worth a thousand words,” isalive and well at any level ACE.ACE personnel should be able tostep back and visually monitorthe moving target indicators(MTIs) on the JSWS, dynamicallyretask collection assets if nec-essary, keep analysts focusedon the commander’s priority in-telligence requirements (PIR),and constantly feed the target-ing cell. They should be aware,

however, that in a heavy-text mes-sage environment, the battle cap-tain could easily fall into the trapof focusing on the monitor andlose sight of the big picture, crip-pling his ability to orchestratethe ACE.

ConclusionThe current Army multicompo-

nent concept can only work inthe military intelligence (MI) com-munity if ARNG division person-nel have opportunities to workwith the AC in a modern archi-tectural environment like RS 99.

The upcoming deployment of the49th Armored Division to Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates aneed for such training. Anotherpurpose for expanding on thistrend is to assist our AC team-ing partners. Shortfalls in MI sol-dier retention have forced manyAC units to seek qualified Na-tional Guard personnel that canstep into a job and hit the groundrunning. Teaming Guard divisionswith AC units and giving them theexperience of a joint exercisehave established a trend that canenable the Army to meet its fu-ture requirements.

Captain John Bento graduated fromRhode Island College with a Bachelorof Arts degree in Soviet Studies andfrom Monterey Peninsula College withan Associate of Arts degree in Rus-s ian Language. He rece ived h isReserve Officer Training Corps com-mission from Providence College andis currently serving as the Tactical In-telligence Officer for the Division Tac-t ica l Command Post , 40th InfantryD iv is ion (Mechan ized) , Ca l i fo rn iaArmy National Guard (CA ARNG). Heis also the div is ion’s ful l - t ime U.S.Army Guard and Reserve (AGR)Deputy G2. Readers can reach CPTBento via E-mai l at [email protected].

Captain Bento and colleague in the ACE.

Lieutenant Colonel Cushing receiving brief during Roving Sands ‘99.

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Managing Editor’s Note: The tragicevents of 11 September 2001 drew animmediate response from the peopleand government of the United States,one that now seems to have exceededthe expectations of those perpetrat-ing the attacks. President George W.Bush vowed to punish those respon-sible, later identifying the Al Qaedaterrorist group under the leadership ofOsama bin Laden. Founded in 1989by bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, AlQaeda was dedicated to opposingnon-Islamic governments with forceand violence. One of its principal goalswas to force the United States mili-tary out of Saudi Arabia, Somalia, andother Moslem states, using force asits means. Even before the attacks,American intelligence had verified thatthe group’s senior leadership were lo-cated in Afghanistan and under theprotection of that nation’s ruling party,the Taliban. Following the attacks,both the United States and GreatBritain demanded the Taliban appre-hend Osama bin Laden and alQaeda’s senior leadership and turnthem over to the United States. Thisdemand was refused and followingPresident Bush’s vigorous and gen-erally successful coalition buildingeffort, on 7 October 2001 U.S. andBritish forces initiated the bombingof Taliban facilities and units and AlQaeda training facilities. This militarycampaign, given the designation,Operation Enduring Freedom, nowincludes military forces from a dozennations with support from most of themember states of the United Nations.Due to the critical importance andthe numerous impacts on both thecivil and military sectors of our na-tion, MIPB has established “Endur-ing Freedom” as a sub-theme. Thecontents are to be treated as a de-partment within the bulletin’s format.We will publish articles on a wide

variety of related and relevant topicsunder this sub-theme and continueto do so through the operation’s suc-cessful resolution. However, as thisis a quarterly publication, with edit-ing and publishing suspenses set bycontract, it is impossible for us tokeep pace with the operation’s rap-idly changing tactical and strategicenvironment. We will, however, pro-vide relevant background informationon Operation Enduring Freedom, itsimpacts at home and abroad, andmore focused impacts on its effectson Military Intelligence professionals.The articles within the Enduring Free-dom department reflect what we cur-rently believe to be some of the mostimportant issues. The timeline is pro-vided to identify key milestones inthe attack, subsequent reactions,and Enduring Freedom. It should beexpected that as new issues of MIPBare published the type of informationprovided may change, based on thefocus on a given area of operations,or even the type of campaign beingconducted. We will do our best toprovide the best and most current in-formation. To assist in our efforts, andwithin security constraints, we requestthat those directly involved in Endur-ing Freedom, provide us with relevantarticles that will benefit the MilitaryIntelligence Corps.

Timeline, OperationEnduring Freedom! 11 September 2001: Terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Cen-ter and Pentagon.

! 15 September 2001: Osama binLaden and the Al Qaeda terror-ist organization becomes thefocus on the U.S. investigation.

! 20 September 2001: The UnitedStates and Great Britain demandthe Taliban apprehend Osamabin Laden and Al Qaeda’s se-

nior leadership and turn themover to the United States. TheTaliban refuse.

! 25 September 2001: The U.S.military response to the terror-ist attacks in dubbed “OperationEnduring Freedom.”

! 28 September 2001: The UnitedNations Security Councilpasses a U.S. sponsored anti-terrorism resolution requiringeach member nation to cut offterrorist-related funding, preventterrorist training and other activi-ties on its territory, and make ita criminal offense to support aterrorist organization.

! 5 October 2001: Mr. RobertStevens, an employee of Ameri-can Media, Boca Raton, Florida,becomes the first to die of an-thrax. As of 19 November 2001,eighteen cases have been re-ported with five deaths.

! 7 October 2001: U.S. and Brit-ish aircraft and missiles targetTaliban facilities in Afghanistan.U.S. aircraft continue strikes onTaliban facilities through 20 No-vember 2001.

! 8 October 2001: U.S. PresidentBush signs an executive ordercreating the Office of HomelandDefense.

! 26 October 2001: The U.S. Con-gress passes the Patriot Act(see below) focused on combat-ing terrorism.

! 15 November 2001: Advances bythe Northern Alliance cause thePentagon to begin thinking aboutcounter-guerrilla operations.

! 20 November 2001: The Talibannow controls less than a third ofAfghanistan with the NorthernAlliance, supported by U.S. airstrikes, poised to take the lastTaliban stronghold in the north,Konduz.

Enduring FreedomEnduring Freedom


by Lieutenant GeneralRobert W. Noonan, Jr

Editor’s Note: Given the recent pas-sage of a number of bills to controlterrorism by Congress, there hasbeen concern over individual free-doms and the military’s role in thenew judicial legislation. This articleis extracted from a memorandum,Subject: Collecting Information onU.S. Persons, dated 5 November2001, and signed by LTG Robert W.Noonan, Deputy Chief of Staff forIntelligence.1

The 11 September 2001 terrorist at-tack on America has presented theUnited States and the U.S. Armywith unprecedented challenges.Both our nation and our Army areresponding vigorously to thesechallenges and will ultimately bevictorious over international terror-ism. Achieving this victory will notbe easy, however. Our adversary isnot a clearly defined nation-statewith fixed borders or a standingarmy. It is, instead, a shadowy un-derworld operating globally, withsupporters and allies in manycountries, including, unfortunately,our own. Rooting out and eliminat-ing this threat to our freedom andway of life will call upon every re-source at our disposal. I am proudto say that Army Military Intelli-gence (MI) will play a pivotal rolein helping to defeat this threat.

Many of the perpetrators of theseattacks lived for some time in theUnited States. There is evidencethat some of their accomplices andsupporters may have been U.S.persons, as that term is defined inExecutive Order (EO) 12333. Thishas caused concern in the fieldregarding MI’s collection authority.With that in mind, I offer the fol-lowing guidance:

a. Contrary to popular belief,there is no absolute ban on intelli-gence components collecting U.S.

person information. That collection,rather, is regulated by EO 12333and implementing policy in DoD5240.1-R and AR 381-10.

b. Intelligence components maycollect U.S. person information whenthe component has the mission(or “function”) to do so, and the infor-mation falls within one of the catego-ries listed in DoD 5240.1-R and AR381-10. The two most important cat-egories for present purposes are“foreign intelligence” and “counterin-telligence.” Both categories allowcollection about U.S. persons rea-sonably believed to be engaged, orabout to engage, in international ter-rorist activities. Within the UnitedStates, those activities must have asignificant connection with a foreignpower, organization, or person (e.g.,a foreign-based terrorist group).

EO 12333 provides that “timely andaccurate information about theactivities, capabilities, plans, and in-tentions of foreign powers, organiza-tions, and persons, and their agents,is essential to the national securityof the United States. All reasonableand lawful means must be used toensure that the United States willreceive the best intelligence pos-sible.” That said, my staff has re-ceived reports from the field ofwell-intentioned MI personnel declin-ing to receive reports from local lawenforcement authorities, solely be-cause the reports contain U.S. per-son information. MI may receiveinformation from anyone, anytime. Ifthe information is U.S. person infor-mation, MI may retain that informa-tion if it meets the two-part testdiscussed in paragraph b, above. Ifthe information received pertainssolely to the functions of other DoDcomponents, or agencies outsideDoD, MI may transmit or deliver it tothe appropriate recipients, per Pro-cedure 4, AR 381-10. Remember,merely receiving information does notconstitute “collection” under AR 381-

10; collection entails receiving “foruse.” Army intelligence may alwaysreceive information, if only to deter-mine its intelligence value andwhether it can be collected, retained,or disseminated in accordance withgoverning policy.

Military Intelligence must collect allavailable information regarding inter-national terrorists who threaten theUnited States, and its interests, in-cluding those responsible for plan-ning, authorizing, committing, oraiding the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-tember 2001. We will do so - as EO12333 directs - “in a vigorous, inno-vative and responsible manner thatis consistent with the Constitutionand applicable law, and respectful ofthe principles upon which the UnitedStates was founded.”

Key ODCSINT numbers for intelli-gence oversight questions are (703)601-1958/1551, or through the 24-hour Intelligence Watch at (703) 697-5484/5485.Endnotes1. LTG Noonan’s memorandum, especiallyregarding the impact of AR 381-10,deserves more study. This is provided byMr. Michael H. Varhola’s article, “AR 381-10, An Enabling Regulation.”

Collecting Information on U.S. Persons

Attention NCOsSend us your articles andbook reviews. If you haveany experience you can shareon MI doctrine, professionaldevelopment, or “how-to” tips,please send them to MilitaryIntelligence Professional Bulle-tin. Topics of interest for futureissues include: analysis, globalconflicts, MI skills training, andtactical operations. E-mailthem [email protected] [email protected] call (520) 538-1004 and (520)538-0979 or DSN 879-1004.


AR 381-10, An Enabling Regulation—A View From An Intelligence Oversight Officer

by Michael H. VarholaIn our zeal to enforce compliance withregulations, we sometimes forgetwhat they are about. This is particu-larly true in the area of intelligenceoversight. Vigorous enforcement, par-ticularly in the 1970s, resulted in amisperception that lingers to this day:that the intelligence oversight programexists to prevent Military Intelligence(MI) from collecting information onU.S. citizens. Nothing could be fur-ther from the truth. The purpose of theregulation is just the opposite; it en-ables intelligence components to carryout their authorized functions effec-tively while ensuring that they performthe activities that affect U.S. individu-als in a manner that protects their con-stitutional rights and privacy. Anyintelligence oversight inspector whodoes not understand this may be do-ing more harm than good, and cer-tainly will not be furthering combatreadiness and mission accomplish-ment.

In my 30 years working in MI, I havenever seen a situation in which AR381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Ac-tivities, prevented an intelligence com-ponent from collecting information onU.S. citizens that it needed to accom-plish its mission. What I have seen isintelligence components being right-fully prevented from doing the missionof others. This was particularly trueafter the Oklahoma City bombing whensome MI components shifted their fo-cus to domestic extremism. This vio-lated AR 381-10, not only because theextremists were U.S. persons, butmore fundamentally because it is notMI’s mission. It is the mission of civil-ian law enforcement, the Provost Mar-shal and the Criminal InvestigationCommand, and sometimes, quitefrankly, MI got in the way.

When it is MI’s mission, AR 381-10is there to provide procedures thatenable the collection of the informa-

tion on citizens of the United States.Procedure 2 gives thirteen criteriaunder which MI can collect informa-tion on U.S. persons. These are all-encompassing. I cannot think of acategory of information on citizens thatMI would need that one of these crite-ria does not cover. Unfortunately, someindividuals find it easier or safer to avoidthe issue altogether by simply notcollecting the data on citizens theymay need to do their complete jobs.What I hear regularly is, “I’d rather erron the side of caution.” This is unfor-tunate and defeats the purpose of theregulation. I have even seen units de-stroy information in individual securityclearance files in preparation for anintelligence oversight inspection, notrealizing that such information is “ad-ministrative,” as AR 381-10 definesthat term, and that the regulation doesnot cover its retention.

The other side of this coin is just asbad or even worse. A small number ofMI soldiers, not understanding theregulation, and perhaps having hadexposure to heavy-handed enforce-ment in the past, have come to be-lieve that it is an outdated regulationor is simply stupid. While there isobviously a continuing need to rein-terpret the regulation as informationtechnology advances and the Internetbecomes a bigger part of our lives, Ibelieve that the regulation is soundand its principles are easily transfer-able. It is not a big intellectual leap togo from collecting open-source infor-mation from newspapers to collect-ing the same information fromwebsites. The same considerationsapply to the involvement of U.S. citi-zens: mission, mission, and mis-sion!

As the Cold War sinks into the dis-tant past and we move into a future ofsmaller and more varied deployments,it becomes increasingly important thatMI soldiers understand the fundamen-

tal purpose of AR 381-10 and use itas the tool the Army intended it to be.U.S. citizens will be operating in manycapacities in every area to which wedeploy; some may even be membersof the opposing force. We cannotanticipte every situation. When MIneeds to collect information about citi-zens of the United States to accom-plish its military mission, AR 381-10provides the procedures that enableit to do so while protecting their con-stitutional rights and privacy. Missionfirst, constitutional rights and privacyalways! Erring on the side of cautionis not a viable option.

As Mr. Varhola’s article was writ-ten before the 11 September 2001terrorist attacks, MIPB asked for anychange in his position. Mr. Varholaprovided the following comment:“As far as I have seen, EO 12333 isstanding up quite well in the post9/11 world. Regarding collectionon U.S. persons, I have seen noproblems. The terrorist attackcame from a foreign source, andAR 381-10 allows the collection ofmilitary and military related foreignintelligence and counterintelli-gence concerning the activities, in-tentions, capabilities, MO, etc ofinternational terrorists. The keything is cooperation and info shar-ing among all the players: strate-gic CI, installation security, tenantunits, PMO, CID, FBI, local authori-ties, etc. If everybody is working to-gether, then the authority that isneeded will be resident in at leastone of the players.”

Michael Varhola is currently an IntelligenceOversight Officer with the Department of theArmy Inspector General. Mr. Varhola earnedhis commission in Artillery through the Re-serve Officer Training Corps at Gannon Uni-versity in Erie, Pennsylvania, where hemajored in Russian and German. He en-tered the Military Intelligence Civilian Ex-cepted Career Program (MICECP) in 1979and worked with the 511th as a CI Opera-tions Case Officer. Readers may contactMr. Varhola via E-mail at [email protected].


by Ali Ahmad Jalali andLester W. Grau,Foreign Military Studies Office,Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Reprinted with permission from TheBear Went Over the Mountain: So-viet Combat Tactics in Afghani-stan, Grau, Lester W., Editor(Washington, D.C.: National De-fense University Press, 1996).

PREFACEAfghanistan, a multi-ethnic state insouthwest Asia, is home to diversesocial communities that share com-mon experience through interactionwith dominant states, empires, in-vading armies, trade and culturalmovements that traversed the landduring their thousands of years ofhistory. The different ethnic groupsin modern Afghanistan (Pashtuns,Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speaking Hazaras, Balochis, etc.)straddle the boundaries of the state.However, their national identity ismostly defined by their differenceswith their ethnic kinsmen across theborders rather than their nationalcommonalities. About 99% ofAfghanistan’s over 17 million popu-lation are Muslim, of which 85% arefollowers of the Sunni sect while therest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans

live in rural communities in a landdominated by mountains anddeserts. Modern travel is primarily re-stricted to a highway ring connect-ing the various cities. There is norailroad network.

Afghanistan has mostly been aloose collection of tribes and nation-alities over which central governmentshad varying degrees of influence andcontrol at different times. The countryhas been historically known for itsremarkable Islamic and ethnic toler-ance. However tribal rivalries and bloodfeuds, ambitions of local chieftains,and tribal defiance of pervasive inter-ference by the central governmenthave kept the different parts of the landat war at different times. In such casesthe kinship-based identity has beenthe major means of the community’spolitical and military mobilization.Such identity places far greater im-portance on kinship and extended fam-ily than ideology.

Afghanistan stands at a geographiccrossroads that has seen the passageof many warring peoples. Each ofthese has left their imprint on the an-cient land and involved the people ofAfghanistan in conflict. Often this con-flict got in the way of economic devel-

opment. What has developed is acountry composed of somewhat au-tonomous “village states” spreadacross the entire country.1 Afghansidentify themselves by Qawm—thebasic subnational identity based onkinship, residence, and sometimesoccupation. Western people may re-fer to this as “tribe,” but this instinc-tive social cohesiveness includes tribalclans, ethnic subgroups, religioussects, locality-based groups, andgroups united by interests.2 TheQawm, not Afghanistan, is the basicunit of social community and, outsidethe family, the most important focuson individual loyalty. Afghanistan has,at times, been characterized as a dis-united land driven by blood feuds. Thefeuds center on family and Qawm.Yet, the leaders of the various Qawmhave resolved feuds and held the landtogether. Village elders can put feudson hold for a decade or longer andthen let them resume once the agreed-on time has expired and the matter isstill unresolved. Afghanistan’s ancientroots and strong ties of kinship pro-vide an anchor against progress, butalso the means to cope when centralauthority has collapsed. Historically,the collapse of the central governmentof Afghanistan or the destruction of its

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: MujahideenTactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Editor’s Note: In mid-October the U.S. House Judiciary Committee met to discuss adoption of the “Patriot Act” andon 26 October 2001 it was approved by Congress. The Patriot Act greatly increases the government’s ability toconduct surveillance and wiretapping operations as well as give it greater authority to detain suspects. The act iscontroversial, however, in that civil libertarians see the changes as a danger to our personal freedoms. Thefollowing items are the key components of the Patriot Act and are included to supplement LTG Noonan’s and Mr.Varhola’s articles.

The Patriot Act would —! Give any U.S. Attorney or state attorney general the power, in “emergency situations,” to install the

Carnivore e-mail snooping system without obtaining a court order.! Allow law enforcement agencies to obtain telephone voice mail messages with a search warrant, which is

issued with less court scrutiny than the previously required wiretap warrant.! Expand the definition of “terrorist” to include non-violent protesters at an anti-war rally.! Make it easier for the government to tap multiple phones as part of a “roving wiretap” warrant.! Allow the government to detain legal immigrants for seven days based only on the accusation of terrorist

activity.


standing armies has never resulted inthe defeat of the nation by an invader.The people, relying on their decentral-ized political, economic and militarypotential, have always taken over theresistance against the invaders.3 Thiswas the case during two wars withGreat Britain in the 19th century (1839-1842, 1878-1880). This happenedagain in the Soviet-Afghan War.

The tactics of the Mujahideen re-flected this lack of central cohesion.Their tactics were not standard, butdiffered from valley to valley and tribeto tribe. No more than 15 percent ofthe guerrilla commanders were mili-tary professionals. However, Afghani-stan had a conscript army and virtuallyever 22-year-old male served his twoyear obligation. This provided a basicmilitary education which easedcooperation between the variousMujahideen groups. The Mujahideenwere true volunteers—unpaid warriorswho fought to protect their faith andcommunity first and their nation next.As true volunteers, fighting for theirQawm and religion, the Mujahideenlooked down on the professional sol-dier (asker) as a simple mercenarywho was either the victim of a pressgang or too stupid to ply any othertrade.4 This disdain did not attach tothe professional officer, who enjoyeda great deal of prestige.

Afghanistan was not a guerrilla warala Mao Tse Tung or Vo Nguyen Giap.The Mujahideen were not trying to forcea new ideology and government on aland. Rather, they fought to defend theirQawm and their religion against ahostile ideology, an atheistic valuesystem, an oppressive central govern-ment, and a foreign invader. It was aspontaneous defense of communityvalues and a traditional way of life byindividual groups initially unconnectedto national or international political or-ganizations.5

The Great Game6

Russian expansionism and empirebuilding in Central Asia began in 1734and Moscow’s interest in Afghanistan

was apparent by the late 1830s. TheGreat Game described in Afghanistanwas apparent by the late 1830s. TheGreat Game described the British andRussian struggle for influence alongthe unsettled northern frontier of Brit-ish India and in the entire region be-tween Russia and India. Afghanistanlay directly in this contested area be-tween two empires. Russia describedher motives in the Great Game as sim-ply to abolish the slave trade and toestablish order and control along hersouthern border. The British, however,viewing Russian absorption of thelands of the Caucasus, Georgia,Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva andBukhara, claimed to feel threatenedby the presence of a large, expand-ing empire near India and ascribeddifferent Russian motives. The Britishstated that Russian motives were toweaken British power and to gain ac-cess to a warm-water port. Britainclaimed that her own actions were toprotect the frontiers of British India.

The Great Game spilled into Af-ghanistan when British forces in-vaded during the First Anglo-AfghanWar (1839-1842). Britain claimedthat the invasion was supposed tocounter Russian influence. After hardfighting, the British withdrew. By1869, the Russian empire reachedthe banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus)River—the northern border of Af-ghanistan. This caused additionalBritish concern. In 1878, the arrivalof a special Russian diplomatic mis-sion to Kabul led to another Britishinvasion and the Second Anglo-Af-ghan War. The British Army againwithdrew. In the Anglo-RussianTreaty of 1907, the Russians agreedthat Afghanistan lay outside itssphere of interest and agreed to con-fer with Britain on all matters relat-ing to Russian-Afghan relations. Inreturn, Britain agreed not to occupyor annex any part of Afghanistan norinterfere in the internal affairs of thatcountry. Although the Amir of Af-ghanistan refused to recognize thetreaty, Russia and Britain agreed to

its terms and honored them until1919 when Afghan troops crossedinto British India, seized a village andattempted to raise a popular revoltin the area. The British respondedwith yet another invasion andthe Third Anglo-Afghan War. Thepolitical settlement resulted inAfghanistan’s full independencefrom Great Britain.

Afghanistan’s foreign policy from1919 and 1978 balanced the de-mands of her immediate neighbors,and external powers such as theUnited States, Germany and GreatBritain. Normal relations with hernorthern neighbor, the Soviet Union,led to increased Soviet investmentand presence in Afghanistan.

In April 1978, a small leftist groupof Soviet-trained Afghan officersseized control of the government andfounded the Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan, a client state of theSoviet Union. Civil war broke out inAfghanistan. The putsch installedPresident Nur M. Taraki, a Marxistwho announced sweeping programsof land distribution, changed statusfor women and the destruction of theold Afghanistan social structure. Dis-regarding the national social struc-ture and mores, the new governmentenjoyed little popular support. Thewobbly Taraki government was al-most immediately met by increasedarmed resistance as the Mujahideenranks grew. In 1978, religious lead-ers, in response to popular uprisingsacross Afghanistan, issued state-ments of jihad (holy war) against thecommunist regime. This was an ap-peal to the supranational identity ofall Afghans—a fight to defend the faithof Islam. The combat readiness ofthe Army of the Democratic Repub-lic of Afghanistan plunged as govern-ment purges swept the officer corps.Soldiers, units and entire regimentsdeserted to the resistance and bythe end of l979, the actual strengthof the Afghan Army was less thanhalf of its authorized 90,000. InMarch 1979, the city of Herat revolted


and most of the Afghan 17th InfantryDivision mutinied and joined the re-bellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoc-cupied the city after the Afghan AirForce bombed the city and the 17thDivision. Thousands of people report-edly died in the fighting, includingsome Soviet citizens.

Soviet InterventionThe Soviet-Afghan War began overthe issue of control. The DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan (DRA) wasnominally a socialist state governedby a communist party. However, thestate only controlled some of the cit-ies, while tribal elders and clan chiefscontrolled the countryside. Further-more, the communist party of Af-ghanistan was split into two hostilefactions. The factions spent moretime fighting each other than tryingto establish socialism in Afghani-stan. In September 1979, Taraki’sPrime Minister, Hafizullah Amin,seized power and murdered Taraki.Amin’s rule proved no better and theSoviet Union watched this new com-munist state spin out of control.Meanwhile, units of the army muti-nied, civil war broke out, cities andvillages rose in revolt and Afghani-stan began to slip away fromMoscow’s control and influence. Le-onid Brezhnev, the aged Soviet Gen-eral Secretary, saw that directmilitary intervention was the only wayto prevent his client state from disin-tegrating into complete chaos. Hedecided to intervene.

The obvious models for interventionwere Hungary in 1956 and Czecho-slovakia in 1968. The Soviet GeneralStaff planned the Afghanistan inva-sion based on these models. How-ever, there was a significantdifference that the Soviet plannersmissed. Afghanistan was embroiledin a civil war and a coup de mainwould only gain control of the cen-tral government, not the countryside.Although participating military unitswere briefed at the last minute, theSoviet Christmas Eve invasion of

1979 was masterfully planned andwell-executed. The Soviets seized thegovernment, killed the president andput their own man in his place. Ac-cording to some Russian sources,they planned to stabilize the situa-tion, strengthen the army and thenwithdraw the majority of Soviet forceswithin three years. The Soviet Gen-eral Staff planned to leave all fightingin the hands of the army of the Demo-cratic Republic. But Afghanistan wasin full revolt, the dispirited Afghanarmy was unable to cope, and thespecter of defeat following a Sovietwithdrawal haunted the Politburo. In-vasion and overthrow of the govern-ment proved much easier than fightingthe hundreds of ubiquitous guerrillagroups. The Soviet Army was trainedfor large-scale, rapid-tempo opera-tions. They were not trained for theplatoon leaders’ war of finding andclosing with small, indigenous forceswhich would only stand and fightwhen the terrain and circumstanceswere to their advantage.

Back in the Soviet Union there wasno one in charge and all decisionswere committee decisions made bythe collective leadership. GeneralSecretary Brezhnev became incapaci-tated in 1980 but did not die untilNovember 1982. He was succeededby the ailing Yuri Andropov. GeneralSecretary Andropov lasted less thantwo years and was succeeded by thefaltering Konstantin Chernenko inFebruary 1984. General SecretaryChernenko died in March 1985. Al-though the military leadership keptrecommending withdrawal, duringthis “twilight of the general secretar-ies” no one was making any majordecisions as to the conduct and out-come of the war in Afghanistan. Thewar bumped on at its own pace. Fi-nally, Mikhail Gorbachev came topower. His first instinct was to ordermilitary victory in Afghanistan withina year. Following this bloodiest yearof the war, Gorbachev realized thatthe Soviets could not win in Afghani-stan without unacceptable interna-

tional and internal repercussions andbegan to cast about for a way to with-draw with dignity. United Nations ne-gotiators provided that avenue andby 15 October 1988, the first half ofthe Soviet withdrawal was complete.On 15 February 1989, the last So-viet forces withdrew from Afghani-stan. Soviet force commitment,initially assessed as requiring sev-eral months, lasted over nine yearsand required increasing numbers offorces. The Soviet Union reportedlykilled 1.3 million people and forced5.5 million Afghans (a third of the pre-war population) to leave the countryas refugees. Another 2 millionAfghans were forced to migratewithin the country. The country hasyet to recover.

Initially the Mujahideen were all lo-cal residents who took arms andbanded together into large, ratherunwieldy, forces to seize the localdistrict capitols and loot their armsrooms. The DRA countered these ef-forts where it could and Mujahideenbegan to coalesce into much smallergroups centered around the rural vil-lage. These small groups werearmed with a variety of weapons fromswords and flintlock muskets to Brit-ish bolt-action rifles and older Sovietand Soviet-bloc weapons provided toAfghanistan over the years. The gue-rilla commanders were usually influ-ential villagers who already had aleadership role in the local area. Fewhad any professional military expe-rience. Rebellion was wide-spread,but uncoordinated since the resis-tance was formed along tribal andethnic lines.

The Soviet invasion changed thenature of the Mujahideen resistance.Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistanand Iran, nervously regarded the ad-vance to the Soviet Army to theirborders and began providing trainingand material support to theMujahideen. The United States,Peoples Republic of China, Britain,France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,and the United Arab Emirates began


funneling military, humanitarian andfinancial aid to the Mujahideenthrough Pakistan. Pakistan’s as-sessment was that the Soviet Unionhad come to Afghanistan to stay andit was in Pakistan’s best intereststo support those Mujahideen whowould never accept the Soviet pres-ence. The Pakistan Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) Agency began tofunnel aid through various Afghanpolitical factions headquartered inPakistan. Eventually there wereseven major Afghan factions receiv-ing aid. The politics of these factionswere determined by their leaders’religious convictions—three of whichwere Islamic moderates and four ofwhich were Islamic fundamentalists.Pakistan required that the variousethnic and tribal Mujahideen groupsjoin one of the factions in order toreceive aid. Over time, this providedthe leaders of these factions withpolitical power which they used todominate the politics of post-com-munist Afghanistan. The Pakistaniauthorities favored the most funda-mentalist groups and rewarded themaccordingly. This aid distributiongave the Afghan religious leadersunprecedented power in the conductof the war. It also undermined the tra-ditional authority of the tribal and vil-lage leaders.

The Mujahideen were unpaid volun-teers with family responsibilities. Thismeant that they were part-time war-riors and that spoils of war played amajor role in military actions.Mujahideen sold mostly capturedweapons and equipment in thebazaars to support their families.As the war progressed, mobileMujahideen groups emerged. Themobile Mujahideen groups were largerand consisted of young (under 25),unmarried, better-trained warriors.Sometimes the mobile Mujahideenwere paid. The mobile Mujahideenranged over a much larger area of op-erations than the local Mujahideen andwere more responsive to the plans anddesires of the factions.

The strategic struggle for Afghani-stan was a fight to strangle theother’s logistics. The Mujahideentargeted the Soviet lines of commu-nication—the crucial road networkover which the Soviet supplies hadto travel. The Soviet attack on theMujahideen logistics was twophased. From 1980 until 1985, theSoviets sought to eliminateMujahideen support in the rural coun-tryside. They bombed granaries andrural villages, destroyed crops andirrigation systems, mined pasturesand fields, destroyed herds andlaunched sweeps through rural ar-eas—conscripting young men anddestroying the infrastructure. TheSoviet leadership, believing Mao TseTung’s dictum that the guerrilla livesin the population like a fish in water,decided to kill the fish by draining offthe water.7 As a result, Afghanistanbecame a nation of refugees as morethan seven million rural residents fledto the relative safety of neighboringPakistan and Iran or to the cities ofAfghanistan. This Soviet effort de-nied rural support to the Mujahideen,since the villagers had left and mostof the food now had to be carriedalong with weapons and ammunitionand materials of war. The Mujahideenresponded by establishing logisticsbases inside Afghanistan. The So-viet fight from 1985 to withdrawal wasto find and destroy these bases.

Terrain, as any infantryman knows,is the ultimate shaper of the battle-field. Afghanistan’s terrain is variedand challenging. It is dominated bytowering mountains and forbiddingdesert. Yet it also has lush forestsof larch, aspen and juniper. It hastangled “green zones”—irrigated ar-eas thick with trees, vines, crops,irrigation ditches and tangled vegeta-tion. It has flat plains full of wheatand swampy terraces which growdelicious long-grained rice. It is notideal terrain for a mechanized forcedependent on fire power, securelines of communication and high-technology. It is terrain where the

mountain warrior, using ambush sitesinherited from his ancestors, can in-flict “death from a thousand cuts”.The terrain dictates different tactics,force structure and equipment fromthose of conventional war.

This book is not a complete his-tory of the Soviet-Afghan War.Rather, it is a series of combatvignettes as recalled by theMujahideen participants. It is not abook about right or wrong. Rather, itis a book about survival against theoverwhelming firepower and techno-logical might of a superpower. Thisis the story of combat from theguerrilla’s perspective. It is the storyof brave people who fought withouthope of winning because it was theright thing to do.

About the BookAuthor Les Grau, regularly travelsback and forth to Russia. He receiveda book from the History of MilitaryArt department at the Frunze Com-bined Arms Academy in Moscow.The book was intended for students’classroom use only and, as such,shows both the good and the bad.With Frunze Academy permission,Les translated this book and addedcommentary before it was publishedby NDU Press as The Bear WentOver the Mountain: Soviet CombatTactics in Afghanistan. Author AliJalali, helped in the editing process.“The Bear” showed the tactics of theSoviets, but the Mujahideen tacticswere absent. Charlie Cuthbertsonand Dick Voltz of the USMC inQuantico agreed that both sidesneeded to be presented and sent Aliand Les to Pakistan and Afghanistanto interview Mujahideen command-ers for a companion volume.

Author Ali Jalali has the perfect cre-dentials to do this book. Ali was aColonel in the Afghan Army andtaught at the Afghan Military Acad-emy and Army Staff College. His for-eign education included the InfantryOfficer’s Advanced Course at FortBenning, Georgia; the British Army


Staff College at Camberley; and theSoviet Frunze Academy. Many ofAli’s officer students were key resis-tance figures. Ali was also a mem-ber of the resistance and anaccredited journalist during the con-flict. Now Ali works as a journalistand has covered Afghanistan andCentral Asia over the last 15 years.Ali is respected by all the factionsand has exceptional entre to theMujahideen.

Ali and Les arrived in Pakistan inSeptember 1996 and were preparingto go into Afghanistan when theTaliban advance on Kabul closed theborders to American citizens. Ali in-terviewed some 40 Mujahideen dur-ing a month in Peshawar, Quetta,and Islamabad, Pakistan. Our col-league, Major Nasrullah Safi, con-ducted interviews for another twomonths inside Afghanistan for thisbook. The interviews are the basisof this book. In those interviewswhere we have several sources forthe same vignette or where we havelots of supporting written reports andmaterial, we have written the vignettein the third person. In those caseswhere the person interviewed is theprimary source, we have written thevignette in the first person. The vi-gnettes are arranged chronologicallyby type of action. Occasionally,when the actions occur at the sameplace over time, we lump those ac-tions together instead of chronologi-

cally. We have tried to make the bookas accurate as possible, but realizethat time and retelling may have al-tered some of the facts. We have lim-ited the span of the book from theSoviet invasion until their withdrawal.The war started before the Soviet in-vasion and continued long after theirdeparture. We plan to write aboutthese battles in a future book.

We used edition 2-DMA seriesU611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S.Defense Mapping Agency for the fi-nal preparation of the material. Forthose who wish to consult the mapsheets, map sheet numbers aregiven with each vignette. We havenumbered each vignette within thechapter and started each chapterwith a country map showing therough location of each vignette. Theinterviews were long and exhaustive,so many details are available. Manyof the interviews were conducted atdifferent times and places, with dif-ferent people who had been part ofthe same battle or operation. Thisallowed us to check and comparedetails and sequences of events.Map elevations are given in meters.Contour intervals are not consistentand merely show elevation. Placeand name spelling is based on AliJalali’s best transliteration efforts.Consistency in spelling is difficultwhen two alphabets are involved—some spellings are different than inother books on Afghanistan. Al-

though the Mujahideen always say‘Russian’ instead of ‘Soviet’, we haveused ‘Soviet’ throughout unless it isa direct quote.

We use Russian map graphics onthe maps. The Afghan Army used theSoviet graphics system and mostMujahideen were familiar with them.Russian graphics are more “userfriendly” (flexible and illustrative) thanWestern graphics. The Russians canshow the sequential development ofan action by adding times or identify-ing lines to their graphics. These linesare explained in the legend. A tableof Russian map graphics is locatedin the back of the book. Mujahideenforces are shown in blue and Soviet/DRA forces are shown in red.Endnotes

1 Ali A. Jalali “Clashes of Ideas andInterests in Afghanistan”, paper given atthe Institute of World Politics, Washington,D.C., July 1995, page 4.2 Ibid, 3.3 Ibid, 4

4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam,Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1994, pages 158-159.5 Jalali, 1

6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyropand Donald M. Seekins (editors),Afghanistan Country Study, Fifth edition,Washington: US Government PrintingOffice, 1986, pages 22-73 and PeterHopkirk, The Great Game, New York:Kodansha International, 1994.

7 Claude Malhauret, Afghan AlternativeSeminar, Monterey, California, November1993.

by Major V.G. Chabanenko1

On 16 March 1985, our intelligenceorgans received reports of a concen-tration of guerrilla forces in theLar-Mandikul’ Valley, some 30 kilo-meters northeast of Kabul. The divi-sion commander ordered myregimental commander to destroythem.2 My commander decided toair land the regiment some six kilo-meters away from the guerrillas and

Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in theLar-Mandikul’ Valley

then sneak up to the valley, block offits exits and then conduct a hunt withpart of the regiment, while the restwould cover their movements. Avia-tion would provide fire support aswould some MRLS located some 15kilometers from the valley with ourbronegruppa. Illumination supportwould be planned and on call and befurnished by illumination flares, artil-lery illumination rounds, and air-de-livered flares. After accomplishing our

mission, the regiment would walk toour bronegruppa.

On 19 March, we hit the LZ andwere immediately spotted by theenemy. The enemy opened up witha heavy volume of fire and began rap-idly pulling his units out from underour air and artillery strikes. Only theforward subunits of our 1st and 2dbattalions managed to reach theirblocking positions and they did nothave sufficient combat power to stop


the enemy main body. During thenext 48 hours, our search groupsfound and destroyed weapons andammunition caches. Our coveringsubunits managed to occupy thedominant terrain, support the searchgroups, and repulse enemy attemptsto clear away the blocking forces.

Over in an adjacent valley, a simi-lar situation had developed. The en-emy managed to extricate hissubunits away from the strike of theregiment and conduct a marchthrough the valley. This was becausewe landed at the tail end of the en-emy column and we could not get tothe blocking positions designated bythe regiment. In addition, once againour landing had been discovered andwe had been put down in the wrongplace. This was because rather thanlanding at the designated sites, welanded in places safe from enemyfire and large enough (2 by 2 kilome-ters) for easy landing. It took twohours to assemble my battalion’ssubunits and, consequently, I wasunable to move to the correct posi-tions in an organized fashion in time.The enemy escaped.

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This op-eration underscores the necessity ofconducting continuous reconnais-sance of the enemy and, dependingon the existing situation, fine-tuningyour plans and, if necessary, chang-ing your LZ. A company should haveone LZ, a battalion should have twoor three LZs that are no farther thana kilometer or a kilometer and a halfapart. You must shield LZs from en-emy fire. Of course, there must be areserve LZ as well.

Combat action in Afghanistan, andin particular this operation, demon-strate that evacuating the assaultforce after mission accomplishmentrequires particular attention, since itis during this stage of the operationthat the subunits receive their mostsignificant casualties. During the re-turn to the assembly areas on heli-copters, pay particular attention toensuring that the enemy has not

placed weapons around them. In or-der to keep the enemy away fromevacuation points, use air-deliveredor MRLs-delivered RDM on enemyapproach routes (see Figure 1).When covering a region from domi-nant terrain, evacuate the force byestablishing a series of perimeterposts around the LZ. After evacuat-ing the main force, evacuate theposts simultaneously. When movingthe assault force to seize an evacu-ation zone, cover the movement withoverwatching forces and aviation,move in precombat formation, andlead with reconnaissance.

Start helicopter load plans imme-diately upon receipt of the evacua-

tion order and refine them when atthe pick-up point. Pull mortar crewsand mortars out first and riflemenlast. The air assault commander di-rects the evacuation and is on thelast helicopter out along with the lastpart of the perimeter security posts.Hold supporting helicopter gunshipsin full readiness or fire on the enemyalong their climbing paths. Air as-sault troopers, once on board thehelicopters, must be ready to con-duct small arms fire through aircraftopenings.

Experience shows that helicoptersshould spend the minimum possibletime at the air evacuation point aspersonnel and equipment are already

Figure 1. Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in the Lar-Mandikul’ Valley.


concentrated there as a tempting tar-get. Helicopters can spend a maxi-mum of one and one-half minutes onthe ground.

Airborne and air assault forcescan return to their initial assemblyareas after mission accomplish-ment on helicopters or in their ar-mored vehicles. In this operationin the Lar-Mandikul’ Valley, theregiment withdrew mounted in theirbronegruppa after fulfilling theirmission. They pulled out at night.In order to navigate at night, com-manders used compasses andparachute flares. During the day,they could have used route recon-naissance. The regiment’s variousbronegruppa moved by bounds assubunits provided overwatch for themain body. Once the main bodyhad passed through a covered seg-ment of the route, the overwatching

forces would rejoin the main forceand other subunits would move for-ward to the next overwatch posi-tions. In this manner, the regimentmaintained a high tempo of move-ment and suffered minimal casu-alties during encounters with theenemy.

EDITOR’S COMMENTARY: Pull-ing out the mortars prior to the in-fantry is a commander’s call anddepends on the tactical situation.However, there are times when themortars will be the final system acommander wants to evacuate.

Many commanders prefer form-ing an uninterrupted “collapsingring” for evacuation zone security.This ring gets tighter with each lift-off. The collapsing ring has a bet-ter chance of preventing enemyinfiltration of the perimeter andevacuating the security personnel

than establishing a series of far-off posts as this vignette recom-mends.

The withdrawal of the forcemounted in its bronegruppa appearsto be a withdrawal under pressure.Night movement of a mechanizedcolumn through the Pandshir valleyusing parachute flares and com-passes seems to be an option thata commander would adapt only un-der pressure.Endnotes1. V.G. Chabanenko served in theRepublic of Afghanistan from December1983 through June 1985 as a battalioncommander.2. The 103d Airborne Division (accordingto Mr. Grau).3. Reprinted with permission from TheBear Went Over the Mountain: SovietCombat Tactics in Afghanistan, Grau,Lester W., Editor (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press,1996).

The White HouseOffice of the Press SecretaryOctober 8, 2001Mission & Management: ThePresident will establish the Office ofHomeland Security that will beheaded by the Assistant to the Presi-dent for Homeland Security — Gov-ernor Tom Ridge. The mission of theOffice will be to develop and coordi-nate the implementation of a com-prehensive national strategy tosecure the United States from ter-rorist threats or attacks. The Officewill coordinate the executivebranch’s efforts to detect, preparefor, prevent, protect against, respondto, and recover from terrorist attackswithin the United States.

National Strategy: The Office willwork with executive departments andagencies, state and local govern-ments, and private entities to ensure

the adequacy of the national strategyfor detecting, preparing for, preventing,protecting against, responding to, andrecovering from terrorist threats or at-tacks within the United States and willperiodically review and coordinate re-visions to that strategy as necessary.

Detection: The Office will identify pri-orities and coordinate efforts for col-lection and analysis of informationwithin the United States regardingthreats of terrorism against the UnitedStates and activities of terrorists orterrorist groups within the UnitedStates.

Preparedness: The Office of Home-land Security will coordinate nationalefforts to prepare for and mitigate theconsequences of terrorist threats orattacks within the United States. Inperforming this function, the Office willwork with federal, state, and localagencies, and private entities.

Prevention: The Office will coordi-nate efforts to prevent terrorist at-tacks within the United States. Inperforming this function, the Officeshall work with federal, state, andlocal agencies, and private entitiesto facilitate the exchange of informa-tion among such agencies relatingto immigration and visa matters andshipments of cargo; and, workingwith the Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs, ensurecoordination among such agenciesto prevent the entry of terrorists andterrorist materials and supplies intothe United States and facilitate re-moval of such terrorists from theUnited States, when appropriate;coordinate efforts to investigate ter-rorist threats and attacks within theUnited States; and coordinate effortsto improve the security of UnitedStates borders, territorial waters, andairspace in order to prevent acts of

Extract from the President’s Executive Order13228: Establishing the Office of HomelandSecurity & the Homeland Security Council


terrorism within the United States,working with the Assistant to thePresident for National Security Af-fairs, when appropriate.Protection: The Office will coordi-nate efforts to protect the UnitedStates and its critical infrastructurefrom the consequences of terroristattacks.

Response and Recovery: The Of-fice will coordinate efforts to respondto and promote recovery from terror-ist threats or attacks within the UnitedStates.The Homeland Security Council:The President’s Executive Order es-tablishes a Homeland SecurityCouncil which will be responsible for

Geography and Transportation of AfghanistanExtract from The World Factbook2001 (Washington, D.C.: Central In-telligence Agency Directorate ofIntelligence, 2001).Location: Southern Asia, north

and west of Pakistan, east of Iran,in a box bounded by 29° to 39° North,060° to 075° East.

Area: 647,500 square km or250,000 square miles (slightly smallerthan Texas). Area is 100% land, 0%water.

Boundaries: Total 5,529 km or3,436 miles, all land with no coast-line (landlocked). Bordering countriesand length of shared borders arePeople’s Republic of China 76 km,Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km,Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan744 km, and Uzbekistan 137 km.

Climate: Arid to semiarid, cold win-ters and hot summers.

Terrain: Afghanistan consistsmostly of rugged mountains, withplains in the north and southwest.The lowest point is Amu Darya at 258meters. Nowshak at 7,485 metersis the highest point. Twelve percentof the land is arable, but the countryhas no areas of permanent crops.Nearly half the land area is perma-nent pasture, and another 3% is for-ests and woodland. Much of theremaining forest land is being cutdown for fuel and building materials,and deforestation is a current envi-ronmental issue. There are alsoproblems with soil degradation, over-grazing, and desertification. Approxi-mately 30,000 square km have been

irrigated (1993 estimate). Damagingearthquakes occur in the Hindu Kushmountains to the northeast. Flood-ing and droughts also threaten thearea.

Transportation: Afghanistan hasa total of 21,000 km of highways. Ofthat total, 18,207 km are unpaved(1998 estimate). The total railwaylength is only 24.6 km (broad gaugerail at the borders with Turkmenistanand Uzbekistan). There are 1,200km of navigable waterways, mostlythe Amu Darya River, which formspart of the country’s northern border.There are 45 airports (2000 esti-mate). Ten of these are paved andonly three of these have a runwaylength over 3,047 meters. There arealso three heliports.

The National Imagery and Map-ping Agency (NIMA) has pro-duced standard hardcopy anddigital map and imagery productscovering Afghanistan. Army logis-tics elements (S4s) can assistin the requisitioning of theseproducts. You may obtain themfrom the Defense Log is t icsAgency (DLA) through a varietyof ordering methods, althoughelectronic ordering is preferred.DLA’s Defense Supply Center-Richmond (the map facility inRichmond, Virginia) requeststhat you use the Military Requi-sitioning and Issue Procedures(MILSTRIP) and submit orders via

Applicable NIMA Products CoveringAfghanistan and the Middle East

the Defense Automatic Address-ing System (DAAS). Electronicordering allows Geospatial In-formation and Services consum-ers to take advantage of theirintraservice or agency logisticssystems to electronically trans-mit their orders to Richmond. Inlieu of intrasupport systems, theDefense Automatic AddressingSystem Center (DAASC), WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio,offers alternate electronic meth-ods that greatly reduce order pro-cessing and shipping time. Onesuch method used by customersfor DAAS connectivity is WebRequisit ioning (WebReq), a

DAAS system that allows cus-tomers to order mapping prod-ucts via an Internet website.Refer to the Richmond Map Fa-c i l i t y Webs i te a t h t tp : / /www.dscr.dla.mil/pc9/ and followthe links to Ordering Info and WebOrdering.

NIMA standard product cover-age of Afghanistan, as of Sep-tember, 2001, includes hardcopytopographic and aeronauticalproducts available from the NIMALibrary (see Figure 1). There areno hydrographic products at thistime. NIMA also offers six stan-dard digital products and an ad-ditional one (see Figure 2).

advising and assisting the Presidentwith respect to all aspects of home-land security. The Council will serveas the mechanism for ensuringcoordination of homeland security-related activities of executive depart-ments and agencies and effectivedevelopment and implementation ofhomeland security policies.


Standard Products.! VMAP1 (Level 1 Vector Map) Vector-based geospatial data in Vector Product Format (VPF).

Data separated into ten thematic layers, each of which contains thematically consistentdata. A reference library provides general information to orient the user. All data are topo-logically structured, and each coverage contains a set of files that describes the features inthat thematic layer. VMAP1 contains medium resolution data at the 1:250,000 scale. Thereare 5 compact discs (CDs) that cover Afghanistan. Currently, we offer no coverage of theKabul area. UVMAPAFGHANISTA is a city-scale vector map of the city of Kabul.

! DTED1, Level 1 elevation data (90-meter post spacings), 2 CDs, TCDXXDTED135 coversmost of the country, south tip is on TCDXXDTED149.

! CIB5, Controlled Image Base-5 meter. In Raster Product Format (RPF), which is compatiblewith the National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) standard. 12 CDs available. TheKabul area and other parts of the north and east are not yet available.

! Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG), a 254-dots per inch (dpi) scan of NIMA hardcopyproducts.Series ARC9 Kabul 1 & 2 (City Graphics)Series ARC1, 1:500,000 (Tactical Pilotage Charts). 7 CDs.ARC1XU611x0001, 45 CDs (most of AF)ARC5, 16 CDs (most of AF)

! Compressed Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG) Also in RPF format. A 169-dpidownsampling of ADRG. Provides a 55:1 compression ratio. Series is CDRG. CDRGXAF100K,1 CD with entire country at 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map), 2 CDs at the 1:250,000scale (Joint Operations Graphics). CDRGXONCTPC, 2 CDs, containing both 1:1,000,000and 1:500,000 scale aeronautical charts.

! Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) Level 1 and 1C. Vector data consisting of selectednatural and manmade features classified by size and composition. Format is sequential(spaghetti) vector and data is segregated into 1° x 1° geographic cells. DFAD 1 is fromimagery, DFAD 1C is from cartographic source. Density of detail approximates that of me-dium scale (1:250,000). Stock number TCDF1WORLDREG6 is both DFAD 1 and 1C andcovers Afghanistan and much of the Middle East.

Nonstandard Products.! Feature Foundation Data (FFD). Vector data at medium scale in VPF. Along IR Border, 1° x

1°, available on NIMA secure websites.

Figure 2. Available Afghanistan-Related Digital Products from NIMA.

Topographic.! Series U611, 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map). There are 505 sheets available,

covering the entire country.! Series U911, 1;25,000 scale (City Graphic), Kabol sheets 1 and 2. No other city graphics for

Afghanistan are currently available.Aeronautical.! Series 1501A (aeronautical) & 1501C (combined aeronautical and ground), Joint Opera-

tions Graphics (JOG) 1:250,000 scale. There are 65 sheets available that cover Afghani-stan.

! Series TPC (Tactical Pilotage Chart), 1:500,000 scale, 7 sheets.! Series ONC (Operational Navigation Chart), 1:1,000,000 scale, 4 sheets.

Figure 1. NIMA Hardcopy Products on Afghanistan.


by Keith Masback

The immediate challenge for Army In-telligence is to meet the myriad chal-lenges associated with the global waron terrorism and emerging homelandsecurity issues while simultaneouslyproceeding with the ambitious ArmyTransformation process. The ArmyIntelligence Master Plan (AIMP) is atthe nexus of Army Intelligence Trans-formation, and the AIMP team isheavily engaged in responding to thecurrent crisis. AIMP integrates andsynchronizes the efforts of diverse or-ganizations, both inside and outsidethe Army.

Established in 1986 through a uniquepartnership of the Army’s Deputy Chiefof Staff for Intelligence, Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations and Plans, andthe Commanding General of the U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand, AIMP comprises a governmentand contractor integrated conceptteam (ICT) and integrated productteam (IPT). The AIMP principal officeis in Falls Church, Virginia, with addi-tional locations at Fort Huachuca, Ari-zona, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, thePentagon, and Fort Meade, Maryland.AIMP, while focused on the future,daily engages in issues that span thefull spectrum of Army Intelligence is-sues.

The AIMP charter is: “To provide asingle, synchronized strategy for theevolution of Army Intelligence, at allechelons, to successfully supportArmy Transformation to the ObjectiveForce.” Enabled by resident subject-matter expertise and an extendednetwork of consultants and advisors,the AIMP coalesces the efforts of allthe important players in Army Intelli-gence to build a coherent strategy forachieving Army Intelligence Transfor-mation. Since Army Intelligence Trans-formation extends far beyond the

Army, AIMP’s critical linkages to jointand national agencies and organiza-tions are crucial.

AIMP Areas of Focus. AIMP’s fo-cus areas are intelligence futures, datamanagement, and decision supporttools.

Intelligence Futures. The AIMPemploys a methodology and processto articulate the vision of Army Intelli-gence for the future, a frank assess-ment of where we are today, and ananalysis of the “delta” that results in aplan to move forward, focused on theenvisioned end-state. The Army Intel-ligence Transformation CampaignPlan (AITCP) codifies that result.Embedded within the AITCP is anaction plan that identifies the high-levelgoals and objectives as well as theorganizational responsibilities for re-fining and executing the actions. Ulti-mately, this will serve to synchronizethe activities of the entire Army Intelli-gence community on the journey thatis Army Transformation.

Crucial to the AITCP is a sound as-sessment of our shortcomings anddesired capabilities. By examining thedoctrine, training, leadership, organi-zational, materiel, soldiers, and policy(DTLOMS-P) impacts, we begin toidentify solutions that, considered inthe light of other intelligence issues,lead to solidified Army positions. Inturn, the output, the electronic AIMP(eAIMP), is the primary means of dis-seminating the established Army po-sitions on intelligence-related issues.The eAIMP is the virtual home of theAITCP. As the eAIMP evolves, it willfoster sharing and facilitating discus-sion among the Army Intelligencecommunity. The eAIMP website (http://aimp.dami.army.smil.mil) is a valu-able resource for all military intelli-gence (MI) professionals.

Data Management. The AIMP pullsdata from more than a dozen dispar-ate Army corporate databases to as-sess issues critical to the MI forceand to provide answers on force struc-

Figure 1. The AIMP functions of the primary participants.

Army Intelligence Master PlanArmy Intelligence Master Plan


ture, manpower, and programmatics.This AIMP program, called the Ana-lytic Assessment Tool (AAT), providesa detailed analysis of MI programs forthe current year through the ArmyProgram Objective Memorandum(POM) years and enables action of-ficers and senior leaders alike to makeinformed decisions on the future MIforce. It is the data warehouse forArmy.

Intelligence – the “one-stop shop” fordocumenting and facilitating analysisabout how we want to look in the fu-ture. The ability to derive the right an-swer at the right time to enable adecision is key to enabling Army In-telligence Transformation.

Decision Support Tools. The AIMPhas developed automated decisionsupport tools to map future Army In-telligence requirements against pro-jected budgets. These tools helpidentify unfunded requirements andassist action officers and decision-makers to determine “bill payers” forthe future force.

The first of these tools is the Na-tional Foreign Intelligence Program In-telligence Investment Strategy(NFIPI2S) which is a prototype deci-

sion tool designed to support programdevelopment for those elements andactivities of the National Foreign Intel-ligence Program (NFIP) that fall un-der Army supervision.

The second decision support tool isthe Force Development IntelligenceInvestment Strategy (FDI2S), a robustprototype software tool to supportanalysis and presentation of the ArmyTotal Obligation Authority by portray-ing funding data from the appropriateArmy databases. Although developedand used for Army Intelligence, in rec-ognition of its powerful analysis ca-pability, the Army has mandated FDI2Sfor use by every battlefield functionalarea in the Office of the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Programs to build theArmy’s POM.

Final Thoughts. The MI leadershippresented the Army Intelligence Visionand essential parts of the AITCP at theSeptember 2001 Army Worldwide Intel-ligence Conference (held at FortHuachuca). The presentation docu-ments are available on the eAIMP. AIMPencourages all MI professionals to be-come involved in the transformation ofArmy Intelligence. You must speak thelanguage, understand, and embraceArmy Transformation so you can help

define and implement Army IntelligenceTransformation. AIMP, through the AITCPand eAIMP, will facilitate the discussionand document the effort. We need theinvolvement of the entire MI Corps totransform Army Intelligence to achievethe goal of providing the Army with deci-sion dominance on the battlefields of thefuture. We must remain “Always OutFront” and the AIMP is integral to thatchallenge.

Keith Masback is the Director of the ArmyIntelligence Master Plan (AIMP), Headquar-ters, Department of the Army, Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence(ODCSINT). During his Army service, Mr.Masback was an Infantry officer with theBerlin Brigade, transitioned to the MilitaryIntelligence Branch and then served withthe XVIIIth Airborne Corps. He served in theODCSINT Initiatives Group and as the Mili-tary Assistant to the DCSINT. In his finalposition as an active duty officer, he man-aged requirements and resourcing for theArmy’s Tactical Exploitation of NationalCapabilities (TENCAP) Program. Most re-cently, Mr. Masback served as the DeputyDirector of the Director’s Initiatives Groupat the National Imagery and Mapping Agency(NIMA). He holds a Bachelor of Arts degreein Political Science from Gettysburg Col-lege, completed the Post-Graduate Intelli-gence Program, and is a candidate for aMaster of Science in Strategic Intelligencefrom the Joint Military Intelligence College,Defense Intelligence Agency.

New Website for Future LeadersCompanyCommand.com is a website dedicated to company-level leaders who want to learn and share their ideason command issues from a myriad of topics ranging from leadership to Army policies. Eight Army officers currentlyassigned as staff and faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, operateCompanyCommand.com during their off-duty hours without remuneration. The website offers many interestingtopics such command philosophies, Army policies, leadership counseling, officer professional development (OPD),and even a recommended professional reading program.

The website’s goal is to improve the institutional knowledge at the company-level of Army leadership by improvingthe lateral flow of information. Its purpose is to serve as a user-driven forum in which former and current companycommanders share their best ideas, products, and lessons learned to benefit current and future company com-manders. Infantry Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, the site founders, commented that their sole purpose ishelping leaders to grow great units and soldiers.

CompanyCommand.com has established a section organized by branch that links unique experiences andcompetencies of former and current commanders. For the intelligence community, the website lists military intelli-gence contacts including three former MI company commanders who are volunteer mentors. The operators of thesite plan to expand it with platoon leader tools for those junior leaders.

Among the site’s other offerings are the “command tools” section with professional presentations, lessonslearned, surveys, and stories from the contributors. There are quizzes, after-action reviews, tactical scenarios,monthly updates, and more. The web site also provides its users with links to other military websites.

CompanyCommand.com’s popularity has increased since its debut in February 2000. The number of “hits” hasincreased from 11,114 hits in February to more than 600,000 hits as of 30 September.


Doctrine CornerDoctrine Corner

by Michael P. Ley

For the analyst, the types of opera-tions conducted since the Gulf Warhave followed no particular pattern;each operation offered its ownunique challenge not only to theNational Command Authority (NCA)but also to the analyst tasked withproviding intelligence for the deci-sion-makers. The unique environ-ments could include any combinationof mission and location (“unique”being both a physical environmentand a “type” of operation for whichthere is a lack of current operationalexperience by U.S. military forces).Such operations and environmentsmight include–

Urban.Mountain.Littoral.

Counterterrorist.Nuclear, biological, and chemi-cal (NBC).Many others.

For the intelligence analyst, theorder to prepare to deploy in sup-port of an operation in a unique envi-ronment often presents the problemof “where to start?” Focused train-ing opportunities such as the mis-sion readiness exercises (MREs)that prepare our units for deploy-ments to Bosnia and Kosovo maybe missing. Instead, the intelligenceanalyst’s experience may be morealong conventional lines, such asforce-on-force offensive and defen-sive operations. As well trained ashe may be for the conventionalbattleground, he may find he is ill-prepared to cope with the threats

identified on 11 September 2001.One example is preparing for opera-tions in an urban environment inwhich, according to Marine GeneralCharles C. Krulak, he may find the“three-block war,”1 an environment inwhich peacekeeping, humanitarianaid, and full-scale combat operationsmay occur simultaneously and withinblocks of each other.

The physical environment mayalso offer unique challenges. For ex-ample, a study of the Fulda Gapmight include its vegetation, eleva-tion, and percent of slope datum,location of water sources, and oth-ers. Now overlay those physical el-ements with the population, layout,infrastructure, and cultural aspectsof a major metropolitan area and youbegin to see the challenge.

The Intelligence Analyst andUnique Environments

Even before 11 September 2001, the end of the Cold War; the proliferation of regional, ethnic, and religiousconfrontations; and the increasing number of stability operations and support operations had forced a change

in the way the Army’s intelligence analysts conducted business. The tragedies in New York and Washington, theanthrax menace, and the still unknown threats posed by terrorist organizations have again changed the way theintelligence analyst must think. Today’s threats and missions span all aspects of full-spectrum operations. Evenworse, the analyst might face several of these threats simultaneously. This was not the case during the Cold Warwhen the focus was on the Soviet Union and both nations faced the same threats and, for the most part, addressedthem in the same manner.

The soldiers of the Gulf War understood Warsaw Pact doctrine well and the United States had, over the years,refined the analytical processes to address it. Today’s analysts must seek innovative solutions to increasinglycomplex problems and threats. “The Doctrinal Corner” will serve as one means to identify potential solutions tothese problems by providing intelligence professionals with the latest in emerging doctrine. Future issues of theMilitary Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) will focus on homeland defense, counterterrorist operations,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other topics. Its accomplishment, however, requires inputfrom two sources. The Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), willprovide the baseline or emerging doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for your review. You, theintelligence professional, must then respond by addressing, through your submission of articles to the MIPB, theeffectiveness of this doctrine and identify new methods and TTP that may have merit. Together, through the MIPBmedium, all will benefit.


Figure 1. Sample Urban Analytical Framework.

What was necessary was ananalytical tool that allowed analyststo focus on the important elementsof the target environment (mission,terrain, and threat). They must do soin a timely manner, and accomplishit while working within the four-stepIPB process.

The result was development of theAnalytical Framework and AnalyticalWorksheet (shown in Figures 1 and2, respectively). The analyticalframework and worksheet are inter-dependent, the framework providing

a graphic aid showing both the criti-cal elements and a process for reach-ing understanding of a situation. Notethat the framework identifies this pro-cess through labeling each elementas a “step.” This step process will pro-vide a logical methodology in identify-ing the critical details of the urbanareas. Like the rest of the frameworkdesign, however, the user defines andmodifies it as desired. Finally, theanalytical worksheet serves as thedata-recording element of the frame-work-worksheet combination and is be

maintainable in both analog and digi-tal formats.

The Urban Analytical Framework inFigure 1 reflects use of this method-ology and process. We chose to dis-cuss the urban environment becauseof its complex nature and the factthat since 1995 the larger Army con-tingencies have been in and aroundurban areas. The twelve elementsidentified on the framework resultedfrom lengthy discussions held at theJoint level. Participants includedrepresentatives of the British Army,


Figure 2. Sample Urban Analytical Worksheet.

Urban Analytical Worksheet


the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), andall U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) proponentsunder the guidance of the CombinedArms MOUT (military operations onurbanized terrain) Task Force. Oneshould not, however, assume thatthese elements were the only onesidentified. This framework focused onthose elements deemed most criti-cal to planners and analysts at theoperational level. The division and bri-gade levels should develop additionalframeworks and worksheets. Belowbrigade, the level of detail more accu-rately reflects elements identified bythe OCOKA (observation and fields offire,concealment and cover, obstacles,key terrain, avenue of approach) fac-tors.

We must emphasize that we in-tended the twelve elements only asa blueprint. The elements employedin any framework are user defined.The intelligence analyst shouldcarefully choose the framework’selements in such a manner as toallow him to address an existingneed. We should also note thatwork on the framework might beginin garrison, at the first indicationthat a unit will deploy, or even aspart of contingency planning. Ini-tial data sources may include thevarious readiness packages, Na-tional Imagery and Mapping Agency(NIMA) products, commercial pub-lications, or other sources.

As seen in the framework, the firsteight elements identify the physicalattributes of the urban environment.

These would seem to place moreemphasis on the physical propertiesthan on the remaining elements;however, we developed this sampleframework specifically to support astudy of Pristina, Kosovo. Other situ-ations may call for the identificationof different elements. Any elementmay develop additional frameworksat any time to show a higher resolu-tion for that specific element asneeded. This would hold true espe-cially through a corps level exercisewhere the G2 wished to see thepoints of focus not only at corps butalso at each division and brigade. Bynetting and linking the various frame-works to show the focus of the infor-mation collection and analyticalefforts, we can accomplish this eas-ily. Additional information on this pro-cess will be available in Chapter 5,ST 2-01.3-1. (Untitled).

In using the analytical framework andworksheet process, the analyst de-termines the details of the elementidentified on the framework andrecords the information on theworksheet where it is available for lateranalysis. When he has identified andrecorded the details of all elements,the analyst has not only an initialframework portraying his environmentbut also has achieved focus on hisefforts. Additionally, this provides botha tool and a methodology within theIPB process to accomplish the analy-sis mission. Other uses of these toolsinclude—

Providing the potential for rapidresponse to the commander’s

initial priority intelligence re-quirements (PIR).Serving as a ready-made brief-ing tool.Providing user-defined level ofdetai l on any element orsubelement under study.Identifying information gaps.Identifying patterns (patternanalysis).Assisting with visualizationand understanding.Providing a graphic illustrationof the urban operations criticalelements.

More work is necessary to refinethis process, and the author solic-its input and recommendations fromusers. Additional research may beconducted at the Doctrine Websiteat http://usaic.hua.army.mil/DOC-TRINE/dlbs.htm and at the MOUTHomepage, http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453.

Endnotes

1. Remarks for The National Press Clubon 10 October 1997.

Mr. Michael Ley is a doctrine writer and theManaging Editor, Military IntelligenceProfessional Bulletin (MIPB), in the Doc-trine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen-ter and Fort Huachuca. He served two toursin Vietnam as a Military Advisor, MilitaryAssistance Command Vietnam (MACV)Team #62, and later served in a variety ofelectronic warfare, collection management,operational testing, and topographic posi-tions. He retired from the U.S. Army in 1990.Readers may reach him via E-mail [email protected] and by telephoneat (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979.

MIPB is pleased to announce the Writers of the Quarter are 1st place, MajorChristopher J. Tatarka for his article “Overcoming Biases in Military ProblemAnalysis and Decision-Making” and runner-up is, Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D.for his article “Strategic Analysis: To Hear the Thunder.” Congratulations towinners and thanks to all of our authors for their articles, book reviews, andletters to the editor. Contributions like yours make MIPB the professional forumfor military intelligence professionals.

Writer of the Quarter


by Colonel Kevin C. Peterson

Prophet is the U.S. Army’s next gen-eration, multispectrum, multi-disciplinecollection, jamming, processing, andreporting system. The Prophet sys-tem will be modular, scalable,deployable, and tailorable to addressthe full range of conflict required ofthe U.S. Army.

The initial version is the high-mobilitymultipurpose wheeled vehicle(HMMWV)-mounted Prophet sys-tem. Prophet also has a dismountedmanpack capability, which isuniquely suitable for airborne inser-tion and early entry into thebattlespace. Prophet’s primary mis-sion will be to provide around-the-clock, all weather, enhancedsituational awareness and situ-ational understanding to maneuvercommanders in near-real time (NRT).It will do this through the detection,collection, and exploitation ofradiofrequency (RF) emissions(Blocks I through V), as well as col-lected signatures and measurementdata (Blocks IV and V). Prophet’ssecondary mission will be to providean array of nonlethal technology(Blocks II, IV, and V), which will beable to interrupt, spoof, disrupt, ordisable select target command andcontrol (C2) nodes.

Prophet will consist of ground RFand measurement collection plat-forms that operate in direct supportof the maneuver unit. The systemwill provide “niche” sensor coverageto support full-spectrum operations.Prophet’s “niche” coverage will providereinforcing and NRT intelligence totactical maneuver commanders undera variety of deployed configurations(division, brigade, regiment, task force,etc.). This intelligence will provide–

! Perceptive environmental sur-veys.

! Indications and warning.! Location, tracking, and identifi-

cation of hostile forces andequipment.

! Determination of enemy plansand intentions.

It will also serve to cross-cue otherbattlefield sensors (e.g., TacticalUnmanned Aerial Vehicle [TUAV],the Future Combat System of Sys-tems [FCSS], and Firefinder radars),as well as to provide amplifying datato confirm indications and collectionfrom other battlefield sensors.

Prophet disseminates intelligenceinformation on the battlefield througha Prophet control (PC) element col-located with the brigade tactical op-erations center (TOC). PCs willperform emitter mapping and nodalanalysis on Prophet-derived intelli-gence, and then forward timely andaccurate targeting information, intel-ligence products, and predictions onprobable enemy courses of actionto the brigade commander. TheProphet control element will providereports to higher echelons usingstandard, digital reporting formatsand voice reporting functionality.Envisioned to operate at the Secretcollateral level only, PC will provideC2 and technical steerage to Prophetsystems and receive situational up-dates and supplementary taskingfrom higher echelons. We will fieldeach set of Prophets with a PC op-erated by four soldiers: two signalsintelligence (SIGINT) Analysts (mili-tary occupational specialty [MOS]98C) and two Communications In-tercept/Locators (MOS 98H).

Since the Prophet program designis for a five-block, acquisition strat-egy program, PC will include follow-on block preplanned productimprovements (P3Is) over the nextfive years. The initial phase PC willonly consist of automation and com-munications equipment. Two All-Source Analysis System-Light(ASAS-L) workstations will comple-ment the PC. ASAS-L workstationsconnected through a local-area net-work (LAN) will provide a distributedprocessing environment for access-ing and managing intelligence dataand information. These workstationswill host a core set of common ap-plications, services, and tools thatappropriate intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR)sensor planning, management, andpresentation software can augmentor update. This software tool set will–

! Enable analysts to research anddetermine traffic densities andnetwork structures.

! Locate emitters.! Display historical trends in elec-

tronic order of battle (EOB).! Produce tactical, multiple intel-

ligence discipline (“multi-INT”)reports.

These tools will also assist the op-erator in interrogation and the re-trieval, processing, and correlationof intelligence information frommulti-INT databases. Operators willuse these workstations to receiveand process Prophet’s digital intel-ligence reports and to provide tech-nical tasking.

As we add the P3I upgrades, PC willmigrate into a multi-INT processingrole and possess the capability to

Analysis the Prophet Way

TSM NotesTSM Notes


by Michel M. Strack

In October 2001, the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) System Manager(TSM) ASAS participated in thesuccessful Division Capstone Ex-ercise Phase II (DCX II) held at FortHood, Texas. This was a goodopportunity to observe the proto-type ASAS Remote Workstation(RWS) Version 6.2.1 software in acommand post exercise (CPX).

While much work remains to bedone, the results were encouraging.Presented below is a brief discus-sion of some problem areas and pos-sible solutions.

Problem Areas and Opera-tor Concerns

The most significant problem con-tinues to be with the stability of thecommon tactical picture (CTP). DCXII produced 38 known trouble reports

generated due to problems with theCTP; these reports described thesystem’s inability to send, receive,or plot operational overlays from theCTP Explorer due to lock-up andbooting problems. Throughout theCPX, the tactical operation centers(TOCs) observed that when the CTPwas stable and operational, the ana-lysts sometimes had to input graph-ics multiple times. Thus, aside fromprobing into the various stability is-

The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) at DCX II

conduct operations mounted on-board a single vehicle. The PC ve-hicle will have a small but capableanalysis, control, and technicalsteerage ability. This capability willpermit system operators to receivelarge amounts of incoming data–such as lines-of-bearing (LOBs) andmeasurement and signature datafrom seismic, acoustic, or infraredsensors–and efficiently fuse this datawith non-Prophet sensor data, suchas moving target indicator data fromthe Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (Joint STARS).Prophet analysts will be able to con-vert the “blobology” of undefined dataintersects into solid identifications,verified by fusing target matches inand across several databases.

The PC will have an on-the-move(OTM) capability that gives the tac-tical commander the flexibility tomonitor new developments duringhighly fluid operations and while re-deploying a TOC. Objectively, the PCelement will also serve as theexfiltration node for remoting se-lected voice-grade channels tohigher echelons for further exploita-tion. Remoting is essential to ex-tend collection baselines tomaximize collection, exploitation,and lethality.

The PC element will be capable ofdigitally interfacing with the sup-ported division well as the tacticalwarfighter “at the point of the spear.”

The Army will upgrade PC’s worksta-tions to be interoperable (informationexchange) with the Army Battle Com-mand System (ABCS) suite and theGlobal Command and Control Sys-tem (GCCS) baselines. As the ex-tended battlespace grows and thespeed of operations increases, PCwill be able to provide for the rapidprocessing, analysis, and through-put of ISR information. PC’s primaryinterface will be the signals and sig-natures enclaves of the DivisionCommon Ground Station-Army(DCGS-A). At the brigade level, PCwill preprocess Prophet-derived in-telligence for subsequent digital in-jection into the supported battlecommand system enroute to theapplicable DCGS-A enclave. PCworkstations will interface with au-tomated C2 and intelligence pro-cessing systems over variousbattlefield communications sys-tems. These communications arevital to the exchange of informationwith other Prophet systems, brigadeoperational and intelligence ele-ments, ISR integration cells, andapplicable DCGS-A. We will accom-plish all multi-sensor (SIGINT andmeasurement and signature intelli-gence [MASINT]) tasking, reporting,cross-correlation of databases, al-gorithm updates, and remoting ofsignals within this framework.

Additionally, P3I will include a PCelement with the ability to receive

collateral Integrated Broadcast Sys-tem (IBS) data digitally, as well asthe ability to inject Prophet-derivedintelligence data and reports intoIBS. Increasing the commander’sability to leverage and cross-cueavailable sensors, PC’s ability totransmit reports enables the shar-ing of Prophet-derived data withother ISR assets operating in the-ater, thus enhancing the supportedcommander’s overall operational ef-fectiveness.

Maneuver commanders on thehigh-speed battlefield of today re-quire the capability to respond rap-idly to changing operationalscenarios that PC and the Prophetsuite of systems provide. PC will bethe critical link between Prophet, itssupported commander, and higherechelons. The PC element’s abilityto process, correlate, fuse, and dis-play Prophet-derived intelligencedata will meet these demands andwill ensure the lethality and surviv-ability of U.S. forces in the field.

Colonel Kevin Peterson is the U.S. Army Train-ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Sys-tem Manager-Prophet (TSM Prophet) at theU.S. Army Intelligence Center and FortHuachuca (USAIC&FH). Readers may con-tact him via E-mail at [email protected] and telephonically at (520) 533-5579 or DSN 821-5579. You may also contactthe Deputy TSM, Major Mark Oleksiak, [email protected].


sues, we are also looking at devel-oping a way to convert ASAS over-lays to operational overlays and viceversa.

Soldiers experienced with the RWSVersion 4.3 systems were generallydisappointed with the Version 6.2.1.The common complaint was that theintelligence functions in the Version 6system did not meet the standard setby the earlier version and the overrid-ing concern was that the Version 6system is inflexible and unreliable.However, many of the soldiers’ con-cerns were actually with the ArmyBattlefield Command System’s(ABCS) foundation software ratherthan the Version 6 ASAS. Observa-tions of the RWSs revealed unex-plained lock-ups and screen freezeswhen multiple operations and pro-

cesses were running in the back-ground. When the operators updatedtheir databases with new information,the systems would often lock duringthe data entry. As usual, the soldiersand contract technicians were ableto find “work-arounds” like minimiz-ing the other processes running atthe same time; this increased sys-tem stability and restored reasonableprocessing speeds.Solutions

TSM ASAS is committed to sup-port the digitalized Army. To shift ourfocus from the “boxes” to the battle,we are examining improved ways totransfer data between computers andsystems. We will overcome the soft-ware complexities and improve thereliability and stability of our systems.In doing so, we focus on supporting

the transformation effort at the U.S.Army Intelligence Center. One areathat must continue to evolve is thetraining of competent digital opera-tors–at both the initial entry and ad-vanced levels–who are proficientlytrained on ASAS with good under-standing of the total ABCS Version6 environment. Training should startwith a familiarity of the ABCS prod-ucts and later include the basiccross-system troubleshooting.

Mr. Michel Strack is the Acting TSM forASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at [email protected] andtelephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN821-3504. The Deputy TSM is LieutenantColonel Vic Fink. Readers can reach himby E-mail at james.fink@ hua.army.mil andby telephone at (520) 533-5145 or DSN821-5145.

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Distance LearningUpdate

to teach soldiers to effectively adaptto unknown and/or rapidly changingenvironments. The courseware cre-ated in this authentic environmentrequires collaboration and can bemedia intensive when using a signifi-cant bandwidth requirement. To pro-duce courseware, the ConstructivistLearning Theory by J. Bruner is usedas the basis for instructional designstrategies. Analysis showed IPDBStechnology as the most efficient wayto meet audience requirements glo-bally and deliver high fidelity prod-ucts combined with full motionmulti-point collaboration. In theory,constructive and virtual simulationscould also be distributed to thehome.

We can ascertain that those whoare most successful in the informa-tion age warfare and global com-merce are those immersed in theinformation age techniques as a cul-ture. Integrating our training withcommunication and entertainment inthe home will in turn mature the userbase needed for global competition.Soldiers and civilians will becomeglobally ready when the informationage is commonplace, just as thetelephone and television are today.

The benefits will transfer from el-ementary to higher education, andon into the business sectors na-tionwide providing an industrialbase that will allow the UnitedStates to be more competitive in aglobal economy. An ancillary ben-efit could be an increase in thenumber and quality of potential re-cruits who may be introduced to

the military ethos in their formativeyears.

The Intelligence Center is propos-ing a government and industry ar-rangement that would implement a1000 user pilot over two years. Thiswill validate the potential to capital-ize on IPDBS return path technol-ogy in conjunction with coursewareplatforms optimized for real-time de-livery. The business model will pro-vide the impetus needed to sustainindustry support as economies ofscale create competitive pricing thatwill lower the government cost to dis-tribute in-home training to more us-ers. This results in higher qualityproducts and services delivered tomore users for considerably lowercost than the Army currently spendsfor distance learning, a pervasive mar-ket base for industry, and a techni-cally competent, competitive country.

New! Anti-terrorism training is nowavailable at the MI Distance LearningWebsite. Lessons are web-deliveredand self-paced; instruction that youcan download includes anti-terrorism,intelligence in combating terrorism,and SAEDA (subversion and espio-nage directed against the Army). Youmay access some of this training viathe Distance Learning Website atwww.intel.army.mil/. Some lessonsare currently available on CD-ROM onlyand can be requested via E-mail [email protected]. You can reach theDL point of contact, Mike Dascanio,at [email protected].

Broadband IntelligenceBroadband IntelligenceBroadband IntelligenceBroadband IntelligenceBroadband IntelligenceTraining SystemTraining SystemTraining SystemTraining SystemTraining System

The Training Development Director-ate, Futures Development IntegrationCenter, USAIC&FH, is introducing abroadband intelligence training sys-tem designed to provide high fidelityadaptive training with collaborativelearning environments to soldier andcivilian homes that will not com-promise operational security. Thetraining available includes counter-intelligence, intelligence analyst,force protection, and foreign languagetraining for active and reserve com-ponent military professionals.

The commercial broadband tech-nology will be used as a way toprovide high bandwidth for Internet-based training and collaboration tosoldier and civilian homes. TheInternet Protocol Direct BroadcastSatellite (IPDBS) technology, com-bined with software for asynchro-nous and synchronous learningenvironments, exploit the technologyand implement cost savings, particu-larly when bundled with existing com-munications and entertainmentservices.

The proposed initiative comple-ments The Army Distance LearningProgram by extending training fromthe classroom to the entity level. Wepostulate that integrated services tothe home will allow training to be-come part of the user’s lifelong cul-ture in a convenient environment thatfacilitates growth, and optimizestime. One advantage is the advance-ment of warfighters from analog tothe digital environment.

In addition to delivering courseware,the Intelligence Center is challenged

Distance LearningDistance Learning


by LTC Rich Holden

Why do we need principles of war? Ac-cording to LTC Bob Leonhard’s book, ThePrinciples of War for the InformationAge, “Principles serve to make us do thingsthat we would otherwise not naturally do ofour own accord. Principles are intended tochange behavior.” Well, that is exactly whathe proposes, and demands, with his newset of principles of war—to change ourmilitary behavior in order to fight and win inthe information age. LTC Leonhard sets thestage for introducing his new principles byconducting a great forensic analysis of thecurrent principles, how they came to be,how some should never have been prin-ciples, and how all but two are no longerrelevant.

Our steady transformation from analog todigital is changing the way we operate innew and different ways every day. If weare truly “in the midst of a ‘revolution inmilitary affairs’” then part of this revolutionneeds to start with the Industrial Age prin-ciples of war, according to LTC Leonhard.This book is even more relevant now thatwe have begun to use the new contempo-rary operational environment (COE) withits new opposing force (OPFOR) as theframework against which we plan all Armytraining. LTC Leonhard issues a challengeto the reader “to question...175 years ofmilitary convention and usage.” It is a chal-lenge that we must take up if we are to besuccessful in information age warfare.

The principles of war are a mental frame-work developed to address problems inwarfare. The currently accepted Principles,better remembered by the acronymMOSSMOUSE (mass, objective, security,surprise, maneuver, offensive, unity of com-mand, simplicity, economy of force), are aset of tactical ideas we have extrapolated,over time, to operational and strategic levels.A problem with the current principles istrying to determine to what level of conflictthey should be applied, given that all of theprinciples started at the level of the tacticalbattle. Since every problem is different,military professionals have to apply andadapt their own experience and judgmentwhile following the principle’s guidance.However, this application by military lead-ers throughout history has varied greatly,and LTC Leonhard’s examples from WorldWar I highlight some of the worst casesof not adapting (the Battle of the Somme,for example).

With the principles of war being one ofthe foundations of our doctrine, anotherimportant issue that LTC Leonhard raisesthroughout the book is this: Which comesfirst, doctrine or technology? He statesthat “Doctr ine typical ly lags behind

technology...sometimes leading to disaster,”which he highlights in his discussion of theprinciple of Surprise. He shows how Sur-prise will remain a principle that appliesto not only tactical surprise, but also totechnical surprise (the extreme example isthe atomic bomb use which led to the defeatof Japan in World War II—their “disaster”).With a view toward the new FM 3-0, Op-erations, the ongoing Army Transformationand the development of the Interim BrigadeCombat Teams (IBCTs), the various BattleLabs, and the Advanced Warfighting Experi-ments (AWEs), has the Army finally realizedthe need to get doctrine up to technology’sspeed? The AWEs include the Task ForceXXI AWE in March 1997, the Division AWE(DAWE), in November 1997, the Joint Con-tingence Force AWE in 2000, the DivisionCapstone Exercise (DCX) I this past Marchat the National Training Center (NTC), andthe November 2001 DCX II at Fort Hood, Texas.

Since a large part of the exercisesmentioned above revolve around simula-tions, LTC Leonhard hits the nail on the headconcerning simulations and their effects onthe results of “doctrinal degeneration” onthe Army. A commonly heard phrase withinBattle Command Training Program (BCTP) isthat “BCTP has taught the Army as many badideas as good ones.” Since BCTP primarilyuses simulations for its brigade throughARFOR level exercises, this concern aboutsimulations is well founded. However, asthe Chief of Staff of the Army has stated atnumerous after-action reviews regardingsimulations used, “It is about warfighting, it isnot warfighting.” As LTC Leonhard correctlypoints out, part of this “doctrinal degenera-tion” derives from the fact that OPFOR insimulations have always fought to the verylast soldier. This has caused us to becometarget-and precision strike-centric in orderto destroy the OPFOR down to that lastsoldier while not taking into account thesynergistic effects of combined-armswarfare or the moral dimensions of war.Fortunately, this approach is changing.Coding changes are in the works so thatthe COE OPFOR will not fight to the lastperson, and we are building several levelsof disengagement criteria into the currentand future versions of simulations (the corpsbattle simulation specifically).

LTC Leonhard uses an interestingframework for discussing the necessarychanges from the current Principles tohis new set. His use of a Civil War battle inwestern Maryland in September 1862 worksvery well by highlighting the differences be-tween the current and proposed principlesin terms of known and potential outcomesof the battle.

With that framework in place, and afterdissecting all of the current principles, LTC

Leonhard lays out his three Laws of Warand his seven Principles of War. As a resultof his analysis of the current principles, hedescribes for the reader why there are threeLaws of War which have risen from andabove the principles: the Law of Humanity,the Law of Economy, and the Law of Duality.The first law exists because all warfare isa human endeavor in one form or another.Warfare is a most “wasteful enterprise,”since “one must economize as much aspossible,” to win and hence we have hissecond law. Nested within his second lawis an intriguing truth on the purpose ofintelligence: “Information leads to a preciseexpenditure of resources, and therefore toeconomy. Indeed, the entire purpose ofintelligence in warfare is to economize—to inform our efforts in order to gain effect atthe least cost.”

His final proposed law, the Law of Duality,lays the foundation for his proposed Prin-ciples of War. A senior observer in a BCTPexercise recently highlighted this duality ofwarfare by stating, “If you ain’t attacking,you’re defending!” Therefore, all of LTCLeonhard’s pr inciples have a dual ,double-edged nature. There is one inde-pendent principle, Knowledge and Ignorance.This principle underlies the reason we haveintelligence professionals. Additionally, LTCLeonhard, while an apparent fan of MilitaryIntelligence, also issues some seriouschallenges to us with the statement “Ourintelligence doctrine and processes—arguably the best in the world—areinextricably bound up with this idea: Weare fundamental ly ignorant of theenemy’s whereabouts and intentions,and so we estimate the future.” With thischallenge, he proposes that we need tochange from “estimate-based” planningto “truth-based” planning. This needs tohappen to a degree; however, we willstill have to estimate our enemy’s futureintentions. The rest of his proposed prin-ciples are—! Aggression: dislocation and

confrontation, and distributionand concentration.

! Interaction: opportunity and reac-tion, and activity and security.

! Control: option acceleration andobjective, and command andanarchy.

In conclusion, The Principles of War forthe Information Age, is worth readingand discussing in a variety of forums. Hisanalysis of the current principles of war isoutstanding. His proposed new principlesof war are worthy of incorporating into ourdoctrine as we develop our 21st centuryinformation age military behavior.

LTC Leonhard includes a great annotated“Works Cited” that contains one of the bestcomments from the whole book. On the oft-quoted Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, hestates, “Many commentators on Clausewitzhave missed the tremendous applicationof his thought to future warfare, fixed asthey are on endless semantic debate.Read Clausewitz; he is smarter thathis interpreters. [Emphasis added]”

Professional ReaderProfessional ReaderThe Principles of War for the Information Age by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard,Novato, CA, (Presidio Press, Inc., 1998), 287 pages, paperback 1995.


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From Out Front

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin2002-03

Themes and Deadline for Article Submission

Issue Theme Deadline Apr-Jun EAC 5 Jan 02 Jul-Sep Homeland 5 Apr 02 Security Oct-Dec ISR Integration 5 Jul 02 Jan-Mar Battlefield Visualization 5 Oct 02 and Presentation Apr-Jun Force Protection 5 Jan 03 Jul-Sep Information 5 Apr 03 Operations

The 743d MI Battalion traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Head-quarters Detachment, Detachment Army Security Agency (ASA) Troop Command, and 7200thAdministrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. On 8 November1963, the ASA Troop Command redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group.With the redesignation of the ASA as the United States Army Intelligence and Security Com-mand (INSCOM) in 1977, the ASA Support Group became the Continental United StatesMilitary Intelligence Group on 1 November 1977. In March 1980, the Army redesignated thegroup as the 704th MI Brigade.

On 3 October 1989, the 743d MI Battalion provisionally activated and the Department ofthe Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th MI Brigade. In July1998, the Battalion underwent major reorganization as the Headquarters moved to Colo-rado. With the move came a marked change in mission.

The 743d MI Battalion’s mission is to support the joint military support activity at the BuckleyAir National Guard Base. They provide continuous worldwide signals and technically de-rived intelligence operations to satisfy national, joint, combined, and Army information supe-riority requirements. The Battalion has supported every contingency operation in which theUnited States has participated since 1989.

The unit achieved the award of two National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citations and theNational Security Agency-sponsored Travis Trophy in recognition of service sites and unitsmaking significant contributions to the national cryptologic effort. The 743d MI Battalion alsoearned the Cypher Wheel Award.

Beyond All Boundaries!

743d Military Intelligence Battalion743d Military Intelligence Battalion743d Military Intelligence Battalion743d Military Intelligence Battalion743d Military Intelligence BattalionThe distinctive unit insignia for the 743d MI Bat-talion is a silver-color metal and enamel deviceconsisting of a medium blue oval gridlined sil-ver delta flight symbol, enclosed in base by ablack scroll inscribed with the unit motto in sil-ver; overall, a diagonally crossed black dag-ger and yellow lightning flash. Oriental blue andsilver gray (silver) are the traditional colors ofthe Military Intelligence Corps. Black and white/silver denote the day and night continuous op-erations conducted by elements of the unit, aswell as the covert and overt nature of the bat-talion. The black dagger symbolizes stealth andmilitary preparedness, as soldiers of the bat-talion are continually prepared for worldwide de-ployment with and for warfighters. The flashdenotes speed and accuracy, as well as thebattalion’s ability to provide worldwide communications and intelligence support. The gridlinedoval represents the global mission of the unit and its soldiers’ widespread deployment. Thedelta flight symbol extending beyond the boundaries of the globe symbolizes the unit’s as-sociation with space and its mission to exploit space-based assets, and underscores theunit’s motto, “Beyond All Boundaries.”