Future Long-Range Strike:Resetting the Balance of

Stand-in and Stand-off Forces

Mark Gunzinger

Director of Future Conceptsand Capability Assessments

• What’s the issue? o Understanding stand-off and stand-in

(penetrating) strike capabilities

o The diminished U.S. bomber force

o An unbalanced force mix

• Factors that should shape thefuture force balance

o Stand-off ranges for non-stealth strike platforms

o Weapon effectiveness against mobile/relocatable, hardened/deeply buried targets

o Weapons cost and cost-per-effect

• An arsenal plane: quick and cheap?

Overview

2

Describing “stand-off” and “stand-in”

Uncontested

Airspace

Contested

Airspace

Highly Contested

Airspace

Direct

attacksShort-range stand-off

(or “stand-in”) attacksLong-range

stand-off attacks

Long-Range Stand-off Weapons Short-Range Stand-off Weapons Direct Attack Weapons

Tomahawk cruise missile, JASSM-ER, etc. SDB II, Joint Standoff Weapon, etc. JDAMs, Quickstrike mines, etc.

• Ranges more than 400 nm

• Typically powered to extend range

• Enable attacks by non-stealth aircraft from outside contestedareas

• Ranges up to 400 nm

• Winged/glide capable, may also be powered to extend range

• Enables attacks from beyond the most lethal ranges of some point defenses

• Ranges of single digit to low 10s of nm

• Weapons are typically unpowered

• Must be released close to targets

Threats increasingly long range

Threats increasingly long range

3

Today’s bomber force is too small

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

375

400

425FY

18

FY1

9

FY2

0

FY2

1

FY2

2

FY2

3

FY2

4

FY2

5

FY2

6

FY2

7

FY2

8

FY2

9

FY3

0

FY3

1

FY3

2

FY3

3

FY3

4

FY3

5

FY3

6

FY3

7

FY3

8

FY3

9

FY4

0

B-21 estimated procurement ramp

Current

Air Force’s Stated Minimum Requirement

End of Cold War

USA

F To

tal B

om

be

r In

ven

tory

Inventory will not recover to FY2020 level

until the mid-2030s

Bomberbathtub

B-1B (stand-off)

B-52H (stand-off)

B-2 (penetrating)

4

Bomber force lacks sufficient sortie capacity

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

16

26

44

76 B-52H

27

13

Total Bomber Inventory

Primary Mission Bombers Assigned to Combat Units

Mission Capable Bombers

63% B-2

61% B-52H

52% B-1B

Estimated Mission Capable Rates

8-10

45 B-1B

20 B-2These 50 mission-capable bombers

could generate about 30 sorties per day depending on mission ranges/durations

Inventory after 17 B-1Bs are retired in FY2021

and is unbalanced

5

Both have advantages and disadvantages

• Both can strike on night-one to achieve time-sensitive objectives

• Both increase survivability of the force

• Stand-off strike platforms must use long-range weapons

• Stand-in bombers can employ short-range/direct attack weapons

Create differences

Targets at risk

Effectiveness against challenging targets

Weapons size, sortie loadouts, and cost

Non-stealthbomber

Long-range weapons

launch point

200 nm

400 nm

800 nm

1,000 nm

1,500 nm

2,000 nm

Miles from PRC Coast

Penetrating bomber

Stand-off distances depend on threats, strike aircraft characteristics, etc.

Stand-off Stand-in

6

Changing character of target sets must inform future force requirements

Target sets maybe very different

• Far larger than post-Cold War target sets

• More distributed, greater depth of the battlespace

• Enemy countermeasures

Mobility, hardening/deeply burying, active & passive defenses effective against PGMs

Advantages of penetrating bombers

• Can reach all targets at using short-range/direct attack weapons

• Can attack from multiple aspects to complicate enemy defensive operations

7

Standoff ranges can affect number of targets that can be held at risk

550 NM standoff

Non-stealthbomber

Assume 550 nm bomber standoff

60% of aimpoints in range of JASSM-ER-like weapons

Assume 800 nm bomber standoff

No aimpoints in range of JASSM-ER-like weapons

Non-stealthbomber

800 NM standoff

Potential targets not covered:

• Interior C2 nodes

• Ballistic missile sites, bomber bases

• Anti-satellite threats

• Military aerospace industry, etc.

Longer range weapons would help but…

• Range can increase weapon size

• Larger weapons = fewer per sortie

• Can increase time to targets

• Can increase cost of weapons8

Enemy countermeasures can reduce effectiveness of long-range standoff strikes

550 NM standoff

Non-stealthbomber

If targets that are hardened, deeply buried, mobile, or relocatable are excluded

60% of potential aimpoints within range of JASSM-ER-like weapons

PLAAF underground

hanger

Mobile HQ-9 SAMBallistic missile TEL

• Standoff weapons can’t carry warheads large enough to hill very hard/deeply buried targets

• Kill chain latency can reduce long-range standoff weapon effectiveness against mobile/relocatable targets

9

Weapons delivered per sortie is another key to campaign success

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52

Pe

rce

nt

Targ

et S

et D

est

roye

d

Days of Conflict

Penetrating / stand-off bomber force mix

Days to attack all required targets

200 / 50 10

50 / 200 32

Days to kill all targets decrease as the number of penetrating bombers that deliver more weapons per sortie increase

10 days 32 days

• The size of weapons generally increase with their range

• Increasing weapons size reduces weapons delivered per sortie (targets per sortie)

80 x 500-lb JDAMs

or16 x larger JASSMs

• Campaign success can hinge on maximizing weapons placed on targets in the shortest amount of time

10

Unit costs increase with range

• Unit cost of weapons generally increase with their range and sophistication propulsion, (guidance systems, terminal seeker, data link, etc.)

Weapons affordability also shapes the force mix

• Weapons affordability is critical if the requirement is to “kill thousands of targets in tens of days”

11

Hypersonic weapons are needed…but kill chain latency will still be a challenge

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000

Low Subsonic

(e.g., SDB)High Subsonic

(e.g., JASSM)

Mach 2 Supersonic

(e.g., Advanced Anti-

Radiation Guided Missile)

Mach 5 Hypersonic

Weapon Launch Distance from Target (miles)

Tim

e t

o R

eac

h T

arg

et

(min

ute

s)

S-300 SAM

about 5

minutes to

relocate

Stand-off distance where

the flight time of a Mach 5

weapon exceeds 5 minutes

12

Arsenal plane: must also consider cost effectiveness from a campaign perspective

Cost of cruise missiles expended in operations can quickly exceed (20 days) cost of a reusable penetrator delivering cheaper short-range weapons

Real-world air campaigns:

• 1991 Operation Desert Storm = 43 days

• 1999 Operation Allied Force = 78 days

• 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom = 42 days

• RAND comparison didn’t include cost of a new stand-off arsenal plane

• A “new-old” C-17 or commercial derivative arsenal plane could cost 400m-plus

2010 RAND Project Air Force

13

2010 RAND Project Air Force 2020 Mitchell Institute

Arsenal plane: must also consider cost effectiveness from a campaign perspective

14

USAF new start aircraft programs average 5-6 years to first flight + 4-5 years to first

delivery -- B-21s will be rolling off the line at scale before an arsenal plane is operational

Recommendations

• The USAF should increase its long-range strike capacity: a total force of at least 316 bombers (still less than the Cold War force)

• As it builds its bomber force the USAF should prioritize penetrating strike: at least 240 B-21 stealth bombers

• Hypersonic weapons are needed but will not be a panacea

• Allocating modified airlift aircraft to conduct strike missions does not make operational sense

• A new arsenal plane will not be a quicker/cheaper and could drain resources from penetrating strike programs

15

16

New arsenal plane availability?

2027 2033 2036

Program Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

F-117

C-17

B-2

F-22

F-35A

KC-46

Notional

Standoff

Rollout1st Flight 1st Delivery IOC

Rollout 1st Flight 1st Delivery IOC

IOC

IOC?1st Delivery

1st DeliveryRollout 1st Flight

1st Flight?

Rollout 1st Flight

1st Flight 1st Delivery

1st Flight 1st Delivery IOC

Awarded

Nov 1978

Awarded

Aug 1981

Awarded

Oct 1981

Awarded

Apr 1991

Awarded

Oct 2001

Awarded

Feb 2011

Notional

Award

2021

IOC

IOC?1st Delivery?

Average Time

to 1st FlightAverage Time

to 1st Delivery

Average Time

to IOC

• Average of 5-6 years to first flight , longer to first delivery of an operational aircraft

• B-21s will be rolling off the production line at scale before an arsenal plane is operational

17