378

AND THAT WAS THE F U T U R E . . .

Futures, futuribles, previsions, Prognosen I. F. Clarke

Two hundred years ago the image of the future was for the most part a blank, save for the possibility of balloon travel and the hopes that after the extraordinary events of 1789 the government of France would change for the better. One hundred years later the idea of the future had become part of general thinking, thanks to many writers as different as Jules Verne and Karl Marx. Fifty years ago the ever accelerating rate of change, as I. F. Clarke shows, had made the study of the future a crucial matter in peace and war. And so it has gone on, stage by stage, to the international conferences in Washington and Peking, and the beginnings of new professional opportunities for economists, sociologists, political theorists, and all the other experts who investigate the trends that point to the future.

There are good reasons for thinking that the modern business of forecasting be- gan to affect the world about 4 pm on November 5th 1937, when Adolf Hitler entered the Map Room of the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. The occasion was a most secret meeting of the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, those once familiar names of von Blomberg, yon Fritsch, Admiral Raeder, and Hermann GOring. As the dark of that winter's evening closed in over Berlin, the F~ihrer began his address by order- ing that, should anything befall him, his thoughts on the future were to be considered his testament to the German people. The destiny of the German Reich began and ended with the one consid- eration of Lebensraum, said the F0hrer. Because the Germans had 'the right to a greater living space than other peoples,' it fol lowed that 'Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space. '1 For

I. F. Clarke was the Foundation Professor of English Studies in the University of Strath- clyde, Glasgow. He began his long associa- tion with Futures (I (4), 1969) with an article on the first forecasts of the future.

nearly four hours the harsh, self- obsessed voice went on and on: analys- ing the military options before Germany, setting the period 1943-45 as the last possible time for successful action, in- sisting on the use of force against Austria and Czechoslovakia as the first stage in the great war for the future of the Third Reich.

That totalitarian commitment to the demented logic of national advantage fol lowed along its predicted path. Ger- man troops occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia, the panzer divisions overran Poland, and in the October of 1939 the bells of Berlin rang to celebrate what the Germans believed would be the final victory and the spoils of a successful war. The future was, howev- er, unpredictable. Many elements in the situation of 1939 were beyond the con- trol of the German supreme command and, in fact, beyond the calculations of most people. Not even Adolf Hitler could have foreseen the ways in which the limited European campaign of 1939 would develop into the first great planet- ary conflict; and very few had the insight or the information to anticipate the constant improvements in weaponry that would achieve such spectacular suc-

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And that was the future. . . 379

cess at Hiroshima. Even in the relative simplicity of military operations the scale of change had become too vast for single individuals to control. As the war spread across the world, the planning staffs in all the continents toiled away at finding answers to the urgent questions about the probable results of future actions.

By the time the Germans had in- vaded Russia and the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, the vast range of the operations--from Leningrad to North Africa, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific--showed the nations of the world that they faced a future very different from anything ever experienced before in human history. That was one of the primary elements in the new idea of coming things. On all fronts the com- batants learned that the new mark of tanks, advanced engines for fighter planes, inventions like radar and the Tallboy bombs, faster submarines--all these developments of the day were certain to change the balance between victory and defeat in the battles of tomorrow. In many ways, however, the most important movements towards the future were political, for the United Nations Declaration of January 2nd 1942 was thought to have marked out the horizons of the freer, juster world that would emerge when the war was over. The declaration pointed towards a com- ing global society: it gave the allied nations a positive attitude to, and a framework for, their future; and for those who lived in permanent oppres- sion under the enemy it was the only hope they had. The signs of coming things were already evident in the au- tumn of 1943, when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was established. Again, by the autumn of 1943, the assessments and directives of the Allied Military Government staffs had already begun to shape the immedi- ate future for Italy to the south of the Cassino Line. By 1944 the Allies had completed plans for the management of Japan, the occupation of Germany, and for the International Tribunal which was to hand down sentences of death on Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, GOr- ing, Streicher, and the rest who had devoted their lives to the future of the Thousand-Year Reich.

Planning for peace

By late 1944, when the wall maps in all the GHQs showed the great advances in the Pacific, on the Russian Front and in Northern Europe, the certainty of com- ing victory caused allied governments to prepare for peace by establishing minis- tries, departments, or committees for reconstruction, housing, demobiliza- tion, agriculture, industry, civilian affairs, and all the other anticipated requirements for the day when peace would come. That planning experience was another factor in developing the methods of analysis and forecasting that carried over into the immediate post-war years. At the same time the problems and the possibilities of the national future became prime material for the press and publishers, everywhere from Sydney to Seattle. To the many ques- tions about the future there were answers on everything from internation- al relations to economic affairs.

In the UK, for instance, the anticipa- tions and forecasts did not follow in the pattern of the customary projections of industrial and technological advances which had been the norm in the 1930s. Instead, the forecasters took note of the immense changes--social, political, technological--and of the universal ex- perience of war-time conditions. So, there was a decided change of direction in the new forecasts, a movement from things to people. For the British people, according to the forecasters, the future was to be a matter of social and political relationships--between all the citizens, between government and citizens, and between the nations of the Empire and the Old Country.

Of the many projections that appeared about the end of the war the most influential and well-informed were in a series which came out from late 1944 onwards under the general title of Target for Tomorrow. That will be instantly recognizable to old soldiers as an astute borrowing from the service jargon of Target for Tonight. The prestigious editorial board was a collective guaran- tee of high seriousness and accurate information. There was Sir William Be- veridge who came straight from found- ing the Welfare State, and there was

FUTURES August 1989

380 And that was the future...

Julian Huxley the principal guru for environmental and scientific matters, as well as Sir John Boyd Orr who was to do so much for world food and agriculture during his outstanding service with the United Nations. The titles of the mono- graphs in the series picked out the areas of greatest interest and importance at that time. Eminent authors analysed the factors most likely to make for change in the post-war period, and they set out ways of preparing for whatever might come. Their publications ranged from the Future of India and the Future of the Colonies to the different problems of Rehousing Bdtain, Industry after the War, Food and the People, and Britain's Way to Social Security. They were among the many signs of a profound change in attitudes to the future. They showed a growing awareness that the scale and the rate of change would affect the conditions of life everywhere more rapidly and more radically than at any previous time in world history.

Emergence of the UN

Hiroshima and Nagasaki confirmed this rupture between the old-style doctrine of a steady-state progress--more of the same--and the unmistakable evidence that citizens and servicemen were not going to settle back into the old world as they had known it. In the longer term, however, there was one question which helped more than any other to concen- trate minds most powerfully on the future: How were the enemies of yester- day to live together in a finally peaceful world?

In those days the answer began with the Atlantic Charter and the inaugura- tion of the United Nations Organization (UNO). Indeed, to look backward at the immediate post-war period is to see now that UNO was first in chronological order of the three major developments that have helped to promote modern practices in the study of the future. The international journals, the annual con- ferences, the research institutes and the many associations for the investigation of coming things--the whole familiar apparatus of trend watching in the late 20th century--all these have their point of origin in the work of UNO during its

first 10 years. At the end of the first great planetary war in human history, after the mushroom cloud above Hiroshima, the UN had a symbolic and psychological role of immense importance. After close on 200 years of ever quickening adv- ances in the applied sciences, and at a time when the great European empires were in the first stages of dissolution, the emergence of UNO marked the closing of a book on the past. The USA had failed the first hope of the League of Nations by refusing to have any part in that organization. As a principal found- ing member of the UN it promised the world a fresh start.

Of its nature the new organization could only look from the present to the future. By existing it became a sign that the nations of the world, whether they liked it or not, were coming ever closer together and, by that token, were com- mitted to working towards some kind of international cooperation. In a more practical way, however, the exemplary role of the UN then lay--and still lies--in the invaluable work of the various coun- cils, commissions and divisions. Here again it has to be said that for the first time in human history there was a centre for the collection, collation and dissemi- nation of accurate information about the many factors that can change the cir- cumstances of nations. The work of the Economic and Social Council, for exam- ple, goes on along the edge of the future in the regional commissions for Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Far East.

One early example of what they had to offer the world was the Economic Survey of Europe in 1948 (1949); and in like manner the compilations of the functional commissions--statistics, pop- ulation, human rights, the status of women--have provided standard means of measuring the rates of change in crucial areas. Again, the annual Yearbooks--demography, statistics, production, world energy--have helped to mark out the contours of tomorrow. Their influence appeared very clearly in the earliest post-war studies on the problems of environmental deteriora- tion, world food resources and over- population. For example, the facts and the statistics of UN sources informed the

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A dominant image of our time is the future space laboratory.

And that was the future... 385

conclusions in S. Chandrasekhar's Population and Planned Parenthood in India (1955) and in Warren Thompson's Population and Progress in the Far East (1959). They are particularly evident in the classic survey on Population, Re- sources, Environment (1970) by Paul and Anne Ehrlich, which was the first com- prehensive, wel l-documented survey of world populations and the problems of world food resources. One of their ma- jor sources was the UN Demographic Yearbook, and of that the Ehrlichs said: 'This annual compilation is the source for world data on population'. 2

Birth of futurology

Although the various divisions of the UN have always supplied much of the essen- tial information for the examination of coming things, the study of the future was not, and indeed never has been, the sole concern of great world institutions. In fact, as individuals everywhere con- templated the unprecedented trans- formations that astounded the world during the 1940-50 period, there was frequent talk about the need for some kind of rational anticipation, some form of sensible prevision of causes and con- sequences, which would help in adjust- ing to the potentially dangerous rate of change. That perception led to the first proposals for a methodical approach to the many problems and possibilities of tomorrow's world. And here the record has to note that the bastard term, futur- ology, first echoed through the lecture rooms of an American university during the fall of 1943, when a refugee German professor spoke on the need for 'a more systematic occupation with the future'. It seemed self-evident to Ossip K. Flecht- heim that the world was moving rapidly towards a time of crisis: 3

In a relatively static age, basic social change is too slow to enter into the consciousness of its contemporaries. In their eyes, past, present, and future are basically identical, each consti- tuting but a link in the endless chain of repetitious events which makes up the whole of human development. To people living in a period of crisis such as ours, however, the future appears to be basically different from the past . . . . We are living through an upheaval comparable to the neolithic and

urban revolution which brought about the first civilizations. Whatever may be in store for us, the status quo will not endure. Such is our rate--our dilemma and privilege.

From that Flechtheim went on to prop- ose in a paper on 'Teaching the future' that the time had come to prepare students for the changing circumstances of their lives in the future. He sent a copy of that 1945 paper to Aldous Hux- ley, then resident in California, and Huxley answered by saying that futurol- ogy 'might be a very good thing, pro- vided that the teaching of it were accom- panied by a teaching of what I might call eternitology.' The grand old magus of Brave New World thought that it was 'not much use knowing what is likely, given present tendencies, to happen, unless one has clear ideas about man's Final End, in the light of which those tendencies and their probable outcome can be evaluated. '4 That letter, as re- corded in the latest edition of the Ox- ford English Dictionary, marks the first use and the consequent embalmment of the word futurology in the English lan- guage.

Huxley had summarized the common-sense thinking of 1946: the belief that the prodigious technological advances of the day, above all the fright- ening innovation of the atomic bomb, demanded prudent decisions about ends and means. That conviction has been the general line in most future studies ever since, from Harrison Brown on The Challenge of Man's Future (1954) to the many recent publications on nuc- lear energy, environmental pollution and the greenhouse effect. In fact, the great accelerator in the universal growth of the futures industry has been the constant questioning that has kept pace with the continuing explosion of the applied sciences these last 40 years. In 1949 the first high-altitude rocket took off from the White Sands testing ground, and in 1950 the Diners Club began another revolution with the first credit card. Then came the videotape and the microwave, and then in 1954 the first nuclear submarine and the first atomic power station. Year by year the list goes on and on: intercontinental ballistic mis- siles, space satellites, lasers, word pro- cessors, heart transplants and test-tube

FUTURES August 1989

386 And that was the future. . .

babies, silicon chips and the many re- finements of the computer. One un- forgettable moment, seen by most of mankind, demonstrated the great divide between the entire human past and the extraordinary 20th century. That was on July 21st 1969, when Neil Armstrong stepped out from the Apollo 11 space module and walked on the surface of the Moon.

Professionalization of futures studies

The non-stop response to these many developments, and to all the other mat- ters from world population to nuclear weapons, has been one more global phenomenon of modern times. Since it would require a small encyclopaedia to describe the innumerable books, re- ports and studies that have gone on pouring out in all the industrialized countries, it is enough to say in common with the other writers in this series that the study of the future has advanced through three main phases towards an increasing professionalization. First, there were the associations of all those with an interest in the future; and these began with Gaston Berger, a man of many interests and great talent, who founded in 1957 the Centre National de Prospective in Paris. He was bold enough to use prospective, a term he adapted from the franglais, in order to direct attention to his belief that the future is not what comes after the pre- sent; it is essentially that which is diffe- rent from the present, because 'the consequences of our actions will have effect in a world very different from that in which we initiated them. 's The right term for the new specialist study of the future mattered greatly to these found- ing fathers. After Gaston Berger there came the Futuribles association in 1960, which Bertrand de Jouvenel later des- cribed as 'a research organization formed in Paris, thanks to the aid of the Ford Foundation, by a small group pre- senting a wide range of nationalities and specialities, brought together by a com- mon conviction that the social sciences should orient themselves toward the future. '6 Why give the name 'Futuribles' to their new field of investigation? Why did they not talk like so many others of

forecast, foresight, prediction, previ- sion? Because, said de Jouvenel, those terms did not accurately describe their intentions and methods: 7

The term 'futuribles' is the label of an intellec- tual undertaking. It was chosen because it designates what seems to be the object of thought when the mind is directed towards the future: our thought is unable to grasp with certainty the futura, the things which will be; instead it considers the possible futures . . . . But a future state of affairs enters into the class of 'futuribles' only if its mode of produc- tion from the present state of affairs is plausible and imaginable.

These metaphysical questions did not seem to concern the founders of the other new associations that appeared in the 1960s. In the UK Michael Young and his fellow social scientists were content with the style of the Committee for the Next 30 Years; in Austria Robert Jungk began his international work with the Institut f~r Zukunftsfragen; and in Italy the economist and industrialist, Aurelio Peccei, hid many ambitions behind the neutral title of the Club of Rome, a most exclusive association of 100 eminent persons from industry, politics, science, economics, education and government. They soon made a reputation for them- selves when they sponsored the inves- tigations of Dennis Meadows at MIT and the attempts of his team to establish a computer model for the future of the world. Readers of this journal may perhaps remember the chain reaction that fol lowed and the special issue of Futures (5(1), 1973) on The Limits to Growth Controversy which put the case against the Meadows argument.

New futures journals

By the 1960s, then, the study of the future was attracting interest every- where. As the associations and the com- mittees multiplied throughout the indus- trialized nations, the race was on to spread the word about the shape of things to come. In this second phase of development Bertrand de Jouvenel came first with Futuribles in 1961, and that grew into Analyse et Pr~vision in 1966. Then came The Futurist in 1967, the foundation magazine of the World Fu- ture Society of America. After that the

FUTURES August 1989

And that was the future... 387

flood began in 1968: the first issue of Analysen und Prognosen, the quarterly journal of the Zentrum fur Zukunftsfors- chung in Berlin; another German pub- lication, Futurum, which had Ossip K. Flechtheim for its first editor; and in the UK the editor of Futures, Guy Streat- field, told the first readers in the September of 1968 that 'forecasting is essential if we are to seize the opportu- nities and reduce the insecurities that result from rapid change.' He set out the policy for the new quarterly as follows: B

Futures is at present in the formative stage. Much is said about the potential power of its methods and the great value they will be to management and government, but concrete results are as yet few. At conferences the most frequent complaint of delegates is that more time is spent in preaching to the converted than in describing actual :investiga- tions. There is clearly a need for futures workers to bring the subject down to earth, and this journal will endeavour to publish papers on case studies and will welcome the submission of such papers from individual researchers.

The papers in the first number of Futures still make interesting reading. The late John McHale, then Executive Director of the World Resources Inventory, wrote on the future of energy resources, and he handed down what is now received doctrine: 'There is a need to diversify the overall world energy economy and to increase its efficiency, so as to pre- serve the environment for the future and to mitigate the disparity between the energy-rich and the energy-poor regions of the world. ' In another paper on 'Human futures' Robert Jungk argued that 'no concept or vision of the future will be correct if we do not find a way to bring man into the picture . . . • . . Unless we begin to devise some kind of "human forecasting", using the re- search done in such human sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy, one essential part of futures research will be missing.'

Twenty-one years ago those thoughts on energy resources and the human dimension were matters of con- cern for the then new futures journals. Those anxieties have grown into the third phase of the world-wide ecology campaigns and the many slogans about

making a technological world fit for human beings to live in. This prolifera- tion of ideas about the future is a testimony to the work of researchers everywhere and it is also an indication of the role the communications media have played in spreading the news about coming things. In effect, the research of today becomes the newspaper headlines of tomorrow and it provides many fasci- nating topics for television programmes. One example is the early work of Her- mann Kahn. The world press quarried abundant material from his first books, On Thermonuclear War (1960) and Thinking the Unthinkable (1962); and the reasoned arguments of Kahn were converted into articles on the flash in the sky that would obliterate cities and whole nations• That topic of the coming end of things has gone on attracting the devoted attention of the press right up to the most recent projections of the nuclear winter and the long night of mankind. In the shock-speak of the banner headlines research into cloning techniques became 'Einsteins from Cut- tings'; the early experiments in prosthe- tic organs raised fears that 'The Man- machines are Coming'; and computer applications have led to headlines that 'Robots will Take over the World'. At the same time editors have had good reasons to rejoice at such optimistic forecasts as Arthur C. Clarke's Profiles of the Future (1962) and George Gallup's The Miracle Ahead (1964), as well as at the many recent forecasts of interplanet- ary travel and the space colonies of the next millennium.

First age of the future

There can be no doubt that the second half of the 20th century has become, in a sense, the first age of the future. Our times have seen the greatest output of science fiction stories in the history of the genre, more films about the future than ever before, and the rolling barrage of forecasts and future studies that goes on without ceasing. In fact, it is a poor nation nowadays that does not have its own committee or commission for the year 2000. According to many we should live in fear and trembling at the pros-

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388 And that was the future. . .

pects before us, and according to many there are good reasons for rejoicing at the better world that will come. For instance, at this moment a London theatre is presenting a new opera, Met- ropolis, which is a musical version of Fritz Lang's original text for his famous film of the same title in 1926. An old terror has become ritual entertainment, it seems; and that fact shows that, although all these modern projections take their shapes from the possibilities apparently inherent in our times, they are not new reactions.

They are no more than the most recent expressions in the ceaseless dia- logue between science and society that has been going on ever since the first balloons and the first steam engines convinced the Europeans that the condi- tion of life was going to change. During the first flood tide of the industrial revolution it seemed that steam power and electricity would transform the world for the better. Already in the 1840s the new sequential and linear notion of progress informed the enthusiastic verse of Alfred Tennyson, the great communi- cator of the day who caught the certain- ties and the assurance of the first age of expansion better than any other writer. He saw himself then--as so many do in modern science fiction--as 'the heir of all the ages, in the foremost files of time.' Had he not been raised on 'the fairy tales of science, and the long result of time'? Forty years later, an older and a wiser man, he returned to the themes of material progress and the future he had first raised in 'Locksley Hall'. After all the immense advances of the high Victorian period he found that men were no happier, because the unbridgeable gap between desiring and obtaining must always leave Homo progressivus with unattainable hopes and unachievable ambitions: 9

All diseases quench'd by Science, no man halt, or deaf or blind; Stronger ever born of weaker, lustier body, larger mind?

Earth at last a warless world, single race, a single tongue~ I have seen her far away--for is not Earth as yet so young?

Every tiger muzzled, every serpent passion

kill'd, Every grim ravine a garden, every blazing desert till'd,

Robed in universal harvest up to either pole she smiles, Universal ocean softly washing all her warless Isles.

Warless? when her tens are thousands, and her thousands millions, then-- All her harvest all too narrow--who can fancy warless men?

Warless? war will die out late then. Will it ever? late or soon? Can it, till this outworn earth be dead as yon dead world the moon?

Modern Inferno

Those characteristic Victorian hopes for the future, rejected by Tennyson, do not find any comparable echoes in the poets of our time. Tennyson's lamentations were entirely for the changes that had not fol lowed on the gifts the applied sciences had bestowed on his age. The experiences of our t ime-- f rom trench warfare to the atomic bomb and inter- continental missi les~find expression in prose lamentations for the lethal gifts of the applied sciences, or rather, for the use men have made of technological inventions. These take the form of the closely reasoned arguments and predic- tions in, for instance, Gordon Rattray Taylor's The Biological Time Bomb (1968) and Jonathan Schell's The Fate o f the Earth (1982), where the lesson reveals all the fearful things that the human race can do to itself. Perhaps some day a latterday Dante may yet compose an Inferno for modern times which would present the fateful journey through the many hells of the future. The guide could not fail to be that courteous Mantuan, the poet Vergil, then and now the symbol of human wisdom and rational philosophy. As the scenario shifts from the morning of Good Friday in the Jubilee Year of 1300 AD, it is evident that there is a parallel switch from sins and their punishments to a World Fair sequence of vivid displays which present the disastrous conse- quences of wrong choices.

As the two poets travel down through all the circles of this future Hell,

FUTURES August 1989

And that was the future. . . 389

down to the eternal cold of the Dismal Pit, the dialogue comments on the dilemmas of the 20th century--so many achievements, so many dangers. We have inherited the belief---and it is com- mon doctrine in schools and universit ies--that Western civilization is of its nature progressive, because our technologies have given us control of the physical environment. That is the poor half of the story'. We fail to perceive that, although the sciences are universal and neutral, they have their applications within nations; and these nations are still seen in the old-style way as so many separate Gibraltars in the one world that the sciences are bringing ever closer together.

In his way Tennyson had realized that our delight in technology has left us trapped between the Promethean ambi- tion to exploit nature and the rational imperative to create a harmonious socie- ty. In looking backward at the immense, unprecedented advances of his age he may have guessed, but did not formu- late, the primary conundrum of all hu- man progress ever since the Neolithic: we can only guess at the history we are making. There is a potent Ayatollah Factor at work in human affairs, a malign gremlin who burrows deep into the system; for everything can change with- out notice when an ideology takes effect or a dominant personality takes control. Question: What shape did the future have before--Robespierre, Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Chairman Mao, or Mikhail Gorbachev? Question: What is a futur- ologist? 'That word means something different now', says an observer from the year 2039 who has discovered all there is to know about coming things at the

Eighth World Futurological Congress. That future is exposed for what it will be in Stanislaw Lem's ironic and hilarious tale of The Futurological Congress where the accomplished Polish writer holds up a distorting mirror to the assumptions of modern times. His first lesson is that: 'A futurologist makes profutes, prognoses, prophecies. '1° However, the future may yet surprise the futurologists, says Lem, for the tech- niques of the year 2039 will depend on Morphological Forecasting and ProJec- tive Etymology. The future will always have the last word: 'Linguistic futurology investigates the future through the trans- formational possibilities of the lan- guage.'

References

1. William L. Shirer, The Third Reich, (Lon- don, Secker and Warburg, 1960), page 305.

2. Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment (San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1970) page 24.

3. Ossip K. Flechtheim, Historyand Futurol- ogy, (Frankfurt, Walther Verlag, 1966) pages 63-4.

4. Grover Smith (editor), Collected Letters of Aldous Huxley (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1969) page 542.

5. Bernard Cazes, Histoire des futurs, (Paris, Segher, 1986) page 339.

6. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjec- ture, (London, Weidenfeld and Nichol- son, 1967) page viii.

7. Ibid, page 18. 8. Futures, 1(1), 1968, page 3. 9. Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Complete

Works, 1898, page 565. 10. Stanislaw Lem, The Futurological Con-

gress (London, Futura Publications, 1977) page 108.

FUTURES August 1989