TEIMUN 2011

11th July – 17th July

GENERAL ASSEMBLY (GA)

Topic I: Changing the Globe and the UN by

Reforming the Security Council

INTRODUCTION The Security Council (SC) is undoubtfuly the most powerful organ of the United Nations (UN). The Charter has given it primary responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security and its decisions are binding for all Member States. Its limited geographical balance combined with five exclusive permanent seats that have veto powers, however, makes the Security Council less representative than desired by many members of the UN. Furthermore, the Council‘s inability to react on certain international issues, due to its composition, has caused serious disturbances in the international public opinion. Even though, thanks to the ―Uniting for Peaceǁ‖ procedure, the General Assembly has a way to bypass the SC‘s authority when it is paralyzed by a veto, this track is quite difficult, because of the requirement of two thirds majority of the members present and voting to have a decision. As a result, there is a clear need to reconstruct the SC. While there is general agreement that the SC needs to be reformed, there is extensive disagreement on how, making the issue both extremely divisive and contentious. To many, the reform of the Security Council is a question of its continuing legitimacy. This issue of reform hinge on the essential question of how to compose a Council both “small” enough for quick and efficient action and large enough for effective and legitimate decision-making, and also a reshaped Council would not be more effective unless its working methods were much more transparent, accountable and inclusive. The need for a reform does not make it easier to accomplish the task. Certain aspects of this reform can only be done via amending the Charter of the United Nations which was accomplished in fact, only three times in almost 70 years—and all dealing only with seat numbers in two of the six principal organs, once for the SC and twice for the United Nations Economic and Social Council; this fact proves us the difficulty of the task. However, the failure to achieve Security Council reform risks negatively influencing other ongoing reform debates, which makes this topic even more important. While we were discussing what topic to pick for the General Assembly (GA) of TEIMUN 2011, after we came up with the idea of the SC reform, a TEIMUN veteran warned us about this topic, saying that this is a ―never ending topicǁ‖; however nothing can be more fit for you, the delegates and the future diplomats, to discuss and come up with an original solution to this ―black holeǁ‖ of UN diplomacy and anything less challenging would be an insult to your intellect and capacity. The Background Paper you are about to read will first present the historical background of the topic in chronological order getting us till the present day, then analyze the important points of this challenging issue and finally highlight the points to discuss in our council.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND a. Formation of SC and First Reformation The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at the Church House in London. Present were five states, victors of the World War II, reserving themselves the permanent seats: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as six non-permanent members chosen on a regional, two-year basis. The last years of 1940s showed the future of the SC till the end of Cold War which was a political battleground between the East and West, serving mainly as a highly publicized forum where appeals for justice could be proclaimed, antagonists demonized, and the virtue of one‘s own cause declared1, resulting a lack of fulfillment of the main purpose of the SC –maintaining global peace and security. Another important detail is that in 1945, the founding members of the UN introduced an article, Article 109, to the UN Charter (hereafter as Charter) reserving the possibility of a General Charter Review Conference ―for the purposes of reviewing the present Charterǁ‖, more clearly requiring the GA to decide, after then, whether it wished to deal with the question of Charter amendments by calling the

above mentioned conference2. However, the increasing polarization of the member states during the Cold War in the 50s prevented such a gathering then, even though the question was on the agenda 1 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, Managing the Change at the United Nations Chapter 1: Reform of the Security Council, Center for UN Reform Education, April 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/23 2 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 24 June 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/357in 1955. No gathering has been convened since3. This missed opportunity might have been the perfect place to reshape the SC; however the P-5 resisted the efforts to convene such a conference and made clear their intention to keep their veto rights intact4. Meanwhile, with the decolonization period, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the membership of the UN grew steadily in numbers, and the influx of new members, especially from Africa and Asia, drastically changed the Organization. Attempts to reorganize the composition of the SC had previously been turned down by the permanent members; but eventually in 1963 the calls for a reform were too loud to ignore, and the same year a Charter amendment emerged with the approval of Resolution 1991 A (or also referred as Resolution VIII) with France and Soviet Union voting against, the US and UK abstaining and China (Taiwan) voting in favor5. After the ratification of necessary number of member states and P-5, the resolution expanding the number of non-permanent seats from six to ten entered in force. b. 1979 India‘s First Proposal The issue of reform remained to be a subject of debate and in 1979, India and other Non-Aligned countries addressed the GA in letter (A/34/246) asking to include the issue on its agenda and it was done so. However, once again the Cold War dynamics prevented the issue to be discussed6 and this important issue wasn‘t considered between 1980 and 1991. As also in many other things, the fall of the Eastern bloc marked a new era for the reform efforts and the issue resurfaced. c. End of Cold War Marking a New Era: Creation of the Working Group Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the UN is no more a battle ground between East and West and as a result direct involvement of the UN in world affairs have been increased, but also this made UN to lean over its internal issues. In September 1992, India and some other 35 Non-Aligned states introduced a draft resolution (later A/RES/47/62), calling for the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 48th session of the General Assembly, an item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”. On 11 December 1992, a new resolution (A/RES/47/62) co- sponsored by Japan was passed unanimously by the General Assembly. This resolution officially placed the item on the General Assembly‘s agenda, where it has since remained. The resolution asked the membership to submit their reform proposals to the Secretariat by the summer of 1993 on how to reform the Security Council7. Even though UN publication A/48/264 Add. 1-108, revealed that the majority of members were calling for an expansion, few agreed on the number or type of seats to be added or which countries should fill those seats. After seeing many proposals submitted by the members, on 3 December 1993 the General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/48/26, which establishes an ―Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Councilǁ‖ (known as the Working Group) which provided a formal forum for consultations on reform of both the expansion of the Council and other matters related to the Council (like working methods of the SC). d. Formation of blocs (This part of the BP will provide you with general information about blocs‘ overall positions along with the historical aspect) Meanwhile, after the Eastern Bloc collapsed, Germany and Japan both started to advocate for permanent seats for themselves. These two countries substantially increased their contributions to the 3 Weiss, Thomas G., The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly, Automn 2003, available at www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_weiss.pdf 4 Ibidem 5 Ronzitti, Natalino, The Reform of the Security Council, Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2010 6 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, Security Council Reform – the 62nd GA Session and the Road Ahead, Center for UN Reform Education, 11 November 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/372 7 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 8 The collection of received Member State proposals

UN as a whole. At the same time, public opinion in these countries began to favor an increased involvement in world affairs. By 1992, Japan and Germany had become, respectively, the second and third largest contributors to the regular budget of the UN.9 Other industrialized nations also felt that they too deserve an increased role in deciding upon international politics. Like Germany and Japan, Italy had also passed well beyond its 1945 status, and by 1992 ranked almost as high a contributor to both the UN regular budget and to its peacekeeping operations. At the beginning, Italy obviously considered their country a serious contender for a possible permanent seat. Yet, with the development of the European Union and the prospects of an eventual common EU foreign policy, Italy instead focused on intensifying their resistance against a permanent seat for Germany and work for increased European integration. Italy‘s fear was that German aspirations would provoke creation of a new power center in Europe, and furthermore negatively affect the prospects for an effective common EU foreign policy, eventually relegating Italy to a second tier membership within the European Union.10

Initially, the United States supported both a German and a Japanese seat. Britain and France, on the other hand, hesitated about adding any new permanent members; but by time they realized the fact that the entrance of Germany would be the only way to legitimize their own seats: The pressure from both inside and outside the European Union to relinquish their own seats in favor of common EU seats can only be eased by adding Germany as a permanent member. This logic caused a progressively increased support from France and the UK for a permanent seat for Germany. It soon became apparent that talks on Security Council reform had the instant ability to make regional rivalries flare up. Nigeria, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, India, amongst with Japan and Germany saw themselves as perfect candidates for permanent seats, while their regional rivals were consistently opposing. Throughout all regions, large or powerful countries favored the inclusion of new permanent members - mainly themselves - while their regional rivals preferred adding more non-permanent seats. As a result, creation of blocs, mainly three, were relatively quick regarding the debate.11

Italy, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Pakistan as well as some other countries asked for the creation of more non-permanent seats with a regional basis election of the members, while resisting adding any new permanent seats (the countries eventually formed an interest group known as the Coffee-Club). On 16 February 2005, the Coffee Club (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Algeria, Italy, Spain, Pakistan and South Korea) adopted a document entitled Uniting for Consensus which became the name of the group later on. Overall, the countries part of the Uniting for Consensus, lead perhaps most vocally by Italy and Pakistan, have called for the equality of all Member States, arguing that an addition of permanent seats would transgress the principle of sovereign equality and create new centers of power, both within and outside the United Nations. Germany, Brazil, India and Japan (known later as the Group of Four or more commonly G4) and their supporters have consistently claimed for the creation of new permanent seats. Germany and Japan based their arguments on the grounds that they are major donors. India did so as the world‘s second most populated country, with one of the world‘s largest economies and the third largest contributor of troops to UN peace-keeping missions. Brazil based its claim on being the largest country in terms of population, territory and economy in South America. The two latter countries have also increasingly based their arguments on their status as leading countries of the ̳global south‘. The African group, which represents the African Union (AU) at the UN, settled early on to fiercely call for two permanent seats for Africa with the right of veto. The Africans argue that, even though the most of the work of the SC is focused on Africa, it is the only continent not permanently represented (if both South and North America are counted as one continent), and this historical injustice has shunned the balance of the Council. Currently, the claim is based on the ̳Ezulwini-Consensus‘, a common position accepted by the members of the AU in 2005. The Consensus calls for two permanent seats; nevertheless, contrary to the previous position paper (the 1997 Harare Declaration) the seats would not be rotating within the group. Instead, they would be country-specific and chosen exclusively by the members of the AU. Although on the outside the African group has managed to maintain unity, there has always been a furious internal debate on who should be allotted permanent 9 Von Freiesleben Reform of the Security Council 10 Ibidem 11 Ibidem seats. At the moment, Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria are among the main contenders for permanent seats, but Ethiopia, Senegal, Algeria, Tanzania have also featured in the discussions. 12 Other sub-groups exist, including a group of Arab states (League of Arab Nations), the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Eastern European group. However, these groups usually support one of

the above major factions, depending on circumstances. e. Issue of Working Methods Expanding the SC with permanent or non permanent members to a new, hard-to-decide number was not the only issue. Meanwhile, reforming the ̳ever provisional‘ working methods of the Security Council (as they remained unformalized since the implementation of Charter to this day) began to attract a large number of countries, both within and with the GA membership, which were more interested in the way the SC interacted, instead of struggling for seats. This applied generally for small and medium-sized countries as realistically they did not have a chance to become a permanent member13. The primary concern for these countries was that they sought easier access to the permanent members of the Council, and they wanted to be able to address the Council in time of need and on specific issues of concern. Especially troop-contributing countries (TCC) wanted to better understand how the Council actually reached its decisions. In common, their aspirations followed three major subjects: transparency, accountability and participation. Apart from this, maybe more importantly, reforming the working methods can be concluded by a simple resolution and does not need a Charter amendment. Consequently, debate on working methods reform - inside and outside of the Working Group - were allowed to develop fairly independently of the enlargement discussions. Yet, aspirants for permanent seats have consistently tended to treat the issue as competitive to their main goal; because the discussion on working methods may distract the membership from the discussion on expansion and moreover an achievement on reforming the working methods may develop the idea that the necessary reform was done and cause to member countries to act reluctantly on expansion debate. The ongoing trend for reforming the SC‘s working methods echoed also in the Council; from 1993 onwards, the SC Member States launched several initiatives to change the Council‘s working methods. Initiatives included: publicizing the daily work program; publishing tentative monthly work schedule; making almost final ( ̳in blue‘) draft resolutions available; providing greater transparency on procedures of the sanctions committee, on peacekeeping operations; initiating meetings between Council and troop contributing countries14; and launching ―Arria-style meetings15ǁ‖, in which a member of the Council could invite experts or representatives of civil society for a discussion without issuing a formal statement16. In 1993, the Council also established the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions, which deals with issues related to working methods within the Council. f. The Idea of Intermediary Approach Arises17 In 1997, the President of the General Assembly and chairman of the Working Group, Razali Ismael of Malaysia, presented an ambitious three-stage reform plan18, which offered for the enlargement of the 12 Ibidem 13 Ibidem 14 Respectively: S/26015; S/26176; S/1999/165; S/1995/234, S/1995/438, S/1996/54; S/PRST/1994/22; S/PRST/1994/22 15 Arria Formula was devised by Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela when he, in the midst of the war in the Balkans in 1992, invited all Council members to meet with a Bosnian priest in the UN Delegates‘ Lounge rather than formally inviting the priest to address the Council in the chamber. The formula has gained popularity and is today frequently used as a way for the Council to be briefed on matters of international peace and security by outside actors, although they are no longer convened at the Delegate‘s Lounge. 16 Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform 17 The issue of intermediary approach will be further examined belove in the relevant section. 18 (A/AC.247/1997/crp.1 and A/51/47, Annex II) Security Council from 15 to 24 members, including the addition of five new permanent members. Although eventually unsuccessful, this innovative proposal deserves mentioning because its use of an ̳intermediary structure‟ inspired later proposals and its failure influenced the reform process later on. The Razali-proposal gave as outcome the resolution A/RES/53/30 passed on 23 November 1998 by the GA in connection with the agenda item of the Working Group entitled ―Majority required for taking decisions on Security Council reformǁ‖. The resolution was claimed as a joint victory for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Italy. According to the resolution, any future resolutions on expanding the Security Council would need at least a two-thirds majority to pass of the UN members and bot two-thirds of members present and voting. Even minor adjustments are subject to this

requirement which has made decisions on Council expansion extremely difficult ever since. After the Razali proposal, the reform process went into a stalemate and no further progress was made despite the fact that the Working Group devoted a significant number of meetings to the subject matter. In 2003, this lack of progression was openly criticized by Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General at the time and he took the initiative to jump start the process saying: ―I respectfully suggest to you, Excellencies, that in the eyes of your peoples the difficulty of reaching agreement does not excuse your failure to do so. If you want the Council‘s decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the developing world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgencyǁ‖19. In December 2004, High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, appointed by the Secretary General, released the report called A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility20 which proposed two models A and B for the SC reform showed in the Chart21 below, both of which suggested expanding the Council to 24 members. 19 (A/58/PV.7) 20A/59/565 21 From the UN report: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm After the release of the report, the blocs were once again unable to come to an understanding while G4 reaffirmed that the changes should be done by a vote and not by seeking consensus; the UfC, on the other hand, insisted upon a broad negotiated solution and promoted the Model B, furthermore were joined by several other countries such as Canada, Ghana, Turkey, Morocco22. In March 2005, the Secretary-General released a follow-up report to the High-Level Panel‘s report, namely In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all23 which endorsed both proposals without favoring any of them and urged the membership to adopt all of his proposals as a package and reach consensus in time for the 2005 World Summit. g. World Summit Rush on 2005 With the initiative taken by Annan, there was a hope that some sort of concrete solution may be reached at the World Summit of 2005. The call from the Secretary General echoed in the blocs. The G4 came up with a draft24 calling for an expansion of the SC by adding 6 permanent and 4 non- permanent seats. The UfC came up with a counter proposal25, expanding the SC by adding 10 additional two year rotating seats. The Africans also came up with their own proposal26 asking for 2 permanent seats with right of veto allotted to Africa. It is of high importance to mention that even though Africans, in principal, oppose to the right of veto, they argue that so long as the latter exists, for the sake of equality, it should also be extended to the new permanent members27. After these proposals were made, a possibility of a looming vote was started be mentioned among the membership. However, this received criticism from Russia and China.The US announced their opposition to a Council larger than 20 members and mentioned only adding Japan as a permanent member, without stating Germany as well (which had been the case in Clinton administration)28. Meanwhile, there were rumors that the African group may split over its position; however they managed to stick together and reiterated their support to the Ezulwini Concensus29. Once again the lack of compromise from the initial positions of the groups resulted in no progress. The enthusiasm and hope ignited by World Summit were in vain. The final document of the Summit mentioned the reform very briefly and with noncommittal paragraphs. The reason for the failure was argued that the initiative to embark such a large reform process would have come from the members and not from the Secretary General30. h. S5 Reopens the Debate on Working Methods Five small countries, Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica and Liechtenstein, formed earlier a group called the Small Five (S5). As they are aware of the fact that they stand no chance of becoming a permanent member and their possibility to receive a rotating seat now and then is quite low because of the size of their country, these group of states layed their effort on reforming the working methods of the SC which does not need a Charter amendment; thus it is the only chance to the non members of the SC to have an access to the SC matters. The S5, following the World Summit, submitted a draft resolution31 focusing on achieving a more accountable and transparent SC, and which asked the Council to consult with all Member States on resolutions, and requested that the five permanent members explain every veto to the General Assembly. The purpose of this initiative, as the resolutions of GA are non binding, was to

create a moral pressure on the SC, mainly on P5 and make the Council 22 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 23 A/59/2005 24 A/59/L.64 25 A/59/L.68 26 A/59/L.67 27 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 28 It is often speculated that the reason for this is the German opposition to the Iraq War. 29 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 30 Ibidem 31 A/60/L.49 to adopt some recommendations. However, P5 harsly criticized the draft and once again made clear that a reform initiative of working methods should come from within the SC, a position that is still preserved by the veto-wielding members of the Council. Furthermore, India and Brazil were not in favor of the draft for the simple reason that focusing on reforming working methods would take the focus from the expansion which hampers their own interest to become permenant members32; thus if they ever managed to become permanent members with or without the veto right, this reform would also limit their future movement areas. Seeing the lack of support to the draft, the latter was never put on a vote. However, it served to something. The SC revive the dormant ̳Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions‘. More importantly, Japan, the chair of the Council for the time, released the presidential note S/2006/507, a document still refered frequently today by S5, consisting of a list of measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency and transperancy of the SC and improving its interaction with non-members, a document that is still referenced today on the matter of working methods reform. i. Facilitators‘ Reports&Reemergence of Intermediary Model On 24 January 2007, the president of the GA at the time, Sheikha Haya issued a letter to the membership stating five key issues to be resolved for the UNSC reform, which have become the main headlines in the discussions to this day: the size of an enlarged Security Council, the categories of membership, the question of regional representation, the question of the veto, the working methods of the Security Council & the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. After indicating the issues to be resolved, on 8 February 2007, Sheikha Haya appointed five facilitators33 in their personal capacities to assist her during the consultation process on the five preceding issues. The facilitators came up with a familiar solution: Intermadiary model. Since the blocs haven‘t moved away from their initial positions, the facilitators‘ report34 was an attempt to break the impasse and force a new development. To them, there were two key factors that had to be taken into consideration: the addition of a mandatory review clause and the inclusion of a provision that would prevent medium to large sized states from „flip-flopping‟ from one non-permanent category to the other, in order to improve the chances for smaller states to be elected to the Council35. Having a mandatory review clause would serve to membership to assess the success of the ―interim modelǁ‖ after trying it and more importantly, as a tool of diplomacy, it would give the membership to set back issues that cannot be solved immediately. Furthermore, no group has to leave their initial positions for the intermediary model. The Africans suggested that the veto should be granted to all new permanent members and then removed gradually in a second phase and they announced that they would not accept any transitional solution envisaging permanent seats and veto power at a later stage, after a review for example, as they would want to be made part of the power balance in the Security Council as soon as possible36. In May 2007, Sheika Haya appointed two new facilitators37 to conduct consultations with membership on how to move the process forward on the basis of the report of the five facilitators. In the summer of 2007, these facilitators released their report38 which suggested that the issue of veto could be discussed within the framework of the reform of the working methods of the Council and reminded Member States that this would be a reform that could be approached and discussed independently since it would not require a Charter amendment. Despite these efforts put through by the president of the GA who is also the Chairman of the Working Group, the members supporting the addition of permanent seats were not satisfied with the pace of the process, they would like to continue with direct negotiations and expect from the Chairman to call for 32 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 33 Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, Ambassador Mirjana Mladineo of Croatia, Ambassador Andreas D. Mavroyiannis of Cyprus, Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands and Ambassador Ali Hachani of Tunisia. 34 Notions on the Way Forward (A/61/47, SUP-Annex I) 35 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 36 Ibidem 37 Ambassadors Heraldo Muñoz of Chile and Christian Wenaweser of Liechtenstein 38 A/61/47, SUP-Annex IV the latter. However, the UfC position itself on the idea that any further discussion should be based on the facilitators‘ reports.

j. IBSA&its Draft and Moving Towards Intergovernmental Negotiations At the end of each session, a resolution is needed for the Working Group to continue its works during the following session. A draft was created by the Chairman in early July 2007; however as many members were dissatisfied by the efforts of the Chairman there wasn‘t much support for her draft. On 11 September 2007, an alternative draft resolution39 was released by India, Brazil and South Africa among with some 24 other countries. In the draft, the proposed elements for negotiations were: expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories; greater representation of the developing countries; representation of the developed countries and those with transition economies reflective of contemporary world realities; comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the Security Council, including ensuring greater access of island and small states; and provisions for a review. India, Brazil and South Africa were meeting since the 1990s on development issues and they were generally refered as IBSA; however this was the first time that their names were mentioned together for the UNSC reform. Yet, the group has not been active regarding the reform since this initiative. The process was once again in a deadlock while it was almost the end of the 61st session. However, with only a few hours left to the end of the 61st session, the Chairman came up with an amended draft40

stating a transition towards intergovernmental negotiations41. This was seen as a compromise between the initial positions that favored direct negotiation as the next step (G4‘s position) and those that favored negotiations based on the facilitators‘ reports (UfC‘s position). The term „intergovernmental negotiations‟, which seemed to be a sufficiently undefined term to be acceptable to all sides, could be interpreted as meaning both direct negotiations on a text or direct negotiations based on the facilitators‘ reports, the latter favoring an intermediary model adding only non-permanent seats for the time being. The term, itself is quite important, as it is a term usually understood at the UN as referring to actual negotiations on the composition of a decision and is often linked to a move away from the traditionally consensus-building Working Group to a plenary of the General Assembly, where decisions can be more easily made by majority vote42. 62nd session of the General Assembly started with new diplomats and a new President, Sgrjan Kerim. The dust of the last session about how to understand intergovernmental negotiations hasn‘t settled yet. While the UfC was urging that the Working Group should remain the main forum for discussion and no ―artificial deadlines should be madeǁ‖, the G4 wanted to continue with text based negotiations in the membership and asked from the President to come up with a text to shape the process. At the end of 2007, the President created a ̳Task Force on Security Council Reform‘ from three diplomats and himself43. However, G4, unhappy with the pace of the process, declared the creation of an overarching group in order to prepare the environment for the intergovernmental negotiations and in a way to surpass the Working Group which takes its decisions principally on consensus; the work was concretized by a proposal, labeled later on as the Cypriote Proposal. The UfC opposed to the overarching process naming it as a unilateral move, as they were seeing the Working Group the sole legitimate platform to discuss the reform issue. Meanwhile, the Task Force delivered a report, once again promoting the very well known way to break the deadlock44: an intermediary process; only this time it was called ―timeline perspectiveǁ‖. 39 A/61/L.69 40 A/AC.247/2007/L.1/REV.1 41 “Decides that the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council should be considered during the 62nd session of the General Assembly, so that further concrete results may be achieved, including through intergovernmental negotiations, building on the progress achieved so far, particularly in the 61st session, as well as the positions and proposals made by all Member States”. 42 Von Freiesleben, Security Council Reform – the 62nd GA Session and the Road Ahead 43 Ambassadors Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, João Manuel Guerra Salgueiro of Portugal and Ismat Jahan of Bangladesh, Roble Olhaye of Djibouti and the President himself. 44 Von Freiesleben, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform All along 62nd session, the G4 pushed for moving towards the intergovernmental negotiations in a plenary session of GA and leave the Working Group45. At the end of the 62nd session, after fierce discussions, with the UfC left alone against G4, a decision was finally reached46 requesting Member States to begin intergovernmental negotiations in an informal plenary session of the GA no later than 28 February 2009. k. New Era: Intergovermantal Negotiations Till the 1st February, the Working Group had to decide on the framework and modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations47. A classical

problem for UN matters, once again: instead of discussing the substance, the discussion was focused on the procedure; the main problem was whether may a decision be taken via a majority vote or should the consensus based decision making process of the Working Group apply. Before passing to the informal plenary session on 28 February, a work plan was released on 18 February by the GA President; there, it was made clear that the RoP of the GA will not apply to the procedure; which means according to some insiders, this implies that Member States cannot ask for a vote while the intergovernmental negotiations are ongoing48; however this is a process where areas of agreement continue to be formulated and that could lead to a real result. The plan outlined a meeting schedule for the upcoming process, with meetings on five key issues. As the Chairman of the intergovernmental negotiations, Ambassador Zahir Tanin of Afghanistan expressed this time, ―this is not negotiations on negotiations anymore, but the start of negotiations on substance”49. Five rounds of meeting on five key issues have been completed so far without substantive improvement. On May 2010, the Chairman distributed a letter with a summary of position papers sent to him by Member States. A giant step was taken by the membership as they accepted to use the text as the basis of the negotiations. So far, the negotiations were described to have proceeded at a moderate pace with the most outstanding achievement being the acceptance to use the text as a basis for the continued negotiations50. Currently, the membership decided to continue intergovernmental negotiations with the decision 64/568. Yet delegates should keep in mind that the Working Group can meet any time, if so is decided by the membership51. Meanwhile the most important and recent news is the clear support from the US to India for a permanent seat in the Security Council52 on November.

II. ANALYSIS ON FIVE KEY ISSUES AND INTERMEDIARY APPROACH The SC reform has quite a lot of controversial areas. However, reaching an agreement in five key issues is a must and a reform not dealing with these issues would not be a complete one. Some of these five issues have a consensus in principle. Almost everyone agrees that the regional representation in the Council must be more balanced and a vast majority of membership opines that the relationship 45 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, Member States Meet to Discuss Report of the Task Force on Security Council Reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 19 June 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/356 46 GA Res. 62/557 47 Swart, Lydia, First Informal Plenary of the General Assembly on Security Council Reform Underway, Center for UN Reform Education, 30 January 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/385 48 Swart, Lydia, Countries Welcome Work Plan as Security Council Reform Process Commences New Phase, Center for UN Reform Education, 24 February 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/386 49 Swart, Countries Welcome Work Plan as Security Council Reform Process Commences New Phase 50 Text-based Negotiations in Full Swing, 22 June 2010, Un Center for UN Reform Education, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/426 51 Lund, Jakob S.&Safran-Hon, Daniel, Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude, Center for UN Reform Education, 22 September 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/407 52 Obama backs India on permanent UN Security Council seat, 8 November 2010 available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11711007 between the two vital organs of UN, the SC and the GA must be improved; but even for these areas, the question ―how?ǁ‖ remains. Other remaining issues, on the other hand, are more controversial. There are not even close ideas on the size of the Council and the veto issue is a quite difficult one, the working methods issue regularly meets P5 objection as they see it as an internal issue of the Council. With all these issues to tackle, whenever a deadlock appears, the solution tends to be a transitional one; yet there is no common understanding on the matter either. This part of the BP will provide with more substantive informations on these vital issues to handle the SC reform. a. Size of the Council, Categories of Membership and Regional Representation Those who favor most, the expansion of the SC base their arguments on a lack of democracy and geographic representation in the Council. On the other hand, the cautious ones emphasize the possible negative impact of enlargement on the effectiveness of the Council. However, among the membership there are no countries openly opposing to the expansion of the SC53. The

proposals on the table for the size of an enlarged SC differ. Mainly they can be grouped as low twenties option, mid twenties option and high twenties option54. The strongest argument for the low twenties option is the efficiency as the Council still stays small enough to act quickly. The G4 proposed mid twenties in their A/60/L46 proposal, but no clear arguments were made to defend the proposal. The most interesting proposal is the high twenties option. Increasing the number of the SC by, for example, some 12 members will definitely make it more democratic with a better regional representation; some55 argue that the main reason for this proposal is to change the SC from the kind of body it is today with the executive powers it holds, they suggest that some countries favoring this option think that over-expanding the SC is the best way to curb its powers. However, the main issue to tackle is not the size but the categories of the membership. It is generally the large and powerful countries which demand new permanent seats, mainly for themselves while their regional rivals campaign for adding more non-permanent seats56. This fact is concretized with G4 pushing for permanent seats and the UfC opposing; meanwhile African Group demanding for seats both permanent and non-permanent based on several different arguments (lack of representation of the Continent, historical injustices,etc). An argument for adding new permanent members which attracts attention is that only new permanent members, with their institutional memory and permanent presence, can ensure a real change in the power structure of the SC, and ensure its accountability to the membership at large57. The proposals on the table from the main groups are58: ● African Group: 2 permanent and 5 non-permanent seats to African States, selected by the AU; ● G4: 6 permanent (2 for African States, 2 for Asian states, 1 for Latin America and Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe and other States) and 4 non-permanent seats (1 African, 1 Asian, 1 Eastern European, 1 Latin American or Caribbean); ● France and UK: Permanent seats to G4 along with representation of Africa. Supporting a permanent seat for Germany is important for these two countries, because firstly, they see it, the only way to legitimize their permanent seats in the Council, both of them representing the Western Europe and secondly, it is the only way for them to evade the pressure coming within the EU; ● The UfC: Seeing that African Group, G4 and most of the P5 supporting the addition of new permanent seats, they came up with a compromise solution from their initial proposal59. 53 Lund, Jakob S., Pros and Cons of Security Council reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 19 January 2010, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/414 54 Ronzitti, The Reform of the Security Council 55 Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform 56 Von Freiesleben, Security Council Reform – the 62nd GA Session and the Road Ahead 57 Second Round of Talks on Security Council Reform Begins, Center for UN Reform Education, 16 June 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/399 58 Ronzitti, The Reform of the Security Council Proposed by Italy and Columbia, the UfC call for longer term seats allocated to regional groups (Africa, Asia, Asia/Africa on a rotating basis, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Western European and Other Groups/Eastern European Group on a rotating basis). They proposed 2 options for the duration of longer-term seats: a) from 3 to 5 years without the possibility of immediate re-election, or b) 2-year term with the possibility of up to 2 immediate re-elections. It is argued that the time for Germany and Japan asking for permanent seats to themselves had a greater chance in 1990s when the main arguments were based on the size of payments to the UN. However, it seems that contemporary global environment seems to have moved away from adding more industrialized nations to adding more developing countries as a way to make the Security Council more representative60. Apart from this, a delegate representing a country opposing to new permanent seats should keep in mind that no expansion may be more favorable than an expansion with new permanent seats. Upon the regional representation issue, there seems to be a consensus among the membership; however the African Group demanding permanent seats with veto rights makes a compromise solution no less of an issue for the membership and this stance from the Africans brings us to the issue of veto. b. Veto Issue, Working Methods and Relation of SC with GA I. Veto The veto issue is a quite contentious area. Apart from P5, the veto wielding countries, in principle all countries agree to abolish the veto right as it is seen as a remnant of the past. The G4, while calling for adding new permanent seats to the Council, does not have common stance regarding the issue. As mentioned above the position of Germany and Japan as candidates of permanent seats are

being questioned, which makes them closer to settle for a permanent seat without veto rights. However, India and Brazil, by being almost the most prominent emerging powers, are less likely to settle for a permanent seat not alike with the already existing ones61. The African Group, on the other hand, while asking for two permanent seats, calls for the abolition of the veto as they label it ―anachronistic and self-servingǁ‖62. However, if it is not abolished, for them, it is a matter of fairness to give the right to veto to new permanent members. The UfC, as mentioned before, does not support enlarging the Council with new permanent seats; yet they are still interested in veto issue. The group has come up with two possible solutions: the complete abolition of or limitations to the scope of, the veto63. The S5, not interested in Council enlargement issue, proposed the most controversial limitations for the use of veto in their draft A/60/L.49: 1) any P5 member that casts a veto has to qualify its use—that is, explain why the veto was cast; and 2) vetoes should not be used in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious crimes against international humanitarian law. What matters most about this issue is the P5‘s position. Firstly, they are quite envious about sharing their veto power64. Even if an expansion of the permanent seats is realized, it is difficult to imagine that P5 will be keen to accept extending the veto power to the new permanent members. The part that they are more sensitive about is any attempt to limit their veto right. Even though informal meetings are held between the P5 members to negotiate ways around usage of the veto, which can be seen as a positive way of reaching compromises and therefore avoiding vetoes 59 Facilitator Releases Status Report on Security Council Reform Process: Maps Way Forward, Center for UN Reform Education, 20 May 2009, available at: http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/398 60 Von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council 61 Ronzitti, The Reform of the Security Council 62 Lund&Safran-Hon, Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude 63

Ronzitti, The Reform of the Security Council 64 Lund&Safran-Hon, Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude being cast65; the veto power and any process to move around it are seen as undemocratic and greatly threatening the legitimacy and reputation of the Council as the veto power represents itself as an inability of the Council to contain a crisis situation. However, this fact does not stop P5 from criticizing the proposals. Proposing to limit the cast of veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious crimes against international humanitarian law is easy; however the definitions of these terms are quite relevant to the countries and even if there is a clear definition accepted by all countries, how are we going to know if the situation at hand fits any of these defined crimes66. About this limitation we have a double layered definition problem. It is likely to have the same kind of problems with any other proposals to limit the scope of the veto. Moreover, the P5 fears that accepting a limitation of their right of veto could open the door to a series of additional demands from the GA to limit their rights67. It should not be also forgotten that according to the Article 108 of the Charter, along with other conditions, any Charter amendment can come into force if the accepted amendment is ratified by all of the permanent members of the Security Council. II. Working methods As mentioned above the working methods reform seems to be the easiest one regarding the procedure of the change as it requires no Charter amendment; yet it remains as controversial as the other issues. Even though a decision of the GA on this matter would be only a recommendation, the main purpose for pushing for a GA decision is that it seems as the only way to put political pressure on the P5 to change the working methods. As explained earlier in this document, there have been some improvements regarding the working methods of the SC. One of the most important changes was the Arria-style meetings. If we look up what had happened so far with these meetings, we can have an insight about the issue. Membership has not gained any formal rights from the increased frequency of the meetings; showing us the dynamic of the Council: the P5 generally averts formalizing anything regarding their working methods68. Furthermore, every step to control the Council brings new challenges. For example as more meetings can be observed by non-members, more decisions have been discussed and agreed upon at informal meetings, mainly between P5 countries, prior to being adopted officially at the official meetings of the Council69. One crucial issue related to this topic is the position of the TCCs. According to the Article 31 of the Charter, ―any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate (...) in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affectedǁ‖, which is exactly the case for TCCs. In 2001, Resolution 1353 was adopted by the Council, giving the TCCs an exclusive right to sit on meetings

relating to the extension of the mandate of peacekeeping missions in which the countries‘ peacekeepers are deployed. Yet, TCCs are discontent arguing that the Council only listens to their remarks on military aspects, while disregarding their contributions about political issues. The prominent group on the working methods reform, S5 declared the following elements, which are interlinked and overlap with each other70, as the most pertinent ones of the working methods reform in their latest proposal dated April 2009: transparency and access, efficiency and implementation, rule of law, use of the veto, peacekeeping operations, accountability and the Council‘s relationship with the GA and its relationship with regional arrangements and agencies. The G4 and the UfC have not raised their voices against the proposal; however they haven‘t made it a priority either. While the UfC asks for a comprehensive reform in all five key issues, it is argued that the G4 is reluctant because pushing 65 Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform 66 Lund, Jakob S., Reforming the Working Methods of the Security Council, Center for UN Reform Education, 18 November 2009, available at: http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/412/ 67 Ibidem 68 Ibidem 69 Ibidem 70 Ibidem for any sort of restrictions imposed on Council members may end up affecting themselves if they should become permanent members71. The P5, on the other hand, is quite unwilling about working methods reform. If there is an effort to start an initiative within the GA on working methods of the Council; they constantly reiterate the fact that the GA and the SC are equal organs and they argue that a change concerning the working methods of the Council should come from within it. Russia, the US and China openly express this position72; however the UK and France seem to be more open to a compromise as they suffer from legitimacy issues on their permanent seats in the Council. III. Relation of SC with GA As to the regional representation, the main issue is the annual report that has been sent to the GA by the Council. These reports have been a mere description of what has been done by the Council and harsly criticized because of their lack of any political analysis of the work of the Council73. c. INTERMEDIARY APPROACH AS SOLUTION Whenever a deadlock appears in the reform process, an intermediary approach has been presented as a solution under different names such as interim solution, intermediary model or timeline perspective, first one being suggested by Germany in mid-1990s74. Even though the proposals change from time to time and member countries tend to interpret the term as they want, it can be argued that everyone agrees that it would be a compromise between expansion with just non-permanent or both categories of members75; but the essential feature of the model is a review conference after the test period is completed76. At first sight, a proposal of an intermediary approach may be seen fit towards a compromise solution, as it has a support from the G4, the UfC and also the P577 which makes it more likely to achieve two- thirds majority; it still needs to be clearly defined in all practical aspects. This support from all sides makes the issue more complex as for those who want an expansion in both categories of Council membership, the intermediate model is a way to get that, and for those who only want to add non- permanent seats to the Council, the model is a way to get that78, and this fact makes a clear definition more necessary. For example, the above mentioned common understanding upon a review clause: some countries see this mandatory review as a sunset clause in which previously agreed reforms would become void if not approved at the review conference; others would argue that if a two-thirds majority cannot be reached against the reforms, the latter should automatically continue79. From the legal aspect, there are no Charter limitations to an intermediary model, not also to a transitional approach as a sunset clause. However, even if the intermediary approach is designed as a temporary solution, it is still an amendment which needs to follow the proper procedure explained in the Article 108 for the amendments: ―Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council.ǁ‖ Yet, the main difficulty is not legal; it is mainly political as explained by an expert: 71 Ibidem 72 Ibidem 73 Ronzitti, The Reform of the Security Council 74 Von Freiesleben, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform 75 Koyu mavi, lacivert yazı tonu 76 Von Freiesleben, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform 77 Lund&Safran-Hon, Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude 78 Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council reform 79 Von Freiesleben, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform ―Apart from being without precedent such a solution is highly problematic from a political point of

view. It could easily lead the UN into a fatal crisis. A state which has enjoyed the privileges of a permanent member, with or without the veto, for a decade will not be ready to give up this position. In the (likely) case of a disagreement about the future membership, it would hardly be feasible to then return to the old (basically 1945) setup of the Council, and indeed such a going back to the old composition could not be explained to the world public. Probably, the Council would continue to work in the ̳provisional‘ composition but be challenged as illegal or unconstitutional. States which at present seek permanent membership will tend to use the sunset clause model in order to calm and reassure their opponents, but even if those opponents go along with it (which I doubt) it‘s a risky way for the Organization, for the reasons mentioned aboveǁ‖80. All along with the above mentioned difficulties, one cannot ignore a transitional approach as a possible solution as it allows the necessary flexibility to the blocs; this approach gives a chance to the membership to achieve a compromise solution without leaving their initial positions and to postpone the issues that cannot be decided upon.

CONCLUSION To this day, there have been many attempts to reform the Security Council; almost all of them have failed so far. This is because of the complex nature of the issue. There are many interest groups making a compromise hard to achieve. The main purpose of the reform should be making the Council small enough to respond quickly to the international crises, yet big enough to be more democratic and to have a better regional representation. Accomplishing this task is not easy, as there are many issues to tackle; most importantly the five key issues. As the historical background of the reform process shows us, on the road to the SC reform, many deadlocks can appear. Achieving a compromise solution on any of the issues needs quite good skills of diplomacy, political decisiveness and most importantly being ready to compromise; however all of these may not be enough to overcome the dividedness among the membership. Then the second best solution may be postponing a solution on the areas in which a compromise cannot be reached. In this case, an intermediary approach would solve the problem. However, one must not forget that an intermediary approach would also probably require a Charter amendment and all aspects of this transitional model have to be decided upon. The topic is consisted upon many controversial areas as mentioned above. However, this makes the topic a perfect fit for TEIMUN. Without having the real burthen of a real diplomat, you, the delegates may freely discuss the topic without contradicting the position of the country that you are representing. For you, it is easy to reach a solution and show the real world how it should be done. For this topic, the positions of countries are quite clear and coherent with a blocs‘ stance, which would make the topic easier for you in sense of how to represent your country. However, this does not definetly mean that you cannot make a compromise from your country‘s position. Dear delegates, instead of getting lost in the corridors of this branched topic and only sticking to your country‘s position, please have an open mind to a compromise solution and tackle this quite important part of the UN reform.

Questions a resolution must answer A resolution definetly needs to come up with a solution to five key issues: ● The size of an enlarged Security Council, ● The categories of membership, the question of regional representation, ● The question of the veto, ● The working methods of the Security Council, ● The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. 80 Ibidem The diplomacy is based upon compromise; however a solution on any of these issues may not be reached despite all the efforts. In this case, we expect from you to come up with an intermediary approach. If this is the case, all the practical aspects of this model must be considered in a resolution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Annan, Kofi, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm Facilitator Releases Status Report on Security Council Reform Process: Maps Way Forward, Center for UN Reform Education, 20 May 2009, available at: http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/398 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, Managing the Change at the United Nations Chapter 1: Reform of the Security Council, Center for UN Reform Education, April 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/23 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security Council Reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 24 June 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/357 Von Freiesleben,Jonas , Security Council Reform – the 62nd GA Session and the Road Ahead, Center for UN Reform Education, 11 November 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/372 Von Freiesleben, Jonas, Member States Meet to Discuss Report of the Task Force on Security Council Reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 19 June 2008, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/356 Lund, Jakob S.&Safran-Hon, Daniel, Third Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council Reform Conclude, Center for UN Reform Education, 22 September 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/407 Lund, Jakob S., Reforming the Working Methods of the Security Council, Center for UN Reform Education, 18 November 2009, available at: http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/412/ Lund, Jakob S., Pros and Cons of Security Council reform, Center for UN Reform Education, 19 January 2010, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/414 Obama backs India on permanent UN Security Council seat, 8 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11711007 Ronzitti, Natalino, The Reform of the Security Council, Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2010 Swart, Lydia, First Informal Plenary of the General Assembly on Security Council Reform Underway, Center for UN Reform Education, 30 January 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/385 Swart, Lydia, Countries Welcome Work Plan as Security Council Reform Process Commences New Phase, Center for UN Reform Education, 24 February 2009, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/386 Text-based Negotiations in Full Swing, 22 June 2010, Un Center for UN Reform Education, available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/426 Weiss, Thomas G., The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly, Automn 2003, available at www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_weiss.pdf