Gaia Gets to Know Herself_ Proclus on the World's SelfPerception

8/12/2019 Gaia Gets to Know Herself_ Proclus on the World's SelfPerception

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Phronesis 54 (2009) 261-285 brill.nl/phro

Gaia Gets to Know Herself:Proclus on the Worlds Self-Perception

Dirk BaltzlySchool of Philosophy & Bioethics, Monash University,

Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia

[email protected]

AbstractProclus interpretation of the imaeusconfronts the question of whether the living beingthat is the Platonic cosmos perceives itself. Since sense perception is a mixed blessing in thePlatonic tradition, Proclus solves this problem by differentiating different gradations ofperception. Te cosmos has only the highest kind. Tis paper contrasts Proclus account ofthe worlds perception of itself with James Lovelocks notion that the planet Earth, or Gaia,is aware of things going on within itself. Tis contrast illuminates several key differences

between contemporary theories of perception and the neoplatonic world view. In particu-lar, it argues that the neoplatonists had a radically different view of these matters becausethey assigned the property of truth not only to representations, but to objects as well.

KeywordsNeoplatonism, Proclus, Gaia, Lovelock, Dennett, functionalism

1. Introduction

A feature of Platos imaeus that is often overlooked is the purporteddivinity of the visible cosmos. According to imaeus, the entire cosmos isitself a living being a visible god endowed with both knowledge and truebelief. In his commentary on the imaeus, Proclus considers the questionof whether the living being that is the cosmic organism should also becredited with the capacity for perception. Tis is not an easy question,since the ambivalence of the Platonic corpus on the topic of perceptionsuggests that there are considerations both for and against this hypothesis.

Proclus solution is to isolate a variety of forms of perception and to assignonly the highest form to the cosmos. Tis, it will turn out, is a form of


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262 D. Baltzly / Phronesis 54 (2009) 261-285

that is as close as possible in its structural features to cognitionor.

James Lovelock is another, more recent, writer who supposes that theplanet Earth is a single living being that is able to perceive itself. Tis is notquite the same as Proclus claim, since it concerns the self-perception ofonly a smallpartof the cosmos not the whole cosmos but the comparisonmay nonetheless be instructive. In the Gaia hypothesis, Lovelock supposesthat Earths tendency to adjust its climatic conditions so as to permit life tobe sustained, even as the output of energy from the Sun changes over time,is evidence that it sensesthe temperature and amount of carbon dioxide inthe atmosphere (1979: 23). Unlike Proclus, Lovelock does not tell us whathe means by sensation. Nonetheless, it is not diffi cult to extrapolate fromhis remarks on cybernetics.

In this paper, I take the opportunity to reflect on the different waysthat these two thinkers see intelligence or and its connection withsense perception. For Lovelock, as for all contemporary functionalists,intelligence is both evidenced and constituted by the capacity to respondappropriately. It is thus essentially dynamic a pattern of activity that fits.For Proclus, by contrast, the activity of is best represented by the

sphere turning on its axis (in im. II 77.10-18, cf. Laws989ab). Whileis an activity, it is the activity that has the most Sameness to it. It isrest in motion (in im. II 94.20-4). Accordingly, the form of perceptionthat the universe enjoys will be one that most closely resembles the activityof . Te cosmos self-perception is constituted by its activity of beinga unified whole. o this extent, it is a picture of cosmic self-perception thatis essentially static.

What explains this contrast? I argue that it is because the neoplatonistsdo not, as contemporary philosophers have, strictly confine the class of

truth-bearers to representational items like utterances, thought-contents,or propositions.1 Tings, as well as contents, may be true on the neo-platonists way of thinking about these matters. Once we accord truth tothings, and locate more truth in some things than in others, then it seemsless implausible that some intelligible thing might be both an object of

1) o illustrate the way in which this restriction is entrenched in modern philosophy,consider the truisms with which Russell begins his discussion of the nature of truth andfalsity in his Problems of Philosophy: []ruth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and

statements: hence a world of mere matter, since it would contain no beliefs or statements,would also contain no truth or falsehood. Russell (1959), 121.


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D. Baltzly / Phronesis 54 (2009) 261-285 263

cognition (a ) and simultaneously an intellect or . Tis isbecause ais true, and the highest level of actuality of a truth is for

it to be grasped by a mind. Similarly, the highest level of actuality had bythe totality of sensible things will be credited with simultaneously beingthe activity of .

2. Te Problem of Cosmic Perception in the Timaeus

Platos imaeustells us that the universe is a divine living being, endowedwith soul and intelligence (30b8). imaeus33a-34a tells us a bit about

what kindof living being the universe is. For example, it is one that is freefrom old age and disease, utterly self-suffi cient, and without arms or legs,since there is nothing for it to grab and nowhere for it to go. In 33c, Platoargues that it does not have sense organs, such as eyes or ears, since there isnothing external to it that it might see or hear. Does it then altogether lackbecause it lacks sense organs? Platos answer to this question is farfrom clear. When we turn to the activities of the World Soul, we find thatit has both true opinionsabout the things in the sensible realm of Becoming,and also knowledgeabout things in the realm of Being. Te former results

from the circle of the Different, while the latter results from the circle ofthe Same. We are not told, however, howthe circle of the Different comesinto contact with the objects of opinion only thatit does.2In particular,we are not told whether the true opinions about sensibles that the WorldSoul forms are formed on the basis of sensingwhat goes on within itself.

If we consider this question just with respect to the imaeus, then thereare considerations that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, itappears that many of the troubles of the embodied soul arise from the twinsources of sense perception and nutrition (43c, 44b). So to give the WorldSoul sense perception might be thought to detract from the blessedness ofits life and affl ict it with the same troubles that we poor humans mustovercome. On the other hand, perhaps it is not sense perceptionper sethatdisturbs the souls psychic circles, but the perception of things externaltoit hence Platos remarks about the psychic circles being shaken as if boundwithin the flow of a river a flow that is presumably distinct and alien tothe soul. Since the World Soul will not be affected by perceptions of whatis external and alien to it, it will not be disturbed. Note that the universe

2) Cf. im. 37a5-6.


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seems to possess the other source of psychic disturbance in human souls,nutrition, without being troubled by it in the same manner that we are

(33a8-9). Te reason, perhaps, is the fact that it is not acted upon by anexternal source in receiving its nutriment.

If we range more broadly over Platos dialogues, then the question ofwhether the cosmos has perception appears to be one of considerableimport for a Platonist.3Certainly, the conclusion that one might drawfrom Phaedo is that the souls salvation requires the cessation of senseperception.4On the other hand, the imaeustells us that vision in particularis a source of the greatest of blessings philosophy and a gift of the gods(47ab). Te divine being that is the cosmos is set up for us as a moralexemplar in the imaeus. We should want the circles within our souls tomove as its circles do (90cd). Indeed, we should want the motions thattake place in our bodies to resemble to the greatest degree possible themotions that take place in its body. Tat is, we want to be predominantlyself-moved (89a). So does our moral exemplar have sense perception? Isthis a way in which we can come to resemble the cosmos, or yet anotherobstacle to overcome in our striving to emulate it?

Proclus takes up this issue in his commentary, noting that there is

disagreement among the ancients on this point (in im. II 82.1). Tepreponderance of evidence seems to be on the side of those who do grantthe cosmos a form of perception. Proclus notes that the Chaldean Oracles(fr. 8, Majercik) assign perception to the cosmos. Homer says that the Sunbeholds and hears all things (Il. 3.227, Od. 11.109) and Proclus supposesthat the Sun is a kind of cosmic eye, as are each of the stars ( in im. II84.8). So if the eye of the cosmos is perceptive, the cosmos must be too.Finally, Proclus finds additional confirmation in the Orphic poems. TeDemiurge is perceptive and he is so by means of the aether that composes

the heavens:

His intellect infallible, of royal aether incorruptible is formedBy it he hears and marks all, and there exists nothing No voice, no cry, no sound, no rumour that escapes the ears of Zeus (Orph. frag.168)5

3) I provide an overview of some of the issues that arise in Damascius and OlympiodorusPhaedocommentaries in Baltzly (1996).4)

Woolf (2006) argues forcefully against this idea.5) ,


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Tese considerations are unlikely to persuade usthat Plato meant to assignsome form of perception to the cosmos, but they nicely illustrate the way

in which Proclus supposes that all true philosophy will coincide with theteachings of Plato when each is properly interpreted, of course! Perhapsmore convincing from our point of view is Proclus observation that Platohimself supposes that all living beings are perceptive, even plants (77ab).Since the cosmos is a living being, it too will have to be perceptive.

But on the other hand, Proclus notes that there are dissenting voicestoo. Te first of these is Plato himself, who says in the Teaetetusthat senseperception is unable to grasp being and truth (189c9).6Second, Proclusnotes that perception is widely thought to be third from the truth (cf. inAlc. 21.18). Te allusion is again to Plato (Rep. X 597e7) where Socratesidentifies the tragic poet, qua imitator, as three removes from the King andthe truth. Proclus himself takes the further step of identifying perceptionwith the tragic poet, presumably on the grounds that the poet creates imi-tations of the way that things lookto us (in Remp. I 205.4-13).

Proclus solution to this interpretive problem is typically Proclean: wewill identify a variety of formsof perception and assign the highest of theseto the universe. Tis will do justice to those considerations in favour of

making it perceptive, while at the same time avoiding the conclusion thatit has the kind of perception that leads us poor humans away from thetruth. And note that Proclus thinks that the considerations in favour ofsome form of cosmic perception are pretty overwhelming:

Tat the universe is perceptive we may make clear from the fact that it is a living thingand also from the fact that the soul of the universe is capable of discursive reason andopinion () and gives to the body of the universe both ofthese qualities through participation that is, both opinion and discursive reason. Forif opinion is a certain sort of rational perception, the cause of perception in the body

will be the kind of life that results from this. (in im. II 83.3-9)

, ,

Proclus passes over in silence the rather odd fact that Orpheus here makes the Demiurge

perceive by means of his a faculty that seems to be antithetical to !6) Cf. Proclus earlier remarks on Phaedo83a at in im. I 346.13-21.


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Not only will the universe be perceptive because it is living, but it will havecertain other powers that are consequent upon having a perceptive life:

And there will also be a certain image of discursive reason in the universe, which wemight call cosmic imagination () in as much as it pictures to itself() the intuitive thought () of the former (i.e.) and it hasin it invisible impressions of the sensibles that come to be in the entire history of thecosmos. (83.9-13)

It is now time to consider the possible forms of perception and to inquireinto that which is most appropriate to the cosmos.

3. Proclus Solution

A. Te Forms of Perception

Proclus identifies four forms or gradations of . Tese are brieflydescribed at in im. II 83.16-84.5:

I say that the first and most proper kind is that which imitates intellect. For every-where the first things [in a series] have a likeness to the things prior to them onaccount of their continuity .7So this first kind of perceptionincludes the sense object in and of itself. Neither does it pass from one thing to another,for this would already be a kind of particularization (). Further, it doesnot proceed into what is external to it, for such a thing is incomplete. Instead, havingthe whole sense object in itself, it is more like consciousness ().8

Te second kind of sense perception after this is that which does proceed outside[itself], but is completely in actuality and everywhere apprehends the whole knowablething entirely and always in the same manner. It is free from affections and all inabili-

ties which are proper to particular, enmattered organs.Te third kind of perception, being affected by external things, is a mixture of per-

suasion and knowledge: it originates from an affection, but ends up in knowledge.Te final kind of sense is that by means of which knowledge is present in the most

obscure way, and it is largely passive and borders on physical co-affection () and because of this is unable to know forms of sensibles. For

7)Accepting Krolls conjecture, for a lacuna at 83.19. For the premisehere invoked, see E28.8)

Festugire seems right to delete the odd feminine article at 83.22 [] .


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example, it cannot know that the thing that affects it is hot or cold, but only that it ispleasant or painful. Such is the sort of perception that Plato gives to plants as the

imaeusgoes on (77b), this being only a registering () of pleasure or painfrom the sense object.9

It will emerge that the cosmos as a whole is assigned the first form of per-ception and so this will be central to our discussion. I will have little to sayabout the other forms of perception. However, the nature of this highestform of perception has recently been the focus of disagreement betweenPeter Lautner and the late H. J. Blumenthal, so it is necessary for us to saysomething about that in as much as it bears on the goals of this paper.10

In effect, Blumenthal says that Proclus is being somewhat disingenuouswhen he calls the first two forms of perception perception. Tese donot have as their objects, but rather intelligibles. Specifically,Blumenthal supposes that the objects of the first two forms of perceptioncorrespond to the upper part of Platos doubly divided line in the Republic.Plato himself would not have characterised these cognitive states as perceptionat all.11

Lautner, however, wishes to resist the idea that the Worlds ismerely homonymous with ours in this way. One strategy for resisting this

move is to insist that in the passage quoted above should notbe understood as reflexive self-awareness. Lautner does not say so explicitly,but I suspect that his motivation is this: if is reflexive self-awareness, then this highest form of perception involves taking itself asobject in a manner that is too close to . It would make the highestform of just a form of cognition by another name thus makingit merely homonymous with our own perception.12

Lautner argues that should instead be translated as somethinglike joint-perception. Lautner isolates two roles for in Proclusother discussions of the term. Looking to Proclus use of at inim. III 8.28-9.2, Lautner argues that the term refers to a particular type

9) rans. Baltzly (2007).10) Blumenthal (1982), Lautner (2006).11) Blumenthal (1982), 3.12) What Lautner says on this point, against Blumenthal, is that the translation [sc. of theterm as reflexive awareness] served to corroborate the claim that Proclus did not regard

this type of as part of our perceptual system, that is he exempted it from thecontact with the perceptible world. (Lautner, p. 120).


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of perception, namely to the perception of time and motion.13In a seconduse, involves the registering of affections that come about in

us (in im. II 7.10-11). However, Lautner distinguishes both of these fromthe rational souls capacity for reflexive awareness of its activities (in Parm.957.32-958.11), which is notcalled .

B. You Call that Perception?

I sympathise with Lautners effort to show that paceBlumenthal Proclusis really ascribing perception (and not merely cognition under anothername) to the cosmos. But I suspect that he thinks that the vindication

of this point requires more than it actually does. Lautner is at pains toshow that the highest two forms of that Proclus ascribes to theuniverse and to the heavenly bodies respectively (in im. II 84.28-32) canbe had by human beings as well.14But surely it is not necessary to show thisin order to vindicate the claim that these highest forms of perceptionare not merely homonymous with human . Tis claim can bevindicated, even if one is left in some doubt about whether human beingscan engage in the two highest gradations of perception.15Not all creatures

13) Lautner (2006), 120.14) Lautner (2006), 125.15) Lautners efforts to show that the cosmic gradation of perception is not ruled out forhumans are ingenious and I am nearly convinced. However, in order to show that the typeof that the cosmos enjoys can occur in us, he must show that Proclus leaves roomfor humans to have perception that (a) is non-discursive (83.20-1), (b) occurs withoutundergoing affections (83.26; 85.1), (c) is directed upon something that is not external toitself (83.21), and (d) enables us to grasp the all at once, entirely, and in a mannerthat is invariant (83.24-5). In addition, it must also (e) know the sensible essences of things(84.17-18). Lautner makes a good case that the of embodied human sense perception

in the psychic vehicles (in im. III 286.20-4) manifests all of (a)-(d). Tis is one and thesame with in the psychic vehicle. However, Lautner does not reckon with inim. I 293.1-5 where Proclus limits to knowledge of the activitiesof sensibles. Itis opinion that knows their essencesas a result of antecedently possessing their . Tesame claim is made for the at I 248.11-20. So the question becomes, What isthe relation between the prior associated with human psychic vehicles and thefaculty of opinion, since it is the latter that seems necessary in order to satisfy condition (e)above? At III 284.26-7 Proclus describes the doxastic life as the of the sensitive one.But, generally speaking, a thing and its first principle are not one and the same. On theother hand, at II 83.7-8 the relation between and opinion is less clear. Perception

seems to be a a kind of rational opinion, depending upon how one construes the grammarof the sentence: ,


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have all of the five sense modalities that we humans have. But this does notmean that, for instance, touch in sightless creatures is merely homonymous

with touch in us. Similarly, the mere fact that the highest form of perceptionis had by the cosmos, but perhaps not by us, should not lead us to theconclusion that this form of perception is merely homonymous withhuman . What goes for the individual sense modalities should goequally for the various gradations of perception itself.

What makes all of Proclus four forms of perception count as perceptionis not their coincidence in percipients such as us. It is the fact that all formsof perception share a common object: things that have been generated. Tisis just what we should expect, given the one-to-one matching of the realmsof Being and Becoming with knowledge and opinion at im. 28a1-3.What makes matters confusing, and leads to a deviation from Aristotlescorrelative definitions of sense faculties and sense object,16is the fact thatthe highest form of perception does not merely grasp the sensible forms of, but rather the of each of them (in im. II 86.17-20).So the proper correlative of is not , but rather .We humans might mistakenly suppose that objects qua sensible, or sensibleforms, are the proper objects of merely because we do not have

the highest form of sense perception. As Proclus says:As that which is always intelligible is not in one way intelligible and in another not,but entirely intelligible not by that which cognises in a divisible or partial manner ofcourse, but by the divine intellect in the same manner the generated sensible is alsonot in one way sensible but in another not sensible, but rather is wholly so. (Toughagain, this is not the case for we who perceive in a divisible or partial manner, but it isso for the total living creature in which the universal sense in located.) For as thethought of the gods is one thing, but that of particular living things is another, so toothe perception of the gods is one thing and that of particular living things is another:

the one also knows the particular sensible essence () while the other knows only the things that pertain to the essence () [i.e. accidents]. (in im. II 84.20-8)

. I am not myself certain that Proclus various statementson perception, opinion and the apprehension of sensible essences adds up to a coherent

position. I am happy to be persuaded of Lautners position, but I think that what I have to

say on the subject of the perception of the cosmos is independent of the question of whether

human souls can engage in the highest form of perception.16) Cf. Cat. 6b35;Metaphys. 1021a33-b3; DA415a14-22.


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Notice how this summary of the objects of intellect and perception returnsagain to the contrast between that which always is and is always intelligible

and the generated sensible. Te claim that the highest form of perceptionknows essencesshould not lead us to Blumenthals conclusion that it is aform of cognition having as its objectsrather than , for theessences that are grasped by the highest form of perception are particularsensible essences, which are enmattered and individual (84.18). Justwhat such sensible essences are in Proclus philosophy is another question.17Te point I want to make here is simply that all four gradations ofperception share a common object and the generated status of these objectsboth binds them together as gradations of perception and differentiatesthem from cognition.

Noting this also relieves us of the burden of arguing that the of cosmic perception is not reflexive self-awareness. I think Lautner felt theneed to do that because to allow to be understood in this waywould make it too much like , and thus undermine the claim thatthe highest form of perception is perception at all. But we now see thatthere is nothing to fear on that score: all four gradations of perception areunified by their shared object: generated things and their sensible essences

or sensible forms. It is not easy to know what Proclus means by in this context. My own guess is that he means that the cosmoss perceptionis not localised into individual sense objects or divided into distinct sensefaculties. It is rather more like our awareness of the totality of our ownbodies what we now call the proprioception that tells us what counts asus and what is distinct from us. Note that the example () is given to gloss the claim that the cosmoss sense perception doesnot go outside itself but rather has the whole sense object within itself (II 83.22-3). Does this cosmic proprioception involve self-reflexive awareness?18

Is the World Soul aware that it is in its own way perceptually aware of

17) It seems to me that on the basis of in Parm. 626.10-15, these are what Aristotle wouldcall individual natures an internal principle of change. Tis passage in the Parmenidescommentary treats sensible essences as equivalent to physical essences that have beenreceived from the intelligibles. Tese , in turn, are equated with sensibleor rational-forming principles that guide sensible things, generating them endlesslyand preserving them as living beings. Tis looks like the functional role of a nature.18)

I am grateful to one of the anonymous readers forPhronesisfor making me think harderabout this question one which I was initially inclined to avoid.


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what is going on within its own body? Proclus discussion of imaeus37b6-c3 may shed some light on this question.

Te World Soul is in contact with both sensibles, via the Circle ofthe Different, and intelligibles, via the Circle of the Same. Proclus invokesTeaetetus185a to argue that the World Soul enjoys a kind of unity ofapperception through the activity of the Being in the psychic mixture (inim. III 299.5-21). Tere must be something in the World Soul that isaware of both and knows both and says that what is intelligible is onething and what is sensible is another (in im. III 308.2-4). It appears tome that this activity of the Being in the psychic mixture is more likeawareness that one is aware. If the perception of the World Soul is afunction of the activity of the Circle of the Different, then it is not simplyby means of the cosmic perception associated with the Circle of theDifferent that the World Soul enjoys the awareness that it perceives.Cosmic proprioception is simply the awareness that it has of what is goingon within itself, just as our proprioception is the awareness of limits of ourown bodies. Because we are so aware, we can become reflexively aware thatwe are thus aware, but this is not a function of proprioception. I thinkmuch the same is true of the World Souls perception.

C. and ruth

Having established that the highest form of perception that possessed bythe cosmos is not merely homonymous with human perception, let usnow concentrate on how it differs.19Unlike ordinary human perception,cosmic perception is non-discursive (in im. II 83.20; 84.29). It is unifiedwith its object. Indeed, it is sounified with its object that the object, thesense and the sense organ are all one (84.13). In this crucial respect, cosmic is structurally isomorphic to the activity of intellectin which knower, known and the act of knowing are one. Proclus makesthis point in a variety of ways that illustrate the identity of and . Te divine light, which Proclus identifies as space and theprimary body of the World Soul, iscosmic vision (II 6.28-7.2).20Similarly,

19) Or taking into account Lautners view that it does not differ from the perceptualpower associated with our psychic vehicles let us consider how it differs from embodiedhuman perception.20)

Te divine light that is stretched through heaven like a rainbow (Rep. 616b5) is,according to Proclus, the space that the cosmos inhabits: Simplicius in Phys. 612.24-613.1.


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the Sun and each of the stars is an eye (84.8). In general, because the WorldSoul is everywhere present to the Worlds Body, each generated thing

marks a locus of coincidence between , and .Tis view about perception can only make sense as an image of the

superior power of intellection or . In the intelligible realm, eachintelligible is engaged in an act of self-knowing, where this act is constitutiveof the intellect.21Tis is the standard neoplatonic adaptation of Aristotlesaccount of .22 Now, note that the most prominent text for thisunderstanding ofis one in which Aristotle draws parallels betweenit and . So it is not surprising that Proclus supposes that there is acontinuity between these two activities and that there will be a form ofperception that will be as similar as possible towhile yet preservinga distinction from it. Te authority of the Aristotelian parallel betweenperception and intellection might be in itself suffi cient to account forProclus belief in this highest form of perception.

But what are weto make of this? Can it be made to make any sense apartfrom its place in Aristotles authoritative text? We might concede that aneoplatonic is a suffi ciently odd object that it is perhaps not soimplausible to suppose that it is simultaneously and the activity of

just by virtue of what it is. Perhaps we just have to shrug and say,Well, strange objects do strange things. In fact, however, there is a sortof confluence of implausibilities that makes the idea that the intelligiblesknow themselves seem less implausible than it otherwise might.

According to Proclus view of space, it is an immaterial body of the nature of light. Tisimmaterial body provides the vehicle of the World Soul. On Proclus theory of space aslight and the place of the heavens, see Siorvanes (1996), 247-56; Schrenk (1989); Schrenk

(1994); Sorabji (1988), 116-24.21) Cf. E167. Te primary, unparticipated intellect knows only itself, and its object is onein number with the object of knowledge. Subsequent intellects have themselves as objects,but also their priors and so there is only partial identity if one may put it this way betweenand. Each suchis the act ofin which it (as well as otherthings) is the. Cf. in Parm. 901.15-18.22) Cf. DAIII.8, 431b20-32a3. Arguably, in Aristotle it is the activityof the thatis the same as the activityof the intellect if we treat as parallel to the case of theidentity of the activity of sense object and sense in DAIII.2, 425b26-26a26. Plotinus goesfurther in equating, and because he thinks that the objects of

are not outside the intellect in the way that the objects of sensation are outside the sense:V.4.2, 44-8.


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It is essential that what is knownshould be true. It is the received wisdomfrom Russell to the present that this means that knowledge is a relation

that obtains only between knowers and true propositions or contents.Where this requirement seems to fail as when we say that Pierre knowsParis we look around for some true propositional knowledge for whichsuch seemingly de re,non-propositional knowledge claims are proxies. Wemight suppose, for instance, that when we say that Pierre knows Paris, thismeans only that he knows many true propositions about where streets andcafs are located in Paris. Whether we are right to do so is not a questionthat I wish to open. I merely want to notice that we think that truth is aproperty confined to representational items truth-bearers. And as far aswe are concerned, the only items that are truth-bearers are those with somepropositional content, whether these be statements, beliefs, or perceptualstates.

Proclus and other neoplatonists are able to regard the activity of intellectas itself an act of knowing and an act of being known because, unlikeus, they think of truth as a property of things.23For us, only certain selectthings truth-bearers are candidates for truth or falsity. Proclus takesseriously Socrates claim at Philebus 64a7-b3 that any existing thing has

some admixture of truth.We know that Proclus wrote an essay on the Tree Monads in thePhilebus (in Remp. I 295.25).24Westerink finds it plausible that in theportion of Damascius commentary on the Philebus that covers 64a-e,the commentator refers to Proclus.25In Damascius commentary, we findthe following ideas attributed to the commentator: (1) ruth makeseach thing wholly and solely what it is so that it is neither an image normixed up with something else (236). (2) Te One Principle of all thingsconstitutes each thing as what it is in itself, and for this reason the One

Principles lightistruth(238). (3) ruth is analogous to the Good, sincethe good for each thing is to be what it itself is (241). On the basis ofthese texts it seems that Proclus took ruth to be a metaphysical principlewhose operation is analogous to that of the One or the Good. Te claim

23) Te following reflections on Proclus were prompted by remarks by Emilsson (1996),237-8 and Gerson (1994), 48 on Plotinus V.5.2, 18-21: So that the real truth is also there[in Intellect], which does not agree with something else, but with itself, and says nothingother than itself, but it is what it says and says what it is.24)

Cf. Combs (1987).25) rans. Westerink (1982).


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about ruth being the light of the One recalls the image of the Sun fromthe Republic, where it is said that intelligibles receive both their truth

(508e1) and their being known () from the Good (509b6).Proclus reflections on the triad ruth-Beauty-Symmetry in the PlatonicTeologyare more or less consistent with this general view that ruth is aprinciple that endows things with their being. Plat. Teol. III 43.20-22makes Symmetry the cause of each mixtures unity, while ruth is the causeof itsgenuinely essential character. Te last member of the triad, Beauty, isgiven responsibility for making things intelligible.26Nonetheless, Proclusalso considers various other orders of priority for the members of this triad,and suggests that in an occult or mysterious way ruth is intelligibleknowledge (Plat.Teol.III 63.1-3).

Tis is the confluence of implausibilities to which I adverted above.Each intelligible object can be simultaneously a knowing intellect and theact of intellection because these thingsare true (at least according to theneoplatonists). So if we accept the latter implausibility (thatare trueor truth-bearers) the former implausibility (that these things are knowersas well as things known and additionally acts of knowing) might seem tobe somewhat ameliorated. What is truesurely has a content, and a content

is the kind of thing that can be known, so from our point of view, thatlooks like a step in the right direction. It seems that Proclus would concur,since in his commentary on the greatest diffi culty passage in the Parmenideshe writes:

And even as Tere the one Knowledge is necessarily prior to the many, the knowledgeof which is the real ruth, as the many knowledges are of the many ruths (for in thecase of each their object is a ruth) . . . (in Parm. 947.37-948.3, trans. Morrow andDillon)

Moreover, this true thing is active(E83), and so it is not merely a truththat can begrasped by a mind, but a mind in the act of grasping that truth.Tis is what the truth of intelligibles does for them. Tis comes acrossnot only in the report from Damascius Philebuscommentary noted above(241), but also in what Proclus has to say in his Parmenidescommentary:

26)

Teol. Plat.III 43.20-2: , , .


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For Tere both Knowledge and ruth and all the Forms in them participate in Knowl-edge itself and ruth itself. Te one makes all things Tere intellectual . . . the other

makes them intelligible for the light of ruth, being intelligible, gives them a share ofits intelligible power. (in Parm. 944.22-29)

One should not give in to the temptation to suppose that the purportedtruth of intelligibles is simply an unfortunate artefact of the fact that inGreek can be used to mean real. Proclus may be mistaken inthinking that things are true, but he is well aware of what he is doing itis not an inadvertent lapse. Tis comes across clearly from in Crat. 36.7-17, where he catalogues the four kinds of things that Plato thinks true and

false may be used to signify. Te first of these is the sense in which thethings that are really real () may be said to be truly, whilethose that are not really real () may be said to befalsely.27Proclus was well aware that Aristotles De Interpretatione16a9 ffinsists on a much narrower use of the word true one that confines it tothings said in combination or assertoric truth. In the Cratyluscommentary,however, he insists that this notion of assertoric truth is just one amongmany. It is diffi cult to know with any certainty the exact relation betweenAmmonius commentary on De Interpretatione and the views of his teacher,

but Ammonius repeats the claim that assertoric truth is not exhaustive,and adds that Aristotle too is committed to what Ammonius calls noetictruth, both in theMetaphysicsand the De Anima.

Te peculiar character of the truth possessed by intelligibles may help toexplain why the question of whether non-discursive thought in Proclus isalso non-propositional is such a vexed one. In a famous exchange, Sorabjiargued that there was conceptual space in Greek philosophy for a form ofthinking that was non-discursive but nonetheless propositional. Tinkingof definitions like justice is each doing its own as identity statementsallows one to see that this could be non-discursive in the sense thatone does not think one thing and then anotherthing but nonethelesspropositional.28A. C. Lloyd replied that this might be so for Aristotle, butthat at least in Plotinus there was additional evidence that is both

27) Te remaining three senses concern: (2) in terms of the truth and falsity of the passions,as in the case of false pleasures in the Philebus; (3) in terms of the understanding (gnsis), aswhen we distinguish true and false opinions; (4) in terms of the instruments of the gnosticlife, for example logoi, names and syllables, which may or may not fit or harmonise with the

things that they refer to. Te last category is, of course, the special concern of the Cratylus.28) Chapter 10 of Sorabji (1983) responds to Lloyd (1969-70).


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non-discursive and such as to lack propositional content.29It seems thatthere are texts in Proclus that pull in both directions. Some suggest that

has a propositional complexity (in Parm. 72.33-74.2 (Klibansky),Plat.Teol. I 98.7-10), while others seem to suggest that intellect thinks allthings as one, contrasting this with the discursive thinking of Soul.30Tevacillation may be a result of the peculiar character of noetic truth. On theone hand, participation in truth makes objects intelligible. On the otherhand, it makes them known. If you think that what is known is a contentof some sort, then this second role for noetic truth pushes Proclus towardgiving propositional content. If, on the other hand, you focus onthe fact that each is a unitary thing, then perhaps this pushes onetoward regarding the thought of it as non-propositional.

D. and the ruth of

With this in mind, let us now turn from to the highest formof , for it is distinguished by its structural isomorphism withintellection. Both the World Soul and the cosmic body that it animateswill have some admixture of truth, just as the do, though it will bea much smaller share. Tis is the clear implication of Philebus64a-b where

the principle is taken to apply to any mixture.31At in Alc.108.1 Proclussays that truth pertains most especially to immaterial objects of knowledge,but this is consistent with sensibles having some lesser portion of it enough that we may avoid being deceived about them at least. At inim. II 51.16 Proclus accords an obscure sort of truth to the things in thesublunary realm. His remarks on the imaean proportion as Being is toBecoming, so is truth to conviction (29c2-3) locate a variety of differentgradations of truth at different levels (in im. I 347.20-348.7). Convictionor in the soul seems to correspond to the kind of truth found amongsensibles.

Te truth of means that, just by being the things that they are,each is a thing known and also an act of knowing In a similar, but lessunified manner, the visible living being that is the cosmos is, in virtue of

29)Lloyd (1986).30) in Prm. 808.18-9 , .31) Indeed, Philebus64a-b would seem to be more obviously a principle about the realm of

Becoming rather than that of Being: note that forms of are used three times in thespace of only four lines.


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the more obscure sort of truth that is present in it, simultaneously subject,object, and content of a perceptual representation. Here, as before, the

idea that truth is somehow a property of things facilitates the blurring ofthe boundary between being a thing and being a representation of thatthing.

Te presence of truth in things even the obscure sort of truth ingenerated things helps make it possible for Proclus to take Aristotlesparallel between andto its logical conclusion. In DAIII.8,431b20-24, Aristotle asserts just what Proclus thinks:

Now to sum up the things that have been said about the soul, let us say again that soul

is in a way all the things that are, for things are either sensibles or intelligibles, andknowledge is in a way the things known andperception is the things perceived.

Aristotle, of course, goes on to say how this can be so by means of hisdivision into the potential and actual objects of knowledge or perception.It is not that the power of vision that makes my eye what it is is the samething as the red rose that I see. Rather, the activity of my visual capacityseeing red is one and the same activity with the activity of the roses sensibleform. Te sense is thuspotentiallythe not in the sense that it ispotentially the itself, but rather itsform. Likewise for that whichis knowable. For Aristotle, perception is the thing perceived merely in thesense that the activity of sensible form and the sense are one and thesame.

While this may be so for human beings, Proclus thinks the totalcoincidence of sense and sense object is exactly right in the case of theWorld Soul that animates the cosmos. However, rather than speakingabout the coincidence of activity of sense and sense object in terms of

sameness of form, Proclus takes the at their highest level ofactuality to be the causes of the generated things. Recall that, as notedabove, in the case of the highest form of perception, the correlative ofis not but . Te admixture of truth in theobjects of perception means that they exist as the activity of the WorldSouls perceptive power in the form of a narrative or logosthat is subject totruth. In describing how the World Soul knows the sensibles through thecircle of the Different (im. 37d) Proclus says:

For it [i.e. the World Soul] has antecedently comprehended () all the sen-sibles and their doings and undergoings. Since the universe is one living thing, it is


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sympathetic with itself, so that all the things that have come to be are parts of the lifeof the world as if it were a single drama for example if there were some tragic poet

who created a drama in which after the gods made an appearance and heroes and otherplayers 32he assigned to those among the actors who were willingsome heroic speech or other part, while he himself encompasses () withinhimself the cause of all that is said. It is necessary in the case of the universal soul tothink along these lines. (in im. II 305.6-15)

Te verb is one of the ways that Proclus indicates theexistence of an object existing at a higher level of being: whenxantecedentlycomprehendsy, thenxisy , whileyisx. Notethat in addition to this causal language, we have the idea of a drama a

narrative speech in which it is true that certain things happen and certainthings are said. Just as are both causes and contents that may beknown, so too at least at the level at which they exist in theperceptive faculty of the World Soul are both causes and things thatadmit of truth. Te activity of the World Souls sense and its sense objectscoincide, just as in Aristotle, and their coincident activity is (among) thecauses of generated things.33 Tis perhaps is why Proclus describes theobject of cosmic perception as the individual sensible essences (in im. II

84.27-8).E. Conclusion: Proclus Cosmic Perception

Let us sum up and draw some generalisations. I said above that what makesall four of Proclus grades of perception count as perception is that theyshare a common object . We are now in a position to see thatthis common object admits of as many gradations of existence as the formsof perception. Corresponding to the World Souls perception, there are thethat exist in the World Soul. Tese are among causesof the objects with which we humans are acquainted through our senseperception. While we apprehend only the sensible forms of these, the WorldSoul apprehends their individual sensible essences (in im. II 84.27-8)

32) Reading in the lacuna at line 12 with Kroll.33) Te even higher causes of these causes in the World Soul also play a role in causingsensibles. Tis is characteristic of the metaphysics of emanation: higher causes play some

role in explaining at the lowest levels, though there is a role for the intermediate causes hereas well.


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because the paradigms of the sensibles we humans experience are in Heras causes.34

Tese causes, however, are simultaneously things that are correctlydescribed as true. Just as the truth of helps explain how theneoplatonists can be so glib in regarding something as simultaneously aknower, a thing known and an act of knowing, so too the truth of helps to explain how the causes of existing in theWorld Soul can be simultaneously regarded as the of this soul.Tey do not have the same degree of truth as , so their presence inthe World Soul constitutes (in im. I 348.3-5). If contemporaryphilosophers are leery of the notion of degrees of truth, this correlationwith causal influence explains why the neoplatonists are not at all botheredby it. Te intelligibles exercise a causal influence over everything of whichthe existing in the World Soul exercise influence, andmore besides.35Degree of truth is thus commensurate with degree of causalinfluence.

One final observation: this is a view about knowledge and perceptionthat makes being known or being perceived a matter of being that verything. Tis means that it is a picture of cognition or perception that is

essentially static. Knowing or perceiving is not a matter of respondingin theright way to things, or being acted upon in the right way by things. Aswe shall see, this contrasts sharply with our representative among modernthinkers who supposes that the world perceives itself.

34) Proclus does not say as much, but I think we surmise that the second gradation ofperception enjoyed by the heavenly gods is similar to that of the World Soul, but not ascomplete. Te plurality of heavenly gods cooperate in mediating the logoiwithin the WorldSoul to matter. So each one will have an apprehension of some of the causes of sensibles asexternal. Tis difference in causal role is physically manifested in the difference between thebody of the World Soul (i.e. the whole cosmos) and that of the individual planets. Tisform of perception is thus said to proceed outside itself. Plant souls experience sensibles notqua sensibles, but only qua sources of pleasure and pain. Teir apprehension of these objectsis thus least complete.35) Cf. E prop. 26: Every productive cause produces the things after it and what is

subsequent to them while remaining in itself and unaffected. Effects are thus explained bycauses at all the levels above them.


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4. Lovelock and Gaias Self-Perception

Gaia is purportedly the complex entity that consists of the Earths atmo-sphere, oceans and soil and now the life within them as well.36Lovelockhypothesized that this entity formed a cybernetic system that acts with theaim of maintaining conditions that are fit for life. Tis notion of a cyber-netic system points us in the direction of the kind of theory of perceptionthat would make Gaia a sentient being.

Lovelock has a lot to say about cybernetics, devoting a whole chapter toit. He is clear that the perceptual systems of human beings play a role in usthat is similar to the role played by thermostats in ovens (2000: 45-8). But

in Lovelocks cybernetic picture of perception, it is not merely our eyes orears that sense. Our kidneys do too.

We now know that the kidney, like the brain, is an information processing organ. oachieve its aim of regulating the salinity of our blood, it purposefully segregates indi-vidual atoms. In every second, it recognisesand selects or rejects countless billions ofatomic ions. (2000: 53, my emphasis)

My point is not to ridicule Lovelock by suggesting that he thinks that your

kidney is a sixth sense. Rather, the point is that once we have adopted thestandpoint of cybernetic systems, we are bound to see some features of thesystem as playing the role of sensing. After all, a cybernetic system (1) aimsat a certain state (e.g. a certain degree of salinity or temperature) and(2) actsso as to bring about changes when conditions deviate from thatstate. In order to so act, it must (3) be able to monitorthe current state ofthe system, as well as the changes to the system that are brought about byits interventions or other factors. When we take up the intentional stanceto such a system it is almost irresistible to describe the activities in this

third role as sensing things.If Lovelock were to pick from among the views about intentionality andperception on the philosophical market, it seems to me that he wouldbe most inclined toward something like Dretskes information-theoreticapproach or Dennetts intentional stance. Both approaches are promiscu-ous about intentionality in general and perception in particular, locatingit in beings or systems that need not have consciousness.37Dretskes notion

36)

See Lovelock (1979: 10, 152) and the addition in (2000: 144).37) Tere is room for confusion here, as usual, over the words conscious and consciousness.


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of a non-epistemic use of sees does not require that the subject who seeshas beliefs about, or conceptual understanding of, what it sees.38Tis is

all to the good, since it seems unlikely that Gaia would be the kind ofsentient being with such conceptual understanding. Dretskes representa-tional theory of sensory experience says that the nature of these experiencesis exhausted by the nature of the objects experienced. We thus have noGaian qualiato worry about. A state may count as a sensory representationof a property or object just in case it has the biological function of convey-ing information about that property or object. (Biological function, inturn, is determined by selection history.)39Tus perception in the non-epistemic sense is basically a matter of having states whose function isreceiving information, and all manner of things may receive information.It is true that Dretskes notion of biological function which presupposes aselection history is not so obviously applicable to Gaia, but perhaps thereare things one could say to make a special case here.

Similarly, intentionality on Dennetts account is prior to consciousness.40Te capacity to have intentional states is not predicated upon the posses-sion of consciousness. Rather, it is the other way around: consciousness such as it is for Dennett is the result of the complex interplay of the

multiplicity of ways and levels at which higher order intentional systemsprocess contentful states.41Since he resists the idea that consciousness maybe the litmus test betweengenuineand merely apparentintentionality, Den-nett would think that there is no deeper question about Gaias purportedsensings than whether taking up the design stance toward her is pragmati-cally indispensable. He might, in fact, disagree with the utility of takingup the intentional stance toward the system that Lovelock identifies withGaia, but that is a rather different disagreement from the one that saysGaia cannotsense the concentration of CO

2in the atmosphere because she

is so obviously not a conscious being. Dennett would presumably think

Dretske argues that both experiences of things (non-epistemic seeing) and awareness offacts (epistemic seeing) are conscious states. However, in Dretskes view there can beconscious states in beings who are neither thing-aware nor fact-aware of them. Tere canbe conscious states without self-conscious awareness. Cf. Dretske (1993).38) Dretske (1969), 20-1.39) Dretske (1995), 104.40) Tis point comes across very clearly in Dennetts reflections on the general themes of his

own work in Guttenplan (1994), 238.41)Dennett (1991).


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that there is nothing in principleimpossible about the Earth having statesthat are rightly regarded as perceptions of temperature or atmospheric

composition. If any theory of perception would permit us at least to enter-tain the proposition that Gaia senses, it would be a theory such as Dretskesor Dennetts. I am not claiming that these theories wouldvindicate Love-locks judgement only that these theories do not clearly rule it out ofcourt immediately. So if we were to take Lovelock seriously when he cred-its Gaia with perception, and ask what he means by perception, I thinkthe most natural answer would be something like what Dretske or Den-nett mean.

5. Cosmic Self-Perception, Ancient and Modern

It is time to harvest the fruits of our comparison. Te first point that leapsout at us is one of contrast: the grounds for Gaias purported self-perceptionis a certainpattern of change. By contrast, Proclus highest form of perceptionis highest precisely because it mimics that essentially static character of.

Tis comes out most clearly if we think about Gaias perception of vari-

ous things in terms of Dennetts intentional stance. We take up the inten-tional stance to systems when we want to explain their behaviour whatthey do. If it is suffi ciently complex that our efforts from the design stanceor the physical stance become impossible or simply too cumbersome, wewill find ourselves ineluctably drawn to explaining this behaviour in termslike sensing the temperature. Being perceptive, in this way of thinkingabout things, is fundamentally about exhibiting a certain kind of verycomplex dynamism.

Proclus view on cosmic perception begins from a very differentorientation. He places a great deal of weight on the passage in Laws898a-bthat asserts that the motion of a sphere on its axis is the visible reflection ofthe activity of .42All intelligibles participate in a kind of atemporalintelligible life a fact that is related to their participation in Motion. Butthe intelligible life is a motion in which Rest predominates, and so too isits visible analogue: the motion of a sphere on its axis (in im. II 134.7-13). Now, the visible cosmos is just such a moving sphere, and in virtue of

42) Cf. in im. II 69.16; 77.9l; 95.23; Plat.Teol. III 25.3.


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this fact it said to have a form or shape that is most adapted to intellect.43Since Proclus considerations weigh in favour of granting it , it

will naturally be the case that it has the form of perception that mostclosely resembles the activity of intellect.44Tis, of course, is a matter ofthe intelligibles simply being the things that they are. Each, simply bybeing a, is simultaneouslyand. So by parity of reasoning,the ensouled visible cosmos will be sense object, sense, and sensation justby being what it is. In contrast to Lovelocks Gaia, Proclus cosmos isperceptive not in virtue of what it does, but simply in virtue of being whatit is. Te self-perception of the cosmos is grounded in its resemblance tothe predominantly static life enjoyed by Intellect.

On reflection, this contrast should not be unexpected. Proclus startsfrom the position that the universe is eternal and eternally contains just thespecies that it presently contains. So there is no tendency to consider howliving, percipient or thinking beings could have come to befrom a lifelessworld. Indeed, because of his metaphysics of emanation, perception iscausally posterior to thinking. Te philosophical challenge, then, is to seehow perception can constitute a derivative and more fragmentary form ofthinking. Given that his paradigm for thinking is a motion in which Rest

predominates, it is unsurprising that his picture of the highest form ofperception is similarly static.But from a modern point of view, it is the other way around. We look

for an explanation of how perceptive creatures could have evolved. Wenotice that even living but non-sentient nature exhibits complex patternsof activity. Small wonder, then, that we tend to think of perception interms of a verycomplex pattern of responsive activity. Moreover, since itseems likely that perceptive creatures were causally prior to thinking ones,we suppose that an account of what constitutes thinking would inherit

many of the dynamic features of our theory of what counts as perception.Hence our most popular criterion for distinguishing the thinking from the

43) Proclus thinks of the cosmoss spherical shape as the sixth of the ten gifts bestowed uponit by the Demiurge. Trough all these gifts it is endowed with the status of a divinity andmade like its paradigm. (in im. II 5.11-31).44) Tis resemblance will not be perfect, of course, since the object of is anunchangingwhile the object of cosmic perception will be a universe that has cometo be. Hence perception is less static than. But the point is that it will be in virtue

of such stasis as it exhibits that the totality of the sensible realm constitutes an act ofperception. I am grateful to Phronesiss referee for pointing this out to me.


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thoughtless the uring test is a test for a very, verycomplex patternof activity.

It is not, however, merely the disagreement about the relative priority ofsensing to thinking that explains the difference between these ancient andmodern notions of cosmic self-perception. Te idea that truth is a predicateof things plays a crucial role in Proclus understanding of how or may be simultaneously things and contents of thought orperception. If truth is a property of, then each is a truth. Since eachisfully actual, and so is all that it can be in a sense, then it must be a truththat isgrasped, for one thing that truths can be is grasped. Hence a fullyactual true object must be simultaneously a grasping of that truth: it isthing known, knower, and act of knowing. Similarly, the totality of existing in the World Soul can be simultaneously thingsperceived, percipients and the act of perceiving due to the lesser degree oftruth that they possess. Tis disagreement about the property of truthmarks a deep fault line between ancient Platonic metaphysics and ourcurrent understanding.45

Works CitedBaltzly, D. (1996). Socratic Anti-empiricism in the Phaedo.Apeiron26 #4, 121-42. (2007). Proclus: Commentary on Platos imaeusvol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press.Blumenthal, H. J. (1982). Proclus on Perception. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Stud-

ies29: 1-11.Combs, J. (1987). Les rois Monades du Philbe selon Proclus in Proclus: Lecteur et

Interprte des Anciens. P. J. and H. D. Saffrey, eds. Paris, ditions du C.N.R.S.:177-90.Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained.Boston: Little Brown.Dretske, F. (1969). Seeing and Knowing. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

(1993). Conscious Experience,Mind102, 263-83. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MI Press.Emilsson, E. K. (1996). Cognition and Its Object in Te Cambridge Companion to

Plotinus. L. P. Gerson, ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press:217-49.Gerson, L. P. (1994).Plotinus. London; New York, Routledge.Guttenplan, S. (1994). A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell

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45) I am grateful to the participants in the Melbourne Ancient Philosophy Reading Group,and especially to David Runia, Fiona Leigh, Nick Eliopoulos, and L. Elaine Miller for

comments on an earlier version of this paper. Te referees for Phronesisposed several deepquestions for me. I hope that this revised version succeeds in answering some of them.


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Lautner, P. (2006). Some Clarifications of Proclus Fourfold Division of Sense-perceptionin the imaeus Commentary in Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik. M. Perkams

and R. M. Piccione, eds. Leiden, E. J. Brill.Lloyd, A. C. (1969-70). Non-discursive Tought An Enigma of Greek Philosophy.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society70: 261-74.

(1986). Non-propositional Tought in Plotinus. Phronesis31: 258-65.Lovelock, J. E. (1979). Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: Oxford University

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Oxford University Press.Morrow, G. and Dillon J. (1987). Proclus: Commentary on Platos Parmenides. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.Russell, Bertrand (1959). Te Problems of Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Schrenk, L. P. (1989). Proclus on Space as Light.Ancient Philosophy9: 87-94. (1994). Proclus on Corporeal Space.Archive fr Geschichte der Philosophie76(2):

151-67.Siorvanes, L. (1996). Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science. New Haven, Yale

University Press.Sorabji, R. (1983).ime, Creation and the Continuum: Teories in Antiquity and the Early

Middle Ages. London, Duckworth. (1988).Matter, Space and Motion: Teories in Antiquity and Teir Sequel. London,

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