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Ma tx~11 !I!):~ SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS Priorities and Costs Associated With U.S. Dismantlement Assistance 148721

GAO -- Soviet Nuclear Weapons 1993

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Ma tx~11 !I!):~

SOVIET NUCLEARWEAPONS

Priorities and Costs

Associated With U.S.DismantlementAssistance

148721

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GAOUnited StatesGeneral Accounting OfTiceWashington, D.C. 20648

National Security andInternational Affbirs Division

B-252668

March 8,1993

The Honorable Hank BrownUnited States Senate

Dear Senator Brown:

In response to your request, we have reviewed several aspects of the U.S.effort to support the dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear weapons.Specifically, we assessed

l the extent to which the United States has developed a complete,

prioritized list of all items affecting the destruction of nuclear weapons inthe former Soviet Union and US. success in executing U.S. priorities first;

. the involvement of U.S. industry experts in developing priorities fordismantling former Soviet nuclear weapons;

l the progress made by former Soviet states in actually dismantling theformer Soviet nuclear arsenal as a result of U.S. funds appropriated forthat purpose; and

l the number, duration, cost, and source of funding of trips to the formerSoviet Union by executive branch officials involved in planning for the useof U.S. funds.

Background program of U.S. aid to former Soviet republics to

. destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;l transport, store, and safeguard weapons in connection with their

destruction; andl establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation.

The Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriat ions Act of 1991 allowed upto $400 million of Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations to betransferred to support the activities outlined in the Soviet Nuclear ThreatReduction Act. The DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 1993 made an

additional $400 million in DOD funds available for transfer for these andother objectives.

*PublicLaw 102-228, ecember12,199l. We did not focus our review on the implementationof morerecent related egisl ation,suchaa he Former SovietUnion DemilitarizationAct of 1992CNtleXIV ofP.L. 102484,Oct. 23,1992)or Title V of the FreedomSupportAct (P.L. 102-611, ct. 24,1992).

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Results in Brief The U.S. government has not prepared a single prioritized list of all itemsaffecting the destruction of former Soviet nuclear weapons2 Its ability todo so has been limited by the fact that Russia has ruled out a direct US.role in dismantling former Soviet nuclear weapons. U.S. officials haveinstead identified broad program priorities, developed potential projectsthat do not directly involve nuclear weapons dismantlement, and madeplans to obligate funds for such projects,

Four projects, valued at $90 million, are now underway to advance theinitial U.S. priority of enhancing the safety and security of former Sovietnuclear weapons. The executive branch has shifted the program’s toppriority toward dismantling nuclear delivery vehicles. It has also recentlyproposed to obligate $76 million (in addition to a previously proposed$16 million) to support the apparent top priority of Russian officials-afissile material storage facility.

US. private industry experts have not been involved in developingpriorities for dismantling nuclear weapons. U.S. officials informed us thatusing private firms to help determine priorities could suggest that suchfirms would enjoy an unfair advantage in subsequent bidding for contractsThey also suggested the U.S. government-and not the privatesector-should define overall US. priorities for the program. Perhapsmore importantly, Russia is not seeking a direct US. role in its nuclearweapons dismantlement operations.

To date, U.S. appropriations have not have directly resulted indismantlements of former Soviet nuclear weapons because U.S. equipmendeliveries have been limited to relatively small amounts of safety andsecurity-related items.

From December 1991 to December 1992,186 executive branch officialsand national laboratory personnel took 343 trips to Russia and otherformer Soviet republics, in connection with the Soviet Nuclear ThreatReduction Act, at a cost of about $1.7 million. About 21 percent of this coswas paid for with DOD funds transferred to support the objectives of theact. The balance was paid for with funds from the regular appropriationsof the executive branch agencies.

%s report uses he term “nuclear weapons” o describenuclear warheadsand bombsas opposed ovehicles such as missilesand bombers)designed o deliver such weapons.

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B-2621168

U.S. Priorities Do Not U.S. officials did not provide us with a single, prioritized list of all items

Focus on ActualDismantlement ofNuclear Weapons

that affect the destruction of former Soviet nuclear weapons. The scope ofpossible U.S. aid has been circumscribed by Russia, which, according toDOD officials, has made clear that it neither needs nor wants a direct U.S.role in its nuclear weapons dismantlement operations. DOD officials havealso noted that only trained personnel with access to sensitive design andfabrication data can safely dismantle former Soviet nuclear weapons.

Instead of addressing all items that could affect the dismantlement offormer Soviet nuclear weapons, U.S. officials focused initially onenhancing the safety and security of those weapons. DOD has proposedobligating up to $90 milli on for four projects that will provide Russia with

10,000 containers for fissile materials, emergency response equipment andtraining,3 2,600 armored blankets, and security enhancements for 115railcars used in transporting nuclear weapons4 DOD obligated about$14,6’million for these projects during 1992. By January 30,1993, haddelivered 260 U.S. surplus armored blankets and 6 sets of emergencyaccess equipment to Russia.

The executive branch has shifted the program’s top priority towarddismantling nuclear delivery vehicles. DOD has reported to Congress that asignificant portion of additional assistance to Russia is anticipated to befor delivery vehicle dismantlement. According to the Department of State,the United States has discussed delivery vehicle dismantlement with

Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

The executive branch has also moved to address the Soviet Nuclear ThreatReduction Act’s objective of establishing safeguards against proliferation.DOD has proposed obligating about $66.5 milli on to support science andtechnology centers in Russia and Ukraine; provide export controlassistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; and help Russia,Ukraine, and Kazakhstan develop material control and accountabilitysystems. However, according to the Department of State, implementi ngagreements for several of these projects have not been concluded orratified. On January 30,1993, DOD reported that during 1992 t had actuallyobligated $160,000 or only one of these projects-the Mosco w science

center.

%uch equipmentwould ncludeprotectiveclothing,video and optical gear,and emergency ccess ndcommunications quipment.

‘Appendix lisb 22 SovietNuclearThreat ReductionAct projectsand heir funding evels.

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B-2625US

After several months of consideration, the executive branch has acted tosupport a proposed Russian storage facility for fusile materials fromdismantled former Soviet nuclear weapons. From the outset, Russianofficials have indicated that the facility is one of their top priorities. InOctober 1992, he United States agreed to spend up to $15 million to helpRussia design the facility. In February 1993, DOD decided to obligate up to$76 million to support the construction of the facility.

No Private SectorRole in SettingPriorities

The executive branch did not involve private industry experts in its effortsto develop priorities for dismantling nuclear weapons . Russia has ruledout a direct U.S. role in dismantlement operations. U.S. government and

national laboratory experts have provided technical guidance in areas ofpotential U.S. assistance.

Executi ve branch officials expressed concern that using a private firm todevelop priorities could create an appearance that the firm would enjoy aunfair advantage in bidding on contracts to carry out the program’sobjectives. A DOD official informed us that DOD would have had to eitherbar such a firm from bidding on contracts or take potentially costly stepsto ensure that bidders were not unfairly disadvantaged. Officials alsoindicated that they believe that the U.S. government should determineoverall program priorities.

US. Appropriations To date, very few-if any-former Soviet nuclear weapons can be said to

Have Apparently Nothave been dismantled as a direct result of U.S. funds appropriated for thispurpose. Only limited amounts of U.S. equipment, aimed at improving the

Directly Resulted in safety and security of former Soviet nuclear weapons, have been delivered

Dismantlementto Russ ia as of January 1993. As discussed previously, increasing amountsof aid are scheduled for delivery over the next 3 years.

$1.7 Million Has Been

Spent on Travel

agencies and 3 national laboratories6 made 343 trips6 to Russi a, Ukraine,

Belarus, and Kazakhstan in support of the Soviet Nuclear Threat

GWe btaineddata rom the Arms Control and Disarmament gency ACDA); he Departments fCommerce, tate,and Energy; he CustomsService; he NuclearRegulatoryCommissionNRC),andthe NationalSecurityCouncil NSC).Department f Energydata ncludes he Los Alamos,LawrenceLivennore,and Sandia ational aboratories.

‘We defineda trip as ravel undertaken o one or mo re destinations n the former SovietUnion by asingle ndividual.Under his definition, a five-person elegati on’sravel to Mosc owand Kievwould bcountedas ive trips.

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B-252658

-.__ -

Reduction Act at a cost of about $1.68 million,7 as shown in table 1. Theaverage length of these trips was 10 days.8

Trips to the Former Soviet Union In Support of the Soviet Nucl ear Threat Reduction Act

Average trip Act-relatedTrips Staff length (days) funds.---___I__ ..-.- -~

127 66 10 $74,712

Other U.S.funds

$641,396

Total cost

$716,108

97 52 9 285,273 134,711 419,984

72 38 14 0 399,223 399,223

20 13 11 0 56,508 56,508

13 7 9 0 56,883 56,883

4 3 8 0 12,964 12,9642 2 6 0 7,181 7,181

8 4 8 0 10,729 10,729

343 185 10 $359,985 $1,319,595 $1,679,580

As shown in figure 1, the Department of Energy (including the nationallaboratories) accounted for the largest share of this cost.

?Dat.arovidedby NSC ndicates hat, n addition o the funds displayed n table 1, he Department fEnergyand DODprovided$4,476 nd $997, espectively,o fund travel by NSC taff. This additional$6,473would raise he total cost of travel from $1,679,680shown n table 1) to $1$X35,063.edid notinclude he additionalamount n table 1 becauseNSCdid not identify whether he $6,473 ame romact-related undsor other sources.

@Ihe hortest rips lastedone day.According o the Department f Energy, he two longest rips-79and 78 days-were takenby two U.S.officials who were emporarilyassignedo positionsat theInternationalScience nd TechnologyCenter n Moscow.

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-.---

Flgure 1: Travel Costs by Agency

/ b&e;ment of Defense

24 Arms Control & Disarmament

43% - - Department of Energy

About 21 percent of the travel costs were financed with DOD fundstransferred to support the act. The balance of the travel costs was paid fowith funds from the executive branch agencies’ general appropriations.

We asked the agencies to provide a brief justification for each trip.Provision of technical expertise was cited in connection with 55 percent othe trips. Technical assistance was provided in the areas of railcar safety,emergency response equipment, container design, storage facility design,material control and accounting, export controls, and the creation of aninternational science and technology center.

Executive branch travel was not evenly distributed over the period that wreviewed, as shown in figure 2. Trips undertaken in 3 months-March,May, and October of 1992-accounted for about half of the total number trips. For example, in May 1992,62 officials, experts, translators, and

administrative support officers-from five agenci es and three nationallaboratories-traveled to Russia and Ukraine for meetings that took placebetween May 24 and June 10. The delegation i ncluded representatives tomeetings on nuclear weapons safety, security, and dismantlement; fissilematerials control and accountability; fissile material containers; fissilematerial storage facilities; railcars; uranium and plutonium disposition;

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B-2112558

and ballistic missiles . According to the Department of State, thesemeetings culminated in four agreements that were signed by thePresidents of the United States and Russia at their June 1992 summit.

Act-Related Trips to the Former Soviet Uni on (by month)

of Trlpr

We conducted our review from November 1992 to February 1993 naccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Wedeveloped the information in this report by reviewing documents andmeeting with officials at DOD, the Departments of Energy and State, ACDA,

and NSC. We also obtained travel data from officials at NRC, the Departmentof Commerce , and the Customs Service. The Department of State informed

us that its travel information included some estimated data. We did notvalidate the travel data provided by the agencies or attempt to determinewhether the amount of travel was been appropriate.

As requested, we did not obtain written agency comment s on this report,although we discussed the information in the report with officials at the

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.* ....._.-B-252568

Departments of Defense and State. They indicated that the travel costswere appropriate for a program of this scope and complexity and notedthat increasing amounts of U.S. aid are scheduled to be delivered in thefuture.

__-- . ..__-.__

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State, Defense,and Energy; the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;and the National Security Council. Upon request, copies will be madeavailable to other interested parties.

This report was prepared under the direction of Joseph Kelley,

Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, who may be reached at(202) 512-4128 f you or your staff have any questions. Other majorcontributors are Louis Zanardi, Assis tant Director; Pierre Toureille,Evaluator-in-Charge; and Julie Hirshen, Evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

Frank C. Conahan

Assistant Comptroller General

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Appendix I

Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Projects

Obligations

Reclplent nationor category Project

Obligations (actuaproposed as of as

Jan. 30.1993 Dec. 31,199

Russia

Material controls

Armored blankets

Railcar security

Emergency response

10,000.000

$5,000.000 $2.691.00

20,000,000 3,080,O

15,000,000 8,168,O

Storage containers

Facility design

Facility support

50,000,000 600,0

15,000,000 3,363,O

75,000,000

Export controls 2,260.OOO

- Science center

Chemical weapons

Subtotal $242,260,000

25,000,OOO

$19.605,000

150,0

25,000,OOO 1,553,oo

Ukraine Emergency response

Communications

5,000,000

2,400,OOO

Export controls 2,260,OOO

Subtotal

Belarus

Material controls

Science center

7,500,000

10,000,000

$27,160,000

Emergency response

CommunicationsExport controls

5,000,000

2,300,OOO 2,260,OOO

Subtotal

Kazakhstan Emergency response

Communications

$9,560,000

5,000,000

2,300,OOO

Subtotal

General

Export controls 2,260,OOO

Material controls 5,000,000

$14,560,000

SuooorVassessment 10.000,000 778,00

Total t303.540.000 8 20.383.00

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