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BLENDING CONVENTIONAL WITH UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERATIONS OF WARFARE

-Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal

"He who understands himself and understands his enemy will prevail in one hundred battles.” – Sun Tzu

Introduction

1. War is changing. Warfare and its means always changes. That is why, all

armies of the world are continuously training to adapt with these fast changing

natures of warfare. Like other armies, we must do the same or fall behind and

lose. Side by side, the technology is also developing and new inventions of

science are directly influencing the changing natures of warfare. A good

economy, indigenous resources and advanced technologies are all prerequisites

to modernise an army. However, a modern army is not a must to win wars but a

trained army is. A trained army always follow, learn and analyse the changes in

the nature of warfare to capitalise on its strong points and exploit enemy weak

spots. Therefore, it is essential to track the changes in the natures of warfare,

analyse and understand the framework of the generations of warfare to evaluate

both ourselves and our enemies.

2. Bangladesh must maintain an army to protect territorial integrity and

national sovereignty though our economic constrains restrict us having a

sophisticated and large army. Bangladesh Army’s standard of training is equal to

any modern armies of the world but we lack in equipment and weapon.

Formulating and implementing a suitable defence plan for Bangladesh is a

nightmare of any military strategists. The legacy of serious mistakes by British

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during formation of India and Pakistan basing on only religious faiths forsaking

the defence consideration is still borne by Bangladesh. Having a strong regional

superpower in all sides, Bangladesh thus faces a serious predicament. With

developing economy and poor resource base, many adverse factors on the

security of small states are common in our country.

3. However, we must ensure our security with resources available. Hence,

we need to defend our motherland and strike a balance between the demand

and resources. The situation may seem bleak but we have many advantages,

too. With a vast homogenous population, we have a reasonably strong

professional military force. Integration of these two vital components can

overcome many odds and achieve wonders. Our Liberation War is a glaring

example in this context. Once motivated and properly trained Bengali soldiers

can be as courageous as any other martial race. This was manifested in 1965

Indo-Pak war and our glorious war of liberation 1971. Not many countries in the

world have earned a new flag through armed struggle. Moreover, history

possesses examples of superpower being routed by combined might of military

and people.

4. Military doctrine is the fundamental principle by which military forces guide

their actions to attain the objective. The Operations of War, Volume 1 (GSTP

0032) came into being to provide Bangladesh Army’s own war fighting doctrine

and formalised the modified ideas to give it a functional shape to warfare. In this

publication, it projects a whole new horizon of tactical ideas of blending

Conventional Warfare (CW) with the Unconventional Warfare (UCW) as “its

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major concept”.1 The Army has made this new adoption with a view to bringing a

qualitative change in our military philosophy. The modifications are made for “the

adjustment of our psyche towards purely functional attitude”2 which certainly

shows the institutional will to continue to change for the better. Therefore,

understanding four generations of warfare will facilitate our thinking process, help

us to analyse and logically justifying the requirement of adopting a doctrine

mentioned above.

5. War is an extension of politics where military is one of the tools to achieve

strategic goal. There are two ways to dominate the war, either by ‘denying’ or by

‘punishing’ the threat’s capability. Denial of enemy’s design of warfare demands

superiority in forces’ strength, technology and even a strong economy. To punish

the enemy by using various types of options may be offensive, air–land battle,

armoured heavy thrusts that can be afforded by superior forces only. Being a

weaker state, Bangladesh’s options for war are limited to defensive and infantry

intensive only. Bangladesh Army being reasonably equipped, over the years,

gained enough strength to blunt any enemy initial offensive. To strengthen this

achievement further, the thought process of the invader has to be disrupted by

attrition from all direction with all means. We lack in geographical depth to fight a

pure conventional war for a long time. CW simultaneously with UCW at

operational and tactical levels, from the very beginning throughout its length and

breadth, will help in compensating for adversary's numerical superiority and own

1Major General Iqbal Karim Bhuian, psc, the Chief of General Staff , Bangladesh Army, The Foreword

of GSTP 0032, April 2006, p ix. 2Iqbal, Loc Cit.

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inadequate geographical depth. Hence, the idea of blending conventional and

unconventional warfare merits a serious consideration.

6. The popular concept of switching over to UCW after fighting and

exhausting the conventional forces (CF) is no longer valid as, “a regular army is a

crucial component of state sovereignty and legitimate authority”.3 This denotes

that UCW is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the CW rather should be

waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the CW. Therefore, the blending of CW

with the UCW will commence from the very beginning of the breakout of

hostilities. Though the conduct will be concurrent yet one of the components

would dominate in a particular time or phase. The UCW will act in a major role

only when the CW can not be continued further. Logically, Bangladesh Army’s

present doctrine: “To blend the CW with the UCW from the very beginning of the

breakout of the hostilities”, is a necessity for a weaker nation like us.

7. Blending CW with the UCW is not a new idea; it is termed as the

Compound Warfare by the USA and also sometimes mentioned as Irregular

Warfare. All terms: Asymmetric Warfare, Irregular Warfare and Compound

Warfare are products of the Fourth Generations Warfare (4GW). In this paper,

the generations of warfare will be discussed to evaluate the changes of warfare.

In order to examine the warfare, the various generations of warfare will be

presented first. A brief description of the evolution process will also be discussed.

Following the discussions, the paper will examine the relation of UCW with the

3 Military force is recognized as one element of sovereignty and national power. Other elements of sovereignty include the ability to tax, print money, legislate laws, etc; elements of national power include economic, diplomatic, and informational power - “The Rapier or The Club: The Relationship Between Attrition and Maneuver Warfare”, by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Springman, United States Army, USAWC Strategy Research Project.

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generations of warfare. A conclusion will be drawn basing on the study as to

where exactly it fits into the theorem of the generations of warfare.

Aim

8. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the generations of warfare by

distinguishing the concept of blending CW with the UCW with a view to

examining the extent to which it fits into the theorem.

The Generations of Warfare

9. The First Generation Warfare (1GW). 1GW was fought with line and

column tactics roughly from 1648 to 1860. It lasted until the time of the American

Civil War. Today its importance for us is that the First Generation battlefield was

usually a battlefield of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from

"civilian”, i.e. uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or ranks were products of the

First Generation and were intended to reinforce the culture of order. 4

10. The Second Generation Warfare (2GW). 2GW was developed by the

French Army during and after World War I. 2GW is also called firepower and

attrition warfare. The characteristics included centrally controlled indirect artillery

fire, carefully synchronized with infantry, armoured and aviation, to destroy the

enemy by killing his soldiers and blowing up his equipment. The French

summarized 2GW with the phrase, “The artillery conquers, the infantry

occupies.”5

11. The Third Generation Warfare (3GW). 3GW also called manoeuvre

warfare, was developed by the German Army during World War I and formalized 4 4GW, FMFM1-A (US Army Field Manual), Draft 3 (revised), 10 Jun 2005, p 35.5 FMFM1-A, Loc Cit.

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in World War II. 3GW dealt with the disorderly battlefield not by trying to impose

order on it but by adapting to disorder and taking advantage of it. 3GW relied less

on firepower than on speed and tempo. The tactics was to get into the enemy's

rear and collapse him from the rear, instead of "close with and destroy." The

approach was “bypass and collapse”. It sought to present the enemy with

unexpected and dangerous situations faster than he could cope with them,

pulling him apart mentally as well as physically. The broad differences amongst

these three generations of warfare are compiled in a table at Annex A.6

12. 4GW.The term 4GW came into use among military strategists and

planners in the late 1980s as a way to characterize the dynamics and future

direction of warfare. The 4GW has evolved in ways that take advantage of the

political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War II. It makes

use of the advantages of those changes offered to an unconventional enemy.7

4GW are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier

and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safe zone. Fourth Generation

forces will be mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation actors can

afford anything else and Unconventional Forces UCF (irregulars) enjoy some

important advantages over CF. UCF are difficult to target, especially with air

power and artillery. They can avoid stronger but more heavily equipped

opponents by using concealment and dispersal (often within the civil population).

They can fight an endless war of raids and ambushes. Because irregulars

operate within the population and are usually drawn from it, they can solicit and

6 Ibid, p 36.7 Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic Forum, No. 214, January 2005, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, p 2.

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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1GW 2GW 3GW 4GW

Attrition

Manouvre

Moral

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enjoy popular support. In the next diagram, it shows that the moral dimension is

emphasized maximum in 4GW.8

The Moral Dimension in Four Generations of Warfare

The Evolution of the 4GW

13. The Psyche. One of the America's greatest military theorist, Air Force

Colonel John Boyd, said, “When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you

have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in

Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost.

So I realized there is something more to it.”9 If war was lone matter of might in

terms of power consisting of advanced weapon system and technology then all

8 William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA),  Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, by Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.pp22-26. 9 FMFM1-A, Loc Cit.

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wars would have been won by mighty nations only. However, the history says

otherwise. Mighty nations also loose to weaker states. The weaker nations

always are in search of that “something more” as mentioned by Colonel John

Boyd.

14. 4GW is a Necessity for Weaker Nations. The prime objective of the fourth-

generation practitioner is to create political paralysis in target nation.10 4GW is

the only kind the United States has ever lost—and not just once, but three times.

“All major failed US uses of force since 1945—in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia

—have been against materially weaker enemies.”11 This form of warfare also

defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq,

Afghanistan and other areas where it is engaged in the war.12 To complicate

matters, 4GW will incorporate elements of 1GW, 2GW and 3GW.

a. Why Blending Conventional and UCF (Irregular)?

(1) A nation that does not possess a large population or

industrial base will not, as a rule, possess durable forces even if it

is a modern nation. It will be forced to rely either on the industrial

capacity of other nations or will not have the manpower required to

maintain durable forces competitive with the major powers. Such a

nation would probably lose a CW of attrition against a major power

because of a lack of depth. In compound warfare,13 one of the

10 G.I. Wilson, John P. Sullivan, and Hal Kempfer,Military.Com, September 8, 2003.11 Jeffrey Record, Why the Strong Lose, Parameters, winter 2005-2006.12 Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic Forum, January 2005. 13 Dr. Thomas Huber, an instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army, Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, raised the idea of compound warfare during the Evolution of Military Thought

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antagonists maintains both a CF (regular force) and an UCF

(irregular force). Countries like Bangladesh that do not possess a

modern industrial base can not sustain forces during a war of

attrition unless they can be guaranteed a steady stream of

replacement equipment14. Our best opportunities will be to win a

decisive battle or revert to attrition through UCW (irregular warfare).

(2) The basic vulnerabilities of our country originate from the

lack of depth and the concept of blending CW with UCW intends to

increase it by fighting with UCF from the beginning. That is, when

CF will start fighting the battle in and around the international

boundary, an UCF would operate along the rear of the invading

force. Numerous and the non-linear actions by the UCF will

overwhelm the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence

(C3I) of the invaders. This simultaneity of operations is termed as

blending.

b. Blending Conventional and UCF (Irregular) for a Protracted War .

Indirect defence via UCW (irregular warfare) is in most cases the only

sensible strategy for the weaker side, because a direct defence is an

invitation to swift defeat. The principal elements of UCW are protraction

(prolonged warfare), attrition, and camouflage. The required protraction

and attrition are dictated by the conventional enemy’s military superiority

course, at CGSC in 1996/1997. The term refers to using both conventional and irregular forces in unison to gain victory.

14 Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Springman, The Rapier or the Club: The Relationship between Attrition and Maneuver Warfare, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, 15 March 2006.

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and sustainability. Because the weaker side has no hope of quick and

decisive victory, it employs time( prolonged warfare) and the steady

infliction of casualties (attrition) and other war costs to subvert the

enemy’s political will to continue fighting. Protraction also requires

willingness to trade space and resources for time, because attempted

territorial defence plays to the conventional enemy’s superiority in

firepower. Camouflage or the capacity to dissolve into the local population

and terrain (natural and man-made), shields UCF from the potentially

catastrophic consequences of the enemy’s firepower superiority and

compels the enemy to inflict politically self-defeating collateral damage

(killing unarmed people) on the civilian population.15

The liberation war of Bangladesh is a classic example where second, third and

fourth generations played an effective role to end the war by only nine months.

The superior strength of commitment thus compensated for military inferiority.

The allied forces (both Freedom Fighters and Indian Forces) eroded the

Pakistani’s political will to continue the war and won despite having the opposing

military force largely intact.

UCW: An Idea and Innovation of the 4GW

15. The Concept of UCW.

a. UCW is a general expression which designates all those resistance

activities conducted within the enemy's sphere of influence primarily 15 Jeffrey. Loc cit.

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utilizing indigenous personnel and resources of military, political, or

economic objectives. The major components are guerrilla warfare and

psychological warfare as it pertains to all phases of UCW. These

resistance activities may be completely overt, completely covert, or

something in between these two extremes, depending upon the

effectiveness of the enemy's countermeasures.16

b. UCW forces are to be integrated with the conventional effort to be

effective. The CF will deploy in their area of responsibility as per the

operational plan. As the battle develops, CF should be able to identify the

main effort of the enemy and concentrate forces accordingly with strong

mobile reserve. Different layers of defence to be prepared prior to initial

engagement. While the UCF gradually cause attrition to enemy war

potentials, the CF will engage the enemy’s major elements at the decisive

time and place.

d. Coordination is necessary between conventional and UCF in

aspects like: intelligence, security, guidance and augmentation of strength.

This will facilitate to have synergistic effort and achieving a cumulative

outcome on to enemy. The chain of command has to be clear an easily

understood to avoid any duplication of actions.

e. UCF need to decrease dependence on centralized logistics. In

Fourth Generation war, most engagements (light infantry combat) will

occur at the company level or below. To achieve sufficient dispersion and

to be able to react swiftly, the forces will require a high degree of ability to 16 Frank A. Gleason, Jr, Unconventional Forces - The Commander's Untapped Resources, Military Review, October 1959, p 25-31.

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live off the land and the enemy. The dispersion of the battlefield "will

require even the lowest level to operate flexibly on the basis of the

commander's intent." 17

f. Mission oriented Command and Control, i.e. Auftragstaktik (Mission

Tactics) has to be adopted to be most effective. As enemy advances

through friendly (own) territory, the engagement areas grow in size and at

some stage he will find himself incapable of tackling his rear and front

simultaneously. He will then have to give up his fight along the

conventional front in favour of securing his rear.

16. The Objectives of UCW.

a. To act as a force multiplier by operating with the CF (regular armed

forces) in major and minor actions. CW and UCW are to be regarded as

single unified combined warfare for the attainment of same overall

objective.

b. To harass and weaken enemy vulnerabilities i.e. to engage and hit

the enemy from all the sides to confuse, bleed, attrite and slow down the

enemy to gradually hit his centre of gravity. All efforts to be made to upset

enemy time plan.

c. To instigate a national action to regain the liberty of a country

threatened by the enemy.

d. To defend the country as a last resort when the CF (regular armed

forces) have been depleted.

e. The Areas to Put Emphasis to be Effective.

17 FMFM1-A, Opcit, p35.

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(1) The maximum emphasis should be put to survive enemy’s

initial air strafing and then negate enemy’s air power.

(2) The full use of urban and built-up area warfare (Fighting in

Build Up Area- FIBUA) must be done. Advanced military powers

are still challenged by the problems of FIBUA.

(3) Junior leaders are to be trained to carry out Mission Type

Orders. Maximum Initiative by the junior leaders is to be allowed

and encouraged as long as they remain with in the broad diagram

of commander’s intent. The cumulative effects of innumerable small

tactical initiatives can become a major factor in changing the overall

military posture of enemy.

(4) For the weaker state, using the UCF will produce the same

effect of manoeuvre. Therefore, the UCF should be light infantry

and be able to operate independently.

(5) The logistics are to be decentralised. Simultaneous

application of both conventional and unconventional method of

warfare requires related logistic support system capable of meeting

the demand of fluid battle condition. According to Lind and his co-

authors, a prominent aspect of 4GW is the: "decreasing

dependence on centralized logistics. As the battlefield disperses

and the organizational links are loosened, 4GW operatives will be

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increasingly responsible for procuring their own logistical

requirements.”18

(6) The conventional logistic support system relies on better-

established line of communications and a set pattern of logistic

train. Hence, the major drawback of conventional logistic support

system is its inflexible nature and reliance on the central base for

replenishment. Such a set pattern of logistic support system will be

unable to provide necessary support to UCF.

(7) Inflict maximum and continuous casualty on to enemy by

targeting the morale of the enemy forces and ultimately target the

popular support of the enemy nation. Large-scale casualties will

provoke his (enemy) population against the government. People

will question government for the justification of sacrifice. For

example, Indian Peacekeeping Force was forced to withdraw from

Sri Lanka because of large-scale casualty.

(8) Blending CW with UCW requires active support of the media

and an active psychological warfare should be launched side by

side. In reality, psychological warfare is part of the military

operation and synchronized with all actions. The media must

project the outcry of the civil population of the enemy state

18 William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA),and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, p 24.

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questioning the timacy of the aggression launched. It must also

capitalize violations made by the enemy state disrespecting Laws

of Armed Conflict.

A Possible End State of 4GW: Through Blending CW with UCW

Conclusion

17. The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower

and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was

quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated by firepower and

ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans

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GOVERNMENT OF THE ENEMY NATION

Inflict Maximum Causality

OWN ACTIONS

Compel To Pull Out Force

MILITARYPEOPLE

ATTACK MORALE DIMENSION ALWAYS

OWN ACTIONSAGAINST ENEMY

Deprive enemy of the popular support

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introduced 3GW characterized by manoeuvre. This type of combat is still largely

the focus of advanced forces.19

18. In broad terms, 4GW seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely

undefined where the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the

vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable

battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may

disappear. 4GW is a form of warfare that uses all available networks—political,

economic, social, and military—to compel the enemy’s war planners to believe

that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for them. The

blending of CW with the UCW falls in the domain of 4GW. This concept believes

that relative military power is hardly a reliable predictor of war outcomes.20

19. The 4GW introduced terms like: asymmetric warfare, compound warfare,

irregular warfare and blending CW with UCW and all these are a necessity for

weaker nations. Blending CW with UCW is an innovation of 4GW that requires a

concerted effort of all sections of society to evolve a plan and a devoted nation to

prepare and execute those with commitment and determination. For both the

stronger and the weaker sides, the CW targets the enemy’s armed forces or

capacity to fight, whereas the UCW seek to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.21

20. Bangladesh is a weak nation like the Vietnam had been against the USA

hence we are to find out that “something more” which compels the strong nations

19Thomas X. Hammes, “4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths,” Armed Forces

Journal, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

20Jeffrey, Loc Cit.21Ibid, P19.

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to lose despite having land, air and naval superiority. We have already started

looking for it by adopting a modified war fighting doctrine that will compensate

our quantitative inferiority, also negate enemy technological superiority by the

qualitative approach of our army.

Lessons Drawn and Recommendations

21. A weaker nation like us is likely to fight against a neighbour who is an

advanced and strong enemy, the aim must be to make the war costlier for the

aggressor that they have calculated and planned for. The enemy will be brought

to a culmination point and will be forced to abandon the invasion. This psyche

should be absolutely made clear to all of our junior leaders so that they can take

necessary initiative at their level to achieve the same goal.

22. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly

important. The main effort should be aimed at collapsing the enemy internally

rather than physically destroying him. Through constant harassment and by

inflicting casualty, the situation should be made as such that the aggressor

looses his own population's support for the war. In all cases the "moral"

dimension of war should be attacked to outweigh the numerical and technological

superiority of the enemy.

MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE

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Sept 2007

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Operations of War, Volume 1 ,GSTP 0032, April 2006.

2. 4GW, FMFM1-A, Draft 3 (revised), 10 Jun 2005.

3. The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps

Gazette, October 1989, William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA),

Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and

Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR),

4. Why the Strong Lose, Parameter, Winter, 2005-2006, Jeffrey Record.

5. Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic

Forum, No. 214, January 2005, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National

Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss, Thomas X. Hammes.

6. Military.Com, 8 September 2003.G.I. Wilson, John P.Sullivan and Hal

Kempfer.

7. Unconventional Forces - The Commander's Untapped Resources, Military

Review, October 1959, Frank A. Gleason, Jr.

8. 4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths, Armed

Forces Journal, November 2004,Thomas X. Hammes.

9. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International

Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), © 2001 by the President and Fellows of

Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ivan Arreguín,

Toft, ,

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