Upload
others
View
10
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
CL
IRK
SO
FA
CE
COURT
OFA
PP
EA
I.$EC
OP
IDQ
IST2
dC
ivilNo
.B2
22
28
4Q
ECEIVED
20110C118PM
3:~0IN
TH
EC
OU
RT
OF
AP
PE
AL
OF
TH
ES
TA
1C
AF
S~
~A
SE
CO
ND
AP
PE
LLAT
ED
IST
RIC
T
DIV
ISIO
N8
1
ES
THE
RG
INS
BE
RG
,eta!.,
Plaintiffs,R
espondentsand
Cross-A
ppellants,-om
Orn4n
o—C
A)
Z9
’VS.
rn~
~C
.0
HA
NN
AG
AM
SO
N,
I
Defendant,A
ppellantandC
ross-Respondent.
Appealfrom
LosA
ngelesS
uperiorC
ourt,No.
BC
346782H
onorableR
icardoTorres,
Departm
entCC
W-3
16
HA
NN
AG
AM
SO
N’S
CO
MB
INE
DA
PP
ELLA
NT
’SR
EP
LY
BR
IEF
AN
DC
RO
SS
-RE
SP
ON
DE
NT
’SB
RIE
F
CL
AR
EM
ON
TL
AW
GR
OU
P,IN
C.
GR
EIN
ES
,M
AR
TIN
,S
TE
IN&
LuisaG
.Jaffe,S
BN
160174R
ICU
LA
ND
LLP
SaulJaffe,S
BN
156499R
obinM
eadow,
SB
N51126
618W
estBaseline
Road
LaraM
.K
rieger,S
BN
218801C
laremont
California
917115900
Wilshire
Boulevard,
12thF
loorTelephone:
(909)445-9133
LosA
ngeles,C
alifornia90036
Facsnm.
(909)445-9138
Telephone:(310)
859-7811Facsim
ile:(310)
276-5261
Attorneys
forD
efendant,Appellantand
Cross-R
espondentH
AN
NA
GA
MS
ON
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S
Page
INT
RO
DU
CT
ION
1
AP
PE
LLAN
T’S
RE
PLY
BR
IEF
4
AR
GU
ME
NT
4
GA
MS
ON
ISE
NT
ITLE
DTO
JUD
GM
EN
TB
EC
AU
SE
TH
EC
ON
SE
RV
ATO
RLE
AS
ED
OE
SN
OT
CO
NFE
RA
PE
RP
ETU
AL
RIG
HT
OF
RE
NE
WA
L.4
A.
TheC
onservatorLeaseC
onfersA
Single
Renew
alThatE
xpiredIn
April2006.
4
1.G
insbergis
notentitledto
atrialon
them
eaningof
theC
onservatorLease’s
ambiguous
renewal
languagebecause,
asa
mailero
flaw,an
ambiguous
renewalclause
confersonly
asingle
renewal.
4
2.C
ontraryto
Ginsberg’s
contention,C
alifornia—like
virtuallyevery
otherjurisdictionthathas
consideredthe
question—disfavors
perpetualleases.5
3.G
insberg’sreliance
onC
aliforniadecisions
thatconsiderthe
ruleagainstperpetuities
ism
isplaced.8
4.Taken
asa
whole,
theC
onservatorLeaseevinces
anintentto
createa
short-termcom
merciallease.
Itslanguage
isinconsistentw
ithan
intenttocreate
aperpetuallease.
10
a.G
insbergcannotshow
thattheC
onservatorLease
isunam
biguouslyperpetual.
10
b.G
insberghas
notrebuttedG
amson’s
analysisshow
ingthatthe
ConservatorLease
takenas
aw
holeis
inconsistentwith
aperpetuallease.
13
5.C
odeofC
ivilProcedure
section1864
doesnot
trump
them
orespecific
rulegoverning
theinterpretation
ofam
biguousrenew
allanguagepurportedly
creatinga
perpetuallease.14
I
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(continued)
Page
B.
No
StatuteO
fLimitations
BarsG
amson’s
Cross-A
ctionSeeking
Declaratory
ReliefO
nThe
Meaning
OfThe
Conservator
Lease’sR
enewalLanguage.
16
1.G
amson.’s
declaratoryreliefclaim
sare
governedby
afour-yearlim
itationsperiod
becausehercross-action
arisesfrom
adispute
aboutthem
eaningofthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage.
16
2.G
amson’s
declaratoryreliefcauses
ofaction
didnotaccrue
when
shesigned
theC
onservatorLeasein
1996;indeed,G
insberg’sperpetuallease
theorydid
notevensurface
untilaftershe
filedthis
action.18
3.G
amson’s
declaratoryreliefclaim
sare
timely
usingany
feasibleaccrualdate:
Ap
ril2006,N
ovember
2004,orD
ecember2003.
21
a.G
amson’s
declaratoryreliefclaim
saccrued
inA
pril2006,when
Gam
sonfirst
became
entitledto
evictGinsberg.
21
b.A
tmost,events
beforeA
pril2006
amounted
toanticipatory
repudiationsthat
didnottrigger
anystatute
of
limitations—
and,inany
event,theyoccurred
within
thelim
itationsperiod.
22
II.IF
TH
EC
OU
RT
DO
ES
NO
TO
RD
ER
JUD
GM
EN
TIN
GA
MS
ON
’SF
AV
OR
,IT
SH
OU
LDR
EM
AN
DFO
RA
TR
IAL
LIMIT
ED
TOTH
EIN
TE
RP
RE
TA
TIO
NO
FTH
ER
EN
EW
AL
LAN
GU
AG
EA
ND
RE
LAT
ED
MA
TT
ER
S.
24
A.
ThereIs
No
Basis
ForG
insberg’sR
equestForAN
ewT
rialOn
Com
pensatoryD
amages.
24
B.
TheT
rialCourt,N
otThisC
ourt,S
houldC
onsiderG
insberg’sN
ewA
ndD
isputedE
xtrinsicE
videnceA
rguments
InThe
FirstInstance.26
11
TA
BLE
OF
CO
NT
EN
TS
(continued)
Page
III.TH
EP
ER
MA
NE
NT
iNJU
NC
TIO
NF
AILS
AS
AM
AT
TE
RO
FLA
W.
30
A.
TheT
rialCourtA
busedIts
Discretion
By
IssuingA
nInjunction
ThatIsN
otPracticable
BecauseItR
equires80-Plus
YearsO
fCourtS
upervision.31
B.
TheT
rialCourtA
busedIts
Discretion
By
IssuingA
nInjunction
ThatGives
Ginsberg
More
Rights
ThanShe
Has
UnderThe
ConservatorLease.
31
IV.
IFG
AM
SO
NP
RE
VA
ILSO
NT
HE
INT
ER
PR
ET
AT
ION
OF
THE
LEA
SE
’SR
EN
EW
AL
LAN
GU
AG
E,
TH
EN
HE
RS
EC
TION
998O
FFER
MU
ST
BE
RE
CO
NS
IDE
RE
D.
35
A.
Overview
.35
B.
AS
ection998
OfferM
ayP
roperlyInclude
Multiple
Conditions.
36
C.G
amson
Was
NotR
equiredTo
TenderSeparate
Section
998O
ffersTo
Ginsberg
And
Eden.37
1.G
amson’s
join
tofferwas
properbecauseG
insbergand
Eden
areco-tenants.
37
2.G
amson’s
join
toffer
was
properbecauseG
insbergand
Eden
arem
anied.38
CR
OS
S-R
ES
PO
ND
EN
T’SB
RIE
F40
ST
AT
EM
EN
TO
FFA
CTS
40
A.
TheC
onservatorLease’sLim
itationsO
nG
amson’s
Repair
Obligations.
40
B.
Ginsberg
PresentsN
oE
videnceO
fLostBusinessA
ttributableTo
Water
Intrusion.43
C.D
uringT
rial,The
CourtE
xcludesE
videnceO
fWhy
Ganison
Believed
TheC
onservatorLeaseE
xpiredIn
2006.44
111
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(continued)
Page
D.
TheJury
Aw
ards$49,100
InC
ompensatory
Dam
ages,Less
ThanA
TenthO
fWhatG
insbergS
ought—B
utA
lmostE
ightTimes
ThatAm
ountinP
unitiveD
amages.
47
AR
GU
ME
NT
48
GIN
SB
ER
GD
OE
SN
OT
SE
EK
,A
ND
CO
ULD
NE
VE
RB
EE
NT
ITLE
DTO
,PU
NIT
IVE
DA
MA
GE
SB
AS
ED
ON
TH
EJU
RY
’SB
RE
AC
HO
FC
ON
TRA
CT
FIND
1NG
S.48
A.
AB
reachO
fContract,
Even
IfWillfb
lOrM
alicious,C
annotSupportA
Punitive
Dam
agesA
ward.
48
B.
BecauseItIs
An
Implied
ContractualTerm
,AB
reachO
fTheC
ovenantOfQ
uietEnjoym
entCannotS
upportA
Punitive
Dam
agesA
ward.
48
II.G
1NS
BE
RG
’SM
AD
E-U
PC
LAIM
—”1N
TE
NT
ION
AL
INT
ER
FE
RE
NC
EW
ITH
US
EO
FP
RE
MIS
ES
”—IS
NO
TA
CO
GN
IZA
BLE
TOR
TA
ND
PR
OV
IDE
SN
OB
AS
ISFO
RA
PU
NIT
IVE
DA
MA
GE
SA
WA
RD
.50
A.
TheT
rialCourtP
roperlyR
ejectedG
insberg’sA
ttempt
ToR
ecastHer
ContractualC
laimFor
Breach
OfQ
uietE
njoymentA
sA
Tort.50
1.A
simple
breachofcontractalm
ostnevergives
riseto
tortliability.50
2.G
insberg’spurported
tortamounts
toa
garden-variety
contractclaimalleging
breachofquiet
enjoyment.
52
B.
Ginsberg’s
Reliance
On
CasesA
ddressingThe
WrongffilE
victionO
fResidentialTenants
FailsTo
SupportH
erC
ontentionThatThere
Exists
AT
ortFor
TheB
reachO
fQuietE
njoymentIn
TheC
omm
ercialContext.
55
I.The
gravamen
ofG
insberg’scross-appealis
hernew
theorythatshe
was
wrongfully
evicted.55
iv
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(continued)
Page
2.Because
Ginsberg
hasnotshow
nthatshe
reliedon
aw
rongfiilevictiontheory
inthe
trialcourt,thisC
ourtshouldnotconsiderit.
57
C.E
venA
ssuming
ThatThereE
xistsA
Claim
ForTheW
rongfulEviction
OfA
Com
mercialTenant,
Ginsberg
FailedTo
Establish
ItB
yP
roogJury
Instructions,Or
SpecialVerdict.
59
1.G
insbergdid
notallegeor
establishthatshe
was
evicted.59
2.The
juryw
asnotinstructed
onw
rongfuleviction.60
3.The
jury’sspecialverdictm
adeno
findingsthat
would
supportaclaim
forw
rongfuleviction.61
D.
TheT
rialCourtP
roperlyR
eliedO
nE
rlichand
Butler-R
uppTo
Conclude
ThatGinsberg
Could
NotR
ecoverTortD
amages
On
Her
Breach
Of
ContractC
laim.
64
III.A
SA
MA
TT
ER
OF
PU
BLIC
PO
LICY
,P
UN
ITIV
ED
AM
AG
ES
SH
OU
LDN
OT
BE
AV
AIL
AB
LE
FOR
THE
BR
EA
CH
OF
THE
CO
VE
NA
NT
OF
QU
IET
EN
JOY
ME
NT
INA
CO
MM
ER
CIA
LLE
AS
E.
65
A.
Even
IfPunitive
Dam
agesW
ereA
vailableForThe
Breach
OfThe
CovenantO
fQuietE
njoyment,They
Would
BeInappropriate
InThe
Com
mercialC
ontext.65
B.
Ginsberg’s
California
Case
LawD
oesN
otSupport
HerP
osition.68
C.
Ginsberg’s
Out-O
f-State
Authority
Does
NotS
upportH
erP
osition.70
v
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(continued)
Page
IV.
THIS
CO
UR
TS
HO
ULD
AF
FIR
MTH
EO
RD
ER
ST
RIK
ING
TH
EP
UN
ITIV
ED
AM
AG
ES
VE
RD
ICT
EV
EN
AS
SU
MIN
GT
HA
TG
INS
BE
RG
PLE
AD
ED
AN
DP
RO
VE
DTO
RTIO
US
CO
ND
UC
TB
YG
AM
SO
N.
72
A.
TheSpecialV
erdictFailsTo
SupportA
Punitive
Dam
agesA
ward.
72
1.A
sa
mailer
ofconstitutionaldue
process,punitivedam
agesm
ustbeara
reasonablerelationship
tocom
pensatorydam
ages.72
2.Because
thespecialverdictdoes
notdistinguishbetw
eendam
agesaw
ardedforbreach
ofcontract
andtort,
itisim
possibleto
determine
whetherthe
ratioofpunitive
damages
tocom
pensatorytort
damages
satisfiesdue
process.73
a.O
nlytortdam
agesm
aybe
consideredin
assessingw
hetherpunitivedam
agesare
constitutionallyexcessive.
73
b.The
punitivedam
agesaw
ardfails
becausethere
isno
specialverdictfmding
thatG
amson’s
purported“intentional
interference”dam
agedG
insberg.74
c.The
punitivedam
agesaw
ardviolates
dueprocess
becausethe
lump-sum
compensatory
damages
verdictprecludesm
eaningfuljudicialreviewofthe
proportionalityofthe
award.
77
B.
Punitive
Dam
agesC
ouldN
otBeA
warded
InLight
OfG
amson’s
Well-Founded
Beliefs
ThatSheW
asC
omplying
With
HerR
epairO
bligationsA
ndThat
Ginsberg
Was
Holding
Over.
79
1.P
unitivedam
agescannotattach
where
thedefendanthad
aw
ell-foundedbeliefthather
conductwas
proper.79
vi
TA
BL
EO
FC
ON
TE
NT
S(continued)
Page
2.A
sa
matteroflaw
,G
amson
hada
reasonablebasis
forasserting
thatGinsberg’s
leaseexpired
inA
pril2006and
thatshew
asa
holdovertenant.81
a.G
amson’s
interpretationofthe
renewal
languagew
asreasonable.
81
b.G
amson’s
interpretationofthe
renewal
languagecannotsupportpunitive
damages
asamatteroflaw
.83
3.The
trialcourt’serroneous
exclusionofevidence
of
Gam
son’sgood
faithentitles
hertoa
newtrial.
85
C.E
venIfP
unitiveD
amages
Could
Be
Aw
arded,TheyM
ustBe
ReassessedIfThe
CourtA
greesThat
Ginsberg’s
LeaseE
xpiredIn
Ap
ril2006.88
V.
THE
$385,000P
UN
ITIV
ED
AM
AG
ES
AW
AR
DIS
CO
NS
TIT
UT
ION
ALLY
EX
CE
SS
IVE
EV
EN
IFTH
EF
ULL
$49,100C
OM
PE
NS
ATO
RY
DA
MA
GE
SA
WA
RD
ISA
TT
RIB
UT
AB
LETO
GIN
SB
ER
G’S
PU
RP
OR
TED
“INT
EN
TIO
NA
LIN
TE
RF
ER
EN
CE
”C
LAIM
.89
CO
NC
LUS
ION
93
CE
RT
IFIC
AT
EO
FC
OM
PLIA
NC
E95
vii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
FE
DE
RA
LC
AS
ES
Page
.8MW
ofN
orthA
merica
v.G
ore(1996)
517U
.S.
55972
Ca4fbrnia
v.Altus
FinanceLA
.(9th
Cir.
2008)540
F.3d992
74,75
Inre
Exxon
Valdez(9th
Cir.
2001)270
F.3d1215
78
Honda
Motor
Co.,Ltd.v.
Oberg
(1994)512
U.S
.41577
Morgan
Guaranty
TrustCo.ofN
Y.
v.Am
ericanSavings
&Loan
Association
(9thC
ir.1986)
804F.2d
148784
StateFarm
MutualA
utomobile
InsuranceCo.
v.C
ampbell
(2003)538
U.S
.408
72,78,89,
90
Waits
v.Frito-Lay,
Inc.(9th
Cit
1992)978
F.2d1093
84
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Aas
v.Superior
Court
(2000)24
Cal.4th
62751
Am
ericanM
odernH
ome
InsuranceCo.
v.Fahmian
(2011)194
Cal.A
pp.4th162
72
Am
erigraphics,In
cv.M
ercutyC
asualtyCo.
(2010)182
Cal.A
pp.4th1538
79
Andrew
sv.M
obileA
ireEstates
(2005)125
Cal.A
pp.4th578
48,53,
54,55,
60
Antounian
v.LouisV
uittonM
alletier(2010)
189C
al.App.4th
43884
viii
TA
BLE
OF
AU
TH
OR
ITIE
S(C
ont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Applied
Equipm
entCorp.
v.LittonS
audiArabia
Ltd.(1994)
7C
aI.4th503
48,66,
67
Apra
v.Aureguy
(1961)55
Cal.2d
82733
Arias
v.Katella
Townhouse
Hom
eowners
Association,
Inc.(2005)
127C
al.App.4th
84737
Barkettv.B
rucato(1953)
122C
al.App.2d
26455,
56
Barlow
v.Frink
(1915)171
CaL
16528
Barnettv.F
irstNat.Insurance
Co.ofA
merica
(2010)184
Cal.A
pp.4th1454
39
Beckerv.
Subm
arineO
ilCo.(1921)
55C
al.App.
6984,
5,6,8,10,
16
Beckettv.
City
ofP
arisThy
Goods
Co.(1939)
14C
aI.2d633
68,69
Behr
v.Redm
ond(2011)
193C
aI.App.4th
51772
Bellv.M
ason(2011)
194C
al.App.4th
110286
BeneficialF
ireand
Casualty
InsuranceCo.
v.Ku
rtHitke
&Co.,Inc.
(1956)46
Cal.2d
51785
Berg
v.Darden
(2004)120
Cal.A
pp.4th721
37
Blake
v.Arp
(1919)180
Cal.
14461
x
TA
BLE
OF
AU
TH
OR
ITIE
S(C
ont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Butler-R
uppv.Lourdeaux
(2005)134
CaLA
pp.4th1220
49,64,
65,66,
67
Cable
Connection,Inc.
v.DIR
ECTT~
(2008)44
CaL4th
133458
Cavalliv.M
acaire(1958)
159C
aI.App.2d
71422
Cheung
v.Daley
(1995)35
Cal.A
pp.4th1673
74,75,77
City
ofH
opeN
at.M
edicalCenterv.
Genentech,
Inc.(2008)43
Cal.4th
37519
City
ofH
untingtonB
eachv.S
uperiorC
ourt(1978)
78C
al.App.3d
33314
City
ofS
acramento
v.Drew
(1989)207
Cal.A
pp.3d1287
34
Cleveland
v.InternetSpecialties
West,Inc.
(2009)171
Cal.A
pp.4th2423
Cunningham
v.U
niversalUnderw
riters(2002)98
Cal.A
pp.4th1141
60
Cyrus
v.Haveson
(1976)65
Cal.App.3d
30649
Daniels
v.Dean
(1992)253
Mont.
465[833
P.2d1078]
70,71
Diam
ondW
oodworks,Inc.
v.ArgonautInsurance
Co.(2003)
109C
al.App.4th
102074
Dinkelspielv.N
ason(1911)17
CaLA
pp.591
19
x
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
PageE.
Gottschalk
&Co.,
Inc.v.
County
ofM
erced(1987)
196C
al.App.3d
137814
Ellis
v.Radem
acher(1899)
125C
al.556
33
Ellison
v.C
ityofSan
Buenaventura
(1975)48
Cal.A
pp.3d952
34
Epstein
v.Zahioute(1950)
99C
al.App.2d
7389
Erlich
v.Menezes
(1999)21
Cal.4th
54364,
65,66
Fairchild
v.Park
(2001)90
Cal.A
pp.4th919
51
Fisher
v.Parsons
(1963)213
Cal.A
pp.2d829
8,9
Fitzgerald
v.Provines
(1951)102
Cal.A
pp.2d529
22
Flaresv.A
rroyo(1961)56
Cal.2d
49280
Foleyv.Interactive
Data
Corp.
(1988)47C
aI.3d654
66,67
Food
Pro
International.,Inc.
v.Farmers
InsuranceE
xchange(2008)
169C
al.App.4th
97683,
84
Foxv.A
ced(1957)
49C
al.2d381
80
Franklin
Mint
Co.v.M
anatt.Phelps
&P
hillips,LLP
(2010)184
CaLA
pp.4th31358,84,85
xi
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Fratessav.R
offr(1919)40
Cal.A
pp.179
36
Freeman
&M
ills,Inc.
v.Belcher
OilCo.
(1995)11C
al.4th85
67
Fuller-A
ustinInsulation
Co.v.H
ighlandsInsurance
Co.(2006)
135C
al.App.4th
95863
Gafjhey
v.Dow
neySavings
&Loan
Association
(1988)200
Cal.A
pp.3d1154
30,83
Gagnon
v.C
ontinentalCasualty
Co.(1989)
211C
al.App.3d
159875
Garverv.B
race(1996)
47C
al.App.4th
99519,20,21
Gilm
orev.
Casw
ell(1924)
65C
aI.App.
29925
Girard
v.Delta
Towers
JointVenture
(1993)20
Cal.A
pp.4th1741
67
Gordon
v.Landau(1958)
49C
al.2d690
33
Grassilliv.B
arr(2006)
142C
al.App.4th
126090,
91
Green
v.S
uperiorC
ourt(1974)
lOC
al.3d616
56
Greystone
Hom
es,Inc.
v.Midtec,
Inc.(2008)
168C
al.App.4th
119451
xii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Guntertv.
City
ofS
tockton(1976)
55C
al.App.3d
13154,
59
Htay
Htay
Chin
v.Advanced
FreshC
onceptsFranchise
Corp.
(2011)194
Cal.A
pp.4th704
36
LJJP.
Corp.
v.210
CentralP
arkSouth
Corp.
(N.Y
.A
pp.D
iv.1962)
16A
.D.2d
461[228
N.Y
.S.2d
883j,affd.
(N.Y
.1963)
12N
.Y.2d
329[189
N.E
.2d812]
70,71
Ilkhchooyiv.Best
(1995)37
CaI.A
pp.4th395
51,66,67
JetSourceC
harter,Inc.
v.Doherty
(2007)148
Cal.A
pp.4th1
73,90,92
KendallYachtC
orp.v.
United
CaLB
ank(1975)
50C
al.App.3d
94987
LibertyM
utualInsuranceCo.
v.Fales(1973)8
Cal.3d
71221
Lindsay-Field
v.Friendly
(1995)36
Cal.A
pp.4th1728
38
Lori,Lim
itedv.
Wosfe
(1948)85
Cal.A
pp.2d54
57
Maguire
v.Hibernia
Savings&
LoanS
ociety(1944)
23C
al.2d719
16,17,21
Mam
moth
LakesLand
Acquisition,
LLCv.
Town
ofM
amm
othLakes
(2010)191
Cal.A
pp.4th435
61
Mancuso
v.S
outhernC
aLE
disonCo.
(1991)232
Cal.A
pp.3d88
25
xlii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Marchese
v.Standard
Realty
andD
evelopmentCo.
(1977)74
Cal.A
pp.3d142
60
Maty
Mv.
City
ofLos
Angeles
(1991)54
CaI.3d
20253
McC
askeyv.
CaLState
Autom
obileA
ssociation(2010)
189C
al.App.4th
94723
McD
onellv.Am
ericanTrustCo.
(1955)130
Cal.A
pp.2d296
67,68
Mitchellv.E
xhibitionFoods,Inc.
(1986)184
Cal.A
pp.3d1033
15,16
Moss
v.M
inorProperties,
Inc.(1968)
262C
al.App.2d
84733,
34
Mother
Cobb~
Chicken
Turnovers,Inc.
v.Fox(1937)
10C
al.2d203
74,75
Munoz
v.MacM
illan(2011)195
Cal.A
pp.4th648
57
Myers
Building
Indusfries,Ltd.
v.InterfaceTechnology,Inc.
48,49,62
(1993)13
Cal.A
pp.4th949
63,72,
76,77
Nathan
v.Locke(1930)
108C
al.App.
15849,
51
New
bergerv.RW
cind(1972)
28C
al.App.3d
107019
Niles
v.LouisH
Rapoport&
Sons,Inc.(1942)
53C
al.App.2d
64419
xiv
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Nullv.
City
ofLos
Angeles
(1988)206
Cal.A
pp.3d1528
60
Panoutsopoulos
v.C
hambliss
(2007)157
Cal.A
pp.4th297
69
Pechenik
v.Baltim
ore&
Ohio
Railroad
Co.(1974)
157W
.Va.
895[205
S.E
.2d813]
6,8
People
v.W
illiams
(2001)25
Cal.4th
44160
Peterson
v.JohnCrane~
Inc.(2007)
154C
al.App.4th
49837
Petroleum
Collections,
Inc.v.Sw
ords(1975)
48C
al.App.3d
84155
Po-Jen
Chen
v.InterinsuranceE
xchangeofthe
Autom
obileC
lub(2008)
164C
al.App.4th
11736
Pope
v.Lee(2005)
152N
.H.
296[879
A.2d
735]6,7
Pope
v.Lee(N
.H.
2005)885
A.2d
4276
Roby
v.McK
essonC
orp.(2009)
47C
aI.4th686
89,90
Rom
anov.R
ockwellIntern.,
Inc.(1996)
14C
al.4th479
23
Rosenerv.
Sears,R
oebuck&
Co.(1980)
110C
al.App.3d
74081
xv
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Roth
v.S
hellOilCo.
(1960)185
CaI.A
pp.2d676
80
Ryland
v.Appelbaum
(1924)70
Ca1.App.268
22
SanF
ilippov.
Gr~ffIths
(1975)51
Cal.A
pp.3d640
16
Saxenav.
Goffney
(2008)159
Cal.A
pp.4th316
63
Schm
ittv.Felix
(1958)157
Cal.A
pp.2d642
38
Shaverv.
Canton
(1994)26
Cal.A
pp.4th568
9
Sim
onv.
SanFaolo
UI
Holding
Co.,Inc.
(2005)35
CaI.4th
115972,
73,74,78,89
Soils
v.O
i(fIeldsTrucking
Co.(1979)
90C
aLApp.3d
34925
Sonic-C
alabasasA,Inc.
v.Moreno
(2011)51
Cal.4th
65968,
69,71,79
Spaulding
v.Y
ovino-Young
(1947)30C
al.2d138
11
Spinksv.
Equity
ResidentialB
riarwood
Apartm
ents(2009)
171C
aI.App.4th
100456
Standard
LiveStock
Co.v.Fentz
(1928)204
CaL
61851
xvi
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Sterling
v.Taylor
(2007)40
Cal.4th
75729
Templeton
Feed&
Grain
v.Ralston
Purina
Co.(1968)69
CaI.2d
46181
Textilev.
Colem
an(1954)
122C
al.App.2d
75633,
34
TextronF
inancialCorp.
v.Nat.
Union
Fire
InsuranceCo.
ofP
ittsburgh(2004)
118C
al.App.4th
106173,
78
Thr~1tyC
orp.v.
County
ofL.A
.(1989)
210C
al.App.3d
88114
Tookev.A
llen(1948)
85C
al.App.2d
23056,
69
Troykv.Farm
ersG
roup,Inc.(2009)
171C
al.App.4th
130515
Trujillo
v.North
County
TransitDistrict
(1998)63
Cal.A
pp.4th280
62
United
Pac~.fIc-Reliance
InsuranceCo.
v.DiD
omenico
(1985)173
Cal.A
pp.3d673
21
Vick
v.DaC
orsi(2003)
110C
al.App.4th
20637,39
Vothv.
Wasco
Public
Utility
District
(1976)56C
aI.App.3d
35351
Walkerv.Farm
ersInsurance
Exchange
(2007)153
Cal.A
pp.4th965
89,92
xvii
TA
BLE
OF
AU
TH
OR
ITIE
S(C
ont’d)
ST
AT
EC
AS
ES
Page
Walsh
v.W
alsh(1941)
18C
al.2d439
28
Wickw
arev.
Tanner(1997)
53C
al.App.4th
57038
WinecellarFarm
,Inc.
v.Hibbard
(July2l,2011)N
.H.
[2011W
L2976753j6,7
Wo~fsen
v.Hathaw
ay(1948)
32C
aI.2d632
80,81
Witv.Interstate
Consolidated
Industries(1991)
226C
al.App.3d
151116
ST
AT
ES
TA
TU
TE
S
CivilC
ode
Section
71893
Section
164113
Section
192748
Section
194164
Section3294
48,73
Section
330051,66
Code
ofC
ivilProcedure
Section
4324
Section
31221
Section
33716
xviii
TA
BL
EO
FA
UT
HO
RIT
IES
(Cont’d)
ST
AT
ES
TA
TU
TE
SPage
Section
62462
Section
99835,36,37,38,39
Section
106021
Section
116122
Section
185833
Section
186414,
15,16
Evidence
Code
Section
77682,
87
Fam
ilyC
ode
Section
76039
InsuranceC
ode
Section
38115
Rev.
&Tax.
Code
Section
1191114
OT
HE
R
CA
CIN
o.2021
52,60
xix
INT
RO
DU
CT
ION
It’sa
classicdiversion
strategy:E
venthough
everyissue
inboth
Gam
son’sappealand
Ginsberg’s
cross-appealturnson
purequestions
of
law,
Ginsberg
devotesm
uchofherbriefto
irrelevantpersonalattackson
Gam
son.G
insbergapparently
justifiedincluding
theseattacks
onthe
basis
thattheyare
relevanttoherargum
entsthatparts
ofthe
trialcourt’s
injunction(R
B/X
AO
B70-74)
andthe
jury’spunitive
damages
determination
(RB
/XA
OB
82-87)are
supportedby
substantialevidence.
Butthose
arguments
havenothing
todo
with
thisappeal:
Gam
sonhas
not
challengedeitherdeterm
ination—orany
otherjuryorthaicourt
determination—
forlackofsubstantialevidence.
Thatisbecause,though
sheprofoundly
disagreesw
ithG
insberg’sevidence
andthe
jury’sand
trial
court’sinterpretation
ofit,
Gam
sonrecognizes
thatbasicrules
ofappellate
lawinsulate
themfrom
review.
Ginsberg’s
strategydoes
notwork.
Thelaw
isw
hatitis—and
itis
definitelynotw
hatGinsberg
saysitis.
Correctapplication
oflaw
requires
reversalofthe
judgment,
exceptasto
theorderstriking
punitivedam
ages.
Gam
son’sA
ppeal.G
amson’s
appealisnotcom
plicated.U
nder
California
law,iflease
renewallanguage
isatalluncertain,then
thecourt
mustrejecta
tenant’sclaim
ofa
perpetualleaseand
construethe
leaseto
conferonlya
singlerenew
al.Thus,
contraryto
Ginsberg’s
contention,
Gam
sonneed
notshowthatthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage
unambiguously
confersa
singlerenew
al.G
amson
prevailsas
am
atter
oflaw
solong
asthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage
is
ambiguous—
anditis.
That’sexactly
whatthe
thaijudgew
hoinitially
presidedoverthis
casefound
when
hedenied
summ
aryjudgm
ent,saying
1
thattherenew
allanguage“show
[s],atbest,thatthere
isam
biguityas
to
whether
anoption
oroptions
were
grantedto
thetenant.”
(2A
A281.)
Ginsberg’s
torturedconstruction
ofthe
ConservatorLease
isnot
credible:She
would
havethe
Courttransform
them
ostbasicstationery-
storeshort-term
formlease
intoa
perpetuallease.Precedentand
policy
precludethatresult.
IftheC
ourtchoosesto
breakw
ithprecedentrequiring
entryof
judgmentin
Gam
son’sfavor,itshould
reversefor
anew
trial:G
insberg
cannotdemonstrate
thattheC
onservatorLease—view
edas
aw
hole—
unambiguously
confersperpetualrenew
alsas
am
atteroflaw
.A
ccordingly,
thetrialcourterred
byentering
judgmentin
Ginsberg’s
favorwithout
atrial.
On
remand,the
trialcourtmustalso
reassessthe
portionsofthe
judgmentissuing
theperm
anentinjunctionand
awarding
Ginsberg
attorney’sfees
andcosts.
Ginsberg’s
Cross-A
ppeal.The
cross-appealtacitlyrecognizes
that
thetrialcourtproperly
rejectedG
insberg’stheory
forrecoveringpunitive
damages—
thatis,thetrialcourtproperly
ruledthata
breachofthe
implied
covenantofquietenjoym
entcannotsupportpunitivedam
agesand
thatthere
isno
suchtortas
alandlord’s
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
of
property.”Instead,
Ginsberg
urgesan
entirelynew
theory:w
rongfhl
eviction.A
ccordingto
Ginsberg,a
handthlofcases
involvingresidential
tenantsw
hovacated
theirleased
premises
showthatthere
existsan
independentclaimfor
“tortious”breach
ofquietenjoym
entinthe
comm
ercialcontextandthatthe
juryfound
Gam
sonliable
forthat“tort.”
Ginsberg
isw
rongon
everylevel:
Sheis
notaresidentialtenant,she
did
notvacatethe
premises,
andshe
was
notevicted,constructively
or
2
otherwise.
Equally
important,
Ginsberg
neveralleged
aclaim
forw
rongful
eviction,and
theju
ryneitherw
asinstructed
onitnorm
adeany
findingsthat
would
supportsucha
claim.
Buteven
ifG
insberghad
pleadedand
provena
viabletort,the
Court
mustnevertheless
affirmthe
orderstrikingpunitive
damages
becauseitfails
topass
constitutionalmuster.
Becausethe
damages
specialverdictformlum
psall
compensatory
damages
together,itisim
possibleto
know
whetherthe
juryaw
ardedany
tortdamages—
aprerequisite
forpunitivedam
ages.
•E
venassum
ingthe
jury
awarded
some
amounto
ftort
damages,the
unitarydam
agesverdictform
precludesthe
Courtfrom
conductingthe
requisiteindependentreview
of
theproportionality
ofthe
punitiveand
tortdamages.
•E
venifthe
entire$49,100
compensatory
damages
award
were
attributableto
acognizable
tort,the
$385,000punitive
damages
award
would
beconstitutionally
excessive:For
multiple
reasons,the8:1
ratiobetw
eenthe
punitiveand
compensatory
awards
isunsupported
andunsupportable.
Accordingly,this
Courtshould
affirmthe
orderstrilcingthe
punitive
damages
award.
3
AP
PE
LLAN
T’S
RE
PLY
BR
IEF
AR
GU
ME
NT
I.
GA
MS
ON
ISE
NT
ITL
ED
TO
JUD
GM
EN
TB
EC
AU
SE
TH
EC
ON
SE
RV
AT
OR
LEA
SE
DO
ES
NO
TC
ON
FE
R
AP
ER
PE
TU
AL
RIG
HT
OF
RE
NE
WA
L.
A.
TheC
onservatorLease
Confers
AS
ingleR
enewalT
hat
Expired
InA
pril2006.
1.G
insbergis
notentitledto
atria
lonthe
meaning
of
theC
onservatorLease’s
ambiguous
renewal
languagebecause,
asa
matter
oflaw,
anam
biguous
renewalclause
confersonly
asingle
renewal.
Ginsberg
groundsherargum
entson
am
isunderstandingofC
alifornia
lawgoverning
purportedlyperpetualleases.
According
toG
insberg,the
Courtm
ustaffirmthe
trialcourt’s
misinterpretation
ofthe
Conservator
Lease’srenew
allanguagebecause
“Gam
sonhas
notprovidedany
analysis(norcould
she)as
tohow
theLease
couldbe
readunam
biguouslyin
herfavor.”(R
B/X
AO
B63,italics
added;
seealso
RB
/XA
OB
66.)B
utGam
sonhas
nosuch
burden.She
needonly
showthatthe
leaseis
ambiguous,and
shehas
donethat.
(AO
B24-40.)
“[L]easesw
hichm
ayhave
beenintended
tobe
renewable
inperpetuity,~fat
alluncertainin
thatregard,w
illbeconstrued
asim
portingbutone
renewal.”
(Beckerv.
Subm
arineO
ilCo.(1921)
55C
al.App.
698,700
(Becker),italics
added;seealso
AO
B18-19.)
4
Forthe
same
reason,G
insbergis
alsow
rongin
claiming
thatshehas
an“absolute
right”to
presentevidenceata
retrial.(R
BIX
AO
B62.)
She
hasno
“right”to
aretrial,because
noam
ountofextrinsic
evidencecan
injectclarityinto
theC
onservatorLease’sfaciallyam
biguousrenew
al
language.(See
pp.10-16,post;A
OB
24-40.)A
sB
eckerrequires,theC
ourt
shouldinstead
“construe[]”the
ConservatorLease
“asim
portingbutone
renewal”
(55C
aLApp.
atp.700)
andenterjudgm
entthatGinsberg’s
lease
expiredin
Ap
ril2006,atthe
endofherone
andonly
renewal,and
shehas
beena
holdovertenanteversince
(see4
AA
815,¶3;4
AA
820,¶20;
4AA
823,~J1).2.
Contrary
toG
insberg’scontention,
California—
likevirtu
ally
everyother
jurisd
iction
thathas
consideredthe
question—disfavors
perpetual
leases.
Ginsberg
concedes,as
shem
ust,thatBecker—
which
isthe
only
California
decisionthathas
interpretedpurportedly
perpetuallease
language—controls
theinterpretation
ofthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewal
language.(R
B/X
AO
B43.)
Shealso
concedes,as
shem
ust,thatunder
Becker,
California
courtsw
illenforcea
purportedlyperpetuallease
onlyif
therenew
allanguageis
clearandunm
istakable.(R
B/X
AO
B43,
citing
Becker,supra,
55C
al.App.
atp.700.)
BecauseB
eckeristhe
onlyC
aliforniaauthority
addressingthe
interpretationoflease
languagethatis
ambiguous
butpurportedlyperpetual,
theopening
briefpresenteda
thoroughsurvey
ofrelevantauthority
from
otherjurisdictions—authority
thatoverwhelm
inglym
inorsB
ecker.
(AQ
B20-29
&lb.
14,19.)
Ginsberg
ticksthrough
much
ofthis
authority
5
withoutseriously
tryingto
distinguishany
ofit.
(Com
pareibid.
with
RB
IXA
OB
53-57.)H
eronly
efforttodiscreditthe
majority
ruleis
todirect
theC
ourttothe
two
outliercases
thatwe
identifiedin
theopening
brief:
Pope
v.Lee(2005)
152N
.H.
296[879
A.2d
735](P
ope),and
Pechenik
v.
Baltim
ore&
Ohio
Railroad
Co.(1974)
157W
.Va.
895[205
S.E
.2d813]
(Pechenik).
(RB
IXA
OB
53-54;seeA
OB
24,fIt12.)
ThatGinsberg
could
fmd
noothercases
reflectingthe
minority
viewconfirm
sourresearch:
Thesearen’tjustm
inoritycases,they
arethe
onlym
inoritycases.
And
not
eventhey
supportGinsberg’s
position.
Ginsberg
suggeststhatin
Pope,supra,
879A
.2d735,the
New
Ham
pshireSuprem
eC
ourtuphelda
perpetualleasew
ithterm
s
analogousto
thosein
theC
onservatorLease.
(RB
/XA
OB
54.)Thatis
incorrect.P
opespecifically
explainedthatit
didnotaddress
aperpetual
lease—instead,P
opeconsidered
therightto
automatic
renewals:
“On
appeal,theparties
donotchallenge
thetrialcourt’s
rulingthatthe
1998lease
agreementdid
notconferuponthe
defendanttherightto
perpetualrenewals.”
(879A
.2datp.740;
seealso
Pope
v.Lee(N
.H.
2005)
885A
.2d427,427-428
[ingranting
reconsiderationin
part,courtclarified
thattheonly
issueaddressed
was
therightto
automatic
renewals
without
theneed
foradditionalw
ritings,nota
perpetuallease].)
Even
ifPope’s
discussionofautom
aticrenew
alrightscould
be
analogizedto
adisputed
perpetuallease,Ginsberg
stillgetsP
opew
rong.
Avery
recentNew
Ham
pshireSuprem
eC
ourtopinionexplains
theflaw
sin
Ginsberg’s
analysisofP
ope.W
inecellarFarm
,Inc.
v.Hibbard
(July21,
2011)_N
.H.
_[2011W
L2976753,
at*1,7
](Winecellar),
considered
alease
statingthatthe
tenantcouldcultivate
andharvesthay
onthe
6
landlord’sproperty
“inperpetuity.”
Winecellarheld
thatdespitethe
“inperpetuity”
language,thelease
didnotestablish
adisfavored
perpetual
leaseholdin
viewofthe
totalityofcircum
stances.(Id.
at*7..8.)For
example,as
istrue
here,theW
inecellartenant’s
considerationforthe
propertyw
asm
eagerand
thetenantm
adeno
showing
thata“bona
fide
purchaser”seeking
tobuy
thefarm
“would
bew
illingto
doso
inlighto
f
theexistence
ofthe
Haying
Agreem
ent.”(Id.
at*~
[tenantrendered
servicesin
exchangeforuse
ofproperty
butpaidno
rentorpropertytaxes].)
And
Winecellar’s
concernsaboutrestraints
onalienation
areequally
valid
here.(Id.
at*78
)
Winecellar
distinguishedPope:
Unlike
Winecellar,the
Pope
lease
“establisheda
leasepaym
entbasedon
theapplicable
consumerprice
index,
andincluded
clausesgoverning
rentalincreases,adjustm
entsand
taxes.”
(Id.at*8,
citingP
ope,supra,atpp.737-741.)
Forexam
ple,theP
opelease
expresslyprovided
foran
automatic
annualrentincreaseof3.5%
.
(Pope,supra,879
A.2d
atp.739.)
Pope
concludedthatthe
dependable
income
streamm
ightbeattractive
toa
prospectivepurchaser.
(Winecellar,
supra,at*8,citing
Pope,supra,atp.
745.)B
utthat’snottrue
inour
case.
Although
theC
onservatorLease
doeshave
arentescalation
clausetied
to
theC
onsumerP
riceIndex,
it’scapped
atanum
bersolow
asto
renderit
almostvalueless
tothe
landlord—and
eventhatm
eagerrentincreasekicks
inonly
onceevery
fiveyears,notannually
asin
Pope.
(4A
A823,¶
1.)
Thatmeans
thatGinsberg
ism
uchm
orelike
theW
inecellartenantthanthe
Pope
tenant:H
ergrossly
under-marketrentdestroys
theproperty’s
comm
ercialvalue.(See
4R
T463-464;butsee
5R
T787-788
[sustaining
objectionsto
evidenceregarding
fairmarketrent].)
7
Ginsberg’s
relianceon
Pechenik
isflaw
ed,too.(R
BIX
AO
B53-54.)
Ginsberg
omits
acornerstone
ofFechenik’s
reasoning:“W
estVirginia
law
disfavorsperpetualleases,butdoubçfulquestions
willusually
beconstrued
infavor
ofthe
lessee.”(205
S.E
.2datp.
815,italicsadded.)
California
law
isexplicitly
contrary:U
nlikeW
estVirginia,
ourcourts“w
ill”construe
ambiguous—
butpurportedlyperpetual—
leaserenew
allanguage“as
importing
butonerenew
al.”(B
ecker,supra,55C
aLApp.
atp.700,italics
added.)
3.G
insberg’sreliance
onC
aliforniadecisions
that
considerthe
ruleagainstperpetuities
ism
isplaced.
Also
off-baseis
Ginsberg’s
discussionofB
eckerand
California
casesthatanalyze
perpetualleasesunderthe
ruleagainstperpetuities.
(RB
IXA
OB
36-38,43-44.)
First,G
amson
never“assert[ed]”
thatBeckerdoes
not“applyto
this
case.”(R
B/X
AO
B43,
citingA
OB
44-45.)To
thecontrary,
Gam
son
providedthe
Courtw
iththe
factualcontextunderlyingthe
disputein
Becker
andexplained
thattherule
announcedin
Beckernotonly
governs
(or“applies”)here,butdictates
thatGam
sonprevailas
am
atteroflaw
.
(AO
B19,20,43-46.)
Where
Beckerdoes
not“apply”is
inits
factual
analysisregarding
theparticularlease
consideredthere.
Butthat’s
because
offactualdifferences
between
Becker’s
oil-and-gaslease
andthe
comm
ercialleasehere—
notdifferencesin
legalprinciples.
Second,Ginsberg
misunderstands
caselaw
interpretingthe
significanceofB
ecker’soil-and-gas
leasecontext.
(RB
/XA
OB
38&
43,
citingFisher
v.Parsons
(1963)213
Cal.A
pp.2d829,
841(Fisher).)
The
8
citedportion
ofFisher
concernsonly
thequestion
ofw
hetherthereis
adifference
between
oil-and-gasleases
andotherleasesforpurposes
of
applyingthe
ruleagainstperpetuities,
anissue
notpresenthere(Fisher
rejectedapplication
ofthe
ruleto
leases).(213
Cal.A
pp.2datp.
841.)
More
tothe
point,Fisherleftno
doubtaboutitsholding
by“em
phasiz[ing]”
that“we
donotdealw
ithan
optionforperpetualrenew
alhere.”(Ibid.)
Finally,
Ginsberg’s
relianceon
two
additionalrule-against
perpetuitiescases
issim
ilarlym
isplaced:S
haverv.C
lanton(1994)
26C
al.App.4th
568(Shaver)
andE
psteinv.Zahloute
(1950)99
Cal.A
pp.2d
738(E
pstein).(R
B/X
AO
B36-38,43-44.)
Throughouttheseproceedings,
Ginsberg
hasclaim
edthatS
haveris
controllingauthority
becausethat
decisionsupposedly
consideredand
rejecteda
challengeto
alease’s
perpetualrenewallanguage.
(See,e.g.,R
B/X
AO
B36-38,43-44;
1A
A196,
239,247-250;2
AA
272-274,333;2
RT
B-4,B
-b—B
-I1,5.)That’s
just
notso.A
sS
haverexplained,
“[altissue
isw
hethera
leaseam
endment
which
providesforperpetualoptions
torenew
isvoid
becauseitviolates
the
rule[againstperpetuities].”
(26C
al.App.4th
atp.571,italics
added.)
Epstein
ruledon
thesam
eissue.
(99C
al.App.2d
atp.739.)
Neither
case
interpretedlease
language:The
perpetualnatureofthe
leasesw
asa
given
ineach.
Nonetheless,G
insbergled
thetrialcourtastray
byclaim
ingthat
Shaverupheld
aperpetualrenew
alclausebased
onan
analysisofthe
lease’slanguage.
(E.g.,2R
T18-19,24,33-34,37,40-42.)
9
4.T
akenas
aw
hole,theC
onservatorLeaseevinces
anintentto
createa
short-termcom
merciallease.
Itslanguage
isinconsistentw
ithan
intenttocreate
aperpetuallease.
a.G
insbergcannotshow
thattheC
onservator
Leaseis
unambiguously
perpetual.
Ginsberg
arguesthatthe
Conservator
Leaseis
unambiguously
perpetual.(R
B/X
AO
B32-43.)
Her
arguments
arenotpersuasive.
Plain
language.The
renewallanguage
doesnotbearthe
hallmarks
ofan
unambiguous
renewalclause.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B32-33.)
Forexam
ple,
theprovision
inB
ecker—the
onlyon-pointC
aliforniadecision—
is
markedly
different.There,the
leasegave
thetenantthe
“rightofrenew
al
fora
fbrtherterm
often
yearsatthe
endofsuch
term,
oratthe
endofany
subsequenttermfo
rw
hichit
may
berenew
ed.”(55
Cal.A
pp.atp.
699,
italicsadded.)
TheC
onservatorLease
doesnotreferto
a“subsequent”
or
laterrentalterm.
Itsays
onlythatG
insberghas
therightto
renew:
“Tenant
shallhavethe
optionto
extendthe
termofthe
leasefor
additionalfiveyear
periodsupon
thesam
eterm
sand
conditionscontained
inthe
lease.”(4
AA
823,¶1.)
Although
thislanguage
mightsuggestpluralrenew
als,itisnot
nearlyas
explicitasB
ecker’sreference
to“any
subsequentterm”
andalso
lacksotherindicia
ofperpetualleases.
Thatisw
hythe
trialjudgew
ho
initiallypresided
overthiscase
(JudgeFerns)
foundthe
renewallanguage
ambiguous.
(2A
A28
1-283.)
Crossed-outlease
provisions.G
insbergsuggests
thatcrossingout
some
ofthe
preprintedlease
provisionsevinces
anintentto
create
10
aperpetuallease.
(RB
/XA
OB
33-35.)H
ardly.C
rossingoutprovisions
saysnothing
abouttheam
biguityin
therenew
allanguage—itshow
sonly
thattheparties
signeda
leasew
ithterm
sdiffering
fromthe
stationery-store
preprintedlease
terms.
Stationery-store
form~cboilerplate
terms.
Ginsberg
arguesthat
some
ofthe
mostboilerplate
terms
ofa
stationery-storelease
formevince
anintentto
createa
perpetuallease.(R
B/X
AO
B35,41,42.)
Forexam
ple,
shesays
withoutexplanation
thattheuse
ofthe
definedtenm
s“Landlord”
and“T
enant”(4
AA
815)instead
ofthe
parties’propernames
“expresses
theintentthatthe
Partiesagreed
thatGinsberg
andE
denshallhave
aperpetualrenew
alright”(R
B/X
AO
B3
5%
1B
utifthisw
erecorrect,
every
formlease
would
createthe
disfavoredand
rareperpetuallease.
That
cannotbe—and
isnot—
right.
Capitalim
provements.
TheC
onservatorLease
statesthatG
insberg
loanedG
amson
$11,950for
capitalimprovem
ents;G
insbergtestified
that
thetotalw
asaround
$30,000.(4
AA
823,¶3;
3R
T238.)
Regardless
of
theam
ount,theC
onservatorLeaseentitled
Ginsberg
todeductfrom
herrent
notonlythe
specified$11,950
butalsoany
additionalamounts
spenton
“[o]thercriticalrepairs.”
(4A
.A823,¶
3;butsee3
RT
239:22-240:9
Ginsberg’s
otherexamples
ofprovisions
purportedlyevincing
anintent
tocreate
aperpetuallease
aresim
ilarlyflaw
ed,including
herrelianceon
standardlease
provisionsaboutheirs
andassigns
andsubordination.
(RB
/XA
OB
35,42;4A
A819-821,¶~J
14,18,
19.)A
nd,contrary
toher
contention,apurchase
option(like
theone
includedin
theC
onservatorLease,4
AA
824,¶6)
iscom
mon
andit
doesnotreflecta
“long-terminterestin
theLeased
Prem
ises.”(R
BIX
AO
B41;
seeS
pauldingv.
Yovino
Young(1947)
30C
al.2d138,
141[purchase
optionis
“comm
onlyfound
ina
lease”].)
11
[Ginsberg
apparentlyonly
tookthe
benefitofthe
initial$11,950].)In
any
case,the$11,950
loanw
asnothing
more
thana
rentreductionfor
eight
months.
(See4
AA
823,¶3
[$11,950loan
tobe
offsetby$1,500
monthly
rentreductions].)Since
Ginsberg
was
reimbursed
forthe
$11,950loan
throughthe
rentreductions,hercapitalinvestm
entwas
atmost$18,050,not
$30,000.YetG
insbergclaim
sthatthe
veryshort-term
$11,950loan
plus
thealleged
$18,050capitalinvestm
entdemonstrate
thatshew
ouldnothave
agreedto
alease
conferringa
singlerenew
al,especiallygiven
thatthe
Rubinfeld
Leasew
ithG
amson’s
fatherconferred,
atmost,
abase
five-year
termplus
fivefive-year
options.(R
B/X
AO
B39-4
0j2
Theargum
ent
doesn’twork.
Forone
thing,G
insbergconcedes
thatsheundertook
the
$11,950w
orthofrepairs
beforesigning
theC
onservatorLease(3
RT
236:5-13,238:2-15;1
AA
46-47,¶flj7-12[firstam
endedcom
plaint);
RB
IXA
OB
39)—therefore,
hersupposed$11,950
loanw
asnotgiven
in
considerationforthe
ConservatorLease,butratherw
asgiven
while
the
Rubinfeld
Leasew
asstillin
effect.For
another,even
overlookingthis
faultyfactualprem
ise,Ginsberg’s
conclusionis
hardlyobvious
andit
certainlyis
notcompelling
evidenceofaperpetuallease.
Mostim
portantly,
herargumentdoes
nothingto
dispeltheC
onservatorLease’s
ambiguity
precludinga
perpetuallease.
2G
insbergm
isstates—yetagain—
Gam
son’sargum
ent,which
isthat
Ginsberg
isentitled
toonly
onerenew
alasa
matter
oflaw
.G
amson
doesnotargue
thattheC
onservatorLease
unambiguously
confersonly
asingle
renewal.
12
b.G
insberghas
notrebuttedG
amson’s
analysis
showing
thattheC
onservatorLease
takenas
aw
holeis
inconsistentwith
aperpetuallease.
Gam
sondem
onstratedthatthe
ConservatorLease
takenas
aw
holeis
inconsistentwith
aperpetualrenew
alright.(A
OB
24-40.)G
insberg’s
responses(R
BIX
AO
B44-49)
arefacially
unavailing.A
tmostthey
are
arguments—
andnotvery
goodones
(forinstance,the
suggestionthat“etc.”
issom
ehownotam
biguous,RB
/XA
OB
45)—w
hyG
amson’s
readingofthe
Leaseas
aw
holedoes
notnecessarilyestablish
thattheC
onservator
Lease’scannotbe
perpetual.B
utunlikeG
insberg,w
eacknow
ledgethatthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage
isam
biguousand
thattherenew
al
provisionm
ustbeinterpreted
inconjunction
with
allofthe
leaseterm
s.
(SeeC
iv.C
ode,§1641
[“The
whole
ofa
contractisto
betaken
together,so
asto
giveeffectto
everypart,ifreasonably
practicable,each
clausehelping
tointerpretthe
other”].)W
hileone
mightfm
dsom
eofthe
clausesw
e
discussin
aperpetuallease,
onew
ouldn’texpectto—and
collectivelyit
would
bealm
ostunthinkable.This
means
thatviewed
asa
whole,
the
ConservatorLease
cannotbeconstrued
asperpetual.
One
ofG
insberg’sargum
ents,however,
isw
rongas
am
atteroflaw
:
herargumentregarding
thepaym
entofdocum
entarytransfertaxes.
(RB
/XA
OB
49.)The
openingbriefexplained
thatunliketrue
long-term
leases,theC
onservatorLeasedoes
notallocateliability
fordocum
entary
transfertaxes.(A
OB
40.)G
insbergresponds
that“[d]ocumentary
transfer
taxesare
consideredrealproperty
taxesand
assessments”
andthatG
amson
isresponsible
forrealpropertytaxes
undertheC
onservatorLease.
(RB
/XA
OB
49.)N
otso:A
“[documentary]
transfertax[is]
atax
onthe
13
exerciseofthe
rightorprivilegeoftransferring
propertyand
notatax
on
realproperty.“
(City
ofH
untingtonB
eachv.
Superior
Court(1978)
78C
aLApp.3d
333,340,italicsadded.)
Ginsberg’s
authorityis
nottothe
contrary.Thr(fty
Corp.
v.C
ounty
ofL.A
.(1989)
210C
al.App.3d
881,884-886,held
thattheterm
“realty
sold”as
usedin
thedocum
entarytransfertax
statute(R
ev.&
Tax.C
ode,
§11911)
includeslong-term
leaseholds.Ifanything,
Thrjfty
illustratesw
hy
long-tennleases
allocateliability
fordocum
entarytransfertaxes:
The
creationofsuch
aleasehold
triggerssignificanttax
consequences.(Itis
unclearwhy
Ginsberg
citesE.
Gottschalk
&Co.,Inc.
v.C
ountyofM
erced
(1987)196
Cal.A
pp.3d1378,w
hichsays
nothingaboutdocum
entary
transfertaxes—itdoesn’teven
containthe
phrase.)
5.C
odeofC
ivilProcedure
section1864
doesnot
trump
them
orespecific
rulegoverning
the
interpretationofam
biguousrenew
allanguage
purportedlycreating
aperpetuallease.
Ginsberg
leadsoffherrespondent’s
briefbyresorting
toan
obscure
ruleofcontractconstruction:
Code
ofC
ivilProceduresection
1864
(section1864),w
hichapplies
“when
differentconstructionsofa
provision
areotherw
iseequally
proper”—in
otherwords,
ifotherrulesofcontract
constructiondo
notresolvean
ambiguity,
thenthe
ambiguous
termshould
beinterpreted
infavor
ofthe
partybenefitted
bythe
term.
(RB
/XA
OB
31-
14
32.)~B
yits
verylanguage,section
1864cannotsupplantthe
specificrule
thatambiguous
renewallanguage
isdeem
edto
conferonly
asingle
renewal.
Thatrulem
eansthatthere
areno
ambiguities
tobe
resolved:The
findingof
ambiguity
isitselfdispositive.
And
evenifthe
ambiguity
didhave
tobe
resolved,sectioh
1864w
ouldnotcom
einto
playunless
theestablished
rules
ofinterpretation
failed.(C
f.Troyk
v.Farmers
Group,
Inc.(2009)
171C
al.App.4th
1305,1332,lii.
15[“W
econclude
that(the)generalrule
of
constructionofcontracts
doesnotsupersede
them
orespecific
statutory
requirementfor
disclosurein
insurancepolicies
setforthin
(Insurance
Code)
section381,
subdivision(f)”].)
Buthere,they
donotfail—
they
negateany
perpetualinterpretation.
Thecase
Ginsberg
cites,Mitchellv.E
xhibitionFoods,Inc.
(1986)
184C
al.App.3d
1033,illustratessection
1864’slim
itedapplication.
Mitchelllooked
tosection
1864—w
hichitterm
ed“one
ofthe
lessfam
iliar
canonsofconstruction”—
onlybecause
them
eaningofthe
ambiguous
lease
termcould
notbenailed
down
bythe
provision’s“express
language”orthe
Section
1864states
infill:
“When
theterm
sofan
agreementhave
beenintended
ina
differentsenseby
thedifferentparties
toit,
thatsenseis
toprevailagainsteitherparty
inw
hichhe
supposedthe
otherunderstoodit,
andw
hendifferentconstructions
ofa
provisionare
otherwise
equallyproper,thatis
tobe
takenw
hichis
mostfavorable
tothe
partyin
whose
favortheprovision
was
made.”
15
“generalrules”ofcontractconstruction.
(184C
al.App.3d
atpp.1041-
1043.)~Our
caseis
different:Because
Beckercontrols
theinterpretation
of
theC
onservatorLease’s
ambiguous
renewallanguage,and
becauseother
rulesofconstruction
alsoapply,
section1864
isirrelevant.
B.
No
Statute
OfLim
itationsB
arsG
amson’s
Cross-A
ction
Seeking
Declaratory
ReliefO
nThe
Meaning
OfThe
Conservator
Lease’sR
enewalLanguage.
1.G
amson’s
declaratoryre
liefclaim
sare
governedby
afour-year
limitations
periodbecause
hercross-
actionarises
froma
disputeaboutthe
meaning
of
theC
onservatorLease’s
renewallanguage.
Thegravam
enofa
claimdictates
theoperative
limitations
period.
(SanF
ilippov.
Gr!fflths
(1975)51
Cal.A
pp.3d640,644-645.)
The
declaratoryjudgm
entclaims
atissuein
thisappealadd
upto
an“action
upon”the
meaning
ofthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage.
(Seegenerally
IA
A131-134,¶~
7-23.)The
four-yearlimitations
period
thereforegoverns.
(SeeC
odeC
iv.Proc.,§
337,subd.(1)
[“action(s)upon
anycontract,obligation
orliabilityfounded
uponan
instrumentin
writing”
mustbe
filedw
ithinfouryears
ofaccrualo
fclaim];M
aguirev.H
ibernia
‘~Ginsberg’s
relianceon
Wu
v.InterstateC
onsolidatedIndustries
(1991)226
Cal.A
pp.3d1511,is
misplaced.
Wu
didnothold
thatalease’s
renewal
languagem
ustalways
beinterpreted
inthe
tenant’sfavor
anditsaid
nothingaboutthe
interpretationofam
biguousrenew
allanguage.In
Wu
therew
asno
doubtthatthelease
conferredrenew
aloptions.W
usim
plyconsidered
thetenant’s
indisputablerightto
renewals
ininterpreting
thelease’s
rent-escalationclause.
(Id.atpp.
1514-1515.)
16
Savings&
LoanSoc.
(1944)23C
al.2d719,
733-734(M
aguire)[sam
e
limitations
periodgoverns
contractactionw
hetherpartyseeks
legalor
declaratoryrelief]
•)S
ButG
insbergclaim
sthata
three-yearlimitations
periodgoverns
becausethe
“nature’ofG
amson’s
claims
are[sic]
thatin1996
when
Gam
sonsigned
theC
onservatorLease,
Gam
son‘did
notintendto
create
optionsin
perpetuity.’(A
A132:22-25.)”
(RB
IXA
OB
64,citing1
AA
132,
¶15(b).)
Shecites
asingle
phrasefrom
thethird
amended
cross-complaint,
which
shetakes
outofcontextand
gramm
aticallyalters,
tocontend
thatthe
“nature”ofG
amson’s
cross-actionis
thatGainson
signedthe
Conservator
Leaseby
mistake
andthatshe
didnotintend
tocreate
aperpetuallease.
But
that’snotw
hatthecross-com
plaintalleges.Itsays,w
iththe
relevant
languageunderlined,
Cross-C
omplainant[G
amson]
contendsthatthe
Conservatorship
Leaseprovides
forone
only[sic]
renewalperiod
(which
was
exercisedin
2001and
expiredin
2006),andthatthe
Conservatorship
Leasedoes
notprovidefor,
andthe
nartiesdid
notintendto
create,
optionsin
perpetuity.
(1A
A132,¶
15(b),underliningadded.)
Incontext,
thephrase
hasnothing
todo
with
“mistake”—
itratheralleges
thattheparties
didnotagree
to
aperpetuallease.
Ginsberg’s
theoryofthe
cross-actionm
ightbeviable
ifthethird
amended
cross-complaintalleged
thattherenew
alclausew
as
~See
1A
A208:16-20
(Ginsberg
pleadeda
statuteoflim
itations
affirmative
defense).
17
unambiguously
perpetualbutthatGam
sonm
istakenlyagreed
tothat
unambiguous
clause.Thatis
notthegravam
enofG
amson’s
operative
pleadingand
Ginsberg’s
characterizationcannotbe
squaredw
ithany
reasonablereading
ofit.
Inany
case,thetussle
overthethree-yearor
four-
yearlimitations
periodis
notdecisive—the
realissuehere
isw
hen
Gam
son’scauses
ofaction
accrued:In
Ap
ril1996
when
theparties
signed
theC
onservatorLease,
orinA
pril2006
when
Ginsberg
breachedthe
ConservatorLease
byholding
over.
2.G
amson’s
declaratoryre
liefcauses
ofactiondid
not
accruew
henshe
signedthe
ConservatorLease
in1996;
indeed,G
insberg’sperpetuallease
theory
didnoteven
surfaceuntilafter
shefiled
thisaction.
Ginsberg
evidentlycontends
thatGam
sonknew
orshouldhave
known
when
executingthe
Conservator
Leasein
1996thatG
insbergw
ould
disputethe
meaning
ofits
renewallanguage
tenyears
later.(See
RB
IXA
OB
67[arguing
thatGam
son’sdeclaratory
judgmentclaim
sconcern
the“actualw
ordsofthe
Renew
alClause,”
ratherthanG
insberg’sbreach
of
theC
onservatorLease].)A
ccordingto
Ginsberg,the
limitations
period
thereforebegan
torun
in1996—
not2006,when
shebreached
the
ConservatorLease
byholding
over.(R
B/X
AO
B64-67.)
Buta
contractclaimaccrues
uponthe
breach—notexecution—
ofthe
contract.A
nyotherrule
would
beunw
orkable:
[It]w
ouldrequire
thefilin
gofa
declaratoryreliefaction
whenever term
sofa
contractrevealedthe
slightesthintof
disagreement.
After
signingany
contract,partiesw
ouldhave
18
toconjure
upevery
imaginable
hypotheticalgroundfor
fliture
disagreementand
thendecide
whetherto
sueim
mediately
or
torisk
losingtheftrights
ifan
actualdisagreementerupts
more
thanfouryears
later.There
isno
reasonto
encourage,
much
lessrequire,
thatsortofprem
aturelitigation.
(Garver
v.Brace
(1996)47
Cai.A
pp.4th995,
1000-1001(G
an’er)
[declaratoryreliefclaim
regardingprom
issorynote’s
pre-paymentpenalty
accruedw
henpenalty
imposed,notupon
executionofnote];N
ilesv.Louis
H.
Rapoport&
Sons,Inc.(1942)
53C
al.App.2d
644,651
[“The
statuteof
limitations
doesnotbegin
torun
fromthe
time
ofm
akinga
contract,but
comm
encesfrom
thetim
ethe
causeofaction
accrues.(C
itations.)
Thestatute
comm
encesas
ofthe
dateofbreach
ofthe
obligation”].)Thatis
why
aclaim
forbreach
ofan
optionagreem
entaccruesonly
when
the
optionis
ultimately
exercised—notw
henthe
optionis
agreedto.
(See
New
bergerv.R~7kind
(1972)28
Cal.A
pp.3d1070,
1077[stock
option];
Dinkeispielv.N
ason(1911)17
Cal.A
pp.591,
600[claim
forbroker’s
comm
issionaccrued
when
purchaseoption
exercised].)
Garver’s
concernsare
particularlyapthere.
Ginsberg
didnoturge
thetheory
thattheC
onservatorLeaseconfers
unlimited
renewals
untilafter
filing
thislaw
suit.B
eforethen,her
conductshowed
thatshebelieved
that
theC
onservatorLease
conferredno
more
thanfive
renewals.
(SeeC
ityof
Hope
Nat.M
edicalCenterv.
Genentech,
Inc.(2008)
43C
al.4th375,393
[“Aparty’s
conductoccurringbetw
eenexecution
ofthe
contractand
adispute
aboutthem
eaningofthe
contract’sterm
sm
ayrevealw
hatthe
partiesunderstood
andintended
thoseterm
sto
mean”).)
19
•In
Ap
ril1997,
almosta
yearafterexecuting
theC
onservatorLease
andlong
beforea
disputeoverits
renewallanguage
arose,Ginsberg
proposedrevised
terms
toadd
atenantand
to“lim
it{]ourlease
tofour
five
yearoptions.”
(1S
AA
955,¶10
[Ginsberg
declarationin
oppositionto
Gam
son’ssum
mary
judgmentm
otion,cited
atRB
/XA
OB
62;see
1R
A
140,¶10];
1S
AA
957;1
SA
A966,¶
1[exhibits
todeclaration].)
Thereis
noreasonable
scenariounderw
hichG
insbergw
ouldhave
preemptively
askedG
amson
tosw
apa
leasew
ithperpetualrenew
alsfor
onew
ithonly
20years’
worth
ofrenew
als—herrequestw
ouldonly
make
senseif
she
believedthatthe
Conservator
Leasealready
conferredsom
ethingless
than
perpetualrenewaloptions.
After
all,Ginsberg
herselfarguesthatshe
wouldn’thave
tradeda
leasew
ithfive
renewaloptions
forone
with
asingle
option.(R
BIX
AO
B40.)
•In
Novem
ber2004,G
insbergagain
comm
unicatedherbeliefthat
theC
onservatorLeasew
asnotperpetual,this
time
writing
toG
amson:
“Iam
officiallygiving
younotice
thatIam
exercisingm
ynextoption
(2ndof5)
toextend
my
leasefor
thenext5
years,when
thecurrentoption
expires.”(4
AA
854-855.)
•N
eitherG
insberg’scom
plaintnorherfirstamended
complaint
allegedthatthe
ConservatorLease
conferredperpetualoptions.
(1A
A
4-17,¶~J12,
18,49;1
AA
46-58,¶~J12,
16,19,41.)
Ginsberg
neverexplainshow
Gam
soncould
haveanticipated
acontractdispute
in1996
ona
theorythatG
insbergherselfdidn’tthink
up
untiltenyears
later.(See
Garver,supra,47
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
1000-1001.)
20
3.G
amson’s
declaratoryre
liefclaim
sare
timely
using
anyfeasible
accrualdate:A
pril2006,
Novem
ber2004,or
Decem
ber2003.
February1,2006—
thedate
thatGinsberg
comm
encedher
action—is
theoperative
filing
dateofG
ainson’scross-com
plaint.(See
RB
/XA
OB
65;
LibertyM
utualInsuranceCo.
v.Fales(1973)8
Cal.3d
712,715,
fit4.)
Accordingly,G
amson’s
cross-actionw
astim
elyundereither
anypossible
statuteoflim
itations—three
yearsor
fouryears—ifhercauses
ofaction
accruedafterFebruary
1,2003.A
sw
enow
demonstrate,they
did.
a.G
amson’s
declaratoryre
liefclaim
saccrued
inA
pril2006,w
henG
amson
firstbecame
entitledto
evictGinsberg.
Likeany
breachofcontractclaim
,thefour-yearlim
itationsperiod
on
Gam
son’sdeclaratory
judgmentclaim
sbegan
torun
when
thoseclaim
s
accrued.(See
Code
Civ.
Proc.,§
312[“C
ivilactions,withoutexception,
canonly
becom
menced
within
theperiods
prescribedin
thistitle,
afterthe
causeofaction
shallhaveaccrued”];M
aguire,supra,23C
al.2datp.
733-
734.)A
declaratoryre
liefclaim
foundedon
acontractdispute
accruesfor
limitations
purposesw
henthe
contractisbreached.
(United
Faq/Ic-
Reliance
InsuranceCo.
v.DiD
omenico
(1985)173
Cal.A
pp.3d673,
677;
Gat-ver,supra,47
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
1000-1001.)A
dditionally,
adeclaratory
judgmentaction
seekinga
“determination
ofany
questionof
constructionorvalidity
arisingunderthe
instrumentor
contract”is
viable
evenbefore
abreach.
(Code
Civ.
Proc.,§1060;M
aguire,supra,23C
al.2d
atp.734.)
21
Under
Gam
son’sinterpretation
ofthe
ConservatorLease,
Ginsberg
breachedthe
leasein
Ap
ril2006,w
henG
insberg’ssingle
five-yearrenewal
periodexpired
andG
insbergrefused
tovacate.
Atthatpoint,
Gam
sonw
as
entitledto
evictherasa
holdovertenant.(See
Code
Civ.
Proc.,§1161,
subd.I
[unlawfuldetainer];R
ylandv.A
ppelbaum(1924)
70C
aLApp.
268,
270.)Thus,
Ginsberg’s
April2006
breachofthe
ConservatorLease
started
theclock
onthe
four-yearlimitations
period,and
Gam
son’scross-action
was
timely.
b.A
tm
ost,events
beforeA
pril2006
amounted
toanticipatory
repudiationsthatdid
not
triggerany
statuteoflim
itations—and,
inany
event,theyoccurred
with
inthe
limitations
period.
Ginsberg
arguablyrepudiated
theC
onservatorLease’srenew
al
provisionon
Novem
ber11,2004—
when
shepurportedly
exercisedthe
“2ndof5”
five-yearrenewaloptions
andsaid
thatshew
ouldnotvacate
the
premises
when
theC
onservatorLease
expiredin
April2006.
(4A
A
854-855.)N
ovember
2004w
astherefore
theearliestthatG
amson
could
havestated
aviable
anticipatorybreach
claim—
meaning
that
Novem
ber2004is
thevery
earliestthatthoseclaim
scould
haveaccrued
for
limitations
purposes.(See
Cavalliv.M
acaire(1958)
159C
al.App.2d
714,
718;Fitzgerald
v.Frovines(1951)
102C
al.App.2d
529,539.)
Butjustbecause
Gam
soncould
havesued
Ginsberg
foranticipatory
breachin
Novem
ber2004does
notmean
thatshehad
tosue
then.G
amson
hadthe
optionofeithersuing
imm
ediatelyor
waiting
untilGinsberg
refused
22
tovacate
when
theC
onservatorLease
expiredin
April2006.
(SeeR
otnano
v.Rockw
ellIntern.,Inc.
(1996)14
Cal.4th
479,488-489.)
Inany
event,even
ifG
insberg’sN
ovember2004
conducttriggered
thelim
itationsperiod,
Gam
son’scross-action
was
timely
filed15
months
lateron
February1,2006.
Ginsberg
suggestsa
thirdalternative
accrualdate:D
ecember2003,
when
Gam
sonfirsthad
noticethatthere
mighthave
beensom
ething
“wrong”
with
theC
onservatorLease.
(RB
/XA
OB
65&
67,citing
4R
T458-459.)
Even
assuming
thatGam
sonw
asvaguely
aware
of
aproblem
with
theC
onservatorLeaseas
ofDecem
ber2003,hercontract
claims
nonethelessdid
notaccrueatthattim
e.
First,a
contractclaimaccrues
forstatute
oflim
itationspurposes
uponbreach—
beforethen,p
lain
tiffhassustained
noinjury
andtherefore
hasno
causeofaction.
(McC
askeyv.
CaL
StateA
utomobile
Assn.(2010)
189C
al.App.4th
947,957-962;
Cleveland
v.InternetSpecialties
West,Inc.
(2009)171
Cal.A
pp.4th24,
31-32(C
leveland).)G
amson’s
declaratory
judgmentclaim
stherefore
didnotaccrue
untilApril2006.
(Seepp.
18-20,
ante.)
Second,thisC
ourthasexpressly
rejectedan
interpretationofthe
discoveryrule
thatwould
acceleratethe
runningofthe
limitations
period:
The“discovery
rulem
ayextend
thestatute
oflim
itations,butitcannot
decreaseit,
anda
statuteoflim
itationsdoes
notaccrueuntila
causeof
actionis
‘complete
with
allofits
elements,’including
injury.[C
itation.]”
(Cleveland,supra,
171C
al.App.4th
atp.32.)
23
Finally,even
ifthelim
itationsperiod
didbegin
torun
in
Decem
ber2003,G
amson’s
cross-actionw
asstilltim
elyfiled
just26m
onths
later,on
February1,2006.
Ginsberg’s
theoriesthatG
amson’s
contractclaims
aregoverned
by
athree-yearlim
itationsperiod
andthatthose
claims
accruedin
1996are
untenable.G
amson’s
cross-actionis
notbanedby
anystatute
of
limitations.
H.
IFT
HE
CO
UR
TD
OE
SN
OT
OR
DE
RJU
DG
ME
NT
IN
GA
MS
ON
’SF
AV
OR
,ITS
HO
ULD
RE
MA
ND
FO
RA
TR
IAL
LIM
ITE
DT
OT
HE
INT
ER
PR
ET
AT
ION
OF
TH
ER
EN
EW
AL
LAN
GU
AG
EA
ND
RE
LAT
ED
MA
TT
ER
S.
A.
There
IsN
oB
asisF
orG
insberg’sR
equestFor
AN
ew
Tria
lOn
Com
pensatoryD
amages.
IftheC
ourtremands
forreconsiderationofthe
renewallanguage,
thenthe
trialshouldbe
limited
tothatsingle
issue.G
insbergis
notentitled
toa
newtrialon
compensatory
damages.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B68;
Code
Civ.
Proc.,§43
[reviewing
court“may
affirm,reverse,
ormodif~’anyjudgm
ent
ororderappealed
from,
andm
aydirectthe
properjudgmentor
ordertobe
entered,ordirecta
newtrialor
furtherproceedingsto
behad”].)
Ginsberg
doesnotclaim
anyenor
inthe
trialofhercom
pensatory
damages
claims,nor
couldshe
crediblydo
so.She
gotthebestpossible
trialonthatsubject,w
ithno
restrictionson
evidenceaboutthe
sourceor
amounto
fherclaimed
damages.
And
becauseofthe
trialcourt’s
misinterpretation
ofthe
ConservatorLease,she
couldeven
seekreliefon
24
thebasis
ofG
amson’s
effortsto
gethertosign
anew
lease.(See,e.g.,
3R
T246-269,
340-342[G
insbergtestified
thatlucrativesublease
was
delayedbecause
Gam
soninsisted
thatGinsberg
firstagreeto
anew
lease
with
lessadvantageous
terms,including
norenew
aloptions];3
RT
319-321
[Ginsberg
testifiedthatG
amson
refusedto
remove
a“for
lease”sign
from
thebuilding
unlessG
insbergsigned
anew
lease];3R
T345-346
[Ginsberg
testifiedthatG
amson
refusedto
allowG
insbergto
repairherinteriorfloor
unlessshe
signeda
newlease];4
RT
454-464[G
amson
cross-examined
abouthereffortsto
enterintonew
leasew
ithG
insberg).)B
estofallfor
Ginsberg,
onthis
issueG
amson
was
defenseless,becausethe
trialcourt
barredherfrom
explainingw
hyshe
wanted
Ginsberg
tosign
anew
lease—thatis,G
amson
couldnotadduce
evidenceofhergood-faith
belief
thattheC
onservatorLeasew
ouldexpire
inA
pril2006.(See,e.g.,5
RT
743-745[sustaining
objectionsto
Gainson
testimony];
5R
T787-788
[sustainingobjections
totestim
onyofG
amson’s
realestatelaw
yerSaul
Jaffe];see
also5
RT
737[G
amson’s
triallawyer
explainingthe
relevanceof
suchtestim
ony];4R
T454-457
[strikingG
amson’s
cross-examination
testimony
aboutConservatorLease
terms].)
Ineffect,
Ginsberg
seeksa
reversaldespitethe
absenceoferror—
anim
permissible
result.(See
Mancuso
v.Southern
CaL
Edison
Co.(1991)
232C
al.App.3d
88,106
[remanding
forlim
itedretrialon
defendant’s
liability,butnottheam
ountofdam
agesaw
ardedin
firsttrial];accord,
Soils
v.O
ij,fIeldsTrucking
Co.(1979)
90C
al.App.3d
349,355;
Gilm
orev.
Casw
ell(1924)65
Cal.A
pp.299,305-306.)
Ginsberg’s
improper
requestfora
retrialoncom
pensatorydam
ages,
however,
doesnotaffecthow
theC
ourtshouldrule
onG
amson’s
appeal.
25
Thatis,ifthe
Courtconcludes
thattheC
onservatorLease’s
renewal
languageis
ambiguous,
butchoosesnotto
enterjudgmentin
Gam
son’s
favor,thenthe
Courtm
ustremand
fora
newtrialon
them
eaningofthe
ambiguous
renewalcause.
Anew
trial—entailing
thethaicourt’s
considerationofextrinsic
evidenceregarding
theparties’intent—
would
be
necessarybecause
theC
onservatorLeaseis
faciallyam
biguousforthe
reasonsdetailed
inthe
openingbrief.
B.
TheT
rialC
ourt,NotT
hisC
ourt,S
houldC
onsider
Ginsberg’s
New
And
Disputed
Extrinsic
Evidence
Argum
entsIn
TheF
irstInstance.
TheC
ourtshouldalso
rejectGinsberg’s
requestthattheC
ourtrely
onhernew
,unsupportedfactualargum
entsto
upholdthe
trialcourt’s
misinterpretation
oftheC
onservatorLease.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B52-53,
59-
60.)6
Ginsberg’s
unsupportedfactu
alrepresentations
andspeculative
theories.G
insbergasserts
thatGam
sonhas
30years
ofexperiencein
negotiatingleases
andthat,during
those30
years,(1)
sheonce
proposed
alease
thatdidnotm
odif5rthepreprinted
form’s
renewalterm
s
(aD
ecember2003
proposedlease
thatwas
notsignedby
theparties),
and
(2)she
oncesigned
alease
thatmodified
preprintedterm
s(the
1996
Conservator
Lease).(R
B/X
AO
B52-53;
seealso
RB
/XA
OB
9.)G
insberg
alsorepresents
that“she[m
eaningG
amson]
crossedoutthe
preprintedform
6Because
theC
ourtdeniedG
insberg’sm
otionto
takeevidence
onappeal,
we
donotaddress,and
theC
ourtshoulddisregard,
Ginsberg’s
arguments
thatarebased
onlease
documents
purportedlybetw
eenG
amson
andthird
parties.(R
B/X
AO
B46,48,50-52.)
26
Option
toE
xtendclause
andagreed
tothe
Renew
alClause
inthe
[Conservator]
Lease’sA
ddendum.”
(RB
/XA
OB
52,italicsadded.)
Relying
onthese
“facts,”G
insbergconcludes
(1)thatG
amson
was
aware
thatpartiescan
electwhetherto
modifS’preprinted
leaserenew
al
clauses,and(2)
thatGam
son“understands
thesignificance
ofusing
differentrenewallanguage
indifferentleases.”
(Thid.)The
recorddoes
not
bearoutany
ofG
insberg’sfactualrepresentations
orspeculative
conclusions,and
becausethese
issuesw
erenevertried,
sheis
entitledto
no
favorableappellate
presumptions.
Moreover,
evenifher“facts”
were
true
(they’renot),they
stillwouldn’t
addup
tothe
requisite“intent”
tocreate
aperpetuallease.
Gam
sonadm
ittedlyfilled
inthe
blanksin
theproposed
Decem
ber2003preprinted
leasew
ithher
own
hand.(4
RT
459;2R
A320-
329[exhibit60].)
Butshe
testifiedthatshe
couldnotrecallits
terms
and
that“[w]hateverM
r.S
knolick[herlaw
yerin
2003]putinthere
isw
hathe
putinthere.”
(4R
T460.)
Ginsberg
doesnotcite
thistestim
ony—even
thoughitrebuts
hertheorythatG
amson
understandsthe
“significanceof
usingdifferentrenew
allanguagein
differentleases.”(R
B/X
AO
B52.)
Ginsberg
tellsthe
CourtthatG
amson
“crossedout”
the
ConservatorLease’s
preprintedrenew
allanguage.(Thid.)
Butthere
isno
evidencethatG
anison“crossed
out”anything
onthe
Conservator
Lease—and
Ginsberg
citesnone.
Instead,G
insbergdirects
theC
ourttothe
ConservatorLease
itsegw
hichdoes
notindicatehow
orwhy
orw
henthe
renewallanguage
was
modified.
(Thid.,citing
2B
A294,301.)
Ginsberg’s
representationthatG
amson
“crossedout”
thepreprinted
renewalclause
is
furtherundercutbyherow
nrespondent’s
btief,which
relieson
the
27
allegationin
Gam
son’sfirstam
endedcross-com
plaintthatGam
sondid
not
evenread
theC
onservatorLeasebefore
signingit.
(P.BIXAOB
65,citing
1R
A5:27-6:1,
6:14-6:15.)M
oreover,theonly
relevantrecordevidence
is
Gam
son’stestim
onythatG
insbergasked
hertosign
theC
onservatorLease
tosupersede
theR
ubinfeldLease.
(5R
T735:4-9,
735:27-736:2.)
Ginsberg
raisesthese
theoriesfor
thefirsttim
eon
appeal.
Ginsberg
doesnotdem
onstiatethatshe
raisedthese
arguments
inthe
trial
court.(See
RB
/XA
OB
52-53,59-60.)
Therefore,even
ifG
insberghad
admissible
evidenceto
backup
herspeculative
assertions(she
doesn’t),itis
thetrialcourt—
notthisC
ourt—thatm
ustconsiderherevidentiary
arguments
inthe
firstinstance.(See
Walsh
v.W
alsh(1941)
18C
al.2d439,
443,quotingB
arlowv.
Frink(1915)
171C
al.165,
173.)
Ginsberg
misstates
thesign~cance
ofherN
ovember
11,2004
letter.Ifextrinsic
evidenceis
relevanttothese
proceedings,then,contrary
toG
insberg’srepresentations,
herNovem
ber11,2004
lettertoG
amson
is
dispositivein
Gam
son’sfavor.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B59-60;4
AA
854-855.)
Inthatletter,G
insbergw
rote:“I
amofficially
givingyou
noticethat
Iam
exercisingm
ynextoption
(2ndof5)
toextend
my
leaseforthe
next
5years,w
henthe
currentoptionexpires.”
(4A
A854-855.)
Thisletterw
as
consistentwith
Ginsberg’s
April
1997proposalthatG
amson
signa
new
leaseto
replacethe
Conservator
Lease—she
proposeda
limited
number
of
renewaloptions,
something
sheneverw
ouldhave
offeredifshe
alreadyhad
aperpetuallease.
(1S
AA
955,¶10;
1S
AA
957;1
SA
A966,¶
1.)
Accordingly,if
Ginsberg’s
Novem
ber2004letteris
toplay
anyrole
inthis
appeal,itm
ustbeto
negateherperpetuallease
claim.
Thatis
28
becauseitis
a“cardinalrule
ofconstruction
thatwhen
acontractis
ambiguous
oruncertainthe
practicalconstructionplaced
uponitby
the
partiesbefore
anycontroversy
arisesas
toits
meaning
affordsone
ofthe
mostreliable
means
ofdeterm
iningthe
intentofthe
parties.”(S
terlingv.
Taylor(2007)
40C
al.4th757,772-773,internalquotation
marks
omitted.)
Ginsberg
arguesthatthis
interpretationofthe
Conservator
Lease—herow
ninterpretation—
isirrelevantbecause
byN
ovember
11,
2004,the“controversy”
between
theparties
hadalready
arisen.
(RB
/XA
OB
60-61.)B
utaccordingto
herbrie
tatthattim
e,the
parties’
comm
unicationsprim
arily(ifnotexclusively)
concernedG
insberg’srent
andrequestto
sublet—notrenew
aloptions.(ibid.)
And
evenifthe
parties
haddiscussed
theC
onservatorLease’srenew
allanguagebefore
Novem
ber11,2004,
Ginsberg
hadn’tyetcontendedthatshe
was
entitledto
aperpetuallease—
shedidn’tadoptthatargum
entuntilsometim
eafter
filingher
amended
complaintin
August2006.
(Seep.
20,ante.)Perhaps
mostim
portantly,ifG
insbergw
ereright,
andshe
assertedthis
interpretation
aftertheparties
were
alreadylocked
ina
disputeaboutthe
meaning
ofthe
renewallanguage,then
herinterpretationw
ouldbe
entitledto
more—
not
less—w
eight.In
them
idstofthatdispute,
Ginsberg
would
havebeen
highlym
otivatedto
interpretthecontested
languagein
thelightm
ost
favorableto
herposition,butthem
ostfavorableinterpretation
shecam
eup
with
was
thattheC
onservatorLease
conferreda
baseterm
plusfive
five-
yearoptions.
Finally,
Ginsberg’s
after-the-factspinon
herNovem
ber11,2004
repudiationofthe
Conservator
Leaselacks
evidentiarysupportand
defies
comm
onsense.
Shetells
theC
ourtthatthe“letter,
atbest,statesonly
29
Ginsberg’s
intentasofN
ovember
11,2004to
exerciseher
‘2nd’option
and
thatsheintends
asofN
ovember
11,2004to
exercise‘5’
options.”
(RB
/XA
OB
59-60,citing
theletterat2
RA
360-361.)In
otherwords,
in
Novem
ber2004,G
insberggratuitously
choseto
signalthatshew
ouldforgo
heralleged
righttoa
perpetualleasein
favorofone
with
onlythree
five-
yearrenewals
remaining
(bythen,
Ginsberg
hadalready
exercisedtw
oof
herpurportedfive
options).N
oreasonable
jury
would
acceptsuch
anotion—
”’[t]hetrier
ofthe
factsm
aynotbelieve
impossibilities.”
(Gaffney
v.Dow
neySavings
&Loan
Assn.(1988)
200C
al.App.3d
1154,
1168.)
III.
TH
EP
ER
MA
NE
NT
INJU
NC
TIO
NF
AILS
AS
AM
AT
TE
RO
FLA
W.
Insteadofresponding
toG
amson’s
challengesto
theinjunction,
Ginsberg
mounts
adefense
toa
substantialevidenceargum
entthatGam
son
hasn’tmade.
(Com
pareA
OB
50-53w
ithR
B/X
AO
B69-74.)
Mostnotably,
Ginsberg
doesnotdefend
theim
practicablityofjudicialsupervision
over
day-to-daym
aintenancerequests
forthenext80-plus
years,nordoesshe
addressthe
trialcourt’serrorin
imposing
obligationson
Gam
sonbeyond
thosein
theC
onservatorLeaseand
evenbeyond
thoseG
insbergrequested.
(AO
B52-53.)~
‘~Gam
sondoes
notchallengethe
injunction’sterm
sforproviding
Ginsberg
with
keysand
accessto
telephoneconnections.
(Com
pareA
OB
50w
ithR
BIX
AO
B72-74.)
30
A.
TheT
rialC
ourtAbused
ItsD
iscretionB
yIssuing
An
Inju
nctio
nT
hatIsN
otPracticable
Because
ItR
equires
80-Plus
Years
OfC
ourtS
upervision.
Thefinaljudgm
entdecreesthatforthe
next80-plusyears,“G
amson
isordered
tom
akerepairs
tothe
Building
within
48hours
ofnoticeofthe
needfor
repairsfrom
Ginsberg;
andifrepairs
arenotm
adeby
Gam
son
within
48hours,then
Gam
sonis
toim
mediately
provideaccess
tothe
Building
toG
insbergfor
Ginsberg
toundertake
andcom
pletesuch
repairs”
(2A
A495).
Thisjudgm
entthreatensto
condemn
generationsofjudicialofficers
tobeing
calledon
tospring
intoaction
wheneverG
insberg(orher
successor)com
plainsthatG
amson
(orhersuccessor)hasn’tm
aintainedthe
buildingup
toG
insberg’sexacting
standards.Thatis
nottheproperrole
of
thecourts.
Ginsberg
apparentlyagrees:
Inthe
respondent’sb
riet
sherelies
onrhetoricalflourishes
ratherthanany
attemptto
arguethatthe
injunction
ispracticable.
(RB
/XA
OB
70.)
B.
The
Tria
lCourtA
busedIts
Discretion
By
Issuing
An
Inju
nctio
nT
hatGives
Ginsberg
More
Rights
Than
SheH
asU
nderThe
Conservator
Lease.
Even
ifthe
injunctionhadn’trequired
80-plusyears
ofjudicial
supervision,thetrialcourtnonetheless
abusedits
discretionby
awarding
Ginsberg
more
rightsthan
theC
onservatorLease
givesher
andeven
more
rightsthan
Ginsberg
herselfproposed.8
8G
amson
raisedthese
arguments
inthe
trialcourt.(See
2S
AA
1181-
1184,1190-1191;
seealso
7R
T1055:10-12.)
31
The48-hour
repair-or-accessinjunction.
Ginsberg
requested
anorder
compelling
Gam
son—in
perpetuity—to
provideG
insberg“access”
toareas
inthe
buildingthatG
insbergunilaterally
believesrequire
repairsso
thatGinsberg
canm
akethe
repairsherself.
(2A
A401,¶
1;2A
A402;
2A
A406,¶~j4-5;
7R
T1046:19-24.)
During
theinjunction
hearing,
Ginsberg
seemed
tonarrow
herrequesttoan
injunctionthatw
ouldcover
onlyaccess
requiredto
repairtheholes
inherceiling
anda
pipeabove
her
store.(7
RT
1046-1049.)G
insberg’sbriefing
didnotspecify
aw
indowof
time
forG
amson
toprovide
such“access.”
(Seegenerally
2A
A400-410.)
Butduring
thehearing,
sheproposed
aseven-day
window
,telling
thecourt:
“And
Iam
happyto
conditioniton,you
know,
sevendays’notice
or
something
likethat.”
(7R
T1049:22-23.)
Gam
soncountered,am
ongother
things,that“[w]hatthis
pla
intiffis
askingyou
todo,Y
ourH
onor,isto
rewrite
theLease.”
(7R
T1055:10-12.)
Atthe
endofthe
hearing,thetrialcourtgranted
therepair-or-access
injunction:“I
willgive
thema
chance,aslong
as,youknow
,they
saythat
youtellthem
whatis
under,whatthe
repairsare,ifthe
waterstarts
toleak
andthey
don’tcom
ein
thereand
fixthe
waterw
iththatpipe
upthere
that’s
exposedthatI
knoww
hatwe
aretalking
about,ifthey
don’tfixthatand
it
startsto
leak,thenyou
can,youknow
,go
inthere
andfix
it.”(7
RT
1059-
1060.)The
orderdid
notaccountfortheC
onservatorLease’slim
itationson
Gam
son’srepair
obligations.(See
pp.40-41,post.)
Inaddition,
although
thetrialcourtin
itially
consideredgiving
Gam
sona
15-dayw
indowto
repair
anyleaks,and
althoughG
insberghad
askedfor
aseven-day
window
,it
suasponte
chosea
48-hourwindow
andrefused
tohear
argumentfrom
Gam
son.(7
RT
1049,1059-1061.)
32
Thetria
lcourtimproperly
rewrote
theC
onservatorLease.
Acontract-based
injunctioncannotconferrights
thatexceedthose
granted
bythe
contract.(See,e.g.,
Gordon
v.Landau(1958)
49C
al.2d690,
695
[reversingperm
anentinjunctionbecause
nobasis
toenforce
non-
solicitationclause
beyondthe
oneyearprovided
bycontract];E
llisv.
Radem
acher(1899)
125C
al.556,
559[reversing
permanentinjunction
in
partbecausetrialcourtordered
appellanttoperform
contractualterms
regardilessofw
hetherrespondentalsoperform
ed:The
permanent
injunctiondecree
“makes
ittheduty
ofthe
appellantabsolutelyto
perform
thecontractw
ithoutanyreference
tothe
paymentofthe
considerationby
therespondentE
llisby
performing
thecovenants
ofsaid
contractonhis
part
tobe
performed”].)
Butthe
48-hourrepair-or-accessorderdoes
justthat.The
trialcourt
effectively—and
improperly—
rewrote
theC
onservatorLease.U
nderCode
ofC
ivilProceduresection
1858,atrialcourt’s
jobis
“simply
toascertain
anddeclare
whatis
interm
sorin
substancecontained
therein,nottoinsert
whathas
beenom
itted,ortoom
itwhathas
beeninserted.”
Inthe
landlord-
tenantcontext,thistranslates
tothe
“long-establishednile
thatnocourthas
authorityto
make
acontractforthe
parties,ortow
riteinto
alease
material
terms
which,
asin
thepresentcase,w
ouldgreatly
broadena
lessee’s
rights.”(Textile
v.C
oleman
(1954)122
Cal.A
pp.2d756,760.)
As
ourSuprem
eC
ourthasexplained,
“[c]learly,neitherthetrial
courtnorthis
courtisem
powered
tom
akeforthe
partiesa
contractual
arrangementw
hichthey
didnotsee
fitto
make
themselves.”
(Apra
v.
Aureguy
(1961)55
Cal.2d
827,830.)
Therefore,a
trialcourtcannotorder
specificperform
anceofterm
snotcontained
inthe
agreement.
(Moss
v.
33
MinorP
roperties,Inc.
(1968)262
Cal.A
pp.2d847,
854.)S
imilarly,
atrial
courtcannotissuedeclaratory
reliefthatincludesterm
snotcontained
inthe
contract.(E
llisonv.
City
ofSan
Buenaventura
(1975)48
Cal.A
pp.3d952,
960-962.)
Thesam
eis
truehere:
Thetrialcourtim
properlyrew
rotethe
ConservatorLease’s
repairobligations
byordering
Gam
sonto
maintain
her
own
buildingto
satisfS’Ginsberg’s
unilateralspecifications.(See
Textilev.
Colem
an,supra,122
Cal.A
pp.2datp.
760;compare
2A
A492-496
[judgment]
with
4A
A816-817,¶~J9(a),9(b),
11(e)[C
onservatorLease].)
Thetrialcourt’s
erroroflaw
constitutesan
abuseofdiscretion.
(City
of
Sacram
entov.D
rew(1989)
207C
al.App.3d
1287,1297
[“Action
that
transgressesthe
confmes
ofthe
applicableprinciples
oflaw
isoutside
the
scopeofdiscretion
andw
ecallsuch
actionan
‘abuse’ofdiscretion”].)
Theinjunction
isoverbroad
inanotherrespect:
Itexceeds
theterm
s
thatGinsberg
requestedatthe
hearing,when
shelim
itedher
accessrequest
tothe
ceilingholes
andleaks
andalso
expresslyasked
fora
seven-day
window
forsuch
access.(See
p.32,ante.)
Accordingly,
thisC
ourtshouldreverse
the48-hourrepair-or-access
injunctionas
anabuse
ofdiscretion.
34
Iv.
IFG
AM
SO
NP
RE
VA
ILSO
NT
HE
INT
ER
PR
ET
AT
ION
OF
TH
ELE
AS
E’S
RE
NE
WA
LLA
NG
UA
GE
,TH
EN
HE
R
SE
CT
ION
998O
FF
ER
MU
ST
BE
RE
CO
NS
IDE
RE
D.
A.
Overview
.
Gam
sonoffered
toseffle
beforetrialunderC
odeofC
ivilProcedure
section998
(section998).
(2A
A507-510.)
Gam
son’ssection
998offer
providedthat(1)
Gam
sonw
ouldpay
Ginsberg
$135,000and
dismiss
the
cross-actionif
(2)G
insbergdism
issedherlaw
suitandG
insbergand
Eden
agreed—as
co-tenants—thatthe
ConservatorLease
would
expireon
April
14,2011.(2
AA
508-509.)~G
insbergand
Edenrejected
theofferby
failingto
respond.(2
AA
505,¶2.)
IftheC
ourtagreesthatthe
ConservatorLease
isnotperpetual,then
Gam
sonw
illhaveachieved
the
exact resultsheproposed
inher
section998
offerregardingthe
interpretationofthe
renewallanguage.
Accordingly,ifthe
section998
offerwas
valid,then
thetrialcourtw
illhaveto
reassessw
hethershe
can
recovercosts.
Gam
sondid
notaddressthe
validityofhersection
998offer
inthe
openingbriefbecause
theonly
issueon
appealisw
hetherthetrialcourt
shouldreconsiderthe
award
ofcosts
inthe
eventofreversal.
(AO
B49-50.)
Ginsberg
doesnotaddress
thisissue
inherrespondent’s
brief.She
instead
arguesthatG
amson’s
offerwas
invalidbecause
itwas
conditionedon
acceptanceby
bothG
insbergand
herhusbandand
co-tenantEden.
~G
insbergis
theonly
pla
intiffsuing
Gam
son(E
denis
adefendantin
Gam
son’scross-action).
Therefore,thefinancialcom
ponentofG
amson’s
offerwas
necessarilydirected
toG
insbergalone.
(See2
AA
508-509.)
35
(P.BIXAOB
67-68.)G
amson
properlyresponds
toG
insberg’snew
argument here.
(SeeH
tayH
tayC
hinv.A
dvancedFresh
Concepts
FranchiseC
orp.(2011)194
Cal.A
pp.4th704,711,
flu.2;Fratessav.Roffi~’
(1919)40
Cal.A
pp.179,
188.)
TheC
ourtindependentlyreview
sthe
validityofG
amson’s
offer.
(Fo-JenC
henv.Interinsurance
Exchange
ofthe
Autom
obileC
lub(2008)
164C
al.App.4th
117,122.)
B.
AS
ection998
Offer
May
Properly
IncludeM
ultip
le
Conditions.
Ginsberg
arguesthatthe
trialcourt“properlydeterm
inedthatthe
offeris
invalid”and
intimates
thatthecourtstruck
Gam
son’sofferbecause,
asG
insbergargues
onappeal,
itwas
anim
permissible
join
toffer.
(RB
/XA
OB
67-68.)B
utthatwas
notthebasis
ofthe
trialcourt’sruling.
Instead,thetrialcourtstruck
Ganson’s
section998
offeron
adifferent—
butequallyerroneous—
ground:The
trialcourtincorrectlyconcluded
that
theoffer
was
invalidbecause
“itw
asalso
conditionalona
number
ofthings
andthatthe
conditionis
thatanew
lease,etcetera,andthatdoesn’tm
akeit,
a998
offer,when
youputin
abunch
ofconditions.
[~j]So
thereforethe
998is
notvalidatall.
[~j]So
itdoesn’teven
applyin
thiscase.”
(7R
T
1074:10-16;accord,
7R
T1078:20-22
[“That’s
notavalid
998unless
you
acceptalloffers.Y
oucan’tbreak
the$135,000
outbyitse
lf’].)
Thetrialcourtw
asw
rong:W
ehave
foundno
authorityholding
that
asection
998offer
may
includeonly
afinancialpayoutin
exchangefor
dismissal.
Tothe
contrary,asection
998offer
isvalid
solong
asits
terms
aresufficiently
“clearand
specific”to
allowplaintiffs
to“clearly
evaluate
36
thew
orthofthe
extendedoffer.”
(Berg
v.Darden
(2004)120
Cal.A
pp.4th
721,727.)
Moreover,
asection
998offerm
ayinclude
nonmonetary
terms.
(See,e.g.,A
riasv.K
atellaTow
nhouseH
omeow
nersAssn.,
Inc.(2005)
127C
al.App.4th
847,855.)
Ginsberg
neverargued—eitherin
thetrialcourt
oron
appeal—thatG
amson’s
offerwas
fatallyuncertain.
(See4
AA
766-
773;7
RT
1074-1081;RB
IXA
OB
67-68.)
Accordingly,the
trialcourterredby
concludingthatG
amson’s
section998
offerwas
invalidon
thisground.
C.
Gam
sonW
asN
otRequired
To
Tender
Separate
Section
998O
ffersTo
Ginsberg
And
Eden.
1.G
amson’s
join
toffer
was
properbecause
Ginsberg
andE
denare
co-tenants.
Contrary
toG
insberg’sargum
ent(RB
/XA
OB
67-68),there
isno
blanketprohibitionon
offerscontingenton
multiple
parties’acceptance.
Jointoffersare
improperonly
where
theyw
ouldfrustrate
theodds
of
settlement.
Thatcanoccurw
hen“an
offerw
hichprovides
itmustbe
acceptedby
allplaintiffsis
fundamentally
unfairtothe
pla
intiffw
ho
believesthe
offerisreasonable
asto
herandw
antsto
acceptit.Such
aconditionaloffer
frustratesthe
chancesofsettlem
ent,which
isthe
whole
purposebehind
section998.”
(Vick
v.DaC
orsi(2003)110
Cal.A
pp.4th
206,211(V
ick).)B
utcourtsrecognize
that“where
thereis
more
thanone
plaintiff,a
defendantmay
stillextenda
single-jointoffer,conditioned
on
acceptanceby
allofthem
,iftheseparate
plaintiffshave
a‘unity
ofinterest
suchthatthere
isa
single,indivisibleinjury.’
[Citation.]”
(Peterson
v.
JohnC
rane,Inc.
(2007)154
CaLA
pp.4th498,
505.)Thatis
thecase
here.
37
Separateoffers
toG
insbergand
Eden
would
notfostersection
998’s
purposeofencouraging
pretrialsettlements.
Tothe
contrary,the
natureof
Gam
son’sdeclaratoryjudgm
entclaims
precludedsettlem
entwith
justone
ofthem
.A
sco-lessees,G
insbergand
Eden
aretenants
incom
mon
(Schm
itt
v.Felix
(1958)157C
al.App.2d
642,646),
anda
“cotenanthasno
authority
tobind
anothercotenantw
ithrespectto
thelatter’s
interestincom
mon
property”(Lindsay-Field
v.Friendly
(1995)36
Cal.A
pp.4th1728,
1734).
So,bothG
insbergand
Eden
would
havehad
toagree
tothe
offer’s
proposedconstruction
ofthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage
forthe
settlementto
beenforceable—
otherwise
onecould
accepttheoffer
while
theothercould
continuedisputing
theC
onservatorLease’sm
eaning.(2
AA
508-509,¶~3,4.)
Thatresultwould
eviscerateany
settlementvalue.
Theauthority
Ginsberg
relieson,
Wickw
arev.
Tanner(1997)
53C
aLApp.4th
570(W
ickware),
doesnotcom
peladifferentresult.
The
Wiclcw
aredefendantoffered
alum
p-sumsettlem
entpaymentto
multiple
plaintiffsprosecuting
apersonalinjury
action.(Id.
atp.573.)
Wickw
are
heldthata
fmancialsettlem
entoffercannotbe
contingentonthe
acceptance
byallplaintiffs.
(Id.atpp.
575-578.)W
ickware’s
prohibitionon
conditional,lump-sum
offersm
akessom
esense
when
onlym
oneyis
changinghands,butnotw
henintenelated,nonm
onetaryrights
areatstake.
2.G
amson’s
join
toffer
was
properbecause
Ginsberg
andE
denare
married.
Ginsberg
andE
dennotonly
areco-tenants,butalso
arem
arried.
Thishas
bothpracticaland
legalconsequencesfor
Gam
son’ssection
998
offer.
38
As
apracticalm
atter,itis
impossible
toim
aginea
scenariounder
which
Eden
couldacceptG
anison’soffer
ingood
faithif
Ginsberg
rejected
it.(C
f.Vick,supra,
110C
al.App.4th
atpp.212-213[“requiring
(that)
married
couplesw
itha
comm
oninterestin
thechose
inaction
beallow
edto
accept orrejectjointoffersindividually
couldresultin
theplaintiffs
gaming
thesystem
byhaving
onespouse
accepttheoffer
andthe
otherrejectit”).)
As
alegalm
atter,ajo
intsection
998offerto
am
arriedcouple
is
valid.(B
arnettv.FirstN
at.InsuranceCo.
ofA
merica
(2010)
184C
al.App.4th
1454,1458-1461;
VicJc,supra,110
CaLA
pp.4thatpp.
211-
213.)A
sa
man-ied
couple,G
insbergand
Eden
havean
“equal,undivided
half-interest”in
therights
conferredby
theC
onservatorLeaseor
anaw
ard
ofattorney’s
feesorcosts;therefore,undercom
munity
propertyprinciples,
eitherone
“couldhave
accepted[G
amson’s)
offeron
behalfofthe
comm
unity.”(V
ick,supra,atp.212;see
Fam.
Code,§
760[“allproperty,
realorpersonal,whereversituated,
acquiredby
am
arriedperson
duringthe
marriage
while
domiciled
inthis
stateis
comm
unityproperty”].)
Therefore,
Gam
son’sjo
intofferw
asvalid.
39
CR
OS
S-R
ES
PO
ND
EN
T’S
BR
IEF
ST
AT
EM
EN
TO
FF
AC
TS
Gam
son’scross-respondent’s
briefdemonstrates
thatthereis
nolegalbasis
fora
punitivedam
agesaw
ard.A
ccordingly,thisstatem
entof
factsdoes
notrespondto
Ginsberg’s
drumbeatofad
hominem
accusations
againstGam
son.R
ather,we
focuson
theevidence
concerningw
hether,as
alegalm
atter,punitivedam
agesw
ereavailable.
Parto
fthatanalysisdoes
requirethe
Courtto
considerGinsberg’s
evidenceaboutG
amson’s
underlyingconduct.
Theissue
there,however,is
notwhatG
insberg’sevidence
shows,butratherw
hatitom
its,and
thatwill
beourprim
aryfocus.
Finally,
we
addressthe
trialcourt’serroneous
exclusionofrelevant
evidenceoffered
byG
amson
onpunitive
damages—
asubjectthatcom
es
intoplay
onlyifthis
Courtaccedes
toG
insberg’srequestthatit
expandthe
availabilityofpunitive
damages
beyondw
ell-establishedboundaries.
A.
TheC
onservatorLease’s
Limitations
On
Gam
son’s
Repair
Obligations.
Ginsberg’s
entirecase
was
aboutphysicaldamage
toherprem
ises
andherm
erchandisearising
fromleaks
andotherproblem
sforw
hichshe
allegedG
amson
was
responsible.
Likem
ostleases,theC
onservatorLease
allocatesresponsibility
for
thesem
attersbetw
eenthe
landlordand
tenant,and
itstrictly
limits
Gam
son’sresponsibility:
40
•G
amson
isnotobligated
torepair
“damage
causedby
any
negligentorintentionalactorom
issionofTenant,Tenant’s
agents,em
ployees,orinvitees.”
(4A
A816,¶
9(a).)
•G
amson
isnot“liable
toTenantfor
anydam
agesarising
from
anyactorneglectofany
othertenant.”(4
AA
817,¶11(e).)
•G
amson’s
repairobligations
arelim
itedto
the“foundations,
exteriorwalls,
andexteriorro
of’;
the“unexposed
electrical,
plumbing
andsew
agesystem
s”;the
“window
frames,gutters
and
down
spoutson
thebuilding”
(butnotshoww
indows);
andthe
“heating,ventilatingand
air-conditioningsystem
s.”(4
AA
816,
¶9(a).)
•A
bsenta“hazard
orem
ergencysituation,”
Gam
sonhas
“thirty
(30)days
afternoticefrom
Tenanttocom
mence
toperform
[her
repair]obligations.”
(4A
A816,¶
9(a).)
•“TenantatTenant’s
solecostand
expenseshallkeep
ingood
order,conditionand
repairthePrem
isesand
everypartthereof
including,withoutlim
itation,allTenant’s
personalproperty,
fixtures,signs,storefronts,plate
glass,showw
indows,
doors,
interiorwalls,
interiorceiling,and
lightingfacilities.”
(4A
A816,¶
9(b).)
•“E
xceptforLandlord’s
willffil
orgrossly
negligentconduct
Tenantherebyagrees
thatLandlordshallnotbe
liablefor
any
injuryto
Tenant’sbusiness
orlossofincom
etherefrom
orfor
damage
tothe
goods,wares,m
erchandise,orotherproperty.”
(4A
A817,¶
11(e).)
41
Theselim
itationsaffectsom
eofG
insberg’sclaim
s.For
example,
Ginsberg
complained
aboutaD
ecember2003
episodeofw
aterintnision
causedby
anupstairs
tenantwho
lefthisfaucetturned
on—w
hattheparties
called“Jack’s
flood.”(3
RT
269:5-24,330:13-19,
332:1-18,343:5-15.)
Gam
sonrepaired
theinterior
ofGinsberg’s
store,so
Ginsberg
suedonly
for
breachofa
claimed
oralpromise
byG
ainson’sem
ployeeto
payfor
damaged
merchandise.
(3R
T233:14-21,269:11-272:13;
6R
T933:1-6;
5R
T750:12-18
[duringcross-exam
ination,Gam
sonagreed
with
Ginsberg’s
counselthat“(t)herew
asno
disputein
thiscase
aboutwhether
ornotyoupaid
therepairs
ofthepatching;
correct?”and
thatthe“dispute
is
whetherornotyou
paidher(sic)
merchandise;
correct?”];see
also1
AA
60-61,¶~f56-59[firstam
endedcom
plaint’sclaim
forbreachoforal
contract].)U
ndertheC
onservatorLease,how
ever,G
amson
isnot“liable
to
Tenantforany
damages
arisingfrom
anyactorneglecto
fanyothertenant”
(4A
A817,¶
11(e))or,
exceptwhere
Gam
sonw
asguilty
ofw
illfhlor
grosslynegligentconduct,
“for
damage
tothe
goods,wares,m
erchandise,
orother
property”(ibid.).
Ginsberg
alsocom
plainedthatG
amson
didnotrepaintpeeling
paint
onherinterior
floorand
reffisedto
repairan
indentationin
thefloor.
(2R
T
190:15-24,191:17-20;
3R
T228:15-231:17,329:1-330:12,
345:18-347:12,
414:7-416:15,417:14-17;6
RT
926:28-927:23;seealso
3R
T433:13-24
[Ginsberg’s
experttestifiedthatthe
indentationdid
notthreatenthe
building’sfoundation
orstructuralsoundness];
4R
T532:2-9,
562:16-565:3,
569:9-15[G
amson’s
expertwitness
describedthe
indentationas
a“divot”].)
Underthe
Conservator
Lease,however,
Gam
sonis
notresponsiblefor
repairingthe
interiorofthe
leasedproperty.
(4A
A816,¶
9(a),(b).)
42
B.
Ginsberg
Presents
No
Evidence
OfLostB
usiness
Attributable
ToW
aterIntrusion.
Ginsberg
testifiedthather
storehad
beenplagued
byepisodes
of
recurrent,destructive
water
intrusionw
hileshe
was
atenantin
Gam
son’s
building—and
specificallyduring
thefive
anda
halfyearsbefore
trial(from
Decem
ber2003
throughthe
eveoftrialin
Septem
ber2009).(See
generally
3R
T269:11-297:14
[Ginsberg’s
testimony
regardingleaks];
seealso
RB
IXA
OB
10-24.)G
insbergestim
atedthatw
aterhadleaked
intoher
store
atdifferentlocations“atleasta
dozentim
es”during
thatperiod.(3
RT
272:14-273:8,italics
added;accord,
3R
T350:24-28
[Ginsberg
employee’s
testimony].)
Ginsberg
alsotestified
thatduringthis
periodher
show
window
leaked“every
time
there’sa
heavyrain”
(3R
T273:15-274:27,
italicsadded)
andthatanother
areaofherstore
(undertheA
partment3
patio)leaked
“everytim
eitrained”
(3R
T275:18-276:4,
italicsadded).
Ginsberg
testifiedthatone
ofherem
ployeesspent30
minutes
everysingle
dayduring
thoseflveand
ahajfyears
dealingw
iththese
leaksand
Ginsberg’s
othercom
plaints.(3
RT
311:17-26;
2A
A335.)
Despite
theseallegations,G
insbergdid
notseeklostprofits
and
presentedno
evidencethatshe
was
unableto
conductbusinessfor
any
appreciableperiod:
Continuous
operationo
fbusiness.G
insbergtestified
thatherstore
was
closedfor
a“few
days”in
Decem
ber2003due
to“Jack’s
flood.”
(3R
T270:28-271:4.)
Butotherthan
those“few
days,”G
insbergneither
allegednorpresented
anyevidence
thattheconditions
shecom
plained
aboutcausedherto
closeherstore
orotherw
isevacate
theprem
ises.N
or
didshe
allegeorpresentevidence
thatGam
sonactually
orconstructively
43
evictedher.
(Seegenerally
2R
T187-192
[Ginsberg
openingstatem
ent];
3R
T201-321
[Ginsberg
directexamination];
6R
T923-940
[Ginsberg
closingargum
ent];1
AA
44-62[firstam
endedcom
plaint];2
AA
329-330
[Ginsberg
trialbrief];2
AA
335[G
insbergdam
ageschart];
seepp.
90-91,
post.)
No
lostprofits.G
insbergdid
notseek—and
presentedno
evidence
about—dam
agesfor
lostcustomers,lostprofits,
orlostgoodw
ill.(E
.g.,
6R
T932-938
[Ginsberg
closingargum
ent];2
AA
335[G
insbergdam
ages
chart].)C.
During
Tria
l,T
heC
ourtExcludes
Evidence
OfW
hy
Gam
sonB
elievedThe
Conservator
LeaseE
xpiredIn
2006.
During
heropening
statement,G
insbergtold
thejury
thatGam
son
knowingly
triedto
breakthe
ConservatorLease
becauseithad
become
disadvantageous:“Y
ouw
illhearthatMs.
Gam
sonno
longerliked”the
Conservator
Lease’sterm
sand
“wanted
more
rent.So
startingin
2003,she
undertooka
campaign
togetrid
ofm
yclientorto
haveherpay
more
rent.”
(2R
T188:24-27;
seegenerally
2R
T187-192
[entireG
insbergopening
statement].)
Ginsberg
framed
thistheory
nearthebeginning
ofher
direct
examination,w
henshe
testified:“M
ycontention
isthatshe’s
doingthis
damage
toforce
me
togive
upm
ylease,to
move
outortosign
anew
lease
andpay
triplem
yrentatleast.
Soeither
Im
oveoutorI
signa
newlease
thatgivesup
my
optionsto
renewthatshe
promised
me
andchanges
allthe
conditionsthatIoriginally
hadw
hen—on
my
firstlease.”(3
RT
234:5-10.)
Gam
soncould
rebutthistheory
onlyby
presentingevidence
ofher
good-faithand
well-founded
understandingthatthe
ConservatorLease
was
44
settoexpire
in2006.
Her
triallawyer
(David
Felsenthal)explained
thisto
thecourt:
“He
[Ginsberg’s
lawyer,M
r.W
eiss]made
anum
berofpoints
about[G
amson]
wanted
increasedrentbut[G
amson]
didn’twantto
payfor
anyrepairs.
Im
ean,hew
entallupand
down
thisissue
about[G
amson]
wanted
more
rentbutwouldn’tdo
repairs.Iw
anttogive
contexttothat.”
(5R
T737:16-19.)
Thecourtresponded
“.
..w
ealready
knowaboutthe
leaseand
soforth.Ifyou
wantto
askspecific
questions,ask
questions.B
ut
don’tgoaround
andbring
allthisstuffup
thatwe’ve
heardalready.”
(5R
T
737:24-27,italicsadded.)
Sim
ilarly,attheoutseto
fGam
son’scase
inch
iet
thetrialcourt
made
clearthatitwould
excludeevidence
regardingthe
terms
ofthe
ConservatorLease
becauseithad
alreadyheld
thatthelease
conferred
unlimited
renewals
with
minim
alrentincreasesonce
everyfive
years.Soon
intoG
amson’s
directexamination,the
trialcourtsustainedobjections
to
questionsaboutthe
circumstances
surroundingthe
executionofthe
Conservator
Leaseand
thedifferences
between
theR
ubinfeldLease
andthe
ConservatorLease.
(5R
T743-745.)
Thecourtconcluded
thatthe
testimony
implicated
“legal”issues
onw
hichithad
“alreadyruled.”
(5R
T
744-745.)
Thetrialcourtalso
sustainedobjections
totestim
onyfrom
Gam
son’s
realestatelaw
yerSaulJaffe
aboutGinsberg’s
under-marketrent.
Thecourt
heldthatthis
topicalso
implicated
a“question
oflaw
”thatithad
“already
ruledon”:
45
Q:A
tthatpointintim
e[around
early2005,
see5
RT
783-784],was
Ms.
Ginsberg
payingless
thanm
arketrent?
A:
Yes.
Q:Based
onyourpersonalexperience
andknow
ledge,howm
uch
undermarketrentw
asshe
payingatthattim
e?
A:
It’sgrossly
undermarket.
Q:C
anyou
explainw
hatyoum
eanand
give—
Mr.
Weiss:
Objection.
Relevance.
TheC
ourt:Sustained.
Mr.
Felsenthal:Y
ourH
onor,his
theoryofthe
caseis
thatdefendant
was
tryingto
increaseherrentand
refusedto
doany
repairs.
TheC
ourt:C
ounsel,theyhave
alease
forthe
amounto
ftherent.
Theyhave
optionsto
renew.
Shepays
accordingto
herlease.It’s
aquestion
oflaw
,and
I’vealready
ruledon
allthose.
(5R
T787-788.)
So,throughoutthetrial,the
jury
primarily
(ifnotexclusively)heard
Ginsberg’s
seemingly
undisputedside
ofthestory:
Gam
sonknew
that
Ginsberg
hada
perpetual,binding,under-marketlease
andtherefore
intentionallycam
paignedeitherto
“extort”additionalrentfrom
Ginsberg
(6R
T930,938,984,
986)or,failing
that,tooustG
insbergso
asto
charge
more
renttoa
newtenant(e.g.,3
RT
233-235,256[G
insbergexam
ination];
4R
T453-455,
460-464[G
amson
examination];
6R
T923,925,
927,928,
930,931,937-939
[Ginsberg
closingargum
ent]).
46
B.
The
Jury
Aw
ards$49,100
InC
ompensatory
Dam
ages,
LessT
hanA
Tenth
OfW
hatG
insbergS
ought—B
ut
Alm
ostEightTim
esT
hatAm
ountinP
unitiveD
amages.
Ginsberg
askedfor
about$545,000in
economic
damages
(2A
A335;2
RT
189-192;6
RT
932-938,990-991),including
over$41,000
onhertrespass-to-chattels
countthatthejury
rejected(2
AA
335,391;6
RT
932-934).O
nthe
countsforbreach
ofcontractand
“intentional
interferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises,”the
juryaw
ardeda
lump
sumof
$49,100,orabout9%
ofw
hatGinsberg
hadasked
for.(2
AA
389-390,
392-393.)The
jury
awarded
$385,000in
punitivedam
ages,oralm
osteight
times
thecom
pensatorydam
agesaw
ard.(2
AA
393;see
6R
T938-939
[Ginsberg
askedfor
$1.2m
illionin
punitivedam
ages].)
On
Gam
son’sm
otionforpartialjudgm
entnotwithstanding
the
verdict,the
trialcourtstruckthe
punitivedam
agesverdict.
(3A
A527-531;
4A
A791;
7R
T1067-1074.)
Thetrialcourtconcluded
thatthebasis
for
thepunitive
damages
verdictwas
thejury’s
findingon
thecountalleging
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises,”butthatthispurported
tort
amounted
toa
contractclaimfor
thebreach
ofthe
implied
covenantofquiet
enjoymentthatcould
notsupportpunitivedam
ages.(7
RT
1067-1074.)
47
AR
GU
ME
NT
I.
GIN
SB
ER
GD
OE
SN
OT
SE
EK
,AN
DC
OU
LDN
EV
ER
BE
EN
TIT
LE
DT
O,P
UN
ITIV
ED
AM
AG
ES
BA
SE
DO
NT
HE
JUR
Y’S
BR
EA
CH
OF
CO
NT
RA
CT
FIN
DIN
GS
.
A.
AB
reachO
fContract,
Even
IfWififu
lOr
Malicious,
CannotS
upportAP
unitiveD
amages
Aw
ard.
CivilC
odesection
3294allow
spunitive
damages
onlyin
an“action
forthe
breachofan
obligationnotarisingfrom
contract.”(~
3294,
subd.(a),italics
added.)“The
statutoryschem
efor
allowance
ofpunitive
damages
requiresboth
atortaction
anda
findingof‘oppression,
fraud,or
malice.’
(Civ.
Code,§
3294.)”(M
yersB
uildingIndustries,
Ltd.v.
InterfaceTechnology,
Inc
(1993)13
Cal.A
pp.4th949,961
(Myers),
originalitalics.)P
unitivedam
agesare
unavailableforbreach
ofcontract,
evenifthe
breachw
as“w
ilffil,fraudulent,
ormalicious”;
accordingly,the
defendant’sm
otivationfor
thebreach
isirrelevant.
(Applied
Equipm
ent
Corp.
v.LittonS
audiArabia
Ltd.(1994)
7C
al.4th503,
514-516(A
pplied
Equipm
ent).)
B.
BecauseIt
IsA
nIm
pliedC
ontractualTerm
,AB
reachO
f
TheC
ovenantOfQ
uietEnjoym
entCannotS
upport
AP
unitiveD
amages
Aw
ard.
Every
leasecontains
anim
pliedcovenanto
fquietenjoyment.
(Andrew
sv.M
obileA
ireEstates
(2005)125
Cal.A
pp.4th578,
588-591
(Andrew
s);C
iv.C
ode,§1927
[“An
agreementto
letuponhire
bindsthe
lettertosecure
tothe
hirerthequietpossession
ofthething
hiredduring
the
48
termofthe
hiring,againstallpersons
lawfully
claiming
thesam
e”).)
Breach
ofthis
implied
covenantgivesrise
toa
contract—nota
tort—claim
.
(Nathan
v.Locke(1930)
108C
al.App.
158,162
(Nathan);
seealso,
e.g.,
Butler-R
uppv.Lourdeaux
(2005)134
Cal.A
pp.4th1220,
1229-1230
(Butler-.R
upp)[only
contract—nottort—
damages
areavailable
forbreach
ofquietenjoym
ent];pp.52-55,post.)
Ginsberg
knows
this:O
verthelife
ofthis
case,shefiled
severalsetsofproposed
jury
instructionsthatw
ould
haveinstructed
theju
ryto
award
contractdamages
onher
quietenjoyment
claim.
(1S
AA
1057,1058;
2S
AA
1145,1146,
1175,1176.)
Becausea
breachofquietenjoym
entisnota
tort,punitivedam
ages
arenotavailable.
(Cyrus
v.Haveson
(1976)65
CaLA
pp.3d306,309-310,
316.)The
trialcourtthereforeproperly
refusedG
insberg’sproposed
instructionsaying
thattheju
rycould
award
punitivedam
agesifit
found
Gam
sonliable
fora
contractualbreachofquietenjoym
ent.(2
SA
A1176;
6R
T910:6-26;see
also2
AA
330[G
insbergtrialbrief].)
Thecourtinstead
instructedthe
jury
toconsiderpunitive
damages
onlyif
Ginsberg
prevailed
onherpurported
tortalleging“intentionalinterference
with
useof
premises.”
(2A
A381;
6R
T910;
seealso
6R
T932
[Ginsberg
closing
argument];
cf.Myers,supra,
13C
al.App.4th
atpp.960-96
1[reversing
punitivedam
agesspecialverdictbecause
jury“w
asneitherrequested
tonor
diditm
akethe
necessaryfactualfm
dingsfor
afraud
orothertortcause
of
action”].)
On
appeal,G
insbergessentially
dropsherearlier
argumentthat
acontractualbreach
ofquietenjoym
entcansupportpunitive
damages.
(Com
pare,e.g.,2
SA
A1176
with
RB
/XA
OB
78-98.)Instead,
shecontends
thatshealleged
andprevailed
ona
completely
differentclaimsupporting
49
herrequestforpunitivedam
ages:“tortious”
breachofquietenjoym
ent.
(RB
/XA
OB
76-77.)A
sw
enow
show,this
contentionis
meritless.
II.
GIN
SB
ER
G’S
MA
DE
-UP
CL
AIM
—”IN
TE
NT
ION
AL
INT
ER
FE
RE
NC
EW
ITH
US
EO
FP
RE
MIS
ES
”—IS
NO
T
AC
OG
NIZ
AB
LET
OR
TA
ND
PR
OV
IDE
SN
OB
AS
ISF
OR
AP
UN
ITW
ED
AM
AG
ES
AW
AR
D.
Thecrux
ofGinsberg’s
cross-appealishercontention
that
“Gam
son’sconductin
deliberatelytrying
todestroy
Ginsberg’s
abilityto
operateherstore
througha
seriesofintentionally
annoyingacts
designedto
compelthe
tenanttovacate,w
asa
tortiousbreach
ofthe
covenantofquiet
enjoymentindependento
fanycontractualobligation.”
(RB
/XA
OB
76-77,
italicsadded.)
Ginsberg
arguesthatcase
lawaboutthe
wrongfuleviction
of
residentialtenantsdem
onstratesthata
comm
ercialtenantcanrecover
for
a“tortious”
breachofquietenjoym
ent.(R
B/X
AO
B78-8
1,87-98.)She
jugglesthese
threetorttheories
interchangeably:“intentionalinterference
with
premises,”
“tortiousbreach
ofquietenjoym
ent,”and
wrongful
eviction.H
ertorttheoryfails
regardlessoftenninology.
A.
TheT
rialC
ourtProperly
Rejected
Ginsberg’s
Attem
pt
To
RecastH
erC
ontractualClaim
For
Breach
OfQ
uiet
Enjoym
entAs
AT
ort.
1.A
simple
breachofcontractalm
ostnevergives
rise
toto
rtlia
bility.
Ginsberg’s
torttheoryim
properlyconflates
contractandtortliability:
“Aperson
may
notordinarilyrecoverin
tortforthebreach
ofduties
that
50
merely
restatecontractualobligations.”
(Aasv.
Superior
Court(2000)
24C
al.4th627,643,superseded
inpartby
statuteon
othergroundsas
stated
inG
reystoneH
omes,Inc.
v.Midtec,
Inc.(2008)
168C
al.App.4th
1194,
1202.)“Ifthe
breachis
bothcontractualand
tortious,we
mustascertain
which
dutyis
thequintessence
oftheaction.
Ifitisunclear,
courts
generallyw
illconsidertheaction
tobe
incontractratherthan
intort.”
(Voth
v.W
ascoP
ublicU
tilityD
ist.(1976)
56C
al.App.3d
353,356-357.)
Disputes
allegingbreach
ofim
plied-by-lawcontractualterm
s(w
hich
would
includethe
implied
covenantofquietenjoym
ent)sound
incontract,
nottort.(See
Fairchild
v.Park
(2001)90
Cal.A
pp.4th919,927
[actions
allegingbreach
ofcovenanto
fhabitability(a
termstatutorily
implied
in
residentialleases)sound
incontract,nottort].)
And
California
courtshave
expresslyheld
thatquietenjoymentclaim
ssound
incontract:
“As
between
landlordand
tenant,where
thelease
containsa
covenantforquiet
enjoyment,
theusualrem
edyforthe
tenantisan
actionfor
abreach
ofthe
covenant.”(N
athan,supra,108
Cal.A
pp.atp.
162;seealso,
e.g.,Standard
LiveS
tockCo.
v.Pentz
(1928)204
Cal.
618,642
[tenantprevailingon
aclaim
forbreachofquietenjoym
entmay
recoveronlycontractdam
ages
underCiv.
Code,§
3300];pp.52-55,post.)
Furthermore,G
insbergand
Gam
sonare
“partiesto
acom
merciallease;
assuch,they
[are]in
nospecial
relationshipthatw
ouldgive
riseto
aduty
intort.”
(llkhchooyiv.Best
(1995)37
Cal.A
pp.4th395,412.)
51
2.G
insberg’spurported
tort
amounts
toa
garden-
varietycontractclaim
allegingbreach
ofquiet
enjoyment.
Even
thoughG
insbergargued
thatGam
sonw
asliable
foran
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofproperty,”
shedid
notproposean
instructionon
thatpurportedtort.
(6R
T873-875;
seegenerally
6R
T873-
890.)She
insteadproposed
aprivate
nuisanceinstruction
(CA
CIN
o.2021)
becauseitw
as“frankly,the
closestone[she]
couldfm
d.”(6
RT
873:20-
87
4:5
.)10
Thetrialcourtrefused
theinstruction.
(6R
T988-990.)
ICG
insberg’sproposed
nuisanceinstruction
said:
EstherG
insbergclaim
sthatH
annaG
amson
interferedw
ithE
stherG
insberg’suse
andenjoym
entofherland.
Toestablish
thisclaim
,E
stherGinsberg
mustprove
allofthe
following.
One,thatEstherG
insbergleased
theproperty;
Two,
thatHanna
Gam
sonby
actingor—
excusem
e—by
actingor
failingto
actcreateda
conditionthatw
asan
obstructionto
thefree
useofthe
propertyso
asto
interferew
iththe
comfortable
enjoyment
oflife
orproperty;
Three,thatthis
conditioninterfered
with
EstherGinsberg’s
useof
enjoymentofherland;
Four,thatE
stherGinsberg
didnotconsentto
Hanna
Gam
son’sconduct;
Five,thatan
ordinaryperson
would
bereasonably
annoyedor
disturbedby
Hanna
Gam
son’sconduct;
Six,thatEstherG
insbergw
asharm
ed;
Seven,thatHanna
Gam
son’sconductw
asa
substantialfactorin
causingEstherG
insberg’sharm
;
And,
eight,thattheseriousness
ofthe
harmoutw
eighsthe
publicbenefito
fHanna
Gam
son’sconduct.
(6RT
874-875;see
also1
SA
A1017-1019;2S
AA
1108-1110.)
52
Gam
sonobjected
throughoutthetrialcourtproceedings
thatthere
was
nocognizable
tortfora
landlord’s“intentionalinterference
with
useof
[thetenant’sjproperty.”
(4R
T497-498;
6R
T893-897.)
Nonetheless,
becausethe
thaicourtoverruledher
objections(4
RT
497-498;6
RT
896,
898),G
amson
proposedan
instructioncovering
bothG
insberg’scontract
claimforbreach
ofquietenjoym
entandherpurported
tortfor“intentional
interferencew
ithuse
ofproperty”
(6R
T880-888).”
Butneitherside
ever
locatedany
relevantauthoritythateven
addressedthe
existenceof
Ginsberg’s
claimfor
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofproperty.”
Instead,the
instructionon
Ginsberg’s
purported“to
rt”w
aspatterned
onauthority
construinga
contractualbreachofquietenjoym
entina
residentiallease,notanytort:
Andrew
s,supra,125
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
585,
590.(6
RT
880-888.)A
ndrews
doesnoteven
suggesttortliabilityor
punitivedam
ages.Itju
stdefmes
theim
pliedcovenanto
fquietenjoyment,
statingthat“[m
]inorinconveniences
andannoyances
arenotactionable
breachesofthe
implied
covenantofquietenjoym
ent.To
beactionable,the
landlord’sactor
omission
mustsubstantially
interferew
itha
tenant’sright
touse
andenjoy
theprem
isesfor
thepurposes
contemplated
bythe
tenancy.”(125
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
589;see
also2
SA
A1173-1174.)
Andrew
sfurtherrecognizes
thatatenantw
horeffises
tovacate
theleased
premises
“may
elect‘tostand
uponthe
lease,remain
inpossession
andsue
for
contractdamages.”
(125C
aLApp.4th
atp.590,italics
added,quoting
“Gam
sonproposed
thisinstruction
onlybecause
thetrialcourtoverruled
herobjections,
soshe
isnotestopped
fromarguing
onappealthatthe
purportedtortfor
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofproperty”
doesnot
exist.(See
Mary
Mv.
City
ofLos
Angeles
(1991)54
Cal.3d
202,212-213.)
53
Guntertv.
City
ofStockton
(1976)55
Cal.A
pp.3d131,
141(G
untert);see
pp.59-60,post.)
Ginsberg
apparentlyagreed
thattheinstruction
onherintentional
interferenceclaim
shouldbe
patternedafterA
ndrews.
(6R
T880-888.)
Sheeven
arguedthatthe
trialcourtshouldadoptherproposed
special
instructionbecause
it—unlike
Gam
son’s—”niniic[ked]”
Andrew
s’breach
ofquietenjoym
entlanguage.(6
RT
883.)G
insbergultim
atelypersuaded
thetrialcourtto
modify
Gam
son’sproposed
tortinstructionin
aw
aythat
shebelieved
more
closelyfollow
edthe
Andrew
sstandard
fora
breachof
quietenjoyment.
(6R
T883-888;
2A
A372.)
Theas-given
specialinstructionsays:
Implied
inevery
rentalagreementis
acovenanto
fquite[sic]
enjoymentby
which
thelandlord
impliedly
promises
toallow
the
tenantpossessionand
“quietenjoyment”
ofthe
premises
duringthe
leaseterm
andnotto,through
actorom
ission,disturbthe
tenant’s
possessionand
beneficialenjoymento
ftheprem
isesfor
thepurposes
contemplated
inthe
lease.
Inorderto
prevailonherclaim
forIntentionalInterference
with
Use
ofP
roperty,pla
intiffm
ustprovethatacts
orom
issionsofdefendant
substantiallyinterfered
with
plaintiff’srightto
useand
enjoythe
leasedprem
ises.A
ctsorom
issionsam
ountingonly
toinconvenience
andannoyance
arenotsufficientto
meetthis
standardofproof.
(2A
A372;
seealso
6R
T887-888,
1004.)
Thisinstruction
doesnotdefine
anytort—
itonlysets
outtheprim
a
facieelem
entsofa
contractclaimarising
froma
landlord’sbreach
ofthe
54
covenantofquietenjoym
ent.Itis
indistinguishablefrom
thisblack-letter
formulation
ofa
contractualquietenjoymentclaim
;A
“landlord’sfailure
to
fulfillan
obligationto
repairorto
replacean
essentialstructureorto
providea
necessaryservice
[cjanresultin
abreach
ofthe
covenantifthe
failuresubstantially
affectsthe
tenant’sbeneficialenjoym
entofthe
premises.”
(Petroleum
Collections,
Inc.v.
Swords
(1975)48
Cal.A
pp.3d
841,846;see
p.53,ante
[quotingA
ndrews’s
breachofquietenjoym
ent
definition].)So,justas
Ginsberg
wanted,the
finalinstruction
“mim
ic[ked]”A
ndrew?
definitionofa
contractclaim,nota
tort.
B.
Ginsberg’s
Reliance
On
Cases
Addressing
TheW
rongful
Eviction
OfR
esidentialTenantsFails
To
SupportH
er
Contention
ThatT
hereE
xistsA
To
rtF
orThe
Breach
OfQ
uietEnjoym
entInT
heC
omm
ercialContext.
Ginsberg
arguesfor
thefirsttim
eon
appealthatcasesrecognizing
atortforthe
wrongfuleviction
ofa
residentialtenantsupporther
contentionthatthere
existsa
tortforthebreach
ofa
comm
ercialtenant’s
quietenjoyment.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B80-81,quoting
Barkettv.B
rucato(1953)
122C
al.App.2d
264,274-275(B
arkett).)H
erargum
entfails.
1.T
hegravam
enofG
insberg’scross-appealis
her
newtheory
thatshe
was
wrongfully
evicted.
Theelem
entsofa
prima
facieclaim
forwrongfully
evicting
aresidentialtenant,
asexplained
byB
arkettandlatercases,are:
(1)the
residentialtenantwas
actuallyor
constructivelyevicted
fromthe
premises
by(2)
thelandlord’s
“seriesofintentionally
annoyingacts”
that
(3)w
ere“designed
tocom
pelthetenantto
vacate.”(B
arkett,supra,
55
122C
al.App.2d
atp.274;G
reenv.S
uperiorC
ourt(1974)10
Cal.3d
616,
625, flu.10.)
Accordingly,this
claimlies
only~fthe
tenantvacatesthe
residence.(G
reenv.S
uperiorC
ourt,supra,10
Cal.3d
atp.625,flu.
10.)
Ginsberg’s
newly-conceived
wrongfuleviction
theoryis
grounded
ona
misunderstanding
ofthetortsetoutin
Barkett.
(RB
/XA
OB
80-81,87-
88.)A
ccordingto
Ginsberg,B
arkettheldthatto
prevailona
wrongful
evictionclaim
,thetenantneed
showonly
theelem
entsfornuisance
as
defmed
bythe
Restatem
ent(First)ofTorts
section822.
(RB
JXA
OB
80-81,
quotingB
arkett,supra,122
CatA
pp.2datpp.274-275.)
Notso.
Barkett
considereda
“willfu
lwrongfuleviction”
ofa
residentialtenantwho
had
vacatedthe
premises—
notasim
pleclaim
fornuisance
orbreachofquiet
enjoyment.
(122C
al.App.2d
atpp.272,274-275[distinguishing
thistort
froma
contractualbreachofquietenjoym
ent].)
Ginsberg
similarly
misconstrues
thetw
oother
casesthatshe
says
showthata
comm
ercialtenantcanstate
aclaim
fora
“tortious”breach
of
quietenjoyment:
Spin/csv.E
quityR
esidentialBriarw
oodA
partments
(2009)171
CaLA
pp.4th1004
(Spin/cs)and
Too/cev.A
llen(1948)
85C
al.App.2d
230(Too/ce).
(RB
/XA
OB
88-89.)O
nceagain,both
cases
involvedresidentialtenants.
(Spin/cs,supra,171
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
1017-
1018,1055
[“wrongfuleviction”
ofaresidentialtenantbased
onlandlord’s
changingtenant’s
locksm
id-lease];Too/ce,supra,
85C
al.App.2d
atp.232
[residentialtenantvacatedapartm
entafterfiling
suit].)
Ginsberg
citesno
authorityforthe
propositionthata
comm
ercial
tenantcanprevailon
aw
rongfhlevictiontheory.
(SeeR
B/X
AO
B80-8
1,
87-89.)B
utevenassum
ingthatsuch
aclaim
were
cognizable,itw
ouldlie
onlyafterthe
tenantvacatedthe
leasedprem
ises:“In
orderthattherebe
56
aconstructive
evictionitis
essentialthatthetenantshould
vacatethe
property.There
isno
constructiveeviction
ifthetenantcontinues
in
possessionofthe
premises
however
much
hem
aybe
disturbedin
the
beneficialenjoyment.”
(Lor4Lim
itedv.
Wojfe
(1948)85
Cal.A
pp.2d54,
65, italicsadded;
Id.atp.
66[constructive
evictionclaim
failedbecause
thetenants
“notonlycontinued
inpossession
butwere
litigating,seeldng
to
remain
inpossession”];
accord,Munoz
v.MacM
illan(2011)
195C
al.App.4th
648,655
[wrongfuleviction
liesonly
ifthe“tenantis
forciblyrem
ovedfrom
premises
withoutjudicialprocess,”
italicsadded].)
2.B
ecauseG
insberghas
notshown
thatshe
reliedon
aw
rongfulevictiontheory
inthe
trialcourt,
this
Courtshould
notconsiderit.
Whateverthe
elements
ofherw
rongfulevictionclaim
are,Ginsberg
hasnotshow
nthatshe
raisedthe
claimin
thetrialcourt.
(Seegenerally
R.B
/XA
OB
78-98.)
Tothe
contrary,Ginsberg’s
primary
theoryon
punitivedam
ages
throughoutthetrialcourtproceedings
was
simple:
Punitive
damages
are
availableto
acom
mercialtenantw
hoprevails
ona
contractclaimfor
breachofquietenjoym
ent.(2
AA
330[G
insbergtrialbrief];
2S
AA
1175,
1176;6R
T895-897;
accord,1
SA
A1057,
1058;2S
AA
1145,1146.)
The
trialcourtrejectedthis
argument(6
RT
910)and
Ginsberg
hasessentially
abandonediton
appeal.
Inthe
trialcourt,G
insbergalso
arguedthatshe
couldrecovertort
damages
forG
amson’s
alleged“intentionalinterference
with
useof
premises.”
(See,e.g.,
6R
T893:22-897:8,
932:8-16.)B
utshenever
57
proposedany
instructionson
thatpurportedtortor
citedany
authority
holdingthatsuch
atort—
--assuniingone
evenexisted—
was
applicableto
thefacts
ofthis
case.(See
generally6
RT
854-903[jury
instruction
conference];2
SA
A1172-1178.)
And
shecertainly
didnotground
her
“intentionalinterference”theory
oncase
lawregarding
thew
rongful
evictionofresidentialtenants.
(See,e.g.,6
RT
873:20-874:5
[relyingon
CA
CIprivate
nuisanceinstruction];
6R
T879:19-888:14
[“tort”instruction
basedon
authorityregarding
contractualbreachofquietenjoym
ent];3
AA
527-529,596-598,
615-617[G
insbergopposition
tom
otionforpartial
JNO
V];
7R
I1067-1073
[hearingon
motion
forpartialJNO
V];
seealso
4A
A779-781
[Gam
sonreply
insupporto
fmotion
forpartialJNO
VJ;
pp.52-55,ante.)
BecauseG
insberghas
notdemonstrated
thatsheraised
herwrongful
evictiontheory
inthe
trialcourt,this
Courtshould
notconsiderit.
(See,e.g.,C
ableC
onnection,Inc.
v.DIR
EC
TV
(2008)44
Cal.4th
1334,
1350,ft
12;Franklin
Mint
Co.v.M
anatt,Phelps
&Phillz~s,
LLP(2010)
184C
al.App.4th
313,349(F
ranklinM
int).)In
anycase,G
insberg’stheory
failson
them
erits.
58
C.
Even
Assum
ingT
hatThereE
xistsA
Claim
For
The
WrongfulE
victionO
fAC
omm
ercialTenant,
Ginsberg
Failed
To
Establish
ItB
yP
roof;Jury
Instructions,O
r
SpecialV
erdict.
1.G
insbergdid
notallegeor
establishthatshe
was
evicted.
Essentialto
aclaim
ofw
rongfulevictionis
thatthereactually
bean
eviction—the
tenantmusthave
vacatedthe
premises.
Atenantw
ho
remains
hasonly
acontractclaim
fordam
agesforbreach
ofthe
covenantof
quietenjoyment.
Thatisw
hathappenedin
Guntertv.
City
ofStockton,
supra,55
Cal.A
pp.3d131,w
herethe
tenant—like
Ginsberg—
was
“not
suingfor
aw
rongful,constructive
evictionbutforthe
lessor’sunjust(fled
andunauthorized
interferencew
ithhis
profitableuse
ofthe
leasedproperty.
Therule
requiringouster
orsunenderpriortosuitforw
rongfuleviction
doesnotpreclude
thetenantfrom
hiselection
tostand
uponthe
lease,
remain
inpossession
andsue
forbreach
ofcontractdam
ages.”(Id.
at
p.141,italics
added.)Later
authoritiesrelying
onG
untertconfirmthat
atenantrem
ainingin
theleased
premises
may
recoveronlycontract
damages:
Guntertm
erelyclarified
thatalandlord’s
interferencew
itha
tenant’s
quietenjoymentm
aysupportan
actionfor
damages
evenifthe
tenantdoesnotm
oveouto
ftheprem
ises.[C
itation.]W
hilea
claim
forbreach
ofthe
covenantofquietenjoym
entissim
ilarto
aconstructive
evictionclaim
,the
criticaldifferenceis
thatthelatter
claimm
aynotbe
broughtuntilthetenanthas
vacatedthe
property.
[Citation.]
59
(Cunningham
v.U
niversalU
nderwriters
(2002)98C
al.App.4th
1141,1152-1153,italics
added;accord,A
ndrews,supra,
125C
al.App.4th
at
p.590;M
archesev.S
tandardR
ealtyand
Developm
entCo.(1977)
74C
al.App.3d
142,148.)
Ginsberg
didnotvacate
theprem
isesand
shepresented
noevidence
ofactualor
constructiveeviction.
(Seegenerally
3R
T201-321
[entire
Ginsberg
directexamination];2
AA
335[G
insbergdam
ageschart].)
Accordingly,her
onlypotentialrem
edyis
contractdamages.
2.T
heju
ryw
asnotinstructed
onw
rongfuleviction.
Thejury’s
verdictmustbe
judgedsolely
bythe
lawgiven
inthe
instructions:“[S
)ince[G
insberg)assert[s]no
claimofenorin
thejury
instructions,the
rulesare
properlylocated
inthe
instructionsgiven
the
jury.”
(Nullv.
City
ofLosAngeles
(1988)206
Cal.A
pp.3d1528,
1534;
seealso
People
v.W
illiams
(2001)25
Cal.4th
441,463[“W
ereaffinn,
therefore,thebasic
rulethatjurors
arerequired
todeterm
inethe
factsand
rendera
verdictinaccordance
with
thecourt’s
instructionson
thelaw
”].)
Ginsberg
neverproposedan
instructionon
thew
rongfuleviction
theorythatshe
urgeson
appeal,and
thejury
receivedno
suchinstruction.
(2A
A372;2
SA
A1172-1178;6
RT
854-903[jury
instructionconference].)
Sheinstead
proposedan
instructionon
privatenuisance
(CA
CIN
o.2021),
which
was
supposedto
coverherpurported“intentionalinterference
with
property”tort.
(6R
T873-875;
seepp.
52-53&
fri.10,ante.)
Thetrial
courtrefusedthatinstruction
(6R
T988-990),w
hichdid
notsetoutthe
prima
facieelem
entsfor
thew
rongfulevictiontheory
thatshenow
pursues
inany
case(seep.
52,fit
10,ante).
60
Theas-given
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises”
instructiontracks
arun-of-the-m
illcontractualquietenjoymentclaim
—not
aclaim
forw
rongfuleviction.(2
AA
372;see
pp.53-57,
ante.)
Specifically,the
jury
was
notinstructedthatit
couldhold
Gam
sonliable
for
“tortiousbreach
ofquietenjoym
ent”(or“intentionalinterference
with
property”or
“wrongfuleviction”)
onlyifitfound
that:(1)
Ginsberg
was
actuallyor
constructivelyevicted
by(2)
Gam
son’s“series
ofintentionally
annoyingacts”
that(3)w
ere“designed
tocom
pel[her]to
vacate.”(See
pp.55-56,ante.)
Ginsberg’s
cross-appealthereforefails:
Shecannotprevailby
assertinga
theoryaboutw
hichthe
juryw
asnotinstructed.
(SeeB
lakev.
Arp
(1919)180
Cal.
144,148
[refusingto
considernew
defensetheory
because“(t)his
pointwas
notpresentedby
instructionsto
thejury,
andit
is
notinvolvedin
anyrequested
instruction,and
thepointw
astherefore
waived”];M
amm
othLakes
LandA
cquisition,LLC
v.Tow
nofM
amm
oth
Lakes(2010)
191C
al.App.4th
435,464,fit
5[rejecting
theorybecause
it
“was
notpresentedto
theju
ryby
instructionsattrial”].)
3.T
heju
ry’sspecialverdictm
adeno
findingsthat
would
supportaclaim
forw
rongfuleviction.
Perhapsthe
Courtcould
overlookG
insberg’sfailure
toallege
and
putonevidence
regardinga
wrongfuleviction
theoryand
theabsence
of
instructionson
theclaim
ifthejury’s
factualfmdings
nevertheless
supportedsuch
aclaim
.B
uttheydon’t.
Aspecialverdictdoes
notbenefitfroma
generalverdict’s
presumption
ofcorrectness.
Areview
ingcourtdoes
notimply
findingsin
favorofthe
prevailingparty;rather,the
verdict’scorrectness
isdeterm
ined
61
asa
matter
oflaw
.(T
rujillov.N
orthC
ountyTransitD
ist.(1998)
63C
al.App.4th
280,285.)In
addition,“[u]nlike
ageneralverdict(w
hich
merely
implies
findingson
allissuesin
favorofthe
pla
intiffor
defendant),
aspecialverdictpresents
tothe
juryeach
ultimate
factinthe
case.The
jury
mustresolve
allofthe
ultimate
factspresented
toitin
thespecialverdict,
so
that‘nothing
shallremain
tothe
courtbuttodraw
fromthem
conclusionsof
law.’
(Code
Civ.
Proc.,§
624.)”(M
yers,supra,13
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
959-
960,originalitalics;internalquotation
marks
andcitations
omitted.)
Judgedby
thesestandards,the
specialverdictformhere
doesnot
supportanykind
oftortclaim
,wrongfuleviction
orotherw
ise.
Therelevantspecialverdictform
isentitled
“IntentionalInterference
with
Use
ofP
remises.”
Itreads:
We
answerthe
questionssubm
ittedto
usas
follows:
1.D
idE
stherGinsberg
provethatacts
orom
issionsofH
anna
Gam
sonsubstantially
interferedw
ithE
stherG
insberg’srights
touse
andenjoy
theleased
premises
forthepurposes
contemplated
inthe
lease?
fles
No
Ifyouransw
ertoquestion
1is
yes,thenansw
erquestion
2.
Ifyouansw
eredno,
stophere,answ
ernofurther
questions,and
have
thepresiding
jurorsign
anddate
thisfonn.
2.D
oyou
findby
clearandconvincing
evidencethatH
anna
Gam
sonengaged
inconductw
ithm
alice,oppression
orfraud?
~Y
es_N
o
(2A
A392.)
62
Likethe
juryinstruction,the
specialverdictfindingthatG
ainson
“substantiallyinterfered
with
EstherG
insberg’srights
touse
andenjoy
the
leasedprem
isesforthe
purposescontem
platedin
thelease”
addressesonly
theelem
entsfor
acontractualbreach
ofquietenjoym
ent,and
notthose
forwrongfuleviction.
(Seepp.
53-57,60-61,
ante.)A
bsentthosew
rongful
evictionfindings,how
ever,G
amson
cannotbeliable
undera
wrongful
evictiontheory
asa
matter
oflaw
:A
“specialverdictis‘fatally
defective’if
itdoes
notallowthe
jury
toresolve
everycontroverted
issue.[C
itations.]”
(Saxenav.
Goffizey
(2008)159
Cal.A
pp.4th316,
325,326
[specialverdict
on“inform
edconsent”w
asdefective
becauseit“did
notrequirethe
jury
to
make
afinding
onbattery”j;F
uller-Austin
InsulationCo.
v.Highlands
InsuranceCo.
(2006)135
Cal.A
pp.4th958,
1005-1006[specialverdicton
“inequitablem
isconduct”w
asdefective
becauseitdid
notrequirejury
to
make
afm
dingon
“reasonableness”];Myers,supra,
13C
al.App.4th
at
pp.960-96
1[punitive
damages
award
was
defectivebecause
specialverdict
formdid
notrequireju
ryto
make
findingson
anunderlying
tort].)
Accordingly,
Ginsberg’s
purportedtortclaim
groundedon
a“w
rongfuleviction”theory
(or“tortious”
breachofquietenjoym
entor
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises”or
anyotherlabelG
insberg
mightsuggest)
failsbecause
theju
ryw
asnotinstructed,
andm
adeno
fmdings,
onthatclaim
.
63
P.
TheT
rialC
ourtProperly
Relied
On
Erich
andB
aile
r
Rapp
ToC
oncludeT
hatG
insbergC
ouldN
otRecover
TortD
amages
On
Her
Breach
OfC
ontractClaim
.
Instriking
thepunitive
damages
verdict,thethaicourtrelied
on
Erlich
v.Menezes
(1999)21C
al.4th543
(Erlich)
andB
utler-Rupp,supra,
134C
al.App.4th
1220.(6
RT
1067-1073.)These
casesacknow
ledgethe
unremarkable
propositionthattortdam
agesgenerally
cannotbetacked
onto
acontractclaim
.(E
rlich,supra,21C
al.4thatpp.
551-554;Butler-R
upp,
supra,134
CaLA
pp.4thatpp.
1227-1228.)G
insbergcontends
thatErlich
andB
utler-Rupp
donotpreclude
tortliabilitybecause
thoserulings
hinged
onthe
“negligent”nature
ofthe
tortiousconduct,w
hereasthe
juryhere
supposedlyfound
Gam
sonliable
foran
intentionaltortbearingthe
hallmarks
ofw
rongfuleviction.(R
B/X
AO
B97-98.)
Ginsberg
misstates
boththe
holdingsofE
rlichand
Butler-B
uppand
thejury’s
verdict.
Erlich
concludedthata
homeow
nercouldnotrecovertortdam
ages
againstacontractorfor
whatw
asessentially
acontractualconstruction
defectclaim.
(21C
al.4thatp.
552.)The
obligationsbetw
eenthe
homeow
nerand
contractorwere
defmed
exclusivelyby
contract;therefore,
tortdamages
were
unavailable.(Id.
atp.554.)
Butler-B
uppheld
that
acom
mercialtenantcannotrecover
ona
tortclaimarising
fromthe
landlord’salleged
breachofthe
covenantofquietenjoym
ent.
(134C
al.App.4th
atpp.1229-1230.)
Butler-R
uppalso
rejectedthe
notion—im
plicitinG
insberg’scross-appellant’s
openingbrief—
thatcase
lawallow
ingresidentialtenants
torecoverpunitive
damages
operatesin
the
comm
ercialcontext.(Id.
atp.1230
[residentialtenantmay
recovertort
damages
underC
iv.C
ode,§1941
(warranty
ofhabitability
inresidential
64
leases),butthatstatute“has
noapplication
tocom
mercialleases”].)
Moreover,
contraryto
Ginsberg’s
contention(R
BIX
AO
B98),
although
Erlich
andB
utler-Rupp
bothconsidered
thetortofnegligentinfliction
of
emotionalharm
,neitherlimited
itsanalysis
tonegligence
claims.
Ginsberg
alsom
isstates,once
again,theclaim
aboutwhich
theju
ry
was
instructedand
rendereda
verdict.C
ontraryto
Ginsberg’s
assertion,
theju
rydid
notconsiderorm
akeany
fmdings
onthe
“independenttort”of
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
andquietenjoym
entofleased
premises,
accomplished
bya
seriesofintentionally
annoyingacts
designedto
compel
thetenantto
vacate.”(R
B/X
AO
B98;see
2A
A372,
392[jury
instruction
andspecialverdict];pp.
60-63,ante.)
Theju
ryrendered
averdicton
acontractclaim
,period.There
was
nobasis
forpunitivedam
agesand
thereforeno
basisforreversal.
III.
AS
AM
AT
TE
RO
FP
UB
LICP
OLIC
Y,
PU
NIT
IVE
DA
MA
GE
S
SH
OU
LDN
OT
BE
AV
AIL
AB
LE
FO
RTEEE
BR
EA
CH
OF
TH
E
CO
VE
NA
NT
OF
QU
IET
EN
JOY
ME
NT
INA
CO
MM
ER
CIA
L
LEA
SE
.
A.
Even
IfPunitive
Dam
agesW
ereA
vailableF
orThe
Breach
OfThe
CovenantO
fQuietE
njoyment,
TheyW
ouldB
e
InappropriateIn
The
ConunercialC
ontext.
Tortand
contractlawprom
otedistinctpolicies,w
hichexplains
why
thedam
agesavailable
aresim
ilarlydistinct:
“Contractactions
arecreated
toprotectthe
interestinhaving
promises
performed,”
while
“[t]ort
actions
arecreated
toprotectthe
interestinfreedom
fromvarious
kindsofharm
.”
65
(Applied
Equipm
ent,supra,7C
aL4thatp.
515,internalcitationand
quotationm
arksom
itted.)G
iventhatdistinction,
contractdamages
are
limited
tothose
within
thecontem
plationofthe
contractingparties.
(ibid.;
Civ.
Code,§
3300.)Tort-type
damages,w
hichcan
includepunitive
damages,are
almostnever
availablein
contractactions.(E
rlich,supra,
21C
al.4thatp.
553.)“C
onductamounting
toa
breachofcontractbecom
es
tortiousonly
when
italsoviolates
anindependentduty
arisingfrom
principlesoftortlaw
.”(A
ppliedE
quipment,supra,7
Cal.4th
atp.515.)
Courts
arecareflulnotto
“blurthedistinction
between
contractand
tort.”(B
utler-.Rupp,supra,
134C
al.App.4th
atp.1229.)
Thisis
especially
truein
thecom
mercialcontext.
Our
Supreme
Courthas
recognizedthatthe
limitation
oncontractdam
ages“serves
toencourage
contractualrelations
andcom
mercialactivity
byenabling
partiesto
estimate
inadvance
the
financialrisksoftheir
enterprise.”(A
ppliedE
quipment,supra,7
Cal.4th
atp.515.)
TheC
ourtarticulateda
similar
concernw
henrefusing
toexpand
tortremedies
inthe
wrongfulterm
inationcontext:
“Theexpansion
oftort
remedies
inthe
employm
entcontexthaspotentially
enormous
consequences
forthestability
ofthe
businesscom
munity.”
(Foleyv.Interactive
Data
Corp.
(1988)47
Cal.3d
654,699
(Foley).)
Thesam
eholds
truein
thecom
merciallandlord-tenantcontext.
Tort
remedies
areunavailable
becausethe
landlordand
tenantare“parties
to
acom
merciallease;
assuch,they
[are]in
nospecialrelationship
thatwould
giverise
toa
dutyin
tort.”(Illchchooyiv.Best,supra,37
Cal.A
pp.4that
p.412.)M
oth
er
courtexplainedthata
comm
erciallandlordand
tenant
shareno
“specialorfiduciary
relationship”because
“eachcontracted
strictly
outofa
profitmotive,
andordinary
damages
forbreachofa
leasew
ere
66
availableequally
toboth.”
(Girard
v.Delta
Towers
JointVenture
(1993)
20C
al.App.4th
1741,1749.)
Accordingly,w
here—as
here—a
landlord’s
“dutiesw
erecircum
scribedby
[her]obligations
underthelease
andw
ere
confinedto
fUlfilling
[thecom
mercialtenant’s]
contractualexpectationsof
economic
gain,”only
contractdamages
areavailable.
(Butler-R
upp,supra,
134C
al.App.4th
atp.1229
[rejectingem
otionaldistressclaim
].)A
ny
additionalrecoveryw
ouldbe
“superfluous”because
thecom
mercialtenant
“ism
adew
holeby
therecovery
ofcontractdam
ages.”(Ilkhchooyiv.Best,
supra,37
CaLA
pp.4thatp.412.)
Ginsberg
nonethelessasks
theC
ourttojum
patw
hatshecalls
the
“opportunity”to
carveoutan
exceptionto
theseprinciples
(RB
/XA
OB
94)
toallow
punitivedam
agesagainsta
comm
erciallandlordforthe
breachof
quietenjoymentifthat“breach
is(1)
accomplished
bya
seriesof
intentionallyannoying
actsdesigned
tocom
pelthetenantto
vacateand
(2)com
mitted
with
‘oppression,fraud,orm
alice
”(R
B/X
AO
B91).
But
shedoes
notaddressthe
settledrules
that(a)a
breachofcontractnever
supportstortrem
edies,includingpunitive
damages,absentthe
breachof
some
extra-contractualduty,and(b)
motive
isneverrelevantto
aclaim
for
breachofcontract.
(See,e.g.,Freeman
&M
ills,Inc.
v.Belcher
OilCo.
(1995)11
Cal.4th
85,102;A
ppliedEquz~m
ent,supra,7
CaI.4th
atpp.515-
516;Foley,supra,47C
al.3datpp.
692-694.)
Whatlim
itedauthority
thereis
inthe
comm
erciallandlord-tenant
contextdemonstrates
thatGinsberg’s
allegationsvery
likelydo
notmake
outanyintentionaltort.
InM
cDonellv.A
merican
TrustCo.
(1955)
130C
al.App.2d
296,299,comm
ercialtenantssued
theirlandlordalleging
that“defendantaw
areofthe
defectivecondition
ofthe
roofanddrains
and
67
knowing
theycould
causedam
age,refusedto
repairthem.”
MeD
onellheld
that“[tjhosefacts
donotspellan
intentionaltort”and
thereforecould
not
supportpunitivedam
ages.(Id.
atpp.299-300[dem
urrerproperlysustained
topunitive
damages
count].)
Finally,
evenifthe
Courtbelieved
thatGinsberg’s
suggested
formulation
were
agood
idea,Ginsberg
stillwould
notbeentitled
to
punitivedam
ages:The
juryw
asn’teveninstructed,m
uchless
made
fmdings,
aboutwhether
Gam
sonbreached
thecovenant“by
aseries
of
intentionallyannoying
actsdesigned
tocom
pel[Ginsberg]
tovacate”
the
premises.
(Com
pareR
B/X
AO
B91
with
2A
A372,
392[jury
instruction
andspecialverdict];
seepp.
60-63,ante.)
B.
Ginsberg’s
California
Case
LawD
oesN
otSupportH
er
Position.
Although
sheacknow
ledgesthat“[n]o
California
casehas
directly
addressedthe
recoverabilityofpunitive
damages
againstalandlord
under
acom
merciallease
forbreach
ofthe
covenantofquietenjoym
ent,”
Ginsberg
claims
that“severalCalifornia
caseshave
touchedon
theissue.”
(RB
/XA
OB
90.)B
utherauthority
consistsofthree
casesthathave
nothing
todo
with
the“issue.”
(R.B
/XA
OB
90-91;see
Sonic-C
alabasasA,
Inc.v.
Moreno
(2011)51
Cal.4th
659,694,lb.14
(Sonic-C
alabasas)[“(I)t
is
axiomatic
thatcasesare
notauthorityforpropositions
notconsidered,”
alterationin
original;internalquotation
marks
andcitation
omitted].)
Beckettv.
City
ofP
arisThy
Goods
Cc.
(1939)14
Cal.2d
633
(Beckett).
Ginsberg
suggeststhatB
eckett“implicitly
acknowledged
that
[acom
mercialtenant]m
ightbeentitled
topunitive
damages”
forbreachof
68
quietenjoyment.
(RB
IXA
OB
90,alteration
added.)N
ottrue.The
underlyingclaim
inB
eckettwasw
rongfuleviction—notbreach
ofquiet
enjoyment.
(14C
al.2datpp.
638-639j’2
Too/cev.A
llen,supra,85
Cal.A
pp.2d230.
Ginsberg
arguesthat
althoughToo/ce
concerneda
residentialtenant,thecourt“touched
on”
comm
ercialleasesby
affirming
apunitive
damages
award
“for,in
part,
‘lossofbusiness
earnings.”(R
B/X
AO
B90.)
Nottrue.
Too/ceconsidered
onlyw
hethertheresidentialtenant’s
“[1]ossofearnings”
shouldhave
been
“pleadedby
way
ofspeciaidam
ages.”(85
Cal.A
pp.2datp.238.)
Fanoutsopoulosv.
Cham
bliss(2007)
157C
al.App.4th
297
(Panoutsopoulos).
Although
sherelied
onP
anoutsopoulosin
thetrial
court,G
insbergnow
concedesthat“punitive
damages
arenotatissue”
in
thatcase.(R
BIX
AO
B90-91;see
3A
A597;
6R
T895;
7R
T1070.)
But
shecites
itanyway
becauseit“noted”
thatanarbitrator
ina
prior
proceedinghad
awarded
“$100,000in
punitivedam
agesagainstthe
comm
erciallandlordon
claims
ofbreach
ofthe
covenantofquiet
enjoymentand
intentionalinflictionofem
otionaldistress.”
(RB
IXA
OB
91.)A
gain,nottrue.
Forone
thing,Fanoutsopoulosidentified
nothingof“note”
inthe
arbitrator’saw
ard—itdescribed
theaw
ardonly
asa
mattero
fproceduralbackground.(157
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
303.)For
another,
thearbitrator
awarded
$100,000in
punitivedam
ageson
aclaim
for
12Beclcettdidnotconsider
orruleon
theviability
ofa
wrongfU
leviction
tortinthe
comm
ercialcontext—itm
erelyassum
edthatthe
tortexisted.Thus,B
eckettisnotauthority
fortheviability
ofthatpurported
tort.(See
Sonic-C
alabasas,supra,51
Cal.4th
atp.694,
fit14.)
69
intentionalinflictionofem
otionaldistress—notbreach
ofquietenjoym
ent.
(Ibid.)
C.
Ginsberg’s
Out-O
f-State
Au
tho
rityD
oesN
otSupportH
er
Position.
Ginsberg
citestw
oout-of-state
opinionsthatshe
says“expressly
affirmed
punitivedam
agesaw
ardsagainstlandlords
undercomm
ercial
leasesfortortious
breachofthe
covenantofquietenjoym
ent”:D
anielsv.
Dean
(1992)253
Mont.
465[833
P.2d1078]
(Daniels),
andh
IP.
Corp.
v.
210C
entralPar/c
SouthC
orp.(N
.Y.
App.
Div.
1962)16
A.D
.2d461
[228N
.Y.S
.2d883],
affd.(N
.Y.
1963)12
N.Y
.2d329
[189N
.E.2d
812]
(LHP
.C
orp.).(R
B/X
AO
B94-97.)
Yetagain,nottrue.
Ginsberg
relieson
theegregious
factsin
Daniels
while
misstating
its
holding.(R
B!X
AO
B94-96.)
Shecontends
thatunderDaniels,the
Court
shoulduphold
thepunitive
damages
award
because,shesays,the
evidence
provesthat—
ashappened
inD
aniels—”G
amson’s
deliberatefailure
to
make
repairscreated
asubstantialrisk
toG
insberg’sbusiness
byturning
away
customers.”
(RB
/XA
OB
96.)She
intimates
thatDaniels’reference
to
tortiousinterference
with
thetenant’s
leaseis
thesam
ecause
ofaction
that
shealleged
here.(R
B/X
AO
B94-96.)
Itisn’t.In
Daniels,the
tenant
complained
aboutthelandlord’s
tortiousinterference
with
contractualor
businessrelationships
with
customers.
(833P.2d
atp.1084.)
TheD
aniels
punitivedam
agesaw
ardw
aspredicated
onfactualfindings
underlyingthat
tort,plusa
defamation
count.(Id.
atpp.1083-1084.)
Incontrast,
Ginsberg
neveralleged
aclaim
fortortiousinterference
with
contractualorbusiness
relationshipsw
ithcustom
ers,andthe
juryw
asnever
instructedon
that
70
theoryand
made
nofindings
thatcouldsupportit.’3
Accordingly,
Ginsberg’s
argumentw
orksonly
byignoring
bothD
aniels’holdingand
the
proceduralpostureofherow
ncase.
Ginsberg
getsLI-fR
.C
orp.wrong,too.
(RB
/XA
OB
96-97.)The
legalissuein
LI-IF.
Corp.
was
whether
equitablereliefcould
support
apunitive
damages
award.
(228N
.Y.S
.2datpp.
885-888,affd.189
N.E
.2d
atpp.812-814.)
Theinterm
ediateappellate
courtheldthatthe
two
forms
of
reliefcouldbe
combined,
andN
ewY
ork’sC
ourtofA
ppealsaffirm
ed.
(Ibid.)B
utneithercourtconsideredw
hether,as
am
atterofpublic
policy,
punitivedam
agesshould
beavailable
toa
comm
ercialtenantprevailingon
apurported
claimfor
“tortious”breach
ofquietenjoym
ent—and
itisnot
evenclearw
hethertheunderlying
causeofaction
inLI-fR
.C
orp.sounded
incontractortort.
(222N
.Y.S
.2datpp.
885,888-889,
affd.189
N.E
.2dat
pp.812,
814.)11fF
.C
orp.is
notauthorityfor
Ginsberg’s
position.
(SeeS
onic-Calabasas,supra,
51C
al.4thatp.
694,th.
14.)
‘~G
insbergim
pliesthatshe
soughtdamages
forcustom
erloss,statingthat
theevidence
showed
and“Judge
Torresfound”
thatthealleged
lackof
repairscreated
“asubstantialrisk
toG
insberg’sbusiness
byturning
away
customers.”
(RB
/XA
OB
96.)B
utJudgeTorres
made
nosuch
finding,eitheratthe
placeG
insbergcites
oranyw
hereelse,and
theclaim
was
neverpartofG
insberg’scase.
(Seegenerally
1A
A44-62
[firstamended
complaint];
2A
A335
[Ginsberg
damages
chart];2R
T189-192
[Ginsberg
openingstatem
ent];3
RT
200-349[G
insbergtrialtestim
ony];6
RT
854-912[conference
oninstructions
andspecialverdictform
s];6
RT
932-938[G
insbergclosing
argument];
6R
T990-991
[referringto
damages
chartused
duringclosing
argument);
7R
T1072:1-7
[trialcourtrecognizedthat
Ginsberg
didnotallege
“lossofprofits,”
only“loss
ofquietenjoym
ent”].)
71
IV.
TH
ISC
OU
RT
SH
OU
LDA
FF
IRM
TH
EO
RD
ER
ST
RIK
ING
THE
P1JINITW
ED
AM
AG
ES
VE
RD
ICT
EV
EN
AS
SU
MIN
G
TH
AT
GIN
SB
ER
GP
LEA
DE
DA
ND
PR
OV
ED
TO
RT
IOU
S
CO
ND
UC
TB
YG
AM
SO
N.
A.
TheS
pecialVerdictFails
ToS
upportAP
unitiveD
amages
Aw
ard.
1.A
sa
matter
ofconstitutionaldue
process,punitive
damages
mustbear
areasonable
relationshipto
compensatory
damages.
TheC
ourtindependentlyreview
sw
hetherthepunitive
damages
verdictisconstitutionally
excessive.(Sim
onv.
SanF
aoloU
S.
Holding
Co.,
Inc.(2005)
35C
al.4th1159,
1172&
fit2
(Simon).)14
Apunitive
damages
award
mustbeara
“reasonablerelationship”
tocom
pensatorydam
ages.
(Id.atp.
1181,citing
BM
WofN
orthA
merica
v.G
ore(1996)
517U
.S.559
andState
Farm
MutualA
utomobile
InsuranceCo.
v.C
ampbell(2003)
538U
.S.408(State
Farm
).)In
assessingthe
constitutionalityofpunitive
damages
awards,
courtsm
ustconsidertheratio
between
thecom
pensatory
14G
amson’s
challengesto
thespecialverdictas
describedin
thissection
areproperly
beforethe
Court.
Shepreserved
thesechallenges
byraising
themin
herpost-trialmotions.
(3A
A532-536,548-558;4
AA
779-788;see
Am
ericanM
odernH
ome
InsuranceCo.
v.Fahmian
(2011)194
Cal.App.4th
162,170.)
Moreover,
“[Ginsberg],
asthe
plaintiff;hadresponsibility
forsubm
ittinga
verdictformsufficientto
supporthercausesofaction.
[Citation.)
Ifshechose
nottoinclude
aproposed
factualfmding
essentialtoone
ofher
claims,itis
notincumbenton
[Gam
son],as
thedefendant,to
make
surethe
omission
iscured.”
(Behrv.R
edmond
(2011)193
Cal.A
pp.4th517,531-532;
accord,e.g.,M
yers,supra,13
Cal.A
pp.4thatpp.
961-962.)
72
andpunitive
damages
awards.
(See,e.g.,Simon,supra,35
CaI.4th
at
pp.1181-1183;JetS
ourceC
harter,Inc.
v.Doherty
(2007)148
CaI.A
pp.4th
1,9-10(JetS
ource).)
2.B
ecausethe
specialverdictdoesnotdistinguish
between
damages
awarded
for
breachofcontract
andto
rt,it
isim
possibleto
determine
whether
the
ratioofpunitive
damages
tocom
pensatoryto
rt
damages
satisfiesdue
process.
Atthe
trialcourt’sinsistence,the
specialverdicthasonly
asingle
determination
ofdam
ages.(2
AA
378,393;
6R
T866:6-21,
868:25-28,
1016:17-1017:25.)Itm
akesno
distinctionbetw
eenG
insberg’scontractand
purported“to
rt”claim
s.(2
AA
393.)E
venassum
ingthatG
insbergalleged
andprevailed
onany
tortclaim,this
failureto
distinguishtortfrom
contract
damages
necessarilydoom
sa
punitivedam
agesaw
ard.
a.O
nlyto
rtdam
agesm
aybe
consideredin
assessingw
hetherpunitive
damages
are
constitutionallyexcessive.
Punitive
damages
areonly
availablefortorts—
notbreachesof
contract.(C
iv.C
ode,§3294;
seep.48,
ante.)Therefore,assum
ingthat
Ginsberg’s
purported“intentionalinterference”
claimw
asa
cognizabletort,
onlythe
damages
awarded
onthatclaim
may
beconsidered
inassessing
whetherthe
punitivedam
agesaw
ardis
constitutionallyexcessive
or
otherwise
defective.(See
TextronF
inancialCorp.
v.Nat.
Union
Fire
Ins.
Co.ofP
ittsburgh(2004)
118C
al.App.4th
1061,1084
(Textron)[“our
considerationofthe
disparitybetw
eenplaintiff’s
actualharmand
the
73
punitivedam
ageaw
ardm
ustbelim
itedto
itstortrelief’];
Diam
ond
Woodw
orks,Inc.v.A
rgonautIns.Co.
(2003)109
Cal.A
pp.4th1020,
1056
&fn.
35,disapprovedofin
partonothergrounds
bySim
on,supra,
35C
al.4thatpp.1182-1183.)
b.T
hepunitive
damages
award
failsbecause
thereis
nospecialverdictfinding
that
Gam
son’spurported
“intentional
interference”dam
agedG
insberg.
Overview
.There
isno
explicitspecialverdictfmding
ofdam
ages
attributableto
Ginsberg’s
purportedtortclaim
for“intentional
interference,”as
distinguishedfrom
hercontractclaim
s.(2
AA
389-390
[breachoforaland
written
contractverdicts);2A
A392
[“intentional
interferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises”verdict];
2A
A393
[damages
verdict).)
Aju
ryfm
dingofactualtortdam
ages,however,is
anabsolute
“predicate”
forpunitivedam
ages.(M
otherC
obb‘s
Chicken
Turnovers,Inc.v.F
ox
(1937)10
Cal.2d
203,205(M
otherC
obb~i).)
As
theC
aliforniaSuprem
e
Courtexplained
longago:
“Evilthoughts
oracts,barren
ofresult,
arenot
thesubjecto
fexemplary
damages.”
(Id.atp.206.)
Thus,aju
ryverdictthat
expresslyaw
ardszero
tortdamages
cannotsupportapunitive
damages
award.
(SeeC
heungv.D
aley(1995)
35C
al.App.4th
1673,1677
(Cheung)
[reversingpunitive
damages
award
where
jury“m
adean
express
determination
nottoaw
ardcom
pensatorydam
ages”];C
alzforniav.A
ltus
FinanceS.A.
(9thC
ir.2008)
540F.3d
992,1001
(AtticsFinance)
[“California
lawis
well-established
andquite
clear.W
herethe
jury
here
explicitlyfound
‘$0’ofcom
pensatorydam
ages,thegeneralrule
precludes
punitivedam
ages”].)
74
Thisrequirem
entisrigorously
enforced.For
example,a
punitive
damages
award
willbe
reversedon
thisground
evenif
substantialevidence
supportsthe
jury’sfinding
of“fraud,
oppressionorm
alice.”(C
heung,
sup-a,35
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
1677.)The
same
istrue
evenif
anotherspecial
verdictshows
thatthejury
believedp
lain
tiffhadbeen
“harmed.”
(Altus
Finance,supra,540
F.3datp.
1002[“jury’s
award
of‘$0’in
compensatory
damages
establishedthat,notw
ithstandingthe
‘harm’
foundin
Form5,the
Com
missionerdid
notsufferthe‘actualdam
ages’necessaryto
sustainthe
jury’spunitive
damages
award,”
citingC
heungand
Mother
Cobb
‘s]~)15
Thedam
agesspecialverdict.
Thedam
agesverdictform
required
thejury
toaw
arda
singlecom
pensatorydam
ageam
ountifGinsberg
prevailedon
anyone
ofherfour
counts.(2
AA
393;seep.
73,ante.)
Becausethe
juryfound
Gam
sonliable
forbreachesofcontract(2
AA
389-
390),thereis
now
ayto
knowfrom
theverdictifthe
jury
intendedto
award
anycom
pensatorydam
ages—m
uchless
theam
ountofthose
damages—
on
the“intentionalinterference
with
useofprem
ises”count(2
AA
392).The
damages
specialverdictdirectedthatifthe
juryfound
liabilityand
harmon
anyofG
insberg’stheories—
which
itdidon
breachofw
rittencontract,
breachoforalcontract,and
“intentionalinterferencew
ithuse
ofprem
ises”
(2A.A
389-392)-—itw
asto
answerthe
question“W
hatamounto
f
15There
isa
narrowexception:
Punitive
damages
areavailable
where
the
juryfinds
actualharmbutplaintiffis
statutorilybarred
fromrecovering
tortdam
ages.(A
ltusFinance,supra,
540F.3d
atpp.1001-1002,
citingG
agnonv.
ContinentalC
asualtyCo.
(1989)211
Cal.A
pp.3d1598,
1603-1605.)The
exceptionis
irrelevant—ifG
insberghad
atortclaim
,therew
asno
statutoryim
pedimentto
herrecoveryoftortdam
ages.
75
compensatory
damages,if
any,do
youaw
ardEstherG
insberg?”(2
AA
393).It
found$49,100.
(Ibid.)
Thespecialverdictthen
instructedthatifthe
jury“answ
ered‘yes’to
question2
inV
erdictFormN
o.4”—
i.e.,the
questionin
the“intentional
interference”verdictasking
“Do
youfind
byclearand
convincingevidence
thatHanna
Gam
sonengaged
inconductw
ithm
alice,oppression
orfraud?”
(2A
A392)—
thenitshould
answerquestion
2in
thedam
agesspecial
verdict:
“2.W
hatamounto
fpunitivedam
ages,ifany,do
youaw
ard
Esther
Ginsberg?
“$385.000”
(2A
A393.)
Thisis
theentirety
ofthe
jury’sdam
agesfm
ding.There
isno
findingthatconnects
the$49,100
compensatory
award
toany
particular
causeofaction,
andthere
isno
way
totie
thenum
bertoany
particular
componento
fGinsberg’s
damages
claims.
Thepunitive
damages
award
fails
asa
matter
oflaw
.The
absence
ofa
specialverdictfmding
ofactualtortdam
agesis
fatalbecausea
punitive
damages
award
mustbe
groundedon
afinding
ofactualtortdam
ages.
(Seepp.
73-75,ante.)
Forexam
ple,a
punitivedam
agesverdictfails
asa
matter
oflaw
ifthejury’s
specialverdictomits
fmdings
onthe
requisite
elements
ofthe
underlyingtortcause
ofaction.
(Myers,supra,
13C
al.App.4th
atp.960-961
[punitivedam
agesverdictfailed
becausejury
was
“neitherrequestedto
nordid
itmake
thenecessary
factualfmdings
for
afraud
orothertortcause
ofaction”].)76
Thisdefectprovides
anindependentbasis
onw
hichthis
Court
shouldaffirm
thetrialcourt’s
orderstriking
thepunitive
damages
verdict:
“[Tin
thosecases
inw
hicha
separatetortaction
isalleged,
ifthereis
‘but
oneverdictbased
uponcontract’
apunitive
damage
award
isim
proper.
[Citation.]
Where
suchan
award
ism
ade,thereview
ingcourtm
aym
odifSr
thejudgm
enttostrike
thepunitive
damages
andaffirm
thejudgm
entasso
modified.
[Citation].”
(Id.atp.
960.)M
oreover,thepunitive
damages
verdictfailsas
am
atteroflaw
evenassum
ing—as
Ginsberg
argues—that
thejm
y’s“m
alice,oppression
orfraud”
fmding
issupported
bysubstantial
evidence.(See
RB
IXA
OB
82-87;C
heung,supra,35C
al.App.4th
at
p.1677;M
yers,supra,13
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
961.)
c.The
punitivedam
agesaw
ardviolates
due
processbecause
thelum
p-sumcom
pensatory
damages
verdictprecludesm
eaningful
jud
icialreview
oftheproportionality
ofthe
award.
Even
assuming
thatthe$49,100
compensatory
award
includessom
e
amounto
ftortdamages,
sothatpunitive
damages
mightbe
theoretically
permissible,the
punitivedam
agesaw
ardstillfails
becausethe
verdict’s
lackofspecificity
violatesdue
process.
Due
processm
andatesm
eaningfulappellatereview
ofpunitive
damages
awards.
(Honda
Motor
Co.,Ltd.v.
Oberg
(1994)512
U.S
.415,
432[holding
unconstitutionalOregon
lawprecluding
suchreview
].)
“[U]nder
Oberg,
[courts]m
ustconsiderwhether
apunitive
damages
award
passes‘m
usterunderfederaldue
processanalysis’in
additionto
reviewing
77
whetherthe
evidenceis
sufficientasa
matter
oflaw
tosupportthe
award.”
(Inre
Exxon
Valdez
(9thC
ir.2001)
270F.3d
1215,1240,footnote
omitted.)
ThisC
ourtcannotmeaningfully
retiewthe
damages
specialverdict
becauseit
doesnotapportion
thelum
p-sum$49,100
compensatory
damages
award
between
Ginsberg’s
contractand“to
rt”claim
s.(See
2A
A393;see
pp.73,75-76,
ante.)The
jurym
ighthaveintended
toaw
ard$0
onthe
purported“intentionalinterference
with
useofprem
ises”tortor$10
or
$100or
$1,000,with
therem
aindercompensating
Ginsberg
onthe
contract
counts.W
ithoutaspecialverdictapportioning
the“tort”
andcontract
compensatory
damages,this
Courtcannotdetennine
whetherthe
$385,000
punitivedam
agesaw
ardbears
areasonable
relationshipto
theactualtort
damages.
(SeeTextron,
supra,118
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
1084[punitive
damages
award
mustbe
basedonly
onjury’s
fmding
oftort—
not
contract—dam
ages].)
Our
Supreme
Court,how
ever,requires
denovo
appellatereview
of
punitivedam
agesaw
ards,which
mustinclude
“making
anindependent
assessmento
fthereprehensibility
ofthe
defendant’sconduct,
[and)the
relationshipbetw
eenthe
award
andthe
harmdone
tothe
plaintiff.”(S
imon,
supra,35
Cal.4th
atp.1172.)
Thepunitive
damages
verdictfacially
foreclosesthis
mandatory
“[e]xactingappellate
review”
onproportionality.
(Ibid.,originalalteration,quoting
State
Farm,
supra,538
U.s.atp.
418.)
78
TheC
ourtmusttherefore
affinnthe
strikingofthe
punitivedam
ages
verdict.’6B.
Punitive
Dam
agesC
ouldN
otBeA
warded
InL
ightO
f
Gam
son’sW
ell-Founded
Beliefs
That
SheW
asC
omplying
With
Her
Repair
Obligations
And
That
Ginsberg
Was
Holding
Over.
1.P
unitivedam
agescannotattach
where
the
defendanthada
well-founded
beliefthather
conductwas
proper.
Thetrialcourtprejudicially
erredby
submitting
thepunitive
damages
issueto
theju
rybecause
theevidence—
andthere
would
havebeen
more
hadthe
trialcourtnotexcludedit—
demonstrated
thatGam
sonhad
areasonable
basisfor
assertingthatG
insberg’stenancy
expiredin
16Lastyear,Division
Two
ofthis
Districtupheld
apunitive
damages
award
eventhough
thejury’s
lump-sum
compensatory
damages
award
didnotinclude
specialverdictfactualfmdings
onthe
amounto
fcompensatory
damages
awarded
forbadfaith
andbreach
ofcontract.
(Ainerigraphics,
Inc.v.M
ercuryC
asualtyCo.
(2010)182
Cal.A
pp.4th1538,
1557-1558(A
merigraphics).)
Butw
hilethe
Am
erigraphicsverdictfonn
issim
ilartothe
onechallenged
here,Am
erigraphicsis
irrelevantbecausethe
courtdidnotconsider
anyargum
entsimilarto
Gam
son’sconstitutional
proportionalitychallenge.
(SeeS
onic-Calabasas,supra,
51C
al.4that
p.694,fit
14.)ifiany
event,Ainerigraphics’rationale
isunsound.
Am
erigraphicsrecognized
theverdict’s
anomaly,butaffirm
edanyw
aybecause
the“special
verdict formhere
didnotpreclude
afm
dingofpunitive
damages.”
(182C
al.App.4th
p.1557,originalitalics.)
Am
erigraphicsw
asm
istaken:The
constitutionallym
andatedde
novoreview
ofpunitive
awards
means
thatthedispositive
questionm
ustbew
hethertheverdictaffirm
ativelysupports
thepunitive
award,notm
erelyw
hetheritdoesn’tpreclude
theaw
ard.A
merigraphics
askedthe
wrong
question,andso
came
upw
iththe
wrong
answer.
79
Ap
ril2006and
thatshehad
complied
with
herrepairresponsibilitiesunder
theC
onservatorLease.(See
Wojfsen
v.Hathaw
ay(1948)
32C
al.2d632,
648-651
[defendant’sactions
inplow
ingfield
leasedto
plaintiffsand
to
which
defendanthadno
leaseholdrights
couldnotsupporta
punitiveaw
ard
where
defendant hadno
knowledge
ofplaintiffs’interestand
believed,
thougherroneously,thathe
hada
validorallease],
overruledin
parton
othergroundsby
Flaresv.A
rroyo(1961)
56C
al.2d492,
49
7•)1
7
“Exem
plarydam
agesare
notrecoverableagainsta
defendantwho
actsin
goodfaith
andunderthe
adviceofcounseL”
(Foxv.A
ced(1957)
49C
al.2d381,
385.)This
isso
becausepunitive
damages
areim
posedonly
ifthedefendantacted
with
therequisite
stateofm
ind:A
“tortcomm
itted
bym
istake,inthe
assertionofa
supposedright,
orwithoutany
wrong
intention,and
withoutsuch
recklessnessas
evincesm
aliceora
conscious
disregardofthe
rightsofothers,does
notwarrantpunitive
damages”
becausethe
“wrongfhlpersonalintention
toinjure
isthe
factorthatcalls
forththe
penaltyofexem
plarydam
ages.”(R
othv.
ShellO
ilCo.(1960)
185C
al.App.2d
676,682,disapprovedofin
partonothergrounds
by
17G
amson
preservedthese
challengesby
raisingthem
inthe
trialcourt.
(See,e.g.,2
SA
A1153-1162
[nonsuitmotion];
4R
T502-517
[hearingon
nonsuitmotion];
3A
A554-556
[newtrialm
otion];4A
A783-784
[replyin
supportofpost-trialm
otions].)In
addition,G
amson
arguedthroughout
theseproceedings
thattheC
onservatorLeaseexpired
inA
pril2006,and
that,as
aholdover
tenant,G
insbergeitherhad
tovacate
orenteranew
lease.(E
.g.,2R
T4,
12[hearing
onG
amson’s
bifurcationm
otion];2
RT
48[hearing
onG
amson’s
requesteddeclaratory
relief];1
AA
132-134,¶~J15,
20,21[third
amended
cross-complaint];
1S
AA
891,¶IJ5-9
[Gam
sondeclaration
insupporto
fsumm
aryjudgm
entmotion];
1S
AA
896-897,¶~J4-5,
7-8[separate
statementin
supportofG
amson
summ
aryjudgment
motion];
seealso
1A
A164,
172-174[m
emo
insupportofG
amson
summ
aryjudgm
entmotion].)
80
Templeton
Feed&
Grain
v.Ralston
Purina
Co.(1968)
69C
al.2d461,470-
471.)A
tthevery
least,adefendant’s
good-faithreliance
oncounselis
afactor
forthe
jury
toconsiderin
assessingpunitive
damages.
(Rosenerv.
Sears,R
oebuck&
Co.(1980)
110C
al.App.3d
740,754.)
Our
Supreme
Courthas
rejectedpunitive
damages
inthis
very
context.In
Wo(fsen
v.Hathaw
ay,supra,32C
al.2datpp.
650-651,
theC
ourtheldthatthe
trialcourterredby
puttingthe
punitivedam
ages
questionto
theju
rygiven
theevidentiary
record:“S
incethe
record
indisputablyshow
sthat[defendant’s)
tortiousacts
uponthe
premises
in
questionstenned
notfromany
‘malice
infact,’butw
hollyfrom
am
istaken
claimofrightunderthe
beliefthathis‘orallease’w
asvalid
and
enforceable,the‘w
rongifilpersonalintentionto
injure’thatcallsforth
the
penaltyofpunitive
damages
was
notestablishedand
thecourterred
in
submitting
them
atterofsuch
award
tothe
jury.”
2.A
sa
matter
oflaw,
Gam
sonhad
areasonable
basis
for
assertingthat
Ginsberg’s
leaseexpired
in
April2006
andthatshe
was
aholdover
ten
an
t
a.G
amson’s
interpretationofthe
renewal
languagew
asreasonable.
We
havedem
onstratedthat,as
am
atteroflaw
,G
insberg’slease
is
notperpetualandtherefore
conferredonly
onerenew
altennthatexpired
in
2006.E
venifthe
Courtdisagrees
thatthelaw
requiresthis
conclusion,
Gam
son’sclaim
iscertainly
tenablegiven
thatitisconsistentw
ithsettled
California
law(A
OB
18-21;pp.4-5,
ante)and
thelaw
inthe
overwhelm
ing
81
majority
ofjurisdictionsthroughoutthe
United
States(A
OB
21-24&
fri.12).
Moreover,G
amson
testifiedw
ithoutcontradictionorim
peachment
thattwo
differentlawyers
toldherthatthe
Conservator
Leasehad
tobe
revised.(See,
e.g.,4R
T454:7-9
[Gam
sontestified
(underEvid.
Code,
§776)
regardingraising
Ginsberg’s
rent:“A
sfar
asw
hateverthelease
said,I’ma
law-abiding
citizen.I’m
goingby
thelease.
And
atthetim
e
therew
assom
econifision
aboutthatlease”];2
RA
318[exhibit57];see
generally4
RT
453:15-464:17[G
amson
testimony
(underEvid.
Code,
§776)
regardingG
insberg’srentand
renewaloptions].)
After
Gam
son
retainedhernow
-currentrealestatelaw
yerSaulJaffe
inlate
2004or
early
2005(5
RT
749,753-754),M
r.Jaffe
comm
unicatedw
ithG
insberg’s
previouslaw
yer“to
claritS’thenum
berofoptions
[Ginsberg]
hadand
to
bringherto
am
arketrentatsome
point”(5
RT
787;seealso
5R
T782-785,
788-789).
And
that’snotall.
JudgeFerns,w
hopresided
overthiscase
before
JudgeTones,
agreedthatG
insberg’srightto
remain
inthe
propertyw
as
uncertain.(2
AA
281-283
[denyingparties’
cross-motions
forsum
mary
judgmentj;
seealso
2R
TB-1—
B-17[hearing].)
Ina
detailedruling,he
foundthatthe
“[renewal]
provision,andthe
provisionsin
theE
stoppel
Certificates
show,atbest,thatthere
isam
biguityas
tow
hetheranoption
or
optionsw
eregranted
tothe
tenant.”(2
AA
281.)
82
b.G
amson’s
interpretationofthe
renewal
languagecannotsupportpunitive
damages
as
am
atteroflaw
.
Given
Gam
son’sconstruction
ofthe
renewallanguage,
shehad
two
choices:eithercom
mence
unlawfhldetainerproceedings
againstGinsberg
aftertheC
onservatorLeaseexpired
inA
pril2006
orpreemptively
negotiate
anew
leasew
ithher.
Sinceneither
coursecould
amountto
anythingm
ore
thanthe
assertionofcontractualrights,neithercould
eversupportpunitive
damages.
(SeeG
affneyv.D
owney
Savings&
LoanAssn.
(1988)
200C
al.App.3d
1154,1170
[“Defendant’s
solerem
edyw
asforeclosure
and
nothingin
itsattem
pttopursue
thatremedy
canbe
construedas
evidence
ofoppression,
fraudorm
alice”].)
Thisconclusion
would
standeven
iftheC
ourtultimately
disagrees
with
Gam
son’slegalposition:
Shedid
nothingm
orethan
assertarightthat
shehad
probablecause
toassertin
lightofthe
lawthatw
ehave
presented
andas
confirmed
byJudge
Ferns’sum
mary
judgmentruling.
Certainly,her
“positioncannotbe
deemed
sounreasonable
asto
evidencem
alice,fraud,
orgross
negligence.”(Food
Pro
InternationaL,Inc.
v.Farmers
Insurance
Exchange
(2008)169
Cal.A
pp.4th976,994-995
(FoodP
ro)[punitive
damages
unavailablein
partbecausetrialcourthad
agreedw
ithdefendant
insurer’sduty-to-defend
position].)G
amson’s
situationis
analogousto
that
ofa
malicious
prosecutiondefendantw
hoprevailed
againstasum
mary
judgmentm
otionin
theunderlying
action:U
nderthe“interim
adverse
judgmentrule,”
thatfactaloneconclusively
establishesthe
defendant’s
83
probablecause
toassertthe
underlyingclaim
becausethe
ruling
“necessarilyim
pl[ies]thatthe
judge[found]
atleastsome
merit”
inthe
claim.
(Antounian
v.LouisV
uittonM
alletier(2010)
189C
al.App.4th
438,
450-451.)So,too,here:
ThatJudgeFerns
rejectedG
insberg’ssum
mary
judgmentchallenge
toG
amson’s
interpretationofthe
ConservatorLease
conclusivelyshow
sthatG
amson
hadprobable
causeto
urgethat
interpretation.Thatbeing
thecase,
Gam
sonshould
notbesubjectto
punitivedam
ages,regardlessofw
hetherherpositionultim
atelyturns
outto
beconect.
Toputitanotherw
ay,theC
onservatorLease’s
veryam
biguitybars
recoveryofpunitive
damages:
“Where
anissue
isone
offirstim
pressionor
where
arighthas
notbeenclearly
established,punitivedam
agesare
generallyunavailable.”
(Waits
v.Frito-Lay,
Inc.(9th
Cir.
1992)978
F.2d
1093,1104
[construingC
alifornialaw
];accord,F
oodP
ro,supra,
169C
al.App.4th
atp.995
[althoughappellate
courtrejectedinsurer’s
positionon
itsduty
todefend,punitive
damages
were
nonetheless
unavailablein
partbecauseinsurerhad
reliedon
advicefrom
two
law
firms];M
organG
uarantyT
rustCo.o
fNY
v.Am
ericanSavings
&Loan
Assn.(9th
Cir.
1986)804
F.2d1487,
1500[“A
lthoughw
ereverse,w
e
acknowledge
thatthisis
aclose
caseand
thatthekey
issueis
oneoffirst
impression.
Punitive
damages
areinappropriate
inthis
case”].)
Likeprobable
causein
am
aliciousprosecution
action,the
determination
ofw
hethera
partyhas
areasonable
basisfor
asserting
acontractualrightis
necessarilya
questionoflaw
.(See
Franklin
Mint,
84
supra,184
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
333[in
them
aliciousprosecution
context,the
“existenceor
absenceofprobable
causeis
aquestion
oflaw
tobe
determined
bythe
courtfromthe
factsestablished
inthe
case”j.)A
tleast
thism
ustbetrue
where
theonly
issueis—
asitw
ashere—
theinterpretation
ofa
contractonits
face.Since
aface-of-the-agreem
entinterpretationis
for
thecourt,only
thecourtcan
properlydeterm
inew
hethera
party’s
interpretationis
reasonable—or,
inthe
words
ofprobable
cause
jurisprudence,“w
hetherany
reasonableattorney
would
havethoughtthe
claimtenable.”
(Ibid.,citation
omitted.)
“This
isan
objectivestandard,
anddoes
nottakeinto
accountthesubjective
mentalstate
ofthe
defendant;
iftheunderlying
claims
were
objectivelytenable,the
malicious
prosecution
claimfails,
regardlessofany
evidenceofm
aliceon
theparto
fthe
defendant.”(Ibid.)
BecauseG
amson’s
leaseinterpretation
was
reasonable,asa
mattero
f
lawherassertion
ofitcannotsupportpunitive
damages.
3.T
hetria
lcourt’serroneous
exclusionofevidence
of
Gam
son’sgood
faithentitles
herto
anew
trial.
IftheC
ourtdecidesto
chartnewterritory
byholding
thatpunitive
damages
canbe
availableunderfacts
likeours,then
atthevery
least
Gam
sonw
illbeentitled
toa
newthaibecause
ofthe
trialcourt’sexclusion
ofevidence
aboutGam
son’sgood-faith
beliefsand
advicefrom
counsel
thatshehad
notbreachedthe
ConservatorLease.
(E.g.,
5R
T737,
743-745,
787-788,796;
6R
T809-810;
pp.44-46,ante;
seeB
eneficialFire
and
Casualty
InsuranceCo.
v.KurtH
it/ce&
Co.,Inc.(1956)46
Cal.2d
517,522
85
[offerofproofnotrequired
“(w)here
anentire
classofevidence
hasbeen
declaredinadm
issibleorthe
trialcourthasclearly
intimated
itwillreceive
noevidence
ofa
particularclass
orupona
particularissue”].)
Thetrial
court’sevidentiary
rulingsw
ereprejudicially
erroneousbecause
Gam
son’s
stateofm
indw
asdirectly
relevanttothe
availabilityofpunitive
damages
anditis
therefore“reasonably
probable”thatthe
jury
would
nothave
imposed
punitivedam
ages—atleastnot$3
85,000’sw
orth—had
itknown
aboutGam
son’sgood-faith
relianceon
counsel.(See
Bellv.M
ason(2011)
194C
al.App.4th
1102,1107
[standardforprejudicialerror].)
Gam
sonpresented
ample
evidence—or
atleasttriedto—
ofher
good-faithand
well-founded
beliefthatshehad
complied
with
oreven
exceededherrepair
obligationsunderthe
ConservatorLease.
(See,e.g.,
5R
T796;
6R
T809-810
[sustainingobjections
toquestioning
ofM
r.Jaffe
aboutGam
son’scontractualobligation
torepair
Ginsberg’s
floorand
awning].)
Forexam
ple,G
amson
testifiedin
detailaboutwhatshe
believed
tobe
timely
responsesto
Ginsberg’s
complaints
andthe
expensesthatshe
incurredin
inspectingand
repairingG
insberg’sstore.
(E.g.,4
RT
473-474,
482-483,486-487;
5R
T744-750;2
SA
A1247-1249
[exhibit627].)
Inaddition,
afterherlawyers
reviewed
theC
onservatorLease
andinspected
theprem
ises,theytold
Gam
sonthatshe
was
complying
with
hercontractual
repairobligations.
(E.g.,2
SA
A1241-1242
[exhibit614];3
RT
347-348;
6R
T814
[Mr.
Jaffetestified
thatGam
sonw
asnotobligated
torepair
Ginsberg’s
floorundertheC
onservatorLease].)
Moreover,
Gam
sontrusted
Mr.
Jaffe,herrealestate
lawyer,
tohandle
Ginsberg’s
repairdem
ands
86
properly:“S
aulJaffew
ouldhave
donethe
besthecan
[sic]to
resolvethe
problem.”
(4R
T478.)
And
Mr.
Jaffetestified
thatGam
sonhas
“exceeded
herobligationsunderthe
lease.”(5
RT
789;see
also,e.g.,6
RT
814-817,
834-835[M
r.Jaffe
testimony
regardingG
amson’s
repairs];2S
AA
1243-
1246[exhibits
623,624].)H
ere,too,G
amson
was
neithercontradicted
nor
impeached.
(Seegenerally
4R
T464:18-490:1
[Gam
sontestim
ony(under
Evid.
Code,§
776)regarding
repairsj.)
Thelease
provisionsquoted
abovebearoutG
amson’s
views.
(See
p. 41,ante.)G
amson
was
entitledto
readthe
Conservator
Leaseas
casting
uponG
insbergthe
responsibilityfor
atleastsome
oftheproblem
sG
insberg
complained
about.To
besure,there
were
disagreements—
forexample,
was
thehole
inG
insberg’sfloorparto
fherpremises
andtherefore
her
responsibility,orparto
fthebuilding’s
foundationand
thereforeG
amson’s?
Theftviews
differedand
thetrialcourtultim
atelyagreed
with
Ginsberg
that
theju
ryw
ouldhave
todecide.
(6R
T862:4-16;2
AA
363;see
also4
P1
516-517[denying
Gam
son’snonsuitm
otion].)B
utiftherew
asenough
of
adispute
togo
toajury,there
was
enoughofa
disputeto
make
Gam
son’s
interpretationreasonable—
andim
mune
frompunishm
entbypunitive
damages.
Her
error,ifany,should
onlyresultin
payingcontract
damages—
nothingm
ore.(See
KendallYachtC
orp.v.
United
Cal.
Bank
(1975)50
Cal.A
pp.3d949,
959[punitive
damages
were
inappropriatein
acase
allegingbreach
ofbank’s
claimed
agreementto
honoroverdrafts
because“(e)vidence
ofan
evilmotive
isrequired,
ashow
ingthatthe
Bank
deliberatelybreached
arecognized
dutyto
theplaintiffs
with
lcnowledge
thatthebreach
was
likelyto
resultinserious
inju
ry....(I)trem
ainspurely
87
speculativeas
tow
hethertheB
ankacted
with
suchm
aliceratherthan
outof
abona
fidedisagreem
entoverhowfar
theB
ankw
asrequired
togo
in
helpingthe
(plaintiffs)w
iththeftfinancialproblem
s,”italics
added].)
C.
Even
IfP
unitiveD
amages
Could
Be
Aw
arded,T
heyM
ust
Be
Reassessed
IfThe
CourtA
greesT
hatG
insberg’sLease
Expired
InA
pril2006.
IfG
amson
prevailsin
herappealandthe
Courtconcludes
thatthe
ConservatorLease’s
renewallanguage
isam
biguoussuch
thatGinsberg’s
leaseexpired
inA
pril2006,
thenthe
predicateofG
insberg’sclaim
sfor
“tort”
damages
andancillary
punitivedam
agesw
ouldeitherdissipate
or
disappear.In
thatcase,Gam
sonw
ouldhave
beenjustified
inasking
Ginsberg
tosign
anew
leaseand
electingnotto
make
repairsbeyond
those
requiredby
theC
onservatorLease.Thus,if
Gam
sonprevails,then
the
Courteither
shouldhold
thatpunitivedam
agesare
unavailableas
am
ailer
oflaw
or,atthevery
least,shouldrem
andfor
anew
trialonG
insberg’s
purportedtortclaim
(assuming
thattheC
ourtholdsthatG
insbergalleged
acognizable
tort)and
theavailability
andam
ountofpunitive
damages.
88
V.
TH
E$385,000
PU
MT
WE
DA
MA
GE
SA
WA
RD
IS
CO
NS
TIT
UT
ION
AL
LY
EX
CE
SS
IVE
EV
EN
IFT
HE
FU
LL
$49,100C
OM
PE
NS
AT
OR
YD
AM
AG
ES
AW
AR
DIS
AT
TR
IBU
TA
BL
ET
OG
INS
BE
RG
’SP
UR
PO
RT
ED
“INT
EN
TIO
NA
LIN
TE
RF
ER
EN
CE
”C
LA
IM.
The$385,000
punitivedam
agesverdictcannotw
ithstandthe
Court’s
independentrevieweven
assuming
thattheju
ryaw
ardedthe
entire$49,100
onthe
purported“intentionalinterference”
count.
Constitutionalprinciples.
Indeterm
iningw
hetherthepunitive
damages
award
isconstitutionally
excessive,theC
ourtconsidersthree
“guideposts”:“U
)the
degreeofreprehensibility
ofthe
defendant’s
misconduct;
(2)the
disparitybetw
eenthe
actualorpotentialharmsuffered
bythe
pla
intiffand
thepunitive
damages
award;
and(3)
thedifference
between
thepunitive
damages
awarded
bythe
juryand
thecivilpenalties
authorizedor
imposed
incom
parablecases.”
(Walker
v.Farmers
Insurance
Exchange
(2007)153
CaLA
pp.4th965,973
(Walker),
quotingSim
on,
supra,35C
al.4thatpp.
1171-1172.)18
As
theC
ourthasrecognized,reprehensibility
isthe
paramount
criterionw
henconsidering
thereasonableness
ofapunitive
damages
verdict.(W
alker,supra,153
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
973,th.
9,quotingState
Farm,supra,
538U.S.
atp.419;
accord,e.g.,Roby
v.McK
essonC
orp.
18W
eare
notaware
ofany
analogouscivilpenalties
forthebreach
of
acom
mercialtenant’s
implied
covenantofquietenjoym
ent.
89
(2009)47
Cal.4th
686,713;G
rassilliv.Barr
(2006)142
Cal.A
pp.4th1260,
1288(G
rassilli).)R
elevantfactorsinclude
whetherthe
“harmcaused
was
physicalasopposed
toeconom
ic;thetortious
conductevincedan
indifferenceto
ora
recklessdisregard
ofthehealth
orsafety
ofothers;the
targetofthe
conducthadfinancialvulnerability;the
conductinvolved
repeatedactions
orwas
anisolated
incident;andthe
harmw
asthe
resultof
intentionalmalice,trickery,
ordeceit,orm
ereaccident.”
(JetSource,
supra,148
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
8,quotingState
Farm,supra,
538U.S.
at
p.419.)Ginsberg’s
minim
alevidenceof“reprehensibility.”
Ginsberg’s
evidencedoes
notdemonstrate
thatGam
sonacted
with
theextrem
e
reprehensibilityrequired
tosupportthe
jury’s$385,000
punitivedam
ages
verdict—alm
osteighttim
esthe
compensatory
damages
verdict.
(2A
A393.)
Thejury
didn’tacceptG
insberg’sstory
ofintolerable
physical
conditionsand
crushingeconom
icdam
ages—itfound
thatGinsberg’s
economic
damages
amounted
nottothe
$545,000she
askedfor,butrather
tobarely
9%ofthat
figure,$49,100.
(2A
A335,393;2
RT
189-192
[openingstatem
entj;6
RT
932-938[closing
argument].)
Thejury
hadgood
reasonnotto
creditGinsberg’s
histrionics,and
thisC
ourtmustalso
be
guidedby
Ginsberg’s
failureto
presentevidencebacking
uphercharges.
Apunitive
damages
award
with
an8:1
ratio—like
thisone—
is“close
tothe
upperconstitutionallimits.”
(Grassilli,supra,
142C
al.App.4th
atp.1289.)
Thus,thejury’s
punitivedam
agesaw
ardcannotstand
unlessG
insberg
90
demonstrated
therequisite
“extraordinaryfactors”
to‘ju
sti~’{]”
thatratio.
(Ibid.)She
didnot.
Forexam
ple:
Ginsberg
testifiedaboutdisastrous
andrecurrentw
aterintrusion.
(Seep.
43,ante.)She
describedveritable
flashfloods
runningthrough
her
store—conditions
thatwould
haveundoubtedly
destroyedany
ongoing
business.Y
etGinsberg
presentedno
evidencethatshe
lostasingle
dollar
ora
singlecustom
erbecauseofw
aterintrusionduring
thefive
anda
half
yearsfrom
Decem
ber2003through
thebeginning
oftrialin
September
2009.She
didn’tevenbotherasking
foran
award
oflostprofits.
(Seegenerally
2R
T187-192
[Ginsberg
openingstatem
ent];3
RT
201-321
[Ginsberg
directexamination];
6R
T923-940
[Ginsberg
closingargum
ent];
1A
A44-62
[firstamended
complaint];
2A
A329-330
[Ginsberg
trial
brief];2
AA
335[G
insbergdam
ageschart).)’9
Nor
didG
insbergpresentany
evidencethatshe
closedherstore
for
anythingotherthan
a‘fe
wdays”
afteranothertenantcaused
aleak
in
Decem
ber2003.
(3R
T270:28-271:4,
italicsadded;
seealso
3R
T332,343
[regardingcause
ofleak].)
Instead,she
identifiedjustsix
dayson
which
waterintrusion
hadallegedly
damaged
hermerchandise
duringthefive
and
aha(fyears
beforetrial:
Decem
ber8,2003;
October
17,2005;O
ctober18,
2005;O
ctober23,2005;
October24,2005;
andM
ay1,2008.
(2A
A329-
330,335;
6R
T932-938.)
Forpurposesofthis
appealonly,we
assume—
eventhough
Ginsberg
didnotallege
orprove—thatherstore
was
closedfor
thosesix
days.Ifso,then
Ginsberg
would
haveclosed
herstore
for0.002%
ofthosefive
anda
hajfyears.
~She
claimed
thatsome
merchandise
was
damaged,butthe
jury
rejected
herclaimfor
“trespassto
chattels.”(2
AA
391.)
91
•G
insbergalleged
thatherstorew
asin
poorrepair,butshedid
not
proveresulting
physicalharm.
ThisC
ourthasheld
thata“conclusory
claim”
ofphysicalharm
lackingevidentiary
supportcannotsupportahigh
multiplier.
(Walker,supra,
153C
al.App.4th
atpp.973-975;
seealso
Jet
Source,supra,148
Cal.A
pp.4thatp.
11[“solely
economic”
harmm
ilitates
againsthighm
ultiplier].)
•S
imilarly,although
Ginsberg
accusedG
amson
offailing
to
maintain
theproperty,she
didnotprove
thatGam
sonw
asindifferentto
or
recklesslydisregarded
anybody’shealth
orsafety.(See
Walker,supra,
153C
al.App.4th
atp.975.)
•G
amson
actedin
goodfaith
andG
insberg’sharm
—ifany—
”was
theresulto
foversight”in
interpretingthe
ConservatorLease.
(Seeid.
at
p.973;pp.
81-85,ante.)
•G
insbergherselfdem
onstratedthatshe
isnotfinancially
vulnerable.Q
uitethe
contrary,she
isan
established,successthl
entrepreneurwho
builtupa
well-know
nvintage
clothingbusiness.
(3R
T
201-224[G
insbergexam
ination];3R
T370-371
[examination
ofG
insberg’s
vintageclothing
expertwitness];
seealso
2R
T187-188
[Ginsberg
opening
statement].)
TheC
ourtshouldtherefore
holdthatthe
jury’spunitive
damages
award
isconstitutionally
excessive.
92
CO
NC
LUS
ION
Gam
sonshould
prevailonher
appeal.The
Courtshould
reversethe
judgmentgranting
Ginsberg
theunfettered
optionto
renewthe
Conservator
Leasefor
thenext99
years—thatis,through
theyear2095—
underC
ivil
Code
section718
(seeA
OB
8,fit
6);ordering
Ganason
tocom
plyw
iththe
48-hourrepair-or-accessorderuntilthe
ConservatorLease
statutorily
expiresin
2095;and
awarding
attorney’sfees
andcosts
toG
insberg.
Inthe
alternative,this
Courtshould
reverseand
remand
fora
new
trialonthe
meaning
ofthe
renewallanguage
becauseG
insberghas
not
shown—
andcannotshow
—thatthe
ConservatorLease
unambiguously
confersperpetualrenew
als.O
nrem
and,thetrialcourtm
ustalsoreconsider
thejudgm
ent’sperm
anentinjunctionand
award
ofattorney’s
feesand
costs.
On
thecross-appeal,there
hasneverbeen
abasis
forpunitive
damages,and
evenifthere
were,the
punitiveaw
ardis
defectivefor
multiple
reasons.A
ccordingly,regardlessofthe
resultonthe
lease
interpretation,the
Courtm
ustaffirmthe
trialcourt’sdecision
tostrike
thepunitive
award.
And
evenifpunitive
damages
mightbe
available,
areversalon
leaseinterpretation
necessarilycom
promises
thebasis
forthe
punitiveaw
ard,andthe
claimm
ustberetried.
93
Dated:
October
18,2011
CLA
RE
MO
NT
LAW
GR
OU
P,
INC
.Luisa
G.Jaffe
SaulJaffe
GR
EIN
ES
,M
AR
TIN
,S
TEIN
&R
ICH
LAN
DLLP
Robin
Meadow
LaraM
.eger
LaraM
.K
rieger
Attorneys
forDefendant,A
ppellantandC
ross-RespondentH
annaG
amson
94
CE
RT
IFIC
AT
EO
FC
OM
PLIA
NC
E
Pursuantto
California
Rules
ofC
ourt,rule8.204
(c)(1),the
attachedH
AN
NA
GA
MS
ON
’SC
OM
BIN
ED
AP
PE
LLAN
T’S
RE
PLY
BR
IEF
AN
DC
RO
SS
-RE
SP
ON
DE
NT
’SB
RIE
Fw
asproduced
using
13-pointTimes
New
Rom
antype
styleand
contains22,081
words
not
includingthe
tablesofcontents
andauthorities,caption
page,orthis
Certification
page,as
countedby
thew
ordprocessing
programused
to
ateit.
:O
ctober18,2011
__
__
__
__
__
__
LamM
.K
rieger
95
PR
OO
FO
FS
ER
VIC
E
ST
AT
EO
FC
ALIF
OR
NIA
,C
OuN
TY
OF
LOS
AN
GE
LES
Iam
employed
inthe
County
ofLosAngeles,
StateofC
alifornia.I
amoverthe
ageof18
andnota
partyto
thew
ithinaction;m
ybusiness
addressis
5900W
ilshireB
oulevard,12th
Floor,LosAngeles,C
alifornia90036.O
nO
ctober18,2011,I
servedthe
foregoingdocum
entdescribedas:
HA
NN
AG
AM
SO
N’S
CO
MB
INE
DA
PP
ELLA
NT
’SR
EP
LYB
RIE
FA
ND
CR
OS
S-R
ES
PO
ND
EN
T’S
BR
IEF
onthe
partiesin
thisaction
bysew
ing:
MichaelR
.W
eissThe
Honorable
Ricardo
TonesE
pstein,Turner
&Song
LosA
ngelesS
uperiorC
ourt633
W.
5thStreet,
Suite3300
CentralC
ivilWest
-Dept.
316Los
Angeles,
California
90071600
S.Com
monw
ealthA
venueA
ttorneysfo
rP
laintiffs,Los
Angeles,
California
90005R
espondentsand
Cross-A
ppellantsE
stherG
insbergand
Harry
Eden
Supreme
Courto
fCalifornia
350M
cAllister
StreetSan
Francisco,C
alifornia94102-3600
(4copies)
Q()B
yE
nvelope-by
placing0
theoriginalQ()
atrue
copythereof
enclosedin
sealedenvelopes
addressedas
aboveand
deliveringsuch
envelopes:
(A)B
yM
ail:As
follows:
Iam“readily
familiar”
with
thisfirm
’spractice
ofcollectionand
processingcorrespondence
formailing.
Underthat
practice,itwould
bedeposited
with
United
StatesPostalService
onthat
same
dayw
ithpostage
thereonfU
llyprepaid
atLosAngeles,
California
inthe
ordinarycourse
ofbusiness.I
amaw
arethaton
motion
ofpartyserved,
serviceis
presumed
invalidifpostalcancellation
dateorpostage
meterdate
ism
orethan
1day
afterdate
ofdepositformailing
inaffidavit.
Executedon
October
18,2011,atLosAngeles,C
alifornia.
(A)(State)
Ideclare
underpenaltyofperjury
undeftThla
oftheState
California
thattheforegoing
istrue
and