Giugni_Was It Worth the Effort

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Annu.Rev. Sociol. 1998. 98:371-93Copyright? 1998 byAnnualReviews.All rightsreserved

WAS IT WORTHTHE EFFORT?TheOutcomesandConsequencesof SocialMovementsMarco G. GiugniDepartmentof PoliticalScience, Universityof Geneva, Switzerland,e-mail:[email protected]:disruption,rganization,ublicopinion, olitical pportunitytructures,socialchange

ABSTRACTResearch on social movements has usually addressed issues of movementemergenceandmobilization,yet haspaidless attention o their outcomes andconsequences.Althoughthere exists a considerableamountof workon thisaspect,littlesystematicresearchhas been done so far. Mostexistingwork fo-cuses on political andpolicy outcomesof movements,whereas few studiesaddresstheirbroaderculturaland institutionaleffects. Furthermore,we stillknow little about the indirect and unintendedconsequences produced bymovements.Earlystudies have dealt with the effectiveness of disruptiveandviolent actions and with the role of several organizationalvariables formovement success. More recently, scholars have begun to analyze move-mentoutcomesin theirpoliticalcontextby lookingat theroleof public opin-ion, allies, and state structures.A comparativeperspective promisesto be afruitfulavenueof research n this regard.

INTRODUCTIONIf we trust our intuitions, the last big European cycle of protest caused suchfundamental changes in the social and political structures that we are still won-dering about the kind of world we are now living in. In the eyes of a neutral ob-server, the democracy movements that shook Eastern Europe in 1989 were

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374 GIUGNIaxis and the organization/disorder xis. Second, I review work that has at-temptedto putmovements and theiroutcomesin theirlargersocial andpoliti-cal context.Third,I pointto some logical as well as methodologicalproblemsof existing work that have preventedthe cumulativegatheringof systematicknowledge.Inthe end,I hopeto be ableto show that,while there exists a con-siderable amount of work on this topic, little systematic research has beendone. This is especially true when it comes to comparisonsacross countriesandacrossmovementsto specify theconditionsthat fostercertain ypes of im-pact, an approach hatI view as one of the most promisingavenues for futureresearch.THE POWER OF MOVEMENTSMost researchso far has focused on the intendedeffects of social movements.Earlyworkhaslookedinparticular t theimpactof movement-controlled ari-ables by attemptingto single out the characteristicsof movements that aremost conducive to success or, more generally,thathelp certain outcomes tooccur.In this respect,one can discern two closely interrelated ines of investi-gation.The first line concernsthe impact, mostly on policy, of variousorgan-izational variablesandhasbroughtresearchers o ask whetherstronglyorgan-ized movements are more successful thanloosely organizedmovements. Thesecondline of inquiryhas looked at theeffects of disruptiveand violentprotestbehaviorandhasopeneda debate n the literature boutwhether heuse of dis-ruptivetactics by social movements is more likely to lead to policy changesthan moderatetactics. This debatehas largely dealtwith the effectiveness ofviolence. Let us briefly discuss each of these two aspects.The Impact of OrganizationResource mobilizationtheoryhas dominatedthe study of social movementsandcontentiouspolitics for at least three decades. It is therefore ittle surpris-ing that researchon movement outcomeshas paida lot of attention o the roleof the organizationalcharacteristicsof movements.Thereis a fair amountoftheoretical and empiricalwork that links various movement-controlledvari-ables to theirallegedimpact.Whileearlytheoreticalwork has speculatedoverthe linkbetween governmentresponsivenessand the natureof movementde-mands,organizational ize and stability, leadership,andstrategies(e.g. Etzi-oni 1970,Lipsky&Levi 1972),otherauthorshavetriedto showit empirically.Brill's (1971) finding (basedon a case studyof rentstrikes)that success is notlikely to resultif the movement leaders are unable to buildaneffective organi-zation is typical in this respect. Relevant work includes Shorter & Tilly's(1974) examinationof the effect of organizationalvariables on the outcomes


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CONSEQUENCESF SOCIALMOVEMENTS375of strikes in France,Staggenborg's(1988) inquiryinto the consequences ofprofessionalizationand formalizationin the pro-choice movement, and Cle-mens' (1993) investigationof the impactof organizational epertoireson insti-tutionalchange.We also have a substantialbody of literatureon the effects oflobbying strategieson governmentaldecisions andcongressionalaction (e.g.Fowler & Shaiko1987,Milbrath1970,Metz 1986).However,these studiesof-ten are more concernedwith interest-grouppolitics than social movementsthemselves.

Important vidence aboutthe relationshipbetween variousorganizationalvariables and the success of social movements comes from Gamson's TheStrategyof Social Protest (1990), which aftermore thantwo decadesremainsperhapsthe most systematicattempt o inquireinto the impactand effective-ness of social movements.The author'scomprehensiveanalysisof the careersof 53 Americanchallenginggroupsactive between 1800 and 1945 led him toconcludethat(a) groupswith single-issuedemandswere more successfulthangroupswith multiple-issuedemands,(b) the use of selective incentives waspositively correlatedwith success, (c) theuse of violence andgenerallydisrup-tive tactics was associatedwith success, while being the objects of violencemadeit more difficult (as we will see in more detailbelow) and(d) successfulgroups tended to be more bureaucratized,centralized,and unfactionalized,which is the mostimportantpointfor thepresentpurpose.Finally,he testedtherole of context variables and foundthattimes (quietorturbulent)didnot mat-termuch,whereaspoliticalcrises seemed to have an effect on theoutcomesofthe challenging groupsexamined.Gamson'swork has raiseda numberof criticisms,mostly methodological(Goldstone 1980, Gurr1980, Snyder& Kelly 1976, Webb et al 1983, Zelditch1978), but also a series of reanalyses of his data,which the author had ap-pendedto the book (Freyet al 1992, Goldstone1980,Mirowsky& Ross 1981,Steedly& Foley 1979).2As in thecase of theroleof disruptive actics,mostofthese works have confirmedGamson'sprincipalfindings,at least in part.Forexample, Steedly& Foley (1979), using moresophisticated echniques,foundgroupsuccess related, n orderof relativeimportance, o thenondisplacementnatureof the goals, the number of alliances, the absence of factionalism,theexistence of specific and limited goals, and the willingness to use sanctions.Similarly, Mirowskyand Ross (1981), aimingat findingthe locus of controlover movement success, found protester-controlled actors more importantthan the supportof thirdpartiesor the situation for a successful outcome. Ofthese protester-controlledactors,the organizationand, above all, the beliefsand goals were seen as crucial for success. More recently, Frey et al (1992)

2Thesereanalyseshave been included n the book's second edition(Gamson 1990).


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376 GIUGNIpointedto the importanceof nothavingdisplacementgoals andgroupfaction-alism to obtainnew advantages.Thus, Gamson's centralargumentstressinginternalvariablesand resourcemobilizationas determinants f groupsuccessfound further upport.However,Piven and Cloward's(1979) thesisthatmove-ments have a chanceto succeed to the extentthatthey avoidbuildinga strongorganizationbroughta fundamental riticismto Gamson'sstress on the effec-tiveness of organization,a criticismthathas triggereda debatein both schol-arlyandgeneralaudience ournals.Inaddition,Goldstone's(1980) reanalysisof Gamson's datacast serious doubtsover his findings andpointedto a per-spective on social movement outcomes thattakes into account theirbroaderpolitical context.Before I return o this aspect,I would like to discuss the sec-ond main axis of existing research: he impactof disruption.TheEffectivenessof Disruptiveand ViolentProtestOverall,the use by social movementsof disruptive acticsand violence seemsto increasetheirpotentialfor change. Severalauthorshave arguedthat, con-traryto the pluralistclaim thatmoderation n politics is more effective thandisruption,the use of force by social movements increasesthe chances thatthey reachtheirgoals (Astin et al 1975, McAdam1983, Tarrow1994, Tilly etal 1975).Again,Gamson's(1990) studyprovidesempiricalevidenceof the ef-fectiveness of violence andthe use of constraints.He foundthatthe use of vio-lence and,moregenerally,disruptive acticsby challenging groupswas posi-tively correlated o his two measuresof success:the acceptanceof challengersas legitimateclaimantsandthe obtainingof new advantages or constituents.These findingsare backedup by some of the aforementioned eanalysesof hisdata, in particular hose by Mirowsky & Ross (1981) and Steedly & Foley(1979). Yet thereis no consensuson thispoint,nor on the implicationsof thisfor movements.Muchevidenceontherelationshipbetweendisruptiveorviolentmovementtactics and their impact comes from two importantstrandsof research:thestudyof strikesandthemanyanalysesof thewave of urbanriotsthat occurredin severalAmericancities at the end of the sixties. As faras strikeactivity isconcerned,Taft & Ross (1969), on the basis of a study of violent laborcon-flicts in the United States through 1968, found little evidence that violencewould helpunionsto reachtheirgoals. A similarconclusionhasbeen reachedby SnyderandKelly (1976). By analyzingquantitativedata on strikesthatoc-curred n Italy between 1878 and 1903, SnyderandKelly were able to showthat violent strikeswere less successful thanpeaceful ones. Theseresultscon-tradictthose obtainedby Shorter& Tilly (1971) in their study of strikes inFrance,who foundapositive correlationbetweenthe use of violence andstrikeoutcomes.Researchon strikeactivity,however,has gone beyondthe specificquestionof disruptionorviolence to examinebroader ssues relatedto the in-


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CONSEQUENCESOF SOCIALMOVEMENTS 377dustrialconflict (Cohn 1993, Franzosi 1994, Hicks & Swank 1984, Swank1983, Shorter& Tilly 1974, Snyder& Kelly 1976).

The effectiveness of disruptiveprotestand movements has been analyzedthoroughly n the aftermathof the urbanriots of the 1960s in the United States(for reviews see Gurr1980, Isaac & Kelly 1981, Piven & Cloward 1993). Tobe sure,riotingbehaviorand social movementsare notequivalent, houghtheyarebothinstancesof contentiouspolitics, defined as collectiveactivityon thepartof claimants-or those who claim to represent hem-relying at least inparton noninstitutionalized orms of interactionwith elites, opponents,or thestate (Tarrow 1996:874). Social movements, on the otherhand,may be de-fined as sustainedchallengesto powerholders n the name of a disadvantagedpopulationliving underthejurisdictionor influence of those powerholders(Tarrow1996:874;see also Tarrow1994,Tilly 1984).However,studyingriotscanyield important nsightson the effectiveness of disruptionandviolentpro-test by social movements. In addition,the Americanriots of the sixties havesparked he intereston the latteraspect amongstudentsof social movements.Someauthors, ncludingHahn(1970), McClurgMueller(1978), Isaac &Kelly(1981), Kelly & Snyder(1980), andSears&McConahay 1973), havefocusedexplicitly on theeffects of violence. Ingeneral,the evidencegathereddoes notallow for a definitive answerto the questionwhetherrioting is beneficial ordetrimental o the populationinvolved. Kelly & Snyder (1980), for example,suggestedthatthere s no causalrelationshipbetween thefrequencyandsever-ity of violence displayedin American cities during he 1960s and the distribu-tion of black socioeconomic gains at the local level, eitherby income level orby employmentandoccupationalchanges.Feagin& Hahn(1973), in a mono-graphon ghettoriots,maintainthat the latter ed at best to limited reformandmostlyto changesinpolice policies. Nevertheless,the authorsdid notprovidesystematicevidence for theirargument.Berkowitz(1974), who looked at so-cioeconomic changesat the neighborhood evel broughtaboutby ghettoriotsbetween 1960 and 1970, found no differential mprovement or riottracts,ar-guing againsta positive effect of the riots (see also Levitan et al 1975). Evenmorepessimistically,Welch (1975) showed thatthe riots led to an increase inurbanexpendituresfor control and punishmentof rioters, and much less intheir favor. However, Colby's (1975) findings in a way contradictWelch's,because he found thatthe riots had a positive influence on redistributionpol-icy, thoughno influence on regulatorypolicy at the state level. On the otherhand, Jennings(1979), also througha comparisonof states but over time aswell, found some support or apositive correlationbetween thenumberof riotsandthe increasein AFDC recipients.Many studies of the urban riots in American cities are directlyrelatedtoPiven& Cloward's(1993) well-knownthesis abouttheregulating unctionsofpublicwelfare(forreviews see Piven & Cloward1993, Trattner1983).As it is


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CONSEQUENCESFSOCIALMOVEMENTS379showed that the use of violent constraints(i.e. militancy), except when thegroupof protesterswas large,hadnegative effects on the protest's outcomesbecause repressionwas more likely to occur(O'Keefe & Schumaker1983).MOVEMENT OUTCOMES IN CONTEXTTo summarize hepaperso far,existingresearchon the impactof severalinter-nal characteristicsof social movements, such as the use of disruptivetacticsand actions, seems to yield contradictory indings.Nevertheless, this contra-dictionmay well be more apparent han real. The puzzle may be solved oncewe acknowledgethe crucial role of the broaderpoliticalcontext in facilitatingor constrainingboth the mobilization and the potential outcomes of move-ments. Strategiesthat work in a given context may simply be ineffective inother political settings and vice versa. Thus, more recent work has shiftedaway fromthe studyof the effectiveness of disruptionandthe organizationalcharacteristicsof social movements towardthe environmentalconditions thatchannel their consequences. This has been done in two distinct directions.First, the role of public opinion in facilitating or preventingmovements tomake an impacthas been thoroughlyinvestigated, particularly n the UnitedStates. A majorturnin the study of movement outcomes, however, has sec-ondly come fromcomparativeanalysesthatattempt o linkthem to the move-ments'politicalcontext. Next Ibrieflyconsiderthese two avenues of research.Public OpinionSocial movements,particularlywhen they express themselves throughtheirmost typical form of action,public demonstrations,address theirmessage si-multaneouslyto two distincttargets: hepowerholdersand the generalpublic.On the one hand,they press thepolitical authorities orrecognitionas well asto get theirdemandsmet, at least in part.On the otherhand,they seek public

supportandtryto sensitize thepopulation o theircause. At the sametime, themost commonpolitical targetsof contemporarymovements,namely local ornationalgovernments,pay particularattentionto public opinion and fluctua-tions therein.All this makes a strongcase for taking public opinion into ac-count as an importantexternal factor in the study of the outcomes of socialmovements. This has been done above all in the United States.Publicopinionhas enteredthe studyof movement outcomes bothas explanatoryvariableandexplanandum. nthe formercase, one examines how andto whatextent move-ments producechanges in the perceptionspeople have of a given issue (e.g.Gusfield 1981,Lawson 1976, Oberschall1973,Orfield1975).However,whileit seems ratherobvious thatprotestactivities raisethe awarenessof thepopula-tion over certain political issues, changes in public opinion can also helpmovements to reach theirgoals by makingdecision-makersmore responsive


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380 GIUGNIto theirdemands.Hence, severalauthorshave stressedtherole of public opin-ion for legislative change(e.g. Burstein1979a-c, 1985, Burstein & Freuden-burg 1978, Costain & Majstorovic 1994, Page & Shapiro 1983, Weissberg1976), thoughnot alwaysrelatedto the impactof social movements.Paul Burstein s certainlyamongthosewho havepaidmost attention o thisaspect.Inhis analysisof the struggleforequal employmentopportunityn theUnitedStates,he showed that equalemploymentopportunity egislationwasadoptedas theresultof social changesthat were manifested n publicopinion,crystallizedin the civil rightsandwomen's movements,andtransformedntopublicpolicy by politicalleaders Burstein1985:125),thuspointingto the in-terconnectionsof public opinion,movementactivities, andcongressionalac-tion in bringing about policy changes for discriminated-againstgroups. Insimilarfashion,CostainandMajstorovic 1994) studied hemultipleoriginsofwomen's rights legislationby stressingthe same three sets of factors.As theyargue,thereare severalviews of the relationshipbetweenpublicopinion andlegislative action.They see fourprevailing nterpretations: . a public opinioninterpretation, tatinga directrelationshipbetweenpublicopinionandlegisla-tive change,2. aninterpretationhat sees public opinionas filteringthe impactof outside events on legislative action, 3. an elite behaviorinterpretation, c-cordingto whichpublicopinionis affectedby legislative elites, and4. a socialmovement interpretation,whereby legislation results from thejoint action ofsocial movements,public opinion, and media coverage.The latterappearsasthe most plausible interpretation,or not only does it take into account bothmovement actions andchangesinpublic opinion,but it also acknowledgesthefundamental ole of the media formovement mobilizationand outcomes.Theway in which the media cover, frame, and interpretsocial movements haslargelybeen neglected in the existing literature.Togetherwith the analysisofthe role of political opportuntystructures or movement outcomes, this is apromisingavenuefor futureresearch(e.g. Gamsonand Wolfsfeld 1993).Political Opportunity StructuresAs our initial example about the fall of the Communistregimes of EasternEurope illustrates,and as Goldstone's (1980) reanalysis of Gamson's datamadeclear,the studyof the outcomesof social movements cannotavoidtak-ing into accountthe political context in which they operate.On the basis of aseries of methodological criticisms, Goldstone challenged both Gamson'smain conclusions and his basic theoreticaltenet. He foundthatthe organiza-tionalandtacticalcharacteristics adno effect on groupsuccess. Thetimingofsuccess, he maintained,is independentof the challengers' organizationandtactics. What s most important,he suggested,is thatthe resourcemobilizationmodel be replacedby a model thatstressesthe crucial role of broad,system-wide nationalcrises forthe success of social movements. We have a namefor


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384 GIUGNIcial values. (b) Drawing both from the social-problems literature and thepublic-policyliterature,Schumaker 1975) definedfive criteriaof governmentresponsivenessto movement demands:access, agenda,policy, output,and im-pact.(c) Riidig(1990) usedthistypology in his comprehensive tudyof the an-tinuclearmovementworldwide.(d) Bursteinet al (1995) also relied on this ty-pology, pointingout correctlythat it addresses severalaspectsof the politicalprocess that hadpreviouslybeen left out. However, they addedstructural f-fects as a sixth type of governmentresponsiveness,thus acknowledgingthatmovementcanprovokealterations n the institutionalarrangements f society.(e) Kitschelt(1986) also stressed structural ffects, i.e. a transformation f thepolitical structures, n additionto proceduraleffects (Gamson's acceptance)and substantiveeffects (Gamson'snew advantages).Thistypology allows fora linkbetween the outcomes of social movements andtheirpolitical context.(/) In quite a similarway, Gurr(1980) hadpreviously defined threetypes ofoutcomes of violent conflicts: effects on the groupfate, policy changes, andsocietal or systemic effects. The advantageof this typology is thatit makes acleardistinctionbetween internaleffects on themovementand externaleffectson policy or the largersociety. (g) Kriesi(1995) addeda furtherdistinctiontoKitschelt's typology by definingtwo types of substantive mpact:reactiveef-fects, i.e. thepreventionof new disadvantages, ndproactiveeffects, i.e. theintroductionof new advantages. This distinctionis relevantwith regardtopolitical opportunity tructures, or it allows us to link social movement out-comes to thestrengthof thestateandhas been usedto investigatetheoutcomesof WesternEuropeannew social movements(Giugni 1995). (h) Finally,Rucht(1992) acknowledgedthe need to distinguishbetween goal-relatedoutcomesand broaderconsequencesby classifying the effects of social movements ac-cordingto two dimensions:internalvs externaland intendedvs unintended.Gurr'sand Rochon & Mazmanian's ypologies presenta furtheradvantage:Theyacknowledgethepossibilitythatdifferent ypesof outcomesbe related oeach other. This is an importantpoint. Gurr(1980), for example, suggestedthat group changes and systemic changes be seen as ultimate outcomes thattakeplace throughpolicy changes,which, in turn,are the proximateresult ofviolentconflicts (Gurr1980).Rochon & Mazmanian 1993) maintain hat sub-stantial gains may be more easily obtained once a challenging group hasreached some degree of acceptance. Other authorshave similarly exploredhow social movements can makea greater mpactby pursuinggoals in admin-istrativeagencies and courts once they have achieved policy responsiveness(e.g. Burstein1985, 1991, Handler1978, Sabatier1975). A recentinterestingvarianthas beenproposedby Diani (1997), who claims that when movementsare able to facilitatethe emergenceof new social networksthey will be moreinfluential n processes of politicalandculturalchange.Here,we abandon heclassificatoryterrain o begin to reason in terms of relationshipsbetweenvari-


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386 GIUGNIness to find the causes of movementsuccess or failure,an attitudefacilitatedby the activistpastof manyscholars andby a sympatheticstandtowardmanycontemporarymovements.Third, he conviction thatpolicy changesare moreeasily measuredthanculturalchanges. The latter reasonwould explain whywe stillhave rather ew studies onthe culturalaspectsof movementsexceptforthe individual-levelconsequences of participation n social movements andactivism,on which thereis a considerablebody of literature e.g. Abramowitz& Nassi 1981, Demerathet al 1971, Fendrich1974, 1977, Fendrich& Krauss1978, Fendrich& Lovoy 1988, Fendrich& Tarlau1973, Jennings1987, Jen-nings & Niemi 1981, Marwell et al 1987, McAdam 1988, 1989, 1998a,Nassi& Abramowitz1979, Whalen& Flacks 1980).

To be sure,there is work on what may be seen as instances of the culturalimpactof movements,suchas theirspillovereffects from one movementto theother(Meyer& Whittier1994), theircapacityto generatesocial capitals(Di-ani 1997), their mpactonthe media(Gamson& Wolfsfeld 1993),and so forth,but these are rathersporadicin comparisonto the huge amount of works onpolicy outcomes. Otherauthors,on the otherhand,have looked at the culturaldeterminantsof movementsuccess as measured hroughpolicy or legislativechange (e.g. Banaszak1996), thusreversingthe causal arrow.Studying heways inwhichsocial movementshave theirdemandsmetis, ofcourse, a legitimate endeavorthat will help improve our knowledge of thecausalprocesses involved in social andpolitical change.Yet, like all kinds ofactions, the effects of social movements are often indirect, unintended,andsometimes even in contradiction to their goals (on the unintended conse-quencesof social action,see Tilly 1996). Increasedrepression, orexample,isoften an immediate effect of protest,but the long-termconsequencesmay bedifferenct(dellaPorta1995). Tarrow 1989, 1993, 1994) goes precisely in thisdirectionwhen he looks atthe broadrepercussionsof cycles of protest, nclud-ing cycles of reform.In his studyof the Italianprotest cycle of the 1960s and1970s (Tarrow1989), the author hows thatthisperiodof disordermadea cru-cial impactand left a positive legacy for Italiandemocracyby promotingre-form, expandingthe political arena,giving autonomyto Italianvoters, and,above all, expandingtherepertoireof the legitimateforms of political partici-pation. By analyzingsocial movementsatthemacrolevel, Tarrowestablisheda link between two broadphenomena: he emergence, development,andde-cline of a cycle of protest,on the one hand,andpolitical, institutional,andcul-turalchanges, on the otherhand,whereby the formerplays a crucialrole inbringingabout the latter. The lesson to be drawnhere is that both the short-term and the long-termconsequencesof movement actionsmust be examined(Andrews 1997).Empiricalworkthat ocusesexplicitlyon theunintended onsequencesof so-cial movements is quiterare(e.g. Deng 1997, Paul et al 1997). Yet, as Charles


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CONSEQUENCESF SOCIALMOVEMENTS387Tilly (1998a) has put it, this range of effects far surpassesthe explicit de-mandsmadeby activistsin the course of social movements,and sometimesne-gates them. By any standard, success' and 'failure' hardlydescribe most ofthe effects. In addition, he maintains, third parties can act and producechanges in the zone of a movement's activities and interests. According toTilly, the difficulties of analyzingtheconsequencesof social movementsariseprecisely from this logical situation,which he has schematizedas three over-lappingcircles.Analystsshouldtake into consideration hree sets of variables:1. all movementclaims, 2. all effects of movements'actions,and 3. all effectsof outside events and actions.Theoverlappingof these three variablescreatesfour situations that must be analytically distinguished.As Figure 1 shows,whatI defined as outcomes,i.e. effects of movementactionsthatbeardirectlyon movementclaims,result fromthe overlappingof set 1 and 2. If the effectscan be completely attributed o the movement's action,we can speakof suc-cess when they arepositive and failure when they are negative (intersectionA), although heproblemof thedifferentialevaluationof success remains.Butat least a partof outcomes areproducedas joint effects of movementactionsand outside influences (intersection B). Furthermore,sometimes externalevents and actions may produceeffects that satisfy movement claims (inter-sectionC). Finally,we musttake intoaccountthepossibility ofjoint effects ofmovement actions and outside influences thatdo not bear directlyon move-ment claims, i.e. unintendedconsequences. Once we have posed the funda-mentallogical problemso nicely illustratedby Tilly, we will be in a betterpo-sitionto build causal theories about social movements,theirsuccess orfailure,theiroutcomes, and the broaderconsequencesof their actions.CONCLUSIONAs the review of the relevantliterature eveals, muchwork on the impactofsocial movements and protest behavior was done duringthe seventies. Thesparkwasprovidedby the wave of studentandantiwarprotestas well as theri-ots thatoccurred nAmericancities during he sixties. The latter, nparticular,incitedAmericanscholarsto inquirenot only into the causes,butalso the con-sequencesof violent politicalbehavior.European cholars,on the otherhand,have usuallyprivilegedthe broadprocesses thathave led to the emergenceofthenew social movements,hencepayingonly little attention o theirrepercus-sions on society, especially in empiricalresearch.Subsequently, he interest nthe effects of movements has somewhatwaned. It resurfacedrecently,how-ever. Two forthcomingcollective volumes (M Giugni et al 1998a,b) and re-cently publishedworksandongoing studies,testify to this renewedinterest nthe consequencesof social movements,which stems less fromthe need to un-derstandcurrentpractices in society, such as riot behaviorin urbansettings,thanfromthe willingness to fill an importantgap in the social movement lit-


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388 GIUGNI

A = EFFECTSOFMOVEMENTCTIONS HATBEARDIRECTLY NMOVEMENTLAIMSB = JOINT EFFECTS OF MOVEMENT ACTIONS AND OUTSIDE INFLUENCESTHAT BEARDIRECTLY ON MOVEMENT CLAIMSC = EFFECTS OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCES (BUT NOT OF MOVEMENT ACTIONS)THAT BEARDIRECTLY ON MOVEMENT CLAIMSD = JOINT EFFECTS OF MOVEMENT ACTIONS AND OUTSIDE INFLUENCES THAT DON'T BEARON MOVEMENT CLAIMS

Source: Tilly (1998)

Figure 1 The problem of identifying social movement outcomes

erature.As such, it is less focused onthose characteristics nd featuresshownby thephenomenacurrentlyunderway and moregenuinelyaimed atunveilingthe processes anddynamicsthat allow movementsto make an impacton dif-ferentaspectsof society. This alone gives us some reassurances hatmoreat-tentionwill be paidin the future o crucialconsequencesof social movementspreviouslyneglected.I amreferringnparticularo theirpotential or influenc-ing processes of broaderculturalandinstitutionalchange.An agendafor futureresearchshould focus on the comparative tudyof theoutcomes andconsequencesof social movements.Comparisonsbetween dif-


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CONSEQUENCESOF SOCIALMOVEMENTS 389ferentpolitical contexts, differentmovements,and differentperiodswill shedlight over the causal dynamics involved in processes of social and politicalchange. A promisingway to do so is to adopta historicalcomparativedesignaimedatanalyzingconcordancesanddifferencesin order o generateexplana-tions. Specifically, we would have much to gain from conducting in-depthcomparisonsof differentnational cases and different movementsover a rela-tively long period, thereby comparinginteractionsthat allow distinctmove-ments to haveagiven typeof consequencein differentcountries.By analyzingmovementconsequencesfollowing a comparativedesign, in addition,we willbe able to avoid the formulationof invariantmodels that serve so badly theneed of social sciences (Tilly 1995). Inaddition,as Tilly (1998a) hascorrectlyput it, the study of the outcomes and consequencesof social movements im-plies, and indeedrequires, he analysisof movement interactionsanddynam-ics. If we do not pay carefulattentionto such interactionsanddynamics,themethodologicalproblemsI have pointedout will always renderour analysesweak and our conclusions shaky. If we do not first clarify the dynamicsthathave led hundredsof thousandsof people to challengethe Communistregimesin EasternEurope,we will hardlybe able to establishwhether those protestswere instrumentaln the dramaticchangesthatoccurredand how. Similarly, fwe do not first shedlighton the interactionsbetweenGreenpeaceactivists,po-litical elites andinstitutions,public opinion,andShell's leaders,we will finditdifficultto attribute hecompany'sdecision to destroytheBrentSparoil rigtothe environmentalists'outragedcall for a boycott. After all, without interac-tions there aresimplyno outcomesor consequences.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSResearchfor this paperhas been made possible by a grantof the Swiss Na-tional Science Foundation.

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