Global/local and Consumption Kritik

Notes:The 2 “separate” arguments are fairly similar in function- Most of the cards can be shuffled around and inter-changed. Global/local has a heavy consumption spin on it, as the thesis of the argument is that Globalization and conceiving of the world as one global order is bad because it results in individual agency being taken away, causing a laundry list of impacts. The consumption angle of it is that environmental law/policies only feed the global economic order, which is unsustainable at the heart of it and will result in environmental destruction. The 2nd argument, De-dev, is pretty simple. It’s an impact turn to econ collapse, criticizing the squo’s economic structures as being exploitative and unsustainable. It hinges around the idea that having a crash/transition NOW is much better than having one in the future, mainly due to the amount of resources left/ how ingrained we are in globalization.

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Short shell

Constructing environmental problems as global leads to global orderEsteva and Prakash 98 (Gustavo, Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board, and Madhu Suri, currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.) CDD

Once environmental “problems ”7 are reduced to the ozone layer or to global warming, to planetary " sources " and "sinks," faith in the futility of local efforts is fed by global experts; while their conferences, campaigns an d institutions present the fabulous apparition of solutions "scientifically" pulled out of the "global hat." Both a global consciousness and a global government (such as the Global Environmental Facility "master minded" at the Earth Summit ) appear as badly needed to manage the planet's "scarce resources" and " the masses " irresponsibly chopping "green sinks" for their daily tortillas or chappatis, threatening the "experts"' planetary designs for eco -development. The "ozone layer" or "global warming" are abstract hypotheses, offered by some scientists as an expla nation of recent phenomena. Even in that condition, they could prove to

be very useful for fostering critical awareness of the folly of the "social minorities." But they are promoted as "a fact," reality itself, and all the socio-political and ecological dangers inherent in the illusion of the " Global Management " of planet Earth are hidden from "the people ." Excluded, for example, from critical scrutiny is the reflection that in order for "global thinking" to be feasible, we should be able to "think" from within every culture on Earth and come away from this excursion single-minded - clearly a logical and practical impossibility, once it is critically de-mythologized. For it requires the supra-cultural criteria of thinking" - implying the dissolution of the subject who "thinks"; or assuming that it is possible to "think" outside of the culture in which every man and woman on Earth is immersed. The human condition does not allow such

operations. We cele brate the hopefulness of common men and women, saved from the hubris of "scientific man," unchastened by all his failures at playing God.

Ordering creates structural violence- Only rejection of the aff solvesNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

The discussion above was intended to provide a perspective of world-order as an historical process of ordering which, contrary to the benign symbolism of

universalism evoked by notions such as "one world" and "global village," is constructed out of the violent destruction of diverse socialities. World-order , when re-viewed, therefore, may be understood as follows: . As a concept that seeks to articulate the civilizational project of humanity , it is at best nonsense, and at worst a fraudulent ideology of legitimization for the perpetuation of colonizing violence--" world-order" as symbolic violence . . As a material reality of violent social relations , it is a conscious and systematized design for the control of resources through the disciplining of minds and bodies--" world-order" as embodied violence . What is to be the outcome of this violent ordering which has coercively structured (in)humanity into the present- day "global village"? Perhaps the following categorization as a recasting of the Three Worlds of world-order might better reflect the material locations of

humanity within "worlds" of "order." Perhaps when all the legitimizations, promises and regrets of world-orderings are stripped bare of their rhetorical garb, this is

the materiality of misorders which resurfaces to vision, naked: The First World is the virtual world of "anywhere" people. This is the world of dreams and lights , its inhabitants, the models of humanity at its [*619] highest point of evolution--mobile, sophisticated, no longer bound by the mind-numbing falsehoods of ideologies of control. They are individual, free, confined to no particular place. This is the world that is the "promised land"--the aspiration for all. The First World of the

ordered world is that of the "corporate leader"--entrepreneur, politician, academic, NGOist, celebrity--all "stars" within the globalized universe. The Second World is the located world of "somewhere" people . This is the world of work, its inhabitants, the honest

grafters whose efforts create and sustain the pillars of the First World, aspiring one day to be rewarded with the benefits of being able to be anywhere, but constantly having to fight the disappearance of this elusive prize. This is the world that is in perpetual limbo, bound in its location between the "promised land" and the fate of the Third World. The Second World of the ordered world is that of the "corporate servant--the blue collar worker, the middle-manager, bureaucrat, publicsector worker, short-term

unemployed--all crucial cogs of the globalizing juggernaut. The Third World is the dislocated world of "nowhere" people. This is the world that is the underground of the First World, its inhabitants, the chewedout remains of the ordering of civil-ization . Neither being anywhere, nor somewhere, their homes are welcome nowhere. They are the "unfit," unable to participate in or unwilling to be seduced into the "honest" servitude of those in the Second World. They may be trampled on, disregarded, expended. This is the world of enforced invisibility. The Third World of the ordered world is the world of the "corporate out-caste"--the "untouchable," the tribal, the "gypsy," the refugee, the landless laborer, the displaced person, the scrounging teenage single-mother, the long-term unemployed--all disposables in this historic journey of a globalizing civil-ization.

Long shell

[Insert specific link here]

Alt- Think local—Solves for global order and spurs movementsEsteva and Prakash 98 (Gustavo, Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board, and Madhu Suri, currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.)

With the traditional humility of Gandhi, Ivan Illich, Leopold Kohr, Fritz Schumacher, and others of their ilk, Berry warns of the many harmful consequences of "Thinking Big" : pushing all human enterprises beyond the human scale . Appreciating the genuine limits of human intelligence and capacities, Berry celebrates the age-old wisdom of "thinking little " or small: on the proportion and scale that humans can really understand, know and assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions and decisions upon others. Afraid that local thinking weakens and isolates people, localizing them into parochialism, the "alternative" global thinkers8 forget that Goliath did in fact meet his match in David. Forgetting this biblical moral insight,

they place their faith in the countervailing force of a competing or "alternative" Goliath of their own, w hose global thinking encompasses the supra-morality of "planetary consciousness." Assuming that "Global Man " (the grown-ups' version of Superman) has more or less conquered every space on Earth (and is now moving beyond, into the extra terrestrial), they think he is now advancing towards a collective con science: one conscience, one transcultural consciousness, one humanity -the great human family. "It is the planetary conscience that takes us to a 'world society' with a 'planetary citizenship'," says Leonardo Boff, the Brazilian theologian,9 describing a hope now shared by a wide variety of "globalists." Hunger in Ethiopia, bloody civil wars in Somalia or Yugo slavia, human rights violations in Mexico thus become the personal responsibilities of all good, non-parochial citizens of Main Street; supposedly complementing their local involvement in reducing garbage, homelessness or junk food in their own neighborhoods. Global Samaritans may

fail to see that when their local actions are informed, shaped and determined by a "global frame of mind,"10 they become as uprooted as those of the globalists they explicitly criticize. To relearn how to "think little," Berry recommends starting with the "basics" of life: food, for example. He suggests discovering ways to eat which take us beyond "global thinking and action" towards "local thinking and action." Global thinkers and think tanks, like the World Bank, disregard this wisdom at the level of both thought and action. Declaring that current food problems,

among others, are global in their nature, they seek to impose global solutions. Aware of the threats perpetrated by such " solutions ," the proponents of "Think global ly, act local ly" take recourse to the tradition of Kohr et al. only at the level of action , as a sensible strategy to struggle against the " global forces ." By refusing to "think little," given their engagement with global campaigns, the World watch Institute and other "alternative" globalists of their ilk inadvertently function on their enemies' turf.

Unless we stop rampant consumption- We’re all going to die horribly Brent 11 (Jason G., Writer for counter currents, “ Billions Of Humans Will Die Horribly”, Jan 9th, http://www.countercurrents.org/brent090111.htm)CDD

The simple questions become can the earth provide those resources to humanity in 2050 when the resources used between 1950 and 2050 are taken into consideration and if the earth can provide the resources for how long can they be provided? While no one can provide an absolute answers to those questions, it would be the height of folly for humanity to gamble its survival on the ability for the earth to provide in 2050 8.41 times the resources it provided in 1950 and it would be extremely foolish for humanity to gamble its survival that the earth could continue p roviding those resources for any length of time . Humanity has two choices --- reduce population or reduce the per capita usage of resources , There are no other choices. If humanity does not reduce population and/or reduce per capita usage of

resources, the earth will be unable to supply the resources civilization needs to function and the population will be reduced by nature--by war, starvation, disease, ethnic cleansing and other horrors .

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Defense

None of their arguments apply- Their defense of order(ing) is tainted by their locationNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

To some , those who might have the occasion to read this current article, the changes brought about by the advent of the so-called post-colonial, post-communist, post-ideological, post-modern period may indeed have been beneficial . Some of us- - the expert intellectual community, the development planners, the security strategists, the bureaucratic elites, even the " students" who might have been encouraged to refer to the insights contained in this Symposium-- are , to some extent or the other, the beneficiaries of this [*626] order ( ing ). From this location , then, it becomes not too difficult to rationalize the limited successes , if not defend the fundamentals, of "our world " within a transnational, global reality. n49 It becomes not too difficult to intellectualize pleasure and pain and to project toward ever-more "new beginnings" in which the virtues of "our world" may be extolled. For this is the "truth" of the "world" as experienced within these locations of privilege . Others among us, without the comforts of such complacencies and with the best of intentions, may seek to extend and apply the benefits of the world that we know, that is " our" truth, to those who we identify as being "excluded." The politics of inclusion then dominates our attention-- inclusion of the poor in "development," inclusion of the terrorized in the framework of "security," inclusion of all those thus far marginalized into the "world." n50 The keyword for this new

politics of inclusion, we often hear, is "participation." So we might struggle to bring the excluded within the fora of national, international and transnational organizations, articulate their interests and demand service to their cause. And yet , so much inclusion has done little to change the culture of violence . However sympathetic, even empathetic, we may be to the cause of the "subaltern," however sophisticated and often self-complicating our exposition of violence, one thing is difficult for us to face: when all is said and

done, most of us engaged in these transformatory endeavors are far removed from the existential realities of "subaltern" [*627] suffering. F or "them," what is the difference , I wonder, between the violence of new orders and that of the old, what is the difference between the new articulations of violence and those of the old, when violence itself is a continuing reality? But we push on, keeping ourselves busy. What else can we do but suggest new beginnings? I am not suggesting that all "new beginnings" of world-order, past and present, were envisioned with cynical intent. Quite the opposite is the reason for the point I wish to make. The persistent realities of violence within "ordered" worlds are all the more glaring when we acknowledge that they arise in the name of human aspirations that were mostly articulated by progressive forces, in the wake of real struggles, to contribute to the transformation of the inequities and violence of the then existing "orders." Yet more and more talk of universal human welfare, transformed world-orders, new beginnings and the like have only given us more and more occasion to lament the resulting dashed hopes. My questioning is not of intent, or of commitment, or of the sincerity of those who advocate world-order transformations. Rather, my questionings relate to a perspective on "implications." Here, there is a very different, and more subtle, sort of globalized world-order that we need to consider--the globalization of violence,

wherein human relationships become disconnected from the personal and are instead conjoined into distant and distanced chains of violence, an alienation of human and human. And by the nature of this new world-ordering, as the web of implication in relational violence is increasingly extended, so too, the vision of violence itself becomes blurred and the voice, muted . Through this implication into violence, therefore, the order(ing) of emancipatory imagination is reinforced. What we cannot see , after all, we cannot speak ; what we refuse to see, we dare not speak.

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The aff’s usage and depiction of policymaking as the only way to solve for <insert scenario here> absolves us of our responsibility to the environment- This makes it impossible to solve for the root cause of the problem. Only a full rejection of the aff’s attempt at policymaking solves, as any usage of status quo law results in only solutions for specific scenarios from the “end-of-the-pipe”— Not addressing the origination of pollution and environmental degradation, requiring further laws to stop other scenarios and reinforcing the global order(ing). This turns the case as it makes all their impacts inevitable and irreparable absent transitioning to a local mindset from our current global one.

Framing issue- Their usage of environmental law only puts a quick-fix on pollution and makes it inevitable Bobertz 95 (Bradley C., Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory”, March, Texas Law Review)CDD

To date, explanations for the intellectual bedlam of environmental law have included analyses of the byzantine organizational and jurisdictional structures of congressional subcommittees, n10

models of public choice and game theory, n11 lessons from evolutionary biology, n12 and visions of [*714] impersonal institutionalized corruption. n13 This Article offers an alternative theory for understanding both the convolutions and the failures of environmental law. Drawing on insights from the fields of anthropology, psychology, and media studies, I examine the phenomenon of societal scapegoating as a means for developing collective solutions to complex, poorly understood problems. My thesis is straightforward: Environmental lawmaking provides an important avenue for alleviating what we -- individually and collectively -- experience at some level as guilt or shame for the environmental degradation we witness through a world view shaped, in large measure, by the media. By offering this scapegoating or guilt-redemption theory, I do not attempt to provide a full explanation of environmental law and its genesis, and I certainly do not purport to diagnose the American psyche. However, I do attempt to explore some of the most basic, yet least understood, questions of the field: Why have we chosen to control pollution through the particular means we have, and why do we create legal responses to some environmental problems but not to others? n14 The theory advanced in this Article relocates federal environmental

law, a relative newcomer to the legal scene, to a more traditional place in the geography of social reform legislation. Rather than manifesting an unprecedented legal experiment, environmental law simply reflects a recent iteration of an old problem -- the attempt to influence mass behavior through the instruments of the legal system . In environmental law, one witnesses the same issues that for decades have provided grist for reform-minded lawmakers: struggles to define desirable and undesirable behavior; debates over incentives, deterrence, and punishment; and questions about who makes the rules and when these rules might violate other aims and values of society. As with other areas of the law, these issues all emerge in the context of a complex, multitiered system of delegated collective power and individual liberty. [*715] In contrast to other areas of social reform, however, environmental law presents some unique problems. While the causes of crime, poverty, and other social problems can,

without too much intellectual turmoil, be attributed to individual behavior, environmental degradation appears to implicate all of us. Pollution can strike observers as the integral by-product of the relatively comfortable lifestyle enjoyed by a majority of Americans in the late twentieth century. Yet, with images of smokestacks, dying lakes, and oil-drenched otters constantly intruding on the public consciousness, we are forced to live out Pogo's dilemma: We have met the enemy, and he is us . n15 Because the deep-seated causes of pollution tend to implicate us all , we feel the desire for psychological guilt release or redemption with special force . Thus, laws that externalize blame to outside forces allow us to preserve a way of life to which we have grown accustomed and one that we are reluctant to change -- the very way of life that generates pollution in the first place. Environmental laws help us escape this psychological dilemma. They establish

clear lines between the perpetrators and the victims , maintaining our position safely on the side of the innocent by treating pollution not as a natural, expected outcome of industrialization, but instead as an aberration from a norm of cleanliness. Environmental laws and the social patterns they reflect raise troubling questions. If we reduce the purpose of environmental law to merely stopping end-point pollution , we inevitably discourage scrutiny of our basic habits and ways of life . With pollution being "taken care of" by the government, only the most guilt-sensitive will take action to change their own behavior, and only the most fervently committed will press for deeper changes in our systems of production and waste disposal.

Unfortunately, these ardent few occupy a marginalized position in mainstream America, and as the process of environmental lawmaking marches onward -- identifying and punishing its scapegoats -- the underlying causes of pollution are rarely mentioned, let alone acted upon. n16 Thus, environmental legislation presents a striking example of how the law can legitimize an existing state of affairs while simultaneously creating the appearance of reforming it. In exploring the scapegoating thesis, this Article will proceed in five parts. Part II introduces the basic theory of environmental scapegoating. It examines how society tends to blame environmental problems on readily identifiable entities or symbols that may or may not correspond to the [*716] actual causes of the problems at hand. Part III examines patterns of reporting in the news media and notes how these patterns both reflect and exacerbate society's tendency toward environmental scapegoating. Part IV then presents an in-depth case study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the ensuing Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to demonstrate how the scapegoating phenomenon both influences public opinion about environmental problems and distorts legislative outcomes. Part V applies the scapegoating theory to additional areas of

environmental law, and finally, Part VI concludes that current trends in environmental lawmaking legitimize the very problems that the laws purport to control , thus helping to explain the overcomplexity and ineffectiveness of current environmental legislation. II. Scapegoating: The Mechanics of Blame and Redemption A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. n17 Once identified as the

culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, n18 family psychology, n19 and mass sociology, n20 but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking. The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical [*717] scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. n21 Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." n22 This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" n23 and the "guilt offerings," n24 were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, n25 these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. n26 Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, n27 anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. n28 Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. n29 Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. n30 [*718] While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. n31 Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. n32 To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. n33 This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling

pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves . For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

Links

Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical industry is propping up consumptionAssadourian 12 ( Erik, a Senior Fellow at the Worldwatch Institute, where he has studied cultural change, consumerism, economic degrowth, ecological ethics, corporate responsibility, and sustainable communities over the past 11 years, “Moving towards sustainable prosperity” ,http://blogs.worldwatch.org/sustainableprosperity/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/SOW12_chap_2.pdf)CDD

It is no surprise that overdeveloped coun- tries also suffer from a series of ailments con- nected to overconsumption —since affluence and development decoupled long ago for many in these countries.

The clearest indicator is the obesity epidemic now plaguing most indus- trial countries and developing- world elites. In the United States, two of every three adults are now overweight or obese, reducing their qual- ity of life, shortening life spans, and costing the country an extra $270 billion a year in med- ical costs and lost productivity due to early deaths and disabilities. This epidemic may even lead to the next generation

living fewer years than their parents did, primarily due to obesity- related problems like heart disease, diabetes, and certain cancers. Tragic statistics, but there are many who prosper from this type of growth : agribusiness, processed-food manu- facturers, marketers, hospitals , pharmaceutical companies , and others all profit from main- taining the status quo. The diet industry alone earns up to $100 billion a year on obesity in the United States. And the United States is not exceptional on this front, merely a trendsetter. In

2010, 1.9 billion people were overweight or obese worldwide, up 38 percent over 2002, even though total population rose 11 percent in that time.8 Obesity , unfortunately, is not the only side effect of overdevelopment . Increased debt bur- dens, long working hours, pharmaceutical dependence , time trapped in traf fic, even increased levels of social isolation stem at least in par t from high-consumption lifestyles . Indeed, while many modern advances—per- sonal transport, single-family homes, televi- sions, computers, and electronic gadgets—seem to have improved human well-being, in reality these advances may have imposed significant sacrifices on consumer populations without their knowledge or consent.9

REM

Mineral extraction is a consumptionist mindset- regardless of recyclingKibert et al. 12 (Charles J, Professor and Director of the Powell Center for Construction and Environment at the University of Florida. He is co-founder and President of the Cross Creek Initiative, a non-profit industry/university joint venture seeking to implement sustainability principles into construction. He has been vice-chair of the Curriculum and Accreditation Committee of the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) and helped create the first ever student chapter of the USGBC for which he serves as faculty advisor.), Leslie Thiele (teaches political theory and serves as Director of Sustainability Studies at the University of Florida. His interdisciplinary research focuses on sustainability issues and the intersection of political philosophy and the natural sciences. His central concerns are the responsibilities of citizenship and the opportunities for leadership in a world of rapid technological, social, and ecological change. ), Anna Peterson, (Department of Religion at the University of Florida. She received her PhD from the University of Chicago Divinity School. Her main research and teaching areas are environmental and social ethics, religion and politics, and religion in Latin America.), and Martha Monroe (Professor of Environmental Education and Extension, at the School of Forest Resources and Conservation of the University of Florida), “The Ethics of Sustainability”, http://www.cce.ufl.edu/current/ethics/Ethics%20of%20Sustainability%20Textbook.pdf)CDD

Mineral Resource Depletion The depletion of key resources needed to support the energy and materials requirements of today’s technological, developed world societies, is a threat to the high quality of life enjoyed by North Americans, Europeans, Japanese, and the other countries that make up these societies. Evidence to-date seems to indicate that we have maximized our ability to extract oil and that we are in an era of probably far higher prices for oil-based products, among them gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and oil-based polymers. A similar scenario is playing out with other key resources, most notably metals . A recent study of the supply and usage of copper, zinc and other metals has determined that supplies of these resources--even if recycled-- may fail to meet the needs of the global population. 13 Even the full extraction of metals from the Earth's crust and extensive recycling programs may not meet future demand if all countries try and attain the same standard of living enjoyed in developed nations. The researchers, Robert Gordon and Thomas Graedel, based their study on metal still in the Earth, in use by people and lost in landfills. Using copper stocks in North America as a starting point, they tracked the evolution of copper mining, use and loss during the 20th century. They then applied their findings and additional data to an estimate of global demand for copper and other metals if all nations were fully developed and used modern technologies. The study found that all of the copper in ore, plus all of the copper currently in use, would be required to bring the world to the level of the developed nations for power transmission, construction and other services and products that depend on copper. Globally, the researchers estimate that 26 percent of extractable copper in the Earth's crust is now lost in non- recycled wastes; while lost zinc is estimated at 19 percent . Interestingly, the researchers said that current prices do not reflect those losses because supplies are still large enough to meet demand, and new methods have helped mines produce material more efficiently. While copper and zinc are not at risk of depletion in the immediate future, the researchers believe scarce metals , such as platinum, are at risk of depletion in this century because there is no suitable substitute for their use in devices such as catalytic converters and hydrogen fuel cells. And because the rate of use for metals continues to rise, even the more plentiful metals may face similar depletion risks in the not too distant future . The impacts on metal prices due to a combination of demand and dwindling stocks has been dramatic. In a single year 2005-2006, zinc and copper experienced a 300% rise, and metals such as nickel, brass and stainless steel rose by about 250%. The good news is the there is a renewed emphasis on recycling, using only the exact quantity of metals required, and insuring that all in-plant scrap is recovered during manufacturing.

Sensationalism

Sensationalist framing allows consumers to put distance between themselves and the problem- That makes it impossible to solveBobertz 95 (Bradley C., Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory”, March, Texas Law Review)CDDThe idea that the media simply reports news in an objective, mirror-like fashion retains few adherents. n35 Media scholars have shown that news reports, like most forms of storytelling, rely on predictable narrative structures and beliefs about heroism and villainy , causation and desert. n36 The news has become a form of cultural mythology, n37 a way for society to converse with itself and reinforce its essential beliefs, world views, and ideologies. n38 One observer calls television, including the news, a "consensus narrative" -- a set of assumptions used "to articulate the culture's central mythologies, in a widely accessible 'language,' an inheritance of shared stories, plots, character types, cultural symbols, [and] narrative conventions." n39 Given its basis in the seemingly objective world of science, the reporting of environmental issues would seem to present an exception to the rule. Scholars of

environmental journalism have, if anything, found the opposite to be true. n40 Typically, news about environmental issues is decontextualized and presented as a series of discrete events that are [*720] fraught with drama, rather than as ongoing problems or predictable malfunctionings of complex technologies. n41 Environmental problems ( particularly those of a catastrophic nature) are reported as aberrations from a norm of health and safety. Charles Perrow's work, Normal Accidents, n42 effectively dispels the idea that environmental problems should be viewed as aberrational. Perrow presents a convincing case that " accidents" like airline crashes, n43 explosions at petrochemical plants, n44 and marine mishaps n45 should be considered "normal " aspects of living in a risky world. Despite our best efforts to prevent catastrophes, technological disasters are inevitable given the unpredictability of multiple failures in complex systems. n46 Every effort may be made to protect against foreseeable breakdowns, both human and technological, but combinations of failures in all their possible iterations may simply be impossible

to predict. n47 As one observer summed it up, environmental stories "are part of a modern myth that focuses attention on natural powers beyond our control and on the blundering efforts of humans to deal with the fruits of the industrial revolution." n48 Environmental reporting also carries a strong whiff of righteousness , with clear lines drawn around the innocent and the blameworthy. The message that environmentalism is basically a moral issue figures prominently in many photographs and reels of television footage that depict pollution. On the original Earth Day in 1970, the Associated Press circulated a photograph portraying a man "sniffing" flowers through a gas mask and set against the backdrop of an industrial wasteland of smokestacks and factories with the New York City skyline barely visible through the smog. "Stop and smell the flowers," read the caption. n49 As President [*721] Richard M. Nixon and Senator Edmund S. Muskie fought for the moral high ground by outbidding each other with stronger clean air bills in 1970, each sought to "present himself to a nationwide audience as the statesman who is trying to bring the

American people relief at long last from the invisible, yet anxiety-provoking, evil of mass pollution." n50 Heavy-handed moralism also provides an effective tool for many environmental groups in their campaigns against polluters. n51 In addition, the power of public shame (and its economic impact on corporations) clearly lies at the core of environmental disclosure laws such as the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 n52 and California's Proposition 65. n53 All this has not gone unnoticed by consulting firms and publishing houses, one of which featured a full-page advertisement prominently displaying the

hangman's noose that awaits environmental violators. n54 Thus, environmental reporting provides no exception to the mythic , stylized character found in other areas of journalism. Explanations for this are varied, but include the following: *

The complexity of the subject matter. One study found that scientific articles contain more than six times the number of errors as ordinary news stories. n55 However, as one observer points out, "[E]rrors derive less from inaccurate reproduction of details than from the inevitable distortions that occur in

translating complex technical terms into lay English." n56 * Journalists' lack of scientific training. Trashing the press is commonplace in scientific circles. This disdain is attributable [*722] partly to the fact that, except for major national dailies, few newspapers have the resources to employ full-time science reporters. n57 Some environmental journalists jokingly call themselves SMEERSHs: "We cover Science, Medicine, Energy, Environment, Research, and all sorts of other SHit." n58 With such a wide range of issues to cover, few journalists can hope to master the

technical background and methodologies of environmental science. * Overreliance on small circles of "experts" as sources, with the effect of ignoring alternative viewpoints . n59 The vulnerability of journalists to expert sources was vividly illustrated by a Kafka-inspired hoax involving a "Dr. Gregor" from the "Metamorphosis"

Institute. According to a bogus press release, Dr. Gregor had discovered a new wonder-drug derived from a peculiar, if common, source -- the cockroach. Fully 175 American newspapers reported this joke as an actual scientific discovery. n60 * A tendency to favor the dramatic over the mundane, regardless of a story's ultimate importance . Most journalists acknowledge the fact that they must entertain as well as inform, particularly as the number and variety of news outlets expand. "The goal of reporters is to find and dramatize 'controversy.'" n61 Yet, a story's "controversy quotient" certainly does not bear a direct correlation with the story's actual importance. n62 * Strong professional disincentives to deviate from the "consensus" of a particular story once it has crystallized. A reporter who covered the Three Mile Island story for the [*723] Baltimore Sun refers to this phenomenon as "the

tyranny of the story." n63 As events unfold, most journalists steer the safe course, repeating the consensus understanding of the story, even if this common understanding (often formed early in the life of a story)

can or should be challenged. Deviations from the "myth of the story" can prove perilous to a journalist's career. n64 * Shared cultural and professional biases among journalists. In her book, Selling Science, Dorothy Nelkin expresses surprise at the degree of cultural homogeneity among reporters and journalists at all levels of science journalism -- from the New York Times, to USA Today, to local television stations. n65 She explains: "While journalistic reports on science and technology vary in accuracy, depth, and detail, most articles on a given subject focus on the same issues, use the same sources of information, and interpret the material in similar terms. . . . [W]riting on scientific issues and events takes place within . . . 'a persistent pattern of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection,

emphasis, and exclusion.'" n66 * The creation of false bipolarities of opinion in the name of journalistic "balance." The idea that the media should present a "balanced" viewpoint is pervasive both in and out of the industry. n67 Unfortunately, the search for balance often results in stories that present only two sides of multifaceted problems. "The greenhouse

effect, for example, has lent itself particularly well to trivialization by juxtaposing competing authorities . . ." n68 * Money. In particular, reporters in smaller markets feel pressure not to bite the hand that feeds them. Journalist William Coughlin recounts the story of local papers discounting reports of groundwater contamination, largely out of fear of [*724] backlash from the local economic community. n69 And, according to Dorothy Nelkin: [W]hen 175 children in a northern Idaho town were found to have dangerous concentrations of lead in their blood, the region's newspapers shied away from the story. Pressure from the local lead and zinc smelter contributed to the news blackout. Moreover, scientists in the area were mostly employed by the industry and would not help reporters unravel the issue. Those stories that appeared had headlines minimizing the problem: "Doctors Said Lead Scare Out of Proportion," "Lead Poisoning Fears Largely Unwarranted," "Bunker Hill Warns Regulation Could Cause

Shut-down." n70 * Deadline pressures and other commonplace realities of the newsmaking business. n71 The way environmental news is typically packaged distorts the formation of public opinion about the nature of environmental problems. In their deadline-pressured attempts to explain complicated problems, reporters resort to familiar patterns of cause

and effect that often bear little resemblance to the problem when viewed in its full context. n72 This further promotes the rote, mythic elements commonly found in environmental reporting. n73 The idea that blame for environmental threats can be quickly identified is one result of these journalistic tendencies. The public comes to believe [*725] that the causes of environmental problems can be identified, understood, and acted upon by experts and elected officials . This inclination to attribute complex problems to simple causes may have far-reaching consequences for the evolution of environmental law and policy, as the following case study illustrates.

Oil spills

Oil policies are sensationalist- They aren’t holistic and re-entrench solving problems at the “end-of-the-pipe” Bobertz 95 (Bradley C., Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory”, March, Texas Law Review)CDDTo examine the scapegoat theory in an actual setting, consider the Exxon Valdez oil spill n74 and the ensuing Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). n75 Analysis of this case both illustrates the power that scapegoating holds on our views about reality and causation and demonstrates how these views are reflected and reinforced by the media. This evaluation also shows how the myth of the Valdez story exerted a strong and distorting influence on an actual legal outcome -- the OPA. A. What Do You Do with a Drunken Sailor? Question:

How many Exxon people does it take to drive a boat? Answer: One and a fifth. n76 In March 1990, a year after the Exxon Valdez spilled eleven million gallons of Alaska crude into Prince William Sound , the Frontline television series broadcast a documentary called "Anatomy of an Oil Spill." n77 The documentary told the following story about the immediate events leading up to the spill: At about 9:30 p.m. on March 23, 1989, the Exxon Valdez left port after being filled with its cargo of crude oil from the Alaska pipeline terminal and port in Valdez, Alaska. At 11:30 p.m., Captain Joseph Hazelwood radioed the Coast Guard to say that he was steering his ship outside the assigned shipping lane to avoid ice in the water. A few minutes later, Hazelwood turned over control of the tanker to Third Mate Gregory Cousins, who was licensed to operate the ship in open water, but not in Prince William Sound. Before retiring to his quarters, Hazelwood instructed Cousins when and how to make the necessary course correction to return the ship to the [*726] proper channel. The ship made its turn at 12:03 a.m., five minutes too late. It is not clear whether Cousins waited too long to order the turn or whether the ship's helmsman (who actually operates the wheel) failed to follow the order in time. n78 The tanker ran aground on the rocks off Bligh Reef a minute later, ripping open a large section of the hull; however, if the ship had been turned as Hazelwood had ordered, the wreck would not have occurred. n79 At 12:26 a.m., Hazelwood radioed the Coast

Guard with the news: "This is the Valdez back. We've -- should be on your radar, there -- we've fetched up hard aground north of Goose Island off Bligh Reef. And evidently we're leaking some oil. . . ." n80 The documentary rejected the conventional wisdom that blame for the spill could be pinned on one person, Hazelwood, and one corporation, Exxon. Instead, Frontline concluded that "the wreck and the magnitude of the damage required the bad judgment of a lot of people, in big oil and government, over a period of years." n81 In fact, a host of institutional players shared in the blame. First, the Coast Guard had rejected at least four critical safety measures that would have prevented the spill, including: (1) full radar coverage of Prince William Sound, (2) a system that would have provided constant updates as to tankers' positions, (3) a rule requiring trained pilots to accompany ships during their journeys through the Sound, and (4) a requirement that tankers be fitted with double hulls. n82 The Coast Guard also routinely allowed tankers to abandon shipping lanes, exceed vessel speed limits, and violate pilotage requirements. n83 Although much was made of the fact that the Exxon Valdez ran aground while being piloted by an uncertified third mate, this practice was commonplace. According to testimony at Hazelwood's criminal trial, "[I]t was common knowledge among tanker skippers that the Coast Guard had been relaxing its pilotage regulations." n84 Indeed, in the hours immediately preceding the spill, at least two other outbound tankers took the same detour as the Exxon Valdez, both piloted by officers lacking proper Coast Guard certification. n85 The tanker owners, for their part, had cut back on crew size and established punishing production schedules that resulted in unreasonable working hours and dangerously fatigued pilots. Union representatives [*727] claimed that "smaller crews increased the danger of accidents because of longer hours and less sleep, especially during the demanding hours when a tanker is in port being filled with or emptied of oil." n86 The Exxon Valdez was designed for a crew of thirty-three, but was operating with a crew of nineteen when it ran aground. n87 Alyeska, the consortium of oil companies responsible for dealing with spills in the Sound, was grossly unprepared for the magnitude of the spill. The consortium had relied on a study predicting a catastrophic spill of 200,000 barrels or more only once every 241 years; a more likely spill, according to the study, would be between 1000 and 2000 barrels. n88 Relying on this lower figure, Alyeska's contingency plan was geared for a spill 175 times smaller than that from the Valdez. The response was doomed from the start. According to former Alyeska President George Nelson: [I]f Alyeska had been out at Bligh Reef anchored to the thing -- you know, ready -- it wouldn't have made any difference. We didn't have -- the equipment we had in our plan, as approved in the '87 plan, was to deal with a 1,000 to 2,000 barrel spill, okay? We did not have the equipment at the terminal -- the plan didn't call for it, we didn't have it -- to take out to deal with a 268,000 barrel spill -- whatever the amount of the spill is. n89 Alyeska was prepared only for the small spill its models had predicted, not the massive spill that actually occurred. n90 While Exxon took most of the blame for the botched clean-up, the company took charge only after Alyeska, hopelessly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the spill, abandoned the effort. n91 Altogether, a complex interaction of institutional and human

factors created a setting in which a major spill -- at some time -- was probably inevitable. n92 [*728] In the hours immediately following the accident , when the news of the spill first hit the media, few reporters were equipped with the essential background information that would have enabled them to understand the context of the incident . n93 And two days later, when Exxon executive Frank Iarossi broke the story that Hazelwood had a history of alcohol problems and had alcohol on his breath after the spill, Iarossi furnished a simple, dramatic explanation that seemingly resolved the complex question of what had caused the spill . According to a reporter for the Anchorage Times, daily press conferences "degenerated into questions about alcohol when early on it was evident alcohol had only a small part, if any, in how the accident happened." n94 At his criminal trial, Hazelwood was acquitted of both drunkenness and reckless operation; he was convicted only of negligently discharging oil. n95 Yet after the alcohol story broke, accounts of the disaster took on the guise of a morality tale involving a drunken sailor and a greedy corporation. Relying heavily on footage of the spill's victims (angry fishermen, oil-soaked birds, dead fish), television broadcasts reinforced the moralistic, innocence-despoiled-by-evil structure of the story. n96 With few exceptions, journalists fixated on the simple and dramatic , completely disregarding (or failing to perceive) any complicating details : Journalists who covered the spill as a fable about a drunken sea captain and a mighty oil company that couldn't clean up after itself provided some great drama, but missed most of the story. The direct cause of the accident was a sober crew member who did not follow clear instructions, and the indirect but perhaps more important cause was a substantial deterioration of the maritime precautions administered by the Coast Guard. Since

equipment and technology does [sic] not exist to contain or clean up large oil spills, the oil industry was certain to fail against public expectations no matter what its cleanup crews actually did. n97 [*729] Thus, an event brought about by the convergence of numerous factors was transformed into a misleading, but culturally resonant, tale of a drunken sailor and a dark-hearted company. n98 B. How a Spill Becomes a Law The Exxon

Valdez catastrophe generated immediate demand for stronger oil spill legislation. At the time, oil spills were governed (none too

well) by a confusing mixture of federal and state statutes, common-law principles, and international treaties. The centerpiece of pre-1990 law was Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, which created a modest response fund for federal clean-ups, imposed penalties on dischargers, and required the President to promulgate clean-up regulations. Significantly, it also imposed extraordinarily low limits on spill liability. n99 Attempts to consolidate and strengthen these laws had been stymied in the past, n100 but now that the media

was supplying daily doses of Armageddon-like language and imagery, n101 momentum for legislative reform became irresistible. In a showing of bipartisan support virtually unknown for environmental statutes, the OPA sailed through both houses without a nay being uttered.

n102 While the OPA may be an improvement over the scattered half-measures of prior law, n103 it stubbornly adheres to the image of the [*730] drunken sailor. Subtitle IV(A), dealing with spill prevention, opens with five sections devoted to the problem of alcohol and drug abuse: section 4101 requires an applicant for a merchant mariners' license both to undergo drug testing and to reveal certain impairment-related information; n104 section 4102 shortens the terms of licenses and creates new authority for the Coast Guard to check criminal records as part of the renewal process; n105 section 4103 sets new standards for suspending and revoking licenses on the basis of drug or alcohol violations; n106 section 4104 establishes procedures for removing a captain from command should he be found to be under the influence; n107 and section 4105 gives the Coast Guard access to the National Driver Register for information on the driving records of license holders. n108 To be sure, these provisions are not unnecessary or ill-advised. They give the Coast Guard authority commonly found in other areas, such as state motor vehicle laws, that the agency had claimed to lack. However, the Coast Guard's general authority to regulate shipping should have enabled it to implement on its own most of the drug and alcohol restrictions set forth in the OPA. Over the past decade, other federal agencies have implemented drug and alcohol policies unilaterally without express statutory language on the subject. n109 What makes the OPA's drug and alcohol provisions noteworthy is their prime positioning and emphasis in the law. A reader of the statute comes away with the impression that drug and alcohol abuse runs rampant among tanker pilots and that Congress has responded with lengthy and specific requirements appropriate to a problem of

vast magnitude. n110 The [*731] point is not that these provisions are wrong-headed (they are not), but that their prominence creates a statute of distorted emphasis. n111 One provision of the Act, however, does deal with the drunken captain problem in a manner that appears to tread on the wrong side of the line separating rationality from its opposite quality. Section 4104 ratifies into federal law the old seafaring version of self-help for crews with vicious captains: "the mutiny." n112 According to this provision, the captain of a vessel must be removed from command if the two next senior officers reasonably believe the captain is incapable of commanding the vessel due to the influence of drugs or alcohol. n113 This curious mandatory mutiny law leaves much unsaid: When is a captain "incapable" of commanding a ship? Does it matter whether the ship is maneuvering at harbor or is at open sea? How should the would-be mutineers respond if the captain resists their efforts at removal? Is violence appropriate? Is it mandatory? And what if the second and third mates themselves are under the influence? Could the most junior sailor rely on the provision to support a one-man mutiny if he reasonably believed that everyone else on board was too drunk to pilot the vessel? Must he? Given the circumstances under which the mutiny provision would actually operate, the likelihood that it will prevent oil spills is virtually nonexistent. Illustrating this point, Professor William Rodgers uses what he calls a "compliancegram" to assess the probable effectiveness of the law. n114 Taking into account the statistical probabilities that the junior officers would be aware of the mutiny provision, that they would both recognize and agree that the captain is "incapable" of commanding the vessel, and that both would overcome their natural hesitancy to challenge the captain (a bad career move), the likelihood that the mutiny provision will function as intended is estimated to be about 1 in 2400. n115 Thus, for every drunken captain properly relieved of command under the law, thousands more

will remain at the helm, steering to the sirens of inebriation. n116 The drunken sailor provisions of the OPA are not the only aspects of the law reflecting peculiar legislative choices. For example, although the [*732] OPA's liability scheme is a direct descendant of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), n117 the differences between the two laws are striking. Whereas CERCLA casts liability widely to cover everyone connected in almost any conceivable way with the release of hazardous substances, n118 the OPA limits liability exclusively to the owner, operator, or charterer of the offending vessel. n119 Strikingly, the oil companies who own the ship's cargo are immunized from liability. n120 This exclusion directly contradicts international conventions considerably less ambitious than the OPA, one of which states that "the economic consequences of oil pollution damage resulting from the escape or discharge of oil carried in bulk at sea by ships should not exclusively be borne by the shipping industry but should in part be borne by the oil cargo interests." n121 Even an industry-sponsored compensation scheme

for oil spills requires contribution by cargo owners. n122 The effects of the decision to limit liability to shippers have yet to be seen, but several unpleasant scenarios are conceivable. Without the threat of statutory liability, oil companies that previously shipped their own cargo might discontinue that practice and divest themselves of their shipping interests, draining the funds available for safety measures, curtailing industry self-policing, and leaving the shipping industry, as a whole, less able to cover response costs. One major oil company has already decided to stop using its own tankers for oil shipments to all but one U.S. terminal. As the company explained: "A shipowner who is involved in a pollution incident in the U.S.A., even when he has behaved properly, responsibly, and without negligence, may face claims which far outweigh the potential commercial reward from such trade." n123 Because major oil spills are relatively rare, oil companies might also choose to contract with cheaper (and presumably riskier and poorer) shippers. Shippers, potentially saddled with massive liability, have good reasons to emphasize safety. On the other hand, they might respond to the law by recasting themselves as thinly capitalized, one-ship corporations, minimizing their potential financial [*733] exposure as much as possible. The problem of single-vessel shipping companies had been mentioned during the House debate on the bill: We are indeed fortunate that the spiller in that case [the Valdez] was a major American corporation with substantial assets which made a commitment to try to clean up the spill as quickly and effectively as possible. Had the spill involved a single vessel foreign corporation with limited assets, the situation would have been truly disastrous. n124 A one-ship company is one of shallow pockets, and Congress's decision to limit liability exclusively to shippers undermines the goal of adequate

funding for clean-ups, supposedly a prominent aim of the OPA. C. Reflections on Oily Seas Although one cannot say precisely what quantum of influence the drunken-sailor account of the Exxon Valdez exerted on the OPA, the image of Captain Hazelwood hovers over the statute as surely as the specter of Love Canal lurks behind CERCLA. Without the alcohol story -- and the quick-and-easy explanation it offered to journalists, to the public, and to Congress -- the OPA would be a strikingly different law. The prominence of the drug and alcohol provisions would, without a doubt, be reduced, and the outlandish mutiny provision would probably

never even have occurred to anyone, let alone have found its way into the United States Code. The Act's liability provisions initially appear more tenuously related to the scapegoat phenomenon and the drunken-sailor story it helped to generate. Yet a dominant subplot of the story was Exxon's blundered efforts at a clean-up. n125 As a legal matter, responsibility for the clean-up lay with Alyeska, the consortium of oil companies that used the Valdez terminal, and not with anyone company alone. n126 By the time Exxon took over the clean-up from Alyeska, the damage from the spill was already irreversible. Exxon could do little, and its subsequent efforts to save wildlife and to spray and wipe oily beaches probably had as much to do with restoring its tarred public image as they did with restoring the ecological integrity of Prince William Sound. Arguably, the "bad corporation" aspect of the Valdez story might support portraying Exxon more as a bad shipper (and employer of alcoholic captains) than as an owner of the spilled oil and major player in the complex web of actors and causes leading to the spill. No direct evidence establishes that the initial [*734] media packaging and subsequent public understanding of the spill contributed to Congress's eleventh-hour abandonment of the Act's

owner liability provisions. Still, the fact that Exxon was depicted as a bad shipper might have made the owner liability provision easier to slide out of the Act and perhaps dampened criticism of that decision. The Valdez-OPA saga provides some additional lessons. The immediate need to assign blame for the disaster led to the construction of a story that identified two primary villains, Hazelwood and Exxon, but ignored other factors. As this version of the spill evolved into conventional wisdom, other contributing causes

fell out of the picture, depriving the event of its full context and l eaving lawmakers with a simpler -- but less accurate -- problem on their hands. The oversimplified version of blame for the disaster made its way relatively undisturbed to the seats of power in Washington. The Hazelwood-Exxon story, though incomplete and misleading, helped to fuel a policy outcome (the OPA) that clearly bears the marks of the story's misleading elements. In effect, the scapegoating phenomenon helped shape a law that

could prove less effective in achieving its goals than alternative approaches. Finally, the frenzied efforts to pin down responsibility in the early days of the spill, and the success of this effort in the form of the Hazelwood-Exxon account, helped exonerate the rest of us as we continued our habits at the pump, thus helping to legitimize the existing state of affairs back home and remove us personally from the circle of blame. n127 The story that emerged from Valdez resonated with existing cultural beliefs and values (relating to drinking and driving and corporate irresponsibility) that at least made it clear that the spill did not implicate our behavior.

Generic environment

Constructing environmental problems as global prevents people from taking action to solve themEsteva and Prakash 98 (Gustavo, Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board, and Madhu Suri, currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.) CDD

Once environmental “problems ”7 are reduced to the ozone layer or to global warming, to planetary " sources " and "sinks," faith in the futility of local efforts is fed by global experts; while their conferences, campaigns an d institutions present the fabulous apparition of solutions "scientifically" pulled out of the "global hat." Both a global consciousness and a global government (such as the Global Environmental Facility "master minded" at the Earth Summit ) appear as badly needed to manage the planet's "scarce resources" and " the masses " irresponsibly chopping "green sinks" for their daily tortillas or chappatis, threatening the "experts"' planetary designs for eco -development. The "ozone layer" or "global warming" are abstract hypotheses, offered by some scientists as an expla nation of recent phenomena. Even in that condition, they could prove to be very useful for fostering critical awareness of the folly of the "social minorities." But they are promoted as "a fact," reality itself, and all the socio-political and ecological dangers inherent in the illusion of the " Global Management " of planet Earth are hidden from "the people ." Excluded, for example, from critical scrutiny is the reflection that in order for "global thinking" to be feasible, we should be able to "think" from within every culture on Earth and come away from this excursion single-minded - clearly a logical and practical impossibility, once it is critically de-mythologized. For it requires the supra-cultural criteria of thinking" - implying the dissolution of the subject who "thinks"; or assuming that it is possible to "think" outside of the culture in which every man and woman on Earth is immersed. The human condition does not allow such operations. We cele brate the hopefulness of common men and women, saved from the hubris of "scientific man," unchastened by all his failures at playing God.

Development

The concept of development is just neo-colonial global orderingNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

Since the demise of the colonial legitimization of the "civilizing" mission, " development" has come to express the contemporary challenge of bringing the benefits of "civilization " and human progress to the populations of the world . It is, it appears, the primary purpose of human endeavor to be collectively undertaken by all and sundry within the context of a humanity-

embracing, "new," post-colonial, "world-order" -- another "new beginning." Through many ups and downs, through many failures and too few successes, the spirit of development as a great human cause has been kept alive. Now we must do everything we can to turn that spirit into practical, visible progress for people in Africa, and people everywhere . Development is everyone's job. No more fundamental cause exists today. I believe that we stand at the start of a time of unique achievement. n19 So many possible audiences stand to be identified by this appeal of the former Secretary-General of the United Nations for the "job" of "development." To the leaders of the world is made the plea to revitalize efforts toward the implementation of development initiatives. To the doubters of the "development" project is made the reassurance that now, despite the "many ups and downs," the spirit and vision of development still rings true and firm. To himself and his staff of the development-related institutions of the UN, perhaps the audience for which the statement is truly intended, is made the reassertion that this work of development is an important one. They, the development workers, have the historic role of ensuring the realization of this vision of human progress, and so much futility and even failure may be erased or forgotten through a renewed commitment to carry on

persistently with their tasks. All this expression of angst and hope is, of course, nothing new. Like a social ritual played out with consistent regularity, we have become familiar with these gatherings of "developmentalists, " at which they administer healthy measures of both admonishments for past failures and [*610] encouragements for future hope. And like in all rituals, processes of "remembering ," which are the public face of proceedings, are accompanied by the equally important processes of "forgetting ." Repeated and remembered are the "failures," the commitments to "humanity," the conditions of suffering that are deemed "intolerable," and the articulations of hope in future "action." Ignored and forgotten are the

violence of the failures, the fraudulence of the commitments, the processes of inflicted suffering

deemed necessary, and the articulations of despair about past actions . Still, the ritual performs a regenerative purpose. It

recasts anew the project of development with all its civilizational importance and reassures its practitioners of their historic mission to "order" society. But what is the message given to the "victims" of development --those who, although intended as the beneficiaries of this universal project, have had to suffer the "many failures and too few successes" as these rituals are enacted? n20 To them is made a plea for patience and a rearticulation of a vision for tomorrow. For them , however, perhaps a different experience of development al (mis)orderings persists, one which bears a striking resemblance to the earlier phase of colonial ordering . While once colonialism was blatant in its dehumanizing of social relationships, notwithstanding the claims of the "civilizing mission," now that same dehumanization takes place under the acceptable, if not desirable, guise of globalized development. The "poor" has come to replace the "savage/native;" the "expert consultant," the "missionary;" "training seminars," mass "baptizing;" the handphone in the pocket, the cross on the altar. But some things--the foreigner's degree, attire, consumer items, etc.--don't change. And what of the "comprador elites," that band of minority mercenaries who symbolized to the colonialist all that was good about what it meant to be the servile "civilized," who served as the faithful mouthpieces of the master? Today, many go by the names of "government functionaries" and "entrepreneurs." Regenerated by these contemporary ideological weapons of the desired human condition, the processes of ordering, of creating orders of inhumanity, carry on with violence intact.

Rhetoric

Global rhetoric re-entrenches colonial mindsets—Leads to orderingNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

It has become a convenience, even an imperative, it seems, to speak in terms of a "global," world. The proliferation of world-order rhetoric is a noticeable feature of contemporar y politico-legal, economic and socio-cultural discourse . In politico-legal terms, languages of the "harmonization" and "integration" of polities have gained prominence since the early [*603] experimentations of the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations. Gradually, it seems, we have moved from a world organized through the isolationism of "coexisting" states, to one co-ordinated by the UN-led interactions of "co-operating" states which have seen the emergence of "internationalism" and "regionalism." Most recently we see a world characterized by a shift, slowly but surely, toward ever greater "interdependence," as reflected through the contemporary mantra of "global governance." In economic and socio-cultural terms, imaginations of a "global village (market-place)" or a "Global Neighborhood," n4 encapsulate this evolution, the final stage toward realizing the aspiration of a "We the Peoples," as contained in the UN Charter, n5 ostensibly to be "connected" through the "world-wide web" of the internet through its many "dot-coms." n6 Driving this movement toward ever greater globality are the new realities of economic and social exchange in human relationships. There appears to be no escaping the bombardment of "globalization-speak." All this, we are told, is in the name of "inclusion" into "one world." n7 Ultimately, what we are witnessing is a nascent "global culture" emerging as an historic movement. The coming together of the peoples of the world is the great challenge of the

twenty-first century civilizational project. n8 [*604] Indeed, much of what provides the descriptive content of world-order narratives appears to be happening. Increased interaction at the global, let alone international, level is taking place. Leisurely meanderings through the streets of any major city, or even minor town, anywhere, provide ample sensory evidence of a globalization-led rise in homogeneity of social experience and aspiration. From advertising hoardings to cinema posters, restaurants to cyber-cafes, shopping malls to banks, hotels to discotheques, muzak to top-tens, fashion of the chic to that of the executive, monocultures prevail. Everywhere, local flavors provide an exotic touch of difference to the otherwise comfortable familiarity of the global. Of course, such leisurely meanderings are limited to those who have the resources by which to make such a comparative study, to those with the mobility to "be anywhere"--the professional, the corporate player, the "global activist," the footloose academic. For these, narratives of a

"global world" find appeal. Thus, a "globalized" world-order has come to fit snugly with in the common parlance of these "global citizens" (politicians, lawyers, corporate actors, professional NGOists, academics), and world-order possibilities have infused their imaginations . The struggle ahead, from such vantage points, lies in determining what the image of order might be, what the structures of a global order might look like. The rush to capture the symbolic and futuristic landscape of world-order provides us with the rich exhortations of "new beginnings," open to the intellectual expertise of both "right" and "left" politico-economic orientations. These range from the "ordering" inclinations of U.S. State officials asserting the right of "benign imperialism," n9 to the "reordering" demands of progressive internationalists calling for "humane governance" n10 and "neighborhood" perspectives. n11 Regardless of political and ideological orientations, the underlying message of the rhetoric of world-order, however conceptualized, is one of increased human welfare, freed now [*605] from the ideological constraints of an outdated, geo-politically based state system. A new order for these exciting times is the order of the day. Setting aside these divergent articulations of the vision of world-order, let us locate the rhetoric of world-order within the realm of social experience. The point of our concern is not simply about "world-order-talk," after all, but rather, about the real or potential impacts of world-orders, real or imagined. I suggest we begin this exploration into an alternative narrative on world-order by stepping off the bandwagon of world-order narratives to reflect on the

connotations of its very terminology. What is this "world" that we have in mind when we speak of world-order? What is the

nature of "order" that characterizes this world that has come to be the template for our new world-order? What has been the fate and fortune of other "We the Peoples"? n12 Should we seek them out, within this order that has come to be created? Our first challenge, I suggest, is in distinguishing between the imaginations of world-order and the materialities of "world

(mis)order(ings)." Order as Evolutionary Structure: The potency of the term " world-order " to mobilize human imagination lies in its appeal to something almost divine : the civilizational project that is the natural path of human evolution, our common destiny, inherently good , bound by the "cords of the heart." n13 In this respect, " order" is presented as standing in opposition to the undesired condition of " disorder ." Therefore, to construct an order out of this condition which, at best, is one of nothingness, and at worst, one of chaos and anarchy, stands as a task of historic human responsibility. Being of the "order of things," so to speak, we may regard the project of creating order, of " ordering," as inherent and intrinsic to human history in its movement toward ever greater levels of evolutionary unfolding. This assumption of order gives rise to a Cartesian conception of the organization of human relationships, wherein the progressive evolution of human civilization entails the mechanical, "neutral" and necessary process of amalgamating diversity ( "disorder") into an efficient and unitary total structure of world-order. Order as Coercive Command: The flip side of order as "structure" is order as "command." Viewed in this way, it is the present of the coercive process of "ordering" rather than the future of the

emancipatory condition/structure of order that becomes emphasized. There is nothing "natural," "evolutionist" or "neutral" about

world-order when the command of ordering is made visible . The vision of civilization as mechanical organization of the component parts

of "humanity" is no longer tenable when the coercion of command to fit into this order is exposed. World-order, then, no longer describes the "order" of the world open to discovery, but rather, the "ordering" of the world open to conflict. [*606] Distinguishing these two meanings of "order" provides us with radically opposed directions of analysis and orientations for future imagings of social relations. Although the rhetoric of world-order would focus on visions of some projected "world" that provides the aspiration for collective endeavors, "order" does not come to be without necessary "ordering;" the "world" of "world-order" has not come to be without the necessary ordering of many worlds. The ordering and the ordered, the world of order and the ordered world, all are inextricable parts of the past and the present of "civil-ization." Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system n14 ), the materialities of "ordering"

were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15

to the "other ," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-West phalian " world " as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world." [*607] The significance of this evolution of the world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that was brought to prominence through acts of

colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it. The idea of a single world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and does

not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world" contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of colonialism is now plainly visible. Through "colonialism" was reshaped the material

basis of exchange that determined human relationships. Put differently, the very idea of what is "human" was recast by the imposed value-systems of the "civilizing" process that was colonialism. To be human, to live, and to relate to others, thus, both lost and gained meaning. Lost were many pre-colonial and indigenous conceptions of human dignity, of subsistence, production, consumption, wealth and poverty. Gained was the advent of the human "self" as an objective "economic" agent and, with it, the universals of commodification as the basis for human relations. Following this transformation of the material political-economy of the colonized, or "ordered,"

colonialism entrenched the "state" as the symbolic "political" institution of "public" social relations. The effect of this "colonization of the mind" was that the "political-economic" form of social organization--the state--was universalized as common, if not "natural," resulting in a homogenization of "political" imagination and language. Thus, diversity was unified, while at the same time, unity was diversified. The particularities and inconveniences of human diversity--culture and tradition--were subordinated to the "civilized" discourse of secular myths (to which the "rule of law" is central), n16 while concurrently, humanity was formally segregated into artificial "states," enclosures of mythic solidarities and common destinies.

Impacts

Horrors

Unless we stop consumption- We’re all going to die horribly Brent 11 (Jason G., Writer for counter currents, “ Billions Of Humans Will Die Horribly”, Jan 9th, http://www.countercurrents.org/brent090111.htm)CDD

The simple questions become can the earth provide those resources to humanity in 2050 when the resources used between 1950 and 2050 are taken into consideration and if the earth can provide the resources for how long can they be provided? While no one can provide an absolute answers to those questions, it would be the height of folly for humanity to gamble its survival on the ability for the earth to provide in 2050 8.41 times the resources it provided in 1950 and it would be extremely foolish for humanity to gamble its survival that the earth could continue p roviding those resources for any length of time . Humanity has two choices --- reduce population or reduce the per capita usage of resources , There are no other choices. If humanity does not reduce population and/or reduce per capita usage of resources, the earth will be unable to supply the resources civilization needs to function and the population will be reduced by nature--by war, starvation, disease, ethnic cleansing and other horrors .

Bio-D

A change in consumption overall is the only way to prevent bio-d collapse – Just a single sector approach failsPBL 10 ( Netherlands environmental assessment agency, “Structural changes in consumption and production could significantly reduce biodiversity loss”, Oct 20th, http://www.pbl.nl/en/structural-changes-in-consumption-and-production-could-significantly-reduce-biodiversity-loss)CDDTo strongly reduce the rate of global biod iversity loss in the coming decades, structural changes in consumption and production are needed . A reduction in meat consumption would be of great benefit. In addition, changes are needed especially in agriculture, forestry, fishery and in the supply of energy. A combined approach would deliver the largest benefits Measures aimed solely at one sector, such as that of forestry or energy, only lead to limited improvements . Implementing measures collectively would yield far greater benefits. The PBL has calculated the effect from one such combination of measures , resulting in a halving of the projected global loss of biod iversity, up to 2050 . Other measures or combinations of measures are also thinkable, but none will be able to halt this loss, completely. The combination of measures as analysed by the PBL would also help to reduce climate change and increase food security. Clever measures will limit biodiversity loss With a number of clever measures it will be possible to combine increasing production and consumption with a reduction in the loss of biodiversity: Animal husbandry is responsible for a relatively large part of biodiversity loss, worldwide. Therefore, a change in consumption patterns towards less meat would contribute to the preservation of biodiversity. If meat consumption were to go down, there would be less space required for animal farming; lessening the amount of food waste could lead to a similar result. This would leave more land area available to natural ecosystems. Modern and sustainable agricultural methods could greatly improve food production per hectare, worldwide. Forestry could become much more effective. The expansion of forest plantations that deliver high timber yields would lessen deforestation in areas with pristine forests. Wood production in mainly tropical natural forests could improve by reducing damage caused by selective logging. Sustainable fishery would lead to recovery of fish stocks and thus enable structurally larger and less perishable catches. Reducing deforestation aids climate change reduction. This is already incorporated into climate policy. These measures, combined with the proven protection of specific species and ecosystems, offer the prospect of a sizeable reduction in biodiversity loss by 2050.

(Taken from IOOS) ExtinctionDavidson, 2003 (Founder – Turtle House Foundation and Award-Winning Journalist, Fire in the Turtle House, p. 47-51)But surely the Athenians had it backward; it’s the land that rests in the lap of the sea. Thalassa, not Gaia, is the guardian of life on the blue

planet. A simple, albeit apocalyptic, experiment suggests Thalassa’s power. Destroy all life on land; the ocean creatures will survive just fine. Given time, they’ll even repopulate the land. But wipe out the organisms that inhabit the oceans and all life on land is doomed. “Dust to dust,” says the Bible, but “water to water” is more like it, for all life comes from and returns to

the sea. Our ocean origins abid within us, our secret marine history. The chemical makeup of our blood is strikingly similar to seawater. Every carbon atom in our body has cycled through the ocean many times. Even the human embryo reveals our watery past. Tiny gill slits form and

then fade during our development in the womb. The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence , the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate . The astonishing biodiversity is most evident on coral reefs, often called the “rain forests of the sea.” Occupying less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the global ocean, coral reefs are home to nearly a third of all marine fish species and to as many as nine million species in all. But life exists in profusion in every corner of the ocean, right down to the hydrothermal vents on the seafloor (discovered only in 1977), where more than a hundred newly described species thrive around superheated plumes of sulfurous gasses. The abundance of organisms in the ocean isn’t surprising given that the sea was, as already mentioned, the crucible of life on Earth. It is the original ecosystem, the environment in which the “primordial soup” of nucleic acids (which can self-replicate, but are

not alive) and other molecules made the inexplicable and miraculous leap into life, probably as simple bacteria, close to 3.9 billion years ago. A spectacular burst of new life forms called the Cambrian explosion took place in the oceans some 500 million years ago, an evolutionary experiment that produced countless body forms, the prototypes of virtually all organisms alive today. It wasn’t until 100 million years later that the first primitive plants took up residence on terra firma. Another 30 million years passed before the first amphibians climbed out of the ocean. After this head start, it’s not surprising that evolution on that newcomer-dry land-has never caught up with the diversity of the sea. Of the thirty-three higher-level groupings of animals (called phyla), thirty-two are found in the oceans and just twelve on land.

Overfishing

Consumption is the cause of overfishingKibert et al. 12 (Charles J, Professor and Director of the Powell Center for Construction and Environment at the University of Florida. He is co-founder and President of the Cross Creek Initiative, a non-profit industry/university joint venture seeking to implement sustainability principles into construction. He has been vice-chair of the Curriculum and Accreditation Committee of the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) and helped create the first ever student chapter of the USGBC for which he serves as faculty advisor.), Leslie Thiele (teaches political theory and serves as Director of Sustainability Studies at the University of Florida. His interdisciplinary research focuses on sustainability issues and the intersection of political philosophy and the natural sciences. His central concerns are the responsibilities of citizenship and the opportunities for leadership in a world of rapid technological, social, and ecological change. ), Anna Peterson, (Department of Religion at the University of Florida. She received her PhD from the University of Chicago Divinity School. Her main research and teaching areas are environmental and social ethics, religion and politics, and religion in Latin America.), and Martha Monroe (Professor of Environmental Education and Extension, at the School of Forest Resources and Conservation of the University of Florida), “The Ethics of Sustainability”, http://www.cce.ufl.edu/current/ethics/Ethics%20of%20Sustainability%20Textbook.pdf)CDD

The Earth’s ocean ecosystems contain a majority of all life found on earth and other bodies of water contain over 22,000 species of fish and ocean mammals, ranging in size from the 150 ton, 40 meter long blue whale to very small fish that feed on microscopic phytoplankton. Unfortunately the world’s fishing fleets are two to three times larger than the level that would produce a sustainable yield of fish , that is, a yield that does not deplete the stocks of fish or destroy the biodiversity of the oceans. The methods used by large commercial fishing are destructive in two ways: t hey result in overfishing and they decimate the ocean bottom due to the use of bottom trawling. Overfishing can be defined in terms of biological impacts or economic impacts. In an economic sense overfishing occurs when the stocks of desirable fish have been depleted to a level that makes it unprofitable for fishing companies to operate. Biologically, overfishing has occurred when the stocks of fish have become so depleted that the survival of the species is in question or the recovery of the fishery will take an extraordinarily long time. Much of the world’s human population relies on fish, both from marine capture and from aquaculture for their nutrition. In a report published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the scientists reported that 52% of fish stocks are fully exploited , 17% are over-exploited, 7% are depleted, and 1% are recovering from depletion.17

Warming

Consumption is the root cause of warmingPentland 11 (William, energy writer for forbes, “Global Warming's Consumption Paradox”, 4/06http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/04/06/global-warmings-consumption-paradox/)CDDSociety needs to consume less of everything from automobiles to air conditioning if it wants to confront climate change, according to Daniel Farber, a professor of environmental law at the University of California, Berkeley and founder of Legal Planet, while speaking today at Pace Law School in White Plains, NY.

Global warming is the consequence of consuming fossil fuels to drive economic growth for more than a century without considering the adverse environmental impacts of doing so. Reducing consumption seems intuitively to be an indispensable component of any policy response to climate change. In Farber’s view, the mechanics of “reducing consumption” encompasses a tectonic shift away from consumption-driven capitalism toward a ”post-consumerism” model of economic growth that promotes a more robust concept of social welfare. In my view, injecting this post-consumerist perspective into environmental and energy policy would not address the gravamen of the global warming problem, which is not over-consumption but under-consumption. More importantly, construing the climate-change problem in this manner may unintentionally and indirectly hamper the success of more comprehensive

climate-change policies. Why? Population and Consumption Too little consumption is the biggest challenge climate-change policy will face in the future, eclipsing the significance of over-consumption. This is more than semantics. Allow me to explain. Over the past five years, the world’s population has risen by roughly 80 million people annually, reaching an estimated 6.8 billion in 2009. Barring a sudden reversal in demographic trends, more than 9 billion

people will inhabit Earth by 2050. The vast majority of population growth has occurred in developing nations like China and India. Developing countries consume far fewer natural resources on a per capita basis than developed countries. Jared Diamond, a professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles, described the significance of this fact like so: “The average rates at which people consume resources like oil and metals, and produce wastes like plastics and greenhouse gases, are about 32 times higher in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia than they are in the developing world . . . The estimated one billion people who live in

developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32. Most of the world’s other 5.5 billion people constitute the developing world, with relative per capita consumption rates below 32, mostly down toward 1.” If consumption factors in the developing world climbed to those in North America and Western Europe, the world’s consumption rates would rise eleven-fold. The Earth could not sustain this level of consumption under even the most optimistic assumptions about future advancements in tech nology and science. Nevertheless, the developing world should not be expected to endure an inferior quality of life compared to the developed world.

Environmental Degradation

Consumption is the cause of environmental degradationJorgenson 3 (Andrew K., professor at the sociology department in the University of Utah, “Consumption and Environmental Degradation: A Cross-National Analysis of the Ecological Footprint”, August 1st, http://www.irows.ucr.edu/andrew/papers/jorgensonSP.pdf)CDDThe Ecological Footprint: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle Having the ability to identify national-level differences in the amount of land and water required to produce commodities consumed would allow researchers to more adequately address questions regarding macrostructural causes of environmental and ecological degrada- tion. Consumption is a critical factor affecting degradation, and unequal relationships between countries in the world-system enable more powerful countries to externalize the environ- mental and ecological costs associated with their domestic consumption of raw materials and produced commodities. While it is very difFIcult to track, consumption in the core is likely a signiFIcant cause of environmen- tal degradation in other zones of the world-system . This becomes even more pronounced over time as non-core countries produce manufactured goods and agricultural products, and extract natural resources for consumption in other parts of the world, particularly the core . (Burns et al. 2001:12)

1st world consumption is the cause of environmental degradation in the rest of the worldJorgenson 3 (Andrew K., professor at the sociology department in the University of Utah, “Consumption and Environmental Degradation: A Cross-National Analysis of the Ecological Footprint”, August 1st, http://www.irows.ucr.edu/andrew/papers/jorgensonSP.pdf)CDDA key factor is relatively ignored in cross-national studies of environmental depletion and degradation: varied consumption levels and the associated natural resources required to pro- duce the commodities in question (Burns et al. 2001; Princen 2002; Princen et al. 2002). The capitalist world- economy produces commodities through labor and natural resource exploita- tion that usually end up in core markets ( Bunker 1985; Hornborg 2001). Although difFIcult to empirically identify, many social scientists argue that material goods consumed in the core have disastrous effects on the environment in other regions of the world (Burns et al. 2001; Clapp 2002; Conca 2002; Hornborg 2001; Tucker 2002). With the recent development of the national-level ecological footprint measure, consumption can now be adequately speciFIed in cross-national research as both a dependent and independent variable for explaining v arious forms of anthropogenically caused environmental and ecological degradation, regardless of where it may occur. This measure identiFIes the amount of land and water required to pro- duce commodities without needing to know the actual source of the resources.

Turns case

Environmental law triggers are key- One large policy creates a snowball effect which confuses the facts and personal causationBobertz 95 (Bradley C., Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory”, March, Texas Law Review)CDDV. Scapegoating in Other Environmental Laws Environmental law is rife with similar illustrations of the scapegoat complex . One clear example is the "evil spray can " story n128 that vaulted into public consciousness in the fall of 1974 after two chemists , Mario J. Molina and F. Sherwood Rowland, published research in Nature magazine n129 suggesting that the release of chlorofluorocarbons ( CFCs ) n130 [*735] could destroy the protective ozone layer in the stratosphere. On September 26, 1974, the New York Times unleashed a media frenzy n131 when it devoted a front page story to the Molina and Rowland research. n132 Ironically, Molina and Rowland's article was preceded by another Nature article published in 1973 that had reported essentially the same findings. n133 "The New York Times and Washington Post avoided it deliberately," Dorothy Nelkin writes, "believing that it was one more doomsday report with little evidence to support it." n134

Once the staid Times had legitimized the story, however, other journalists exhibited little inhibition in describing the issue in dramatic, end-of-the-world prose: The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote that "the world will end, not with a whimper but with a quiet p-s-s-t. . . . The earth may have already committed partial suicide or at least severe self-mutilation." The New Haven Register described an industry spokesman in the following terms: "Beneath the guise of Kris Kringle affability lurks one of the men who may cause the end of our present day earth." A widely published AP dispatch asked, "Is a homely aerosol spray can and its charge of propellant gas sowing the seeds of doomsday?" n135 A cartoon published in the New York Times in 1975 typifies the mood of the story. n136 The cartoon depicts a gigantic spray can hovering over New York City, shooting its contents skyward. The atmosphere, drawn as a thin layer of brittle glass, shatters and plummets toward the New York skyline. Chicken Little, the cartoon seems to suggest, is having the last laugh: The sky is indeed falling. Although many reporters made it clear that CFC propellants -- and not spray cans themselves -- were the culprits of

ozone depletion, others were less careful with the facts. n137 Overall, the dominant cultural understanding [*736] of the problem coalesced around the idea that using spray cans was harmful to the environment. n138 The lowly spray can now bore the emblem of environmental culpability. n139 Muddled in the public mind was the fact that CFCs , and not spray cans in general, were the actual source of concern. CFCs and other ozone- depleters have been used for a variety of non-spray-can purposes worldwide. n140 From a global perspective, the use of CFCs in American aerosol products did not represent the total CFC problem. n141 Yet the spray can was an easily recognizable object (and one symbolic of an age of waste), and the broader CFC problem was more difficult both to communicate and to comprehend. Thus, the spray can itself became the villain of the piece. In the minds of many consumers, the use of aerosol spray cans became a blameworthy act, a demonstrable deed of environmental irresponsibility. Environmentally conscious shoppers stopped buying aerosol spray cans altogether, n142 and marketers of spray products urged their customers to "use the pump," one technological response to the problem. n143

Securitization

Global-order rhetoric inherently endorses securitization Nayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

"Security" is another bulwark of the "new world-order." This is not surprising, for " development" requires the creation of conditions that facilitate its implementation and that ensure the obedience, if not the subservience, of those to be "developed ." Security, as a motive for ordering, has been a useful distraction for this purpose, as is demonstrated

by its transformation from a precept of coexistence to a common cause of globalization. From its very conception, the current framework of international order , constructed through the United Nations Charter, had as its fundamental rationale the creation of conditions of security . Born out of the expressed aspirations of the Atlantic Charter n26 amid the early phases of the Second World War, the postwar UN Charter begins with words that were intended to resonate generations down the line: "We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to save succeeding generations from the

scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." n27 [*613] With these visions of an order freed from the madness of states in conflict, there was created a basis for collective responsibility in the preservation of peace-- the collective security regime under the supervision of the Security Council, and particularly, its "Permanent Members," as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. n28 Many further refinements to these high ideals have since been made as the post-UN Charter world-order evolves. With the end of formal colonialism, attention was transferred in the 1960s and 1970s to the perceived importance of elaborating on

principles of non-aggression and non-intervention. The 1980s and 1990s have seen a reversal of enthusiasms, however, as interest is being increasingly expressed, especially within "Western" states , for a more " collective" undertaking of responsibility in matters of security . This includes the forwarding of arguments in favor of " humanitarian intervention" in cases of " internal" conflicts . n29 These trends in the changing outlook on "security" and its relationship to "sovereignty" have continued, and have recently resulted in the formation of a permanent International Criminal Court to bring to justice perpetrators of "genocide," "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity." n30 Ever so gradually, it seems, the "new world-order" is moving away from the statist pillars of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction to a globalist notion of collective rights and responsibilities. Yet, as the following two observations on the nature of the global "security" landscape demonstrate, the

realities of ordering that have flowed from reiterations of the commitment to non-violence have failed to establish a legacy of security for the majority of the global population: The period since 1945 may be regarded as a long peace only in the restricted sense that there has been no war between major powers. In other respects, and for much of the world, it has been a period of frequent wars . . . . By one estimate, between 1945 and 1989 there were 138 wars, resulting in some 23 million deaths. . . . All 138 wars were fought in the Third World , and many were fuelled by weapons provided by the two major powers [the United States and the Soviet Union] or their allies. n31 The twentieth-century is a period of history which, in the words of anthropologist Marvin Harris, has seen "a war to end all wars followed by a war to make the world safe for [*614] democracy, followed by a

world full of military dictatorships." We were then promised a New World-order as the reward for agreeing to the Gulf War , as the end of the Cold War gave way to a seemingly endless series of intra-state wars which the international community is unwilling or unable to bring to order. n32 Once again, from the perspective of the ordered , the order of security has proved to be the ideological weapon for the systematic infliction of violence . It is not so much the order of security that is of interest here, but rather, the ordering which takes place in its guise. And with the passing of history, so has the legitimizing claim for the necessity of violent ordering for "security" purposes--fascism, colonialism, communism, capitalism (depending on the ideological orientation of the claimant), terrorism (particularly of the Islamic bent). There is always an enemy, sometimes internal, sometimes external, threatening the well-being of the people. The languages of nationalism and sovereignty, of peace and collective security, constructed to suit whichever threat happens to be in fashion, are passionately employed; the anarchy that is a Hobbesian state of nature is always the prophesied consequence of the lack of

order that is impending. And the price that the "ordered" has to pay for all this " security " in the post-colonial, new world-order?: the freedom of those who order to be violent !

Alt work

Alt- Global/local

Alt- Think local—Solves for global order and spurs movementsEsteva and Prakash 98 (Gustavo, Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board, and Madhu Suri, currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.)CDD

With the traditional humility of Gandhi, Ivan Illich, Leopold Kohr, Fritz Schumacher, and others of their ilk, Berry warns of the many harmful consequences of "Thinking Big" : pushing all human enterprises beyond the human scale . Appreciating the genuine limits of human intelligence and capacities, Berry celebrates the age-old wisdom of "thinking little " or small: on the proportion and scale that humans can really understand, know and assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions and decisions upon others.Afraid that local thinking weakens and isolates people, localizing them into parochialism, the "alternative" global thinkers8 forget that Goliath did in fact meet his match in David. Forgetting this biblical moral insight, they place their faith in the countervailing force of a competing or "alternative" Goliath of their own, w hose global thinking encompasses the supra-morality of "planetary consciousness." Assuming that "Global Man " (the grown-ups' version of Superman) has more or less conquered every space on Earth (and is now moving beyond, into the extra terrestrial), they think he is now advancing towards a collective con science: one conscience, one transcultural consciousness, one humanity -the great human family. "It is the planetary conscience that takes us to a 'world society' with a 'planetary citizenship'," says Leonardo Boff, the Brazilian theologian,9 describing a hope now shared by a wide variety of "globalists." Hunger in Ethiopia, bloody civil wars in Somalia or Yugo slavia, human rights violations in Mexico thus become the personal responsibilities of all good, non-parochial citizens of Main Street; supposedly complementing their local involvement in reducing garbage, homelessness or junk food in their own neighborhoods. Global Samaritans may fail to see that when their local actions are informed, shaped and determined by a "global frame of mind,"10 they become as uprooted as those of the globalists they explicitly criticize.To relearn how to "think little," Berry recommends starting with the "basics" of life: food, for example. He suggests discovering ways to eat which take us beyond "global thinking and action" towards "local thinking and action." Global thinkers and think tanks, like the World Bank, disregard this wisdom at the level of both thought and action. Declaring that current food problems, among others, are global in their nature, they seek to impose global solutions. Aware of the threats perpetrated by such " solutions ," the proponents of "Think global ly, act local ly" take recourse to the tradition of Kohr et al. only at the level of action , as a sensible strategy to struggle against the " global forces ." By refusing to "think little," given their engagement with global campaigns, the World watch Institute and other "alternative" globalists of their ilk inadvertently function on their enemies' turf.

To change the global we must change the local- It’s a pre-requisiteNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

We are today bombarded by images of our "one world." We speak of the world as "shrinking" into a "global village." We are not all fooled by the implicit benign-ness of this image of "time-

space" contracted--so we also speak of "global pillage." This astuteness of our perceptions, however, does not prevent us from our delusion of the "global ;" the image of the "global" world persists even for many activists amongst us

who struggle to "change" the world. This is recent delusion. It is a delusion which anesthetizes us from the only world which we can ever locate ourselves in and know--the worlds of "I"-in relationships. The "I" is seldom present in "emancipatory" projects to change the world. This is because the "relational I"-world and the "global"-world are negations

of one another; the former negates the concept of the latter whilst the latter negates the life of the former. And concepts are more amenable to scrutiny than life. The advance in technologies of image-ing enables a distanciation of scrutiny, from the "I"-world of relationships to the "global"-world of abstractions. As we become fixated with the distant, as we consume the images of "world" as other than here and now, as we project ourselves through technological time-space into worlds apart from our here and now, as we become "global," we are relieved of the gravity of our present. We , thus, cease the activism of self (being) and take on the mantle of the "activist" (doing). This is a significant displacement. That there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more visible by the technologies of image-ing. Yet for all its consequent fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also served to disempower . By this, we mean not merely that we are filled with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly, that it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our disposal -- the power of self - change in relationships of solidarities. The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past.

It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change

the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there . Power , when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal ; power does not exist out there, [*630] it only exists in relationship. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. There can exist no power if the subservient

relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence. Changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed . And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships , we must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow . This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the essential message of Mahatmas.

Alt- Recenter the political

We need to re-center the political- Any other way annuls our power and results in failing tyrannical policiesSwyngedouw 9 ( Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pg. 601–620 ) CDD

Live Earth concerts, waving the banner of climate change and urging the world’s leaders to take immediate and serious action, were beamed across the airwaves from 8 major cities on 8 July 2007, watched by an estimated record number of 3 billion people. Cheered on by Al Gore and riding on the popular success of his unsettling ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ documentary, the concerts — exquisite expressions of contemporary spectacularized city life — re-enforced the consensual view that nature, the climate and the environment are in clear and present danger, threatening the life and sustainability of all the world’s peoples, in particular the poorer ones, and whipping up a moral crusade for a more energy-selective and carbon-sparse code of socio-economic conduct. It is of course ironic that these concerts took the urban as their stage, while it is exactly the socio-metabolic functioning of cities that requires gigantic energy resources to sustain their socio-metabolic processes, while pumping an accelerating volume of CO2 into the atmosphere (Swyngedouw, 2006). Cities produce 80% of the world’s greenhouse gases, express often the most pervasive forms of socio-environmental injustices and are central to producing more sustainable environmental futures (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Sze, 2006; Doucet, 2007).

Indeed, the environmental question has become one that mobilizes and galvanizes political energies, and around which a political consensus has emerged, one that has literally ‘ naturalized the political’ (see Debruyne, 2007: 2). Indeed, a scientific consensus, most vividly illustrated by the successive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, fused with a pervasive apocalyptic imaginary,

and combined with asserting the intrinsic value of a nature that has to be retro-fitted to regain a ‘sustainable’ configuration, has taken hold (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Environmental politics is a politics legitimated by a scientific consensus which, in turn, translates into a political consensus. The world is in clear and present danger and urgent, sustained and consensual action is required. This is a politics that ‘legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge’ (Žižek, 2006c: 188) or, in other words, it is a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose parameters are defined by consensual

socio-scientific knowledges. This reduction of the political to the policing of environmental change , so I shall argue, evacuates if not forecloses the properly political and becomes part and parcel of the consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic polity . The depoliticized contradictions of such postpolitical environmentalism exploded with acute force in 2008, when energy prices, and in particular oil, spiralled upwards to quadruple in a few months’ time. Irrespective of the reasons behind this spectacular rise in oil prices (whether driven by extremely profitable financial speculation in the futures markets after the speculative land-bubble had imploded or by a combination of peak-oil conditions and rising demand of China and India, or a combination of both, remains disputed), the implications in terms of urban environmental justice became clear quickly. Hailed by some environmentalists as finally opening a window to bring oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions down, poor people around the world suddenly saw food prices spiral out of reach, food crops replaced by bio-fuels, access to energy curtailed and the cost of moving around going up. While seemingly offering an opening towards a more sustainable postcarbon society, the contradictory effects rapidly came to the boil. Urban riots in Haiti, Mexico, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, China and elsewhere signalled that the environment is indeed a deeply political matter, one cut through by all manner of social antagonisms, radical disputes

and profound disagreements. In recent years, urban research has become increasingly concerned with the social , political and economic implications of the techno-political and socio-scientific consensus that the present unsustainable and unjust environmental conditions require a transformation of the way urban life is organized. This special issue testifies to this concern and, in particular, to the socially highly uneven consequences of both the increasingly unsustainable environmental practices and the feeble attempts to ‘rectify’ the problem, to retrofit a nature that science suggests is out of synch with its own internal balancing act. A flurry of writing in recent years has

begun to interrogate the close relationship between urban processes and environmental transformations (see Bickerstaff et al., 2009, this issue, for a review). Social environmental research has by now convincingly argued and demonstrated that physical-ecological processes are not independent from socio-economic and cultural processes. While such political and socio-ecological perspectives were originally primarily concerned with the degradation of ‘natural’ conditions (like soil erosion, deforestation, climate change or resource depletion), recent work has increasingly concentrated on the pivotal role of the urban in political ecological processes (see, e.g., Bell et al., 1998; Braun and Castree, 1998; Forsyth, 2002; Robbins, 2004; Castree, 2005; Heynen et al., 2005; 2007). Prompted by David Harvey’s counter-intuitive comment that there is nothing unnatural about New York City, urban political ecologists insisted that urban environments, like any other socio-physical assemblage, are produced through combined social and ecological processes that shape particular socio-geographical conditions and manufacture the architecture of the socio-metabolic circulations and transformations that shape everyday urban life (Harvey, 1996). Neil Smith’s (1984) ‘production of nature’ thesis has been expanded and reformulated in an attempt to let ecological processes re-enter our perspectives on nature and on the city (see, e.g., Gandy, 2003; Desfor and Keil, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005). In In the Nature of Cities, a range of urban political ecologists argued indeed that cities are produced socio-metabolic assemblages and their analyses insisted on the ‘produced’ character of urban environments, including the distribution of social roles and positions, the socio-ecological flows of materials and

the metabolic re-working of socio-physical processes into the fabric of what is defined as a city (Heynen et al., 2005). In short, urban environmental conditions are seen as dynamic , socio-physical, power-laden and co-evolutionary1 constructions . Uneven consequences of socio-environmental change, the distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, and the rhizomatic networks that relate local urban ecological transformations with distant socio- ecological processes are now commonly understood as combined social and physical entanglements. Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio- metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All

manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological

claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’

understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges , both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the

political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention . This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio- environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual

naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno- managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition . These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with

governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997). Second, I shall argue that the particular staging of the environmental problem and its modes of management signals and helps to consolidate a postpolitical condition , one that evacuates the properly political from the plane of immanence that underpins any political intervention. The consolidation of an urban postpolitical arrangement runs, so I argue, parallel to the rise of a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and

technocratic environmental management. In the third part, I maintain that this postpolitical consensual police order revolves decidedly around embracing a populist gesture, one that annuls democracy and must, of necessity, lead to an ultra-politics of violent disavowal, radical closure and, ultimately, to the tyrannies of violence and of foreclosure of any real spaces of engagement. However, the disappearance of the political in a postpolitical arrangement leaves all manner of traces that allow for the resurfacing of the properly political. Indeed, the incoherencies of the contemporary urban ordering, the excesses and the gaps that are left in the interstices of the postpolitical urban order permit

thinking through if not materially widening and occupying genuine political urban spaces. This will be the theme of the final section. I shall conclude that re-centring the political is a necessary condition for tackling questions of urban environmental justice and for creating different, but egalibertarian, socio-ecological urban assemblages.

FWOur interpretation is that the aff needs to justify the assumptions behind the plan before they get to weigh the aff—otherwise it results in depolitcization that holds a monopoly on power.

We need to re-capture the political—Its devolved into policymaking, killing democracy—This is key to education Swyngedouw 9 ( Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pg. 601–620 ) CDD

Rethinking the political: police, politics and the city In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière revisits the Aristotelian foundations of political theory and considers whether the political can still be

thought of in an environment in which a postpolitical consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policymaking’ , to managerial consensual governing. This reduction of the political to the ‘mode of governing’ is particularly prevalent in environmental practices . From the environmental justice movement that urges the elites to rectify environmental ‘wrongs’ on the basis of a Rawlsian equal distribution of goods and bads (see also Beck, 1992), to ecological modernization perspectives that insist on the possibility of a technological-managerial conduct that can marry ecological sustainability with economic ‘progress’ (Harvey, 1996) and the scientific consensus that urges the adoption of a particular set of management and accounting rules to mitigate imminent catastrophic environmental disaster, general agreement exists, shared by a broad range of often unlikely allies, about the need to

develop a more sustainable, and just, socio-ecological practice, one that operates fully within the contours of the existing social order (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Rancière’s political philosophical mission , in contrast, is to re-centre the ‘political’ as distinct from ‘policy’ (what he calls ‘the police’) and to ask whether the properly political can be thought of and, if so, what constitutes a proper political gesture. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (le police), ‘the political’ (le politique) and ‘politics’ (la politique). For him, the political ‘turns on equality as its principle’ and is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding ‘the part for those who have no-part’ (Rancière, 2001: 6);

politics disrupts the police order, ‘a refusal to observe the “place” allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)’ (Robson, 2005: 5). Indeed, as Dikeç maintains, the central premise of Rancière’s politics is ‘the contingency of any established order of governance with its distributions of functions, people, and places’ (Dikeç, 2007: Chapter 2: 3). Politics , then , is the arena where the principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’ . Equality is thereby axiomatically given and presupposed rather than an idealized- normative condition to move towards (Badiou, 1992; 2005a; Lévy et al., 2007): ‘Everyone can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to so’ (Badiou, cited in Hallward, 2003a: 225). In democracy, the place of power is indeed structurally empty (Lefort, 1994) and

equality is presupposed. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted ; it opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality. Equality is, therefore, not a sociologically verifiable concept or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which will remedy the observed inequalities, but the ontologically given condition of democracy. Justice, from this perspective, disappears from the terrain of the moral and enters the space of the political under the name of equality. For Etienne Balibar (Balibar, 1993), for example, the unconditional premise for justice and emancipation resides in the fusion of equality and liberty (what he names as ‘égaliberté’), the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç, 2001). Egaliberté stands, thus, for the universal and collective process of emancipation on which the very promise of political democracy is founded.

What is central to Balibar’s and Rancière’s vision is that neither freedom nor equality are offered, granted or distributed, they can only be conquered. The political , therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify injustices , inequalities or unfreedoms, but about the enunciation of the right to égaliberté ; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in a police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. Put simply, politics (or a properly political sequence) arises when, in the name of equality, those who are not equally included in the existing socio-political order, demand their ‘right to equality’, a demand that both calls the political into being , renders visible and exposes the ‘wrongs’ of the police order: this is the place and time of politics when the staging and articulation of an

egalitarian demand exposes the lack, the superfluous, inscribed in the order of the given situation (Arsenjuk, 2005).

Answers 2

Sustainability

Their sustainability is only the sustainment of the world order(ing)—Further reason to reject itNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

Thus, just as the aspirations of most anti-colonial elite leaderships were infused with the colonizer's visions of human progress--the languages of "statehood," of "modernization," of " institution building , and the like--so too now the languages of the elites of "civil society" reflect the terrain as demarcated by contemporary world-orderists . Development , democracy, human rights, NGO "networks," even " education " and " law," are all contemporary slogans that are repeated in the hope of a progressive civilizational movement toward human emancipation . And increasingly, these "transnational," even "global," languages of human emancipation are formulated and articulated within professional sites of resistance and activism that stand as mirrors of ordering institutions; for the government committee there are the NGO forums, for the ministerial conference there is the "alternative" conference of civil society delegates, for the business/corporate

coalition with government there are the similar NGO partnerships. The play of critique and legitimization , of compromise and cooperation, of review and reformulation, is thereby enabled , taking on a [*625] momentum and a rationale of its own, becoming an activity of grand proportions where the activity itself becomes a reason for, and object of perpetuation. To be outside of these circles of "communication" is deemed to be without "voice," which is for the critic, an

unacceptable silencing. To be inside these circles, however, entails a constant torment of co-option, betrayal and appropriation of voice. The power of world-ordering to self-sustain, I suggest, lies precisely in this , its ability to order the "voices " and the "voicing" of dissent . From this perspective, the fact of dissent or critique is not, in itself, the significant indicator of resistance that we might consider it to be. The point, I argue, is not that dissent is registered, but rather, how, where and in what form that dissent is expressed . Voices of dissent that are absorbed into the channels of voicing as provided by the structures of order , in my view, have themselves been ordered. Rather than providing energies for imagination, they are drained of them , sustaining instead the orders against which they purport to stand. In the struggle to find a voice we, therefore, comply

with the orders of voicing; the best of times being when our voice is "heard," tolerated, sometimes even congratulated and rewarded, the worst of times being when it is appropriated and transformed into further legitimizations of violence, and most commonly, when it is simply ignored. To sustain "us, " therefore, self-referential communities of voice are founded, established and propagated, quoting back and forth the same voices , repetition being equated with significance and impact. While we keep busy being heard, "achieving" lots by way of giving volume to (our) voice, little is changed in the order-ing of worlds. How much of the continuing violence within the misorderings of the world has followed from this experience?

Perm

Only a total rejection will solve- The affirmative cannot sever out of their usage of policymaking, and anything short of total rejection just co-opts the movement and re-entrenches global order(ing).

Rejection of the aff’s policy is key- Simplistic environmental law only results in a massive tangle of incomprehensible legal jargon that is impossible to sift through- Only a holistic policy solves- Bobertz 95 (Bradley C., Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory”, March, Texas Law Review)CDDVI. Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws The phenomenon of environmental scapegoating helps to foster the massiveness, disorganization, and incomprehensibility that plague environmental law . n176 When lawmakers react to a social problem by enacting legislation that hinges on a distorted picture of reality, a legal regime that lacks appropriate formative principles is an unsurprising result . Moreover, a law that depends on false diagnoses will grow in complexity as its legal [*742] suppositions come into increasing conflict with the facts. n177 As a coping strategy, lawmakers opt to adjust (and complicate) legislative programs only enough to accommodate the current problematic factors instead of starting fresh with new models that conform more accurately to the true problem. n178 The Clean Air Act's "nonattainment program" (a euphemistic name for a failing system) provides a good example. Its length and complexity increased geometrically between its initial enactment in the mid-course correction amendments of 1977 and its second, monstrously intricate iteration in the 1990 amendments. n179 Explaining the nonattainment provisions and other aspects of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments to lawyers ordinarily accustomed to reading and understanding statutory law continues to provide lucrative business opportunities for continuing legal educators. n180

Overcomplexity in the law by itself imposes costs on society. Initially, regulated entities must add to their ordinary cost of compliance the cost of simply understanding what the law requires them to do. Complicated laws also increase the likelihood of noncompliance , n181 undermining the attainment of environmental goals and creating pressures for extending [*743] deadlines and raising permissible emission levels -- a pattern endemic in environmental law. n182 Even more troubling is the fact that unnecessary legal complexity deprives society at large of a common, comprehensible vocabulary for debating environmental policy. A system of democratic rule implies discourse not only among a select group of experts, but also among the voting public. Environmental law has swollen into a fortress of specialized concepts and jargon practically impregnable to ordinarily informed and aware citizens. n183 Creating barriers to public understanding of, and involvement in, environmental law frustrates the theoretical virtues of democratic self-rule and also engenders a problem of more practical import -- a spirit of confusion and anger that characterizes most public encounters with environmental problems and the laws erected to correct them. n184 Such encounters typically result in resignation and apathy

toward the law, qualities that impoverish any legal system directed toward social reform. n185 Ultimately, the legacy of environmental scapegoating may be the paradox of legitimizing polluting activities while simultaneously appearing to curtail them . The legitimizing effect of environmental lawmaking involves two factors that will be discussed in detail in separate sections below. The first section notes that environmental legislation does not merely punish the blameworthy; it exonerates the "innocent." Upon the conviction of one suspect, the others are set free. Thus, the appearance of positive action in Washington (or the state capitol) creates the impression that a problem has been solved and repairs the perceived break in the social order that had given the law its initial momentum. The second section [*744] observes that enacting any social reform legislation, including environmental laws, n186 creates new expectations and patterns of behavior that harden with time into societal structures that, however flawed, prove nearly impossible to alter. Today's innovative solutions can become tomorrow's institutionalized nightmares, n187 a pattern from which environmental law enjoys no immunity. A. Rituals of Guilt Redemption in

Environmental Lawmaking The first aspect of the legitimizing effect of environmental law centers on guilt , n188 shame, n189 and forgiveness, subjects that have engaged human thought for millennia. n190 How are these subjects

pertinent to [*745] environmental law? To state the case plainly, the enactment of environmental laws can be viewed as ritualistic acts of redemption for the collective guilt of a society ashamed of its polluting ways. To be sure, the laws are intended to address real problems with the legal tools at hand. But on another level, environmental law functions to absolve a culture at odds with its own conception of itself. Fleshing out this idea requires discussion of two basic premises: (1) the existence of "guilt" for environmental problems and (2) the suggestion that passage of environmental laws can function to expiate

such guilt, much like the scapegoat rituals discussed above. n191 As to the first premise, knowledge of environmental problems , unlike other issues of exigent social import (e.g., crime, health care), has the unique capacity to bring the observer within the circle of the blameworthy . Knowledge of other social problems may produce anxiety, fear, and anger, but the causes of these problems are rarely thought to implicate the observer personally. n192 By contrast, a feeling of personal involvement in environmental problems can be difficult for many people to avoid, particularly as we learn about these problems through the starkly

moralistic, good-versus-evil narratives of the media. For example, reports of oil spills, burning tire piles, and the environmental culpability of automobile emissions appear in the news with regularity, yet we continue to drive our cars as before, contributing our part to the overall problem. Because one's own share of the responsibility is small, a change in personal behavior is unlikely. Yet knowledge of one's personal involvement in the larger problem can, in many people, produce feelings of guilt. Advertisements for environmentally benign products and slogans like "think globally, act locally" reinforce this sense of personal responsibility. n193 Individualizing blame has been a central aspect of environmentalism from the beginning. As Senator Muskie said in 1970: "It is easy to blame pollution only on the large economic interests, but pollution is a by-product of our consumption-oriented society. Each of us must bear his share of the blame." n194 By way of illustration, suppose a version of the "garbage-crisis" story plays on the evening news. Even if the story involves other people's [*746] garbage (recall the travails of the "garbage barge"), n195 the observer may find it difficult to escape the central message that gives the story its emotive power -- we all

create waste, and as a nation we do so in prodigious quantities. The irrefutable fact of personal waste production (we all take out the garbage and flush) situates the observer among the perpetrators of the problem and not just among its victims. The feelings of guilt thereby created may exist at low frequencies, but they exist nonetheless. Witness the booming popularity of recycling programs. n196 By taking part in these programs, one does the environmentally "right thing," regardless of the particular program's ultimate effectiveness. Participation in recycling activities may be motivated as much by the desire to ease a troubled conscience as by an individual commitment to abstract principles of waste reduction. In addition, sixty percent of Americans identify themselves as "environmentalists," and another thirty percent lean in that direction. n197 At various times, polls indicate that people

rank environmental issues at or near the top of the list of problems facing the country. n198 Yet conforming one's personal behavior to an espoused concern for environmental quality takes the kind of energy, time, and diligence that few people can consistently muster. Alternatives to this guilt-producing predicament hold little appeal. They include: cynically denying either that environmental problems exist or that personal action matters; engaging in various forms of Ludditism; or resigning oneself to some degree of personal hypocrisy. Environmental guilt -- endemic in some people, negligible or absent in others -- seems an inevitable consequence of enjoying the benefits of life in an industrialized nation that

simultaneously has an insatiable appetite for crisis-driven environmental journalism. n199 Questions of guilt lead to matters of atonement . "The real question," one author writes, "is not how one gets into guilt but how one gets out of [*747] it." n200 According to psychologists, theologians, and the voice of common experience, feelings of guilt engender a desire for forgiveness. n201 This desire for absolution lies at the core of many religions. Rituals of guilt redemption -- however counterfeit they might appear to nonbelievers -- are vital to the devout. n202 But in a religiously heterogeneous society like the United States, there can be little hope for consensus about which religious ceremonies carry the true powers of

redemption. n203 What we do share , however, is a common faith in the power of law . One might argue that the legalistic character of American society fills the vacuum created by the lack of common religious values. Law thus becomes our secular religion, having its own sacred texts and its own priesthood -- whether they wear the robes of judicial power, fill the seats of Congress, or occupy the Presidency. n204 [*748]

Without commonly accepted religious ceremonies to expiate guilt, Americans turn instead to the sanctifying rituals of lawmaking. The ritualistic elements of legislative action are difficult to dismiss. In environmental law, we have our own sacred clerics, scapegoats, and rites of redemption, even though they inhabit the seemingly a sectarian world of law and politics. Indeed, the inherent spiritualism associated with nature provides a special religiosity to environmental lawmaking , as twenty-five years of incantatory rhetoric from the mouths of our leaders amply prove. n205 Unfortunately, when society retrofits the simple calculus of blame, sacrifice, and redemption to resolve complex social problems, it leaves a legacy of legislative overbuilding and conceptual chaos -- precisely the condition of environmental law today. The enactment of

environmental laws also includes a less virtuous tendency to return with one hand what is taken away by the other. We wish to exorcise our demons, but

still retain the pleasures of their company. A law that strikes at the external manifestations of an environmental problem satisfies the common desire for identifying and banishing the guilty. On a personal level, however, no one wants her own habits exposed to the same harsh light. By acting with righteous vehemence against the visible end-products of pollution, we avoid asking harder questions about global resource allocation and the sustainability of existing industrial, agricultural, and personal patterns of behavior. Enactment of environmental laws not only releases us from guilt -- or the state of being "part of the problem" -- but also enables us to avoid scrutinizing deeper patterns that implicate our personal habits and appetites. Few would like to admit that these habits, and not simply the immediate targets of environmental law, create the very problems the law appears to address. In this manner, laws aimed at curtailing pollution can ultimately create barriers to lasting reform by legitimizing the more deeply rooted causes of pollution that the very process of lawmaking has exonerated from blame. Except for the environmental scapegoats -- duly shamed and punished -- the rest of society is liberated, free to pursue its old ways without fear of reprisal. [*749] B. Institutionalizing "Pollution" The passage of environmental laws, as with the creation of any legal regime of social reform, establishes new expectations and

incentives and results in new patterns of behavior. Unavoidably, laws rely on and institutionalize the regnant assumptions of their period. When the engines of lawmaking produce the kind of massive legal system epitomized by environmental law, that system (with its then-prevailing wisdom) solidifies over time into a set of expectations around which subsequent legal and technological developments must adapt. The fact that regulated businesses desire consistency in the application of the law only hastens the fossilization of assumptions buried within the system's original framework. Although any number of assumptions about the nature of environmental problems could be extracted from a study of environmental law, one in particular has driven the system from the beginning: the idea that "pollution" -- the

stuff billowing from the top of the smokestack -- is itself the problem on which the legislative eye should focus. Pollution is not viewed as the result of other problems; it defines -- or is -- the problem itself. Deeply ingrained in our vocabulary and world view, this idea has clearly molded American "pollution control" laws and their emphasis on treatment and disposal at the end of the pipe (that is, the point at which pollution itself becomes manifest). In

turn, this emphasis reinforces the cultural view that pollution itself, rather than its deeper roots , is the evil to be eliminated by acts of legislation. A preoccupation with pollution qua pollution is not the only -- or most desirable -- means for achieving the aims of environmental law. Within the past decade, a devoted group of regulators,

environmentalists, and businesses have championed the idea of "pollution prevention" as a new approach to environmental protection. n206 The idea behind pollution prevention is simple. Instead of concentrating on end-of-the-pipe solutions to pollution abatement, society should concentrate its energies on developing cleaner ways of producing waste-generating products. n207 In other words, environmental problems are viewed from the front end, before pollution is generated, instead of from behind, when adequate treatment may be too late, too costly, or simply impossible. n208 [*750] Despite the seeming obviousness of this idea, pollution prevention was hailed as the novel innovation in environmental policy in the late 1980s. In its twentieth annual report, the Council on Environmental Quality wrote that "the term 'pollution prevention' may well become the hallmark of environmental quality in the 1990s

and beyond," n209 and similar claims were made by the Environmental Protection Agency. n210 Yet, despite its intuitive, practical, and economic attractiveness, pollution prevention remains on the outskirts of environmental law. Congress gave a brief nod to the idea in 1990 in a short and mainly hortatory measure shoehorned into that year's omnibus budget reconciliation act. n211 The EPA has also acted to implement some preventive approaches, n212

but the magnitude of its efforts pale before the agency's rhetorical devotion to the idea. n213 The disappointments of the pollution prevention movement illustrate both the persistence of traditional end-of-the-pipe conceptions of environmental problems and the difficulty of altering the initial premises of social reforms once they crystalize into legislation . Like it or not, we must deal with a system of environmental law that looks at pollution through the back end of the cycle. This approach seemed entirely sensible in the early 1970s when images of smokestacks and discharge pipes visibly portrayed the problems of pollution. Our faith in technological fixes to technological problems was at that time defined by the Apollo 11 landing, not the Challenger explosion. With billions of dollars at stake and more than twenty years of adjustments to the original system, maintenance of that system, with all its flaws, is by far the preferred alternative to thoroughgoing reform for most of the system's participants. In this way, the erroneous assumptions of 1972 become the institutionalized truths of 1995. The legislation that emerged in the early 1970s to eliminate pollution "in our lifetimes" has in fact created a system wedded to fundamentally mistaken ideas. Unfortunately, few people have an interest in changing that system because [*751] it has evolved into the background reality around which other decisions are made. The price of significant change is simply too high, and the original structures and assumptions of the system remain largely unchallenged. In short, by preserving the structures and assumptions of our original environmental legislation, we maintain a system that both legitimizes "pollution" as the article of regulation and rejects alternative approaches. We have legitimized pollution through the very laws that were intended to eliminate it.

World order captures “truth” and claims it as it’s own- Especially in academic settings- A total rejection is needed to prevent co-option- Perm can’t solveNayer 99 (Jayan, professor of law at Warwick University, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems )CDD

Perspectives on the truth of the human condition, and of its possibilities, lie at the heart of transformatory imagination. To control , if not capture, truth , therefore, is to enforce "order ." This may be made

clearer if we revisit the earlier discussion in Section II on the meaning of "order" as "structure." Truth, as the ground from which "humanity" springs , represents that fundamental exposition of the human condition from which all social relationships gain meaning. The notion of order as "structure" pertains precisely to this laying of the truth of humanity. "Order," in this respect, is premised on the existence of the undesired "other" condition of "disorder, " from which structure is to be created. From the previous discussion on the ideologies of "development" and "security" we see this clearly. n40 The "order" of "development" is presented as the humanizing process of creating structure and movement from the truth of the undesirable "disorder" of "underdevelopment" or "poverty," the "order" of "security," from that of "insecurity" and

"anarchy." These suppositions of the truths of the human condition , therefore, serve to authenticate and legitimize the constructed institutions and structures of order as part of the progressive civilizational movement out of the preceding, pre-civilizational, non-humanity. Before the "ordered" world, the argument would go, there was the word of "order;" before the Word of order, there was nothingness. Yet, this proclaimed "truth" is a lie . The "other" of civil-izational order was never , and is not, nothingness . Rather, the other of order may be seen, alternatively, as diversity . Seen in this light, the universalism of order is but the negation of diversity, to validate the "truth" of the one "order" is to invalidate the truths of diverse orders . This other truth of humanity, however, is the unspeakable of order; that which does not conform to the "civilized" vision of order, is deemed invisible, non-existent, despicable, and if nothing else, unworkable, irrelevant, unrealistic. From the violence of colonialism , through to the current orderings of the present-day "uncivilized," this negation of other orders has served to legitimize the violence perpetuated in the name of human betterment and progress. This regulation of truth, (despite the rhetoric of "reason," that truth exists as an eternal, open to those who

are simply willing and able to "discover" it), cannot be achieved without processes of coercive ordering . Humanity requires constant reminding of its asserted truthfulness. So , human sociality is [*622] repeatedly defined and confined , faithfuls rewarded and deviants punished . All aspects of humanity, therefore, become subjects for the domination of ordered truths, reached and checked through the many technologies of truth-propagation. The institutions of "vision" and "information" and their "(re)presentation" of truths, n41 institutions of "learning" and their "teaching" of truths, n42 institutions of "doing" and their "acting" upon truths, n43 all recreate the desired "order" of civil-ization. Within and through these institutions is "spoken" and "heard" what is deemed to be the "truth."

Outside them, so it would be claimed, exists "untruth," superstition and propaganda. "We" too are subjects of this regulation . I speak here from my location

within an institution of "teaching"/"learning." Nowhere is this order(ing) of truth more insidiously and impoverishingly done , than in the "worlds" of socalled " education ." Here takes place the propagation of "truth-knowing;" here, knowledge that is " valuable" and " worthy " is expounded . But the body of knowledge that is regarded as valuable and worthy is increasingly becoming one that is homogenized, standardized, and "monoculturized." Despite having been exposed as a colonizing and alienating force, the "banking" model of education thrives on. n44 The "real" knowledge of the "world," through the "learning" of the life sciences, social sciences, business administration, and information technology, is everywhere disseminated using the

same signposts, reference-points and "texts" of wisdom if it is to be "recognized" as valuable and worthy. n45 Thus, "students" from around the "world" come together to share in these discourses , minor inconveniences of vocabularic differences and accents aside, they share a language and, therefore, a "worldview ." Questions of what is "real," what is "possible," what are the " problems " and what may be the " solutions " are , therefore, contemplated and [*623] imagined within managed parameters . "Creativity" is confined within the boundaries of a validated discourse, if not paradigm. n46 This is the knowledge domain of "practitioners." This is not to say that knowledges of the "other"--of cultures, languages, social systems, beliefs, rituals, "traditional" economies--are excluded. They too have their hallowed place; they are the "studies" of antiquity and the exotic. They are studied for the

sake of "knowledge" rather than wisdom, information rather than action. Their students are "scholars," not "practitioners." Thus, the past, the present, the future, to be human, and to exist in "society" are all given "ordered" meaning. Thus, the world-order(ing) of truth is the

impoverishment of the diversity of wisdom through the particularization of knowledge. With this "truth," we then set about viewing the world, setting it right. These "truths" of a (mis)ordered (in)humanity , therefore, become repeated, and although critiqued, are maintained in their integrity as constituting a self-contained universe of and for imagination.

Deterritorialization turn

Deterritorialization is white-washing—And increases state controlKearney 95 (M. , professor of anthropology at the University of California Riverside, “The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism”, JSTOR)CDDRunning through the literature on globalization is a concern with how produc• tion, consumption, communities, politics, and identities become detached from local places. The term deterritorialization has several usages that speak to such processes. As noted above, Harvey discusses how capitalist enterprises control time and space by relocating operations. As he puts it, "any struggle to recon• stitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial bases," which is why capitalism constantly deterritorializes and reterritorializes (66:238). Transnational migrants move into and indeed create transnational spaces that may have the potential to liberate nationals within them who are able to escape in part the totalizing hegemony that a strong state may have within its national borders (e.g. 22, 71, 112, 113). But as

Basch et al (7) argue, a deterritorialized nation-state may extend its hegemony over its citizens who , as migrants or refugees, reside outside of its national boundaries. For example, President Aristide of Haiti has referred to Haitians in the United States as constituting a "tenth province" in addition to the nine within the national territory of Haiti (7:146ff; 108:190). Such "[d ]eterritorialized nation-state building is something new and significant, a form of post-colonial nationalism that reflects and reinforces the division of the entire globe into nation-states " (7:269). Deterritorialization in this sense contrasts with the concept of diaspora whereby people imagine themselves as a nation outside of a homeland. But in the case of the deterritorialized nation-state, a people may be "anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state " (p. 269).

Global/local & Consumption Aff

Global/local & Consumption

FW

The negative must engage with existing institutions- That’s key to real-world education and policymaking—Only interacting with the local robs us of agency skillsSrnicek, 10 (Nick, degree in political science from the University of Western Ontario, “Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, 2010, http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/JCGS_Issue2_Conflict_Networks.html)CDD One final note on agency: if the empirical world is composed of human and nonhuman actors interacting with each other and inducing actions in each other, any particular human individual will be the manifestation of a (variably-sized)[21] local network .[ 22] In this way, actor-network theory gives an empirical and scientific basis to the oft-cited claim that actors are socially and culturally embedded. Rather than citing an empty notion of ‘context’ (e.g. “it depends on the context”), actor-network theory forces the researcher to discern, describe and reveal the power of the surrounding network. Note, though, that by saying that everything emerges from a concatenation of local networks , we are not excluding the global – our reformulation of the global means that it must be channeled through a series of localized networks , which means that macro-level actors can and do act to produce phenomena. But they act only through a particular series of conduits , and not through some abstract ‘social structure’ or ‘ social force’.

Deterritorialization Turn

Globalization is good—It breaks down binaries and increases acceptance of differing identities—Ethical obligation Kearney 95 (M. , professor of anthropology at the University of California Riverside, “The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism”, JSTOR)CDDA landmark in the study of cultural processes played out on a global scale is the founding in 1988 of the journal Public Culture, which is devoted to exploration of global cultural flows. Central to this project is a displacement of inquiry from an intellectual space shaped by " the distinction between 'first,' 'second,' 'third' and 'fourth' worlds " and the conceptions of modernity and history they imply regarding the homogenizing effects of cosmopolitanism (12:1). Furthermore, exploration of public culture involves a rethinking of culture theory in the contemporary world "where popular culture is often the product of urban, commercial and state interests, where folk culture is often a response to the competitive cultural policies of today's nation-states,

and where traditional culture is often the result of conscious deliberations or elabo• ration... " (5:8). Similarly, Borofsky notes that it is now difficult to bound a community as a "cultural group." Referring to Pukapuka, he says, "More than half of those one might deem as Pukapukans .. .live off the island, especially in New Zealand. Pukapukan cultural dynamics extend beyond its reefs -to Rarotonga, to Auk• land, and to Sydney" (9:1-2; see also 100). Likewise, A Gupta & J Ferguson (unpublished

manuscript) say that a view of " the world as a mosaic of separate cultures is what made it possible to bound the ethnographic object, as well as to see generalization from a multiplicity of separate 'cases'". They cite work that

regards such boundedness and coherence "more as a narrative device than as an objectively-present empirical truth" (A Gupta & J Ferguson, unpublished manuscript; see also 68). It is somewhat ironic that while the conditions of transnationalism are causing anthropologists to reconsider the validity of the culture concept, the growth of transnational communities is causing the legal system to pay more attention to it as, for example, cultural considerations intrude into legal proceedings (e.g. 25, 86).

Awareness of growing dispersion , decentering, interpenetration, and gen• eral complexity of globalized and transnational communities is reflected in anthropology as a rising concern with identity . Thus it is

understandable that a new journal devoted to "global studies in culture and power" should be called Identities (41). Indeed, it is arguable that the culture concept as the cornerstone of US anthropology is giving way to concern with identity (e.g. 58, 77). Such movement is most apparent in work on gendered identities in relation to globalization (see especially 55, 67; also 36, 127, 129. The culture concept grew out of mostly German romantic ideas regarding distinctive characteristics of peoples "rooted" in national territories (see e.g. 88). But according to a recent International Labor Organization report (113a), in 1992 there were an "unprecedented" 100 million people living outside of their natal countries, people who for the most part are scattered as

a result of wars, unemployment, and poverty. As King (77:6) notes, "[i]t's not just that, increasingly, many people have no roots; it's also that they have no soil. Culture is becoming increasingly deterritorialized . " Not only does deterritori• alization obviate any notion of bounded cultures, but so does the constantly increasing volume and velocity of global transmission of information, images, simulacra, and stuff that is a diffusion of cultural traits

gone wild, far beyond that imagined by the Boasians and creating a nightmare for contemporary cross-cultural correlational studies. Such flows require a reconsideration of presumably bounded culture areas . Thus, for example, Alvarez (la) shows how the binary absoluteness of cultural areas and identities is giving way to models of border areas as places of interpenetrating spaces and more complex, nonunitary identities. Growing appreciation of the complexity of identity, and its implications for the culture concept , was also noted by speakers in a session at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the AAA, "Rethinking the Cultural: Beyond Intellectual Imperial• isms and Parochialisms of the Past," organized by Borofsky. In this session, Geertz underscored how contemporary people who live in close proximity often do not share a common culture, but instead interact with people who are dispersed, resulting in an increasingly interconnected world: "We are trying to find our field in a seriously scrambled world that does not divide itself cleanly at the joints into societies or traditions .... That makes the analysis of culture a far more awkward enterprise" (quoted in 138:A18). In the same session, Rosaldo asked, "What happens to notions of cultural uniqueness when indi• viduals acquire cultural repertoires that are binational?" (quoted in 138:A18). The anthropological analysis of personal and collective identity depends on some theory of classification. If indeed the world has turned a corner into a period of globalization that is distinctly different from the modern, then what are the implications for classification, considered not as an invariant subject of investigation in anthropology, but taken instead as a historically contingent world-view category able to assume different forms in different periods in the history of anthropology? Elsewhere I argue (73) that modern anthropological classification of social types is a variant of "official" principles of classifica• tion that are predicated on presuppositions of unitary identities, i.e. of indi• viduals as members of bounded groups, of which the most rationalized are modern nation-states. Such official individual identities are either-or catego• ries, of which "citizen," and other officially licensed, credentialed, censused, and documented

forms are variants. Such classification of individuals obeys a binary logic in which one either is or is not a distinct member of a category such as a nation, a military unit, or a firm. Modern anthropology has been enamored of this kind of classification as in, for example, ethnoscience , which assumes a binary either- or logic, the logic of the branching tree in which diacritica of identity become more and more discreet and distinctive until the unique form is identified . In contrast we can consider what form classification would take in an anthropology sensitive to globalized and transnationalized identities that resist official

classification by being constituted in non-official social spaces such as transnational communities, informal economies, and border areas populated by "undocumented" persons (71). For example, Velez• Ibafiez (134) examines the life and work of Anzaldua (2), who uses her lesbianism to transcend the multiple dualities of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and nationality that shape identity in the Mexican-US border area (see also 54). Similarly, Ong examines overseas Chinese who, "As postcolonial transna• tional subjects [call] into question not only stability in cultural identity, but also ties to a

single nation-state, or even to a single imagined community" (102:747). Such identities escape in part from either-or classification and become defined more by a logic of "both-and-andv'' in which the subject shares partial, overlapping identities with other similarly constituted decentered subjects that inhabit reticular social forms. The reticulum (fr. Latin, network) is a biological metaphor appropriate for the age of globalization. A reticulum cell is " [ o ]ne of the branched anastomosing reticuloendothelial cells that form an intricate in• terstitial network ramifying through other tissues and organs" (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1984). Such is the form of globalizing reticula, which ramify into nations,

communities, and many other social bodies and spaces. Deleuze & Guattari (26) propose a similar imagery with their "rhizome," which unlike a tree or its roots, "connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature .... " The rhizome is "[u]nlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relation• ships between the positions ... " (26:21; cf 6). Such connections made by reticula and rhizomes are like those of a hypertext in which words are not classified in a hierarchical index, but instead have direct intratextual links. Other

comparable decentered systems of networks are the Internet and the human brain. Thus, rhizomes and reticula suggest the form and physiology of nomadic transnational and global communities that flourish outside the stri• ated space of the state.

Global/Local distinction

The global and local are intertwined—You need to address BOTH to solve- this turns the K Srnicek, 10 (Nick, degree in political science from the University of Western Ontario, “Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, 2010, http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/JCGS_Issue2_Conflict_Networks.html)CDD

Since the end of the Cold War , it has been widely acknowledged that conflict is increasingly complex and increasingly intrastate with the majority of conflicts now involving non-state actors such as local tribes, militias, criminal organizations, and insurgents. There has been , in other words, an increasing localization of conflict within particular states. Simultaneously, with the rise of a system of liberal global governance, new international norms concerning humanitarian intervention, and the rising entanglement of development projects with human security concepts, conflict has taken on an increasingly global aspect (See Duffield,

2001). The largest current wars – Iraq, Afghanistan, and the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo – all simultaneously incorporate the highest levels of the global system with a radical diversity of local situations and actors . Yet despite the voluminous literature on these conflicts, and the complications arising in their local dynamics, it has been exceedingly rare for commentators to discuss how the global conflict interacts-with , is embedded-within, and passes-through the local networks that make up the terrain of actual conflicts. Moreover, this is a deficiency common to the analysis of all macro-level conflicts – whether between the West and fundamentalist terrorism, liberalism versus illiberal states, capitalism versus the multitude, or power versus resistance. All such global conflicts exist only as embodied within their local instantiations , yet the crucial role of these mediators has gone largely unacknowledged. In the cases where the global-local link is substantively examined, three analytically distinct conceptions of the global are often invoked either explicitly or implicitly: (1) the global as container, (2) the global as the highest position in a hierarchy, and (3) the global as a level of detail (See Keohane, 1986; Putnam, 1988; Singer, 1961). The first conception of the global visually

imagines it as being the larger container within which regional and local dynamics occur. The global, in such a perspective, is what provides the basic framework for the dynamics occurring inside of it. We see this most explicitly in analyses of social structure, as a limiting construct within which other processes occur. In International Relations, it has been popularized by Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, with the international system determining the limits of domestic action through the mechanisms of socialization and competition (Keohane, 1986). Similarly, analyses which see economic globalisation as a constraint on state action also tend to subscribe to this sort of ‘container’ approach.

Personal solutions don’t work- They just inscribe consumer culture more and prevent us from actually being activistsJensen 9 (Derrick, activist and the author of many books, “Forget shorter showers”, http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/4801/ ) CDDWOULD ANY SANE PERSON think dumpster diving would have stopped Hitler, or that composting would have ended slavery or brought about the eight-hour workday, or that chopping wood and carrying water would have gotten people out of Tsarist prisons, or that dancing naked around a fire would have helped put

in place the Voting Rights Act of 1957 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Then why now, with all the world at stake , do so many people retreat into these entirely personal “ solutions ”? Part of the problem is that we’ve been victims of a campaign of systematic misdirection . Consumer culture and the capitalist mindset have taught us to substitute acts of personal consumption (or enlightenment) for organized political resistance . An Inconvenient Truth helped raise consciousness about global warming. But did you notice that all of the solutions presented had to do with personal consumption—changing light bulbs, inflating tires, driving half as much—and had nothing to do with shifting power away from corporations, or stopping the growth economy that is destroying the planet? Even if every person in the United States did

everything the movie suggested, U.S. carbon emissions would fall by only 22 percent. Scientific consensus is that emissions must be reduced by at least 75 percent worldwide. Or let’s talk water. We so often hear that the world is running out of water. People are dying from lack of water. Rivers are dewatered from lack of water. Because of this we need to take shorter showers. See the disconnect? Because I take showers, I’m responsible for drawing down aquifers? Well, no. More than 90 percent of the water used by humans is used by agriculture and industry . The remaining 10 percent is

split between municipalities and actual living breathing individual humans. Collectively, municipal golf courses use as much water as municipal human beings. People (both human people and fish people) aren’t dying because the world is running out of water. They’re dying because the water is being stolen. Or let’s talk energy. Kirkpatrick Sale summarized it well: “For the past 15 years the story has been the same every year: individual consumption— residential, by private car, and so on— is never more than about a quarter of all consumption ; the vast majority is commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness and government [he forgot military]. So, even if we all took up cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and atmospheric pollution.” Or let’s talk waste. In 2005, per-capita municipal waste production (basically everything that’s put out at the curb) in the U.S. was about 1,660 pounds. Let’s say you’re a die-hard simple-living activist, and you reduce this to zero. You recycle everything. You bring cloth bags shopping. You fix your toaster. Your toes poke out of old tennis shoes. You’re not done yet, though. Since municipal waste includes not just residential waste, but also waste from government offices and businesses, you march to those offices, waste reduction pamphlets in hand, and convince them to cut down on their waste enough to eliminate your share of it.

Uh, I’ve got some bad news. Municipal waste accounts for only 3 percent of total waste production in the United States. I want to be clear. I’m not saying we shouldn’t live simply. I live reasonably simply myself, but I don’t pretend that not buying much (or not driving much, or not having kids) is a powerful political act, or that it’s deeply revolutionary. It’s not. Personal change doesn’t equal social change. So how, then, and especially with all the world at stake, have we come to accept these utterly insufficient responses? I think part of it is that we’re in a double bind. A double bind is where you’re given multiple options, but no matter what option you choose, you lose, and withdrawal is not an option. At this point, it should be pretty easy to recognize that every action involving the industrial economy is destructive (and we shouldn’t pretend that solar photovoltaics, for example, exempt us from this: they still require mining and transportation infrastructures at every point in the production processes; the same can be said for every other so-called green technology). So if we choose option one—if we avidly participate in the industrial economy—we may in the short term think we win because we may accumulate wealth, the marker of “success” in this culture. But we lose, because in doing so we give up our empathy, our animal humanity. And we really lose because industrial civilization is killing the planet, which means everyone loses. If we choose the “alternative” option of living more simply, thus causing less harm, but still not stopping the industrial economy from killing the planet, we may in the short term think we win because we get to feel pure, and we didn’t even have to give up all of our empathy (just enough to justify not stopping the horrors), but once again we really lose because industrial civilization is still killing the planet, which means everyone still loses. The third option, acting decisively to stop the industrial economy, is very scary for a number of reasons, including but not restricted to the fact that we’d lose some of the luxuries (like electricity) to which we’ve grown accustomed, and the fact that those in power might try to kill us if we seriously impede their ability to exploit the world—none of which alters the fact that it’s a better option than a dead planet. Any option is a better option than a dead planet.

Besides being ineffective at causing the sorts of change s necessary to stop this culture from killing the planet, there are at least four other problems with perceiving simple living as a political act (as opposed to living

simply because that’s what you want to do). The first is that it’s predicated on the flawed notion that humans inevitably harm their landbase. Simple living as a political act consists solely of harm reduction, ignoring the fact that humans can help the Earth as well as harm it. We can rehabilitate streams, we can get rid of noxious invasives, we can remove dams, we can disrupt a political system tilted toward the rich as well as an extractive economic system, we can destroy the industrial economy that is destroying the real, physical world. The second problem—and this is another big one—is that it incorrectly assigns blame to the individual (and most especially to individuals who are particularly powerless) instead of to those who actually wield power in this system and to the system itself. Kirkpatrick Sale again: “The whole individualist what-you-can-do-to-save-the-earth guilt trip is a myth. We, as individuals, are not

creating the crises, and we can’t solve them.” The third problem is that it accepts capitalism’s redefinition of us from citizens to consumers . By accepting this redefinition, we reduce our potential forms of resistance to consuming and not consuming. Citizens have a much wider range of available resistance tactics, including voting, not voting, running for office, pamphleting, boycotting, organizing,

lobbying, protesting, and, when a government becomes destructive of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, we have the right to alter or abolish it. The fourth problem is that the endpoint of the logic behind simple living as a political act is suicide . If every act within an industrial economy is destructive, and if we want to stop this destruction, and if we are unwilling (or unable) to question (much less destroy) the intellectual, moral, economic, and physical infrastructures that cause every act within an industrial economy to be destructive, then we can easily come to believe that we will cause the least destruction possible if we are dead. The good news is that there are other options. We can follow the examples of brave activists who lived through the difficult times I mentioned—Nazi Germany, Tsarist Russia, antebellum United States—who did far more than manifest a form of moral purity;

they actively opposed the injustices that surrounded them. We can follow the example of those who remembered that the role of an activist is not to navigate systems of oppressive power with as much integrity as possible, but rather to confront and take down those systems.

Sustainable

The plan provides investment—This is needed for sustainable consumptionEhrlich and Goulder 7 (Paul, Profressor of biological sciences at Stanford University, Lawrence, professor of economics at Stanford University, “Is Current Consumption Excessive? A General Framework and Some Indications for the United States”, http://www.uvm.edu/giee/pubpdfs/Ehrlich_2007_Conservation_Biology.pdf)CDDConsumption, Investment, and Sustainability Investment plays a central role in achieving sustainability. It is needed to maintain capital assets and thus a society’s ability to provide goods and services. Investment helps maintain capital three ways. First, it yields new capital that replaces worn out or retired old capital. Reproducible capital physically depreciates with time and use, and in- vestment in its repair or replacement can help maintain or augment its current effective quantity. Similarly, a soci- ety’s stock of employed human capital would also decline in the absence of investments in education because work- ers age and retire. Educating new and younger workers offsets what otherwise would be a reduction in human capital. Second, for renewable natural capital (e.g., fish, pol- linators) the stock can be maintained by reducing the harvesting rate or by habitat restoration. This allows the recovery of stocks through natural reproduction . Even when efforts of this type involve no financial outlay, they constitute “investment” because they lead to the expan- sion of capital. For nonrenewable natural capital, investment can con- tribute to sustainability a third way. For these resources, there can be no “production” of new stocks within the relevant time frame—only on a geological time scale are new stocks produced. Although society cannot produce new stocks of, say, petroleum, it has the potential to maintain its overall productive capacity and offset the de- cline in this asset by expanding the stocks of other capi- tal assets (e.g., solar-hydrogen energy systems, or wind farms ). Thus, investment in a different type of capital can potentially offset the loss of natural capital stocks. As indicated in Fig. 1, investment in reproducible capital—producing more machines or factories—req- uires natural resource inputs. Hence, this investment is ac- companied by the depletion of nonrenewable resources. Despite this depletion the overall productive base —the capacity for producing goods and services now and in the future— need not fall . When natural resources, labor, and other inputs are organized to produce new capital, this change in organization makes possible ( but does not guarantee) greater output of useable goods and services in the present and future. We return to this issue below in connection with the issue of the scale of the economy.

Perm

Perm solves- We can still act against specific purposes globally while thinking locally Esteva and Prakash 98 (Gustavo, Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board, and Madhu Suri, currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.)CDD

How do we defeat the five Goliath companies now controlling 85 percent of the world trade of grains and around half of its world production? Or the four controlling the American consumption of chicken? Or those few that have cornered the beverage market? The needed changes will wait for ever if they require forging equally gigantic transnational consumers' coalitions, or a global consciousness about the right way to eat. In accepting the illusory nature of the efforts to struggle against "global forces" in their own territory, on a global scale, we are not suggesting the abandonment of effective coalitions for specific purposes , like the Pesticides Action Network, trying to exert political pressure to ban specific threats. Even less are we suggesting that peo ple give up their struggles to put a halt to the dangerous advances of those "global forces." Quite the opposite. In putting our eggs in the local basket, we are sim- ply emphasizing the merits of the politics of "No" for dealing with global Goliaths: affirming a rich diversity of attitudes and ideals, while sharing a common rejection of the same evils. Such a common "No" does not need a "global conciousness." It expresses the opposite: a pluriverse of thought, action and reflection.

Premise behind the K is wrong- the global and local are indistinct and are one, only the perm solves Srnicek, 10 (Nick, degree in political science from the University of Western Ontario, “Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, 2010, http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/JCGS_Issue2_Conflict_Networks.html)CDDWith a basic analysis of conflict systems in place, we can now begin to substantiate some of our theoretical arguments in the first section with reference to this empirical system. Our task here will be to extract immanent abstractions concerning the global-local linkages operative within conflict situations. This will aim to give concrete meaning to the relations between the two , by showing the ways in which local , regional and global vectors pass through a conflict system, and refract each other. Our focus, in particular, will be on the links between micro- and macro-actors involved in contentious actions. A more extensive study would include the links between non-governmental organizations, donor countries, international institutions, and regional economies. Within this constraint, we will examine six analytically distinct modes through which the global and the local interact within an immanent plane: infection/contagion, alliance, leverage/cascade, and aggregation. The modes analyzed here are some of the ways in which macro-actors interact with their local assemblage during conflict. It refutes the standard ideas about the global’s relation to the local, which typically take the form of unexamined metaphors like the local ‘embodies’ the global, ‘reflects’ it, ‘overlays’ it, or ‘manifests’ it. All of these explanations of the relationship are premised upon the separation of the global from the local, whereas, as we have seen, this transcendence must be refused. Macro-actors must thread themselves into the local fabric, and operate from localizable positions. They exist immediately as a unity of both the global and the local.

Alt work

The global is key to the local and vica versa – Means the alt can’t solveSrnicek, 10 (Nick, degree in political science from the University of Western Ontario, “Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, 2010, http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/JCGS_Issue2_Conflict_Networks.html)CDD

The second major mode of interaction, alliance , refers to the tendency for micro-actors to cooperate with the local representatives of macro-actors in order to further their own aims. While this is given a prominent role in Kalyvas’ work, it arises in numerous other studies as well, suggesting it is a widespread mechanism (See Lubkemann, 2005; Kalyvas,

2006). As such, it is arguably one of the primary ways in which a global conflict is inflected through a local prism. The specific mode of alliance often takes the form of denunciation. Since the controlling force of a particular territory requires info rmation about defectors, they turn to local individuals for assistance. Most of the time the information that emerges from these denunciations is the result of local disputes rather than accurate denunciations (Lubkemann, 2005, p.

498). People spread rumours or use the local authorities as means to further their own goals, and avoid any direct retaliation against an opponent. Despite the frequently false information, the mechanism has the effect of playing a

massive role in determining the use and scope of violence, thereby playing a large role in the overall dynamics of the conflict. A similar dynamic occurs between occupying forces and local leaders, who come from a variety of different authority centers, “including tribal structures, insurgent or terrorist networks, local mosques, business and criminal networks, […] government structures, political and religious parties, and official and ‘unofficial’ security forces.” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 158.) Within these competing leadership roles, the crucial individuals are those crossing over a number of different networks (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 158) – what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) has called ‘connectors’: individuals with an unusually large number of social connections and that play a major role in passing along information and in influencing others to adopt new practices and approaches. Simply because of their structural position in a social network, these individuals largely determine whether certain memes and practices diffuse and spread, or retreat and perish. Alliance, therefore, takes on another modality by connecting not with a wide

range of everyday people, but by connecting with a few key nodes in the local network. Alliances are thus largely the composition of a unique assemblage consisting of, on the one hand, personal networks , social gossip, everyday disputes, and habitual systems of authority , and on the other hand, a large collection of weapons, trained and untrained fighters, and access to resources. The transferring of information in one direction, and the reciprocal transferring of violent or non-violent support in the other direction, is what constitutes the logic of this mechanism.