Governance and power shifts in the education sector · Policy briefing 6/2014: Governance and power shifts in the education sector – the autonomy and collective influence of the

Governance and power shifts in the education sector – the autonomy and collective influence of the profession

Policy briefing 6/2014

Policy briefing 6/2014:

Governance and power shifts in the education sector

– the autonomy and collective influence of the profession

One in a series of policy briefings on governance and quality

This publication has been produced by the department of

professional politics.

The publication is rooted in the policies and core values of the

Union of Education Norway but has not been reviewed by the

union’s governing bodies prior to publication.

Cover photo: ellge

Published by the department of professional politics, October 2014.

Case officers: Arnhild Grønvik Bie-Larsen and Trond Harsvik

Published by: Union of Education NorwayPostboks 9191 Grønland,0134 OsloTel: (+47) 24 14 20 [email protected]

Policy briefing 6/2014: Governance and power shifts in the education sector – the autonomy and collective influence of the profession

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Relevance ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

The 2014 teachers' strike – a crisis of confidence in the education sector ......................................................... 6 Political decision-making .......................................................................................................................................................... 6 Inequality on the agenda ............................................................................................................................................................ 7

1.2 Definitions and delimitation ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter 2 Professional autonomy .......................................................................................................................... 9

2.1 Standardisation and disregard for professional judgement ....................................................................................... 9 2.3 Pedagogic programmes ........................................................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Testing and constricting the social mandate ................................................................................................................. 12 2.4 Individualisation of the profession ...................................................................................................................................... 14 2.5 Decentralisation in the education sector ......................................................................................................................... 15 2.6 The influence of private, commercial interest on education ................................................................................... 16

Chapter 3 The collective influence of the profession ........................................................................................ 19 3.1 The Norwegian model ................................................................................................................................................................ 19 3.2 Basis for the profession's influence .................................................................................................................................. 20 3.3 Governance trends in the public sector ............................................................................................................................ 21

Managerial prerogatives .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 New forms of management..................................................................................................................................................... 22

3.4 Changing employment structures in the labour market ............................................................................................ 24 Contract workers ......................................................................................................................................................................... 25 Privatisation and competition ............................................................................................................................................... 25

3.5 Democratic control of welfare services ............................................................................................................................ 27 Chapter 4 Alternatives to current governance practices ................................................................................ 28

4.1 The consequences of power shifts in the education sector ..................................................................................... 28 4.2 Developing a governance system that ensures equity and quality ..................................................................... 28

Professional ethics and the professional learning community ............................................................................... 29 Management by objectives and professional contribution ........................................................................................ 31 Trust and quality .......................................................................................................................................................................... 33 The profession and co-operation between the parties .............................................................................................. 35

4.3 Final reflections .......................................................................................................................................................................... 36 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 37


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Chapter 1 Introduction

Fundamental questions about which kind of education system we want cannot be disassociated from the

question of which kind of society we want. It is about equity, quality and democratic and political decision-

making.

In this policy briefing we will be looking more closely at governance issues in the education sector in a

power shift perspective. We will discuss how the autonomy and collective influence of the profession are

affected by various trends in society. We will then examine these issues in the context of the wider goal of

equitable, high-quality education as well as the desire for – and necessity of – democratic control of the

education system as a social institution. The questions of who exerts influence over the design of our

education system and who holds the power of definition with regard to the quality of education are both

of significance to the development of the education system and society as a whole.

We will seek to describe international trends that affect overarching governance policy in the public

sector in general and in the education sector in particular. By presenting examples of governance

practices in the education system and changing structures in the labour market, we will aim to

demonstrate how the sum of isolated changes in different areas paints a bigger picture of a systematic

power shift – from practitioners towards the education authorities at various levels, from employees

towards employers, and from elected politicians and professionals towards various private stakeholders.

Governance trends and changing structures in the labour market are putting pressure on teachers'

professional freedoms and altering the basis for trade union influence.

In this briefing we will be looking at governance practices and power shifts that affect the profession's

autonomy (Chapter 2) and its collective influence (Chapter 3). This is then used as a backdrop to a

discussion on alternatives to current governance practices (Chapter 4). The alternatives will be examined

with particular reference to the goal of equitable education for all, the need for democratic control of the

education system, and the value of professional input in order to ensure development and quality in the

education sector. The alternatives must be able to ensure appropriate distribution of power and influence

between different stakeholders and to underpin the far-reaching social mandate of education.

The aim of this policy briefing is to help create a basis for further debate and policy development

surrounding governance in the education sector. It is part of a series of publications addressing

governance and quality in the sector1, and it builds on previous briefings on quality, management by

objectives and privatisation.

1 A system evaluation of education in Norway – how can evaluations help improve compulsory education? (Policy briefing 9/2011) The quality concept in Norwegian education. What is it all about? (Policy briefing 3/2012), Management by objectives – challenges and opportunities (Policy briefing 4/2013), The method of open co-ordination in


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1.1 Relevance

The 2014 teachers' strike – a crisis of confidence in the education sector

In the summer of 2014 members of the Union of Education Norway (UEN) went on strike. The strike was

triggered by a disagreement over working hours for teachers employed in the local and regional

government sector. It later became clear that the strike was about more than just working hours. In this

briefing we will look at the strike in a power shift perspective. Both before and during the collective pay

negotiations the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) signalled that it wished to

transfer decision-making powers on matters that previously required consensus between the parties to

the employers' organisations alone. KS argued in favour of exercising more control over teachers' working

hours in order to compel them to co-operate more,2 a move that would have curtailed teachers' power to

decide when and how to do their job. The Union of Education Norway (UEN) argued that the flexibility

granted to teachers in respect of how to practise their profession is crucial in order to give pupils a good

education and to allow teachers to work closely with different partners, including parents. It also emerged

that the teachers felt that local authorities, in their role as employer representatives, have for some time

been acting in a way that suggests a lack of confidence in the teaching profession – demonstrated by

attempts to micromanage their day-to-day work. At the same time the very nature of the governance

exercised by local authorities can be seen to be dismissive of the factors that the profession itself

considers important to promote the quality of education. The teaching profession's lack of confidence in

KS can, amongst other things, be seen in light of the fact that the profession is not sufficiently involved

when local authorities develop governance and quality control systems. We will look more closely at these

issues later in this briefing.

The teachers' organisations won the strike with professional arguments that resonated with public

opinion. Both politicians and parents expressed understanding for the fact that teachers require

professional freedom in order to fulfil their social mandate and safeguard the quality of the education they

provide. This can be a stepping stone from which to further develop a governance system that ensures the

involvement and influence of the profession.

Political decision-making

In this briefing we will seek to outline a picture of international trends relevant to several sectors,

including in Norway. By providing selected examples we will attempt to demonstrate how individual

factors form part of a greater whole. Such trends do not occur out of nowhere. They reflect the choices

made by politicians at various levels. Greater emphasis on quantifiable results, control, privatisation and a

the EU – does it extend to Norwegian education? A closer look at kindergartens, primary and secondary schools (Policy briefing 6/2013), Privatisation and quality in education – a broad social mandate and the role of the teaching profession (Policy briefing 8/2013), School owners' financing of compulsory education. Criteria models and the importance of employee co-determination (Policy briefing 2/2014), Changing conditions for school leaders. Framework conditions for developing the learning environment (Policy briefing 3/2014) 2 Recent figures from the TALIS survey show that Norwegian teachers already co-operate more closely than do teachers in most OECD countries, and they spend more time in school in addition to their own teaching hours than teachers in many other countries (OECD 2014b).


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more fragmented labour market are some of the consequences of such choices. It is the sum of many small

adjustments that create big changes at a system level. Holistic and alternative policies must therefore be

based on a clear definition of what kind of society we want to create. It is about political decision-making.

There is an ongoing debate in the education sector about which decisions should be made centrally and

which should be made locally. At the same time it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a lack of

coherence between political ambitions at a national level and how these ambitions are put into practice

locally.

At present there are major cross-sector processes underway that will have an impact on the way in which

power and influence are distributed in society in general and in the education sector in particular. The

government-appointed Productivity Commission has been tasked with putting forward proposals on how

to increase productivity in the Norwegian economy, both in the private and public sectors (Productivity

Commission 2014). The goal of the Norwegian government's local government reform is fewer and larger

municipalities. Along with the recommendations of the Productivity Commission, this reform will have an

impact on equity in education, on the co-determination of the profession, and on the scope for exercising

power and influence.

Inequality on the agenda

Inequality is a frequently recurring theme in the ongoing debate about what creates a good society. In

2009 the book The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (Wilkinson and Pickett

2009) helped raise awareness of the interrelationships between economic inequality in society and a

number of parameters linked to issues such as health, violence and quality of life. One of the book's key

conclusions was that having only minor differences between rich and poor is better for everyone –

including the richest in society. In 2014 Thomas Piketty's book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty

2013) placed renewed focus on inequality, both nationally and internationally. His book concludes that

inequality between people is on the increase – including within most countries3. The international

discourse on inequality is also having an impact on the domestic debate, both in relation to productivity

levels and taxation and wealth distribution policy. Organisations such as the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are now challenging the

Norwegian government's wealth distribution policy on the basis of analyses that largely concur with

Piketty's conclusions.

If more equal wealth distribution and only limited inequality are good both for a country's productivity

and for its citizens, then more even wealth distribution should become an overarching political goal. This

is about employment, wages and taxation, but also about how freedom of choice is distributed – in terms

of access to welfare services, for example. A key issue in this perspective is to preserve kindergartens and

schools as inclusive community arenas, partly in order to prevent segregation and the sustenance of

3 This is essentially because the return on capital is increasing faster than the return on labour, contrary to what most economists have always thought. It is also the case that capital is becoming more concentrated, partly because inequality is passed on by inheritance. In turn, this concentration of capital is posing a democratic threat because politics is increasingly governed by capital and by the influence of private interests.


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inequitable distribution. In other words, education is a fundamental element in the wider public debate

about inequality, development and productivity.

1.2 Definitions and delimitation In this briefing we use the word power to describe how a stakeholder in the education sector is able to

impose its will on other stakeholders, for example. Stakeholders described in the briefing include

democratically elected politicians at both national and local levels, private commercial interests,

bureaucrats, employers, trade unions and practitioners. A power shift occurs when one stakeholder

acquires power at the expense of another.

The notion of quality in education is not a clear-cut concept. It has been investigated by the UEN in further

detail in a previous policy briefing (2012). What is considered quality will depend on who is defining the

concept and on which quality perspectives are applied to the definition, for instance. In this policy briefing

we are looking at quality in education in a societal perspective. Quality in this context primarily refers to

the quality of education at a system level. Quality is also linked to the social mandate of education.

International organisations, agreements and programmes have an impact on Norwegian education policy

in a number of ways. The OECD's PISA survey and other international surveys along with issues

concerning the optimisation of education for the labour market through the so-called Skills Strategy have

been subject to particular debate (OECD 2012a, 2014a). The efforts to draw up the TISA4 and TTIP5 trade

agreements are other examples of international processes that may come to have a significant impact on

the content and design of education in Norway. This type of international influence will not be addressed

especially in this policy briefing, however.

When we use the word teacher we mean teachers in both kindergartens and schools. Most of the examples

we have used are taken from kindergartens and schools, but the general trends will be familiar to

practitioners working elsewhere, too. The problems we address are applicable to the entire education

sector as well as to large parts of the public sector and the Norwegian labour market in general.

4 After the WTO negotiations over trade in services ended, some countries (Norway included) begun negotiating a free trade agreement for services (including welfare services). This agreement is referred to as the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 5 The EU and the US are in the process of negotiating a free trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).


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Chapter 2 Professional autonomy

Practitioners in both kindergartens and schools fulfil their social mandate on the basis of legislation,

curricula and the ethical platform of the teaching profession. The profession is therefore committed to and

responsible for the social mandate of our kindergartens and schools. The objectives of kindergartens and

schools are founded on a number of core principles that the profession as a whole must work together to

give practical meaning to, and teachers must strive to adhere to these principles when practising their

profession.

Teachers enjoy extensive professional autonomy. They have traditionally been considered to possess

particular qualifications that are necessary in order to achieve the desired quality in kindergartens and

schools. The context in which practitioners are working has been acknowledged as being professionally

demanding, complex and unpredictable. This requires particular skills. Teachers carry out their duties

according to the situation-specific and individual needs of the children and pupils and using their

professional and ethical judgement, something which makes a degree of autonomy necessary. Teachers

must be able to decide for themselves how to teach their pupils or how to organise activities in

kindergarten. This is an important part of what we could describe as teachers' professional autonomy. This

autonomy is now being challenged in several quarters.

Below we will highlight a few examples from the education sector. We will be looking more closely at the

power shift away from practitioners and towards those in governing positions at different levels in the

education system, and away from practitioners towards representatives of various private, commercial

interests. We have grouped the examples under individual headers, some of which overlap. Many of the

examples could therefore have been mentioned several places in the text. The examples do not provide

exhaustive descriptions of the different situations.

2.1 Standardisation and disregard for professional judgement One common denominator of many of the trends we are seeing in kindergartens and schools is

standardisation. Standardisation is the unambiguous description of an object or method. It may be an

express aim in itself or an unintended by-product of other measures. It also implies an understanding of

quality in education as something that can be evaluated according to whether or not we are working to

established standards. In this perspective the quality of the education is assessed according to given

specifications. The standard approach is that quality is absolute, that it can be quantified, and that

outcomes can often be expressed in numbers (Union of Education Norway 2012). One divergent approach

to this is pedagogy as a complex relational activity involving autonomous practitioners who, by virtue of

their extensive expertise, practise their profession on the basis of the social mandate of kindergartens and


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schools. When we pit these two approaches against each other it becomes clear that standardisation will

come to challenge professional practice and professional freedom in a number of ways.

One example is political overruling of teachers' judgement in respect of pupil assessments in favour of a

standardised assessment model. The municipality of Sandefjord made a political decision for primary

school pupils to be assessed using a multiple choice model citing “below average, satisfactory or above

average attainment” (Union of Education Norway 2014a). The teachers felt that it should be up to them to

use their professional judgement to assess each pupil in accordance with the Assessment Regulations,

legislation and national curriculum and that the multiple choice model with its implicit grading scale did

not serve the pupils' interests and did not promote learning. It was also pointed out that this form of

marking is in breach of the Assessment Regulations. For their part, the teachers carried out thorough half-

yearly assessments and gave formative feedback to pupils and parents in line with legislation. And yet the

teachers who refused to use the adopted form for pupil assessment were threatened with dismissal by the

local authority on the grounds that they refused to obey orders. With the support of the UEN, the teachers

eventually succeeded in making the local authority reverse its decision. In the winter of 2014 the school

and kindergarten committee in the municipality of Sandefjord resolved not to continue the half-yearly

assessment model, and it was decided that teachers should be free to choose whether or not to use the

half-yearly assessment forms in their present format. It was also agreed to involve the profession in the

process of designing new assessment systems to be implemented in the autumn of 2014 (Union of

Education Norway 2014c).

There are further examples of the overruling of teachers' professional judgement in other parts of the

education sector, too. Some municipalities are seeking to establish more control over the work of the

educational psychology service (PP). We have seen examples of municipal executives requesting to review

and approve expert assessments before they are released. Elsewhere local authorities are putting

pressure on the PP service not to disclose the extent of special needs provision in their expert

assessments, nor to reveal how the special needs education is being organised. This contravenes

government guidelines that requires the PP service to do just that. This way professional judgement is

being overruled.

Other municipalities, too, place much emphasis on standardisation. Oslo, for example, has expressed a

wish to standardise education. City Council report no. 1/2013 states that:

“The City Council is of the opinion that standards and examples of good tuition, class management etc.

can be important tools for improving learning outcomes […]. The City Council is seeking to […] launch

research-based trials with a standardised school structure placing great emphasis on developing

fundamental skills in the core subjects (City of Oslo 2013).

The imposition by the education department of specific procedures for how teachers should organise and

give their lessons represents a curtailment of their professional autonomy.


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Many of the programmes and tools being introduced in the education sector originated outside our

kindergartens and schools. Lean is an example of a tool now being launched as an instrument for ongoing

improvements. Lean was first developed by Toyota to improve its car manufacturing process (Lean Forum

2014). The method was first developed in the 1950s, but since the 1990s it has enjoyed a renaissance as a

popular efficiency model in both the public and private sectors in many countries (Ingvaldsen et al. 2012).

Lean has now reached the education sector but has yet to gain wider currency (Bedre skole 2013). Lean

attaches particular importance to rationalisation, and the standardisation of processes is a key element in

cutting the use of resources. Standardisation requires an accurate description of the processes in question,

and each employee's duties must be carried out in accordance with specifications. Research shows that

efficiency improvements can come at a significant “human cost” as a result of narrow spans of control, low

levels of autonomy and high work pressure (Ingvaldsen et al. 2012). The Norwegian Civil Service Union

(NTL) has been a vocal opponent of the introduction of lean at the University of Oslo (NTL University of

Oslo 2011). The NTL points out that lean implies a quantification of work processes where it is likely that

each employee will be monitored according to set targets. In practice this could easily result in

management by objectives at an individual level whereby professional autonomy is restricted. (Ibid.)

There is one further risk associated with simplifying complex pedagogic processes in the form of

standardisation. It will generate a power shift away from practitioners towards those setting the

standards.

Other examples from higher education include the development of a national qualifications framework

and the use of learning outcome descriptors. Thanks to the Bologna Process, issues surrounding higher

education curricula have led other national and international players to enter the arena and gain more

power to influence content in higher education institutions. The qualifications framework represents a

shift away from focus on content towards focus on learning outcomes, and away from subject and

institution-based curriculum descriptors towards standard descriptors. This represents a power shift in

terms of the definition of the content of higher education away from the profession towards technocrats

and stakeholders working outside universities and higher education institutions (Karseth 2009).

2.3 Pedagogic programmes There are numerous pedagogic programmes and methodology packages being offered to kindergartens

and schools. Examples include TRAS6, ART7, The Leader in Me, The Incredible Years and SWPBS8. Some of

these programmes have been developed and are being sold by private, commercial enterprises, while

others have their origins in public institutions. The use of these programmes can be seen as problematic

for a variety of reasons. In many cases the decision to adopt a given programme is taken at a superior level

with the result that teachers are told to implement the programme without having participated in the

decision-making process. The teachers' professional judgement and critical assessments are therefore

being disregarded. New programmes and methodologies will often describe a problem that can be solved 6 TRAS is an acronym for Tidlig Registrering Av Språkutvikling (early screening of language development). 7 ART stands for Aggression Replacement Training. 8 SWPBS stands for School-Wide Positive Behaviour Support.


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and offer a product that promises to provide a universal solution. These products usually constitute

recipes and procedures that must be followed in order to achieve the desired result. This implies that

professional judgement is set aside in favour of predefined categories to which pedagogic reality must

adapt (Pettersvold and Østrem 2012). One Norwegian tool that has been the subject of debate in recent

years is TRAS (early screening of language development), designed for use in kindergartens. The UEN is

very clear that one-sided focus on such tools for documentation and evaluation is not in line with good

professional practice. The UEN believes that the diverse experience base that is so crucial to a good

kindergarten education is being constricted and that the kindergarten learning environment is becoming

poorer. Tools such as these do not pick up on the complex processes and fundamental challenges faced by

each child in their learning (Union of Education Norway 2009).

All municipal schools and kindergartens in Larvik have adopted the ART programme. The programme was

developed in the US in the 1980s to help children in the 12–17 age group displaying chronic aggression.

The programme has been translated into Norwegian and is now used by several local authorities as a

universal programme for all children. Researchers (Pettersvold and Østrem 2012, Løvlie 2013) have

criticised the universal application of the programme for several reasons. Firstly, the programme was

originally intended for a defined group of children who had particular issues concerning anger

management. The universal application of the programme is highly time-consuming for both schools and

kindergartens and is seen as a misdirected use of the tool. Another aspect is that teachers in kindergartens

and schools are being instructed in how to address the issue of social competence. By rolling out the

programme as a universal standard for how teachers in a municipality should do their job, the teachers

are robbed of their autonomy in respect of their role as educators. Løvlie (2013) criticises programmes

such as ART and SWPBS for being too focused on behavioural moderation, something which has

traditionally been associated with a behaviourist view of learning rather than the sociocultural approach

on which the Norwegian education system is built. The imposition of such programmes can in other words

lead kindergarten and school teachers to take a more instrumental approach to teaching than would have

been the case had they been able to retain their autonomy in this particular area. Solbrekke and Østrem

(2011) claim that growing calls for standardised programmes are forcing teachers into a new position of

responsibility, one in which professional responsibility is distinguished more by a form of answerability

and reporting of attainment levels than by professional judgement and professional autonomy.

2.3 Testing and constricting the social mandate When various stakeholders such as central or local education authorities give much prominence,

relatively speaking, to results from standardised tests such as national tests and the PISA tests, this can

also put teachers under compulsion in terms of how they practise their profession. Quality in education


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can quickly become synonymous with achieving high scores in such tools. This is part of an international

trend, described by Diane Ravitch9 thus:

“…students must be constantly tested, and that the results of these tests are the most important

measures and outcomes of education. The scores can be used not only to grade the quality of every

school, but to punish or reward students, teachers, principals, and schools” (Ravitch 2010).

Quality can in other words be linked to testing so that quality in respect of each teacher is assessed on the

basis of the test results of his or her pupils. Several Norwegian municipalities have resolved to score

higher than average in national tests. The results from each school are frequently compared with those of

the neighbouring school, and municipalities will compare themselves with other municipalities. This

means that the test results become a goal in themselves rather than a means of promoting learning.

The mandate of our schools is broad, and it is therefore not possible to quantify all aspects of a school's

activities using standardised tests. There is a risk that it is the things that are easy to quantify that are

being assessed, while those that are more difficult to identify are not given the same amount of attention.

Learning outcomes are not seen as qualitative phenomena that should be subjected to professional,

competent judgement, and the learning is reduced to what can be quantitatively measured by tests (Engh

2012). Another phenomenon is “teaching to the test”, whereby the tuition is tailored to make the pupils

perform well in tests at the expense of general learning. This phenomenon exists in many countries.

Reports and books have been published in both the US and England in recent years describing the

negative effects of a quality assessment system that places great emphasis on testing and on making test

results public. In England the Cambridge Primary Review published its final report in 2010 (Alexander

2010). It points out that too much prominence has been given to the parts of the syllabus on which the

pupils are being tested, with the result that their education has become narrower than what the

curriculum prescribes. The parts of the syllabus not subjected to testing are being squeezed out. The

report's authors conclude that English pupils are receiving inadequate tuition as a result of the great

emphasis placed on testing and of the importance that these tests have gained. In Norway there has been a

debate over whether pupils in individual municipalities are revising more than is necessary for national

tests (Marsdal 2011). An evaluation of the national tests carried out by the Nordic Institute for Studies in

Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU) shows significant variations in how schools prepare for the

tests (Seland et al. 2013). There are also examples internationally of systematic cheating with such tests as

the tests gain more prominence (Morgenbladet 2014). The evidence cited above shows how aspects of

governance information emphasised at a system level can have direct consequences for individual

practitioners' ability to do their job in line with their social mandate since there are strong incentives to

curtail this mandate.

9 Diane Ravitch was an education adviser to former US president George Bush Sr. and was at the time an advocate of more testing and more competition in schools. She is now a professor at New York University and has changed her position on testing, competition and marketisation in the education sector.


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2.4 Individualisation of the profession The teaching profession has a collective focus whereby each teacher's knowledge, experience, ethical

reflections and professional practice can be discussed and tested in conversation with colleagues. It is the

body of staff, comprising teachers and managers, who together are tasked with developing good teaching

practices and with promoting and further developing teacher professionalism (Lærerprofesjonens etiske

plattform 2012). In order to achieve improvements in kindergartens and schools, managers, teachers and

other staff must have a common understanding of what constitutes a good education, of what is required

of each employee and of the staff as a whole, and of which framework conditions are required. The

profession's collective professional and ethical foundations are being challenged by various trends with

the one thing in common that they individualise responsibility in one way or other.

Management by objectives (MBO) can be practised in a number of ways to facilitate good professional

practice to greater or lesser extent (Union of Education Norway 2013a). It is becoming increasingly

common to break down targets to an individual level, and systems are being created that oblige staff to

meet their targets. The performance-based contracts with headteachers in Oslo is one example of this.

Kindergarten heads, meanwhile, are being assessed on whether they meet their budgets, on the outcomes

of user surveys amongst parents, and on sickness absence amongst staff. Other forms of MBO have been

introduced by local authorities whereby targets are set for employees within given deadlines (Kommunal

rapport 2014). This form of management by objectives at an individual level is an element in what is often

referred to as “hard HRM” and is associated with American management styles. Some of the consequences

of introducing MBO at an individual level, or of hard HRM as a management principle, are that the demand

for loyalty to the management and to the targets shifts power upwards in the organisation, and it restricts

professional freedom since it limits the employees' opportunity to apply their expertise (Stugu and

Nordrik 2012). MBO at an individual level is not compatible with the core idea of MBO as originally

described (Union of Education Norway 2013a). The performance-based headteacher contracts in Oslo

were also kept secret, and headteachers' salaries were linked to the meeting of secret targets. Oslo no

longer rates its headteachers on the basis of the targets achieved under the contracts (City of Oslo 2014),

but the arrangement whereby school leaders are assessed according to set targets is being continued in a

different format (City of Oslo 2014, Malkenes 2014).

Such management by objectives at an individual level is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it is clear

that the pupils' performance levels in different tests may vary for reasons unrelated to the performance of

the individual school leaders. Another issue is that such secret contracts challenge the ethical platform of

the profession. It is highly problematic when teachers are unaware of any contractual attainment targets

for the school that the headteacher may have accepted. It also does away with existing arenas for

argumentative testing of views and values. This is detrimental to the teachers' ethical obligations and to

co-operation between colleagues. In order to fulfil the social mandate granted to schools, all teaching staff

must be given the opportunity to discuss what their school should be, which targets are legitimate, and

how to work towards these goals. This ethical dimension can also be related to Skjervheim's (1976)


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description of the “instrumentalist mistake”, which implies that pedagogic actions are interpreted using a

model for instrumental actions. This means that we evaluate the extent to which an action is working on

the basis of whether or not we meet the target. The ethical aspect, in the sense that this is about

relationships between people, is not taken into consideration. Humans are objectified, and in this

particular context other humans become instruments for reaching our own goals.

Another facet of the increased individualisation resulting from such management by objectives is that this

practice is at odds with the knowledge that autonomy at work boosts motivation. Professor Kuvaas at BI

Norwegian Business School puts it like this:

“Empirical data shows that perceived job autonomy is king in the workplace. It gives people the

feeling of job variety, opportunities for growth and development, a feeling of being part of a bigger

whole. Micromanagement by target-setting does not place trust in the employees or allow them to

think for themselves or make independent decisions. It kills off their inner motivation.” (Kommunal

rapport 2014)

Performance-related pay (PRP) for teachers is mooted at irregular intervals by various players as an

incentive for motivating teachers. It was proposed by the Chief Executive of the Confederation of

Norwegian Enterprise, Kristin Skogen Lund, at the confederation's annual conference in 2013 (NHO

2013). The Aftenposten newspaper has also run leaders advocating PRP as a way of retaining talented

teachers (Aftenposten 2014b). The PRP model has been trialled and introduced in various guises in

countries such as the US and England (TES 2013). PRP is usually linked to quantifiable indicators designed

to provide a picture of the teacher's performance on the basis of learning outcomes. In a Norwegian

context, examples of indicators include the pupils' scores in national tests or exams. No correlation has

been documented between school systems using PRP for teachers and PISA results (OECD 2012b). The

UEN maintains that PRP, just like management by objectives at an individual level, is demotivating for

teachers (Union of Education Norway 2014b). The linking of pay to often predefined quantitative

indicators associated with pupil performance also poses ethical, professional and didactic concerns.

2.5 Decentralisation in the education sector The decentralisation of power and/or responsibility is another international trend affecting professional

freedoms. We are seeing how decentralisation in many cases moves responsibility from a national to a

local level, and in some cases as far as to an individual level. There is also an ongoing debate over what

should be governed at a national versus a local level. This is rendered relevant by the perception that

there is a lack of coherence between political ambitions at a national level and how these ambitions are

actually put into practice locally. The most far-reaching consequence could be that individual teachers are

held responsible for ensuring that all objectives and targets for the tuition are being met in the case of

each child and each pupil, including where the framework conditions for achieving this are not present.

This puts the teacher in a particularly vulnerable and difficult position. If democratic governance of

education at a national level is weakened, we may see a big gap opening up between national objectives of


16

equitable education and the ability of teachers to realise them (Hultqvist 2014, Bergh 2014). Sweden has

gone far in municipalising its schools (Lewin 2014). The evaluation of this process shows that it has had

consequences both for framework conditions for the profession and for equity in education. The transfer

of additional powers to local authorities has contributed to declining performance levels amongst pupils

and to more inequality. Working conditions for teachers have become more difficult, and the workload has

increased. School leaders are also finding themselves in a more difficult position, partly because local

authorities are increasingly making decisions that intervene in and encroach on their professional

freedoms (Ibid.).

The introduction of the Norwegian Knowledge Promotion reform as a governance reform can also be

viewed in a power shift perspective. One premise of the Curriculum for Knowledge Promotion was that

any changes to school learning should start at the bottom. When evaluating the reform, however, it was

pointed out that the autonomy of the profession does not appear to have been strengthened (Aasen et al.

2012, Aasen 2012). The researchers concluded that national political governance during the

implementation period became progressively stronger and more activity and action-driven than

direction-driven. The implementation of the Curriculum for Knowledge Promotion has therefore resulted

in increased tension between centralised and decentralised governance and between political and

professional governance (Ibid.)

2.6 The influence of private, commercial interest on education The freedoms of teaching practitioners' can also be diminished by the introduction of private, commercial

interests in the education sector. One obvious example of this is of course ownership. For owners of

commercial schools it is an advantage to be able to point to the good grades of their students. In Sweden

this has manifested itself in the form of so-called “grade inflation”. This means that pupils from private

schools receive higher coursework grades than pupils from state schools. At the same time it has become

clear that private pupils are getting relatively lower exam grades than they are coursework grades

compared with pupils from state schools. The same tendency has been identified and discussed in Norway

(Union of Education 2013b, Grønmo and Onstad 2013, Directorate for Education and Training 2013,

Aftenposten 2013). Teachers have spoken up about how they are put under great pressure by the school

management to give pupils better coursework grades that can be justified on the basis of their academic

performance (Utdanningsnytt 2013, Nordlys 2013, Sundsvalls tidning 2011). This puts pressure on

teachers' professionalism and integrity, while their loyalty to the owner and employer is being challenged

(Ibid.) A recent review of the grade differences between public and private upper secondary schools in

Norway carried out by the Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU)

shows that the picture is nuanced. The report found greater discrepancies between coursework and exam


17

grades in private, general schools10 than in private Christian, private specialist, and state schools

(Hovdhaugen et al. 2014).

Another aspect of the influence of commercial interests concerns the use of consultants. Consultants from

the private sector are currently being hired in to “clean up” schools. One example of this is Oslo, where

Ernst & Young has been contracted to help 13 schools in the city over a four-year period. The schools have

been selected on the basis of poor results and challenging pupils. The consultants will be looking at

management, pupil behaviour, the structure and organisation of the tuition, skills, and co-operation with

parents/guardians. These tasks can be defined as being core tasks for teachers. It would be pertinent to

ask what the consultants possess in terms of relevant professional expertise and why the profession itself

is not represented by advisory teams or teacher training institutions (Aftenposten 2012a and b). The

profession should have been involved as contributors when it has been deemed necessary to seek external

help. This is an illustrative example of a power shift away from the profession. In this case it is the

consulting industry that is being tasked with defining what constitutes good pedagogic processes.

Consultants are used by executives across the entire welfare sector in Norway, and they therefore play a

part in defining what constitutes good professional practice11. This phenomenon is not unique to Norway.

In Denmark the management consulting firm McKinsey has been asked to design and implement large

parts of the government's schools reform (Politiken 2014). The Danish government argues that it is useful

to obtain external input in order to identify new solutions. On the other hand, the consultants are working

on the basis of a particular understanding of what education is, how the education sector should be

governed, and how the sector can be made more efficient. The knowledge of the teaching profession as

expressed by the teachers' unions is given much less thought. cf. the lockout that Danish teachers suffered

in 2013.

As mentioned previously, many of the pedagogic products offered to kindergartens and schools are

marketed by commercial interests. One complicating factor in all this is when these commercial interests

also have ownership interests in an institution. “The Leader in Me” is one example of this. “The Leader in

Me” is a controversial programme designed to train kindergarten children to become proactive, to put

work before play, and to think about win-win situations, amongst other things (The Leader in Me,

FranklinCovey 2014). Eleven kindergartens have now adopted the tool, which was developed by a

management consultancy (Aftenposten 2014, Aftonbladet 2013). The tool was developed by a commercial

10 General private upper secondary schools offer general study programmes preparing the pupils for higher education. Some of these schools will offer partly exam-focused tuition for private candidates in single subjects and partly ordinary study programmes with exam accreditation involving three years of study and organised in the same way as state schools. The NIFU study covers the latter form of study since students on these programmes will normally be given both coursework grades and exam grades, both of which are necessary in order to carry out an analysis. Many of these schools were licensed under the Free School Act before it was superseded by the new Private Education Act in 2005. This category also includes schools advertising “guaranteed grades”, often in connection with study programmes not covered by the NIFU analysis where the students sit their exams as external candidates in individual subjects (Hovdhaugen et al. 2014). 11 We can see the criticism of the use of McKinsey's consultants as setting the agenda for the frustration surrounding the hospital merger in Oslo, which was implemented in the face of stark warnings from the health sector that the economic benefits and academic consequences that the consultants cited were not based on adequate background data. The same consultants are also being used to implement the policies that they themselves have drawn up (Kierulf and Slagstad 2011, Slagstad 2012).


18

enterprise where the Norwegian rights are owned by the same person who owns the kindergartens that

have implemented the programme. We shall refrain from commenting on the views on children and

childhood that this management programme promotes. The problem with commercial kindergarten

owners buying such a programme from themselves and compelling their employees to adopt it illustrates

how the profession is becoming sidelined and how kindergartens' social mandate is being subordinated to

the interests of others. This type of governance of educational institutions represents a distinct power

shift away from practitioners towards commercial ownership interests.


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Chapter 3 The collective influence of the profession

In this chapter we will look more closely at the power shifts taking place from employees to employers

and from trade unions and elected politicians to representatives of various private, commercial interests.

Governance trends and changing employment structures are affecting the long-term co-operation

between the parties in the education sector. A number of minor changes combine to cause significant

consequences for development processes in kindergartens and schools.

There are at least two key aspects of these developments. Firstly, the changing basis for the profession's

collective influence and for democratic governance of the education sector will have an impact on equity

and quality in education. Secondly, if professional associations, other trade unions and elected politicians

lose power and influence over public sector services, we must expect other players to reinforce their

positions. It is of great interest to the national debate on education policy to establish who these interests

are and which values they represent and promote.

The review given below does not paint a complete picture of changes and challenges in the Norwegian

labour market. We have selected general examples, albeit of particular relevance to the co-operation

between the parties in the education sector.

3.1 The Norwegian model The Norwegian model12 has traditionally been cited as the reason why Norway is doing well in a number of

international surveys on quality of life, development and productivity. At a macro level the Norwegian

model can be described as a “well organised democratic nation in which the parties in the labour market

and in wider society are obligated to each other and help improve welfare for all” (Hernes 2006:13).

Both the right and the left of Norwegian politics have embraced the model, despite there being some

disagreement over how and why the Norwegian model works. However, there is broad consensus that the

cornerstone of the model is the co-operation between different stakeholders centrally and between

employers and employees locally (Trygstad and Hagen 2007). The system of agreements that regulates

the Norwegian and Nordic labour markets has an impact on rights and on the balance of power, and it has

been key to the Nordic countries' ability to combine equality and productivity. The model is also credited

with creating steady growth and high employment in the Norwegian economy and labour market. This

creates a sense of predictability and security, which is of great benefit to employers, employees and

12 The Norwegian model is often referenced in the public discourse on the social model that regulates Norwegian society and its labour market. Research literature often uses the term the Nordic model as a common identifier for features that characterise all the Nordic countries. The two terms are used interchangeably in this briefing. The Norwegian model is often divided into a labour market model, a welfare model and an economic model. The labour market model is particularly relevant to the issues raised in this policy briefing.


20

society as a whole. The model also provides a basis for systematic employee-driven development.

Furthermore, the fact that the model is built on trust and co-operation has enabled quality control and

development in the labour market – at a low cost and with a high level of legitimacy amongst the parties

(Hernes 2007).

Good co-operation between employers' and employees' organisations – both in the form of contractual co-

determination rights and through formal and informal co-operation between representative organisations

– is the backbone of the model. A high level of trade union membership and strong unions are therefore

prerequisites for the Norwegian model (Bergene 2012, Hernes 2006).

3.2 Basis for the profession's influence Just as teachers are the most significant individual factor in ensuring quality in education, the teaching

profession – represented by the trade unions – plays an equally important role in further developing and

quality-assuring education through representation at different governance levels within the education

sector.

The Norwegian macro model for organising the labour market and the welfare state has a parallel in the

Norwegian micro model in the business world (Hernes 2006, Hernes 2007). The Norwegian micro model

consists of two key components, one of which being the distribution of revenue through negotiations on

pay, regulations and co-determination. The second component, co-operation on development, is at least as

important in order to understand why and how the Norwegian model is working so well. Co-operation

between the parties often takes place in the form of participation by employee representatives in projects

relating to development and change. This form of co-operation on development is one of the things that

make the Nordic labour market especially adaptable, productive and development-driven (Ibid.). In the

education sector much of this co-operation takes place in kindergartens and schools. The UEN's member

survey found that this type of co-operation has become firmly established in the education sector

(Jordfald et al. 2014).

The relevance and influence of the trade union movement at both macro and micro levels are reliant on a

high degree of trade union membership and on a high number of employees being covered by collective

agreements. These requisites ensure the representativeness and thus the legitimacy of the trade unions,

both at a societal level and within a given trade or profession. The education sector is characterised by a

high level of trade union membership and strong involvement by members and employee representatives

(Jordfald et al. 2014). Co-operation between the parties takes place at different governance levels within

the education sector and may manifest itself in the form of co-operation on curriculum development

centrally, budgets at a municipal level, and professional/pedagogic development in schools and

kindergartens. Employee representatives in the workplace are important cornerstones in the Norwegian

labour market model at an enterprise level (Trygstad and Vennesland 2012). In schools and kindergartens

they represent the teaching profession on professional issues and on other matters relating to

employment. It is therefore important to organise the education sector and other parts of the public sector


21

in such a way as to safeguard and further refine the best aspects of this co-operation model. This is

necessary in order to enable the professional associations to serve as strong and representative parties in

the long-term co-operation over development and quality – both centrally and locally.

This co-operation takes place at several different governance levels and is based on good and long-

standing co-operative relationships between parties who acknowledge that they may have conflicting

interests – but common goals. Co-determination is often taken to mean participation in decision-making

processes where managers and employee representatives are, in principle, equal parties. Contribution

means taking part in the implementation phase within the frameworks set by the decision makers.

Participation by employees can overlap with both co-determination and contribution, while influence

refers to the actual effect of the employees' participation (Trygstad and Hagen 2007).

3.3 Governance trends in the public sector Since the 1990s the Norwegian public sector has seen increasing decentralisation and a wave of reforms

often described as New Public Management (NPM), in which management by objectives and market

principles are key elements. Under NPM forms of organisation and management used in the private sector

serve as models for public sector reform. This includes the use of demand-delivery models in the public

sector, outsourcing and breaking up of state-owned enterprises, and so-called customer focus and

freedom of choice aimed at citizens of the welfare state. At a municipal level the development of

intermunicipal co-operation and the introduction of municipal parliamentarianism are examples of

changes leading to new challenges in respect of co-determination and political lobbying.

In the policy briefing Management by objectives – challenges and opportunities (Union of Education

Norway 2013a) we looked in detail at management by objectives, at the correlation with NPM, and at how

such governance is practised in the public sector in general and in the education sector in particular. The

way in which the governance system is designed and practised has a major impact on the Norwegian

model at both micro and macro levels. The debate that ensued after the publication of the 22 July

Commission's report resulted in a common, cross-sector understanding of the governance challenges in

the public sector. There is now broad consensus that the form of governance that has been practised in the

public sector has not been management by objectives, but extensive micromanagement (Dagens

Næringsliv 19.9.12). This practice has undermined the main intention behind MBO – namely the

empowerment of employees at the expense of top-down management (Drucker 1954).

Parallel to the introduction of governance systems from the private sector there has also been a transfer of

management and organisational principles from the private sector to public sector enterprises. This trend

has an impact on the role and function of employee representatives and will in some cases come to

challenge the goal that managers and employee representatives should be able to interact as equal parties

(Hagen and Trygstad 2008). We will now look more closely at what these trends mean for relations

between employers and employees.


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Managerial prerogatives

A cornerstone of the Nordic model are the laws and collective agreements that limit managerial

prerogatives and grant employees the right to co-determination through trade unions. This arrangement

is regulated by the Basic Agreement from 1935. These rights are now being challenged in ever larger parts

of the labour market. There is a trend towards increased managerial prerogatives in several areas. The

government's proposed changes to the Working Environment Act in the summer of 2014 are but one

example. One of the most hotly debated proposals is the government's drive to relax restrictions on the

use of temporary employment contracts and to introduce changes to working time regulations in several

areas. One common denominator of many of the proposals is that power and influence are being shifted

away from employees, employee representatives and trade unions towards employers (Folkestad et al.

2014).

The position taken by the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) in the conflict

with the teachers' organisations in the spring of 2014 can be seen to represent the same view on

managerial prerogatives. The teachers' strike in 2014 ended in a comprehensive victory for the teachers'

arguments in favour of professional autonomy. This conflict between the teachers' organisations and KS

had interesting parallels with what happened in Denmark in 2013, although there are also significant

differences between the two events. Local Government Denmark (LGDK), the sister organisation of

Norway's KS, wanted to make changes to the working time agreement with Danish teachers. Using

lockouts and rejecting the teachers' right to hold genuine negotiations, LGDK and the Danish government

succeeded in quashing the teachers' negotiated settlement on preparation time, after-school work and

teaching load as well as older teachers' right to fewer teaching hours. Analyses of the chain of events

indicate that the aim of the changes was partly to use teachers and pupils to finance the government's

major modernisation reform and partly to eliminate teachers' right to negotiate working hours through

collective agreements and replacing trade union influence with increased managerial prerogatives. In this

perspective the developments in Denmark represent a serious attack on the professional autonomy of the

teaching profession and a weakening of the Nordic model of co-operation (Thording and Bank 2014).

New forms of management

Other governance trends making their mark on the Norwegian labour market include those often

described as American management theories. One thing these theories have in common is that there is no

room for the trade unions. Introducing this thinking in the Norwegian labour market will therefore also

weaken and undermine the Norwegian model at an enterprise level. So-called human resources

management (HRM) often involves managing by objectives at an individual level, cf. Chapter 2. Another

aspect of this style of management is that, contrary to Norwegian tradition, it is the management team that

sets the agenda. Collectively driven HR policies are often also replaced by increased individualisation of

the relationship between manager and employee. In such a system trade unions and professional

organisations are sidelined, and co-determination is replaced by information and informal discussions

that give employees little influence over important decisions. This power shift is in stark contrast to the


23

management practices that have come to characterise the Norwegian model and laid the foundations for

employee-driven development in the public sector (Barsok 2012, Stugu and Nordrik 2012).

The form of management described here is often also accompanied by an increased use of external

consultants to “objectively” set the agenda for enterprise development. As previously mentioned, these

consultants have also made their entrance in the education sector. It can be argued that by hiring external

consultants, the executive management assumes increased power over the perception of reality that gives

rise to changes. In such a perspective the consultants aid in strengthening the management and

weakening the professional influence of employees (Herning 2014).

Active participation by employees, including professional contribution, is key to quality control and

development in the public sector. For that reason the design of the governance system and the choice of

management principles in the education sector are inextricably linked to the quality of education. We

know that in the education sector local co-operation between the parties works better if managers have

good knowledge of the trade unions and their role (Jordfald et al. 2014).

In the new management theories, focus is on the manager. People management and knowledge of

interrelationships are also cited as important, but the issues of employee representation and collective

agreements are rarely covered on management training programmes (Trygstad and Hagen 2007). In 2007

the research foundation Fafo found the Norwegian Defence University College to be the only institution to

have included the Basic Agreement in its syllabus. Nor would it appear that co-operation is given much

attention on the national training programme for headteachers (NIFU and NTNU 2011, 2012, 2013). The

training programme for kindergarten heads is under review, and the last interim report is due in the

autumn of 2014. It is therefore too early to say how co-operation is being addressed on the national

training programme for kindergarten heads.

Various trends linked to development processes are also making their mark in the labour market. Ongoing

development has always taken place in Norwegian kindergartens and schools. In most places these

processes are firmly established and an integral part of the collective profession's pedagogic work. These

are processes in which teachers and leaders play complementary roles and where the teaching profession

as a collective enters into a collaboration with the education authorities at different governance levels. In

Chapter 2 we mentioned lean, a management philosophy that involves developing an organisational

culture for continual improvement in order to make better use of resources and to increase efficiency.

There are numerous tools available for achieving this, including developing best practice. As a method,

lean is highly controversial in the Norwegian labour market. Its sharpest critics believe that “lean is the

main taylorist approach of our time” and that it is an integral element in management theories for human

resources management (Norwegian Civil Service Union at the University of Oslo 2011). The aim of lean is

to eliminate unnecessary resources and activities that do not generate concrete and quantifiable benefits.

At public sector institutions such as the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration and the University

of Oslo, where lean has been introduced, the trade unions have received feedback from employees and

employee representatives saying that the method undermines their right to co-determination and


24

involvement in development and restructuring projects. There is frustration at how standardisation and a

stopwatch mentality has a detrimental effect on service quality (Elgsaas 2012).

Working systematically and with a resolve to raise quality in enterprises is both necessary and desirable –

both in the private and the public sectors, and not least in schools and kindergartens. The unwelcome

effect of the trends we have described here is that development models are being chosen that undermine

rather than build on what has been the hallmark of the Norwegian labour market for many years – namely

employee-driven development. The use of external consultants and management-driven development in

such processes moves power upwards in the organisation and plays a part in weakening professional

quality control and legitimacy surrounding necessary development processes.

3.4 Changing employment structures in the labour market Privatisation and competition along with the use of temping agencies and other short-term labour are

changing the employment structures in the public sector. This trend is increasingly also affecting the

education sector. This rise in insecure and casual employment is an international trend which results

partly from the privatisation and commercialisation of welfare services. The International Trade Union

Confederation (ITUC) describes this as precarious work13 and at its 2014 world congress resolved to

intensify its efforts against this type of work (ITUC 2014). Education International (EI) has published a

report on trends relating to the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in the

education sector after the financial crisis. The study's findings include:

“…working conditions in the education sector are increasingly precarious, with widespread use of

short-term, interim or fixed-term contracts, impacting the quality and continuity of education

services.” (Wintour 2013)

What is often referred to as flexibility, modernisation and simplification of the public sector does in fact

frequently imply a switch towards more insecure and casual employment, something that has an adverse

effect on the security and predictability for each employee and on the stability and long-termism of the co-

operation between the parties in the workplace. As mentioned above, the proposed changes to the

Working Environment Act relating to temporary employment are an example of this trend. In its

consultation response Unio states that:

“Unio takes the view that the proposed changes to the Working Environment Act will lead to weaker

protection and poorer conditions for employees, it will be a hindrance to gender equality, and it will

weaken the existing three-party co-operation in the Norwegian labour market.” (Unio 2014).

13 […]


25

It also concludes that

“if the government were to win support for its proposed changes, it would be a historic turning point

to the disadvantage of employees.” (Ibid.)

The interrelationships between governance trends, the organisation of the labour market and new forms

of employment – and their impact on trade union membership and contractual co-determination – are

becoming increasingly clear (Bergene 2012). One common denominator of insecure and casual

employment is that it has a detrimental impact on trade union membership. These developments

therefore lead to both uncertainty for individuals and a general weakening of the influence of the trade

unions.

Contract workers

We are seeing how the use of contract workers is becoming more prevalent, also in the education sector.

One criterion for co-operation in the workplace is the knowledge that the parties will be interacting and

co-operating for a long time (Hernes 2006). Established, long-term development processes contribute

towards professional and holistic quality improvements in the sector. This co-operation will certainly

become more fragmented if the use of contract workers becomes commonplace. Short-term employment

impels both employers and employees to act differently. This manifests itself in the form of a lack of

training and reduced investment in further and complementary training. We have already seen several

examples of this in relation to the use of temps in the health sector (Bergene 2012). This trend poses a

threat to both quality and equity in the education sector. Taking a long-term perspective on skills

development is key to ensuring good welfare services of a high quality.

We also know that temporary employees are less likely to be organised in trade unions. In workplaces

where there are few or no trade union members it is difficult to implement collective agreements and

elect employee representatives. Successful co-operation relies on well trained employee representatives

at all levels. The co-determination arrangements associated with the Norwegian co-operation model in the

labour market are far less ubiquitous in sectors where trade union membership and the use of collective

agreement are limited (Trygstad og Vennesland 2012).

When using temping agencies a blurred line emerges between who the contracting party is and who the

employer is, something that complicates the relationship between employee and employer because it is

not clear who the relevant parties are when negotiating and co-operating. We are also seeing how co-

determination is made more difficult when employers and employees are not physically present in the

same workplace. This fragmentation could help cause statutory co-determination to become meaningless

(Bergene 2012).

Privatisation and competition

The use of temping agencies is already commonplace amongst private, commercial enterprises, both in

kindergartens and schools. Such enterprises often operate with corporate structures where temping


26

agencies are integrated subsidiaries (For the Welfare State, 2010, 2013). In the wake of the

commercialisation of Swedish schools there is clear evidence that the growth of private, commercial

interests in the education sector leads to increased use of temping agencies, temporary employment and

unskilled labour (Lindgren 2013). This results in lower costs and subsequently better potential for returns

for these commercial interests. In the policy briefing Privatisation and quality in education (Union of

Education Norway 2013b) we showed how this trend has a negative impact on equity and quality in

education. One of the reasons for this is that the changing structures in the education sector have an

impact on the very foundations for the Norwegian model and on the balance of power between the parties

in the labour market.

The experiences from Sweden also show that increased commercialisation in the education sector over

time means it is the large, often international, enterprises that emerge as the biggest players (Swedish

National Agency for Education 2012a). Being an employee representative in a big enterprise is often seen

as a demanding role, because decisions are frequently made in fora where employee representatives are

not present. In other sectors there are also examples of ambiguity in terms of whom the employee

representatives should negotiate with – whether the other party is the local management or the group

management – and which matters should be subject to co-determination. The employees' ability to

influence decisions is restricted if the decision-making structures of laws and collective agreements do not

match the company's decision-making structure (Norwegian Civil Service 2012, Trygstad and Vennesland

2012). The same tendencies can be seen in the Norwegian kindergarten sector. When power and influence

is shifted to boardrooms far away from everyday practice in kindergartens and schools it undermines

good co-operation on development, something which has traditionally been a key feature in the education

sector, and it will limit the profession's ability to make a systematic contribution to the joint effort to

improve education standards. In other words, the structures resulting from privatisation and

commercialisation can in themselves contribute to the power shift that continues to erode the basis for

local co-operation between the parties.

The same applies to competitive tendering. The use of tenders and competition in the public sector

frequently implies a time frame of four to six years before new tendering processes result in potentially

new owners. Competition in the kindergarten sector, for example, has serious consequences for

employees, partly in relation to pension entitlements. We will not go into this in detail here. Our main

concern in this context is to identify the uncertainty and lack of predictability that results from time-

limited tendering processes. Development in kindergartens and schools is a complex process that

commands a long-term perspective on issues such as skills and skills development. Long-termism is

another important building block for exploiting the potential that the co-operation between the parties

offers. Competition therefore involves perspectives and frameworks that ruin the scope for long-term

development. Another facet of the competition situation is that it pays for the competing parties not to

share experiences and knowledge.


27

3.5 Democratic control of welfare services The growing presence of commercial and private enterprises in the education sector also leads to a loss of

democratic control (Union of Education Norway 2013b). One illustrative example of this came in 2010

when the red-green government launched draft legislation on placing a cap on the dividends that can be

paid by commercial kindergartens. Commercial kindergarten owners objected and threatened to close

down kindergartens if the bill was passed. In the end the bill was amended, and the entire process just

goes to show how market share gives power and influence over education policy (Herning 2013). Similar

situations could occur in municipalities where commercial enterprises with a large share of the

kindergarten or healthcare markets, for instance, are effectively given a veto when local lawmakers draw

up policies for the sector. One example of this occurred in Bergen in the autumn of 2014. The private,

commercial kindergarten chain Kidsa is by far the biggest operator in Bergen in the sector. In the last two

years it has made profits of NOK 53 million and has been deemed to be a good working partner for the city

council. Like many other private kindergartens, Kidsa runs a cheaper pension scheme than do public

sector kindergartens, yet it has been given the same level of funding as if it operated a public sector

pension scheme. Disagreement arose, however, when the city council decided to cut grants for private

kindergartens. Kidsa responded by announcing that it will no longer hold two intakes a year (Bergens

Tidende 2014, ABC nyheter 2014). This case highlights how local politicians, too, lose their political

latitude and democratic control when private providers gain influence over important policy areas.

Influence exercised by trade unions and other parties requires open democratic processes and genuine

political latitude. The power shift resulting from the privatisation of the public sector displaces both

politicians and practitioners. The consequence is a democratic deficit and professional decline. Along with

the trends on the governance of the public sector and new structures in the labour market described

above, this contributes to a power shift that weakens the co-operation on development in the labour

market and in wider society. The goal should be to identify an appropriate distribution of power and

influence between politicians and practitioners that ensures both necessary political control and

professional autonomy.


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Chapter 4 Alternatives to current governance practices

4.1 The consequences of power shifts in the education sector In this policy briefing we have highlighted how different trends in society encroach on working practices

and change the way in which trade unions can exercise influence over key areas of the labour market.

Such trends can be found across different sectors and in different countries. The adopted governance

models for the public sector in general and the education sector in particular are the result of political

decision-making. In a governance perspective it is therefore pertinent to ask questions about how power,

influence and responsibility should be distributed. Which roles should practitioners, politicians,

employers and representatives of various private interests play? Which values do we want to embrace in

the development of the education system as a social institution?

Earlier in this briefing we addressed the autonomy and collective influence of the profession in two

separate chapters while seeking to demonstrate how many of the same trends have consequences for both

these dimensions. The governance trends currently dominating the education sector have an impact both

on the professional autonomy of school and kindergarten teachers and on the Norwegian co-operation

model in the labour market, and subsequently also on the collective influence of the teaching profession.

For that reason the solutions offered by the UEN must integrate both the perspectives of the profession

and the traditional perspectives of the trade unions. It is the Norwegian model that lays the foundations

for the collective influence of the profession, which in turn is a prerequisite for professional autonomy.

4.2 Developing a governance system that ensures equity and quality On the basis of the arguments set out above, we should like to outline three requirements that must form

the basis of any alternatives to current governance practices.

Equitable education Serving as both a trade union and a professional association, the UEN is working to ensure good and

equitable education for all. This manifests itself in the broad social mandate granted to kindergartens and

schools and in the ethical platform of the teaching profession. These values and principles are thus

cornerstones of the UEN's objectives and guiding principles for identifying alternatives to the existing

trends.

Democratic control The governance of the education sector at a superior level must be democratic. This is necessary in order

to ensure that practices in kindergartens and schools are in line with the social mandate of these

institutions. Education in Norway is subject to politically determined objectives. It is in everyone's interest

that elected politicians retain control over education in such a way that key education policy goals such as


29

equity and quality in education can be realised. The Norwegian three-party co-operation model also relies

on the existence of a democratic, political entity with actual power and influence to act as a meaningful co-

operation partner – both for employers and employees.

Influence of the profession When alternatives to current practices are being drawn up, it is also essential that steps are taken to

ensure that the influence of the profession at all levels of the education sector is maintained. This is

necessary in order to develop a governance system that safeguards each individual teacher's professional

autonomy. The collective influence of the profession is protected by employee representatives at all levels.

In this chapter we will be reflecting on some aspects that may be relevant to the ongoing process of

developing alternative governance practices. The three requirements equitable education, democratic

control and influence of the profession form the basis for our argument.

Professional ethics and the professional learning community

School and kindergarten teachers, kindergarten heads and leaders in the education sector are obliged to

act in the interest of the values and principles of the teaching profession as expressed in the teaching

profession's ethical platform. The platform asserts that the loyalty of the profession lies with the children

and pupils with a view to bringing out the best in them. The profession does not compromise on the values

embedded in its social mandate, in its skills and expertise or in its ethical platform. This also means that

practitioners must take responsibility for raising the alarm when framework conditions result in

professionally and ethically unacceptable situations (Lærerprofesjonens etiske plattform 2012). The

platform thus gives practitioners a common base and an obligation to put their foot down when

governance systems, tools, measurements and reporting routines are at odds with the best interests of the

children. In the case of Sandefjord, the teachers' objections against being forced to implement

professionally and ethically unacceptable evaluation and reporting procedures could be justified on the

basis of the profession's ethical platform. At the same time it is clear that it requires courage to speak up

when there is strong pressure to toe the management line. When the entire profession is committed to the

same values and principles, it paves the way for common ethical reflections leading to positions that do

not leave individual teachers to themselves, instead uniting the profession in standing up for their

adopted values and principles. Alternative governance systems must help ensure that each teacher or

leader's professional practice is not individualised and separated from those of their peers.

The teaching profession's ethical platform can also be used as a stepping stone for developing alternative

governance models that concur with the profession's values, both professionally and ethically. We could

mention core values such as human dignity and human rights, professional integrity, respect, equality and

the protection of privacy. A value-based governance system and management model require knowledge of

the profession and of the rationality that characterise its members along with insight into the profession's

core values (Glomseth 2014). UEN president Ragnhild Lied puts it like this:


30

“It is the professional duty of each school and kindergarten teacher to continue to seek answers to how

the expectations laid down in laws and curricula can be followed up on a daily basis. These

expectations must be interpreted, the situation in question must be interpreted, and the teacher must

decide which steps to take. This is how easy, and how difficult, the teacher's role is. This is professional

judgement. This is what the government delegates to teachers. And this is what school leaders must

qualify and support their teachers to do. It requires a close, ambitious and critical dialogue between

leaders and teachers. What we do not need is for this type of trustful professional dialogue to be

replaced by governance.” (Utdanning 2014).

Good teaching practices and good kindergartens arise from the collective of teachers. Both teachers and

leaders are committed to the same core principles, including the goals and intentions embodied in laws

and curricula and other key governance documents derived from these. The justification for the

professional dialogue can be found in these sources. A good leader will call for and be a challenger in such

a dialogue, but he or she will also facilitate and stimulate in order that a professional dialogue can take

place. This runs counter to a governance line where players outside the educational institutions set out to

manage in detail how the teaching should be carried out, for example, before following up with a rigid

control regime.

In a joint statement, the OECD and Education International (EI) emphasised that the teachers' role is key

to achieving change in the education system and that strong trade unions play a decisive role in the

development of education policy (Schleicher og Leeuwen 2014). One prerequisite for this professional

dialogue is that kindergarten heads and school headteachers possess the professional and pedagogic

expertise needed to enable them to take part in the discussions with teachers and to exercise pedagogic

leadership. Imsen (2014) concludes that by adopting a model from the world of business, the politicians

have introduced a system under which the requirements for pedagogic qualifications amongst school

leaders have been eroded over time and which is built on the belief that it is leaders who generate results

(Ibid.) Headteachers are no longer required to hold a teaching qualification; they only need to meet

criteria for pedagogic expertise and necessary management skills. Training programmes for headteachers

cannot compensate for a lack of teaching experience. Training for both headteachers and kindergarten

heads must also address the issue of co-operation with other parties if these leaders are to engage in

constructive co-operation locally.

Exercising professionally competent leadership in a professional learning community also requires

proximity in time and space. When, for example, local authorities choose to introduce organisational

models where kindergarten heads are physically separated from the kindergarten they are tasked with

managing, their ability to manage and take part in the professional learning community is significantly

weakened. In recent years a growing number of local authorities have reorganised their kindergartens

into units comprising multiple kindergartens with a joint head of department (Greve et al. 2014).

Research has shown that kindergarten heads, and then particularly heads of departments, have become

less accessible in recent years, which means more of the administrative management falls to the senior


31

teachers (Hauge 2001, Kildahl 2004). In the Alna district in Oslo a survey was carried out to identify the

most time-consuming processes after the reorganisation into units. The survey found that the content of

meetings had moved away from professional issues, i.e. planning and assessment, towards the

reorganising of personnel and providing information (Nicolaisen et al. 2012). This form of organisation

thus undermines the scope for professional management of a professional learning community, while the

frameworks for local co-operation between the parties are weakened.

Teachers are more than just members of the professional learning community made up of the teachers

and leaders in an institution. The collective voice of the profession is united in a common ethical platform

but also in the form of a common policy approach via the trade unions. Strong professional learning

communities can work together to identify good solutions and exercise collective influence – in individual

schools and kindergartens, within municipalities and counties, and at a national level.

Management by objectives and professional contribution

The prevailing governance philosophy in the public sector is often described as management by objectives

(MBO). This is entrenched in the financial regulations as a fundamental governance principle at both

government and municipal levels (Ministry of Finance 1996, 2010). The regulations state that all

enterprises must set goals and performance targets within the limits of their available resources and the

conditions stipulated by the superior authority (Ibid.) However, the existing governance regime is not fit

for purpose. MBO in the education sector has taken on a form which in practice goes against the intention

behind MBO as a governance instrument in many ways (Union of Education Norway 2013a). While MBO is

intended to promote employee autonomy, set the course for improvements and ensure contribution from

employees (Drucker 1955), the model as practised today has led to quite different outcomes. As

mentioned previously, strengthening teachers' autonomy as practitioners was one of the intentions

behind the Knowledge Promotion reform. However, the evaluation of the reform discovered that teachers

are instead being overruled by the hierarchy (Aasen 2012). In brief, we can link current governance

practices to increased bureaucracy, control before development, constantly changing goals,

micromanagement instead of professional autonomy, and a lack of contribution from the profession

(Union of Education Norway 2013a. De Bruijn (2009) states that the nature of professional, complex

services means that MBO becomes far more challenging in the public sector than in the traditional

production of goods. It is more difficult to measure results in organisations associated with more

intangible values. One reason for this is that the values in themselves can be mutually contradictory,

which means some of the values are easily ignored (only values that can be easily measured are being

measured). The measurements will therefore not provide an accurate picture of professional

performance14.

14 Furthermore, it becomes more difficult to measure outcomes when the service is provided in partnership with others – because the outcomes therefore also depend on the efforts of others – and when the outcomes are affected by external factors. In the case of the education sector we can but mention that social background plays a major part in most targets. We can also link this to the fact that measuring results is based on the idea that an organisation is autonomous in respect of the outcomes it achieves. It is more difficult to measure outcomes when the provision of


32

The debate over governance in the public sector after the 22 July Commission's report generated

increased awareness of these governance challenges. This is illustrated by the comments on the report

from the Norwegian Labour Party, the Socialist Left and the Centre Party:

“… In hindsight we can see how the targets have been too many and too detailed, and that MBO as a

principle has been too dominant in deciding how different agencies should be run. In practice, MBO

has just as often been an obstacle to allowing good and qualified decisions to be made by those with

the best knowledge of the field and to allowing agencies to learn from experiences and developing

better services. Current and future governments should make it their overriding goal to ensure that

the targets that are set for public agencies are few in number, that they are qualitative, and that

employees are involved in drawing up the targets within the frameworks of political guidance and

annual budgets (Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs 2013)

This quote hints at a different version of MBO where allowances are made for far greater contribution

from the professions. This was also part of the message given in Unio's consultation response in

connection with the so-called police analysis. The response also cited co-determination by employees and

their organisations along with a balance between control and trust as a means of giving the professions

space to make professional and ethical judgements (Unio 2013). This way the further development of

MBO can form part of the solution to the governance challenges in the public sector in general and the

education sector in particular, and it can create a framework for co-operation between the parties over

equality, quality and profession-based development.

From a professional perspective, MBO is probably the governance model that will give the profession the

greatest professional influence compared with other governance alternatives such as political

micromanagement, market-driven management or direct management by government agencies. There are

three key MBO components in particular that must be developed further in order to unlock this potential.

Firstly, targets must be defined at a superior level and with the active input of employees. Secondly, co-

determination and contribution by employees and their organisations must be an integrated part of both

design and practice when it comes to governance. This will give legitimacy to the governance model and

ensure the quality and relevance of the governance documentation that is collected. The third and last

component concerns performance evaluation. In order for the governance system to promote quality in

education, performance evaluations and evaluations for improving pedagogic practice must be applied

more carefully. A national quality assessment system (NKVS) has been developed for schools. Work is also

underway to develop a similar system for kindergartens. Research communities that have evaluated NKVS

have concluded that the current system primarily facilitates control routines, while it is less

accommodating in respect of the scope for learning that the system should also contain (Allerup et al.

services is reliant on others and does not take place in isolation. Scoring highly on a given performance indicator for an organisation can come at the expense of the targets set for a different organisation or unit. Together this can be suboptimal in relation to joint, overarching targets. Finally we should mention the relationship between performance measurement and quality. De Bruijn asks whether performance measurement paints an accurate picture of the quality of the service, and if there is inconsistency between measurements and quality, we run the risk of drawing more attention to quantity than to quality (Ibid.)


33

2009, Union of Education Norway 2011). The researchers point out that we should consider whether

there are other elements that could help encourage local opinion on the issue of a stronger assessment

culture. Roald (2010) states that an assessment culture must be built from the bottom up. This highlights

the role of the professional learning community in developing an alternative governance practice.

Analysing results requires professional insight, as does identifying measures to follow up on the

performance evaluations. The profession plays a key part in this respect. As previously mentioned, MBO

should promote autonomy in the workplace at the expense of control and micromanagement by others.

Development and improvement should be the goals for MBO. We can relate this to the formative and

summative functions of evaluation, whereby the former is linked to improvement and the latter to control.

An evaluation designed to monitor the use of resources and ascertain whether the desired outcomes are

achieved will have a highly prominent controlling aspect to it. It is difficult to combine control with

development. Those who are subjected to control in relation to outcomes and use of resources will

obviously want to present themselves in the best possible light. There is no incentive to put your

weaknesses on display on such an occasion. When the objective is learning and development, it is the very

aspect that we wish to improve that must be highlighted. The publication of results with subsequent

rankings does not serve the development objective. Many have pointed out that the binary function

whereby tests and surveys are developed and used as political governance tools and tools for pedagogic

development in individual schools does not work (Allerup et al. 2009, Seland et al. 2013, Sørreime 2013).

A distinction must be made between these tools. The teaching profession must be involved in this process.

In order to avoid an infinite number of targets and checks on outcomes at a superior level, it is in no way

necessary to follow up all objectives with targets, milestones and indicators. For some parts of an

enterprise it may be sufficient to carry out ongoing monitoring using selected indicators. This could

perhaps involve a loose connection between indicators and overarching targets. The KOSTRA database is

one example of this. It contains statistics not directly linked to targets. Such indicators will in many cases

provide adequate governance information for higher-ranking levels. MBO should primarily be used to

improve and further develop pedagogic practice and must therefore be based on the experiences and

expertise held by the individual kindergarten or school. It must also allow for the collection and use of

qualitative information. In the education sector the teachers' qualitative, professional judgement will in

many cases provide the most relevant governance information. It is within such a system – based on input

from the profession – that MBO can serve a purpose and gain legitimacy amongst both the education

authorities and the profession.

Trust and quality

The Norwegian social model is built on high participation rates and a good and trustful relationship

between the parties in the labour market. Strong social capital15 is in other words one of the

characteristics of the Norwegian model. It is this very social capital that enables valuable co-operation 15 One common feature of the main definitions of the term social capital is that they all describe trust between people, social networks and standards for reciprocity and co-operation. Social capital is a resource allowing the combination of network and trust to result in collective action.


34

between the parties to take place (Hernes 2007). There is a strong correlation between trust16, coherence

and solidarity in society. If trust is eroded, it takes a great deal to rebuild it. In the labour market there are

clear links between trust, social capital and productivity. Trust makes co-operation and transfer of

information easier, it cuts the cost of transactions, it smooths decision-making processes, and it reduces

the need for costly control mechanisms. Control systems are needed where there is a lack of trust in the

work of others. These systems have a tendency to be costly in terms of effort, time and money (Rødvei

2008, Grimen 2009). A high degree of trust will therefore help to better utilise the resources in a

governance system. For that reason the balance between trust and control when designing and practising

governance systems should be improved. This will lead to both better quality and higher productivity.

Being aware of these links is also important in terms of resolving the crisis of confidence that was

uncovered during the teachers' strike in 2014. Increased professional autonomy and a governance system

based increasingly on trust will cut bureaucracy and free up time for the core duties of the profession. The

reduced need for costly control systems will in turn contribute to increased productivity in the public

sector. In light of this it is pertinent to point out that productivity in the public sector cannot be viewed

independently of the social mandate of the sector, which includes equity and quality.

The government has announced that it wants to reduce micromanagement and place more trust in leaders

in the state sector. Experiences from Copenhagen show that trust-based management is possible. In the

Danish capital the political leader Ninna Thomsen (SF) (mayor of health and care) has taken the initiative

to do away with widespread red tape and extensive standardisation of home help services. She found that

the cost of management and control exceeded the savings that had been the original objective, and that it

undermined the professionalism of workers in the sector. In a chronicle in the Danish newspaper Politiken

she writes:

Denmark is proclaimed to be the most trusting country in the world. But the trust we have in each

other is not being converted into an intrinsic value in the way we organise the workplace. Why not end

bureaucracy and double controls and generate renewed meaning and motivation amongst public

sector workers, thereby improving the quality of the services we provide to the public? (…) The trust

reform in Copenhagen has paved the way for a form of democratisation, whereby employees once

again have influence over their working life and where trust in their profession is key. (Thomsen et al.

2013).

Teachers have a unique ability to evaluate quality in schools and kindergartens. This skill should be better

utilised, both when designing governance systems and when interpreting governance information – not

least when evaluating what constitutes relevant governance information. In many cases the qualitative

assessment by a practitioner will contain more useful information than that which can be gleaned from

16 The link between education and trust is also a long established empirical fact (Putnam 2000, Wollebæk og Segaard 2011). Kindergartens and schools are important community arenas in society. Education is therefore key when it comes to revitalising and renewing our fundamental value and trust structures (Kristiansen 2012), and it lays the foundations for social capital and trust in the labour market.


35

quantifiable surveys and measurements. Politicians and administrators have a legitimate need for

relevant governance information, but they usually do not have the required qualifications to be able to

assess the quality of professional work. This must be taken into account if we are to develop a governance

system that does not tie up unnecessary resources in bureaucracy and which both has legitimacy amongst

the profession and serves as a political governance tool. As mentioned previously, it is necessary to

distinguish between development and control in the governance system.

Trust and quality are in other words closely linked to social capital and productivity. It is trustful, long-

term co-operation between the parties in the workplace that creates good and equitable education.

The profession and co-operation between the parties

The profession's influence is realised through co-operation between the parties at different levels of the

governance system. This co-operation must therefore be strengthened in order to resolve the governance

challenges in the education sector. UEN employee representatives will thus play a crucial role in ensuring

professional autonomy when the governance system is being designed. The UEN member survey from

2013 concluded that co-operation between the parties is well established. However, it also found that

employee representatives are more frequently involved in decision-making processes relating to the

workplace and its members than in decision-making processes concerning pedagogic issues (Jordfald et al.

2014).

Co-determination is a core principle of the Basic Agreement. Making more active use of the right to co-

determination and the general co-operation between the parties to make professional arguments – both

centrally and locally – will reinforce the frameworks for professional and ethical practice in the

workplace. In individual municipalities, for example, it would be relevant to involve the expertise of the

profession in different phases of a decision-making process. Co-determination can be exercised in respect

of how the decision-making process is organised, which objectives should be applied to the decisions

being made, and in the actual decision-making process. It is essential that the profession contributes with

arguments and exercises influence in all these phases in order to ensure a policy that helps promote

quality in education. Professional and ethical considerations should form the basis for all decisions being

made, and the decision makers should therefore be able to perceive the contribution of the profession to

be of value. The teachers' strike in 2014 is one of several examples of the power of professional

argumentation.

Thanks to well trained employee representatives at all levels, the UEN is in a unique position to promote

knowledge-based arguments. Decentralisation in the education system reinforces the need and

opportunities for making use of this autonomy. Many decisions on education policy are currently being

taken by municipal and county councils as well as in individual schools and kindergartens. Knowledge of

management and governance systems that underpin the Norwegian model is crucial if we are to exploit

the potential offered by the co-operation between the parties in the education sector. It is therefore

necessary for leadership training programmes at all levels in the education sector to teach the value and

potential of this co-operation.


36

4.3 Final reflections The public debate on governance has shown that the governance challenges we are experiencing in the

education sector have parallels across the public sector. Politicians and professional communities

acknowledge the weaknesses in the governance system, and they have expressed a desire to develop

alternative governance practices.

As a representative of the profession, the UEN can play a key role in developing a governance system that

supports the broad social mandate of education. The education sector is noted for its long established co-

operation between the parties and for its competent and knowledgeable practitioners. The sector is

therefore well placed to step up and take the lead in developing an alternative governance model in the

public sector. This is a process that must be conducted both centrally and locally and in broad alliances

inside and outside the trade union movement.


37

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