[G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.]

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND CONSING), respondents.

Leo B. Diocos for petitioner.

Antonio Ramas-Uypitching for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY OMISSION OR

MISTAKE IN DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF DECISION; MAY BE CLARIFIED BY THIS

COURT BY AMENDMENT EVEN AFTER JUDGMENT BECOME FINAL. — The

dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it

carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal

property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.

Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to

prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical

defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is

an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of

the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even

after the judgment has become final. In doing so, the Court may resort to

the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the

conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision.

2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS; DISSOLUTION

THEREOF BY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES;

GROUNDS. — Art. 178(3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article

128 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may

petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment

by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to

comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if

said spouse does not leave the other spouse.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT, EXPLAINED. —

Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent

never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and

without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although

able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties

and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly

expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is

deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal

dwelling without any intention of returning."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT CAUSE PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already

rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home

in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she

was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention

of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the

final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the

private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The

physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private

respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute

abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal

property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the

Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be

considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: . . . (6) That at

the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least

one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

5. ID.; FAMILY CODE; MADE APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The

amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case

before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we

held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 231: The greater weight of

authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a

judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law

prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law

prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will

therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at the time it was originally

rendered where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change in the

law which renders such judgment erroneous at the time the case was finally

disposed of on appeal.

6. ID.; ID.; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION THEREOF BY JUDICIAL

SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES; DIVISION BETWEEN SPOUSES. — The order of

judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of

both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed

their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided between

him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during

coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private

respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties

properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered

in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J p:

The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with

three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the

herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter,

Monina Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not

parties to this case.

In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of

conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier

action for support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the

Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.

The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983,

Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive

portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations, this

court hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to

Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as

the lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a

monthly support of P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or

before the 5th day of every month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount

of P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros

Oriental where she may live separately from the defendant being entitled

under the law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse and to

pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in-arrears

and to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's

fees. prcd

As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for

support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal

property.

Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling

of the trial court in the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial

separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action

and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article

178 of the Civil Code.

When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to

this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review on

certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17,

1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and

Prima and the obligation of the former to support her and her daughter.

This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal

property.

It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the

judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under

Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was

decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.

The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can no

longer be reviewed at this time because it has long since become final and

executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil Case

No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The petitioner

should have called the attention of the trial court to the omission so that

the proper rectification could be made on time. Not having done so, she is

now concluded by the said decision, which can no longer be corrected at

this late hour.

We deal first with the second ground.

While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the

dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues

that a disposition of that case was nonetheless made in the penultimate

paragraph of the decision reading as follows:

It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are

considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to

separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code,

which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.

The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not

feel it was necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order

embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the

respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding

that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come to

this Court for relief. Cdpr

The petitioner has a point.

The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as

it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal

property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.

The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's

counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for the rectification

of the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the decision could

have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have

avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.

Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to

prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical

defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is

an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of

the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even

after the judgment has become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may resort to

the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the

conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3

The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial

separation of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the private

respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the

petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were

registered in the name of an apparent dummy.

There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the

decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such findings and so

should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent

court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing

Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance.

In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings, we

hereby make such modification.

And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the

separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of

abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the

petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where

she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held

that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under

Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of

abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only

remedy available to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of

the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property

would be terminated.

The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted

Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement

between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live

with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to

visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even

if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she

returned to him at Dumaguete City and, he refused to accept her.

The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:

ARTICLE 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without

judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at

least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or

administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of

property.

The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the

Family Code, which states:

ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to

comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may

petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for

authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property,

subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. llcd

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to

marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left

the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who

has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed

within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts

shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the

conjugal dwelling.

Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial

separation on either of these grounds:

1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and

2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the

family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other

spouse.

Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent

never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and

without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although

able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,

duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is

clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a

spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the

conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already

rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home

in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she

was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention

of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1988 until the

final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the

private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The

physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private

respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute

abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal

property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by

Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply

with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from

refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete

City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring

many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and

their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for

support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions,

significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent

has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his

obligations to his wife as a dutiful husband.

Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family

Code, providing as follows:

ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for

judicial separation of property:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in

fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case

before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we

held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals: 7

The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate

court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question

according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not

according to the. law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed

judgment. The court will therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at

the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has been an

intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at

the time the case was finally disposed of on appeal.

The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the

finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent

is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided

between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired

during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private

respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties

properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered

in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital

flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an

accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his

promise to her of his eternal love and care. LLpr

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the

respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor

of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the

petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between

them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial

court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said

conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered

in the name of other persons.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.]

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.,

Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region,

Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent. cdasia

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL CODE; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; WHEN

SANCTITY THEREOF VIOLATED; EFFECT IN CASE AT BAR. — Contrary to his

protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after

his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal

home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously

and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by

the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and

Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus

was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20,

1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly

lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still

valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and

Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven

years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent

spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of

succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own

allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that

time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla

Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to

presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all

purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan

in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and

subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the

inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According

to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized

world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,

an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing

matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By

committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust

reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals

and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.

Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).

2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATION; CONSTRUED; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE

AT BAR. — An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's three

illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these

children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry

therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus

and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and

1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla,

which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,

despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be

legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they

were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and

his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case

at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as

amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only natural children can be

legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of

the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to

marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and

cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42

Phil. 855). The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on

August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus: Art. 177.

Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the

time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any

impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The reasons for this limitation are given

as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would

be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There

will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too

violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will

destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if

the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code,

p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).

4. LEGAL ETHICS; NOTARY PUBLIC; COMPENSATION; RULE; WHEN

VIOLATED; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent himself admitted that he prepared

and notarized the documents wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he

was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to

the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this

defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Sec. 252.

Compensation of Notaries Public — No fee, compensation, or reward of any

sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be

collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such

money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally.

Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the

fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds.

(Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)

Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by

him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law

raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use. cdlex

5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the charge that respondent

prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for

which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein,

respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer any

evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and

convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves

no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the

testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People

v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to

adhere to, and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct, to wit: Canon 2 — A judge should avoid impropriety and

the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM p:

"We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found

to be patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or

compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted

out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augeun stable." 1

Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates

chosen for their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning. And

so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and

out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening off

the misfits, considering the great number of judges and justices in the

country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The

effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the

strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity of

our courts of justice.

The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8,

1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of

respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with

"gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a

judge."

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of

gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent

had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan

during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.

Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly

shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May

23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the

fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita

Banzuela.

Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the

marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a

marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.

cda

Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier,

respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran

vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged

therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora

Pillarion with whom he had a son.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that

respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate

children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:

Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970

Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971

Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975

by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration

was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth

and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally

registered as legitimate.

The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:

(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice

of law by the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he

charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary

Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private

practice of law, prejudice public interest.

Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these

allegations:

a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that

respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex

"C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio

Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees

(par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);

b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that

he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and

notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano,

Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November

12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex

"D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);

c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the

respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that said respondent

received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for preparation and

notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata

Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10 (a) a-c Complaint, p. 9

records);

d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed

by the respondent himself showing that he received from Nelly Baradas the

sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to

the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9

records);

e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991, issued by

the respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of

P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint

Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e

Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).

(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by

an affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide,

stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by

respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which

respondent Judge received.

(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out

of which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio

Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant

therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused

perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J",

respectively.)

Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the

foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a

dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public

had allegedly lost confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as is

evident to see that the person occupying the position of a judge lacks the

morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office.

Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his

cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor

immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first

wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since

then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent

has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had

already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married

Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.

Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of

the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts:

"After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the

absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those

of succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)

"After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the

absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for

those of succession." (Art. 390, Civil Code.)

The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for

the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former

spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in

point.

He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then

"single," but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false

misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to

choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose

the word "single," it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and

Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela

was honestly divulged.

On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes

"4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to

the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such,

respondent may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having

charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received by him

were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been

receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover

expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification

(Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government

of Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the

yearly appropriations.

Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct which states:

"A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to

improve . . . the administration of justice."

Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was

inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his

residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or

office was located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan

and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish and the squid should have

become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent submitted as Annex

"8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who declared:

xxx xxx xxx

"3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C.

Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home in the afternoon and we

in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the

usual ways of the Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel;

4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also

together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and he

proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;

5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing

anything except his 'Hand Bag' which he used to carry in going to the

office;" (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an

Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged

the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The

complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the

complainant in the rape case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support

of the charge of corruption against respondent.

Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and

resentment because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M.

No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct."

The Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a

repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with. Respondent claims that the

complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of

insubordination in the following manner:

1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand

them over to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders;

2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor

requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual report;

3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as

Clerk of Court;

4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court.

On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein

administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the

Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and

recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2)

counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for

his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case

pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.

In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge

Angeles found that:

ON GROSS IMMORALITY:

In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of

the records), respondent did not hide the fact that he was married to

Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with

Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly

paragraph 4 thereof which reads:

"4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T

. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their family home sometime in 1965

in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her

whereabouts is not known."

It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83(2) of the Civil Code

which, although bigamous, remains valid until automatically terminated by

the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42,

Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his

first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not

return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as

husband and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage,

respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and scandalous

manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly

declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be considered cleansed by

their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on

contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital

cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Code was

intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have

been living in a state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino,

Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code,

1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as

"single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact, specially to the

solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the

aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.

ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:

Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely:

Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom

were born before their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the

solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23,

1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports the marriage contract of

respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having shown such fact.

Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27,

1993, consisting of three pages, was submitted by the complainant for the

purpose of proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his

three separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding

the late registration of birth of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M

dated May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child

Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in

reference to the late registration of birth of his second child Venus B.

Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight as the

reasons for the delayed registration of their births, without however

presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying respondent the

opportunity to cross examine her. Her affidavit is not among those brought

out in the pre-hearing conference, and was not discussed during the hearing

itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated. The

supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to

the births of respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit shows,

negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part to register their birth on

time. Not having been presented for respondent to confront her, or an

opportunity to do so, Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the

charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People vs.

Villeza, 127 SCRA 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is

presented.

ON CORRUPTION:

1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:

Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected

fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely: (1)

affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila

Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of

Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the

correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age

of Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts

therein stated as having been collected by him from them (please see Pre-

Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking

justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his

comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications of Manukan

Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public

in Manukan town, respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to

prepare and ligalize (sic) documents."

He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of

documents were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and materials

of his Office," explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the

appropriations of the local government which are inadequate. On page 120

of the records, his Annex 6 shows a shortage in his appropriations for

supplies. And supplies from the Supreme Court can only be obtained if

secured personally but has to assume the expenses for transportation,

freight and handling.

Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not

prohibit him from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he has received were

much lower than the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of

the records, to prove it.

Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct which provides that a judge may, with due regard to official duties,

engaged in activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent

claims that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of

his office covering a floor area of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang

Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per

certification shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).

In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of Municipal

Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the

capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M.

No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:

"MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no

lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio

perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided

that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and

turned-over to the municipal treasurer (Lapeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter

No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in

the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public

in such municipality or circuit." LLpr

Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in

Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed,

respondent Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did

not, however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge

for the account of the Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer

all notarial fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his

assertion that the notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy

supplies and materials for his office, absent any accounting.

2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:

Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records,

respondent, however, denied the imputation therein contained by affiant

Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a

certain Edna Siton who had a case with respondent's court as complainant

in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling the affiant himself, complainant

presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was

squid and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero

Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the Court

staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended

for Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they afterwards

partook of it without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus."

(Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her

witness, complainant is bound by her testimony. This particular charge is,

therefore, not proved.

3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:

Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial

Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted: one by Arcelita Salvador,

complainant in an attempted rape case who was categorical in her

declaration that respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola,

brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00 after the Judge

prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss which he made

her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records). Benito Sagario who was present executed

another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records,

confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the

imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting them or

presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could have demanded

that the affiants, including the persons they mentioned were present in the

transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola,

Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Caluña be required to appear for

his confrontation, but respondent chose not, contended himself only with

the explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant Abadilla and

her husband, a major in the military who is an active member of the Iglesia

Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and

unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn other than holding, as

the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. Evidently,

Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he

is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to

insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays

his insistence of innocence.

On Respondent's Counterclaim:

It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that

the records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of

the records, were not in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely

O. Inot, respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the

same were already being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the

memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court

was not, therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.

Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in

1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to respondent's

claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by

sheer impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports upon which

the annual report shall be based, were not prepared by her, not because of

her refusal to do so which is among those included in her job description,

but because the Judge himself took the work from her for no other reason

than to establish the false impression that the complainant is disobedient to

the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.

By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and

respondent are not in talking terms. They are hostile to each other.

Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him

whenever they meet each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing

it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking out her tongue

to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot conclude as

sufficiently established even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is

far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is understandable

because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her

(Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).

The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on

Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of Court under a

previous Judge of the same Court for quite long without any complaint

having been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show

that respondent tried to build up a situation of undesirability against his

Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out from her position in his Court.

Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:

The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the

complaint on the basis of which respondent filed his comments, other

matters not therein covered which complainant brought out by way of

presenting documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not

subject of this report and recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION:

The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been

proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to sustain a

pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as

notary public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of

desistance of a case in his Court. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and

false imputation against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.

WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a

period of three months is recommended.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross

immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said

Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B.

Tabiliran.

Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla

Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned

him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had

been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as

1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely

Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on

July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born

on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla

Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to

his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the

Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an

absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still

lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except

for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's

own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From

that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla

Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to

presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all

purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan

in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabilaran was still valid and

subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the

inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According

to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized

world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,

an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing

matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).

By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust

reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals

and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.

Tiongson , 229 SCRA 690). LLjur

As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We

are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts

for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of

the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83

(2) of the Civil Code.

With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge

has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates

(Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with

Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate

issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to

note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed

Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and

prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a

lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent

marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any

way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was

an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.

Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of

the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:

ARTICLE 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born

outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the

former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are

natural.

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of

adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code

(Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated

the above-mentioned provision thus:

ARTICLE 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of

parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not

disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional

rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores

change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous

children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years

after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give

refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.

It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita

disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears

that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent

entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (A.C. No. 906) which was decided by this

Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of

his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly

begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure

of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was

reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live

Separately from Bed," with a stipulation that they allow each of the other

spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the

objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where

respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald

Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues.

Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that

Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are

erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the

Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two

counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees

in preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.

Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the

documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial

fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees

therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of

Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and

illegal acts.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:

SECTION 252. Compensation of Notaries Public. — No fee, compensation,

or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by

law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a notary

public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them

personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their

services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government

funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p.

202.) LLcd

Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by

him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law

raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.

With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of

Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the

amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely

denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such

denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a

negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and

cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible

witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA

166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this

remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:

Canon 2

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all

activities.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of

gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently,

orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it

cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,

and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all

without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

SO ORDERED. Llibris

[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]

LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J p:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has

unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception

between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the

depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in

the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's

capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. CTEaDc

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2

of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The

Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)

and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful

consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years

old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first

meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila

City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de

Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of

their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)

months later.

On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to

respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on

Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He

asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was

celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity,

petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the

people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and

other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an

illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the

adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's

parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their

marriage. 11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,

attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.

Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a

degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with

Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her

family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the

same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine

Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14

but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said

hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and

under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from

Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the

commercial industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that

respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when

she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that

Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when

he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she

altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She

bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired

it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary

items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.

20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of

calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no

longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He

tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he

finally left her for good in November 1991. 21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede

(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical

psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner

was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person.

On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant

lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic

relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further

asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It

reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to

suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They

concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically

incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her

marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She

asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated

stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,

thus: ASHaDT

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because

she was afraid of losing her husband. 25

(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her

because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her back and

ogling her from head to foot. 26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been

teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive

producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with

McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson,

and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording

artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she

reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a

luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel

on 8 December 1979. 28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by

her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the

Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos

was employed with Saniwares. 29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but

averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was

the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her

husband's whereabouts. 30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported

almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child

prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were

mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the

evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity

on her part. 32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a

psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.

Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33

together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-

Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude

that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the

essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross

neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are

signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited

from respondent. 34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation

conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and

interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of

only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar

can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held

that respondent's propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation,

state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-had been

duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability

to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a

world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it

rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.

36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and

respondent null and void. cDCaTH

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan

Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the

parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37

During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the

Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the

National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only

respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the

decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the

Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic

tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While

conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with

petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the

evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological

incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court

of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological

incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner

elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence

conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by

the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41

It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial

court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect

from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to

observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may

indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the

fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence

presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such

evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of

respondent. 43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the

operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of

facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the

declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in

Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case 45 ), and

indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC

in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court

has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down,

there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 48 wherein the

Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated

under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that

the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as

the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding

cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous

on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a

decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose

the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for

its allowance. HSEcTC

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated

to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise

be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its

solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for

nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity

has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage

persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of

contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as

void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons

already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground

for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either

party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an

"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the

ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law

enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the

Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was

classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The

mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the

grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly, among the

marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is

one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,

just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the

essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did

not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,

both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the

Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and

conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a

marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and

obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his

commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to

comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to

the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as

phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that

"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from

physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the

marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code . . . [and thus]

should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the

same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological

incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this

would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns

though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals, 64

wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity

that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants

that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the

marriage." 65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to

understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to

comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina 66 case. Therein, the

Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that

"[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the

court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such

extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was

assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption

thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological

incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of

awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is

about to assume." 68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity

deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading

"psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently

recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was

to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding

specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under

the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision

committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case

basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in

psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,

although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect

since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for

annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the

law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a

priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own

facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of

marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.

The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the

appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own

judgment for that of the trial court. 72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity,

as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.

Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by

evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current

trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is

under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court

has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since

1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary

framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of

nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set

in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of

each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary

understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present,

and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that

precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well

which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity

under Article 36. CSTHca

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in

Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation

of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the

Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of

psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one

member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages

already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74

It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church

doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and

the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the

National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still,

it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of

influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may

have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code

and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular

progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is

merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court

interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide

utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under

Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying

petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the

Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the

Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall

strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and

that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the

importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the

institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state

protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the

family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of

marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based

on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of

course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to

the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the

legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect

marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the

enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells

out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect

married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of

nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial

denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the

constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely

enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained

decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and

2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be

taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by

a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an

implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed

State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which

in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding

interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote

family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the

initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote

wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not

capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of

marriage. SECHIA

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present

petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in

the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has

consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the

guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to

the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and

continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is

rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the

validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes

an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the

nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it

from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage

are to be "protected"' by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family

and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently

proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the

Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not

physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The

evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was

mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have

known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have

given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity

need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under

the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be

identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully

explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and

clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was

existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the

illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have

attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative

only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against

everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to

the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related

to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,

a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and

prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to

procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of

marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of

the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild

characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional

outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as

downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much

less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in

the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that

effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby

complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as

well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and

their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated

in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or

decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article

36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of

the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which

provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable

to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of

psychological nature." HEcTAI

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to

reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should

be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law

on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed

civilly void. 77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor

General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or

opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed

with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the

appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of

the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take

care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is

not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of

respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's

participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records

of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on

this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary

trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity

of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had

consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and

personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication

sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article

36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the

psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he

presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's

behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine

Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her

alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the

field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent

was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts

below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the

appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with

petitioner. 80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity

under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a

preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be

considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed

with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of

the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to

take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that

evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able

establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant

evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily

negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been

medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven

by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory

complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual

and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous

stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to

petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation,

income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked

to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of

psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.

Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at

least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to

me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with

the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated

over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant

and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment

of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. . . .

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations

of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations

of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards

another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is

also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is

based on communication between individuals and what we generally

communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and

expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And

therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far

as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic

relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the

respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable

of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is

the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been

calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of

the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is

specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes,

what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,

which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her

husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then

that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same

way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in

extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact

that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she

persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different

women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered

psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the

marriage? IDcTEA

A- Yes, Ma'am. 83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the

psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity

of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that

[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on

the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony,

as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did

not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.

Marcos 85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not

required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We

deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis

for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common

conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their

own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However,

since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual

premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological

incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court

explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is

psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of

marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent

has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her

occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She

has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.

She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in

a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In

persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the

basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and

respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such

repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological

incapacity. 87

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly

existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She

fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before

she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her

natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had

found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to

prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is

immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year

of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever

such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it

likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as

borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life

was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted

as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More

disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish

truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and

the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling

lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them,

were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the

essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish

between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the

legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the

corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One

unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any

legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly

tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability

to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature

of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage

hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential

marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the

essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the

evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth,

her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded

much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which

states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was

obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances

constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other

misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment

of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between

misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under

Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of

the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the

lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her

own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to

psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital

obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68,

in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,

respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the

trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be

able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based

on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into

consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the

Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally

inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed

decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88

Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that

interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should

be given great respect by our courts. DTISaH

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila

decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated

30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of

respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92

In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a

restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting

respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's

consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is

considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when

elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary

judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the

practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from

the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the

marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law

that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the

testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made

the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were

markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the

Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her

matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words,

afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete

judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern,

the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial

consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as

well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only

by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the

proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They

hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court,

of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead

appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court

affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter

would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of

the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are

accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that

such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals

reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it

did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that

Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially

separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.

However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she

continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.

From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is

incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that

respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that

respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.

Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses

characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained

silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts'

taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial

court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well

before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement

that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in

Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. DTAIaH

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,

began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code

committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at

its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98

Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the

deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of

a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the

Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized

"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However,

in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in

Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of

psychological incapacity. 101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial

court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether

respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did

not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be

established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no

jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent

promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of

incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when

this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation

that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law

constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet

we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The

requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined

without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical

averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological

incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal

necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was

not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep

reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before

Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where

presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not

have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in

those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is

actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation

of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be

insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical

diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling

cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by

the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we

are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological

incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are

further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which

indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological

incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so

incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was

warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for

declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly

ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does

the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible

that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with

petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for

nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's

avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these

cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal

contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in

love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10

August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent

NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No

costs. TAcSCH

SO ORDERED.

/---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez---\

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City

of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in

Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,

Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left

margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G.

Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures

below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page

of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was

acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and

her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she

was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from

illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will

and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously

executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of

any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of

P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named

Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her

interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in

equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said

spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and

universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed

of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the

will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on

September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties

concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a

deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of

Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September

2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following

grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix

was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its

execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of

fear.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the

oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after

due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of

Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her

opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to

the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took

care of the testatrix during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered

its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but

declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the

statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to

the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a

motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the

portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.

Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a

motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees

the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to

intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that

portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied,

both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from

that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and

declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal

heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And

in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which,

stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has

oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2)

Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the

probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the

provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to

be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene

Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to

intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or

in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a

claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,

September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who

would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim

against the estate like a creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, in Saguinsin vs.

Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:

"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters

of administration must be filed by an 'interested person.' An interested

party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefitted

by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,

such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it

is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special

proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party

thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs.

Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)."

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the

provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to

the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she

has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor

does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it

nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or

devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will

either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any

portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she

previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had

already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor

acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She

would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but

she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an

acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the

deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased

sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if

it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the

deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so

because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding

to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil

Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato

from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And

the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68

Phil., 128, as follows:

"'Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or

mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They

cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there

is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based

upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested

parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the

legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child;

the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources

of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child

nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the

family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more them

recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.' (7

Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)"

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an

adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship

established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted

does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted

child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is

created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.

As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the

relatives of the adopter.

"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the

adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as

expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as

a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of

the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that

the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.

Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the

adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and

the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino,

Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)

"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not

extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is

prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal." (An

Outline of Philippines Civil law by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C.

Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil law,

1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.

1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as

testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the

ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A

was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not

have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but

also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix

affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the

evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the

declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the

time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her

intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation

clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the

presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it

was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as

such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the

will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it

was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the

testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses

to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of

the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be

one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the

attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the

witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the

instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time

and place and identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively,

that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and

her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided

for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is

also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the

following observation:

"The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof

with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion

that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged

fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for

their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the

vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after

the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts may have

some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce

yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix,

had she really wanted to, from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did

not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as

testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen

at the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied

by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with

her."

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord

with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina

Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert

pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several

years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering

from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for

several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the

instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily

and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the

will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue

influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind

that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy

her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her

own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging

the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a

matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is

sufficient but was disproved by the testimony the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the

intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in

a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:

"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will

cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is

merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the

requirements of the law." (Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220)

". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as

touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those

requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It

does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or

efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null,

notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points

remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been

authenticated. . . .

"From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions

therein contained, it does not follow that such provisions lack of efficiency,

or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not

impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that

the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must

be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to

public morals." (Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680)

"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts

that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the

testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the

proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The

judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.

In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions

made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void

and another one valid." Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the

court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will

Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.

Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the

legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for

he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other

pronouncements, touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some

relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which

declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the

same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is

ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No

pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J. Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur

\---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez---/

([1965V82E] VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DEL VAL

CHAN, ETC., oppositor-appellant., G.R. No. L-18753, 1965 Mar 26, En Banc)