■

6 JFQ / Summer 1999

Why Strategy Is D

Meuse, 1918.

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:02 PM Page 6

By C O L I N S. G R A Y

M y aim is to relate the nature of strat-egy to the character of its artistic ap-plication and to the unknowablecontext of the 21st century. The im-

modesty, even arrogance, of this endeavor is bestconveyed through an anecdote about a meetingbetween Hannibal Barca and an armchair strate-gist. Hannibal suffered from what in this last cen-tury has been the German failing—winning battlesbut losing wars. Hannibal won all of his battles inthe Second Punic War except, sadly for a Carthagethat did not deserve him, the last one, against Sci-pio Africanus at Zama in 202 BC. He is reported tohave had little patience with amateur critics.

According to Cicero (de Oratione), the great generalwhen in exile in Ephesus was once invited to attend alecture by one Phormio, and after being treated to alengthy discourse on the commander’s art, was askedby his friends what he thought of it. “I have seenmany old drivellers,” he replied, “on more than oneoccasion, but I have seen no one who drivelled morethan Phormio.” 1

The theme of this article lurks in the ancientstrategic aphorism that “nothing is impossible forthe man who does not have to do it.” When I wascontributing to the Defense Guidance in the early1980s its basic direction for the Armed Forcescould be reduced to “be able to go anywhere,fight anyone, and win.” To repeat my point, tothose who do not have to do strategy at thesharp, tactical end of the stick, the bounds of fea-sibility appear endless.

True wisdom in strategy must be practical be-cause strategy is a practical subject. Much of whatappears to be wise and indeed is prudent as hightheory is unhelpful to the poor warrior who actu-ally has to do strategy, tactically and opera-tionally. Two classic examples make the point.

Summer 1999 / JFQ 7

Colin S. Gray is director of the Centre for SecurityStudies at the University of Hull; among his booksis The Leverage of Sea Power: The StrategicAdvantage of Navies in War.

s DifficultU

.S. A

rmy

Westmoreland with Nixon, 1969.

DO

D

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:03 PM Page 7

■ W H Y S T R A T E G Y I S D I F F I C U L T

Carl von Clausewitz advised us that there is a“culminating point of victory,” beyond which liesa decline in relative strength.2 Great advice—save,of course, that political and military maps, letalone physical terrain, do not come with Clause-witz’s “culminating point” marked. Imagine thatyou are a German and that it is anytime betweenlate June 1941 and late August 1942. You haveread Clausewitz. Where is the culminatingpoint—at Minsk or Smolensk, on the Dnieper,Don, or Volga? How can you find a culminatingpoint of victory until adverse consequences un-mistakably tell you where it was?

The other example of great strategic wisdomthat is difficult to translate into practical advice isthe insistence of Clausewitz (and Jomini) that“the best strategy is always to be very strong; firstin general, and then at the decisive point.”3 Nat-urally the challenge is not to comprehend the allbut sophomoric point that one needs to be verystrong at the decisive point. Rather it is to knowthe location of that point. What did Clausewitz’sadvice mean for Germans in the late summer andfall of 1941? Did they need to concentrate theirdissipating strength on the Red Army in the field,on the road to Moscow, or both?

For a tougher call, consider the Americanmilitary problem in Southeast Asia in the secondhalf of 1965. General William Westmorelandsomehow had to identify military objectives tomatch and secure the somewhat opaque politicalobjectives. Mastery of the arguments in the clas-sics of strategic theory was unlikely to be of muchpractical help.

The ArgumentBefore expounding the central elements of

my argument, which appear pessimistic, let mesound an optimistic note. Terrible though the

20th century has been, it couldhave been far worse. The badnews is that the century wit-nessed three world wars—twohot, one cold. The good newsis that the right side won eachof them. Moreover, threats to

peace posed twice by Germany and then by theSoviet Union were each seen off at a cost that,though high, was not disproportionate to thestakes nor inconsistent with the values of our civ-ilization. Western statecraft and strategy in twoworld wars was not without blemish. One needsto remember the wisdom of Lord Kitchener whosaid during World War I: “We wage war not as wewould like but as we must.” Strategically,notwithstanding errors, the Western World didrelatively well. Now for a darker view.

My key argument is organized around threereasons why it is difficult to do strategy well:

■ its very nature, which endures through timeand in all contexts4

■ the multiplicity and sheer variety of sources offriction 5

■ it is planned for contexts that literally have notoccurred and might not occur; the future has not hap-pened.

This argument is essentially optimistic, eventhough that claim may appear unpersuasivegiven that the high-quality strategic performanceis always challenged by the nature of strategy—not only by its complexity but by the apparentfact that whatever can go wrong frequently does.Also, strategy can fail because it may apply thewrong solutions to incorrectly framed questionsbecause guesses about the future were not correct.If, despite this, the bad guys were beaten threetimes during the course of the 20th century, thereare grounds for hope.

Before explaining the many sources of diffi-culty for strategy, it is necessary to highlight therecurrence of a serious fallacy. Lest this point ap-pear unfairly focused on the United States, I willsugar coat the pill by citing an American who gotit right, and two others—one American and oneGerman—who got it wrong. Samuel Griffith, whogot it right, was a scholar of Chinese military the-ory from Sun Tzu to Mao. He once observed that“there are no mechanical panaceas” when com-menting on a Newsweek report in July 1961 abouta fuel-air explosive to destroy bunkers.6 TheAmerican and German, who got it wrong, al-lowed themselves to be seduced by the promise of“mechanical panaceas.” One must hasten to addthat these two warrior-theorists were exception-ally able men. The point is that, writing ninetyyears apart, they made almost the same mistake.

The issue underlying both views is whethermuch of the fog and thus friction that undoes ap-plied strategy can be thwarted by modern tech-nology. Writing in 1905, Lieutenant GeneralRudolf von Caemmerer, a member of the greatgeneral staff working under Field Marshal AlfredGraf von Schlieffen, offered this claim:

The former and actually existing dangers of failure inthe preconcentrated action of widely separated por-tions of the army is now almost completely removedby the electric telegraph. However much the enemymay have succeeded in placing himself between ourarmies, or portions of our armies, in such a mannerthat no trooper can get from one to the other, we canstill amply communicate with each other over an arcof a hundred or two hundred or four hundred miles.The field telegraph can everywhere be laid as rapidlyas the troops marching, and headquarters will knowevery evening how matters stand with the variousarmies, and issue its orders to them accordingly.7

8 JFQ / Summer 1999

Western statecraft and strategy in two world wars was not without blemish

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:03 PM Page 8

G r a y

Caemmerer proceeded to admit that the tele-graph might dangerously diminish the initiativesallowed to army commanders. The irony is thatpoor communications, lack of coordinated ac-

tion, and a general loss ofcohesion by the all impor-tant armies on the rightwing of the German as-sault in early September1914 allowed an Allied

victory with the miracle on the Marne.8 The tele-graph was a wonderful invention, but it couldnot reliably dissipate the fog of war.

An American example of a functionally iden-tical error is drawn from the magical “system ofsystems” invoked by Admiral William Owens, for-mer Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In1995 he wrote, “The emerging system . . . prom-ises the capacity to use military force without thesame risks as before—it suggests we will dissipatethe fog of war.”9

New technology, even when properly inte-grated into weapons and systems with welltrained and highly motivated people, cannoterase the difficulties that impede strategic excel-lence. A new device, even innovative ways toconduct war, is always offered as a poisoned chal-ice. Moreover, scarcely less important, strategycannot be reduced to fighting power alone.10

Progress in modern strategic performance has notbeen achieved exclusively through science andtechnology.

Consider this argument: strategists todayhave at their disposal technological means tohelp dissipate the fog of war and otherwise defeatfriction that previous generations could onlyimagine. Modern strategists can see over the hill,communicate instanteously with deployed forcesaround the world, and in principle rapidly de-stroy enemy assets wherever they are located—atleast in fine weather and provided no innocentcivilians are colocated with the targets. The prob-lem is that war can’t be reduced simply to thebombardment of a passive enemy.

Despite electro-mechanical marvels it is noeasier—in fact it is probably harder—to performwell as a strategist today than a century ago. Con-sider the utility of railroads, telegraph, radio, andaircraft to the strategist. The poison in the chaliceof each is that other polities have acquired them;each has distinctive vulnerabilities and worse (re-call the radio intercepts of World Wars I and II);and none of them can address the core of thestrategist’s basket of difficulties.

Strategy is not really about fighting well, im-portant though that is. To follow Clausewitz, it isabout “the use of engagements for the object ofthe war.” 11 The fog of war and frictions that ha-rass and damage strategic performance do notcomprise a static set of finite challenges whichcan be attrited by study, let alone by machines.Every new device and mode of war carries thevirus of its own technical, tactical, operational,strategic, or political negation.12

To tackle the fog and friction of strategy andwar is not akin to exploring unknown terrain,with each expedition better equipped than thelast to fill in blanks on the map. The map of fogand friction is a living, dynamic one that reorgan-izes itself to frustrate the intrepid explorer.

Why So Difficult?Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke—

victor in the wars of German unification—had itright when, in Instructions for Superior Commanders,he wrote that “strategy is the application of com-mon sense to the conduct of war. The difficultylies in its execution . . . . ” 13 The elder Moltke wasrephrasing the words of the master. Clausewitz ad-vises that “everything in strategy is very simple,but that does not mean that everything is veryeasy.” 14 Why should that be so? Five reasons canbe suggested.

First, strategy is neither policy nor armedcombat; rather it is the bridge between them. Thestrategist can be thwarted if the military wages thewrong war well or the right war badly. Neither ex-perts in politics and policymaking nor experts infighting need necessarily be experts in strategy.The strategist must relate military power (strategiceffect) to the goals of policy. Absent a strategic

Summer 1999 / JFQ 9

U.S

. Air

Forc

e

B–52 bombing north-west of Saigon, 1965.

to tackle the fog and frictionof war is not akin to exploringunknown terrain

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:03 PM Page 9

■ W H Y S T R A T E G Y I S D I F F I C U L T

brain—as was the case of the United States andNATO vis-à-vis Bosnia and Kosovo—one is leftwith an awkward alliance of hot air (policy state-ments) and bombardment possibilities (the worldis my dartboard view of aerial strategists).15 Strat-egy is difficult because, among other things, it isneither fish nor fowl. It is essentially differentfrom military skill or political competence.

Second, strategy is perilously complex by itsvery nature. Every element or dimension can im-pact all others. The nature of strategy is constantthroughout history but its character continuallyevolves with changes in technology, society, and

political ideas. Success instrategy is not really about se-curing a privileged positionin any one or more of its di-mensions—such as technol-ogy, geography, or leader-ship—because it is alwayspossible an enemy will find

ways to compensate for that strategic effect fromits special strengths. This is a major reason whyinformation dominance in a technical-tacticalsense cannot reliably deliver victory. Triumph inwar does not correlate with superior technologynor mastery in any allegedly dominant dimen-sion of conflict.

Third, it is extraordinarily difficult, perhapsimpossible, to train strategists. Consider thesewords of Napoleon Bonaparte:

Tactics, evolutions, artillery, and engineer sciencescan be learned from manuals like geometry; but theknowledge of the higher conduct of war can only beacquired by studying the history of wars and the bat-tles of great generals and by one’s own experience.There are no terse and precise rules at all; everythingdepends on the character with which nature has en-dowed the general, on his eminent qualities, on hisdeficiencies, on the nature of the troops, the technicsor arms, the season, and a thousand other circum-stances which make things never look alike.16

Napoleon was in a position to know. Like Hanni-bal he was good at winning battles, but he failedcatastrophically as a strategist. Like Imperial Ger-many, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, Impe-rial France pursued political goals that were be-yond its means. That is a failure in strategy.

Basic problems in training strategists can bereduced to the fact that no educational systemputs in what nature leaves out, while the extraor-dinary competence shown by rising politicians orsoldiers in their particular trades is not proof ofan aptitude for strategy. The strategist has to beexpert in using the threat or use of force for pol-icy ends, not in thinking up desirable policy endsor in fighting skillfully.

Fourth, because strategy embraces all aspectsof the military instrument (among others), aswell as many elements of the polity and society itserves, the maximum possible number of thingscan go wrong. To illustrate, sources of frictionthat can impair strategic performance includethose familiar to the military realm (incompati-bilities among the levels of military activity andspecialized functions such as operations, logistics,and weapons production) and, conceivably themost lethal of all, a mismatch between policy andmilitary capabilities. In the world of strategists, asopposed to that of tacticians, there is simplymuch more scope for error.

Finally, it is critical to flag an underrecog-nized source of friction, the will, skill, and meansof an intelligent and malevolent enemy. AndreBeaufre defines strategy as “the art of the dialecticof force or, more precisely, the art of the dialecticof two opposing wills using force to resolve theirdispute.” 17 Recall Clausewitz’s dictum: “War isthus an act of force to compel our enemy to doour will.” 18 Yet it is easier to theorize about newways of prevailing than to speculate honestly andimaginatively about possible enemy initiativesand responses.

Further ThoughtsThere is a sense in which this article rein-

vents the wheel. It is no great achievement to ap-preciate that strategy is difficult to do well. In-deed, my point is not dissimilar from that madeby Lawrence Freedman, who takes 433 pages inThe Evolution of Nuclear Strategy to state that thereis no truly strategic solution to the dilemmas ofnuclear strategy.19 When armchair strategists tellmilitary practitioners that their task is difficult onthe level of strategy, they should not expect muchpraise. After all, strategy does have to be done.Academics can vote undecided and write anotherbook. Practicing strategists must make decisionsregardless of the uncertainty.

Next, one must stress the strategic ignoranceof even practical people. Clausewitz wrote:

It might be thought that policy could make demandson war which war could not fulfill; but that hypothe-sis would challenge the natural and unavoidable as-sumption that policy knows the instrument it meansto use.20

The challenge is that before undergoing trial bybattle, no one really knows how effective militarypower will be. Every passage of arms remainsunique. A capability that appears lethally effec-tive in peacetime exercises will not translate auto-matically into a violent elixir to solve political is-sues. That the Armed Forces appear lethallypotent against a conventional enemy in openwarfare could prove irrelevant or worse in urban

10 JFQ / Summer 1999

before undergoing trial bybattle, no one really knowshow effective militarypower will be

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:03 PM Page 10

G r a y

areas. In peacetime, militaries train against them-selves, and that has to comprise a major source ofuncertainty concerning future effectiveness.

It is vital to recognize potential tension inthree sets of relationships: between politiciansand commanders, between commanders andplanners, and between commanders and theorists(recall Phormio’s efforts to educate Hannibal).

Military professionals must simplify, focus, de-cide, and execute. Politicians, by virtue of theircraft, perceive or fear wide ramifications of ac-tion, prefer to fudge rather than focus, and like tokeep their options open as long as possible bymaking the least decision as late as feasible. Al-though commanders are gripped by operationalrequirements, planners—especially if unschooledby real operational experience—are apt to live inan orderly world where a model of efficiency andcompromise is acceptable, indeed is a driver.

The tension becomes acute when a soldierwho is only a planner finds himself in a positionof high command. The classic example is DwightEisenhower, a superb staff officer and militarypolitician who lacked the experience and the ap-titude for command, let alone supreme com-mand.21 As to the terrain between theorists anddoers of strategy, the former are skilled in the pro-duction of complexity and are unlikely to enjoythe empathy for operational realities that makes

Summer 1999 / JFQ 11

Inspecting beaches at Normandy, 1944.

Allied Force, 1999.

U.S

. Nav

y

DO

D (B

ill K

imbl

e)

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:04 PM Page 11

■ W H Y S T R A T E G Y I S D I F F I C U L T

strategic ideas readily useful. For example, the nu-clear strategist might conceive of dozens of tar-geting options yet be unaware that his theorypassed its “culminating point of victory”—actu-ally its “culminating point of feasibility”—at adistinctly early stage. A President thoroughly un-interested in matters of nuclear strategy until sud-denly confronted at dawn some Christmas withthe necessity for choice can’t likely cope intellec-tually, morally, politically, and strategically withmany options. Probably he would find it useful tohave alternatives: shall we go now, shall we golater, shall we go big, or shall we go small. Butthose broad binaries may be close to the limits ofPresidential strategic thinking. Many strategistshave presented seemingly clever briefings to poli-cymakers and senior officers whose eyes crossedand brains locked at the sight of the third Power-Point slide.

The many reasons why strategy is so difficultto do well can be subsumed with reference tothree requirements. For strategic success:

■ forces must be internally coherent, which is tosay competently joint

■ be of a quantity and provide a strategic effectscaled to the tasks set by high policy

■ be employed coercively in pursuit of militaryobjectives that fit political goals.

Competence cannot offset folly along themeans-ends axis of strategy. Military history is lit-tered with armies that won campaigns in thewrong wars.

Since the future is unforeseeable—do not putfaith in the phrase “foreseeable future”—we mustuse only assets that can be trusted. Specifically, weplan to behave strategically in an uncertain futureon the basis of three sources of practical advice:historical experience, the golden rule of prudence(we do not allow hopes to govern plans), andcommon sense. We can educate our commonsense by reading history. But because the futurehas not happened, our expectations of it can onlybe guesswork. Historically guided guessworkshould perform better than one that knows noyesterdays. Nonetheless, planning for the future,like deciding to fight, is always a gamble.

To conclude on a positive note, rememberthat to succeed in strategy you do not have to bedistinguished or even particularly competent. Allthat is required is performing well enough to beatan enemy. You do not have to win elegantly; youjust have to win. JFQ

N O T E S

1 J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War: A History of the SecondPunic War (Warminster, UK: Aris and Phillips, 1978), p. 275.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans-lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 566–73. See alsoAntulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz: Toward a Theoryof Applied Strategy,” Defense Analysis, vol. 11, no. 3 (December 1995), pp. 229–40.

3 Clausewitz, On War, p. 204; Antoine Henri de Jo-mini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1992),p. 70.

4 This argument is the central theme of Colin S.Gray in Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999).

5 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 119–21.6 Samuel B. Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York:

Praeger, 1961), p. 31.7 Rudolf von Caemmerer, The Development of Strate-

gical Science During the 19th Century, translated by Karlvon Donat (London: Hugh Rees, 1905), pp. 171–72.

8 Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germanyand Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (London: Arnold,1997), pp. 96–106, is excellent.

9 Williamson Murray, “Does Military Culture Mat-ter?” Orbis, vol. 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999), p. 37.

10 See Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: Germanand U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport,Conn.: Greenwood, 1982).

11 Clausewitz, On War, p. 128.12 For lengthy musings, see Edward N. Luttwak, Strat-

egy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1987). Luttwak argues that what works welltoday may not tomorrow exactly because it worked welltoday. Because Clausewitz insists war is essentially a duel,one may face an enemy capable of reacting creatively toone’s moves and perhaps even anticipate them.

13 Caemmerer, Strategical Science, p. 276.14 Clausewitz, On War, p. 178.15 This is a fair reading of the underlying premise of

airpower theory. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of theAir, translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Arno Press,1972), p. 50; and John A. Warden III, “Success in Mod-ern War: A Response to Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win,”Security Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 174–85. To the air strategist targeting is strategy.

16 Caemmerer, Strategical Science, p. 275.17 André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (London:

Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 22.18 Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.19 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strat-

egy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 433.20 Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.21 Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Coali-

tions, Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of Commandin Two World Wars (London: Brassey’s, 1993), chapters9–16, is pitilessly Anglo-Canadian in its critical view ofEisenhower as commander and serves as a partial cor-rective to the “patriotic” school of military history ofthe European campaign that finds undue favor amongAmerican writers such as Stephen E. Ambrose in TheVictors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998).

12 JFQ / Summer 1999

0422 Gray.pgs 2/7/00 3:04 PM Page 12