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8/10/2019 Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp
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GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., peti tioner vs . COURT
OF APPEALS AND MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the
Decision[1] dated May 17, 1993, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution [2] dated
January 4, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 18341. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of the Misamis Oriental Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in an insurance claim
filed by private respondent against Great Pacific Life Assurance Co. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered adjudging the defendant GREAT
PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION as insurer under its Group
policy No. G-1907, in relation to Certification B-18558 liable and ordered to
pay to the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES as creditor of the
insured Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, the amount of EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P86,200.00); dismissing the claims for damages,
attorney‟s fees and litigation expenses in the complaint and counterclaim, with
costs against the defendant and dismissing the complaint in respect to the
plaintiffs, other than the widow- beneficiary, for lack of cause of action.”[3]
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Great PacificLife Assurance Corporation (hereinafter Grepalife) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (hereinafter DBP). Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing
loan mortgagors of DBP.
On November 11, 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor ofDBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application form, Dr.
Leuterio answered questions concerning his health condition as follows:
“7. Have you ever had, or consulted, a physician for a heart condition, high blood pressure,cancer, diabetes, lung, kidney or stomach disorder or any other physical impairment?
Answer: No. If so give details ___________.
8. Are you now, to the best of your knowledge, in good health?
Answer: [ x ] Yes [ ] No.”[4]
On November 15, 1983, Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558, as insurance
coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness amounting to
eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.
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On August 6, 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to “massive cerebral hemorrhage.”
Consequently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim
alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for an insurancecoverage on November 15, 1983. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose he
had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death. Allegedly, such non-
disclosure constituted concealment that justified the denial of the claim. On October 20, 1986, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio, respondent Medarda V.
Leuterio, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,
against Grepalife for “Specific Performance with Damages.”[5] During the trial, Dr.
Hernando Mejia, who issued the death certificate, was called to testify. Dr. Mejia’sfindings, based partly from the information given by the respondent widow, stated that
Dr. Leuterio complained of headaches presumably due to high blood pressure. The
inference was not conclusive because Dr. Leuterio was not autopsied, hence, other causes
were not ruled out.
On February 22, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent
widow and against Grepalife. On May 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals sustained the trialcourt’s decision. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners interposed the following
assigned errors:
"1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANTLIABLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP)
WHICH IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE FOR PAYMENT OF THEPROCEEDS OF A MORTGAGE REDEMPTION INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OFPLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND WILFREDO LEUTERIO ONE OF ITS LOAN
BORROWERS, INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINSTDEFENDANT-APPELLANT [Petitioner Grepalife] FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANTOF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OR NATURE OF THE ACTIONAND OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO
PAY TO DBP THE AMOUNT OF P86,200.00 IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYEVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW MUCH WAS THE ACTUAL AMOUNT
PAYABLE TO DBP IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS GROUP INSURANCECONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN - HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL INFORMATION ON THE PART OFWILFREDO LEUTERIO IN HIS APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE
GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PLAN BETWEEN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OFTHE INSURANCE CLAIM ARISING FROM THE DEATH OF WILFREDOLEUTERIO.”[6]
Synthesized below are the assigned errors for our resolution:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to DBP as beneficiaryin a group life insurance contract from a complaint filed by the widow of the
decedent/mortgagor?
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2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Dr. Leuterio concealed that hehad hypertension, which would vitiate the insurance contract?
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Grepalife liable in the amount ofeighty six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos without proof of the actualoutstanding mortgage payable by the mortgagor to DBP.
Petitioner alleges that the complaint was instituted by the widow of Dr. Leuterio, notthe real party in interest, hence the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case. It
argues that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, Grepalife was
held liable to pay the proceeds of insurance contract in favor of DBP, the indispensable party who was not joined in the suit.
To resolve the issue, we must consider the insurable interest in mortgaged properties
and the parties to this type of contract. The rationale of a group insurance policy of
mortgagor s, otherwise known as the “mortgage redemption insurance,” is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has
to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the
mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from suchinsurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs
of the mortgagor from paying the obligation.[7] In a similar vein, ample protection is given
to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death; the mortgage
obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to themortgage indebtedness.[8] Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance
premium under the group insurance policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the
insurance is on the mortgagor’s interest, and the mortgagor continues to be a party to thecontract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the
insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the
contract.[9]
Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides:
“Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of property effects insurance in
his own name providing that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or
assigns a policy of insurance to a mortgagee, the insurance is deemed to be
upon the interest of the mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the
original contract, and any act of his, prior to the loss, which would otherwise
avoid the insurance, will have the same effect, although the property is in the
hands of the mortgagee, but any act which, under the contract of insurance, is
to be performed by the mortgagor, may be performed by the mortgagee therein
named, with the same effect as if it had been performed by the mortgagor.”
The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or
interests in the insurance, the policy stating that: “In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to
pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance of sum
assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by thedebtor.”[10] When DBP submitted the insurance claim against petitioner, the latter denied
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payment thereof, interposing the defense of concealment committed by the
insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and took the necessary
action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private respondent.[11] In Gonzales La O vs.
Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Ins. Co.[12] we held:
“Insured, being the person with whom the contract was made, is primarily the proper person to bring suit thereon. * * * Subject to some exceptions, insured
may thus sue, although the policy is taken wholly or in part for the benefit of
another person named or unnamed, and although it is expressly made payable
to another as his interest may appear or otherwise. * * * Although a policy
issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the benefit of the mortgagee and is made
payable to him, yet the mortgagor may sue thereon in his own name, especially
where the mortgagee‟s interest is less than the full amount recoverable under
the policy, * * *.‟
And in volume 33, page 82, of the same work, we read the following:
„Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest, although he has assigned
the policy for the purpose of collection, or has assigned as collateral security
any judgment he may obtain.”[13]
And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or
succession to any person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such personmay recover it whatever the insured might have recovered,[14] the widow of the decedent
Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer, Grepalife.
The second assigned error refers to an alleged concealment that the petitionerinterposed as its defense to annul the insurance contract. Petitioner contends that Dr.Leuterio failed to disclose that he had hypertension, which might have caused his
death. Concealment exists where the assured had knowledge of a fact material to the
risk, and honesty, good faith, and fair dealing requires that he should communicate it tothe assured, but he designedly and intentionally withholds the same.[15]
Petitioner merely relied on the testimony of the attending physician, Dr. Hernando
Mejia, as supported by the information given by the widow of the decedent. Grepalife
asserts that Dr. Mejia’s technical diagnosis of the cause of death of Dr. Leuterio was aduly documented hospital record, and that the widow’s declaration that her husband had
“possible hypertension several years ago” should not be considered as hearsay, but as part
of res gestae.
On the contrary the medical findings were not conclusive because Dr. Mejia did notconduct an autopsy on the body of the decedent. As the attending physician, Dr. Mejia
stated that he had no knowledge of Dr. Leuterio’s any previous hospital
confinement.[16] Dr. Leuterio’s death certificate stated that hypertension was only “the possible cause of death.” The private respondent’s statement, as to the medical history of
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her husband, was due to her unreliable recollection of events. Hence, the statement of the
physician was properly considered by the trial court as hearsay.
The question of whether there was concealment was aptly answered by the appellate
court, thus:
“The insured, Dr. Leuterio, had answered in his insurance application that hewas in good health and that he had not consulted a doctor or any of the
enumerated ailments, including hypertension; when he died the attending
physician had certified in the death certificate that the former died of cerebral
hemorrhage, probably secondary to hypertension. From this report, the
appellant insurance company refused to pay the insurance claim. Appellant
alleged that the insured had concealed the fact that he had hypertension.
Contrary to appellant‟s allegations, there was no sufficient proof that the
insured had suffered from hypertension. Aside from the statement of the
insured‟s widow who was not even sure if the medicines taken by Dr. Leuteriowere for hypertension, the appellant had not proven nor produced any witness
who could attest to Dr. Leuterio‟s medical history...
x x x
Appellant insurance company had failed to establish that there was
concealment made by the insured, hence, it cannot refuse payment of the
claim.”[17]
The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to entitle theinsurer to rescind the contract.[18] Misrepresentation as a defense of the insurer to avoid
liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish such defense by satisfactoryand convincing evidence rests upon the insurer .[19] In the case at bar, the petitioner failed
to clearly and satisfactorily establish its defense, and is therefore liable to pay the
proceeds of the insurance.
And that brings us to the last point in the review of the case at bar. Petitioner claimsthat there was no evidence as to the amount of Dr. Leuterio’s outstanding indebtedness to
DBP at the time of the mortgagor’s death. Hence, for private respondent’s failure to
establish the same, the action for specific performance should be dismissed. Petitioner’s
claim is without merit. A life insurance policy is a valued policy.[20] Unless the interest ofa person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary measurement, the measure of
indemnity under a policy of insurance upon life or health is the sum fixed in the
policy.[21] The mortgagor paid the premium according to the coverage of his insurance,which states that:
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“The policy states that upon receipt of due proof of the Debtor‟s death during
the terms of this insurance, a death benefit in the amount of P86,200.00 shall be
paid.
In the event of the debtor‟s death before his indebtedness with the creditor shall
have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the Creditor and the balance of the Sum Assured, if there is any shall
then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor.”[22] (Emphasis omitted)
However, we noted that the Court of Appeals’ decision was promulgated on May 17,1993. In private respondent’s memorandum, she states that DBP foreclosed in 1995 their
residential lot, in satisfaction of mortgagor’s outstanding loan. Considering this
supervening event, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs of the
deceased person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates that DBP should not unjustly enrichitself at the expense of another ( Nemo cum alterius detrimenio protest ). Hence, it cannot
collect the insurance proceeds, after it already foreclosed on the mortgage. The proceeds
now rightly belong to Dr. Leuterio’s heirs represented by his widow, herein privaterespondent Medarda Leuterio.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 18341 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the petitioner is ORDERED to pay the insurance proceeds amounting to Eighty-sixthousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos to the heirs of the insured, Dr. Wilfredo
Leuterio (deceased), upon presentation of proof of prior settlement of mortgagor’s
indebtedness to Development Bank of the Philippines. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur . Bellosillo, (Chairman), J., on official leave.