Greater Manchester a resilient city region U-Score Essential 8 In partnership with: European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection Salford United

Greater Manchester a resilient city region

U-Score Essential 8

In partnership with:

European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil

Protection

SalfordUnited Kingdom

AmadoraPortugal

Stoke-on-TrentUnited Kingdom

Arvika

Sweden

Jönköping

Sweden

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience

Addresses understanding how critical infrastructure systems will cope with disasters the city might experience and developing contingencies

to manage risks caused by these outcomes.

Essential 8: Methodology

• Engage Category 1 & 2 responder and obtain specialist knowledge covering respective risk areas through group meetings• Engage Category 1 & 2 responder and obtain specialist knowledge

covering respective risk areas though one-to-one sessions• Completion of custom designed U-Score template• Discuss completed essential and proposed scores at multi-agency

steering group (RDG)

Essential 8: Challenges

• Resource intensive and time consuming due to 33 separate indicators across 11 workstreams and number of different stakeholders who are required to provide data

• U-Score definitions at odds with UK CCA industry framework / timescales (e.g. annual and 4 yearly respectively. Days of service lost etc.)

• Commercially and Counter Terrorist (CT) sensitive data not being available in some cases• Indicative measurement scales at times very broad, terminology not consistent and

therefore at times difficult to distinguish between e.g. –

(4) deficiencies relative to “most severe” scenario but designed to deal with “most probable” scenario –

(3) would mitigate most of “most likely” scenario but some impacts would be felt; deficiencies relative to “most severe” are

more serious;

Essential 8: Outcomes

10 items measured


• 8.1 Protective Infrastructure

• 8.1.1 (4) Adequacy of protective infrastructure (Ecosystem services offering protection or mitigation):

Over 42,000 properties at risk of flooding from rivers in Greater ManchesterThe schemes that the EA builds are individually assessed using rules set out in the HM Treasury Risk properties identified and 6 year programme under way to improve defences

• 8.1.2 (5) Effectiveness of maintenance All flood risk assets and channels are inspected at a frequency determined by the level of flood

risk and are cleared, repaired or replaced if found to below required condition where it is cost effective

Measured against 1 in 100 year fluvial event although new defences include a +20% allowance for potential climate change impacts

Flood defence includes both hard infrastructure and community response


• 8.2 (4) Communications

• 8.2.1 Service days at risk of loss

• 8.2.2 Designated critical asset service days at risk of loss from communications failure.

• 8.2.3 Cost of restoration.Used one service providerAssessed against one risk (H40 – loss of fixed and mobile telecommunications (both voice service and internet access) for up to 100,000 people for up to 72 hours)Resilience is key consideration in design specificationsProactive risk management, BCM, incident management processes informed by international and industry standardsInvestment in disaster recovery capability of core network together with inbuilt redundancy, mobile back-up capabilities and response specialistsPossibly opportunities for better sharing of specific risk information e.g. flooding to add local context to this assessmentUK industry-wide response systems in placeSensitivity of data (private commercial)

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.3 Electricity (0 local, 1 national based on U-Score definitions)

• 8.3.1 Customer service days at risk of loss.

• 8.3.2 Designated critical asset service days at risk of loss from energy failure.

• 8.3.3 Cost of restoration

Assessed against risks UK risks H41 (total failure of GB’s national electricity transmission network) and H45 (disruption to Regional electricity distribution or transmission network)

Electrical infrastructure design should be compliant with industry resilience standards; response can utilise a range of options Other than full restoration e.g. rota disconnections

The industry is regulated by Ofgem and DECC (Department of Energy & Climate Change)

Service provider would seek to work with the LRF (Local Resilience Forum) to establish restoration priorities

The UK electricity network has never completely failed. However, the UK has robust, well developed and resilient “Black Start” plans to recover the electricity network from a complete failure. All major Greater Manchester hospital sites have generators on site with fuel stocks so theoretically should be able to run for approx 2-3 days.

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.4 Water, sanitation

• 8.4.1 (4) Customer service days at risk of loss.

• 8.4.2 (4) Designated critical asset service days (for example, service to hospitals or other critical assets) at risk of loss from water or sanitation failure.

• 8.4.3 Cost of restoration of service (Cost information is commercially sensitive)

• Assessed for EA flood defence infrastructure

• Data is official sensitive (security?)

• Maintenance clearly linked to asset resilience and value for money in infrastructure investment

• Role in encouragement and enforcement of third party assets; management of land adjacent to rivers

• An audited annual inspection process and remediation programme is in place

• Assessed against H39 (failure of drinking water infrastructure or loss of drinking water); H41 (loss of power); H23 and H flooding

• System redundancy and capacity to rezone supplies support resilience, performance at a point in time depends on availability of/speed of access to alternative supplies

• Application of the indicative measurement scale is difficult due to the range of possible scenarios and with the most probable scenario being low/no impact pipework bursts

• Having said this there are statutory responsibilities for minimum supply, prioritising vulnerable people and having regard for non-domestic users.

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.5 Gas

• 8.5.1 Safety and integrity of gas system

• 8.5.2 Customer service days at risk of loss.

• 8.5.3 Designated critical asset service days at risk of loss from gas supply failure.

• 8.5.4 Cost of restoration of service

• National Grid sole owner and operator of gas transmission

• System is nationwide and not configured specifically at a city region level

• Regulated and audited industry for design, safety and resilience, response.

• National Capability Survey completed by National Grid

• Ofgem’s Gas Security of Supply Report in November 2012

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.6 Transportation• 8.6.1 (0) Road – service from road system at risk of loss

Risk: H21: severe inland flooding affecting more than 2 UK regionsExplored impact after mitigation measures and inter-relationship of strategic and key road networksAssessed by TfGM, HE, MAGIdentified lack of historical evidence/experience of the event as an issueRoad loss factor – item (c) definition – calculation is not well explained

• 8.6.2 Road (2) – survival of critical access and evacuation routesRisk: HL18: local/urban flooding (fluvial or surface run-off)Assessed by TfGM/HE/MAGAssessed against reasonable worst case scenario with greatest impactThe critical evacuation/emergency supply routes been defined using integrated transport network data cross-referenced with the EA flood data

• 8.6.3 Rail/metro (0) – service from rail system at risk of lossAssessed for metrolink and not heavy railAssessed for H41: technical failure of national electricity networkFactor ‘b’ (number of days before reopening) is a factor of the risk, not necessarily of the infrastructure itselfAssessment assumes mitigation measures in place and is on a GM rather than district basis, Lack of historical experience of these types of eventsRail loss factor = capacity of affected network/ capacity of total network x no. of days before reopens Uncertainty around passenger response to situation and alternative travel they would choose

• 8.6.4 Air (0)Assessed by Manchester Airport against H55 (severe volcanic activity)Highlights airspace control by EuroControl, UKNATS, CAA and technical assessments by airlines/manufacturers on safetyAirport loss factor does not include economic considerations (also commercially sensitive)Airport loss factor = estimated flights post-disaster/max no. of flights normally x no. of days before full service restorationScenario much better understood following experience/debrief (compare with scenarios that sectors have not experienced)

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.7 Law and Order, First responders

• 8.7.1 (3) Protection of critical law and order/responder assets.Law & Order critical asset (LOCA) loss factor

Assessed against the 9 top risks, Assessment completed by GMFRS, NWAS, GMP

First responders - Definitions for the risks were taken from the national planning assumptions

If a facility was lost, assets and resources would be drawn from or relocated to other areas locally or across the UK

• 8.7.2 (4) Disaster resilience of prison systemHighest risks from prison perspective pandemic influenza (H23) and concerted indiscipline (outcome of H33 unofficial strike action by Prison Officers)

Flagged up lack of awareness of risk to prison power supply from flooding

Any assessment requires a national perspective (e.g. NOMS)

Regulatory framework requires resilience and BCM planning

Any scenarios used for planning are dynamic and dependent on specific factors at the particular point in time (numbers/types offenders)

Plans are sensitive (security) and are not shared beyond a need to know

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.8 Education facilities (4)• 8.8.1 Structural safety of education facilities

Sector is required to comply with government programmes, business continuity, emergency and inclement weather plans in placeChildren Services forward looks at emerging risk patterns in advance and has asset

management plans in placeSchools test not just on fire evacuation but in other high risk areas, will test procedures for Comah and Flooding incidents

• 8.8.2 Loss of teaching timeAssessed on school by school basis no central repository for data Redundancy in place for alternative premises , temporary and relocation of pupils to other establishments

• 8.8.3 Education dataMulti-risk assessment in place, multiple back-up systems available

Essential 8: Increase Infrastructure Resilience• 8.9 Healthcare (4)

• 8.9.1 Structural safety and disaster resilience of health care and emergency facilities

• 8.9.2 Health records and data

• 8.9.3 Availability of emergency healthcare including facilities and urgent medical supplies for acute needs.

Assessed against the risk of flooding

Assessed by NHS(E) with one provider (acute trust)

Major trauma centre and provider of acute care

Highlighted the interdependencies with social care services (provided by alternative providers)

Picked up potential dependencies on regional and UK healthcare networks

Identified direct and non-direct consequences (e.g. flooding to residential properties may delay patient discharge and therefore bed availability; community services may have difficulties in their delivery due to flood water leading to increased demand)

Identified BCM measures

Challenges drawing a single quantitative figure from this rich data

May lead to this provider conducting further work against the high risk scenarios in the CRR

This or a similar process may offer benefit in highlighting CRR risks to local service providers?


• 8.10 Administrative operations

• 8.10.1 (3) Assurance of continuity of all critical administration functionsInternal service level demand and performance data, HR Data, IT, OCR and Estates data, GMP Strategic Policies, GMP BC Plans- Strategic, Tactical ,Operational, Planning Toolkit and Guidance Documents, DR plans Assessed against threats and two of the CRR top risksEstimated number of days disruption under worst case scenarioSome information is sensitive (security)BCM plans and processes are dynamic and reflect the changing nature of threats and hazards, public service reforms and staff changesBCM plans are aligned with national standards, including ISOBCM arrangements do depend on other organisations e.g. supply chains and there is a wide variety of maturity in BC programmes between organisations which may impact unexpectedly on partners

Conclusions?

Conclusions• What does all the above tell us about the resilience of GM’s infrastructure?

• Do we better understand the resilience of our critical national and local infrastructure?

• Do we have a better view of potential impacts of different HLHI risks?

• Have we identified any areas where we would recommend GM invest in infrastructure improvement/enhanced response?

• Flagged up that key corporate business continuity risks (‘emergencies’ for the organisation) and risks arising from community risk register may not be aligned

• Link between causative hazards and risks could be clearer e.g. would flooding cause loss of a GSP or is loss of a GSP causative in its own right?

• Local resilience is part of wider overlapping networks of regional/national services and structures

• Supported development of new connections/relationships between services

• Complex systems/systems of systems

• The extent of some losses are influenced both by system design and planning by service providers and by the investment in resilience by customers (e.g. rather than electrical assets being designated as critical due to their importance for the functioning of some other critical asset, customers may be expected to invest in alternative power supplies)

• Cost of restoration (communications, electricity, water) designed to help establish the return on investment from investing in hardening the relevant infrastructure – how do these industries do this?

• Where assessments are against a worst case scenario, lower scores result. What would our expectations be around resilience levels against worst case scenarios?

• Varying balance in both sectors and the Scorecard about the importance of impacts across economy and public. (N.B. CRR includes a wider set of impact scoring?)

• Scenario much better understood following experience/debrief (compare with scenarios that sectors have not experienced)

• Suggest we take one essential and one or two risks and test them in a group meeting of stakeholders