Gregory Vlastos Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge

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Socrates' Disavowal of KnowledgeAuthor(s): Gregory VlastosSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 138 (Jan., 1985), pp. 1-31Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219545

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ThePhilosophicaluarterlyol. 5 No. 138

ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

The

Philosophical

QVarterlyVol.35No. 138 January985

SOCRATES' DISAVOWALOF KNOWLEDGE

BYGREGORY LASTOS

In Plato'searliest ialogues1, hen ocrates ayshe hasnoknowledge,oeshe ordoeshe notmeanwhathe says?The standard iewhas been thathedoes not. What can be said for his nterpretations wellsaid in Norman

1 I dividePlato'sdialogues nto hreegroups:(I) Elenctic:hese re the arliest.believe, ut hallnot rgue n this ccasion, hatnthesePlato recreatesin scenes which remostly ictional)he moralphilosophymethod nd

doctrines) f thehistorical ocrates. list hem n alphabeticalrderby self-explanatory

abbreviations:p.,Ch.,Cr., u.,G., HMi., on, a., Pr.,R.I (classifyinghefirst ookof heRepublic,ownto 354A11,with hepreceding, egardless f thetimeat which t was

written,ecause it satisfiesrilliantlyhesamecriterion).(II) Transitional:y.,HMa., Eud.:dialoguesnwhich hemethod f hosen I) is discardedwhiletheirmoral doctrines re preserved. argueforthis classificationn "Socratic

Elenchus",Oxfordtudies nAncienthilosophy(1983) 25-59 at 57-58. To this ssay, owhich hepresent ne is a companion-piece,shallbe referringythe bbreviationSE'.



2 GREGORYVLASTOS

Gulley's hilosophyf ocrates1968):2Socrates'professionf gnorances"an expediento encourage is nterlocutoro seekout thetruth,omakehimthinkhathe is joiningwith ocrates na voyage fdiscovery"p.69).More recently he opposite interpretationas found a clear-headedadvocate. erence rwinnhisPlato'sMoralTheory1974)3holds hatwhenSocratesdisclaimsknowledgehe should be takenat his word:he hasrenouncedknowledge nd is content o claimno more thantrue belief(pp.39-40).

I shall rgue hatwheneach of theseviews s confronted ith hetextualevidence ach is provedfalse: there re textswhichfalsifyhefirst,ndotherswhich alsifyhe second.Howcould this e?Theseviews reproper

contradictories:feithersfalse,mustnot heother e true?Notnecessarily.IfSocrates smaking ppropriatelyariable se of his wordsforknowing'4bothviews ouldbe false. shall rgue hat his sinfact he ase,proposinga hypothesishich xplainswhy ocrates houldwish odo just his.5 shallreview herelevantvidenceSection ), develop hehypothesisSection I),exhibittsexplanatoryower Section II), andmeet bjectionsSection V).

(III) Dialoguesof Plato'smiddleeriod, eginning ith heMeno:herebothmethod nddoctrinesrePlato's.

In present-daylatonic cholarshiphere s massive greementnthedialoguesn III) andon most f those n I). But theres widedisagreementnwhich houldgointo II) becausemiscellaneous riteria reemployed hichyield onflictingesults.

For allpractical urposes he Socrates" f his aper s theprotagonistf heworksn I).Those whodeny hatPlato atany ime nhis ifewrote ialogueswhich im torecreate isteacher's hilosophizingre atlibertyo think he"Socrates" fall thedialogues Platonicfictionmaintainingonsistency ithinachof those hree roups.My argument illnotbe

damaged fthey o.

2 Hereafter shallrefer othiswork nly ytheauthor's ame.3 HereafterPMT. Mydebt othisbook s very reat.Nothing have everreadon Socrates'

philosophyas done more o sharpen p my wnunderstandingf t.Onlythosewho are

strangersotheethos fscholarlyontroversyill ee anythingut ttestationfhigh steemin mycontinuingritique f PMT here and in a parallel ssay, Happiness nd VirtuenSocrates'MoralTheory", orthcomingntheProc. f heCambridgehilologicalocietyandalso in Topoi).

4 The verbs Exioraualt, ei6tval, ytyvaoaxetv, eraiCctv,nd their cognate nouns,ifany;theadjective ocpoq, nd the noun oocpia,which s used as interchangeableitherlorTa,uras e.g. at Ap. 23A7: here grtar/juryould have been substituted oraoocia

salvaveritate,s it n fact s at 19C6).5 Thisproposal reakswith reviousnterpretationswith ll ofthoseknown ome), ncludingan earlier ne of mine in my ntroductionoPlato'sPROTAGORAS [Jowett'sranslationrevised yM. Ostwald,G. Vlastos d.,New York,1956], xxx-xxxi), here conflated wodistinct laims:thatSocratesrenounces ertaintywhich s true) ndknowledgewhich s

false).Gulleyfell ntothe sametrap.He assumed hathis (perfectlyalid)critique f thesecond claim lso disposes fthe first.



SOCRATES' DISAVOWALOF KNOWLEDGE 3

IThe firstnterpretations virtuallybiquitous. t has evencaptured he

dictionaries. ebster's ives his ntrynder irony':

T1 A pretence f gnorancendofwillingnesso learnfrom nother ssumed n order omakethe other's alseconception onspicuous yadroit easoning called also"Socratic rony".

The O.E.D. givesthe same explanationorthe "etymologicalense" of

'irony':

T2 Dissimulation, retence;especially of] ignorancefeigned ySocrates s a meansofconfutingn adversary(Socratic rony).

'Pretence' s thekeywordhere.Socratessdissembling,houghor xcellentreasons.To the pedagogicalones adduced by Gulleymightbe addedSocrates' nterestnmanoeuvringis nterlocutorsnto he nswerer'sole,so hemaykeepthequestioner's orhimself. ristotlettests hisuse ofthe

disclaimer:T3 Soph.El. 183B6-8: "... Socratesasked questionsbutgaveno replies: orhe confessedJ/utoOdyEt)e hadno knowledge".

But Aristotle s not implyinghatthe disclaimerwas a pretence.6His

wording tronglyuggestshe pposite.7he same uggestionsconveyed ya writerfSocraticdialogues ontemporaryith lato's:

T4 Aeschines Socraticus,Alcibiades fragment 0C,Dittmar): I had no knowledge could teach the man to

improve im,but thoughthat yassociating ithhimcould mprove imthroughmy ove".

6 Quitethe ontrary:s Gulleynotes p.62),Aristotleites ocrates s one who rgueswithout

havingknowledge f the subjectunder discussion not acg ci6bc;, ut "peirastically"(Soph.El. 183A39ff.). f.mydiscussion f thispoint nSE, 42-43.

7 oCuoOdyEt in past imperfect:he used to confess').For 'pretended' r feigned'Aristotle

wouldhave writtenrQoaerotlTro: he uses thisverbrepeatedlyn his discussion f theEilQWv in N.E. 1127B10ff.and t7Qoaooiriotq in 1108A21)and inMagnaMor. 1193A28ff.

(notealso the use of oJLo)oyElv in contrasto rQoavrotEleioatn thedescriptionf the

darUtevrtlxo;, .E. 1127A25, rd tvJrdQgovraouoAoyw5v.)or Aristotle ocrates isindeedan Ei'Qov,but notfordisavowingnowledge: owhere oes he bring heprofessionof gnorance nder he disclaimerfprestigiousualities"which e ascribes o Socrates uaeltQWV.



4 GREGORYVLASTOS

In Plato theonly haracter hosaysthat ocrates s feigninggnorances

Thrasymachus:T5

Republic,337A3-7: "Whenhe heard hishe

gavegreatsardonichorselaughnd said: "Heracles! This isSocrates'customaryeigningiewovEia).I hadpredictedhis I had toldthepeopleherethatyouwould notwant to give answers nd would dissemble

(EtiQwvEOoto) and would do anythingut answer f

youarequestioned".8

But Socratesdoesnot gree,nordoesanyone riendlyo him. fwe were obelieve

Thrasymachus,e wouldhaveto do so without

upportrom

nyf

our earliest ources.And we would have muchexplainingo do. How could Socrates be

dissembling sayingwhathe does notbelieve whenhis own first ule nelenctic ialogue s saywhatyoubelieve'?9 ndhowwouldwe account orthepretence n circumstancesn which t cannotbe meant o bring heinterlocutorntothe answerer's ole?So, notably,t the conclusion fthedebatewithCallicles.Why hould Socrates aythen, I do not assert he

things sayas one who knows"G. 506A3-4),andagainthree ages ater,after eclaringhathistheseshavenowbeen"bound ndclamped ownbyargumentsf ron ndadamant"508E-509A),why houldhe then dd,

T6 Gorgias509A4-6: "But as for me my position(io'yog) is always he same:10 do not knowhowthese

thingsre".118 Here eiQovet'a clearlymeans dissembling'.t is given hissense in thetranslationsy

Cornford,indsay, ndRobin,but smistranslateds 'irony'ntheonesbyBloom,Grube,Shorey,possibly ecause the conceptualdifferenceetween ronynd dissemblings not

observed: he ntentionodeceive, uilt nto hemeaning f the atter,must e absent romtheformer'Whatfineweather!',aid while t s rainingatsanddogs, s notmeant o foolanybody). iQwcove'a traddles this difference, ence Plato may use it for eitherdissemblingas here ndsometimeslsewhere:oph.268B-C, Laws908E) or ronyas quiteclearlynSymp. 18D6 and G. 489E1-3, lessclearlynAp. 37E, Symp. 16B4).9 Cr.40C-D; Pr.331C; R. 337C, 346A, 350A;G. 495A,500B. And see thediscussion fthisrule nSE (cf.n. 1 above),35-38.

o0The )oyos at 509A4is notthetheseshehasdefendedgainst allicles tothesehe refersbyraviraatA5, as previouslyt 508E6 and subsequentlyt 509B1),but hisdisavowal fknowledgecf. ov6e ei6doa;AEyc at 506A3-4 with adyos6ot ovx ol6a here).Nor is

do'yog eingused here to mean argument'so translatedy Irwin Plato:GORGIAS,Oxford, 979]); Socratesdisavows nowledge ere ndat506A3-4,butdoesnot rgueforthedisavowal.

l This disavowal,o unqualifiedn theface of t,Gulley p.69) dismisses ya complicatedexegeticalmanoeuvre,orrowed rom . R. Dodds (Plato'sGORGIAS[Oxford,959],541).Formy ritique f t see my etort oDodds in"Afterthoughtsn theSocratic lenchus",OxfordtudiesnAncienthilosophy(1983), pp. 71-4, at 71.




Ifthedisavowalsfalse,why ishoutthefalsehoodt this atemomentnthedebate?

But we have notyetreached hestrongestvidence hat hedisavowal s

sincere. t comes n theApology. haerephon ad asked tDelphi:"Is thereanyonewiser hanSocrates?".Andthe oraclehad said,"No".

That answer,Socrates tells the jury,plungedhim into prolongedperplexity:

T7 Apology1B2-5: "When heard his kept hinking:'Whaton earth oes thegodmean?What s hehintingt?For I am awareofbeingwise innothing, reat r small.What then ould he mean

by sayinghat amwise?'".

CouldSocrateshave saidtohimself,I am aware fbeingwise nnothing',fhe thoughtt untrue? he samequestion risesagaina few ines ater sSocratesnarratesheoutcome fhis firstncounter ith victim fconceitofknowledge:

T8 Apology1D2-6: "As I wasgoing way rom hismanI reasoned omyselfhat amindeedwiser hanhe. It is

unlikelyhat ither f us knows nythingobleor good.Buthe,having oknowledge,hinks e knows omething,while , having one,don'tthink haveany".

Whatwouldwe make of thatnarrated oliloquy n thehypothesishatSocraticgnorances feigned?s thenarrative eant o be fact r fiction?f

fiction,ocrates s lying o the udges,to whomhe had promised,ustamomentarlier20D): "Now shall ellyouthewhole ruth".f fact if he

storys meant o be true then ocrateswouldhavehadto believe hathehad

performednunperformablepeech-act, amely,

hat e hadknowinglydissembledo himself.

Let us then onsider healternativeypothesisthat Socrates laimsno

knowledgeorhimself... He allows othhis nterlocutorsndhimselfruebeliefswithoutnowledge'.12 fso,how s itthatwhathekeeps earchingor

throughoutis ife s not truebelief, utknowledge?

12 PMT pp. 40-1. Though rwin's s theonly rgued ut defence f this iew nthescholarlyliterature,have the mpressionhatt swidelyhared. t s conceded nMylesBurnyeat's"Examples nEpistemology:ocrates, heaetetus ndG.E. Moore",Philosophy2 (1977),pp.381-98,at384ff.; he oncession,ncidentalo hisdiscussion f he Socratic allacy",snot rgued or nitsown ccount.t sasmarginalandmorehesitant)nG. Santas, ocrates(London, 1979), 119ff. nd 311, n. 26. To Irwin's rgument cannotdo detailedustice.Constraintsfspaceallowmeno more han worejoindersnd a moregeneral eflection:

(1) Whilehis thesis s a perfectlyeasonable onclusion rom hetextshe cites,thattextual ase is incomplete:missing romtare a series ftextsalsounnoticedyBurnyeat



6 GREGORYVLASTOS

T9 Gorgias 05E4-5: "I thinkwe shouldbe conten-tiouslyagertoknowwhat s true nd what s false boutthethingswe discuss .."

T10 Gorgias72C6-D1: "Forthe hings e aredebatingare ... thingswhich oknows noblest, ottoknowmostbase.Fortheir umandsubstances this: oknow rnot oknowwho s happy ndwho s not".

Ifafter ecadesofsearchingocrates emainedonvinced hat e still newnothing13,ouldnotfurtherearching avebecomea charade orratherworse, orhe holds that irtue is" knowledge:fhe has noknowledge,islife s a

disaster,e hasmissedoutonvirtue

nd,therewith,n

happiness.How is it then hathe is serenelyonfidente has achieved oth?14Inany ase,theres a familiarextwhere ocrates ays latlyhat eknows

a moral ruth:

and Santas)where ocrates, houghtoppinghort fassertingxplicitlyhathehasmoral

knowledge, everthelessmpliestunambiguouslyT12-T17 below).(2) I shall rgue hat hetextswhichhavebeen dubbed theSocratic allacy",whichhe

cites n support f hisview, re in fact nconsistentith t. I shallexpound 1) at length,

devotingo it therest fthepresent ection. 2) must waitmydiscussion f"theSocraticFallacy" n Section II.)

(3) I surmise hat rwinand thosewho agreewithhim are conflatinghe claim to

knowledge ith he claim ocertainty,s Gulley ndI did earlier n (cf.n. 5 above).Onceone comesto realize hat ocrates an avowknowledgenthebasis ofnothingetterhan

falliblyustifiedrue eliefas I shallbe arguing e does:Section I below) ne s less ikelyodismiss rbypass hose extsnwhich ocrates ays r mplies hat ehasknowledgen the

strengthfnothing etter.13 "Absolutelyothing"s the lear mportfT7 andT8, whoseforce asbeen blunted ast ll

recognitionnscholarlyomment n it, s e.g. inEduardZeller, okratesnddieSokratiker

(English ranslationf the3rd German dition yO. J. Reichel reprinted962),p.124[I have added thereference-marks]):[a] Socratesreallyknewnothing,r to express t

otherwise,b]hehad nodeveloped heorynd nopositive ogmaticrinciples".Who wouldhave thought hata seriousphilosophermighthave said [a] and meant b]? Similaremasculationsf Socrates' vowal f gnorancebound nthescholarlyiterature;or fair

sample ee theexpositionf whatW. K. C. Guthrie erms the gnorancef Socrates" n

HistoryfGreek hilosophy,ol. iii,TheFifth enturynlightenment,22ff.14 His avowalsof epistemicnadequacy, requentn thedialogues, re neverparalleled y

admission f moralfailure; he asymmetrys striking. e will face the last judgmentconfidenthat"he has neverwrongedmanor god in word or deed" (G. 522D); he is

convincedhat he does nowrong oanyone" Ap.37B3-4). Thathedoesnot ayheknowsthis as Irwin bserves, MT 294) is no objection: eing onvinced fp is consistent ith

knowingp. s for appiness, o scenerecordednthe eculariteraturef heWestportraysmore ompellinglyerenityndeven heerfulness'inxtremishan oes thedeath cene nthePhaedo117B3, C4), whichsadmissibles evidence fSocrates' ersonal ualities: ere, salso in Alcibiades' peech in theSymp., hepersonal haracter f Socratessurvives istransformationnto mouthpiecefPlatonic hilosophy.




T11 Ap. 29B6-7: "... but that to do injustice nddisobeymy uperior,odorman, his know o be evil ndbase".

This single ext,fgiventsfullweight, ould ufficeo show hat ocratesclaimsknowledgef a moral ruth.rwin enies tanyweightnthegroundthatt s so exceptional,15hich, fcourse,t s,16butnot s much o as heand others avethoughtt.

Considerwhat Socratessaysto Callicleswhentheir ebate s abouttostart:

T12 G. 486E5-6: "I know ellthatfyouwill greewith

me on thosethingswhichmy oulbelieves, hosethingswillbe thevery ruth".17

To grasp he mportfthis ext or hehypothesishat ocrates s claimingto haveknowledgefmoral ruth emust ake ccount fwhathe aimstoachieve nelenctic rgumentndhowhegoesabout chievingtwithin heframeworkf a standard lenchus.18 is aim,he says, s to compelhisinterlocutorso "witness gainst hemselves",19.e. to induce them o seethat the falsehoodof theirtheses is entailedby propositionsresentlyembeddedwithin heir wnsystemfbelief propositionshey hemselvesconsider rue.To achieve his imhe figuresut whatpremises heywillacceptwhichwill enable him to contrivehecontradiction20nd securestheircceptance y dhoc greement.etp be an interlocutor'shesiswhichSocrates onsiders alse, nd etq and rbethepremisesnwhich greement15 PMT 58. He givesno other easonfordismissingt.16 This is indeed the onlyplace in Plato's earliestdialogueswhereSocrates avowsflatly,

without esort o ndirectionfany ort, hathe knows moral ruth.Why his houldhave

happened o rarelys an importantuestion o whichmyhypothesisupplies n answerinSection V below).

17 Inexplicablybutperhapsnotunpredictably:f.n. 12(3) above)there sno confrontationfthis extnPMTnoryet f he nes shallbe citingftert nthepresentectionT13-T17):noneof them re listed n thebook's commendablyull) ndexocorum;heir elevance oIrwin's hesis s ignored.

18 Formy nalysisf'standardlenchus'theusualform f lencticrgumentnPlato's arliest

dialogues) ee ES 38ff. indicate here fn.47) brieflyome differencesetween rwin's

understandingf Socrates'use of lenchus nd mine. incethey o not ffectmateriallyurdifferencesn mypresent heme simplifyy gnoringhem.

19 For thereferencesnd comment ee SE 48-50.20 "The art of elenchus s to findpremises elievedbythe answerer ndyet entailinghe

contraryfhisthesis"RichardRobinson, lato's arlier ialectic,Oxford, 953),p. 15).To'believed' dd andadmitted'. or f he nswerer ere o concealhistrue pinion ocrateswouldbe stymied: e canonly efute heses owhich he nterlocutorillownup (of.n. 9above). Hence Socrates' joy at meetingn thepersonof Callicles an adversary hoseconvictionsre at thefarthestxtreme rom isown ndwho anbecounted n toblurt hem



8 GREGORYVLASTOS

is reached.Does Socrates,forhispart,believethat and r are true?nstandard lenctic rgumenthere an be no doubtofthis: tfollows romSocrates' conviction hat he contradictionoes morethanexpose ncon-

sistency ithinhe nterlocutor'seliefs that trefutesisthesis,s we cansee, for nstance,when Polus is told that heargument hichfaulted im

"proved rue" heSocratic hesis gainst is G. 479E8). Socrates ouldnothavesaid thisunless he were convincedhat and rwhich re shown oentailnot-p re themselvesrue.Would he be prepared osay hathe knows

theyretrue? ust his s whatwe learn rom 12: ifCallicleswill gree nqandr,he (Socrates)21knowswell"that andr willbe true.How so? WhatmakesSocrates hink e knows his?And whatdoes he meanbysaying e

does? These arehighly elevantuestions. heywillbe answeredn duecourse fn. 3 below).For thepresentet us be contentogetnomore hanthis utof T12: Socrates s claimingo know hat hepremises o whichhe

expectsCallicleswillagreearetrue.Now ifSocrates s assuming e knows hat hosepremises retrue,we

may nfer hathe is also assuming e knows hat heconclusions,alidlydeducedtherefrom,re true.This inferenceeems afeenough.But etusnottake t forgranted.s there extual vidence hatSocratesmakesthe

latterssumption?here s: forwhenhisargumentasrebutted, Socratesfeelsentitledo assert hatnot-phas therebybeen mademanifest",22r,equivalently,hat he nterlocutorow"sees"that his s thecase.23To saythis s altogetherifferentromayinghat he nterlocutoras nowcometobelievenot-p,which could havehappened24 orepistemically eightless

out. Here Socrateswill find"the stonebywhichthey estgold" (486D4). What thistouchstone ill estwillbe Socrates' ssumptionhat ven hemostmisguidednddepravedmanwill still arryn his ownsoul a residueof truthwhich an be shown o entail he

negation f hisperverse iews.This iswhy ocrates an tellCallicles:"inyour greementandmineconsummationf truth illbe already ttained"487E6-7).

21 Withoutmplyinghat alliclesdoes so too.FromAknowshatp ndB agrees hatp' tdoesnotfollowhat knows hatp; nd Socrateshasnot aid that eliefs fhiswillbe true nlyfCalliclesagrees: n ifyouwill gree'he names sufficient,ota necessary,ondition. oserve ocrates s a "touchstone"cf. hepreceding ote)Calliclesneeds noknowledge; istrue eliefs uffice. tnopointntheir ebatedoesSocrates redit allicleswith nowledge.In "youhave knowledgend goodwillnd outspokenness"487A2-3) themockerys as

palpable nthe first s in the second of thewords have talicized.22 cpavY cpaivouat, in its non-dubitativeenseof come to light',becomemanifest':SJ

(subverbocaiva),passive,B1), forwhich tsuse inmathematicalrgument ight e cited:DemocritusB155 [=Plutarch,de commun. otit. 079E]: q(aveirat rd rov xvAiv6bovrnenovcO6d6 o-vog: willmanifestlyavegot hepropertiesf thecylinder"so Cherniss

translates).23 Cf.my Afterthoughtsn the Elenchus" fn.11 above),71-72.24

If tdid. tmight ot:Calliclesmay erightnsayinghat many" ind ocrates npersuasive(G. 513C5-6).




reasons becausehe wascajoledorbullied r ustworn own. t stoclaimthathe hasnow beengiven ood eason o believe hat is false.And tosaythis s to makea knowledge-claim,fwe giveto 'knowledge'ts minimal

senseof justifiedruebelief'.25 ut s there vidence hat ocrates s awareofmakingucha claim thathewouldbe prepared osaythat he elencticrefutationfp has putthe nterlocutorn theposition fknowinghat isfalse, nd not-p s true?There is. We see himsaying s much on twooccasions.

The firstomes ttheconclusionfhisargumentgainstthemultitude"in the Protagoraswhich establishesthatwrongaction (d/uaQravetv)comes about not because the agent s "overcomeby pleasure",as his

adversaries ad maintained, ut because of his ignorance f the good.Socrates henproceeds otellthem hat,nviewofwhathisargumentasshown,

T13 Pr. 357D7-E1: "You yourselves, urely,know(ibrae rov)thatwrong ctiondonewithout nowledgesdonebecauseof gnoranced/ua&ia)".

In sayinghat heynow hishe is implyinghat eknowst,for fhe did not

he would haveno reasonfor ayinghat hey o.Here is the econdoccasion:Thrasymachus'srazen laim hatustice snovirtue nd njustice ovice,forustices "stupidity"nd njusticesoundcounsel", s attacked ya standard lenctic rgumentR. 348C2-350C11),which oncludes:

T14 R. 350C10-11: "Therefore,he ustmanhasbeenrevealedto us to be good and wise, the unjustto be

ignorantnd bad".

Then,a Stephanus agelater,withoutny nterveningtrengtheningfthe

argumentor hat onclusion,ocrates emarks:

25 I shallbe arguinghat lencticallyustifiablerue eliefmakes ood enseofwhat ocrates s

claimingo havewhenhe avowsknowledge.rwinoo holds PMT37ff.) hat he rue eliefshe allowsSocrates resupportedyelencticrgumentcf.n. 18 above).Evenso,hedeniesthatnSocrates'view hey onstitutenowledge.his is the rux fourdispute. his isnotwhetherjustifiedruebelief' s an acceptable ense forknowledge'nstandard ses ofthetermwhichnowadaysmost hilosophers oulddeny) utrather hetherocrates a) does

avowwhatheunderstandsyhiswords orknowledge', hateverhatmay e,and b) insodoinghas nviewnothingtrongerhanjustifiedrue elief'. nthe aseof a) the videnceampresentingere,never reviouslyonfrontednitsentiretyespeciallyexts 12-T17),shouldbe conclusive.nthe ase of b) I am contentoargue orust hat; ut f casecouldbe made forgiving ocrates'conception fknowledgehe benefit fsomethingtronger("beliefwhich trackstruth" s expoundedby R. Nozick, "Knowledge",PhilosophicalExplanationsOxford, 982)) I wouldwelcome t; cannotnow see that t could be.



10 GREGORYVLASTOS

T15 R. 351A5-6: "... fornjusticesignorance-noonecould still not know this (oviSei adv 'rt rooro26

ayvoj aEtlV)".

- that s tosay,noweveryone ouldknow t:afortiori,o wouldSocrates.There are two more passages where Socrates lets on thathe has

knowledgewithoutctually aying o. The firstomes ate n theGorgias,whenthefight gainstCallicles has beenwonand Socrates s engaged n

mopping-up perations. e tells parable.A sea-captainwhohasbroughthispassengersafe oport fter perilousourneymusesonwhetherr nothe did them goodturn ybringinghemback alive.His thoughtsakeSocratic urn.He reasons hat fone ofthemhadbeen

sufferingrom a

grave nd incurable" hysical ilment,ohim afereturn ouldhavebeennoboon.Norwould t,thecaptain eflects,ooneafflictedith n equallygrievousllness fthe oul"whichs so muchmoreprecious han hebody".Then Socrates dds:

T16 G. 512B1-2: "He knowshat or wickedman t sbetter ot tolive,forhe mustneeds ive ll".

This sea-captains Socrates' reature. is thoughtsndreasoningsrewhat

Socrates aysthey re.27 o for ocrates osaythat hesea-captain nowsthat or nincurably ickedmandeathwouldbebetterhanifes as good s

sayinghathe,Socrates,knows his.The same admission s made in the Critowhere we meet the same

doctrine hat ustas lifewould not be worthivingn a disease-ravaged,ruined ody o neither ould t beworthivingwith comparablyamagedsoul. Here this s expounded ySocrateshimselfnpropriaersona from47D7 to 48A3 hespeaksndirect iscourse andsimultaneouslymputedo

a mysteriousigure ho s described nly s "theone, fthere s one,whoknows"Cr. 47D1-2):

T17 48A5-7: "About he ustandtheunjust, bestofmen,we should onsider otwhat hemany utwhat hemanwhoknows hallsaytous - that inglemanandthetruth".

Who sthisman?Likethe ea-captainftheparablehe is a constructfthe

26 I take the referent o be the immediatelyreceding lause, e'rEt6e eQ eor'ivdCatuiai a'dbxia, whichmaynow be regarded s known "no one could stillnot know t")because tfollows irectlyrom he ong rgumentt348C2-350C11,whose onclusion asasserted categoricallydvarc'qcavrat, 350C10) and is now regarded as agreed(6tlwooAoyyroa'd?eua, 50D4).

27 And mostcertainlyelieves o be true:cf.G. 505A-B and Cr. 47D-E, whereSocrates

speaksdirectly,ithoutesort o a notionalmouthpiece.




argument.ocrateswould haveno ground or mputing nowledgebout

anythingoeither igure nlesshewereconvinced hathe himself adthat

knowledge.fhe didnotbelieveheknowswhathesays heynow, issaying

that hey o wouldbe a fraud.Thus Socrates' disavowalof knowledge s a paradox.He makes it

frequently,xplicitly,mphatically:nditssincerityannot e doubted, orwhathe tells thers e also tellshimselfnthe nmost rivacyf elf-scrutinywherehe isnotpreparingface omeet hefaceshewillmeetbutfacing ptowhathe is. Butwhenwe go throughurtexts ispassionately,ithoutinitial arti ris,we see firstT9, T10) thatknowledge,ottruebelief,swhathe keepssearchingor, ndthen,fwekeep ooking s carefullynd

imaginativelys we should,wecansatisfyurselveshat ocrates shimselfconvinced hathe has foundwhathe has been looking or:knowledgefmoral truth e avowsopenly n T11, programmaticallyn T12, byclear

implicationn T13 andT15, throughotional roxiesnT16 and T17. Canwe make senseof thisbehaviour?want oargue hatwe can.

II

Let usreflectn ourownuseof he ermsknow' nd knowledge'.hattheyare all-purposewords,used to mean quite differenthingsn different

contexts,s a commonplacen present-dayhilosophy. ut there s one

aspectof this ommonplace hich s seldomnoticed nd whenfirst oticed

may ven ook ike paradox: here re timeswhenwereadily ay,na givencontext,hatweknow omething,hile n a sufficientlyifferentontext ewouldbe reluctantosayweknow t andmightvenpreferodeny hatwe

do, and thiswithoutnysense ofhaving ontradictedurselves hereby.Consider the proposition,Veryheavy smoking s a cause of cancer'.

Ordinarilywouldhaveno hesitationn saying hat know his, houghhavenotresearchedhesubject nd havenottried o learn venthehalf fwhat could be learnedfrom hosewho have. Now supposethat am

challenged,But doyouknow t?'.Sensing he shifto thestrongerriteriafor knowing"hequestioner asinview, mighthenfreelyonfess hat

don't, ddingperhaps,Ifyouwant otalk osomeonewhodoes,askN.' - arenownedmedicalphysiologistho has been researchingheproblem or

years.By sayingnthis ontext,heknows, don't', wouldnotbe implying

that hadmadea mistake hen hadpreviouslyaid didknow thatwhatshouldhave said nsteadsthat ll had wasa true elief. he convictionnwhose trengthhadactedwhen gaveup smoking ears gohadnotbeen

justa truebelief. had reasonsfor t- imperfectnes,tobe sure,whichwouldnothavebeennearly ood enough or researchcientist:nhiscaseitwouldbe a disgrace osayheknows n reasonsnobetterhan hose.But



12 GREGORYVLASTOS

forme those reasonswere,and stillare, good enough"forall practicalpurposes"; n the trengthf hose dmittedlymperfecteasons hadmadeone ofthewisestecisions fmy ife.

I submit hat longroughlyimilar ines- theparallel s meant o besuggestive, ot exact- we maylook for our best explanation orthe

extraordinaryact hat,withoutvincing ny enseof nconsistencyrevenstrain,ocrates andeny, nd doeshabituallyeny, hathehasknowledgewhilebeingwellaware hat e does have t.To resolve heparadoxwe need

only upposethathe ismaking dualuse ofhiswordsforknowing.When

declaringhat e knows bsolutelyothing e isreferringo that erytrongsense n whichphilosophers adusedthem efore nd wouldgo onusing

them ongafter whereone saysone knowsonlywhenone is claimingcertainty.his would leave himfreeto admitthathe does have moral

knowledgen a radicallyweaker sense - the one requiredby his ownmaverickmethodof philosophicalnquiry, he elenchus. This is the

hypothesiso which referredt the start. shallexplaintfurthern the

present ection nd shallproceed oarguefor t ndetail nthe next.I startwith a passage thatgives good insightnto the conception f

knowledge cceptable o Greekphilosophersround his ime:

T18 Rep.477E:'Socrates, Not ong go youagreed hatknowledgend belief renot thesame".Glaucon, Howcould anyman of sense identifyhatwhich s infallible(dvauaQdQrrrov)ith that which is not infallible?".Socrates, You areright".

Is Plato28 eally aying hat o qualifys knowledge cognitivetatemust

possess infallibility?hat is how his ownword comes through ll thestandard ranslations.ut considering ow strong view we wouldbe

imputingo him fwe werereallyounderstandim obe sayinghat his swhatdistinguishesnowledgeromrue elief,etus make urethatwe arenotdoing o on thestrengthf a tendentiousranslation.he Greekwordcouldbe used to meannot inerrable'thatwhich annot e in error), ut

onlyinerrant'thatwhichsnot nerror).We canseePlatoelsewheresingtheword neachoftheseways:nthe atter, henTheaetetus ells ocrates,in strikingontrasto whatGlaucon had toldhim n ourpresent ext, hattrue belief 6oEd?ctv d'r!i90) is dvaitdQarrlov29 not in error Tht.

28 The readermaybe reminded hat take he"Socrates" f Plato'smiddle ialogues o be amouthpieceorwhatPlatothinkst thetime fwriting,henhe is nolonger ecreatingisteacher's hilosophizingfn.1 above;andcf. fn.14 sub in.).

29Correctlyranslatedfree fmistakes' yJohnMcDowell Oxford, 973).WhatTheaetetusmeanswe can see from he mmediateollow-up,and all that esults romt s admirableand good",which, s McDowell observes d loc. "is best understoodn the ight fMeno96D5-97C1 1", .e. that or heright uidance f ction rue eliefs as goodas knowledge.




200E); in the former,when Socratesasks Thrasymachusf rulersaredva,uLirprot - incapable ferrorR. 339C1).30Can we be surethat helatter,not the former,s the waydvaudaQrrrov is beingused in our

present ext?We can. Plato is laying owna criterionordistinguishingknowledgerom elief s such- hencefromrue, o lessthanfalse, elief.

Inerrancyouldnot erve his urpose:f beliefstrue,t sno ess nerrantthan s knowledge.31Infallible' henmustbe whatPlatomeans. So he is

maintaininghatwe know thatP is trueonlywhen we possesstheveryhighest egreeofcertaintyoncerninghetruth fP.

On firstearing,hisnotion sforbiddinglyntractable.ne hardlynowshow to come to gripswith conceptionwhich ndows ecularknowledge

with nfallibleertainty. e can makebetter rogress youtflankingheposition, xplainingwhythe conceptionwhich s being denied makesexcellent ense- is indeedtheonewe livebyall the time.Whatwouldbemeantby saying hat ureveryday nowledges fallible?Withoutssayinganydeep epistemology,t will ufficeor resent urposes oholdthat nehas fallible nowledgehat is truef hefollowingonditionsrefulfilled:

1 One believesP on evidence ;

2 P is true ndQ is true;3 Q is reasonable vidence or ;4 ButQ does not entail : Q could be true ndP false.32

Let 'P' stand or I locked hedoorwhen left hehousethismorning'. o Iknow his? wouldnot hesitate osayso. Is my laim o know t nfallible?

Obviouslyot.Why ot? ecause he vidence,, doesnot ntail he ruthf .

30 This has to be the sense ifThrasymachuss to sustainhis definitionf justice'as 'theinterest f "the stronger"' nd maintain hatto obey the "stronger"s (always) ust(339B7-8). For given he atter, hen,werethe ruler qua "stronger")o issue a mistakenorder, oobey t wouldbe just,yet lsounjust, ince tcommands hedoing fsomethingcontraryo the stronger's"nterest. o avoid his ontradictionhrasymachus'efinitionf'justice'must e buttressedpby he ssumptionhat ua"stronger"heruler s incapableferror:nfallible.

31 Whenthe mbiguitys thus esolvedheres,obviously,o contradictionnPlato's ayingnT18 that ruebelief s notdvaudQrryrovnd sayingn Tht. 00E that t s.

32 I have aid down ufficientonditions or allible nowledge: hereknowledge' 'justifiedtruebelief', fallibleknowledge' 'falliblyustifiedruebelief, i.e. true beliefwhosejustificationalls hort fcertaintyecause trests n evidencewhich onstituteseasonablegrounds or he beliefbut does notguaranteetstruth.n sayinghat uchknowledgesfallible ne is notsayinghat nemaybe mistakennbelieving hat ne knows o be true(whichwouldbe nonsense:I know ' entailsP istrue', s Socrates ecognizedG.454D]),butonly hat ne maybe mistakenn claimingo know his, .e. in claiminghat ne hasreasonable vidence or hat elief nd that hebelief s true.



14 GREGORYVLASTOS

LetQ be, as is often hecase, ustmymemoryfhavingurned hekey nthe ock as I went utofthedoor.The truth fQ33certainlyoes notentailthat fP: mymemory,sually eliable, oeswrong t times. his could be

oneofthose imes. s itthen easonable obelieve onevidences insecureas that? es, entirelyeasonable. or supposethecontrary.upposethatinsisted n strongervidence. could getit,forexample, y phoningneighbourotryhe dooror,better till, yrushingack tocheck hedoormyself.Would thisbe a reasonablehing odo? t wouldnot:thebenefitfthe trengthenedvidencewouldnotbeworthts ost: here sgreater tilityin ivingwith herisk hat mightemistakenhan ngoing othe roubletwould take to reduce the insecurityf its evidential ase. There are

circumstances hen twould e reasonable o do that. upposetherehadbeenmany urglariesnmyneighbourhoodndthat priceless icassowashangingnthe iving oom nplainview f nyone nteringhehouse.Thenitwouldbe reasonable ogo toenormousrouble oraisemy ertaintyhatthedoorwas ocked.Butsincenothingmuch sin eopardyfP isfalse, amwellcontent oclaim hat know onnothingetter hanmy ecollection.fI werenotcontento ivewith uch deflationfthedemands or ertaintywould,quite iterally,o mad: I would ointhecompulsive and-washer,

whowillnot ccept hefact hat ehas scrubbed is handswithhisofexusttenminutesgo as a goodreasonfor elievinghat hey re nowfree romdeleterious erms.The willingnesso live withfallible nowledges builtinto hehuman ondition. nly godcould do withoutt.Only crazymanwouldwant o.

We can nowconfronthealternativeonceptionfknowledgehat ed agreat hilosophero accept nfallibilitys its hallmark. learly, e didnotmean ocover ases ike heones nmy xample. hese he woulddismiss skitchen-stuff.is

paradigmases wouldbe

preciselyhose nwhich t is

plausible o claimthat hesecurity-gapetween andP cannot rise. nAristotlehesemaybe theoneswhere nhisviewnoQ distinct rom isrequired propositions hich, s he puts t,"are known hroughhem-selves":

T19 Aristotle,r.An. 64B34-36: "It is ofthenature fsome things o be known hroughhemselves; f otherthingsobe knownhroughhingsther han hemselves".

All of the first rinciples f a science itselarrryltovtxa dQaXai) re ofthis sort:propositionstrue and primary, hichproduceconviction otthroughther hingsutthroughhemselves"Top. 100B1-2).ForAristotlejusttounderstandor"think",oelv)suchpropositionss tobe satisfiedftheir ruth:33 I.e. thefact hat do have thismemory, hichmay, rmaynot,be veridical.




T20 Aristotle, etaph. 051B31-1052A1:"About uch

thingst s impossibleobe deceived:we eitherhinkhemor not (daA' r' voelv i' trj) ... to thinkthem is [to

possess]thetruth".34

Ifwe start ith ropositionsf his ort,makinghem he firstrinciples"(archai)of our demonstrations,nd movebeyond hemonlyby stepsof

necessarynference, verypropositionn the sequence will satisfyhe

infallibilityriterion:oranyP in thatordered ystem be it one of its"immediate"irstrinciplesr oneofthenecessaryerivationsherefromtheclaim hat is true ouldgo wrong nlyfwe fail o understand hatweare

sayingrwhat ollows

ecessarilyromt.Here

every, asAristotleikes

to emphasize,s a necessarytatement:

T21 Aristotle,ost.An. 71B3-4: "If somethings the

object funqualifiednowledge,t s mpossibleor ttobeotherwiserovr' d6SvaTov daw'i; 'Eltv)".35

Statementsf this ortno argumentould nduceus totakeback:

T22 Aristotle,bid.72B3-4: "He whohas unqualifiedknowledge must be immoveable by persuasion(duetrdteazorovvat)".

In Platotoo the ssentialsf his onceptionfknowledgeremaintained,though eachedby differentoute, or lato's ttitudeomathematics,hemodel cience f he ge, s so different.36or Aristotlehefirstrinciplesf

34 Aristotles notappealing o self-evidences a psychologicaltate, .e. to thefeeling f

certainty,ut o nsight that nderstandingfessencewhich e takes o be encapsulatednthe first rinciplesf an axiomatized cience cf.thequotation rom urnyeatn thenextnote sub in.) failed o makethisclear nmy SocraticElenchus" cf.n. 1 above)when

ascribingoAristotleheview hat hepremises f ll demonstrativecience reself-evidenttruths. hough 'self-evidence' s a close counterpartf Aristotle's hrase known6t'avTr (from hich ur termself-evident'eems o derive ia theLatin er enotum),tmaybe best to avoid t est tsuggest psychologicalrocesswhichAristotleoes nothave nview.

35 Cf. M. Burnyeat,Aristotle n Understandingnowledge", nAristotlen Science:The'Posteriornalytics',tudiaAristotelica (1981), pp.97-139, at 111: "To understandtheorem oumust nderstandthat].. it snecessaryecause t sdemonstrableromriorprinciples hich re themselvesecessary.. becausetheyreper epredicationsxpressinga definitionalonnectionPr.An.74B5-12 with, 4). What s requireds a predicationaB

where ither belongs nthe definitionfB orB belongs nthe definitionfA".36 I have nview hedefinitiveositionnthemiddle ooksoftheRepublic:ot he ransitional

onedisplayedntheM., wherehe borrowsrom hegeometricianshe hypotheticalethodof investigation"VeVnroEoew;Oxoneirat,, 86E), offers o critique fmathematics,anddraws he distinctionetween nowledgend truebelief97E-98A) withouteferencetothe"unhypothesizedirstrinciple"f heRepublic510B7,511B6) and withoutppealtoan ontologyfeternal orms.



16 GREGORYVLASTOS

that cience reself-certifying.ot so for lato,whoregardshe xiom-setsofgeometryndnumber-theorys mere"hypotheses"nd themathemati-cian as "dreamingboutreality"o longas his demonstrationsave no

greaterecurityt their ase.37That iswherePlato'sdialecticianmust akeover, reatingheprimitivesfmathematicss mere stepping-stones"nd

"spring-boards"o "thefirst rinciplefall",38which s itself ertain ndconfers ertaintyn everythingrounded n it.39 o forPlatotoo,as forAristotle, nowledgeconsistsof propositionswhich are "secure andunshakable"Ti. 29B7) anddiffersromrue pinionnits"unmovability"by countervailingrgument:

T23Plato,

Ti. 51E4:"[Knowledge]

s immoveableypersuasion,while true elief] an be changed ypersua-

sion".

And for himtoo, as forAristotle,f P is known o be true,thenP isnecessarilyrue:his whole pistemologysbuilt ntherestrictionfwhat sknown o what s necessarilyrue.This is theunavoidableonsequence fhis cardinalmetaphysicaloctrine hatthe subjectmatter f bonafideknowledge onsistsexclusivelyf eternalforms entities,ll ofwhose

properties,ocked nto heir efinitions,re as immuneocontingencys arethe truthsf ogicand mathematics.In taking hisposition lato and Aristotle ere notdisportingccentric

views.Theyfelt heywerearticulatinghephilosophicalonsensus f theirage. SaysAristotle:

T24 Nic.Eth. 1139B19-21:"Weallbelieve hatwhatweknow ould notbe otherwiseu-q6' ev6xEsawatda'Ao

E'etv)"

ThatPlatotoospeaksforwhathe takes obe a consensus hows nthewayhebrings pthe nfallibilityriterionnthe natch fdialogue uoted bove.If he had anticipatedesistance e wouldhavehad Socrates ntroducet,

37 "We see that hey redreamingboutbeing nd cannothave a wide-awake ision f t solongas using hypotheseshey eavethemunshaken, nableto give n account f them"(533B8-C3). Contrast hedescriptionf he amepeople unphilosophical athematicians- intheEuthydemus,hich,ncommonwithmost cholars, have beendating efore heMeno SE, 57-58): "they iscover eing" dvevQiaxovatrd ovra, 290C3).

38 rr)v oV ravro6daXrjv, . 511B6-7.39 I take this to be the implication f the dialectician's oing en' avrr)v riTr daQXXv

i'vaPEpacatoarlrat,33C-D: so longas one does whatmathematicianso, provingheirtheoremsrom rimitiveshich rethemselvesngrounded,ll onecanclaim s that ne'ssystem as internalonsistency,ndonly byforce fhabit anthisbe called knowledge"'(534D); bonafidenowledges reachedwhen, ndonlywhen, doing waywith ypotheses,one reaches he firstrincipleofind ertaintyhere".




Glaucondemur, nd SocratesarguedownGlaucon'sobjection.What hedoes instead s to have Glaucon state t,and Socratesaccept t unques-tioningly.he modeofpresentations thatofa truth o obvious hatno

reasonable eader ould be expected ogainsayt.The antecedents f this view can be discerned generationr more

before ocrates,n thedawnofmetaphysicsnGreece,when pistemology,stilln ts nfancy,snotyet fullyrticulatedisciplinend tsdoctrinesreset forth n oracularprose (as in Heraclitus)or in poeticform as inParmenides nd Empedocles).To illustrate rom armenides: is implicitacceptance f ndubitableertaintys theprerogativef thephilosopher'sknowledgehowsup in the fictionaluiseofdivine evelationnwhichhe

presents ismetaphysicalandevenhisphysical) ystem. is treatises thenotional iscourse f a goddesswhoreveals ohim"theunshaken eart fwell-roundedruth"dArjleirSeSvXiVoE40 drQeUe; 1roQ, 1,29), i.e.a doctrine hat s undisturbableyobjections "unshaken") nd systema-tically omplete "well-rounded"). he appeal is throughouto criticalreason,nottofaith;hegoddessdoes not ay Close your yes ndbelieve',but Open yourmind ndattend othe"strife-encompassedefutation"41offer'. ut thehierophanticrappingsfthe rgumentttest he ertaintyts

author ttaches oitsconclusion. venconsiderablyater,nthematerialistDemocritus,ocrates' ontemporary,he onvictionhat enuine nowledgemust ossesscertaintyersists. nlikehispredecessors,emocritus as the

gravestmisgivingshat uchknowledgeanbe attained. e evenseems to

deny hat tcan:

T25 Democritus,r.B117 (Diels-Kranz): In reality eknownothing,or ruths inthedepths".

But thisdespairing

onclusion oes notexpress ejection

fthedogma

hat

knowledgentails ertainty.tattestshedogma.Had Democritus limpsedthe possibilityf fallibleknowledge, e could not have drawn such aconclusion rom isconvictionhat:

T26 Democritus,r.B9 (Diels-Kranz): . . .inreality eknownothingwithcertainty4j,eu 6be T) 3uev dOvrtovi6v dr9ExE avviEuEv)".

FromWe knownothing ith ertainty'ecouldnothave nferredInreality

40 I follow he atest ditor,M. SchofieldinG. S. Kirk, .E. Raven, nd M. Schofield, hePresocratichilosophersCambridge,1983), p.242): a difficult ecision in favourofEVxvx)1o', thoughthe alternativeeading, V2jretOoc, has strong ttestation,nd is

acceptedbysome editors.41 I follow chofield's ranslationf 7ro2V6Seltv ')eyXov,p.cit., . 248.



18 GREGORYVLASTOS

we knownothing'xcept nthetacit remiseIn reality e know nlywhatweknowwith ertainty'.

I shalluse 'knowledgec' odesignate nowledgeo conceived, sing he

subscript s a reminder hat nfallible ertaintyas its hallmark.Nowwhatever ocratesmight e willingosayheknowsnthedomain fethicswouldhavetobe knowledgeeached ndtested hrough is ownpersonalmethod finquiry,he elenchus: his s his onlymethod fsearching ormoraltruth.42o when he avowsknowledge as we have seenhe does,rarely,but unmistakably the contentof that knowledgemust bepropositions e thinks lencticallyustifiable.4j shall,therefore,all it'elencticknowledge', bbreviatingo knowledgeE'.

Socrates ouldnothaveexpected isknowledgeEo meet hefantasticallystrong tandards fknowledgec.No great rgumenthouldbe needed toshow his. nelencticnquiry othingsever knownhroughtself' utonly"through therthings" nd there s always security ap between heSocratic hesis nd itssupportingeasons.And thegeneral eason ocrateshas for he ruth f ny articularhesis fhis sthatt selencticallyiable: tcan be maintainedonsistentlynelencticrgument,hile tsdenial annot.This, nthe astanalysis,s theQ for very roposition,, inthedomain f

ethicswhich ocrates laims oknow;hisreason neach case is,atbottom,twofold:

Q[a] P is entailed ybeliefsheldby anyonewho denies t;Q[b] not-P s notentailed ybeliefs eldbySocrateswhoaffirmst.

The claim s treblynsecure. or,tobeginwith,ven fQja] were rue, ll twouldprove s thatSocrates' nterlocutorsappento havebeliefswhich,unbeknownothemselves,ntail heSocratic hesiswhich hey ispute a

veryemarkableact

ndeed,ffact t

s,butwhatwould tshow?tcouldnot

begin o showthat hosebeliefs re true.44ut sQ[a] true?What ould beSocrates' vidence or hat? imply is ownexperiencenelenctic ractice.Whatwouldthatprove? upposeQ[a] had turned uttrue n a thousand

42 PaceIrwin, MT, p.37 and,p. 39: cf.SE, n. 47.43 This iswhat ocrateswouldunderstandy aying e "knows" hemoral ruthnT11 above,

sincetheonly easonhe could offers that heclaim s justifiableyelenctic rgument.otooby ayingtT12 he "knowswell" hat hepremisesnwhich e cangetCallicles oagreeare true:they re propositions e wouldstandready o justifyy elenctic rgumentf

Callicleswere odispute heir ruth. his is evidentlyhe ense of youknow' tT13, i.e. ithas beendemonstratedoyou byelenctic rgument.o too mutatis utandistT15, T16,T17. And see thecomment n T28(b) [=T6] inn. 48 below.

44 To showthis, J[a]wouldhave to be strengthenedoQ[A] P is entailed ytrue eliefs eldby anyonewhodenies t

which s equivalento thepropositionformulated orefullynSE (52) as assumptionA'(the"tremendous"ssumption):




elenchi; tmighttill urn ut false n thethousand-and-first.nd is Q[b]true? an theelenchus rove ttrue? lenchus s not computerntowhichsets of propositionsan be fed to have their onsistencyhecked with

mechanical ccuracy. t is a humanprocess, contest,whoseoutcome sdrasticallyffectedythe skill nd drive f thecontestants.o ifSocrateswins all theargumentshismayonly howthathe is thebetter ebater. tcould notshow hat here sno inconsistencyithin is own etofbeliefs

only hat,f there s,no opponent asmanaged ospot t.Socratescouldnothave beenunaware fthisuncertainty,uilt ntohis

instrumentfresearch, hich nfectsll itsfindings.hat heis not oblindshowsup in remarks e makesfrom ime otime. o, for xample,n this

asidetoCritias:T27 Charmides66C7-D4: "How couldyouthinkhatwould refute oufor nyreasonbut theone forwhichwould refutemyself, earingest I might nadvertentlythink know omething hen don'tknow t?Andthis,say, s whatI am doingnow,examininghe argumentchieflyormy wn ake, hough odoubt lso for he akeofmyfriends".

Since by to know' Socrateshere s referringirectlyowhathe seeks toachievebyelencticnquiry,hefearhe isvoicings that emighthinkruetheseswhichhave faredwell npastelencticnquiryut are nfact alse. n

sayinghat his ear uelshis elencticearchinge reveals ishauntingenseofthe nsecurityfknowledgeEhis awareness hatnrespect fcertaintytis the diametricalpposite fknowledgec.

There s a furtherespect

nwhich ocraticnowledge

spolesapart

rom

knowledgec:t is full fgaps,unanswereduestions;t s surrounded ndinvadedbyunresolved erplexity.ut thisdoes not trouble ocrates.He

A Anyonewho everhas a falsemoralbeliefwill lways aveat the same time ruebeliefs

entailingtsnegation.The other ssumption gaveSocrates nSE (55) is

B The set of moralbeliefs eldbySocrates tanygiven ime s consistent.B is equivalentoQfb]above. have scaled downA toQ[a] inresponse ohelpfulriticismfrommyfriends, homas Brickhousend Nicholas Smith their aper,presented o myBerkeleyeminarnthe ummer f1983,willbepublishednthenext ssueofOxfordtudiesinAncienthilosophy).t is nowcleartomethat nductivevidenceextrapolationrom astexperiencenelenctic ractice)whichs available o Socrates or [b] is not vailable o himfor JA]; llhe canhopeto ustifyrom hat ource s,atmost, QJa].J[A],hus nsupportedandunsupportable ithin heelenctic ialogues,must wait hemetaphysicalroundingtwillbe given yPlato ntheMeno: ransmigrationnd the heoryfrecollectionnsure hattruebeliefs ntailinghenegation fevery alsebelief reinnaten thesoul.



20 GREGORY VLASTOS

does not find tdebilitating,utexhilarating,s well he may, orwhatheneedsto makehis methodwork s notcompletenessutconsistencyithinthat etofelencticallyestable eliefswhich onstituteisknowledgeE.tno

timedoeshis method equire fhim hat eproducehimselfhe nswers othequestionshisinterlocutorsail o find. he task t sets him s to refute

bogus ones, and thishe does by eliciting rom hem thebeliefswhich

generatehenegationftheir alse nswers. o if ninquiryhould un nto

aporia, e can reckon he exercisenot totalfailure ut ncompleteuccess.

Nothing as transpiredo showthat heunfound nswers unfindable,or

yet oinvalidate hefragmentaryruthsnearthedlongtheway ndshakehisclaimthat ntheir ase he doeshaveknowledgeE.45

So this sthehypothesis:nthedomain fmorals theonetowhich ll ofhis nquiriesre confined whenhesaysheknows omethinge isreferringtoknowledgeE; henhe saysheknows othing absolutelyothing,greatorsmall" T7) - herefersoknowledgec; henhesayshe has noknowledgeof a particularopichemaymeaneitherhatnthis ase,as inall others, ehasno knowledgecnddoes not ookfor nyorthatwhathe lackson that

topic s knowledgeE hich,withgoodluck,he mighttill eachbyfurther

searching.

III

Ifthishypothesisere ruetwould xplainhemost erplexingeaturefSocrates' pistemictance.46t would howhowhecould, ndshould,havewanted osay hat fterehadproved istheses ruehestill id not know" f

theyretrue.We see himdoing o inthecase ofthat entral octrinefhisforwhich e does battlen the

Gorgias,irst

gainstolus and

then,tgreater

45 Scrutinyfanyof theaporetic ialogues hould atisfynyone hat nroute o the eventual

aporia ocratesproduces lencticustificationf mportantheseswhose ruths unaffected

bythe eventual ailure ofind heanswer o the What s F?' question.46 And the mostdistinctive unparalleledn thewholeof thephilosophicaliteraturefthe

West noothermajor hilosopherverputshimselfntheposition f ayingI haveproved,butdo notknow, hat is true');unparalleledlso in anypost-elencticlatonic ialogue,even heTheaetetus,here lato'sSocrates imulates ocraticgnorancen tsmost xtremeform"I question thers utmakeno assertion boutanything yselfcf.T3 above],for

theres nowisdomnme" 150C5-6): even here latonever uts ocratesnthepositionfsaying e doesn'tknow propositionorwhichhe has produceduncontested,pparentlyconclusive,roof; hus,when ocrates eaches he onclusion hat nowledges to be foundnot n sense-perceptionut"inwhatgoes on whenthesoul occupies tself y tselfwith

being" Theaet. 87A4-6),he is not madetoreiterateistotaldisavowal fknowledge; edoesnot urn round ndsayhedoesn'tknowwhat, oallappearance, ehas ust hown hathe has cometo know.




lengthnd from ifferentremises, gainst allicles: hat osuffernjusticeis always etter han odo it:47

T28 G. 508E6-509A5: "[a] ... thesethings ave beenclampeddown and bound by arguments f iron andadamant .. [b] =T6 above)Butas formemy ositions

always he same: do notknowhowthese hingsre".

At a] Socratesmplies hat e hasproved is doctrinerue; arlier n, nhis

argumentgainst olus,he hadnothesitated osayhe had:

T29 G. 479E8: "Has it notbeenproved hatwhatwasasserted

bymyself]s true?".

Is Socrates thenwelshingnpart b] of T28 on whathe had justsaid toCallicles nitspart a] and more xplicitlyoPolus nT29? Is he retractinghis claim o haveproved and thus hown hat eknows that isdoctrineis true?On theproposedhypothesishisquandary oesnotarise:whathedisclaimsnT28[b] and, mplicitly,laimsnT28[a] andT29 arealtogetherdifferenthings: mplyinghathe has knowledgeE,48e deniesthathe has

knowledgec.49

He had made the same disclaimerfknowledgec little arliern theGorgias,na context herehe availedhimself fboth heopposing ses of'know'within singleparagraphf Plato'stext:

T30 G. 505E4-506A4: " ... we should all be conten-

tiously ager o know =knowE]50 hat s true nd what sfalse bout thethingswe discuss . . [So] if tappears o

47 A corollary f his rejection f the lextalioniswhichhe and othersfeel separateshim

irreconcilablyrom he establishedmorality:f.Cr.49C10 - D5 withG. 481C1-4.48 That this s all he meant o claimn T29 canbe inferredrom hefact hat lencticrgument

was all he had offeredy wayofsupport or he theseshe had "proved" rue.Thatthis swhathe means t T28 iseven learer: o continue he itation509A5-7): "but f ll thosehaveencountered,one hasproved apableofspeaking therwise ithoutmaking imselfridiculousi.e.bybeing hown ohavebeliefswhich ontradictisassertion],s happenedjustnow".He is saying:heonly roof can offerormydoctrines that ll thosewhohave

opposed t nelenctic rgumentavebeen defeatedn that rgument.incethat esult oesnot ntail he ruth fhis doctrineutdoesconstitute,nhisview, easonable vidence ort,he isperfectlyustifiedndisclaimingnowledgecndclaimingnowledgeEf ts ruth,s he

does,by mplication,tT16 above,where isproxy,hephilosophicalea-captain,knows"(=knowsE)thatpersistent rong-doing ould be so ruinous o one's happiness hat he

wrong-doer ouldbe better ff ead than live.49 Strainingo catchthis ense Robinslips ntoover-translation:vtx i6a at G. 509A5he

rendersje ne saispas d'une cienceertaine'.50 That this s the ort fknowledgeo which e isreferrings clearfrom hefact hat lenctic

arguments the method ywhich t s being ought; f.T26 above.



22 GREGORY VLASTOS

anyofyouthatwhat admit omyselfsnot he ruth,oumust nterruptnd refuteme. For I do not assertwhatassert s one who knows =knowsc] ..

Whenthe critical erms redisambiguatednthiswaywe can see notonlywhat ocratesmeans osaybutwhyheshouldwant osay tat thisuncturewhen t is clearto everyonehathe has won the debate. He says n the

Apology23A3-4) thatthosewho witnesshis dialectical ictorieswould"think imwise [=wisec] in thosethingsnwhichhe refutesthers" anaturalnoughmpressionheymight erive romeeinghimmaintain verandover gainhis record s undefeatedhampionftheelenchus-ring.oin our

present assagen the

Gorgias,markingmomentt whichhe has

given stunningemonstrationhat e does haveknowledgeEfthe ruth fhistheses,he has specialreason owarnhis hearers hathe doesnothave

knowledgec, herebynderlininghesincerityndurgencyf hisdesire oentertainbjections:fhe allowedhishearers obelieve hat e wasspeakingas one whohasknowledgec isprofessednterestnhearingriticism ould

ringhollow.

Similarly e couldgo throughll the extsnPlato'selenctic ialoguesnwhich know', knowledge',wise', wisdom'occur- all of thoseI cited

earlier nd all thoseothers have hadno occasion ocite resolvingheirambiguitiesn the sameway.So understood,ll of thosestatements illmake sense. Socrateswill neverbe contradictingimself y saying, r

implying,hat e bothhasandhasn'tknowledge,or ewillnotbe sayingr

implyinghathe does and doesn'thaveknowledgeE,r thathe does anddoesn'thaveknowledgec,utonly hathe does haveknowledgeEnd doesnot haveknowledgec. hus his avowalof ignorancewillnevergeneratepracticalnconsistencyr doctrinalncoherence.Whenhe tellsthe nter-

locutor hathe hasnoknowledge ewillnotbe violatinghe saywhatyoubelieve' uleofelenctic ebate, or ewillnotbefeigninggnorance:e doesbelievewith ull onviction,ith tterincerity,hat ehas noknowledgec.51Nor willhe be endangeringisdoctrine hatVirtuesknowledge' hen hisis read,as itshouldbe, Virtue s knowledgeE'.

Moreover, hehypothesisxplainswhySocrates shouldmake,nottheavowal fknowledgeE,utthedisavowal fknowledgec isfront efore heworld, isepistemicmanifestos itwere:only nce, t willbe remembered

(T11 above),does hesay nsomanywords hat e knows moral ruth.nalltheother extshat othe amewayheavowsknowledgey ndirection,s if,after houtingI don'tknow' he wouldonlywhisperand yet do'. Thehypothesis otivateshis symmetry.fknowledgecswhat veryonexpectsofyou s a philosopherndyou reconvinced hat ouhavenoneof t,not51 Since theelenchus s Socrates' ole accesstomoralknowledge.




smidgin f t,youwouldnaturallyavereason oadvertise our gnoranceandadmityourknowledgenconspicuously,lmost urtively.

I nowproceedto a morecomplex xhibitionftheexplanatoryower f

thehypothesis its dissolution f the so-called"SocraticFallacy",muchpuzzledover nrecent iscussions.5zhese havecentred npassageswherePlato makesSocrates ssert

(A) If one does not knowwhat heF is,53 ne cannotknow fF is trulypredicable fanythinghatever,54

which, eterGeach argued na famous aper,55 as a corollary,

(B) It is uselesstotry

odiscover hat heF isby nvestigatingxamplesof t.

That (B) is false takeforgranted. nd no one wouldhave found tmore52 I broach hisquestion n thepresent ssay mostreluctantly,or onstraintsfspacewill

allow mere keleton fthe rgument,o be fleshedut n a futureublication)ecause f

ignoredtthedefence fmy iew gainstrwin'scf.fn.12,part 2), above)would imp:hisderives oodsupport rom hats nowwidely egardeds therightolution o thepuzzle:cf.

BurnyeatndSantas cited n n. 12above) ndPaulWoodruff,lato,TheHIPPIASMAJOR(Indianapolis, 982),p. 140 (I forgo urthereferenceso contributionso this ssue:these

three, longwith rwin MT 39-41, sufficeormypresent urpose).53 Or the form r essence ofF which Socraticdefinitions expected odisclose.54 (A) is assertednpost-elencticialogues, heLy.and theHMa. (which haveclassifieds

"transitional":. 1 above)for wovaluesof F: for hilonn theLy. (atthevery nd of the

dialogue,when he earchfor heF hasfailed) ndforkalonntheHMa. (atthe tart fthesearchfor heF, 286C-E, and then gain t its end to lament tsfailure,04D-E [=T31below]). t swidelyssumed hatA) isalso assertedn elenctic ialogues:n theCh. for =

sophrosyne,76A6-8); ntheLa. (for = 'virtue' 89ES-190B1); intheEu. (for = 'piety',6E, 15C). I submithat his ssumptionsunfounded.nthefirstwo f hese assages A) isnot ssertedn ull eneralitywhichs the rux fthepuzzle):neither fthem ay hatfone

does notknow heF onecan'tknowf nythinghatevers F. Fullgeneralitye doget nthethird, ut for differentroposition,(C) Ifoneknowswhat heF is,one can knowfF is trulyredicable fanythinghatever.As Santashaspointed ut Socrates,16- 117),what slaid down s a necessaryonditionn

(A) is only aid to be a sufficientonditionn C). Thus the atastrophiconsequencen A)is not nvisagedn C), which ays nly hatfwedidknow heF wewouldbe ina positionoknow bout ny f t sF: a fortunateositionndeed, utbynomeans necessaryne thusinthe Cr. Socrateshas notroublescertaininghat scapewouldbe unjustwithoutnvokinganydefinitionf justice'or injustice'),while he box intowhichA) putsus is paralysing(fancy otknowinghat ven ctingustlys kalonustbecausewe havenodefinitionfthat

predicate!). he fourthassage Eu. 15C) is a spin-offrom he hird:fEuthyphroad ctedwithknowledgefpietywhichhe foolishlyhought e had:4E, 15D-E), he andSocrateswouldknow hathis actionwaspious- which s nottosaythat his ufficientondition f

piousaction,whichEuthyphroad notmet, s a necessaryne.55 "Plato'sEuthyphro:nAnalysisndCommentary"'onist 0 (1966),pp.369-82,reprinted

in hisLogicMattersOxford, 972) - a paperwhichhas provedpowerfullynd fruitfullyprovocative.A) and (B), taken rom ispaper,have beenrephrased.



24 GREGORYVLASTOS

embarassinghanwouldtheSocrates fthe elenctic ialogues,56fhe had

thoughtttrue:whathe does nLa. 190E-193Csa locus lassicusf earchingfora definitionymeansof examples. o this s thepuzzle:howcould

Socrateshave searchedfordefinitionsythatmeans fhe accepted A)?How could he havesought o come to knowwhat heF is by nvestigatingexamples f t, fhe believed hatwhenhe did notknow the couldnotknowif t is truly redicable f thoseexamples,.e. couldnotknow fthey regenuine s orbogusones? rwin's nswer PMT pp. 40-1) is in essence:AcceptingA), Socrates an evade tsself-defeatingonsequences ecausealthoughby A)) he cannotknowfF ispredicable fexampleswhileusingthem osearchfor tsdefinition,emaynonetheless ave true eliefsbout

them: ruebeliefs ansknowledge illsuffice.et us call thisproposal he'sufficiencyf true belief'interpretationftheSocraticview 'STB' forshort).57 ill t olve hepuzzle? twould ndeed fit quaredwith he extualevidence, s itssponsors avebelieved.But tdoesnot.

Consider:

T31 HMa. 304D5-E3: "He58 willask me if I am notashamed to dare speak of the kalon59when elencticrefutationakes t o evident hat do not venknowwhat

on earth hekalontselfs. [a]"Andhowwillyouknow," ewillsay, ifsomeonehasproduced kalon peechoranyotherkalonactionwhatever, henyou don'tknowthekalon?b]And fthis s tobe your ondition,oyouthink

youare better ff livethandead?" .

Part a] ofthistext plainlyn instantiationf [A] above- is, ofcourse,consistent ith TB.60 But ookatpart b]:Socrates' ritic ellshim hat f

56 I havebeenwriting,nd shallgoonwriting,Socrates' nthis aper orefer o theprotagonistinpart I) of thePlatonic orpus thenumberings inn. 1 above), gnoringisnamesaken

parts II) and III) exceptor urposes f dvertisinghe ontrast ith ither he Socrates' n

(III) (which ecame alientnSection I: cf.n. 28 above)orwith he Socrates' n II) (whichhas idled so far,butnow comesalive: the contrast etween he Socrates' n (I) who iscommitted o the elencticmethodof investigation,earching orknowledgeE,nd theSocrates n II) whohas abandoned he lenchusndtherewithheconceptionfknowledgeas knowledgeE,s vital otheproposed olution f the "Socratic allacy". f. n. 60 and 65

below).57 Accepted independentlyf rwin) yBurnyeatndbySantas nhis book thereferencesn

fn.12 above)andbyWoodruffnhisbook cited n fn.52), p.140.58 Socrates'philosophicallter gorepresenteds a relentless,ullying,ritic the omicmask

Plato wearsto distancehimself rom isbeloved,eacher, o whosemoraldoctrine e stilladhereswhilerejectinghe elencticmethod ywhich t hadbeenestablished.

59 Literallybeautiful',oingdoubleduty y ervinglso as a moral redicate indeed s themost eneral redicate fmoral ommendationvariouslyranslateds honourable',noble','admirable',fine').

60 IrwinPMT 39, 284) cites t as evidence or TB, whichwouldbe perfectlyightfwewere




this s tobehiscondition that fnotknowingf ny ctionwhateversor snotkalon hemights wellbe dead: his ife s worthless. e knowwhat heone thing s that would make lifeworthless orSocrates:forfeituref

virtue.61hus Socrates' riticstelling im hat obe inthe ondition fnotknowingfanyparticularction s kalons tantamounto moral ankruptcy.He isimplyinghatfSocratesweredeprivedf uchknowledgeispracticalmoraludgments ouldbe at sea: he wouldbe unable o make orrectmoralchoices n hisdailyife nd thus ouldnot ctvirtuouslycouldnotbekalos,i.e. a just,wise,brave, emperate,iousman.Canthis e squaredwith TB?

Clearlynot. If STB had been Socrates' view,thenin the absence of

knowledgehat nythings kalon, e would fallbackon truebeliefs othe

same effect62nd thedisastern[b]wouldbeunintelligible.learlyhen heSTB solutionfthepuzzlewillnotdo: it s inconsistentith textwhich he

sponsors fthat olution ake o be genuinelyepresentativeftheviews fSocrates s expoundednPlato'searlier ialogues.Wemust ookelsewherefora solution.The hypothesisfthe dual use of to known the elenctic

dialogues pensthewaytoone.

Alertings tothe mbiguityn know',ttells s thatf hequestionIs (A)true?'had been put to Socrates n the elencticdialogues twouldhave

requiredfurtherpecification.e would haveneededto be told howheshould ead know' n A). Shouldhe read tas knowc'?fso, A) turnsnto

(Ac) If onedoesnotknowcwhat heF is,one cannot nowc fF is trulypredicable fanythinghatever.

Or shouldhe take t nthe alternativeense,readingt as

(AE) Ifone does notknowEwhat heF is,one cannotknowEfF is trulypredicable fanythinghatever.63

entitledo assume hatwhat s true or ocrates nthis ost-elencticialoguecf.n. 1 above;for rgumenteeSE pp.57-8)wouldhavebeen alsotrue or im arlier,n the lencticnes,whichwe are not: thesequenceof texts 11-T17, discussed nSection above, nwhichSocrates by mplication)vowsmoralknowledge,ncludes extstobe cited n thenext utoneparagraphnthetext bove)which re rreconcilableith 31[a], as I shallbe pointingout.

61 Cr.47D-48A; G. 521B1-2 (= T16 above).62 As theupholders f STB assume, pparentlyailingodiscern hat heassumptionlies n

thefaceofT3 1,which tates hat a]knowledgef heF isa necessaryonditionfknowingthat nythingsF and [b] that fone cannotknowhat nythingsF one is damned I haveitalicizedknow':no room s left or ruebelief s a viable lternative).

63 I disregardwoother ermutations,(AcE) Ifone does notknowcwhat heF is,one cannotknowE tc.

(AEC) Ifone does notknowEwhat heF is,one cannotknowc tc.The consequents,espectivelyhose f AE)and Ac), tellus nothing ew boutwhat ocratescanknow rwants o know.



26 GREGORYVLASTOS

Howwouldhe haveresponded oeach ofthese uestions?ortheSocratesofthe elenctic ialogues,who has renounced nowledgecock, tock, ndbarrel,Ac) wouldbevacuous:64he has nointerestnknowingc nything,o

why houldhe be atallconcernedbout hefact hatfhedidnotknowc hedefinitionsfhismoral erms, e wouldnotknowc f nyofthem retrulypredicable fany ctions rpersons? ut now uppose, lternatively,hat ehad read A) inthe enseof AE). nthat ase he wouldhavedeclared t alse.Thus atT11 abovehe "knows"'=knowsE) hathecanpredicateevil'and'base' of doing njusticenddisobeyingissuperior', hough o definitionofeither redicate as beenassayed nd theres nogoodreason obelievethat f t had been itwould have metwithgreateruccessthanhad anyof

thosepursued n dialoguesof elenctic earch.Again, t T15, thoughnodefinitionf ignorance's anywheren sight, e saysthat veryone hofollowedhis argumenthouldknow =knowE) that ignorance' an be

predicatedf'injustice'. husoncethe riticalerbhas beendisambiguated,(A) is trouble-freeor he Socratesoftheelenctic ialogues: nnocuousfreadas (Ac), false s (AE).On either eadingt s a papertiger.65

IV

So far hehypothesisarns ts alt.Buttwobigquestionstill emain. hefirstrisesover hefact hatwhen ocrates eard hat eportrom elphihe

64Thoughno doubt ruefor ll he knowsor cares)to thecontrary.

65 The sameargument ill pplymutatis utandisothe twin f A),namely(A*) If one does notknowwhat heF is, one cannotknow fanythinghatevers truly

predicable fF (M. 71A-B and80D-E; R. 354C),disarmingt nexactlyhesameway: onfronted ith t ntheelenctic ialogues, ocrateswouldhave declared t vacuousf read as

(A*c) If one does notknowcwhat heF is,one cannot nowc f nythinghatevers trulypredicable fF,

false fread as

(A*E) If one does notknowEwhat heF is,onecannotknowEf nythinghatevers trulypredicable fF.

(A*), ike A), s never ssertedntheelenctic ialogues: ace rwinPMTp. 294) it s not nPr.361C2-6,where herequired eneralitys acking.tsonly ccurrencenthe orpus,partfrom heM., is inRepublic54C: tacked n attheendof Book , this annot elong o the

composition hich recedes t,forwhat t ays if don'tknowwhatustices I cannot nowif t s a virtue)mplicitlyontradicts15, where no one could not know hat njustices

ignorance" nd so, by mplication,o one could not know hat ustice s knowledgend,therefore350B5) virtue. I have anticipated ere the fuller reatmentf the "Socratic

Fallacy"I shallbe publishing efore ong,wheie I shall also be calling ttention o amomentousevelopmentnthepost-elenctic ialogueswhich xplainsmuch hathappensthere: Plato's immersionn mathematicaltudies whichtake him to the frontierfmathematicalesearchnhis time an interest hich loods heM. butpredatest, howingup fleetinglyntheHMa. [303B7-C1]: the first lear ndicationnthecorpus hat lato s




wassurprised. hy o,on thishypothesis?66hy houldhenothave houghtthetributewell deserved?Not all of his elenctic earcheshad failed.Onsomeabsolutelyundamentalhings e had struck old.He had come to

know knowE thingswhich toknow s noblest, ottoknowmostbase:who s happy ndwho s not".67Why hen houldhe feelperplexed t theoracle'sdeclarationhat omanwas wiser hanhimself?nnoneofthe extsI haverevieweds there ven glimmerfthe nswer. ortunatelyhere retwo more,both of themfrom he context f the oracle story nd itsaftermath: henundertakingo explain wayhis public mageas "wiseman", Socrates confessesthaton this score the public had not been

altogether rong:

T32 Ap. 20D6-E1: "I came by this reputation,Athenians,only by a sort of wisdom (6td aoqpt'avrtva). Whatsort ofwisdom? xactly hat ortwhich s,no doubt (i'awo), human wisdom (dvpwcomrt'v7aoqgia). It looks as though xtvbvvev'o) n thisI am

reallywise (ru o'vrt .. aoqpod).But thoseofwhomspoke ustnow68 re wise in a wisdom hat s morethanhuman (ueSt'o rtvd xar' d'vfitOwov

ocpt'av)- I

don't know how else to speak of it (j' ovx e'xo rt2>y,o)".

Here Socrates dmitsnsomanywordswhat havebeenhypothesizingll

along:thathe can use 'wisdom' and knowledge')o refero either ftwo

radicallyifferentognitivechievements,ne ofwhich ocrates ares laimtohave whiledisclaiminghe other.And that hishumanwisdom' fhis,whichheopenlyvowshere, ouldonly eknowledgeEollowsromhefact

that heelenchushad been hisonlywayofseekingt. He goeson to offerDelphiccertificationf his claim ohave suchknowledge:

now abreastof advancedmathematics)nd arguablymotivateshe abandonmentf the

elenchus,nevitableasualty fa shifto a mathematical odelforknowledge.)66 I shall wasteno timeon theeasyanswerbecausehe thoughtherewouldbe otherswith

muchhigherredentials':tfoundersn thebrilliantriumphsocrates cores e.g. nthe r.wherehe is stillyoung 314B, 317C, 361E]) over thosemosthighly eputedfortheir"wisdom" hroughoutreece. fChaerephon adnot xpectedome uch nswers the nehe gothe wouldnothave askedhisquestion. o he could nothavebeengreatlyurprised.Why hould ocrates?PaceBurnet's loss nAp.21A5,wegetno ightnourquestion romthereportnDiogenesLaertius 2.65]thatAristippusad beendrawn oAthens rom ar ff

Cyrene bySocrates'fame":Diogenes'authoritys excellentAeschines fSphaettus],uthe givesno indicationf the relativeime-frames.)

67T10, abbreviated.

68 Natural hilosophers18B-19D7) andsophists19D8-20C7): cf. ophost 19C6 and then

againat 20A3.



28 GREGORYVLASTOS

T33 Ap. 23A-B4: "It looks as though hegod is reallywise and thatwhathe is sayingnthis racle s this:humanwisdom s worth ittleor nothing. y referringo this

'Socrates'he seems to be usingmyname as an example,as ifhe weresaying,That one ofyou,o men, swisest,who, ikeSocrates, asunderstood hatnrelation o wis-dom he is trulyworthless ov6evo6 d'tdo Eoartt1dAr6eltat0Qod;ocpiav)'

Now he isdenigratingis "humanwisdom" sayinghatncomparison ithtruewisdom,hat f hegodwho"isreally ise" his own sworthless. hyso? Isn't thisour riddle ll over

gain?f"theunexaminedife s notworth

livingby man" (Ap. 38A5-6) and the elenchus s its examining, hyshouldn'tSocratesthink heknowledge hat ssues from t man's most

precious ossession?Why hen houldhe be sayinghatt s "worthittle r

nothing"? onversely,houldn't e be debunkinghealternativehich, yhis owndescriptionf t, sbeyondman'sreach, enouncingt s awill ' the

wisp, mirage, roduct fthe xtravagantspirationsfdeludedmetaphysi-ciansandword-happyophists?

IfSocrateshad beenan epistemologisthis, urely, ouldbe the ine he

wouldhavehadto take.His commitmento the lencticmethodwouldhaveleft imno other hoice: twouldhave alledfor head-on ollisionwith he

prevailing aradigmof infallible, nrevisable,unpersuadable" raspof

necessary ruths, nd a reasoned defenceof a new model of fallible,provisional,orrigible nowledge. ut the Socratesof thispaper is no

epistemologist.e isa moralisture ndsimplewhopractisesmoralnquirybut never nquiresnto hetheoryf moral nquiry.69e is as innocent f

epistemologys ofmetaphysics.e is noDewey, edto therenunciationf

the quest forcertainty70y an "instrumentalistogic",no Wittgenstein,impellednthatdirectionya critique f anguage.Our Socrates acksthe

conceptualmachineryhatwouldbe neededto dismantle he established

paradigmnd erect newoneinitsplace.Whenhepeersat theabyss hat

yawns etween nowledgecndknowledgeEemeasures hedistance ot n

analytic utin religious erms.He broodson itin thespirit ftraditional

pietywhich ounselsmortalso "thinkmortal" tokeepwithinhe imits fthehuman ondition:

T34 Euripides, acchae 95-7: "Clevernesss not wis-dom(r6 aopov 6' ov' aoit'a). And not to thinkmortal

thoughts rd re ,uj iOvrd pQoveiv), s to see fewdays".

69 For argumentothis ffect ee SE 27-28 and 53.70 "The QuestforCertainty"ad been the title fJohnDewey'sGiffordectures.




T35 Sophocles, Trach.473: "Being mortal, thinkmortal thoughts: I am not senseless (tvTrfv,cpovovaav Ovrzrd ovx ayvacuova)".

In this, s in so many therways,he is poles apartfrom oth Plato andAristotle. heirphilosophicutreachwilfullyefies he imits fmortality.Transcendence ffinitudes theheart fPlatonicmysticism.nAristotleoothisfaithives, hough arelyoiced. n theMetaphysics,alling his cience,provocatively,divineknowledge"ct'av ro3vErtarrz6v, 983A6), he

protests he venerable ogmathat humannature s in bondage",deniedthatmost ublime fcognitivechievementsy he jealousy f hegods". ntheNicomacheanthicshis

rejectionf the

dogmais moredefiant nd

explicit:

T36 N. E. 1177B31-34:"We shouldnotheed thosewhocounselus that, eingmen,we should hink uman, nd

beingmortals, e should hinkmortal. utweought,ofaras in us lies, to make ourselves mmortalxat' 3o'ov

ev63XErat dOavart'Etv) strainingevery nerve tolive n accordancewith hehighest hingnus".

Socrates oo strainsvery erve o ive naccordancewith hehighest hinginus. Butthishe takes obe elenctic eason a poorthing, utman'sown.

Resigned o think uman, e thinks ith ll hismight: ith he est, enacity,honesty,nddaring fSocratic lenchus.

Now,I suggest,we can understand hy ocrates s startledy Delphi'saccolade.He canhardlyring imselfobelieve hat isownunderstandingofthegood life, hancy, atchy, rovisional,erpetuallyelf-questioning,endlessly erplexeds it s,shouldhave ny alue tall nthe yes f hegodwhoenjoys heunshaken eart fwell-roundedruth theperfectecurity,the serenecompleteness fknowledgec. o he goes out intotheworld,searching igh nd owfor omethingetter. he search ails.He is theneftwith he convictione expressesnT33: lowas his ownmoralnsightmustrankbythegod's absolute tandards,t is still uperior o anyalternativeopento manandearns hegod'spraisebecause t shumble. rainedof allepistemic resumption,wareof his own gnorance,e knowsE hathe hasno knowledgec.

Butthere s a furtheruestion:fthat s thepoint fhis I don'tknow'the shortfalln certaintyhat fflicts an'scognitivechievementst theirbest why idn'the say o?Why houldhe choosetosignaltonly hroughan unresolved mbiguity?he questionconcerns inguisticonventions.Wouldcontemporarypeech-patternsave toleratedo devious form fcommunication?n this I could discourse at length. n Heraclitus,



30 GREGORYVLASTOS

Sophocles,Euripides mbiguous tterances a favouriteorm fpregnantspeech.I mustcontentmyself ithone example:T34, td aocpov 6' ov'aocoia. Since the articular euter djective s in Greekidiompreciselyequivalentothecognate bstract oun,whatEuripidess saying, ut ntoliteral, nmanipulated,nglish,s just Wisdom s not wisdom' a blankself-contradictiontwhich ranslatorsalk: heyan't wallow hat s said ntheGreek, o theydoctor tup: 'The world'swise are notwise' (GilbertMurray);Cleverness snotwisdom'Dodds),and so forth.he Greekpoetfeelsnosuchblock.He flings issentence t the udience, urethat oonein itwill fail ocatchon instantly,nderstandingr aopodv toreferothejur Ovrayd qcove!v displayed n thatbrash,sneering,eering, mart-

alecky ationalismfPentheus, heextreme pposite f"wisdom"n thatother ense ofthewordrepresented yTeiresias reverentcceptance fthe ncestral aith hoserejectionyPentheuswill pellhis doom.Couldn'tthe poet have said this moreplainly?Obviouslyhe could. Who wouldsuppose that to contrive metrical quivalent f 6etvd6rI;oovaocptawould have strained heresources fEuripidean rosody? ut suchgain nluciditywouldhave been poetic oss. If itsparadoxwere defusedwherewouldbe thewonder tirrednusby tsoxymoron?arbetter hat eshould

havethrownheburden fdisambiguationponus.Ifyousay,ButSocrates s a philosopher,ot poet', wouldremind ouofwhat a maverick hilosopher e is: a teacherwho shunsdidacticism,believinghatmoral ruth asa dimension hich ludesdirectxpression adepthbestrevealednotby nstructionutbyprovocation.orthat urposehe invented he figure f speechwhichstill bears his signaturen thedictionaries.did notgloss hose ntries n Socraticrony'nWebster's ndthe 0. E. D. when cited them tthe start.Had I done so I wouldhave

pointedoutthat hey efer s only o thesimplest ses ofSocratic rony.Only nthese s ita figurenwhichwhat s said s simply otwhat s meant.In Socrates'mostpowerfulses of tthe ronys morecomplex: n theseSocratic ayings hat s said both s and sn'twhat s meant. o, certainly,nthatother nventionfhis which tillbearshis name n common peech:Socratic eaching. e teaches aying e s not eaching.Whathesays s whathe means f oteach s to mpartoa learner ruthlready nownooneself.It is notwhathe means fto teach s totriggerna learner n autonomouslearning rocess.As instrumentfSocratic eachinghis ronys best eftunresolved.tspurposesnot, sKierkegaard ouldhave t, o"deceive thelearner]nto he truth".71t is totease,mock, erplex im nto eeking he71 "One candeceive person bout he ruth,nd rememberingldSocrates) ne can deceive

a personnto he ruth.ndeedwhen persons under nillusion,t sonly ydeceiving imthathe can be broughtntothe truth"quotedbyWalter owrie,KierkegaardPrinceton,1938),p.248).




truth.Whentheprofessionfignorances used for hesamepurpose ts

ironys likewise est eft nexplained.n telling imself e hasno wisdomSocrateshas no need to explain. n telling thershe doesn'twantto. He

tauntshem oponderwhatheishintingtbyusingwords hat o anddon'tsaywhathe means.72

UniversityfCaliforniatBerkeley

BIBLIOGRAPHYAlanBloom,TheREPUBLIC of lato New York,1968).John urnet,lato's UTHYPHRO, HEAPOLOGYOFSOCRATES,ndCRITO (Oxford, 924).HaroldCherniss, lutarch's ORALIA,Vol.XIII, Part I (London, 1976).F. M. Cornford, heREPUBLIC of lato Oxford nd NewYork,1945).E. R. Dodds,Plato's GORGIAS (Oxford, 959).GeorgeGrube,Plato'sREPUBLIC (Indianapolis,974).Terence Irwin, lato'sGORGIAS (Oxford, 979).A. D. Lindsay,TheREPUBLIC of lato London,1935).JohnMacDowell,Plato'sTHEAETETUS (Oxford, 973).Leon Robin,Platon:Oeuvres ompletes,ol. I (Paris,1950).Paul Shorey, lato'sREPUBLIC (London,1930 and 1935).PaulWoodruff,lato'sHIPPIAS MAJOR Indianapolis, 982).

72 Mywarmesthanksredue to theUniversityf St.Andrews ornviting etogive seriesof Giffordectures,llowingme to devote hem o thephilosophyf Socrates. he effortomeet that hallengeed me to rethink yfavouritehilosopherromheground p. The

present aper s a partial utcome f thisprojectwhich s still nprogress. present ere

thoughts havevoiced ndifferentormsn differentccasions: nGiffordectures t StAndrewsn1981; n HowisonLectures tBerkeleyn1984; n ad hocectures ttheNationalCenterfor he HumanitiesnNorthCarolina n 1980 and 1981; inpapers o seminarsn

Berkeleyn 1983 and in CambridgeEngland) n 1984. I have earnedmore han couldacknowledgefromfriendswho have respondedto those thoughts: rincipallyMylesBurnyeatnd AlanCode, fromwhom have earned hemost; ut lso IanKidd,JonathanLear, Geoffrey loyd,AlexanderNehamas,David Sedley,Dory Skaltsas, nd HaroldTarrant. also thank heeditor f thisournal or ivingmethebenefit f commentsyan

anonymouseferee.None of those have thankedmaybe presumed oagreewith iewshave defended.

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Gregory Vlastos Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge