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Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

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Page 1: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Groups

Page 2: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions

Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations of game with same

players Even so, only in very small groups

In large groups, it is too difficult to know what players did (either C or D) in previous interactions

High monitoring costs

Page 3: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Market theories, cont’d Further, at least some of these

theories suggest that market approaches are most likely to produce cooperation (instead of just coordination) when people are following rules (eg Schelling).

Where might these rules come from? Is government the only source?

Page 4: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Groups In all societies people belong to a

variety of groups Families, churches, athletic clubs, firms,

etc. These groups are related to overall

social order in complex ways.

Page 5: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Groups Social groups can be very powerful

E.g. gender roles

Page 6: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Groups Groups can teach people values Groups can enforce norms

Page 7: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Social order via values

Values are General and relatively durable internal

criteria for evaluation General = they apply in many different situations Relatively durable = they don’t change very often Internal = they are inside our heads, and directly

motivate action Do not require external incentives

Evaluation = they tell us what is good and bad

Page 8: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Sigmund Freud

Page 9: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud People try to maximize their

happiness the “pleasure principle” Infants want their mother’s breast,

but it is not always available This perception distinction between

self (ego) and the external world The “reality principle” – you can’t always

get satisfaction

Page 10: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud, cont’d How the infant copes with the

mother’s absence or disapproval By taking the parent into the self

(super-ego), and allowing that internal parent to monitor its behavior

Evidence for the super-ego A sense of guilt

Page 11: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

The fundamental aspect of civilization

The replacement of the power of the individual with the power of the community

Individual liberty was no gift of civilization; it was greatest before civilization existed The urge for freedom is directed

against civilization

Page 12: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

The parallel between individual and social development

Just as the developing individual is led to renounce initial desires for sensual pleasures, so civilization depends on a renunciation of instinct Namely, the individual desire to

maximize personal freedom

Page 13: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Human nature: sexuality and aggressiveness

Sexuality is a fundamental motivator of human behavior

(derived from the pleasure principle)

Sexuality threatens social order because Unregulated sex

Leads to interpersonal conflict (over love objects) – hence social disorder

Drains energy from economic productivity

Page 14: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Man is instinctively aggressive

Page 15: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Human nature must be contained to attain social order

Society employs a variety of methods to regulate sexuality and aggressiveness The incest taboo – common to all societies The sexual urges of children are discouraged,

so that their adult lusts can be controlled later on

Many societies outlaw anything but heterosexual genital love

Religions implore people to love their neighbors, etc.

But these methods are largely unsuccessful

Page 16: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud’s solution The super-ego

i.e. the conscience Solution: strengthen the super-ego

Page 17: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud: the price of social order

The superego creates guilt; therefore we are less happy.

Trade-off between civilization and individual happiness

Page 18: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud: Summary of causal relations and mechanisms Macro-level cause: dependence Situational mechanisms: people desire

love, want to avoid punishment, transfer of aggression to the super-ego

Individual internal state: super-ego Behavioral mechanisms: guilt Individual behavior: prosocial behavior

Page 19: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud: Draw the theory

Dependence

Super-ego Prosocial behavior

Page 20: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Freud How do we know if the theory has

merit? Look at the empirical world

Freud’s argument suggests that children who receive unpredictable nurturing (for example, those in orphanages or with neglectful parents) will be poorly socialized, and in turn, behave in antisocial ways.

Page 21: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Emile Durkheim

Page 22: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Durkheim Wanted to understand suicide Existing solutions are inadequate

Mental illness Heredity Environment (climate and

temperature)

Durkheim turned to social factors

Page 23: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Egoistic suicide Observation: Higher rates of

suicide among Protestants vs. Catholics Single males vs. married males Families with few children vs. families

with many children

Why?

Page 24: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Egoistic suicide Individualism suicide

Single people are more individualistic than people with spouses and children

Families act as Support structures Rationales for living when times get tough

Social integration low suicide, conformity to norms, social order

Page 25: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Mechanisms for egoistic suicide

People want to be attached to something greater than themselves They want a purpose

If the individual is sufficiently integrated, the social group provides that purpose.

Page 26: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Altruistic suicide Results from too little individualism;

too much social integration Evidence

Tribal societies have high suicide Armies have higher suicide than

civilian populations Within armies, officers are higher than

enlisted men

Page 27: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Altruistic suicide, cont’d Too much social integration

encourages people to sacrifice themselves for their groups/societies Individual life loses value

Page 28: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Effects of social integration on suicide Egoistic and altruistic suicide at

opposite poles of social integration dimension Too little integration (= too much

individualism) egoistic suicide Too much integration (= too little

individualism) altruistic suicide

Page 29: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Egoistic/Altruistic suicide: Summary of causal relations and mechanisms Macro-level cause: group integration Situational mechanisms:

Individuals need a sense of purpose that can only be provided by the group

Attachment to the group increases attachment to group values

Individual internal state: individualism Behavioral mechanism: people behave in accordance

with internalized values – if weak, one is vulnerable to discouragement; if strong, one has little sense of self-preservation

Individual behavior: suicide Transformational mechanism: aggregation Macro-level outcome: suicide rates

Page 30: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Egoistic/Altruistic Suicide: Draw the theory

Integration

Individualism/ purpose

Individual suicide

Suicide rates

Page 31: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Anomic suicide

Evidence Suicide higher in economic

depressions Suicide higher in economic booms Suicide rates correlated with divorce

rates

Page 32: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Anomic suicide, cont’d Explanation

Crises inhibit social regulation Lack of social regulation leads to

individual anomie Anomie = erosion of values

Anomie leads to suicide

Page 33: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Situational mechanisms/assumptions Human needs/desires are unlimited.

Individuals cannot create their own limits Thus, the passions must be limited by

some exterior, moral force This force is society

Society is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts

Without societal regulation, individual desires are infinite. Individuals are in a state of anomie.

Page 34: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Situational mechanisms, cont’d

Society determines the rewards offered for every type of human activity There is social consensus about the

relative values of different occupations

Everyone realizes the limits of his ambitions and strives for nothing more

This limits the passions

Page 35: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Behavioral mechanisms/assumptions

People are content when they get the socially appropriate (‘just’) rewards No one can be happy without limits Anomie is an unhappy condition

Anomie Suicide

Page 36: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Durkheim In sum

Social crises erode consensus about appropriate expectations and rewards

Without regulation, desires are infinite. Infinite desires produce misery.

Misery suicide

Page 37: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Effects of Regulation on Suicide

Anomic and fatalistic suicide are at opposite poles of the regulation dimension. Too little regulation anomic suicide Too much regulation fatalistic

suicide

Page 38: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Anomic Suicide: Summary of causal relations and mechanisms Macro-level cause: social crisis/lack of

regulation Situational mechanism:

Individuals have limitless desires Can only be limited by society

Individual internal state: Anomie Behavioral mechanism: Anomie makes one

miserable Individual behavior: suicide Transformational mechanism: aggregation Macro-level outcome: suicide rates

Page 39: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Anomic Suicide: Draw the theory

Social crisis/lack of regulation

Individual anomie

Individual suicide

Suicide rates

Page 40: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Suicide rates: an indicator of social disorder

Two causes of suicide Social integration

Egoistic suicide Altruistic suicide

Social regulation Anomic suicide Fatalistic suicide

Page 41: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Egoistic suicide Altruistic suicide

Fatalistic suicide

Anomic suicide

High incidence of

suicide

Social integration

Social regulation

A schematic view of Suicide

High incidence of suicide

Page 42: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

What can be done to increase social order?

Marx/Engels say Private property conflict; thus abolish private

property Freud responds

Aggressiveness was not created by property – it reigned without limit in primitive times

Durkheim says Strengthen religion and common values (the

conscience collective) Freud: social regulation guilt Durkheim: social regulation contentment

Page 43: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Alexis de Tocqueville

Page 44: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville What is the connection between

groups and other institutions such as government? Groups exist in societies with

governments Do groups complement government

or undermine it?

Page 45: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville’s Democracy in America A French aristocrat visits the U. S.

A. in the 1830’s Compares American democracy to

European aristocracy Focuses on the role of voluntary

associations Freedom of association restricted in

aristocracies; believed to cause social disorder

Page 46: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville

Social isolation despotism

Page 47: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

In democracies To obtain political support, each

person must lend his neighbors his cooperation

People seek to attract the esteem and affection of those in the midst of whom they must live

Self-interested action declines

Page 48: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

If equality individualism, then how to produce social order?

When people are involved with trying to address local problems, they realize how interdependent they are.

Page 49: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Role of associations in combating individualism In aristocratic societies, individual

nobles can accomplish great things because they can call on the aid of their dependents. In democratic societies, where all are roughly equal and weak, collective action is more problematic – and for that reason, more important. A principal basis for this collective action occurs in voluntary associations (321).

If government replaces voluntary associations, then people will need to turn to government more.

Page 50: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Role of associations, cont’d When people are involved in

voluntary associations, they learn to bend their will to the common good.

This suggests that freedom of association contributes to order, rather than threatens it.

Page 51: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville’s conclusion Americans learn how to be good citizens

through their experience in political associations.

Cf. Banfield on Montegrano Cf. Putnam on social capital

Page 52: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville: Summary of causal relations and mechanisms Macro-level cause: voluntary associations Situational mechanism: learn to cooperate Individual internal state: enjoy cooperating Behavioral mechanism: act accordingly Individual action: cooperative behavior Transformational mechanism: aggregation Macro-level outcome: social order

Page 53: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville: Draw the theory

Voluntary associations

Enjoy cooperating

Cooperate

Social order

Page 54: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Tocqueville How do we know if the theory has

merit? Look at the empirical world

E.g. Robert Putnam’s study of Italy (Making Democracy Work, 1994)

Page 55: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

One way that groups affect individuals is by helping them internalize cooperative values.

Another way that groups facilitate cooperation is through norms.

Page 56: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Norms Norms

Cultural phenomena that prescribe and proscribe behavior in specific circumstances

Thus: external criteria for evaluation Unlike values, norms

Require sanctioning if they are to be effective

an external solution to the problem of social order

Page 57: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Norms: some examples Books of etiquette tell us how to

behave at Weddings Funerals Baseball games Birthdays Classrooms When we are visitors to other

countries

Page 58: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Violations have consequences Coach George O’Leary Historian Joseph Ellis These people are very good at

their jobs -- but they lied Implication: there is a norm of truth-

telling at American universities Sanctions are strong

Page 59: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

How norms order To the degree that people comply

with prosocial norms Their behavior will be predictable They will act cooperatively

Page 60: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Where do norms come from?

Page 61: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Michael Hechter

Page 62: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Hechter: The Theory of Group Solidarity

Addresses two questions Under what conditions do groups

form? Under what conditions are existing

groups more or less solidary (e.g. ordered)?

Page 63: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Group formation People form groups only when there is

a net benefit The principal benefit of groups

The concentration – or pooling – of individually-held resources, such as

Security Insurance from natural disaster and disease Greater access to mates and information

Resource pooling specialization greater efficiency of production (Smith)

Page 64: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Group formation (cont’d) People form groups to attain these

private (=excludable) goods Either they cannot provide these

goods at all via their own efforts Or they cannot provide them

efficiently (e.g. at reasonable cost) Motive of group formation

Access to jointly-produced goods

Page 65: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Group production These joint goods must be produced

Members must comply with rules assuring production of joint goods

Compliance with these rules is costly Members have an incentive to free ride

Compliance is the principal cost of group formation

Page 66: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Insurance groups Group formation motivated by

desire to insure against uncertainties of physical and economic security Friendly societies and fraternal

organizations Mutual benefit associations Rotating credit associations

Page 67: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Group solidarity If members free ride, then few joint

goods are produced Rationale for group formation

to gain access to joint goods If too few joint goods are produced

then group will dissolve Groups have varying levels of solidarity

The greater the proportion of each member’s resources contributed to the group’s ends, the greater the solidarity

Page 68: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Solidarity increases when Members are dependent on the group

for access to the good Dependence varies to the degree that

Members value the joint good They cannot obtain it elsewhere

Members are subject to control Monitored to detect if they contribute Sanctioned

to punish them for not contributing, or rewarded for exceptional contribution

Page 69: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

The theory of group solidarity

Visibility of members

Dependenceof members

Efficiency of Monitoring

Efficiency ofSanctioning

ExtensivenessExtent of normativeobligations

Probability of

compliance

Group solidarity

+

+

++

+

+

+

Page 70: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

How to overcome 2nd order free rider problem? Group survival requires compliance with

rules Don’t skip town with all the money

Compliance requires control apparatus Control apparatus = a collective good

Why will it be produced? People invest only if there is control Members have an incentive to enforce the rules

(this protects their private goods) Conclusion: rational egoists establish control

in small groups providing private goods

Page 71: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Summary Solidarity is a positive function of

Members’ dependence on group Group’s control (monitoring and

sanctioning) capacity

Page 72: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Theory of group solidarity How do we know if the theory has

merit? Look at the empirical world

E.g. The Amish Witness

E.g. Kibbutz versus Moshav (Schwartz 1954, Yale Law Journal)

Page 73: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Theory of group solidarity Hechter argues that when people

are visible to each other, norms are more likely to be enforced

But why do people want to enforce norms?

Page 74: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

James S. Coleman

Page 75: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Coleman One possibility is that people want the

resulting benefits E.g. When others cheat, the individual loses.

If the individual can punish cheating, so that cheating declines, the individual is better off

E.g. Smoking. When people realized that second-hand smoke caused health problems, they wanted smoking to be regulated

Page 76: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Coleman So, when behavior produces harms

for others, those others have an interest in regulating it

In turn, they are more likely to punish it

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Coleman: Draw the theoryExternality NormsProducing Behaviors

Regulatory Punish interest

deviance

Page 78: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Christine Horne

Page 79: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Horne But presumably, any individual

would prefer to let others make the effort to sanction rather than bear the costs themselves Sanctioning can take time and

energy. It can be embarrassing. It can result in retaliation.

So, why sanction?

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Horne People care about their relationships

with others, and they care about how others treat them

So, when they make decisions about reacting to deviance, they consider how their actions will be viewed by others They consider how others are likely to react Such reactions are called ‘metanorms’

Page 81: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Horne People are more likely to get

support for sanctioning in tight-knit groups That is, metanorms are stronger in

tight-knit groups

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Horne Cohesive groups therefore have

more norm enforcement than noncohesive groups E.g. fraternities

Page 83: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Horne: Draw the theoryGroup NormsCohesion

Interest in maintaining Individualsrelationships and evoking sanction &positive responses support others’

sanctioning efforts

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Macy

Page 85: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Centola, Willer, and Macy This concern with social relations

can lead people to punish behavior – even if the behavior produces no harm. E.g. fashion, music

Page 86: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

If groups control their members, then group solidarity will be high. But how is order within a group connected to order in the larger society – especially when the society is diverse?

Page 87: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Hechter, Friedman, and Kanazawa: Attaining order in heterogeneous societies

Chapter contrasts two explanations of social order Order via coercion

Critique: need for legitimacy Order via values and norms

Critique: if order is a product of common values and norms, how to explain order in societies with discrete subcultures, like the U.S.A?

Page 88: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Thesis The members of groups produce

local order (e.g. solidarity) to satisfy their own private ends

Once produced, local order contributes to the production of social order

Page 89: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Local order and social order States free-ride on the production of

local order Local order contributes to global order,

regardless of the norms of local groups A counterintuitive implication of this

argument The more deviant the normative content

of the local order, the greater its relative contribution to social order

Page 90: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Why deviant groups contribute more to social order All groups control members’ behavior (to

variable degrees) Members are consumed by the demands of the

group, and although the group explicitly intends to provide an alternative to mainstream norms, the fact that their members are compelled to satisfy corporate obligations limits their ability to engage in other, potentially antisocial, activities

Members of deviant groups more likely to behave anti-socially than members of the Rotary Club Hence: there is a bigger payoff for regulating

the behavior of deviant than straight individuals

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The exception: counterproductive groups Exception

This proposition is not true if this local order causes the state to expend its resources on control

This occurs with the prevalence of counterproductive groups, which Require their members not to comply with

at least some important social norms, e.g. Street gangs Separatist militias Terrorist cells (Al Qaeda, etc.)

The more solidarity counterproductive groups have, the less the social order

Page 92: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Hechter, Friedman, & Kanazawa: Drawing the theory

Solidarity & productivity of groups

Costs for non-group members/ government

Sanctioning by the state

Social order

Page 93: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Sanctioning varies among deviant groups Sanctioning reserved for counterproductive

groups Little sanctioning of deviant groups that

are not counterproductive Example

Hare Krishna and Rajneesh are both deviant groups

Hare Krishna not sanctioned by the state Rajneesh sanctioned

Conclusion: deviance of the group doesn’t explain differential sanctioning

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Evidence Because the state has limited

control capacity, it can only enforce the legal code selectively

Differential treatment of the Saints vs. Roughnecks

Tolerance of the Guardian Angels

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American inner-city street gangs The most successful urban gangs

regulate their members' behavior by punishing those who engage in random violence that is unsanctioned by the leadership

Gangs who fail to keep their members from preying on the community are denied the community's safe haven and soon unravel (Jankowski)

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State tolerance of vice The police are more likely to turn

a blind eye to illegal activities of groups that contribute to global order (like gambling parlors in New York's Chinatown; prostitution everywhere) than those that threaten it (like crack-dealing gangs in Watts)

Page 97: Groups. Recap: Market theories Hold only under stringent conditions Games have clear, cardinal payoffs Payoffs are common knowledge Indefinite iterations

Conclusion Order in heterogeneous societies enhanced

by the existence of large numbers of relatively small solidary groups unable to command control over resources that threaten the unique position of the state

Social order is enhanced by the freedom of association, especially at the margins of society. The most efficacious way to produce global order is to strengthen the conditions for the production of local solidarity.