Upload
arshihashmi1
View
215
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
1/35
SOUTH ASIAS GROWING VULNERABILITY TOEXTREMISM AND TERRORISM: REDEFINING THEDISCOURSE
Arshi Saleem HashmiSenior Research Analyst, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad
Visiting Assistant Professor, National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad
Existing scenario
It is militant forms or expressions of religion and religious ideology, which, under the
guise of fundamentalism, are arguably the point of connectivity between religion and religious
terrorism. Contrary to what Hent De Vries (1) argues that there is no religion without violence of
some sort and no violence without religion of some sort, religion itself is not the cause of conflict.
In fact, problems arise when powerful vested interests associate religion with violence, as Mark
Juergenmeyers argues that religious violence is a result of peoples tendency to see their life as a
struggle between good and evil. The clash between the forces of darkness and light can be
understood not as a sacred struggle but as a real fight, often political manoeuvring taking place on
the earth. He claims that when there is an identity crisis, or problem of legitimacy, threat of
defeat, a real world struggle can be conceived as a sacred war and enemies are
demonized. (2) Another school of thought, that includes Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard
Lewis and Jessica Stern, sees only Islam and not other religions as inevitably violent. Daniel
Pipes, for instance, claims that radical Islam is an ideology incompatible with secular society.
Muslims want to force the secular world to submit to their principles. They are thus a radical
network of terrorists, terrorists in this world who can't stand the thought of peace, terrorism
with a global reach, evildoers, a dangerous group of people, a bunch of cold-blooded
killers, and even people without a country. (3) But there can be surely many other explanations
to understand why religion has become an essential tool in politics and its extremist
manifestation. For instance, Ted Gurrs model of relative deprivation, mobilization and
grievances is very relevant in order to understand the intrusion of religion in politics and the
phenomenon of extremism. (4)
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
2/35
No doubt that the Taliban-Deobandi axis represents the legacy of revivalism that had, in
the latter part of the 19th century, swept the Muslim world with a wave of militant insurrections
led by the fundamentalist ulema, but it has become a fashion to trace all acts of violent behaviour
to Islamic community. There is so much rhetoric in this regard that other possible reasons for the
rise of militancy in the region have been set aside. The international media has found a new
excitement about the activities of the militant groups and linking them with the Muslim ideology,
notwithstanding their geographical location. It is being envisioned as if the origin and
manifestation of extremism and terrorism is only confined to Islam or at least to people who
believe in the religion and call themselves Muslims. This impression is further reinforced by the
Greater Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, which after 9/11 got the opportunity to strengthen
their dictatorial rule, by deliberately misinterpreting the unrest in their respective societies.
According to this propaganda tool, the element of dissent and revolt is branded as an act of
extremism.
In societies like Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, religious terrorism became
an expression of ethnic identity as well, when the non-religious expressions of the communities
were denied democratic outlet. In Bangladesh and Nepal, it is solely ideological expression than
ethnic, which shaped into political violence.
Militant expression of religious extremism is a global issue but South Asia is the worst affected
region. Religious extremism and its expression through terrorism is a non-state, international
phenomenon and, therefore, needs to be dealt with at the state, regional, and international levels.
Conceptual framework: Collective radicalization and mobilization
It is often said that religious extremists are not the poorest of the poor. In fact all the big
names in the list of the culprits in recent history turned out to be educated and relatively better
off. This leads us to explain that those who are most deprived, most oppressed, most in need are
not those who usually rebel violently. Of course there have been food riots and peasant uprisings,
but most often revolutions and violence have occurred when conditions are better or have been
improving, and among those who are not the most deprived. Explanations vary but generally
focus on two propositions. First, deprivation is subjective, a function of a persons perceptions,
needs, and knowledge. To nail deprivation to an objective or absolute lack of something such as
freedom, equality, or sustenance, is to ignore that definition of these shifts according to historical
period, culture, society, position, and person .
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
3/35
The second proposition deals with these norms. It asserts that we take our presently
perceived or expected positions, achievements, gratifications, or capabilities as a base of
comparison against our wants or needs, or what we feel we ought to have. The gap between wants
and ought to or gratifications and capabilities is then our deprivation, or relative deprivation in
the sense that it all depends on our base of comparison.
The literature on these two principles and on relative deprivation is well organized in
Gurrs book, (5) which merits discussion. The idea of relative deprivation has been used either to
measure fairness, inequality, or social justice, or to explain grievance, social hostility, or
aggression. Gurrs concern is with relative deprivation as a cause of aggression.
Ted Gurrs articulated models suggesting that the gap between expectations and
achievements would contribute to the willingness of people to rebel; in particular, rebellion was
fuelled by movements in this perceived deprivation. In our discussion here on religious
extremism, the aggressive, violent phenomenon of extremism attests to Gurrs theory that it is
actually the gap between the expectation of a regime based on true faith and the reality of an
adulterated regime that leads these self-proclaimed custodians to resort violence in the name of
religion. (6)
The basic thesis of this paper is based on two theories; one that grievance borne of
deprivation (either economic or political) is an individual concern that manifests itself
collectively. Quite often material and political deprivation is aggregated within specific groups
with a homogenous cultural identity. For example, a religious or linguistic minority might suffer
disproportionately in a given society, and this form of grieve can lead to unrest across the social
lines that distinguish the minority group. (7) True, in most regions of the world where we find
ethnic and religious movements at times violent are minorities rebelling against the system.
South Asia, however, is unique in the sense that the religious revivalism in extreme form
in all of its troubled areas was initiated by the religious majority. This brings us to the second part
of the thesis, in order to understand the phenomenon of religious extremism in South Asia, weneed to look at the element of Fear. When Winston Churchill warned, we have nothing to fear,
but fear itself, its doubtful he realized the sweeping political accuracy of those inspiring words.
The common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear and it is true for
violent religious movements as well. The fear of being deprived of something drives one to act
aggressively. Fear of being left out is the factor that drives the movements against the prevalent
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
4/35
forces. It is not the only motivating factor behind political manifestation of religious violence, nor
necessarily the most obvious, but it is virtually always there. Whenever we ask why people hate,
or why they are willing to kill or die for a cause, the answer is invariably fear.
Religious radicals are united by fear. Whether they are Christian, Muslim, Jew, Hindu orBuddhist, fear of being deprived of the role and status that they expect and want to achieve, is the
common denominator. Some groups fear change, modernization and loss of influence, others fear
that the young will abandon the churches, temples, mosques and synagogues for physical and
material gratification. They especially fear education if it undermines the teachings of their
religion. They fear a future they cant control, or even comprehend.
So if relative deprivation can explain the phenomenon of religious extremism among the
religious minorities, fear of being deprived of the status and achievement of the desired society
can explain the rising religious extremism and militancy among the religious majority. South
Asian religious majorities are suffering from such fear that leads to tragic occurrences like the
Gujarat pogrom perpetrated by the Hindu-majority extremists or Islamic militancy waging jihad
against the infidels in Pakistan or Bangladesh or Sinhalese Buddhists resorting to violence
against Tamil Hindus and Christians in Sri Lanka.
Basic questions
The paper addresses some basic questions. For instance, why does religion sooften become a source of conflict in South Asia? How can doctrines that emphasize
harmony and peace get so politicized that justifies rioting, war, and terrorism? Whether
the role-played by religion in public life and in politics is proper? While focusing on
South Asia, the study raises an important question: Does the religious confrontation in
South Asian politics lead to regional instability?
Role of religion in South Asian politics
Grievance vs. ideology: A fundamental difference or a false dichotomy
Ian Pitchfords separation of a) ideologically-driven groups and b) grievance-driven groups may
be read to suggest a distinction between a) groups whose terrorism we unequivocally condemn
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
5/35
(al-Qaeda, Taliban in Pakistan, RSS Hindu extremists and b) groups whose terrorism we
understand (Hamas in the Middle East, Baluch in Pakistan, insurgents in NorthEast India).
Regardless of what the specific causes of terrorism in one place or another may be, it must carry
with it an ideology namely, that attacking innocent civilians is fair game (or else that there is no
such thing as an innocent civilian). (8) This is hardly trivial, and therefore all terrorist groups are ideological. When upper-class
Hindus organize violence against untouchables who try to win equal political status they are
expressing a grievance. Not the one that we recognize as legitimate, but a grievance all the same.
So whether somebody has a grievance is independent of our evaluation of its being just and
genuine; since members of every terrorist group, including al-Qaeda, say they have grievances.
The question is if there is any terrorist group without a grievance? But most importantly,
since it is certainly not the case that everybody with a grievance launches into wholesaleslaughter of civilians, we need to pay more attention to the causes responsible for an ideology that
endorses killing the innocent.
The media and Western leaders speak often about this phenomenon in relation to Islam.
We know about the extremists in Iran and Saudi Arabia and about the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But
it is also the experience in all the other great faiths. Hindu extremists have been in Indian
administration and Jewish extremists in Israeli administration and in both cases theyve definitely
got nuclear weapons already. Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka have prevented reconciliation with
the Tamil minority for decades. Bangladesh has been suffering from fundamentalist Islam versus
liberal Bengali nationalism and that has led to the election victories of the two mainstream
political parties in the country.
Though the establishment of one religion as a countrys official religion is permitted
under international standards for freedom of religion or belief and thus is not problematic, it is the
implementation of this right that unfortunately provides one community an edge over other and
hence leads to exploitation and sometimes violence in the name of religion. We have noticed that
the establishment of a religion also establishes an inevitable formal inequality which implies
some risk of discrimination, of whatever degree of mildness or severity; and which undercuts
national unity, necessarily based on perceptions of common heritage and aspirations, to the extent
that those outside the established religion feel themselves excluded from or peripheral to a
defining characteristic of national identity.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
6/35
The South Asian countries being discussed here except India and Sri Lanka have given special
place to religion in their constitutions. A quick scan of these constitutions shows the importance
of religion not only legally but politically as well
Constitutional umbrella and the politics of the South Asian countries
Through the Proclamation (Amendment) Order No. 1 of 1977, the Bangladeshi
Constitution has lost its original secular character and has been highly Islamized. The
process of Islamization of the constitution started during the rule of Ziaur Rahman with
the insertion of Islamic words. But it was General Hussain Muhammad Ershad who
completed this process by declaring Islam the state religion through the Eighth
Amendment. Article 2A of the Constitution says, The state religion of the Republic is
Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the republic. With
this insertion, one of the religions as practiced in this country has been placed above the
others, and discrimination and religious harassment or persecution against other religious
groups intensified.
The Sri Lankan political system approves Buddhism enjoying foremost place in their
society through constitutional guarantee. Buddhism has a special place in Sri Lankan politics;
officials pledge allegiance to Buddhist clerics after assuming power, and the military hasincorporated Buddhist rituals into its ceremonies. Though still not part of the constitution, the
proposed 19 th Amendment to the Constitution would make Buddhism the official religion of Sri
Lanka. Article 9.1 of the proposed amendment states that The Official Religion of the Republic
is Buddhism. Other forms of religions and worship may be practiced in peace and harmony with
Buddha Sasana .(9)
The word secular was inserted into the Preamble of the Indian Constitution by the 42 nd
Amendment Act of 1976 . It implies equality of all religions and religious tolerance. India
therefore does not have an official state religion. In theory, every person has the right to preach,
practice and propagate any religion they choose. The government must not favour or discriminate
against any religion. It must treat all religions with equal respect. Those who support turning
secular India into a Hindu state through constitutional amendments argue that Buddhism, Jainism,
and Sikhism share with Hinduism the concept of dharma along with other key concepts, and the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/19768/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
7/35
four religions may be said to belong to the dharmic tradition. (10) The word Hinduism retains this
sense in some usages in the Indian Constitution of 1950. However, in practical politics, Hinduism
is used in a narrower sense to distinguish it from the other religions of Indian origin .
Part IX, Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan, provides that all existing laws shallbe brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah. In this Part, referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, it is stated that no law shall be
enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions. Further explanation (Art.242) provides that in the
application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression Quran and
Sunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect. (11) The constitution also
provides that nothing in this Part shall affect the personal laws of non-Muslim citizens or their
status as citizens.
Reference to Hindus in the last Nepali Constitution (12) shall be construed as including a
reference to persons professing the Buddhist, Shamanist or other religions existing in Nepal over
the course of many centuries, and references to Hindu religion and religious institutions shall be
construed accordingly. Such a provision might have the effect of extending protection to Nepal's
other widely followed indigenous South Asian religions. On the other hand, it might also easily
evoke feelings of being subsumed in a kind of Hindu-centric hegemony, despite the long history
of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shamanism alike as inclusive rather than exclusive religions, able to
coexist well with other religions. And of course it would not solve the problem of a religion such
as Islam, also present in Nepal for many centuries, or of more recent introductions such as
Christianity. (13)
The 2004 Afghan Constitution describes Islam as the state religion. A system of civil law is
described, but no law may contradict the beliefs and provisions of Islam. It was widely reported
that the Sharia (the system of Islamic laws) is not specifically mentioned, but in fact Hanafi
jurisprudence is one of the six branches of Sharia. Moreover, concessions are made to Shia
jurisprudence in cases arising strictly between Shiites. Followers of other religions are free to
exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the law. There is no
mention of freedom of conscience , and in fact apostasy is punishable by death in Islam
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_law_(common_law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_consciencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_consciencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_law_(common_law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
8/35
Policy implementation
The institutional provision of religion in the constitutions of almost all South Asiancountries has made it a political force. India is technically a secular state; Pakistan and
Bangladesh have Islam as state religion, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are Buddhist and Nepal a Hindu
state. The political leaders as well as military rulers in South Asia have used religion for political
legitimacy and integration. Not only that, religious identity, slogans and symbols have often been
used by political parties for political mobilization. Political use of religion has heightened
religious antagonism and acrimony; has made room for religious militancy and extremism. More
importantly, recent years have witnessed a resurgence of religious militancy in South Asia;
militant fundamentalism has emerged under the garb of religious extremism.
Change and continuity still characterize the development of religious traditions in South
Asia as they have in the past. Pakistan and Bangladesh have experimented to different degrees
with the integration of Islamic legal structures into the running of the nation-state, but in neither
nation has conservative Islam exerted a definitive influence on governance. The legal system in
India has retained differing systems for Hindu and Muslim personal law (more than 10 per cent of
the population of India is Muslim). The Sikhs have battled for their own homeland, and though a
relative peace has returned to the Punjab, since 1997, the issue may emerge again. Fundamentalist
Hinduism, especially after the destruction of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in 1991, has raised
concerns for all religious minorities in the regionSikh, Muslim, and Christian alike. South
Asias dynamic religious presence is manifested throughout the world, since the South Asian
diaspora is a vital and growing community. Religious traditions are transformed by this
increasingly small world, influenced by economic and political change, new media, and altering
social expectations. Core religious beliefs and practices will continue to change, as living cultures
do, in the future.
In the South Asian region, the ruling political leadership has been unfortunately suppressing those
who dare oppose its theories of culture and civilization. The speed and ferocity with which
political leaders are diminishing the civil and political rights of their constituencies indicates that
South Asia is in for a prolonged period of turmoil.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
9/35
Politico-religious extremism in South Asia
What are the sources of religious extremism? When we ask a question like this, we mean
at least two things. One is a question of explanation, asking why it happens. While this
question is inevitable, it is always risky, for the answer can be both simplistic and reductionist.
The other is a question of interpretation, asking how we see things. This encourages us both
to be more open-minded and to expect to find complexities.
Though prevalent in other societies too, especially the Middle East, religious extremism
in South Asia is unique. Proper understanding of the phenomenon depends therefore on sustained
and comparative discussion of all the politically important cases of religious extremism
Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist across South Asias major states. Without this, we are in danger of
having only a series of isolated national or sub-regional perspectives, based on a single case-
study approach, which fail to illuminate the extent to which movements of extremist religious
nationalism in different parts of the subcontinent inspire and provoke each other. (14)
Religions role in the politics of South Asia and its radical manifestation increased many
times after the anti-Soviet Afghan War. The way Kashmir struggle became more of a religious
struggle rather than a political/territorial dispute says a lot about the impact of religious
extremism in one part of the region on the other part. Kashmir was not the only case. Much
before the azadi movement in Kashmir was radicalized, the separatist movement inspired by
extremist Sikh nationalism in the Indian Punjab and the Tamil separatist movement againstBuddhist extremism in Sri Lanka grew more alarming at the same time, in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, bolstering each other as well as other ethno-religious azadi /separatist insurgencies,
particularly in Kashmir, Northeast India, and the Chittagong Hills. In addition, reactive or
retaliatory effects are observable: Hindu-extremist attacks on Muslims in India have helped
inspire Muslim-extremist attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh, and strengthened the resolve and
ferocity of Islamic militants in Kashmir.
Of crucial importance for understanding South Asian religious extremisms impact on the
politics is to understand the relationship between religious extremism and violence committed by
non-state actors. In particular, religious extremism tends to inspire religious violence and
terrorism and also, because of its persistence and virulence, to provoke reactive religious
violence, terrorism, and even terrorist movements. The Gujarat pogrom of 2002 shows both:
extremist Hindu nationalists, many of them in government, used systematic violence in a
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
10/35
systematic fashion against innocent people to achieve political purposes a practice which
certainly fits textbook definitions of terrorism. At the same time, such violence has provoked a
wave of reactive violence almost certainly by Indian Muslims.
Most of the literature typically focuses on religious extremism, a phenomenon outside of government: What happens when the philosophy becomes a reality and tastes power; religious
extremist parties on gaining power use violence as a semi-official instrument of governance and
political self-preservation as Hindu nationalists in India effectively used communal violence to
win elections in Gujarat in December 2002, a strategy the national leadership of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) has committed itself to replicating across India. Similarly, in Pakistan the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or united action committee) used the slogan Islam in
danger in the 2002 general election in the backdrop of US attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and
approves of the actions taken by the militants and the Taliban in the Tribal areas of Pakistanagainst the infidels. It is therefore very important to evaluate the impact of religious extremism
on democracy. We have witnessed in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, how religious
extremism has promoted majoritarian and illiberal conceptions of democracy that erode and
weaken the political rights and civil liberties of religious minorities. In other words, it is crucial to
grasp the important political role religion and its extremist variant actually plays in South Asia,
particularly in democratic politics, and how it attracts political support and exerts political
influence beyond core supporters and succeeds in shaping national politics throughout the
subcontinent.
On the one hand, religious fundamentalism excludes, virtually automatically, anything
that relative to it appears liberal; on the other this same fundamentalism can display a propensity
to include, in respect to considerations of the policies and praxis of social organization, all others
that fall within its frame of reference or worldview. This holding together of an ideological
exclusivism with an inclusivist polity , where it occurs, comprises the contextual scope of
fundamentalism which is a mark of hardline fundamentalism and gives the first point of a profile
of religious extremism as such. (15)
Another point is negative value application, which is a feature of fundamentalism. It occurs
where otherness per se is negated and, as a necessary corollary, the superiority of the self is
asserted. The other is often cast as satanic, or at least seriously and significantly labelled as a
hostile opponent, and so regarded hostilely. However expressed or referenced, it will be clear that
the fundamentalist is showing signs of deepening extremism in applying negative valuation to
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
11/35
otherness as such, together with a corresponding assertion of self-superiority vis--vis any
other. As the shift from a merely hardline to an actively impositional fundamentalism takes
place, we discover two critical factors at work: sanctioned imposition and legitimated violence .
The former sees the very imposition of the fundamentalists views and polity as, in fact,
sanctioned by a higher or greater authority, howsoever that is conceived. This leads naturally to
the legitimization of extreme violence and so a platform of justification being established, at least
in the mind of the impositional fundamentalist. Sanctioned imposition and legitimized violence
are the two sides of the chief coin of justification in the currency of religious extremism. They
form the feature of explicit justification, which is a mark of impositional fundamentalism and the
fourth point in the profile of religious extremism. (16)
Ad hoc and organized intentional terrorism in South Asia
On the one hand manifestations of contempt, as an expression of
negative judgments and the negation of the other, often appear in various contemptible
behaviours intimidation, coercion, violent and destructive actions directed at non-
human symbolic targets: works of art, places of worship, and so on. Such behaviours may
be ad hoc or temporary, simply manifesting an underlying contempt in a comparatively
spontaneous fashion. (17) On the other hand, there is certainly the phenomenon of
intentionally organized terrorism where extremism knows no bounds: the terrorizing of a
targeted populace is itself both the means and the end. For it is only so that the extremistensures that the imposition, that has been duly sanctioned, can actually be brought about.
South Asia is unique as it has both temporary, random, abrupt phases of violent
expression as well as organized, intentional terrorist actions against certain groups or the
state. Since in South Asia we are still not so civilized to go for the root causes of the
problem of religious extremism and its militant manifestations, though badly affected by
terrorism, the region has not been able to address the root causes that are responsible for
mounting terrorist activities. Cosmetic steps to go against the militants after the terrorist
act is committed already cannot solve the problem. These groups go underground when
military action is taken by the governments and re-emerge when and as they feel the
chance to exploit the grievances of the masses.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
12/35
Shift from extremist politics to militancy
Individual motivations to group dynamics
There can be many phases in the process when individual motivation transforms into
group dynamics resulting in militancy in the society. As Prof. Adam Dolnik puts it: first, pre-radicalization period, a number of factors working on individuals pushing them to extreme
behaviour; second, cognitive opening, a situation where we are ready to take another look at what
we believe and it completely changes our perspective triggered by thematic events that happen;
third is self-radicalization, and finally, the concept of Jihadization .(18)
If militant theology is more often the consequence than cause of a militant orientation,
the question arises what leads religious groups to militancy in the first place? Why religious
groups choose violence to improve the lot of their institutions and constituents, by resistingrepression and gaining political power. One reason could be that in religious societies, favouring
one group over other suppressing all other competing sects encourages furious, fanatical violence.
Since the South Asian states have achieved independence, the tolerant religious
nationalisms that helped spawn these nation-states have been fiercely challenged by extremist
variants. Unlike their forebears, these variants have several distinguishing characteristics. First,
they assume the religious identity of the majority as not merely one important aspect of the
nations identity but as central and overriding. Second, they consider ethnic or religious identities
different from those of the majority presumptively alien and disloyal and thus create a tiered
conception of citizenship. Third, extremist religious movements are often propagated by
movements that believe that communal and even terrorist violence are normal and legitimate
means of promoting their visions and of keeping religious and ethnic minorities in their
(subordinate) place. Finally and perhaps most dangerously, religious extremism fosters intense
rivalries with other South Asian nations that do not share their religious identity.
India
Modern India, the worlds largest democracy, had its share of violent and not so violent
episodes of religious extremism along with religious nationalism. Caste continues to exert a
profound influence both on individual lives and on regional and national politics. However,
leaders like Mr. Ambedkar, who chose to convert to Buddhism to combat the stigma of
untouchable, and others have challenged the status quo like the Bhakti poets and Buddhist sage
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
13/35
centuries ago. The rise of a Hindu majoritarian politics since the 1980s in India must be placed
squarely in the context of the many powerful regional challenges to central authority. As
ideologies of secularism and socialism lost credibility, the Congress regimes at the centre turned
to an implicit, if not explicit, religiously based majoritarianism to ward off regional threats. By so
doing they paved the way for the more ideologically committed and organizationally cohesive
forces of Hindutva the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to emerge as major forces on the Indian political
scene.
The Indian Constitution explicitly rejects the communalist ideology of the BJP, based on
RSSs philosophy under which the ideal state must be a Hindu state, and not just a Hindu state
but an authoritarian and undemocratic state. The architects of RSS ideology did not hide their
love for Hitlers ideas of superiority of German nation, believing that similar notion of Hindusupremacy should rule India. Deployed initially vis--vis a Sikh 'other' in the early 1980s, Hindu
majoritarianism increasingly took on anti-Muslim overtones. (19)
The state is partly responsible for the reinforcing of stereotypes coming from the same
mindset, as demonstrated by the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. At a public rally in
the state of Goa, Vajpayee was reported as saying that wherever there were Muslims in the world,
there was strife. Once Islam meant tolerance, truth and compassion from what I see now, it
has come to mean forcing their opinion through terror and fear. Islam is run on jehad . As the
statement made its way through the media, drawing criticism and making Indian diplomats
squirm at international forums, the Indian government sought to put a spin on it, claiming the
prime minister was quoted out of context. But the message was clear. We were secular even in
the early days when Muslims and Christians were not here, Vajpayee had said in the latter part
of his speech. We have allowed them to do their prayers and follow their religion. (20)
Having formed a stable governing coalition at the center in 1998, they have used their
unprecedented national power to make India an official nuclear power, rewritten history
textbooks to exalt the glory of Hindu civilization at the expense of Muslim and Christian
foreign invaders, orchestrated the destruction of churches and killing of missionaries, (21) passed
legislation that would subject religious conversion to government regulation, and organized a
pogrom (in Gujarat in 2002) that killed as many as 2,000 Muslims. (22) Stephen Cohen warns that
the Gujarat riots had the perverse effect of strengthening Pakistans resolve to resist what it
views as Hindu chauvinism. (23)
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
14/35
While Islamic madrassas are being targeted, the Indian governments have maintained a
disturbing silence on the role and functioning of the institutions run by Hindu fundamentalists
such as the VHP and RSS. Though there are inherent differences, the aims of the RSS-run
shakhas (training cells) and Saraswati shishu mandirs (kindergartens) are strikingly similar to,
and no less dangerous than, those madrassas all over Pakistan and Afghanistan which follow
radicalism and spawned the Taliban. (24)
Much before the BJP came into power and RSS stalwarts got a free hand to communalize
history, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi mobilized Hindu majoritarianism in India to suppress
regional and separatist movements, including the extremist Sikh nationalism that sought to create
a separate state. The policy of her government in dealing with the separatist movements
culminated in a raid on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar, in revenge for which her Sikh
bodyguards assassinated her in 1984.
The BJP did indeed make dramatic improvements in their representation in the Indian
parliament, and came to power in a coalition government in 1998. The BJP's election manifesto
was greatly influenced by the `Sangh Parivar', which had clearly subscribed to the acquisition of
the nuclear weapon. As far back as the early fifties, the Jana Sangh, which was the forerunner of
the present-day BJP, had also championed the cause of going nuclear. (25) The nuclear bomb was
considered to be a visible symbol of power, strength and militarism and especially of a resurgent
Hindu nationalism. The Indira Gandhi-led Congress government conducted the first nuclear test
in 1974; it was within a stated policy of not going in for nuclear weaponisation .They were quite
clear that they would propagate and promote global nuclear disarmament. Later, prime minister
Rajiv Gandhi also proposed nuclear disarmament at the UN on 9 June 1988. (26)
The BJP government in an attempt to realize its long-stated goal of making India a
nuclear power conducted the five Pokhran tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. That led to Pakistans
decision to go nuclear and conduct six tests at Chagai on 28 and 30 May 1998. The symbolic use
of religion with the nuclear weapon is to use it for pride and national cohesion.
Mark Tully, the BBC journalist, made a pertinent remark on religion in Indian politics, he
said, Anyone who says religion is needed in Indian politics where Hindus in Gujarat took
bloody revenge for a Muslim attack on a train might well be accused of criminal
irresponsibility. But during my travels around India searching for an answer to militant Hinduism,
everyone I met felt religion should have a place in government. However, most politicians believe
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
15/35
this will only be possible if Indias age-old tradition of religious tolerance remains at the centre of
its national ideology. (27)
Indias political traditions are founded upon liberalism, democracy; and tolerance; but the
growth of extremism in that nation threatens those foundations, and threatens to ignite not onlyinternal violence but also conflict with other nations like Pakistan. There may be justifiable
concerns about the possibility of Muslim extremists taking over in Pakistan, a country with
nuclear weapons, but we should have similar concerns about India as well a country which is
much larger, more powerful, and which possess more nuclear weapons than Pakistan.
Pakistan
Pakistans suffering because of religious extremism is no secret. In Pakistan,
the problem is not just against other religious communities, for instance, violence against
Ahmadis or Christians, but within the Muslim community hard-line religious groups
differ with each other on interpretation based on various sects which often leads to worst
forms of sectarian violence. Religion is politicized and abused for the instigation of
terrorism by two sets of actors in Pakistan. The two sets are somewhat inter-related but
show certain differences regarding their objectives, areas of operation and targets of
violence. First, there are sectarian groups belonging to the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam
that resort to terrorist activities which are mostly, though not exclusively, directed againstthe people from the opposite sect. This schism on sectarian lines was the direct outcome
of the process of Islamization of laws in Pakistan that was introduced, as noted above,
by Gen Zia-ul-Haq in 197788; sectarian violence was very rare before that period. The
Shias, feeling empowered after the 1979 Iranian revolution and embittered over Zias
Islamization programme, created an organization called Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-
Jaffria (movement for implementing the Shia law) and protested against Zias policies.
They were successful in securing rider clauses in the new Islamized laws for themselves
and in having the Shias in general exempted from certain aspects of those laws.
Not only did Zia get personally apprehensive about Shia power in Pakistan, the Sunnis
were also agitated at the time. They feared that people might seek conversion from the Sunni fiqh
to Shiism in order to seek exemption from zakat (the annual tax of 2.5 per cent on the savings of
Muslims collected for distribution among the poor) or from other, more rigid Sunni family laws.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
16/35
The vigilante Sunnis therefore set up Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (army of the companions of the
Prophet).
The other set of religious extremists is of those who believe in a grand agenda, the
movement or network of the residue of the Afghan war. Way beyond the Shia-Sunni conflict, thisgroup believes in a constant war with the forces of evil (meaning, the West in general and the US
in particular and all those who support these states, including Muslim states friendly to both) and
the forces of virtue, i.e Al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden. This group is led by the residue of
Afghan Jihad movement. With sure financial supply, the group vows to bring ideal Islamic
system to the country. Mainstream Islamic political parties, though denying any link to the violent
agenda of Al-Qaeda, are sympathetic to its objective of puritanical Islamic system in the country
and any violence that takes place is sanctioned as an effort to please God.
Extremist Islamic nationalism and an accompanying jihad culture infuse the countrys
political, educational, and military institutions, partly as a result of a combination of Zias Afghan
policy and his Islamization campaign. In the post-9/11 scenarios, Pakistans official policy has
changed considerably. But domestically, we are still dealing with the problem of countering
jihadi publications and banned terrorist groups who appear to operate under new names. The
war against terror is but one sign that the country is suffering from the malaise of other peoples
war and the frightening situation that arms religious extremism with modern-day high-tech
weaponry is a scary thing to imagine.
An interesting point to note in Pakistans case is that there is a distinction between old
and new Islamists, the latter being the protagonists of political Islam who are seeking to
transform politics through religion and religion through politics. The old Islamists are willing to
co-exist in peace with secular politics. The new Islamists are not willing to consider such an
option. The political strategy pursued by new Islamists in Pakistan is to seek to capture civil
society institutions in order to eventually capture the state.
Sri Lanka
Religious extremism is not restricted to Islam and Hinduism. In Sri Lanka, the deep
rivalry between the majority Sinhalese Buddhist and minority Tamil Hindus has led the
Tamils to wage a bloody separatist war that has left several thousands dead. Sri Lanka
shows the potential long-term consequences of implementing an extremist religious
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
17/35
nationalism and then enforcing it through semi-official pogroms. It is estimated that
1,000 (28) Tamil people were killed, tens of thousands of houses were destroyed, and a wave
of Sri Lankan Tamils left for other countries. The riots occurred following a deadly
ambush by the terrorist organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
which killed 15 Sri Lanka army soldiers in July 1983.
There are several factors behind the persecution of the minorities, but they all relate to a
growing Buddhist nationalist sentiment a folk belief that when the Buddha was on his
deathbed, he asked for the island of Sri Lanka to be set aside to protect Buddhism. There is also
what some observers describe as a siege mentality among the majority Sinhalese ethnic group.
Although they are 74 per cent of the population, the Sinhalese have always felt insecure. This has
resulted in decades-long ethnic tensions with the Tamils, and now the escalating religious
conflict. Christianity is the only faith that cuts across ethnic lines in the country. According to
Yogarajah, all Hindus are Tamil, all Buddhists are Sinhalese, and only Christians are found
between both communities. (29) The final episode of the end of LTTE supremo Villupilai
Prabhakaran , on the one hand is good for the conflict-ridden nation but on the other it reinforces
the hand of the majority against the minority. The terrorists are now eliminated but the majority
Shinhalese may become even more suspicious of the Tamils seeking to prevent any future
movement. And the Tamils who even if they were not supportive of the LTTEs ways, would
always be under pressure because they belonged to a community whose significant percentage
was either involved in the armed struggle or was part of the sympathizers.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh tasted political role of religious groups soon after
independence. Interestingly, Bangladesh originally had a strong secular foundation
consisting of non-religious Bengali nationalism. Yet after 1975, strong opposition to
secularism surfaced, and the state was made officially Islamic in the late 1970s. (30) In the
course of the 1990s, Islamic extremism became all-encompassing. Attacks on religiousminorities, especially Hindus, were on the upswing, partly in retaliation for Hindu-
extremist attacks on Muslims in India, which Bangladeshis observed with increasing
alarm since the Ayodhya mosque demolition in 1992. (31) Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) and its coalition partners, which included two Islamic parties, saw a decisive
victory in the October 2001, parliamentary elections. Bangladeshi politics had been
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_peoplehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Tamilshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Tamilshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_people8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
18/35
divided into those arguing that this large Muslim country might become a target of
Western and Indian pressure and those who believe in secular ideas in order to be part of
the post-9/11 world. The Awami League campaigned that a victory by the BNP and its
Islamic-party partners would lead to the Talibanization of Bangladesh. (32)
The Islamic militants came to the limelight after the countrywide simultaneous bombings
on 17 August 2005, in which the militants exploded about 459 bombs in capital Dhaka as well as
in 63 out of the total 64 districts. Subsequent suicide bombings also proved their existence.
Ja'amatul Mujahideen Bangladesh claimed responsibility for the bomb blasts, (33) Despite
government measures (banning organization, monitoring funding and recruitment, legal and
police measures) the problem of Muslim militancy has by no means been resolved.
The rise of fundamentalism in Bangladesh is not just a side-effect of military politics.Enayetullah Khan, Editor of the Bangladesh weekly Holiday , says that a Muslim element has
always been present; otherwise, East Pakistan could have merged with the predominantly Hindu
Indian state of West Bengal, where the same language is spoken. Were having a bit of an
identity crisis here, says Khan. Are we Bengalis first and Muslims second, or Muslims first and
Bengalis second? This is the problem. And when Muslim identity becomes an Islamic identity
we're in real trouble. (34)
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one country that has been both the victim as well as the
perpetrator of all sorts of radicalization. Afghanistan is not new to the menace of
terrorism; it has suffered and has been a center of militancy and religious extremism. At
the start of the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistans military
government supported Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a pan-Islamist
extremist, more because of his beliefs and policies than because of any actual
achievements inside Afghanistan. Military types are likely to prefer a disciplined kind of
religion that is not too concerned about civil liberties and electoral process. Kurt Lohbeck
in Holy War, Unholy Victory reports the comment of a CIA officer that fanatics fight
better. (35) Operatives went scouting around the Arab world and Africa recruiting zealots,
who then flocked to Afghanistan. The CIA was responsible for the first trans-national
jihad in a thousand years; indeed, was responsible for transforming the idea of jihad into
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
19/35
the indiscriminate sowing of terror. The Islamic ideal of the Ummah, the one people of
Islam transcending all differences of nationality and geography, has thus been given a
terrifying new meaning.
The rise of radical Islam along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border has its roots in
three major factor s.(36) The first is the disintegration of Afghan social structures at both the state
and tribal levels, beginning in 1979 with revolts against the communist government and
communist infighting and the subsequent Soviet invasion. The second is the increased sway of
political Islam, due mostly to outside influences, including Salafist thought from the Middle East,
and the more local Deobandi philosophy. The third is the radicalization of the Pashtuns, the
dominant ethnic group along the border. These three converging factors have created the current
instability on both sides of the border leading to total chaos and militancy.
Following an Afghan wartime tradition, mullahs stepped forward to become military
commanders during the war against the Soviets. Almost certainly, the length and intensity of the
war, coupled with the destruction of the Afghan state, increased the role of the mullah in society.
At the same time, as the war against the Soviets dragged on, the Afghan education system
crumbled and largely ceased to exist; as a result, madrassas in Pakistan began to provide religion-
based education to refugees. (37)
Growing vulnerability to extremism and terrorism
Alex Schmid, a leading international expert on terrorism, has explored the definition
and context of terrorism in terms of five conceptual lenses, thus providing a multi-
perspective framework. These five lenses comprise crime, politics, warfare,
communication and religious extremism. (38) Since we are focusing on religious
extremism, it is important to note that though Schmid looked at terrorism through five
different lenses, these are inter-related. Religious extremism does not occur in isolation,
crime, political mobilization, civil war/chaos, propaganda all contribute towards making
a society religiously intolerant leading to violent acts and terrorism.
South Asia specialist Akbar S. Ahmed states that while Islamists are an important source
of political instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, their impact is often overstated in the western
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
20/35
media. To the contrary, Ahmed argues, the ability of religious extremists to find such a wide
audience in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is in fact a symptom of much deeper and complex
problems within South Asia. In particular, Ahmed points to three problems that have contributed
both to the rise in popularity of Islamist movements and overall instability in the region. They
are: (39)
1. A general breakdown of law and order: Prof. Ahmed states that both
Afghanistan and Pakistan are suffering from similar and deeply rooted
breakdowns in the ability of the state to maintain law and order. This has created
a situation where not only is physical security of citizens uncertain in many
places, but the inability of the central governments to effectively provide social
services also has left the leadership of both countries with tenuous popular
support.
2. A breakdown in inter-ethnic trust and dialogue : Noting that India-Pakistan
relations are perhaps at a historic low point, Ahmed argues that even within
mixed communities inter-ethnic and inter-religious respect and tolerance are at an
all-time low. This has created an atmosphere where a sense of hopelessness has
taken over, where Muslim-Hindu differences are viewed on both sides as
intractable.
3. A breakdown in the sense of control average people feel they have over
their lives: Building upon his previous points, Ahmed suggests that the growth
in mutual distrust and the uncertain physical security in Afghanistan and Pakistan
have left many feeling that they have no control over their lives. With rampant
mistrust between different religious and ethnic groups, many have turned to
religion to regain a sense of control for coping with the difficulties of their
everyday lives.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
21/35
Contributing factors
1- Porous borders
The long history of each state offering sanctuary to the others opponents has built bitterness andmistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan sheltered Baloch nationalists in the
1970s while Pakistan extended refuge and training to the mujahideen in the 1980s and then later
supported the Afghani Taliban. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistans
then military dictator Zia-ul-Haq promoted the jihad in Afghanistan, funded thousands of Islamic
madrassas, armed domestic Islamist organizations, and in the process militarized and
radicalized the border region. By supporting Islamist militias among the Pashtun, Pakistan
government has tried to neutralize Baloch and Pashtun nationalism within its borders.
In Nepal and India, Maoist and Communist organizations have developed strong ties witheach other, and their influence is growing in bordering towns. Although the Maoist Movement
played a major role in changing the course of history in Nepal, at the same time the separatist
movement in Tarrai is also active with the same radical ideology. Apart from the radical Maoist
movement in the region, Hindu extremist groups are as well making their space in Nepals
bordering towns.
The radicalization of the separatist movements not only makes the border disputes
complex but also starts shifting inside the countries. Talibanization in Pakistan, Islamization in
Bangladesh, Maoist and Naxalite nexus in India, Hindu radicalism in Nepal and the sectarian andseparatist threat in Iran cannot be countered without proper internal strategies, joint resolute
mechanisms and inter-state cooperation.
Small-scale armed clashes on the Pak-Afghan border have become a routine matter.
Taliban and al-Qaeda presence on both sides of the border has made this area very important for
the world. The complex influx of Taliban has also its impact on bilateral relationships of both
states and the Durand Line is becoming an issue of concern.
The South Asian states have been using the options of force and politics to resolve
the disputes but the minority ethnic and religious movements, divided along the borders make itdifficult for a state to resolve the issues single-handed, especially, when states have failed
addressing their economic and social grievances. South Asian countries also lack confidence in
each other, which makes it difficult to form any joint mechanism to counter common threats.
Kashmir has been a source of permanent mistrust between India and Pakistan whereas
Talibanization issue is keeping mutual suspicion alive between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
22/35
2-Governance issues
One of the weaknesses of democracy in South Asian countries is that their differing needs,
interests, and aspirations are ignored. Almost every state in the region is multilingual,multiethnic, multireligious, and multicultural. Yet these diversities within our borders are not
addressed at any level of governance, and so identity politics is increasingly a cause of conflict in
the region. The post-colonial states failed to perform their fundamental functions of the state, i.e.
ensuring justice, social development, rule of law and order and security and safety of the
individuals, human freedoms and constitutional values and institutions. In addition, social and
economic forces also play a vital role in radicalizing South Asian countries. When people are not
treated in the same way at social level and they dont have opportunities equal to that of the elite
classes, they are forced to think either it is their fate, or it is the existing system that is responsible
for their deprivation. When they revolt against the system they are declared radicals by the
elites.
3- Inept political and social approach
Extremism primarily rejects existing means of political participation and finds existing
social economic and political institutions inadequate to address the problems facing the
society in general and some of its sections in particular. Extremists and extremism are
about fundamental structural change in all spheres of societal life, including politicalrelations, economic relations and social hierarchies. In South Asian context, we find both
demand for new ideas or structural changes rejecting the old order like the popular
uprising against the monarch in Nepal, or calling for the old order that represented an
ideal model of an Islamic state, like Islamist radicalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh or
Hindutva radicalism in India. It popularizes their ideologies and questions the legitimacy
and relevance of existing ideologies. Extremism whether Islamist/Hindu or Socialist,
creates a myth about change in constructive terms. Exploiting the basic grievances of the
masses, extremist ideology tries to gain ground by influencing the minds of people
looking for spiritual solace to avoid the effects of economic frustration and political
instability. Governments failure is that, instead of paying attention to a social approach
to solve the problem, it just waits until the problem becomes uncontrollable and instead
of right policy decisions, military approach is often used to deal with the problem.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
23/35
There is no permanent social or political approach in place in all the South Asian
countries to deal with the root causes of extremism and militancy and to assess how the political
vacuum is often filled by extremist ideology. People in South Asia are looking for right kind of
solutions, it is not that they support extremism and militancy; most of the time, they do not have
any option. There is nothing offered to them by the leaders that could convince them that if they
do not support the extremist/religious groups, their problems would be solved by the state.
Speeches alone cannot solve the problem.
4- Political and economic discontent
The deteriorating economic conditions, unemployment and lack of freedom of
expression in society are all pertinent factors responsible for growing numbers of the
radicals despite the withdrawal of state patronage. As mentioned above, since the
religious groups have become so independent and all powerful financially that the
monetary tool that was once controlled by the state and which had made such groups
dependent, now after the withdrawal of state patronage, has become ineffective as they
have found other means to sustain. Unless the state comes up with some financial
attraction to the young and the frustrated they would continue to fill in the ranks of the
jihadi organizations independent of the state. Political deprivation is yet another factor.
Out of four provinces, Balochistan has been struggling for political rights in addition to
redressal of economic discontent. Similarly, lack of political infrastructure in the Tribalareas paved the way for different religious groups to establish their emirates. These
emirates are well-resourced and well-equipped with modern weapons, hence no dearth
of people joining them and challenging the state.
5- Politico-religious mobilization
Desire to promote specific political goals, financial, spiritual and emotional
incentives by locals as well as outsiders, Individuals feeling humiliated for variety of
reasons to join these groups.
The root causes of identity mobilization are related to the underlying characteristics of
politics in a weak state and its susceptibility to the intrusion of outside forces into its body politic.
There are sectarian/majoritarian specific brands of religious groups espousing, for instance, Shia-
Sunni conflict, Deobandi-Bralevi conflict in Pakistan, caste conflict and Hindu/Muslim/Christian
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
24/35
riots in India, Sinhala Buddhist/Tamil Hindu problem in Sri Lanka and monarch/Maoist clash in
Nepal. The other set of religious extremists comprises those who believe in a grand agenda, the
movement or network of the residue of the Afghan war. Way beyond the Shia-Sunni conflict, this
group believes in a constant war between the forces of evil (the US and other states of the West
and all those who support these states, including Muslim states friendly to them) and the forces of
virtue, i.e. al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden. The residue of the Afghan Jihad movement leads
this group.
Saudi Arabia erected a number of large global charities in the 1960s and 1970s whose
original purpose may have been to spread Wahhabi Islam, but which became penetrated by
prominent individuals from al-Qaedas global jihadi network. The three most prominent of these
charities were the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO an offshoot of the Rabita
Aalam al Islami or Islamic World League), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and theCharitable Foundations of al-Haramain. All three are suspected by various global intelligence
organizations to be funding terroirsm. (40) From the CIAs interrogation of an al-Qaeda operative,
it was learned that al-Haramain, for example, was used as a conduit for funding al-Qaeda in
Southeast Asia. It would be incorrect to view these charities as purely non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or private charities.
University of Chicago political scientist Robert Papes study of suicide bombers, Dying
to Win (41) is based on what Aristotle stated long ago believing that ambition was a more powerful
incentive to sedition and revolution than deprivation; he said: Men do not become tyrants in
order to avoid exposure to cold. The central role of communal humiliation in inspiring terrorism
is the key finding of the study. According to Pape, two factors have linked Tamil, Palestinian,
Chechen, and al-Qaeda suicide bombers. First, they are members of communities that feel
humiliated by genuine or perceived occupation (like the perceived occupation of the sacred
territory of Saudi Arabia by virtue of the presence of US bases, in the eyes of bin Laden and his
allies). Second, suicide bombers seek to change the policies of democratic occupying powers like
Israel and the United States by influencing their public opinion in a sense making the
occupying power suffer the same level of humiliation they have felt. It would be a mistake to treat
prosperity as a universal solvent that can deprive jihadists like bin Laden of allies and
sympathizers in populations that feel humiliated by foreign domination or frozen out of politics.
Ultimately, both foreign occupation and domestic autocracy are political problems that must find
political, not economic, solutions. The campaign against jihadism and the campaign against
global poverty are both justified. But they are not the same war. (42)
http://www.powells.com/partner/32324/s?kw=pape%20dying%20to%20winhttp://www.powells.com/partner/32324/s?kw=pape%20dying%20to%20winhttp://www.powells.com/partner/32324/s?kw=pape%20dying%20to%20winhttp://www.powells.com/partner/32324/s?kw=pape%20dying%20to%20win8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
25/35
Is there a way forward?
Religious extremism is unique in South Asia because it cannot be understood in isolation
and independently. In other words, one simply cannot understand religious extremism in one partof South Asia Hindu extremism in India, for example in isolation from the other
manifestations of religious extremism that have swept over the politics of all the other South
Asian countries Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and forms of Islamic nationalism in
Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as Afghanistan. The lack of a subcontinental and comparative
perspective has yielded neglect in the literature of the extent to which religious extremism has
either directly or indirectly fostered dangerous hostility and confrontation between South
Asias major states.
There is a great need to understand that religious philosophy and political violence may
not necessarily have a link in theory. In practice, however, there seems to be strong connection
between the doctrine and the politics in contemporary religio-political situation in South Asia. For
example, Hinduism or Buddhism, which call for pluralism, would never appear to be the source
of militancy and extremism. But the reality on ground tells us the story of violence and extremism
in the name of religion in both India and Sri Lanka.
Similarly, it is very important to note the difference between characterizing Islamic
extremists and to focus on terrorism as a phenomenon in its own right. Terrorism is a particular
form of violent activity and not simply a natural corollary of any religion. Terrorists often seek
legitimacy through particular religious idioms but the label Islamic terrorists was often used to
suggest that it was a phenomenon that required no elaboration. This reinforced the stereotyping of
Islam.
It is often said in the West that due to lack of a true democratic system, religious
extremism flourishes, (one wonders what explanation is given for religious extremism in the
largest democracy in the world India!). One can argue that religious extremism underminesdemocracy. Ironically, we have seen that democracy has facilitated religious extremism BJP
rule in India and MMA rule in NWFP and Balochistan through votes in the 2002 elections.
Interestingly, a close and comparative look at South Asias different contexts reveals that
except for Pakistan, which has been under military rule for more than 32 years of its over 60
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
26/35
years history, mass electoral democracy has actually facilitated the rise of religious extremism in
South Asia. In Sri Lanka, for a short period after independence and in India for about 30 years
after independence, politics was largely a matter of elite bargaining, and mass participation was
severely constrained or narrowly channelled through the dominance of a single political party.
Religious parties availed the opportunity by filling in the vacuum between the restricted political
clout and the masses. Changing international situation provided a golden opportunity to the
Islamic extremists to attract the masses in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and during the same time,
Hindu extremists targeted the Hindu vote among Indians who were already quite disillusioned by
not being part of the Congress politics which had become elitist and restricted. Sinhalese
Buddhist often mobilized the poor and rural Sinhalese Buddhists of Sri Lanka and made them a
political force to be reckoned with. And in Bangladesh, which was of course part of Pakistan as
East Pakistan until 1971, the country saw the rise of a strong Islamic nationalism almost as soon
as the nation began to enjoy independence but little democratic self-government.
This raises of course the question of Pakistan. It is true that military governments
depended on religious parties for legitimacy from the masses. In the initial period after
independence, religious parties could not play any significant political role and the country tended
to be most secular when it has been most elitist and restrictive. Later, however, long periods of
authoritarian rule helped these scattered religious groups to claim political power under the
shadow of the military dictatorship. So what has exclusively been a conservative group of Islamic
fundamentalists got into mass-based politics (for example in the 1985 party-less elections) as aconsequence of democratic openings though short-term and politically weak. Unfortunately,
transition to democracy in Pakistan after long military rules brought religious parties with
confrontational agenda against the West to power. This is what makes religious extremism in
South Asia a unique phenomenon as compared to other regions.
An interesting, yet alarming observable fact in South Asia is that democracy may not
always bring the moderates in power. It may be the other way round: democracy can and has
actually brought the religious nationalist with extremist agenda to power.
In order to uphold the ideal of a modern progressive state, and to tackle the politics of
medieval religiosity in a post-colonial Muslim-majority state like Bangladesh and Pakistan or a
Hindu-majority India or Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka, deliberate social engineering
initiative is needed. Despite severe limitations in understanding, analyzing and defining
modernity and progressiveness, there is a huge percentage of moderate urban civil society in
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
27/35
South Asia which has the intellectual quality, organizational ability and experience of social
activism and is the only visible social force that can fight the religious orthodoxy and could play
an effective role in establishing a modern state.
It is important to note that due to their shared history as a single political unit under theBritish rule, the South Asian states depend on ideologies that enable their people to identify with
their own countries. South Asian nations have sometimes inflicted their religious politics in an
extremist manner on other South Asian nations in an attempt to validate their political identity.
An analysis of the relationship of religious movements to political developments
demonstrates how new forms of ideological bonds, rooted in indigenous religious and cultural
traditions, are challenging the Western model of the secular state in South Asia. Because there is
no satisfactory compromise between the religious vision of the nation state and that of liberal
democracy, a new kind of cold war may develop, no less obstructive of a peaceful international
order than the old.
To label religious extremism as the product of ignorance, coercion, or psychopathology is
to foster misunderstanding. To combat religious extremism as opposed to extremist violence
with the powers of the state is to invite conflict if that extremism represents a widespread
unmet demand for some set of services. To support good religion while repressing bad
religion is to invite violence. (43)
Finally, there could be any number of far-reaching political consequences of intrusion of
religious extremism into politics in South Asia. For instance, religious extremism fosters
religiously defined conceptions of national identity that politically unify and mobilize peoples and
serve as benchmark of governmental legitimacy. Religious extremism has undermined democracy
in the region by promoting a majoritarian theory and practice of illiberal democracy that in the
words of Fareed Zakaria marginalizes and disenfranchise religious and ethnic minorities. (44) Also,
the prospects for regional peace and stability are severely affected by further intensifying the
longstanding hostility between India and Pakistan and by laying the basis for new rivalriesdefined on ethno-religious lines, particularly between Hindu India and Muslim Bangladesh and to
a lesser extent Hindu India and Buddhist Sri Lanka.
Unfortunately, religious extremism is often considered as merely periodic interruption of
the normal course of South Asian politics and national political development, rather than a deep-
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
28/35
rooted feature of the regions national political cultures. Religious extremism by its very nature is
assumed to operate at the margins of society rather than on the center-stage of national political
life but this leads to politically crucial and growing alliance between religious extremism and
political nationalism throughout South Asia.
Collective Approach to Deal with Extremism
Until now the South Asian countries have been dealing with the menace of extremism
individually. While some acknowledged its existence and came up with anti-terrorism laws and
initiatives, others opted for a policy of denial. Unfortunately, we have reached the stage where
neither individual policies to deal with the problem nor denying its existence would work.
Religious extremism has become a transnational phenomenon and in South Asia it is affecting all
the states equally. The mindset that once existed about a particular interpretation of religion in
their respective countries has found its manifestation in the form of terrorism.
The way forward is to realize the fact that given the nature of our geography, the South
Asian States need to let go of their trust deficit and devise a comprehensive strategy by
identifying the enemy as one who in the guise of their respective religions is creating havoc in the
region. Separating the enemy as Pakistani terrorist or Indian terrorist or Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan
terrorist would not work. The basic ingredient of the regional approach is to look beyond the
national boundaries. If we do not recognize this, we would continue to engage in declaring ,
exposing and trying the terrorists in each others country just to teach a lesson to other. Thetime, resources and energy and media attention wasted on this exercise would only benefit the
terrorists and help them achieve their objectives.
Joint Mechanism: Is it Practical?
The idea of Pakistan, India, Iran, Afghanistan along with the US and China jointly
managing the conflict has both merits and demerits. One of the major hurdles is the trust deficit
between the countries of the region, i.e. India-Pakistan conflict particularly the Kashmir dispute,
Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict over the Durand Line, Pakistan-Iran disagreement over Balochistan
vulnerability, India-China territorial dispute etc. Then between India and Bangladesh the border
problem, Nepals unstable government, and Sri Lankas recent experience with a harsh and brutal
war with the LTTE that led to the death of its supremo Villupilai Prabhakaran. In such a situation
the idea of joint mechanism to combat terrorism appears as wishful thinking. However, the same
demerits can work in favour of joining hands to eliminate this menace from the region. The
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
29/35
abovementioned political/territorial disputes have prompted the South Asian states to wage proxy
wars in each others country. They have also diverted them from focusing on developmental
issues in their countries and bringing about economic change. Owing to this lack of economic and
developmental approach, these neglected areas became a safe haven for terrorists in the region. It
is not just about the FATA region which is out of government control in Pakistan; the border
areas between India and Bangladesh have been used for cross-border movement of a huge
number of people. If only the regional states stop waging proxy wars against each other, most of
the problems related to terrorism and militancy would be solved.
India being the biggest country in the region needs to strike the right balance vis-a-vis its
neighbours. The crisis in Pakistans frontier region not only accentuates the crisis across the
border in Afghanistan but also drives the extremist threat to other states of the region.
There is a serious need to deal with the concerns Pakistan has about Indias role in thecrisis. Should India place its boots on the ground? To what extent can India continue to expand its
diplomatic and economic profile in Afghanistan without an appropriate security apparatus in
place? The emerging political and military situation makes it imperative for India to evolve a
clear policy, to establish a meaningful presence in the region and realize some of its larger
interest. (45)
As for Pakistan, the spillover effect of the war on terror, and a history of troubled alliance
relations, makes both the public as well as the civil-military administration wary of American
intentions. However, in spite of reservations, the new overtures have been greatly welcomed,
especially US President Barack Obamas stance regarding the need to tackle Kashmir as it is the
most important issue in South Asia.
It is highly unfortunate that the security managers in New Delhi, once again, successfully
de-linked Kashmir from the larger picture. Indian National Security Adviser MK Narayanans
statement that the US would be barking up the wrong tree, and then lobbying hard to get India
excluded from the proposed regional approach to solve the problems affecting the two
neighbours, serves no purpose. (46) If the idea was to prevent internationalizing the Kashmir issue
and opening doors to third-party intervention, then it is imperative to mention that nearly all
peace overtures in the region have been successful only through third-party facilitation.
Ironically, whenever it suits the parties concerned, issues, even as intractable as Kashmir, have
been internationalized to garner favourable support. Moreover, if India does not want to be party
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
30/35
to any US-backed regional framework, then seeking Holbrookes attention to discuss alleged
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is not appropriate. (47)
The political instability in Afghanistan over the past two decades has had a significant
impact on the region's overall stability affecting not only the politics of neighbouring Iran andPakistan, but even Indian-Pakistani tensions in Kashmir as well. The US move to engage Iran and
India in managing the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistans tribal belt has sparked
some controversy in Pakistan; but on the other hand, it also shows that by engaging the Indians
and Iranians, the US has prevented any indirect, behind-the-scenes actions of the two countries in
Afghanistan as was the case in the past. This strategy might also work in preventing India and
Iran and Pakistan from fighting proxy wars in Afghanistan. India and Iran have huge economic
projects in Afghanistan that demands security and stability. By letting the two countries to invest
in Afghanistan, the US has removed the hurdle in its way to have an administration that wouldguarantee safeguarding the US interests as well as providing economic opportunities to India and
Iran. Pakistan is still struggling with the idea of giving up its long-lost goal of having a friendly
government in Kabul. In present circumstance when its own survival is at stake due to the
growing power of the extremists in certain areas, the best bet would be to become a part of the
collective effort to combat extremism and terrorism and then enjoy the benefit of economic
prosperity by focusing on mutual economic interests rather than continuing with the policy of
confrontation. Accommodative policy based on peaceful coexistence is the only option left with
Pakistan.
The idea of a religion free South Asia would never be materialized given the nature of
the societies in the region, be it Hinduism or Islam or Buddhism or other religions, their followers
would continue to look at the world through their own religious lenses. Aiming at getting the
South Asians to change their lenses would be impractical strategy. Religion would continue to be
a political force; however, right policies could prevent its militant manifestation. It is therefore
important to have cooperation rather than confrontation on the part of the policy-makers to ensure
possibility of a happy synthesis in which essential elements of democracy will be conveyed in
the vessels of new religious states. (48) It is essential to know the distinction between the religious
orthodoxy that we need to fight and the finer moral values of religion that needs to be assimilated
in South Asia.
http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2004/0427_habibullah.htmlhttp://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2004/0427_habibullah.html8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
31/35
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Hent De Vries, Religion and Violence , (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
2. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence , (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
3. Daniel Pipes, The war against Islamic militants, Human Events, Washington, 7
October 2002, Vol.58, Issue. 37; p.10.
4. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
5. Ibid.
6. Gurr, for example, explains: In summary, the primary source of the human capacity for
violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not
necessarily lead to violence, and violence for some men is motivated by expectations of
gain. The anger induced by frustration, however, is a motivating force that disposes men
to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities. If frustrations are sufficiently
prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain, to occur. To concludethat the relationship is not relevant to individual or collective violence is akin to the
assertion that the law of gravitation is irrelevant to the theory of flight because not
everything that goes up falls back to earth in accord with the basic gravitational principle.
The frustration-aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law of gravity:
men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in
proportion to the intensity of their frustrations..., ibid, pp.36-37.
7. Ted Gurr, 2000, People Vs States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
8. Ian Pitchford, A fundamental difference, in Scott Atran, Genesis and Future of
Suicide Terrorism , 6 July 2003, Interdisciplines, a project of CNRS, Paris, available at
.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
32/35
9. Of particular concern are other articles in the amendment that would violate the
internationally guaranteed rights of minority religious groups. The same amendment was
proposed last year and found to be unconstitutional by Sri Lankas Supreme Court.
Passage of this amendment would jeopardize the rights of all Sri Lankan citizens as
outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, said Commission Chair Michael Cromartie.
10. .
11. This has created a lot of problems for people belonging to minority sects interpreting the
holy Quran according to their sect.
12. The status of the Nepali constitution is currently uncertain. Nepal, with no permanent
constitution, is presently governed by an interim constitution that came into effect 15
January 2007. It replaces previous constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990.
13. Himalayan Research Bulletin , Vol. XI, Nos. 1-3. 1991.
14. See Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1994).
15. Douglas Pratt, Contemporary Christian Extremism: Fundamentalism, Extreme Religion
and the Threat of Terror, SOF conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 19 July 2008,
available at .
16. Ibid.
17. Douglas Pratt, Religious Fundamentalism and Extremism: A Paradigm Analysis, New
Zealand Association for the Study of Religions-Biennial Conference, Queenstown, 6-8
June 2007, available at
.
18. Terrorism is a Product of Strategic Choices and Psychological Forces, Prof. Adam
Dolnik, Director, Research Programmes and Senior Research Fellow at Centre for
Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia.
8/6/2019 Growing Vulnerability of South Asia
33/35
Speaking at a session on What do we know about why do people become terrorists?
organized by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) on 15