GS EP SAF 380 - SAFETY ENGINEERING … · API RP 14B Recommended Practice for Design, Installation, Repair and Operations of Sub Surface Safety Valve (SSSV) Systems API RP 14C Recommended

Exploration & Production

This document is the property of Total. It must not be stored, reproduced or disclosed to others without written authorisation from the Company.

GENERAL SPECIFICATION

SAFETY

GS EP SAF 380

Safety Engineering Requirements for an F(P)SO

Main Instructor for Derogation: ECI (Design of Filed Facilities)

00 10/2009 First issue

Rev. Date Notes


General Specification Date: 10/2009

GS EP SAF 380 Rev: 00


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Contents

1. Scope and Applicability..........................................................................................5 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................5 1.2 Objectives ..........................................................................................................................5 1.3 FPSO Safety Engineering Approach .................................................................................6

2. Reference Documents ............................................................................................7

3. Terminology and FPSO definitions......................................................................10 3.1 Terminology .....................................................................................................................10 3.2 FPSO Definitions .............................................................................................................12 3.3 Classification Definitions..................................................................................................14

4. Overall assessments of FPSO hazards ...............................................................15 4.1 4.1 Technological Risk Analysis ......................................................................................15 4.2 Hazards Evaluation..........................................................................................................16 4.3 Scenario Based Risk Assessment...................................................................................17 4.4 Consequence Analysis and Safety Studies .....................................................................17 4.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)..............................................................................19

5. Interfaces with Subsea Production System........................................................19 5.1 Management of Interactive Hazards................................................................................19 5.2 Protection Measures for the Subsea Production Facilities ..............................................19 5.3 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) of the Subsea Facilities.....................................................20

6. Interfaces to Umbilicals, Flowlines and Risers (UFR)........................................20 6.1 Interactive Hazards from Flowlines and Risers ...............................................................20 6.2 Management of Hazards .................................................................................................21 6.3 Prevention of hazardous occurrence ...............................................................................21 6.4 Emergency Shutdown of the risers and pipelines............................................................21

7. FPSO Overall Requirements ................................................................................22 7.1 7.1 Management of Hazards ...........................................................................................22 7.2 FPSO General Arrangement ...........................................................................................22 7.3 Accommodation Block and FPSO Control Room ............................................................24





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7.4 FPSO Fire zones and Layout Safety ...............................................................................25 7.5 Hazardous Area Classification, Ventilation and Pressure Protection ..............................30 7.6 Fire and Gas detection system........................................................................................33 7.7 Emergency Shutdown and Depressurisation Systems....................................................37 7.8 Fire Protection Philosophy...............................................................................................42 7.9 Active Fire Protection.......................................................................................................43 7.10 Passive Fire Protection....................................................................................................47 7.11 Explosion Overpressure Protection .................................................................................49 7.12 Flare System and Stack...................................................................................................49 7.13 Drains Systems................................................................................................................50 7.14 Noise and Vibration .........................................................................................................50

8. FPSO Accommodation Building Requirements .................................................51 8.1 Layout Safety...................................................................................................................51 8.2 HVAC Systems ................................................................................................................51 8.3 Flammable gas detection within critical areas of the Accommodation Building...............52 8.4 Fire detection in the Accommodation Block.....................................................................52 8.5 Fire detection in Hull Machinery spaces and Technical Rooms ......................................52 8.6 Fire detection in workshop and other buildings ...............................................................53

9. FPSO Hull and Mooring System ..........................................................................53 9.1 Management of Main Hazards.........................................................................................53 9.2 Specific protection measures for cargo handling.............................................................53 9.3 Safety Requirements for FPSO Mooring System ............................................................56

10. FPSO Safety Support Systems ............................................................................58 10.1 Communications Systems ...............................................................................................58 10.2 Essential and Emergency Power.....................................................................................59 10.3 Navigation Aids................................................................................................................60

11. Escape and Rescue...............................................................................................61 11.1 Escape Evacuation and Rescue......................................................................................61 11.2 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment.....................................................................................63

12. Export Systems and Pipelines .............................................................................65 12.1 Crude oil export system...................................................................................................65 12.2 Gas Export.......................................................................................................................66





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12.3 ESD and Alarm Interfaces ...............................................................................................67 12.4 Interfaces with the Off take Tankers ................................................................................67

13. Simultaneous Operations.....................................................................................67 13.1 General ............................................................................................................................67 13.2 Anchors of Vessels ..........................................................................................................68 13.3 Safety Distances..............................................................................................................68

14. Handling of Emergencies on Site ........................................................................68 14.1 Principles .........................................................................................................................68 14.2 Crisis Control Centre .......................................................................................................68 14.3 Mutual Help......................................................................................................................69 14.4 Security measures for the installation..............................................................................69

15. Derogations ...........................................................................................................70 Appendix 1 Methodology ......................................................................................................72





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1. Scope and Applicability

1.1 Introduction The purpose of this General Specification is to define the Safety Engineering requirements for floating hydrocarbon production and processing facilities as opposed to traditional onshore or offshore “fixed” installations that were the basis for the COMPANY General Specifications for Safety.

Therefore, this General Specification defines COMPANY interpretation of General Specifications in addition to defining specific Safety Engineering requirements for offshore floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) installations. It can be considered as a master Specification giving the rules of applying the other General Specifications for FPSO’s. In case of any conflicts between specifications, the FPSO specific requirements given in this General Specification shall take precedence.

For simplicity, the abbreviation FPSO is used throughout this document to refer to a moored monohull floating unit that has oil processing storage capacity and offloading facilities or processing facilities only (FPU), or storage facilities only (FSO).

This specification document was written for use on a typical development with a spread-moored or turret moored FPSO vessel.

1.2 Objectives The General Specification sets out the COMPANY philosophy and requirements for the safety engineering of FPSO units processing and handling hydrocarbons.

The primary objective of this specification is to protect personnel from hydrocarbon hazards and other operational hazards associated with FPSOs.

For this purpose, this specification has been prepared on the basis of the following requirements:

• To protect personnel on the FPSO during operations by preventing the occurrence of hazards and during their evacuation or escape in case of any hazardous events.

• To minimise damage due to hazards and thus enable the Installation to return to operational status as soon as possible after the event.

• To minimise escalation of any hazard which could lead to widespread installation damage and pollution of the environment?

In order to achieve these objectives this General Specification defines the minimum requirements for both active and passive protection systems for the facilities of a FPSO based development.

• FPSO Interfaces to Subsea Production System (SPS) composed of drill centers with production wells, gas and water injection wells.

• Interface to the Flowlines and their risers to FPSO including Gas lift lines from the FPSO to production riser at seabed.

• FPSO Topsides and the Hull systems, including:

FPSO spread moorings or turret mooring arrangements





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FPSO Hull tanks

• Oil Export from FPSO via an offshore SPM (Single Point Mooring) oil offloading buoy located about one nautical mile from the FPSO.

• Tandem offloading of oil from the FPSO to offtake tankers. (Back-up case).

• Gas export to shore via a pipeline.

1.3 FPSO Safety Engineering Approach The risk assessments and safety studies, including those listed in Section 4 of this General Specification, shall be carried out for the hazards identified by hazards identification (HAZID) exercise conducted before the end of the Basic Engineering phase. The results of these assessments and studies shall be used to determine the scope, ratings and the endurance periods of the required safety systems and protection arrangements for the FPSO. If such risk assessments and safety studies are not carried out for the potential FPSO related hazards, then the default criteria for safety systems and protection arrangements, given in this General Specification, shall be used. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – FPSO Safety Engineering Approach

The default criteria for safety systems and the protection arrangements given in this General Specification can be used for the Pre- Project phase, to develop the Safety Concept for the Project. It is strongly recommended that, the risk assessments and safety studies are carried out before the end of Basic Engineering phase to validate the default values used for the scope, ratings and the endurance periods of the required safety systems and the protection arrangements, for the Project FPSO.

Risk Assessments to define parameters

Prescriptive Values

Fire Risks

Explosions

SSIV Study Dropped Objects

Escape

QRA for Options and total risks

FPSO - Hazards Prevention, Detection, Mitigation,Protection and EscapeLayout SafetyFire ZonesHull and Marine Protection

Hazardous Areas/Ventilation

Detection

•HC Recovery and Blanketing

of Tanks

•Tank Pressure Protection

•Fire & Gas

•Pressure Levels

Emergency Shutdown & Blowdown HIPSPassive Fire ProtectionActive Fire Protection

Support SystemsElectrical Systems

EscapeEvacuation and Rescue

FPSO Safety Concepts Existing GS SAF ’ s

Collisions Risks





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The reports and recommendations of the risk assessments and safety studies carried out, including those listed in section 4 of this General Specification shall be subject to COMPANY (EP/HSE/ SEI) approval.

The design requirements for protection arrangements and the individual safety systems for the FPSO shall also comply with the applicable General Specifications listed in section 2.0, except in the following cases:

• Some requirements specified in General Specifications listed in section 2.0 are not applicable for a FPSO.

• Revised or additional or reduced requirements specified in this General Specification, based on the experiences of COMPANY and Industry Experience.

In addition the protection arrangements and the safety systems in the Accommodation Block, Hull Deck, Hull tanks and Hull Machinery areas shall also comply with the latest SOLAS requirements. The main SOLAS requirements are identified in this Specification.

2. Reference Documents The reference documents listed below form an integral part of this General Specification. Unless otherwise stipulated, the applicable version of these documents, including relevant appendices and supplements, is the latest revision published at the EFFECTIVE DATE of the CONTRACT.

Standards

Reference Title

IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems

IEC 61511 Functional safety : safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

IEC 60092-502 Electrical Installations in ships – Part 502: Tankers – Special features





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Professional Documents

Reference Title

API RP 14B Recommended Practice for Design, Installation, Repair and Operations of Sub Surface Safety Valve (SSSV) Systems

API RP 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms

API RP 14J Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities - Second Edition

API STD 521 Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressuring Systems

ISO 10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations – Basic surface process safety systems

NFPA 15 Water spray fixed systems for fire protection

NFPA 20 Installation of stationary fire pumps for fire protection

Regulations

Reference Title

IMO MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships.

IMO SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

IMO COLREG Convention of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

Codes

Reference Title

MODU Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units.

ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security code.

LSA International Life Saving Appliances Code

ICAO Annex 14, Volume II Heliports

Other documents

Reference Title

Not applicable





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Total General Specifications All engineering work for the safety systems and protection arrangements on the FPSO shall be in accordance with all the relevant latest edition of the COMPANY specifications listed below, unless more specific requirements are given in this General Specification:

Reference Title

GS EP STR 631 CALM buoy terminals

GS EP STR 651 General Principles for an F(P)SO Design

GS EP STR 652 F(P)SO – Steel hull design requirements

GS EP STR 661 F(P)SO – Design requirements for mooring and anchoring

GS EP STR 901 Design rules and construction standards for ancillary structures of offshore installations

GS EP PLR 100 Installation of submarine pipelines

GS EP SAF 021 Layout

GS EP SAF 041 Technological risk assessment methodology

GS EP SAF 216 Area classification

GS EP SAF 221 Safety rules for buildings

GS EP SAF 222 Safety rules for turbines, Diesel engines, gas engines and process units in sheltered or enclosed areas

GS EP SAF 226 Completed wells safety systems and safety rules

GS EP SAF 227 Safety rules for fired heaters

GS EP SAF 228 Liquid drainage

GS EP SAF 253 Impact area, restricted area and fire zones

GS EP SAF 260 Design of high Integrity protection systems (HIPS)

GS EP SAF 261 Emergency shutdown & emergency depressurisation (ESD & EDP)

GS EP SAF 262 Pressure protection relief and hydrocarbon disposal systems

GS EP SAF 311 Rules for the selection of Fire Fighting Systems

GS EP SAF 312 Guidelines for selecting and installing fire and gas detection systems

GS EP SAF 321 Fire pumps stations and fire water mains

GS EP SAF 322 Fixed fire water systems

GS EP SAF 331 Carbon Dioxide fire extinguishing systems





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Reference Title

GS EP SAF 334 Foam fire extinguishing systems

GS EP SAF 337 Passive Fire Protection: Basis of design

GS EP SAF 351 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue from fixed installations

GS EP SAF 371 Emergency Control Facilities

GS EP ELE 001 Electrical design criteria

GS EP ELE 021 Emergency design Criteria for floating units

GS EP ENV 001 Environmental Requirements for Projects Design and E&P activities

GS EP ENV 500 Noise abatement in production units

GS EP LSO 110 Environmental effects considerations for helidecks

GS EP MED 060 Onsite medical structures

3. Terminology and FPSO definitions

3.1 Terminology There are three types of statements in this specification, the “shall”, “should” and “may” statements. They are to be understood as follows:

Shall Is to be understood as mandatory. Deviating from a “shall” statement requires derogation approved by the COMPANY

Should Is to be understood as strongly recommended to comply with the requirements of the specification. Alternatives shall provide a similar level of protection and this shall be documented

May Is used where alternatives are equally acceptable.

For the purpose of this specification, the following definitions shall apply (the terms defined in this section are often in bold characters in the text of the specification): Abnormal operating condition

A condition which occurs in a process equipment or unit when an operating parameter range is outside of its normal operating limits. (API).

Availability Proportion of the total time during which a component, equipment, or system is performing in the desired manner (UKOOA).

Blow-Down (vent gas) Automatically operated (fail to open) valve used to vent the pressure from a process station on Shutdown (API).

Emergency Depressurisation (EDP)

Control actions undertaken to depressurise equipment or process down to a pre-defined threshold (generally 7 barg or 50% of design pressure) in a given period of time (generally 15 minutes) in response to a hazardous situation (ISO + COMPANY).





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Emergency Shutdown (ESD)

Control actions undertaken to shutdown equipment or process in response to a hazardous situation (ISO).

Emergency Shutdown System

System of manual stations and automatic devices which, when activated, initiate installation shutdown (COMPANY).

Emergency Shutdown Valve (ESDV)

High integrity shutdown valve, handling a hazardous fluid or a fluid having an essential function, and located at the limit of a fire zone or within a fire zone to limit hydrocarbon inventory (COMPANY).

Equipment Any component or group of components specifically identified and itemised on the P&IDs (COMPANY).

Failure Termination of the ability of a device or equipment item to perform a required function (IEC + API).

Fire & Gas (F&G) System Safety system which monitors the temperature or the energy flux (fire), the concentration of flammable or toxic gases (gas), and initiates relevant actions (alarm, ESD, EDP, active fire-fighting, electrical isolation etc) at pre-determined levels (COMPANY).

Fire zone Areas within the installation where equipment is grouped by nature and/or homogeneous level of risk attached to them. The partition into fire zones is such that the consequences of a flammable gas leak, an explosion or a fire corresponding to the worst credible event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk (COMPANY).

High Integrity Protection System (HIPS)

Instrument-based system of sufficient integrity (involving high reliability redundant and/or diversified instruments) so as to make the probability of exceeding the design parameters lower than a target value (GS EP SAF 260).

Redundancy Existence of means, in addition to the means that would be sufficient, for a functional unit to perform a required function of data to represent information (IEC).

Reliability Probability that an item is able to perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time or for a stated demand (UKOOA).

Safety Integrity Average probability of a safety-instrumented system satisfactorily performing the required safety instrumented functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time (IEC).

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

SIL is a measure of risk reduction provided by a safety-instrumented function based on four levels. Each level represents an order of magnitude of risk reduction. Every safety instrumented function has a SIL assigned to it, the safety instrumented system and equipment themselves do not have a SIL assigned to it (IEC).

Safety integrity Level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and Safety Integrity Level 1 has the lowest (IEC).





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Shutdown (SD) Control actions undertaken to stop operation of equipment or a process. Shutdown can be automatically triggered or initiated by voluntary action.

Shutdown Valve (SDV) Automatically operated valve (generally fail to close) used for isolating a process station (API). SDVs are often referred to as Process Shutdown Valves (PSDV). The acronym SDV and PSDV are equivalent but SDV is used in this specification because SDVs may not always be attached to a process system.

SPM or CALM Buoy Buoy for the oil offshore terminal (OOT).

SSIV Sub-sea Isolation Valve

3.2 FPSO Definitions

3.2.1 General This section defines the terminology used for arrangements, components and areas of the FPSO in this General Specification.

The figure below shows a typical FPSO arrangement to illustrate the definitions and numbering conventions.

• FPSO is a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Unit

• FPU is a Floating Production Unit. (No Storage facilities).

• FSO is a Floating Storage and Offloading Unit. (No Production facilities)

Accommodation

Block

Hull Tanks and Cargo Area





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• The Floating Unit is kept on station by the mooring system, which can be one of the following arrangements:

Spread mooring

Internal Turret

External Turret

For simplicity, the abbreviation FPSO is used in this document to refer to a unit that has oil storage capacity and production facilities.

• The letter O refers mainly to the oil export and covers a variety of possibilities: tandem offloading, export to a remote loading buoy or export through a pipeline.

The use of brackets in F(P)SO means that requirements are valid for any type of vessel.

3.2.2 FPSO Topsides Layout The FPSO Topsides, comprising several modules normally has the following deck levels:

• Hull deck which is the top of the hull tanks

• Bottom decks of the Process and utilities Modules (Referred to as the Process deck (i.e. the level above the hull deck).

• Mezzanine/deck of the Process and utilities Modules.

• Upper deck of the modules.

The main process systems consisting of separation, compression, flaring and offloading equipment are located on the process deck, at a sufficient height above the hull deck, to provide drainage and separation from the hull deck.

The Electrical/Instrumentation (E&I) buildings can be located if required, above the hull deck and between the process areas and utility areas or in a location inside or adjacent to the Accommodation Block.

3.2.3 FPSO Hull Layout FPSO hull will contain the oil cargo tanks, process tanks, slop tanks, storage tanks for methanol, Diesel, fresh and potable water and water ballast tanks. Process tanks refer to hull tanks dedicated to process functions such as wash tanks, settling tanks and dewatering tanks. The aft section of the hull will contain the spaces with main machinery rooms.

Hull systems shall be segregated from process or utility systems, for safety, operation and construction purposes. The unavoidable exceptions are the hydrocarbon inerting of the hull cargo, wash, settling and slop tanks. Ballast and bilge pumps and their pipework shall be located inside the hull frame.

The following definitions are used:

• Accommodation Block (AB) includes the Living Quarters (LQ), the Hotel/Catering functions, offices, technical rooms, the helideck and the Central Control Room. Accommodation Block levels are numbered from the level corresponding to the process deck level (A deck) upwards to roof level below the helideck.





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• Fore or bow refers to the end of hull where the flare and the oil offloading station are located. When the FPSO is turret moored, the internal or external turret is located at the Fore end. The F(P)SO is generally towed by this end.

• Bow area covers the hull deck area where usually towing equipment as well as tandem offloading equipment is installed.

• Aft or stern refers to the end, where the Accommodation Block is located.

• Cargo Area is the section of the Hull where oil is stored in tanks.

• Machinery space is the section of the hull located under the AB. Machinery space levels shall be numbered downwards from hull deck (No 0) to keel (No n).

• Appurtenances: F(P)SO specific elements including their foundations which are protruding from the hull not normally existing on ships such as risers supporting structures, boat-landings, support structures, topsides stools, protectors, flare foundations...) .

• Lay-down Area: The Lay down Area is an area situated in front of the AB dedicated for the temporary storage of goods/spares/consumables which are transferred onboard the F(P)SO by one of the pedestal cranes.

• Surfer Landing: The light craft landing structure described in GS EP STR 901 used to transfer personnel from vessel to vessel.

3.3 Classification Definitions The FPSO, their station-keeping systems (mooring system, yokes, turrets,), the product transfer systems (tandem offloading) and the SPM (CALM buoys, etc) shall be classed by a recognised Class Society, as specified in GS EP STR 651.

For the FPSO, the scope of Classification shall include the following components which shall comply with the latest requirements of the applicable SOLAS Regulations:

• The hull

• The Accommodation Block

• The utilities systems of the hull

• The safety and life saving systems

• The cargo oil handling systems

• Tandem oil offloading system (hawsers, hoses and ancillary equipment)

• The methanol loading and storage system

• The lifting appliances (Cranes and other devices)

• The hull integrated supports of topsides

• The structure integrating the station-keeping system (turret, chain stoppers, etc)

• Hull onboard towing equipment

The oil offloading transfer systems (SPM or CALM Buoy or other types and their moorings) shall be classed separately from the FPSO.





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The process systems (topsides), the export lines and the flow lines and risers do not require classification by the Class Society.

4. Overall assessments of FPSO hazards

4.1 Technological Risk Analysis The Technological Risk Assessment methodology in accordance with COMPANY GS EP SAF 041 shall be implemented for the FPSO development. The method includes two parallel approaches, namely scenario based risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment (QRA). An overview of the risk assessment process is shown in figure 2. Both these approaches shall be used for FPSO based developments.

Figure 3 Hazard IdentificationHazard Identification

Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)

Safety – Individual Risk


Individual Risk

Detailed Analysis of Scenarios

Safety, Environment & Asset


Human, Environment & Asset

Preliminary Risk Assessment


Scenarios & Scenarios & Critical Events Register

Scenario Risk Assessment

Scenario Risk Evaluation

Hazardous EventsHazardous Events

Assessment of Individual RiskIndividual Risk

Evaluation

Action Plan,Risk RegisterAction Plan,Risk Register

Scenario based method QRA methodCommon to both methods

IterationsIterations

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Risk Acceptability?Risk Reduction Workshop, Cost Benefit Analysis

ALARP Demonstration


ALARP Demonstration

Figure 3 Hazard IdentificationHazard Identification


Safety – Individual Risk


Individual Risk


Safety, Environment & Asset


Human, Environment & Asset



Scenarios & Scenarios & Critical Events Register

Scenario Risk Assessment

Scenario Risk Evaluation

Hazardous EventsHazardous Events

Assessment of Individual RiskIndividual Risk

Evaluation

Action Plan,Risk RegisterAction Plan,Risk Register

Scenario based method QRA methodCommon to both methods

IterationsIterations

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5


ALARP Demonstration


ALARP Demonstration

Figure 2 - Scheme of Technological Risk Assessment

This Technological Risks Assessment shall cover all the systems, components and activities required for the Development, including the following:

• The FPSO Topsides, Hull and the mooring system

• Subsea production systems, flowlines, pipelines and the risers





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• Oil Export systems

• Gas Export systems

• Simultaneous Production, Drilling and Construction Operations (SIMOPS)

The main internal and external hazards to above systems and components shall be identified by a HAZID. The initial HAZID shall be done in the Pre-Project stage and this HAZID shall be used as the input to the Technological Risk Assessment.

This HAZID shall also identify the specific safety evaluations and the scope of the Consequence Analysis and safety studies to be carried out as part of the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) are summarised in Section 4.4.

4.2 Hazards Evaluation The hazards to be evaluated by both the scenario based risk assessment and the QRA, shall include those listed in this section.

4.2.1 Hydrocarbon Hazards

• Accidental gas leaks on the FPSO from Process Systems, the riser terminations and the risers.

• Releases due to dropped objects onto hydrocarbon containing equipment, risers or pipelines

• Collisions of vessels with the FPSO and/or the risers causing structural damage to the FPSO hull and /or the risers, resulting in a release of hydrocarbons.

• Jet fires and pool fires due to ignited hydrocarbon releases on or near the FPSO

• Ignited gas releases from FPSO flares

• FPSO flare flame out causing potential gas hazard

• Fire in hull tanks

• Fire in the hull or topsides machinery areas

• Explosions due to delayed ignition of gas releases on or near the FPSO

• Explosions in hull tanks

4.2.2 Marine and Operational Hazards The impact of the following scenarios which could impact the FPSO hull integrity shall be evaluated to determine the necessary protection requirements.

• Extreme site environmental and sea conditions that could cause excessive excursions of the FPSO, resulting in possible damage to risers and flowlines.

• Hydrocarbon release in case of a failure or fracture of a flowline routed under the FPSO.

• Maloperation of the cargo and ballast transfer systems would lead to stressing of the hull which could result in fractures or break-up of the hull.

• Marine collision risks to the FPSO hull that can arise from the vessels visiting the installation and the adjoining fields.





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• Failure of the cargo offloading system (through the buoy or in tandem) to shuttle tankers.

4.3 Scenario Based Risk Assessment A Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) shall be performed during the pre-project phase of the Development in line with the requirements of GS EP SAF 041. The PRA may be carried out using semi-quantitative analysis to estimate the frequency and damage severity of accident scenarios identified by a HAZID. The resultant values are to be plotted on the COMPANY “Screening Matrix” to select scenarios to be evaluated in more detail in the Detailed Risk Assessments and ALARP demonstration to be carried out in the following Project Phases.

4.4 Consequence Analysis and Safety Studies The detailed evaluations including those as specified in this section shall be carried out before the end of the Basic Engineering Phase. The findings from these studies shall be utilised for the Scenario Based Risk Assessment and the Quantitative Risk Assessment. In addition, the recommendations from these evaluations shall be reviewed and the identified risk reduction measures and protective arrangements shall be incorporated into the design.

4.4.1 Dropped Object Study The Dropped Objects Study shall be carried out to identify the frequency and impact of dropped objects for the following:

• FPSO topsides due to crane and other mechanical handling operations.

• Riser bay, risers and pipelines in the vicinity of the FPSO due to crane operations.

• Subsea wells and manifolds due to drilling and well intervention activities.

• Installation or handling risers while FPSO is in operation.

• Mechanical handling of cargo pumps located in the hull tanks.

Study recommendations shall be used to identify protection for subsea wellheads, manifolds, flowlines, risers and the deck areas of the FPSO.

4.4.2 Risers Risk Reduction Study An evaluation, based on Consequence Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Cost Benefit Analysis as specified in GS EP PLR 100 section 16, shall be carried out to determine the risk reduction and protection measures required to protect the FPSO from hydrocarbon releases from the hydrocarbon pipelines connected to the FPSO. This evaluation shall determine if it is necessary to install Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV's) on these hydrocarbon pipelines. This is to ensure the safety of personnel and ensure the integrity of the FPSO against potential hydrocarbon fire threats due to the failure of the risers.

This evaluation shall also evaluate the benefits of installing automatic operated valves on the manifolds of the flowlines as a risk reduction measure to protect against a potential failure of the flexible risers, for the incoming flows from the wells.

4.4.3 Fire Risk Analysis Potential jet fire and pool fire scenarios due to potential ignited hydrocarbon releases on the FPSO or from the risers to the FPSO shall be evaluated. Fire Risk Analysis results shall be





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used to formulate protection and mitigation measures against jet and pool fires for the FPSO areas and critical components as specified in Section 7.0.

4.4.4 Explosion Modelling and Overpressure Resistance Explosion modelling based on 3D Computational Fluids Dynamics (CFD) shall be carried out to determine explosion overpressures on the FPSO due to ignited gas clouds of varying gas mixtures and sizes. Based on previous evaluations for FPSO’s, it is expected that at least the following four explosion scenarios must be considered with detailed layouts in the CFD modelling:

• Case 1: An explosion in the gas compression module

• Case 2: An explosion in the riser manifold area

• Case 3: An explosion in the region around the main separators

• Case 4: An explosion in spaces between the hull deck and the process deck.

The explosion overpressure loadings for the structural design using the results of the 3D explosion modelling and exceedance curves shall be determined for all areas of the FPSO, including the primary structural members and Safety Critical Elements. The following classification shall be used to define the Safety Criticality:

Level 1 = items whose failure due to gas explosion would lead to major fire escalation or major impairment of EER possibilities.

Level 2 = items whose failure due to gas explosion would contribute to significant fire escalation locally but not of such magnitude as to be outside the fire design scenarios.

Level 3 = items whose failure in an explosion event would contribute to minor effects.

Two level of explosion resistance with the pressure pulse profile shall be determined as follows:

• Ductile Level Blast resistance based on the likelihood of failure in an explosion of any of the above structural elements would be less than 1E-04/year.

• Strength Level Blast resistance which is about 1/3rd the Ductile Level Blast resistance

4.4.5 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis An Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis for the FPSO shall be carried out to ensure that the required adequate escape routes and rescue facilities are incorporated in the design and layout of the FPSO.

This analysis shall also evaluate the protection requirements for the escape routes and muster stations against the potential hazards to them

4.4.6 Ship Collision Study Studies will be conducted to examine the ship collision risk for the FPSO from vessels visiting the installation and from passing vessels. The study shall determine the frequencies and consequences of potential collision risks.

The results of the Ship Collision Risk Assessment shall be used by implementing the following:

• Procedures for the approach of supply boats and oil export tankers to the FPSO.





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• Protective fenders to be installed around vulnerable equipment, typically such as risers, moorings and the offloading lines.

4.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) A QRA Study shall be carried out to determine the risk levels associated with all FPSO operations and hydrocarbon handling facilities. The risk levels shall be calculated using the results of the evaluations listed in Section 4.4 and shall also include the risks due to the transfer of personnel to and from the FPSO.

The QRA shall be undertaken in accordance with GS EP SAF 041 principles to confirm that individual risk levels are tolerable and to identify and define further risk reduction measures that are required to reduce the FPSO risks to ALARP.

In line with COMPANY Policy the maximum individual risk per annum (IRPA) due the FPSO operations must be below 1.0 E-03 and the COMPANY aim is to achieve an IRPA close to 1.0 E-04.

5. Interfaces with Subsea Production System This section identifies the potential interactive hazards for the FPSO due to hydrocarbon systems connected to it and defines the protection requirements.

5.1 Management of Interactive Hazards Particular attention shall be paid to the safety requirements to be included in the design to manage hazards due to simultaneous operations (SIMOPS). These operations include specific well operations (drilling, work over, pulling, wire line, stimulation, other servicing etc), maintenance work or construction activities adjacent to live wells and manifolds.

The following safety engineering measures shall be implemented during the Project Development phases of the COMPANY FPSO Projects:

• Protection against impact of dropped objects on the Sub-sea Production Systems, including potential dropped objects during simultaneous well operations and hydrocarbon production

• Restricted areas between moored Drilling Rigs (and their anchors) and the FPSO (and its moorings) shall be identified for all SIMOPS scenarios in the field.

• Each well intervention scope of work shall be subject to a specific HAZID study whereby adequate emergency shutdown arrangements to mitigate the risk shall be addressed. The well being worked over shall be under the control of the ESD system of the well intervention vessel for the duration of the well intervention work.

• An evaluation of all overpressure scenarios in the flowlines from the wells to the FPSO to identify any additional over pressure protection measures required for these lines.

• Implementation of a minimum safe distance separation between the anchor lines and mooring lines and the subsea production equipment.

5.2 Protection Measures for the Subsea Production Facilities The COMPANY specification GS EP SAF 226 defines the safety requirements applicable to well integrity, surface equipment (including flow-lines and injection lines) and active safety devices.





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Safety requirements given in this specification shall be incorporated in the design of the well Xmas tree completion and the flowlines.

In accordance with the hazard management for production installations (as per API RP 14J), the safety measures contribute to the containment of hydrocarbon by meeting the following objectives:

• Providing the subsea wellheads with adequate protection and barriers.

• Providing flowlines and injection lines with adequate isolation and safety devices.

• Provisions to prevent leaks from the wells.

A subsea preservation system comprising of methanol injection to subsea wellheads and jumpers and dead oil or diesel displacement of live production fluids in the production flowlines shall be provided, in case of a production shutdown where a re-start cannot be achieved before hydrate formulation conditions are expected to develop in the subsea production system.

5.3 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) of the Subsea Facilities The FPSO Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System shall be interfaced with the subsea ESD system which is defined by the following shutdown levels:

• Individual well stop (WS) – shutdown level SD 3

• Shutdown of individual production well (W.SD)

• Shutdown of individual subsea production loop (SPL.SD)

• Shutdown of all subsea production (Subsea ESD)

The following minimum subsea ESD levels are initiated as a result of the following FPSO ESD conditions:

• ESD 0 on FPSO initiates shutdown of all subsea production (Subsea ESD) and close the surface controlled down hole safety valve (SCDHSV) in the production well

• ESD 1 on FPSO initiates shutdown of all subsea production (Subsea ESD)

Individual well shutdown shall be carried out by closure of the well valves as defined in GS EP SAF 226.

6. Interfaces to Umbilicals, Flowlines and Risers (UFR)

6.1 Interactive Hazards from Flowlines and Risers Accidental loadings on the UFR components that could occur as a result of the marine hazards shall be evaluated and taken into consideration in the design of the protection requirements for the risers and pipeline end terminations.

Fire and explosion scenarios are defined as an ignited hydrocarbon release from any subsea hydrocarbon pipelines causing a fire on the sea surface, or from a hydrocarbon riser causing a fire on or above sea surface, including escalation from a riser to other risers.

Any pool fire, jet fire or flash fire from a flammable liquid or gas release could cause the impairment of the risers main safety functions with probable loss of production and fatalities or injury to personnel. These fires can also impact on the hull of the FPSO and escalate to the wing tank.





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6.2 Management of Hazards

6.2.1 Assessment of risk reduction Measures for the Gas Export Pipeline The requirements for automatically isolating the FPSO gas export riser and other hydrocarbon risers from their respective pipelines, in case of a gas release below the riser ESD valve, must be evaluated. This is in order to minimize the duration of any potential hydrocarbon release (and the duration of a jet and /or pool fire if the release is ignited) in the vicinity of the FPSO.

For this purpose, an evaluation shall be carried out to determine the need to provide Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV’s) on the hydrocarbon pipelines connected to the FPSO. This evaluation shall be based on the following two methodologies:

• Consequence Analysis of the potential failure scenarios, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the alternative protection measures, as per the Methodology given in GS EP PLR 100 Section 16.

• Technological Risk Assessment Methodology as per GS EP SAF 041.

If these evaluations are not performed, automatic subsea isolation valves shall be located on the hydrocarbon flowlines and pipelines connected to the FPSO.

6.2.2 Failure of Risers due to loss of FPSO station keeping FPSO mooring lines failure and/or extremely adverse weather could cause the excursion of the FPSO from the station and could cause excessive tension in the risers with potential failure, resulting in the hydrocarbon release. Monitoring facilities shall be provided to detect these hazards.

A Clashing Analysis shall be carried out to determine the minimum separation distances required between the subsea facilities, flowlines, risers and the FPSO mooring lines. This Analysis shall take into consideration the potential extreme FPSO excursion conditions.

6.3 Prevention of hazardous occurrence There are potential hydrocarbon jet fire and explosion threats from riser releases to the FPSO, including the Accommodation Block. As such the following protection measures shall be confirmed by risk assessments and the safety studies:

• Risers and their structural supports shall be provided with passive fire protection against collapse of the structure or any other failure: it gives higher availability and lower maintenance requirements than for other protection means (including I tube used to route the risers).

• Possible segregation and sequencing of risers according to risk potential or mechanical protection to prevent escalation.

• The routing of flowlines or pipelines under the FPSO shall only be permitted if it is demonstrated by a Risk Assessment that a hydrocarbon release from these flowlines or pipelines will not impact the station keeping of the FPSO.

6.4 Emergency Shutdown of the risers and pipelines Two ESD valves shall be provided on each hydrocarbon riser including the gas lift risers connected to the FPSO. The inboard ESD valves can also be used as a process shutdown





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valve (SDV) provided it is fitted with two solenoids to accept separate signals from the FPSO ESD system and the process control system.

Automatic closure of these two ESD valves located on each of the hydrocarbon risers shall be initiated when an Emergency Shutdown Level 1 is generated on the FPSO. In addition, automatic closure of the two ESD valves located on each of the hydrocarbon risers shall be initiated by a low (PSLL) signal generated by the pressure monitoring system of the particular hydrocarbon riser.

In the case of Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV’s) being installed on the hydrocarbon pipelines connected to the FPSO’s, the following arrangements shall be provided for the operation of these SSIV’s :

• An automatic shutdown of the SSIV’s, if an ESD0 Shutdown is initiated on the FPSO

• Push button in the FPSO CCR to initiate the opening and the closure of SSIV

• Confirmed fire and gas detection in the riser porch (or riser balcony) alarm annunciation shall be provided in the CCR, to warn the Operator, on the need to close the SSIV for the affected pipeline /riser

• Pressure switches on the inboard side to the SSIV skid or on the riser tower shall be installed to generate a PSLL signal with 2oo3 voting arrangement, which shall initiate an automatic shutdown of the SSIV.

7. FPSO Overall Requirements

7.1 Management of Hazards This section defines the minimum requirements for the overall FPSO safety related systems and protection arrangements which are common for the Topsides, Hull and Mooring systems of the FPSO. The formulation of these requirements is based on the following hazards management strategy:

• Prevention of hazards and their escalation by layout and passive protection

• Detection of the hazards initiating conditions by fire and gas detection

• Mitigation of the consequences of the hazards by emergency shutdown arrangements

• Protection of personnel and the FPSO from the effects of the hazards, including providing passive and active protection against potential hydrocarbon jet fires (ignited gas release), explosions and/or pool fires (ignited liquid release)

• Protection shall be provided against the non hydrocarbon fires that could occur on the FPSO, including fires inside the hull spaces, the topsides areas, in the E/I buildings and in the Accommodation Block

• Provision of Escape, Evacuation and Emergency Response arrangements

7.2 FPSO General Arrangement

7.2.1 Layout Philosophy The FPSO general arrangement shall comply with the requirements of this General Specification by establishing a hierarchy between different areas according to the hazards they





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generate. The layout based on this hierarchy shall be to locate safer areas towards the Accommodation.

Hence, the layout for a spread moored FPSO in the wind direction from the stern to bow shall comply with the following order:

• Accommodation block / Living Quarters with the helideck located on its top deck.

• Utilities areas including water treatment, main power generation and E&I buildings;

• Process area, including:

HC Riser terminations, manifolds of production lines,

Oil and gas processing facilities

LP compression train

HP compression train

Heater and oil export facilities

Flare KO Drum and the flare boom

The riser termination bays attached to the hull shall be arranged such that hydrocarbon risers shall not be located beyond the aft end of process areas, to prevent these risers encroaching into the utilities area.

The above layout philosophy shall be applied to an internal or external turret moored FPSO, with the requirement that the turret areas shall be separated from the adjoining areas (or Fire Zones) by fire and blast rated bulkheads as specified in sections 7.10 and 7.11 of this General Specification.

The helideck shall be located above the Accommodation Block for landing helicopters against the prevailing winds. Depending on field operations requirement, an area may be provided adjacent to the helideck, having sufficient size for a parked helicopter (rotors folded). The helideck layout shall comply with the requirements of GS EP LSO 110 (which is based on CAP 437).

Flares and vents shall be positioned with regard to prevailing winds so as to minimise the risk of gas clouds drifting towards the utilities area and the Accommodation block.

Dispersion calculations for accidental gas leaks from the FPSO process facilities, releases from cargo tank vents, exhausts from the gas turbines and heaters shall be carried out based on the maximum exhaust flow rates. The results shall be used to determine the location of the vents and exhausts location to ensure that the harmful concentration of gas releases does not reach locations where site personnel or crane operations or helicopter paths can be affected.

The requirements for protection against lightning shall be evaluated and implemented. The guidelines used for oil tankers will be used for this evaluation.

Escape routes for all areas of the FPSO, muster stations and evacuation arrangements including freefall boats shall be provided to ensure a safe evacuation of the FPSO maximum persons on board (POB), as described in section 11.0.

On the hull deck, process equipment and pipework shall be minimised. In particular, hydrocarbon piping beneath the process and utilities decks is restricted to lines serving the hull tanks.





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7.2.2 Mechanical Handling in Process Area The location of cranes in the process areas shall be subject to the following conditions, in order to prevent crane operations over equipment containing hydrocarbon:

1. These crane operations shall not be permitted on a daily or routine basis.

2. Electrical system overrides and permissive shall be provided, so that the electrical feeders to the cranes and the drive mechanisms on the cranes can only be energised with the approval of the RSES and applicable Permit to Work form with all mitigating measures (such as process shutdown and depressurisation in place).

3. Mechanical interlocks shall be provided on the cranes which can only be removed with a Permit to Work approved by the FPSO RSES.

7.2.3 Machinery Rooms in Hull Spaces The location of fuel gas fired engines or heaters or gas turbines within the hull spaces are prohibited.

7.3 Accommodation Block and FPSO Control Room

7.3.1 Accommodation Block The Accommodation block containing the Living Quarters (LQ), Electrical and Instrument technical rooms support facilities and the emergency generator enclosure shall be located in the non-hazardous aft area of the FPSO

The exterior bulkheads and support of the Accommodation Block shall comply with passive fire protection and explosion overpressure resistance requirements specified in sections 7.10 and 7.11.

The Accommodation Block shall be mechanically ventilated by HVAC systems as per the requirements of GS EP SAF 216. The ventilation inlet arrangements for this HVAC system shall be located in a non-hazardous area and protected against a potential blast overpressure due to an explosion in the process areas.

7.3.2 Central Control Room The FPSO Central Control Room shall also be located inside the Accommodation block and is continuously manned. High hazards areas, such as the laundry, kitchen and workshops shall not located next to , above or below the CCR.

This CCR shall have the facilities to monitor and control all FPSO operations and systems including the following as a minimum:

• Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems

• Emergency Depressurization (EDP) System

• Fire and Gas detection and protection systems

• Fire Water and Foam systems

• Fixed Fire Extinguishing systems

• Process and hydrocarbon processing systems





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• Gas blanketing of the cargo tanks with recovered hydrocarbon gas

• Inert gas system

• Venting of hull tanks

• Risers and subsea production systems

• Gas export systems

• Oil offloading via the SPM or CALM Buoy and in the tandem mode

• Hull systems for storing, transfer and export of oil

• Systems for methanol handling

• Ballast system

• Main Essential and Emergency power generation

• Emergency Depressurization of the process systems

• HVAC systems

• Public Address / General Alarm system

• External Communications

• FPSO excursion status

• Tension in the FPSO mooring lines

• Berthing Aids

CCR shall have the facilities to monitor the tension of the FPSO Mooring system lines and to initiate the alarm and shutdown actions, on a FPSO excursion beyond a set limit, determined on the basis of an evaluation.

7.4 FPSO Fire zones and Layout Safety

7.4.1 Requirements of Fire zones The FPSO shall be divided into fire zones to comply with the following objectives, as specified in the GS EP SAF 253 requirements.

"Fire zones are areas within the installation where equipment are grouped by nature and/or by homogeneous level of risk attached to them. The partition into fire zones is such that the consequences of a fire, a flammable gas leak or an explosion corresponding to the credible event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk."

A Fire zone is defined physically by its limits and hydrocarbon inventory inside the zone. It shall be possible to isolate completely the hydrocarbon inventory within a single fire zone by Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDV's) and depressurise it by Emergency Depressurisation valves (BDV's).

7.4.2 Separation of FPSO Fire zones The basis for the minimum separation distances between separate Fire zones relative to facilities in open area are defined in GS EP SAF 253. However, it is not feasible to achieve





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these separation distances on a FPSO. Thus an approach based on appropriate partitioning and fire and blast escalation prevention measures shall be adopted as specified in this General Specification.

7.4.3 Definition of FPSO Fire zones for a spread moored FPSO The FPSO shall be partitioned into fire zones with escalation prevention arrangements as illustrated in Figure 3 and described below, in order to separate areas with different types of risks and limit the probability of escalation.

Note: No ESD Valves for hydrocarbon lines are required from Zone D to forward Flare area.

Figure 3 – Fire zones for FPSO

Fire zone A – Accommodation block, Helideck areas and aft areas This Fire Zone includes the Accommodation Building with the Living Quarters (LQ), the Central control room, radio rooms, technical rooms, offices, and emergency generator room located above Hull deck level at the stern of the FPSO. The Accommodation Block internal areas will be classified as per SOLAS requirements and the spaces will be partitioned accordingly.

Fire Zone A also includes the Helideck located on the roof.

Zone A

Zone A

Zone B

Utility AreasZone D

Zone F (Hull tanks)

Zone G (Optional)

Zone E Zone E

AFT FORE

Zone C

P P

FB FBP E/I Bldg

P

FB

FBP

= Plated deck

= Fire and Blast Rated Bulkhead

= Fire and Blast Partitions

Notes

Zone E





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Fire zone B – Aft Hull Machinery Space Area It includes the machinery spaces in the hull area located below the accommodation and separated from the cargo tanks by void spaces and cofferdams as per SOLAS Requirement. This Fire Zone contains the essential Diesel generators room, workshops and stores areas, water treatment unit, hydraulic power units, HVAC room, sewage treatment plant, Diesel treatment / transfer and other required utilities.

The layout and the safety arrangements for the Fire Zone B shall comply with the latest SOLAS Regulations.

Fire zone C – Utilities Areas and adjoining areas This fire zone the utilities areas from the process deck level to the weather deck level, comprising of modules supporting sea water system, electrical generation, water injection.

Fire zone C extends to the stern to include the main lay down area at the process deck level. Two cranes shall be installed (port and starboard) for handling and storage of containers, chemicals tote tanks and other miscellaneous equipment. Fire Zone C also includes the area containing the aft mooring equipment, injection package with chemical tote tanks and the laboratory.

The fuel gas users supply header (for turbo-generator and inert gas system), located in the utilities area, shall be run in the main pipe rack and shall be fabricated in continuously welded pipe work in accordance with appropriate codes and standards. The use of flanged connections shall be minimised local to the fuel gas users. If any additional fuel gas conditioning skids (e.g. turbine fuel gas K.O. pot) are required, they shall be located preferably on the outboard edge of the module, away from air intakes.

Fire Zone D – Hydrocarbon processing areas above the Process deck level This fire zone includes the modules supporting process equipment and systems, gas compression equipment and systems, the riser’s manifold areas and the piperacks.

The process areas shall have plated decks at the process deck level and grated decks at higher level decks except under vessels or equipment containing significant hydrocarbon inventories.

Fire Zone E – Spaces between Process deck level and the Hull deck This fire zone D includes the space between the process deck and the hull deck (i.e. tweendeck top of the cargo area). This Fire Zone extends the whole of the hull deck starting from the cofferdam between the Accommodation Block and the cargo tanks, to the forward area of the FPSO.

This Fire Zone also includes the port and starboard riser porch areas.

The forward area of this Fire Zone includes the flare tower area and the oil offloading station at the fore end of the vessel.

Fire Zone F – Areas and Tanks below the Hull Deck This Fire Zone includes the internal areas of the cargo oil storage tanks, hull process tanks, slop tanks, ballast tanks, Diesel storage tanks and forward methanol tanks. The access hatches of all these tanks will be closed during normal operations. The opening of these tank hatches and entry into these tanks will be controlled by Permit to Work (PTW) procedures.





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Fire Zone G – Forward Hull Machinery Room (An optional arrangement) In certain cases a forward hull machinery room may be used to house the ballast pumps, forward fire water pumps and other utilities.

7.4.4 Fire and Blast Escalation Prevention The Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) and 3D Explosion Modelling shall be carried out to define the detailed passive fire protection fire and blast structural resistance requirements for:

(a) The detailed design of the forward bulkhead of the E&I building or alternatively for a separate dedicated fire and blast partition(s) between the process and utility areas.

(b) Process deck above the hull deck.

(c) Partitions between the process area and the forward areas containing the methanol tanks, chemical tanks, the flare structure and associated equipment.

(d) The requirement to extend the topsides E&I building forward bulkhead or the dedicated fire and explosion partition down to the hull deck.

If these evaluations are not done the default protection arrangements specified below and in Sections 7.10 and 7.11 of this General Specification shall be used.

• The Utilities and Process Modules shall have plated process deck (minimum H0 rated) at a suitable elevation above the Hull Deck. This plating requirement at the process deck level shall also cover space allocated for future additional equipment in the process and utilities areas.

• The forward bulkhead and a wrap around of 3 meters ( towards the aft ) of the E & I buildings located between the process and utilities areas shall be reinforced with fire and blast protection to provide fire and blast protection between the utility areas fire zone ‘C’ and the process area fire zone ‘D’. (Note: E&I building entrances shall not be located on the side of the building facing the process area. The cable transits and other penetrations shall be on the aft face of the E&I buildings).

• If the E/I buildings are located in the aft section of the utilities areas, then dedicated vertical partial fire partitions shall be required for separating the utilities areas (Fire Zone C) from the process areas (Fire Zone D).

• Fire rated partitions at the forward end (and possibly the sides) of the gas compression modules.

7.4.5 Fire Zones for a Turret Moored FPSO In the case of an internal turret or an external turret moored FPSO, the turret including the gantry areas shall be considered as a separate Fire Zone, (Fire Zone T)

In the case of an internal turret, the turret and gantry areas shall be separated from the adjoining Fire Zones (which may include the Accommodation Block) by bulkheads with passive fire protection against jet fires for two hours and explosion overpressure resistance of 1.0 bar. All hydrocarbon lines penetrating these bulkheads shall be provided with an ESD valve.

In the case of an external turret at the Accommodation Block end, explosion overpressure resistance of 1.0 bar and passive fire protection against jet fires for two hours shall be provided for the Accommodation Block bulkhead facing the turret plus 3 meters wrap around. This shall





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be in addition to passive fire protection against jet fires for two hours and explosion overpressure resistance specified in this General Specification for the forward bulkhead of the Accommodation Block.

7.4.6 E/I Technical Buildings The external E/I Technical Buildings can be located on the process deck between the non-hazardous areas and the process areas handling hydrocarbon or in the utility areas.

Location of external E/I buildings within the process areas shall require a Derogation, justified by the results of a Fire Risk Analysis and 3D CFD explosion modelling.

The extent of hydrocarbon gas cloud in case of a credible release event on the deck areas shall be calculated to support the location of the HVAC air inlets of the Technical Buildings and utility enclosures on the deck. These air inlets shall be fitted with gas tight damper(s) and hydrocarbon gas detection.

7.4.7 ESD Valve Locations and Protection By reference to GS EP SAF 261, the following requirements for ESD valve isolations shall apply, to the FPSO.

• One dedicated ESD valve (ESDV) on each hydrocarbon lines passing from one fire zone to another, including the hydrocarbon drop lines from the topsides process systems to the hull tanks. This requirement shall not apply to the lines for tank venting and tank inerting.

• Two ESD valves shall be provided on each of the following risers

• All incoming hydrocarbon riser

• All gas lifts risers.

• All gas export and import risers

• Oil export lines to the offloading buoy and to the shuttle tanker for tandem loading (the back-up case)

• One ESD valve on each fuel gas supply lines

In the above cases, outboard valve shall be located above the air gap, i.e. above the maximum sea state but below the hull deck. The inboard ESD valves can also be used as a PSD valve provided this valve is fitted with two solenoid valves to accept individual ESD and PSD signals.

7.4.8 Restricted Area Concept The restricted areas are the installation areas affected either permanently by the normal operation or, exceptionally by an emergency situation caused by a major failure, as defined in GS EP SAF 253.

Because of the FPSO layout specifics, the complete FPSO up to the physical extremities, but excluding the internal areas of the Accommodation block, E/I Technical Buildings and hull machinery spaces shall be designated as the restricted area of the FPSO. The electrical items and equipments located in the restricted areas of the FPSO which are outside the limits of the areas classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2 hazardous areas, shall be certified equipment suitable for use in Zone 2 hazardous areas. These criteria shall not apply to the internal areas of the Accommodation block, E/I Buildings and hull machinery spaces which shall be provided with





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hazardous area over pressurisation (50Pa) and airlocks monitored by gas detectors to prevent any gas ingress into these areas.

Flare tips and outlets of hydrocarbon vents from hull tanks shall be sited such that the radiation levels in the restricted area zone) of 500 meters radius around the FPSO shall be implemented and registered in the Admiralty Charts.

7.4.9 Fired Heaters The location and the design of any fixed heaters on the FPSO shall comply with GS EP SAF 227.

7.4.10 Diesel Oil Storage Tanks The Diesel oil storage tanks are located in the FPSO hull and as such are not affected by any process equipment and the hydrocarbon pipes. The Diesel day tanks for the Diesel engines shall be provided with a retention bund designed for at least 110 % of the tank’s volume.

7.4.11 Exhausts of Gas Turbines Gas dispersion calculations shall be performed for the gas turbines exhausts above the FPSO process deck. These calculations shall be done for the scenario of all gas turbine generators and gas turbine compressors running simultaneously. Results for different wind and atmospheric stability combinations are to be calculated for the SO2, NO2 and H2S potential maximum concentrations defined in GS EP SAF 253.

The turbine exhaust studies shall also determine the exhaust gas plumes temperature when they pass over the helideck and their consequential effects on helicopter operations. The gas plumes potential temperature effects on crane operations must also be identified, as required by GS EP LSO 110.

7.5 Hazardous Area Classification, Ventilation and Pressure Protection

7.5.1 7.5.1 Hazardous Areas Classification The classification of hazardous areas on the FPSO is defined as follows:

Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

Explosive atmosphere is or is likely to be permanently present

Explosive atmosphere is likely to be present in normal condition of operation

Explosive atmosphere is likely to be present in abnormal condition or during a short duration in normal condition.

Two codes are applicable to the hazardous area classification of the complete FPSO/FSO:

• IP Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15 (IP 15): Area Classification for Petroleum Installations. The provisions of this code are supplemented by the COMPANY General Specification GS EP SAF 216, which shall apply for the definition of hazardous areas generated by topsides equipment on FPSO/FSO units on or above the production deck.

• International Standard IEC 60092-502. This applies to all spaces in the hull of an FPSO/FSO, including the hull deck.





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On an FPSO, the interface between the two codes lies in the space between the process deck(s) and the hull deck of “tweendeck”. Whatever the separation between the two (grating or plating), the full volume of the “tweendeck” is considered as a semi-enclosed space, in compliance with 4.2.2.5 of IEC 60092-502, and as such a classified zone 1 with a subsequent extension of a 3.5m zone 2 where appropriate as shown in the figure 4 below.

7.5.2 Specific requirements for a FPSO The ventilation requirements for enclosures of Gas Turbines, Diesel Engines and other enclosures shall comply with GS EP SAF 216.

A swivel (riser rotating joint) for turret moored FPSO gives rise to a 3m zone 1 and a further 4.5m zone 2. These values may have to be increased in specific cases such as high volume of gas handling.

Conventional hose-based crude oil tandem-offloading systems generate a 3m zone 2. However if a quick disconnect device is installed on the FSO/FPSO, a 3m zone 1 plus a further 4.5m zone 2 are required in the vicinity. Consequences of operation of a break-away coupling have also to be addressed.

On an FPSO, a methanol tanker berthed alongside may create a temporary zone 1 and/or zone 2 in the offloading area depending on the location and layout of the methanol tanker, and this should be taken into account in the design.

Particular attention shall be paid to vents of the hull tanks, breathers, fuel gas in machine enclosures on the deck.

Hazardous equipment tables and hazardous area classification layout and elevation drawings for the entire FPSO, including the topsides, risers, and export and import facilities shall be prepared in accordance with COMPANY specifications GS EP SAF 216 and IEC 60092-502.

Process Deck

Hull Deck





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7.5.3 Selection of Electrical Equipment All electrical equipment on the complete open deck areas of the FPSO including the Electrical Power Generators shall be minimum Zone 2 certified. All equipment shall be rated suitable for gas group IIB Temperature Class T3 (200ºC max. surface temperature).

All electrical equipment in Zone 1 areas and/or equipment and systems required to operate after an ESD1 emergency shutdown situation, shall be suitable for Zone 1. The logic solvers for these items shall be located in non-hazardous areas.

Electrical equipment which cannot be isolated in case of gas detection, or is essential for equipment such as post lube oil pumps for the gas turbines or emergency ventilation shall be suitable for Zone 1 group II B T3.

7.5.4 Ventilation and differential pressurisation Ventilation systems for enclosed areas and enclosures on the FPSO shall be designed to comply with GS EP SAF 216 and the specific requirements given below:

• The Accommodation, E&I technical rooms, buildings and workshops on the FPSO deck, shall be mechanically air conditioned, ventilated and over-pressurised with a minimum of 50 mbar. Each normal entrance to these buildings shall be via pressurised air locks provided with gas detectors. In the event of a loss of pressure (in airlock or room) for a period exceeding 30 seconds, an alarm shall be activated in the central control room.

• The ventilation air intakes for E/I buildings shall be of sufficient duct length to ensure that the gas detectors shut the inlet damper prior to the gas reaching the enclosure, avoiding the need for the room electrical isolation.

• Fresh air inlets for HVAC or inlet air of E&I Buildings or air inlets for gas turbines and machinery enclosures on the deck must be located in safe areas at more than two meters from any hazardous area boundaries and comply with the requirements of GS EP SAF 216.

• Hull machinery spaces shall be maintained at a positive pressure and shall have gastight and watertight hatches to prevent possible gas ingress into the hull.

• Ventilation systems for laboratories shall comply with the GS-EP-SAF-216 and shall be under pressurised to avoid gas egress to surrounding safe area.

• The secondary muster station at the bow shall be mechanically overpressurised.

The machinery package enclosures located on the open deck areas including the following shall be mechanically overpressurised.

• Emergency Diesel generators

• Electrical generators

• Fire water pump Diesel drivers

• Hydraulic power units

• Inert Gas Generators





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7.6 Fire and Gas detection system

7.6.1 General An integrated Fire & Gas (F&G) detection and protection system shall be provided for FPSO. This system architecture and components shall comply with the applicable General Specifications GS EP SAF 261 and GS EP SAF 312, except for any variations defined in this General Specification. This system shall include a fire detection system provided for the internal areas of the accommodation to comply with the SOLAS requirements and a fire and gas detection system for the hull internal areas to comply with the SOLAS requirements.

7.6.2 Functions The F&G detection system of the FPSO shall be totally independent from the process control systems and shall continuously monitor all areas of the FPSO containing process, risers and utilities for potential events.

The control and monitoring facilities for Fire and Gas and ESD systems include the different operator work stations, which also display ESD and F&G mimics and Fire and Gas and ESD systems matrix panels in the CCR, which shall include the following features:

• Confirmed gas and fire detection status (lamps) per fire zone, for all the topsides, hull machinery spaces, Accommodation Block internal areas and other FPSO areas.

• ESD0, ESD1, ESD2 and SD2 status (lamps) with facilities to activate such levels

• Facilities to initiate the protection systems including the active fire protection (i.e. foam and/or firewater deluge or fixed total flooding extinguishing systems).

The F&G system will use the General Alarm system of the FPSO to initiate audible and visual alarms throughout the FPSO.

7.6.3 System Features The overall F&G detection system, including the Fire detection system within the Accommodation Block, shall have safety integrity levels as specified in section 7.7.6 of this General Specification.

All detection equipment including those inside the Accommodation and E/I Buildings shall be suitable for installation in Zone 1 Gas Group IIB Temp. Class T3. Detection equipment in the battery rooms shall be suitable for installation in Zone 1 Gas Group IIC Temp. Class T3.

Equipment packages such as power generators shall have their own F&G systems supplied as part of the package. The logic solvers for these individual F&G systems shall be interfaced to the main F&G system.

7.6.4 Flammable Gas Detection

7.6.4.1 Flammable Gas Detection in Open Areas A mixture of point hydrocarbon gas detectors and open path hydrocarbon gas detectors, suitable for the areas monitored shall be located in the hydrocarbon process areas and other open areas of the FPSO.

Flammable gas point detectors with a 2 out of 3 voting arrangement shall be provided for:

• Congested process areas





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• Hull deck areas including void spaces on the hull

• Hatches (i.e. entrances) to the ballast tanks

• Potential sources of ignition on the deck areas (on the basis of 3 detectors close to each critical source

• Each ventilation, air intakes of combustion equipment enclosures, (e.g. fire water pump enclosures)

Infra Red (IR) open path beam gas detection shall be provided to monitor all uncongested hull / process area and external areas containing large numbers of valves and flanges, or to monitor gas cloud migration from areas susceptible to gas leak, in particular:

• Along the port and starboard sides of the process and upper decks

• Along the pipe racks on the process and upper decks

• Above riser ESDV's and the riser porch

• Areas above the hull deck (i.e. top of the cargo tanks / ballast tanks /process tanks) to detect potential releases from the HC Blanketing system

• Automatic safety actions for gas detection shall be based on a 2 out of 3 voting system, inclusive of all point and open path beam detectors in the area.

In case of gas detection in the process and utilities areas, or on the hull deck or at the riser porch area (with the ESDV's), the following actions shall apply: In case of point gas detection In case of IR beam gas detection

1oo 3 at

20 % LFL

1oo 3 at

50 % LFL

2oo 3 at

50 % LFL

1oo 3 at

1 LFL.m

1oo 3 at

2 LFL.m

2oo 3 at 2 LFL.m

- Alarm in CCR

- Alarm in CCR

- FPSO general gas alarm

- Initiation of ESD 1

- Alarm in CCR

- Alarm in CCR

- General gas alarm in the units

- Initiation of ESD 1

A combination of point gas detection and IR beam detection with voting arrangement can be used in the process and utilities areas, or on the hull deck or at the riser porch area (with the ESDV's). In this case, a 1oo3 at 50 % LFL and 1oo3 at 2 LFL.m, shall initiate an ESD 1.

7.6.4.2 Flammable Gas Detection for Buildings and Enclosures Flammable point gas detectors shall be located in accordance with GS EP SAF 312 and include the following locations:

• In the HVAC air inlets and access air locks of the Accommodation block.

• In HVAC air inlets and access air locks of the hull machinery spaces (Fire Zone B)

• In the HVAC inlets and access air locks of the Electrical /Instrument Buildings

• Inside Electrical /Instrument Buildings on the deck

• In the HVAC inlets and internal areas of the Laboratory and Workshops





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• In the HVAC inlets of rooms containing essential telecom equipment,

• Inside machinery enclosures on the deck.

In addition to initiating ESD1 actions listed in this General Specification the confirmed gas detection in the above locations shall ensure the isolation of the electrical equipment in buildings and enclosures, which are not suitable for a Zone 1 environment.

The electrical isolation of equipment unsuitable for a Zone 1 environment in the E/I Buildings located on the deck results in the isolation of Topside UPS. Hence, system design must ensure that the monitoring and control of the Topside F&G system is available in the Central Control Room, even when there is detection of gas in the ventilation inlets of these Buildings. Hence, the electrical systems inside the Electrical/Instrument buildings not suitable for a Zone 1 shall only be isolated if the gas is detected inside the buildings. For this purpose the following arrangements shall be used:

• At least 3 gas detectors shall be installed inside the E&I buildings on the deck.

• These gas detectors will trip all live electrical equipment on a 1oo3 voting logic.

• A time delay up to 30 minutes shall be introduced to isolate the live electrical equipment automatically.

Hydrogen gas detectors shall be installed at each battery room in accordance with GS EP SAF 216 section 7.0. They are required to vote on a 2002 basis, with alarm levels set at 5% LFL and control actions performed at 10% LFL.

Consideration shall also be given to the provision of hydrogen gas detectors on the electro chlorination package located externally on the process deck.

7.6.5 Fire detection

7.6.5.1 General Fire, flame, heat and smoke detection shall be provided throughout the FPSO, as per the detectors selection and location requirements given in GS EP SAF 312. The locations to be monitored shall include the following locations of the FPSO:

• In open areas in particular throughout hydrocarbon processing and utilities areas

• In E/I Technical Buildings including their entry airlocks

• In gas turbine hoods

• Machinery rooms and equipment enclosures located in the deck areas

• All ventilation inlets and internal areas of the Accommodation Block

7.6.5.2 Fire detection in open areas Flame and heat detection shall be provided to cover the process and utility areas and the area above the cargo tanks. A combination of triple IR, UV/IR and Pneumatic (fusible loop) detectors shall be used for open process and utilities areas and the areas above the cargo tanks, on the basis of the selection criteria given in GS EP SAF 312.

Visual CCTV imaging flame detectors can be used on the FPSO in combination with other detectors specified in GS EP SAF 312, with the condition that the output from the CCTV





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imaging flame detectors shall have only alarm functions and shall not be used to initiate any automatic actions.

The fire detection shall be configured on 2 out of N voting arrangement in order to minimise the effects of false alarms and increase the detection reliability. Fire detected by confirmed (2ooN) flame detectors in the FPSO deck areas shall initiate the following actions:

• Raise an alarm in the Central Control Room

• Raise general fire alarm on the FPSO

• Initiate ESD 1, only in case of fire detection in the process areas

• Start the duty fire water pumps in a predetermined sequence

Confirmed fire detection, in the Process areas, shall activate the fixed deluge systems in deluge sub-zones, as specified in Section 7.9.

7.6.5.3 Fire detection in E/I Technical Buildings on the Main Deck Smoke and heat detectors will be provided in the different rooms and false floors of the E&I Technical buildings. They shall be wired on a minimum of two loops.

Single fire detection shall raise an audible alarm locally and in the control room.

Confirmation of fire detection shall, in addition to the above the following actions:

• Raise a common fire alarm on the fire panel, in the Central Control Room

• Initiate the isolation of the power supplies (including battery power) to the E&I building

• Close the fire dampers,

• Stop the HVAC system to the building(s) affected

• Initiate the release after an appropriate time delay of the fixed fire protection system, for the affected E&I Technical buildings in the Process/Utility areas.

Heat detectors shall be provided over transformers. An alarm shall be sent to the CCR on single detection.

7.6.6 VESDA Systems Very Early Smoke Detection Alarm (VESDA) system can be used in addition to the systems specified in GS EP SAF 312 for any subsea preservation system using dry oil or diesel and methanol. This preservation system is used for the subsea network during periods of prolonged shutdown. In this case, the function of the VESDA system is to monitor all the electrical switchboards and instrument panels associated with the systems and utilities required for subsea preservation system. The requirements must be decided on a case by case basis.

VESDA systems may also be required to monitor the Battery rooms.

7.6.7 Manual alarm call points Manual Alarm Call points (MACs) shall be provided and strategically distributed throughout the FPSO for personnel to raise an alarm in the CCR and initiate the General Alarm. In the Accommodation Block manual alarm call points shall be strategically located in all corridors, stairways, and escape routes and at each exit.





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7.6.8 Fire and gas detection for turbine and engine enclosures The F&G detection system, including the executive actions, shall be designed by the Vendors of gas turbines and Diesel engine packages to comply with GS EP SAF 222. A fire and gas panel shall be supplied for each of these with provision to interface the monitoring and shutdown signals with the FPSO F&G system.

7.7 Emergency Shutdown and Depressurisation Systems

7.7.1 General Philosophy The FPSO topsides, the hull systems and the subsea facilities shall have an integrated automatic emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency depressurisation (EDP) systems to comply with GS EP SAF 261 and requirements as specified in this General Specification.

The shutdown levels, listed below in descending order, shall be used for the FPSO depending on the type of cause and effect detected by the automatic system or emergency assessed by the operator. A higher ESD level shutdown shall initiate all lower level shutdowns in sequence.

• ESD 0 – Prepare to abandon FPSO and total field production and facilities shutdown

• ESD 1 – FPSO total production and utilities shutdown including initiation of an automatic EDP

• ESD 2 – FPSO total production shutdown, but no automatic initiation of the EDP

• SD 2 – (PSD) Process shutdown by shutdown of oil, gas and water production and associated export systems

• SD 3 – Unit shutdown of individual process train or equipment

In addition to the monitoring and control logic facilities of ESD and EDP systems provided in the ICSS workstations, a matrix panel shall be located in the FPSO CCR with the following features:

• Display of the ESD Levels and actions initiated, in a hazardous situation.

• Push buttons to operate the ESDV’s and BDV’s.

• Push buttons to initiate ESD shutdowns and Alarms.

The Safety Integrity for the overall ESD systems shall be as specified in section 7.7.6 of this General Specification.

7.7.2 Emergency Depressurisation (EDP) EDP of the FPSO process systems is required to mitigate consequences in case of a gas leak or fire.

The depressurisation criteria are to reduce the system pressure for the process inventory in the Process Fire Zone D and Fire Zone E (i.e. above the riser ESD valves), down to the lower of 7 barg or one half of the operating pressure, in less than 15 minutes starting from the operating pressure. Depressurisation staggering in order to meet these criteria is not permitted.

Equipment packages such as power generators shall have their own shutdown, depressurisation, fire and gas systems supplied as part of the package. These systems shall comply with the requirements of GS EP SAF 261 and shall be interfaced to the main ESD system.





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7.7.3 ESD Shutdown Levels

7.7.3.1 Level ESD 0 – Total Shutdown ESD 0 shall automatically initiate an ESD1 and lower levels of shutdown. ESD 0 shall prevent the emergency generator start-up and initiate the following actions:

• Activate the FPSO General Alarm system,

• Shutdown of all subsea wells and their downhole safety valves (SCSSV’s),

• Shutdown of all electrical systems and potential sources of hazard and ignition in all areas including those certified Zone 1, except navigation aids and those systems required to operate during an emergency situation including Fire & Gas detection, ESD, Communications, General Alarm and Emergency Lighting.

Note 1: ESD 0 does not stop Diesel driven firewater pumps if they have already been started up either automatically or by manual means.

Note 2: Telecommunication systems shall be maintained after the ESD 0 initiations.

ESD 0 is caused by the ESD 0 push buttons located at strategic locations, including the Offshore Installation Manager’s office, inside the FPSO CCR, primary muster station and helideck.

Black Shutdown The only exception to above manual actions initiating an ESD, is the automatic initiation of ESD 0 in the case of a Black shutdown scenario as specified in GS EP SAF 261.

A Black Shutdown is initiated on the FPSO, by confirmed gas detection at the accommodation HVAC air intake downstream dampers serving the technical rooms or the CCR.

7.7.3.2 Level ESD 1 – Total shutdown of process and utilities systems ESD 1 shall initiate the automatic shutdown of all process and utility systems in Fire Zones C, D and E, except the following systems:

• HP Hydraulic system

• Inert gas and Nitrogen systems

• Instrument Air System

Thus an ESD1 shall result in the shutdown of the following:

• All ESDV’s on the hydrocarbon risers

• All ESDV’s on the process systems

• All ESDV’s on the hydrocarbon drop lines into the hull tanks

• The subsea preservation system

• The main power system and initiate the emergency power system

• Initiate the shutdown of the flow from the subsea wells to the FPSO

• All cargo offloading and cargo transfer systems





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• In case of gas detection: shutdown of all potential sources of hazard and ignition (except for fire water pumps), in the fire zone except controls and emergency or vital equipment on individual battery systems and suitable for zone 1,

• In case of fire detection: fire-extinguishing means activation in relevant deluge zones of the process areas or protected enclosures.

• An ESD1 shall initiate an automatic EDP of all the process systems in the process fire zone D and Fire Zone E.

ESD 1 is caused by the following:

• ESD 0 in the restricted area

• Initiation of a ESD1 pushbutton

• Confirmed gas detection outdoors or in an enclosure on the deck

• Confirmed gas detection in a ventilation inlet air duct of the Accommodation block or a E/I Technical building or an enclosure on the deck

• Confirmed fire detection in the Process areas

• Low UPS battery voltage, (i.e. loss of power supply to ESD and F&G systems)

• Leak detection on the subsea flowlines or oil and gas export

• FPSO loss of position, caused by the failure of one or more mooring lines and FPSO offset reaching a predetermined limit. This FPSO offset limit shall be calculated with reference to GS EP STR 661.

7.7.3.3 Level ESD 2 – Total Process Shutdown The ESD 2 level shall initiate the total process systems shutdown (i.e. all process systems, oil and the gas export systems), but without initiating an automatic EDP of the process systems.

ESD 2 is caused by the following:

• An ESD 1

• Initiation of an ESD2 pushbutton.

• A gas blow by scenario from the topsides process system impacting the hull tanks.

• LSLL in the second stage separator.

• LSHH in the flare KO drum(s) connected to the unit or FSLL on the flare system.

• PSLL of the instrument air system.

• PSLL fuel-gas when fuel gas is used to prevent air ingress in the flare system.

7.7.3.4 Level SD 2 (PSD) – Process Shutdown The SD 2 (PSD) level shall be designed for the initiation of the following actions depending on the particular process upset conditions:

• Shutdown of all oil processing systems and oil export

• Shutdown of gas export and initiation of gas diversion to the flare





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• Shutdown of produced water

• Permissive to perform manually EDP if relevant to concerned process unit.

SD 2 (PSD) is caused by the following:

• ESD 1

• Initiation of a SD2 pushbutton.

• Process upset conditions on process systems including cargo handling systems to be identified on a case by case basis.

7.7.3.5 Level SD 3 – Equipment/package shutdown Level SD 3 initiates the following actions:

• Shutdown of individual production or utility equipment, with automatic depressurisation,

• In case of gas detection or fire detection inside an enclosure, shutdown of all potential sources of hazard and ignition within the enclosure except emergency on individual battery system and suitable for zone 1.

• In case of fire detection inside an enclosure, activation of fire-fighting means in the equipment enclosure, equipment shutdown and closure of dampers (as relevant).

Level SD 3 is caused by the following:

• ESD 1 or ESD 2 or SD2 or SD3 initiation of pushbutton

• Fire or gas detection inside a gas turbine, machinery or an equipment enclosure,

• Process, utility or equipment related fault.





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7.7.4 Summary of ESD Initiating Events

Causes Automatic Actions

ESD 0 Push button (manual action) ESD 0 ESD 1 SSIV

ESD 2 / SD2 SD 3

Gas detection inside Accommodation ESD1 (Note 1)

Outdoors gas detection on or near FPSO ESD 1 Outdoors fire detection on or near FPSO ESD 1 Gas detection inside a technical Room ESD1 UPS low low battery voltage ESD 1 Detection of a PSLL condition in the incoming hydrocarbon system to the FPSO or in the hydrocarbon export system.

ESD 1

FPSO excursion over predetermined unit ESD 1 Accommodation inlet gas detection ESD 1 ESD 1 (direct action) ESD 2 PSLL fuel gas ESD 2 PSLL in Instrument Air ESD 2 LSHH flare K.O. Drum ESD 2 Process fault (as appropriate) SD 2 Loss of Main electrical power ESD 2 Communications loss to SPM or CALM Buoy Offshore Offloading Terminal Alarm

only

ESD 1 or ESD 2 in SPM or CALM Buoy Offshore Offloading Terminal Oil export

shutdown

ESD 2 (direct action) SD 3 Gas detection (inside an equipment encl) SD 3 Fire detection (inside an equipment enc) SD 3 Equipment fault (relevance) SD 3

Note 1 – Plus isolation electrical circuits inside the Accommodation

Push buttons shall be located in the following locations of the FPSO to trigger the relevant shutdown levels:

Location Shutdown Action Central Control Room (CCR) ESD0, ESD1, ESD2, SD2, SD3 Muster Station in Accommodation Block ESD0 Emergency Control Centre ESD0 Unit Local Panels ESD2, SD3 Outdoor SD3





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7.7.5 High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) Instrumented high integrity pressure protection systems (HIPS) shall only be implemented if it is not feasible to protect the FPSO topsides systems against over pressurisation by full pressure rating of the topsides process equipment or by the Process Safety Valves (PSV’s).

A HIPS system may be required to prevent the potential for causing over pressurisation of the FPSO Topsides process systems including the process separators by the production flow lines due to a possible malfunction of the inlet choke valves or abnormal packing pressure in the subsea production loops.

In addition, the potential pressurisation of a Process tank due to an excessive flow from the second stage separator in a gas blow by scenario shall be investigated, in order to identify the need for HIPS to prevent this incident.

The HIP’s systems shall comply with the requirements of GS EP SAF 260.

7.7.6 Safety Instrumented System Integrity and Reliability (SIL) If specific SIL assessments (including hazard and risk analysis) as specified in GS EP SAF 261 are not carried out, the following shall apply by default for the safety instrumented systems on the FPSO:

Safety Instrumented Systems SIL Level for the system loop including the field detectors, the logic solvers and the field end elements.

ESD 0, ESD 1, ESD 2 and EDP systems SIL-3 F&G System monitoring , logic and shutdown actions initiated by the F&G detection

SIL-3

Equipment package F&G systems SIL 2 Process Safety Systems SIL-2 High integrity pressure protection systems (HIPS) To be determined by a SIL

assessment to be approved by the HIPS Committee

7.8 Fire Protection Philosophy All fire protection and extinguishing systems and equipment shall comply with COMPANY standards GS EP SAF 321, GS EP SAF 322, GS EP SAF 334 and GS EP SAF 337. In addition, Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) shall be used for the selection of the appropriate fire protection systems to ensure protection of the personnel, the asset, the production and the reserves.

The fire protection measures as appropriate to the risk shall be used and these include the following:

• Application of passive protection for protection against jet fires, including the risers porch areas.

• Firewater deluge systems for process areas to cool down the hydrocarbon containing equipment in the affected areas during a fire event.

• Foam deluge used with the firewater deluge systems for the hydrocarbon handling and process areas to provide fire-extinguishing capability for liquid hydrocarbon spill fires.





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• Foam deluge used with the firewater deluge systems for the Hull deck and Cargo tanks area to provide fire-extinguishing capability for liquid hydrocarbon spill fires.

• Firewater / foam hydrants for all FPSO areas.

• Firewater / foam monitors to cover the FPSO main and hull deck areas.

• Firewater / foam monitors to cover any sections of the FPSO mooring lines above the sea level.

• Fixed inert gas total flooding fire extinguishing systems for the internal areas and false floor voids of instrument, electrical and emergency electrical technical rooms.

• Fixed CO2 or water mist total flooding fire extinguishing systems for the gas turbine hoods and the Diesel generator enclosures.

• Fixed inert gas total flooding fire extinguishing systems for unmanned technical rooms on the deck areas.

All the internal horizontal and vertical partitions of the Accommodation Building shall comply with fire protection ratings as specified by the latest SOLAS Rules. Hence there is no requirement for water sprinkler systems for the internal areas of the Accommodation Building.

CO2 total fixed fire extinguishing systems shall not be used inside the hull or inside the Accommodation Block.

Manual fire hydrants (foam and water) and manual fire fighting portable / wheeled fire extinguishers shall be provided throughout the FPSO to permit rapid intervention on open area fires including the Diesel storage tanks and bunded areas.

7.9 Active Fire Protection

7.9.1 Fire Water and Foam Systems Philosophy All hydrocarbon areas and equipment of the FPSO including those listed below, shall be covered by fixed water deluge and foam systems in accordance with NFPA15, GS EP SAF 321 and GS EP SAF 322 requirements and the specific requirements given in this General Specification.

• Process Areas including the piperacks

• Equipment, vessels & piping handling or storing hydrocarbon and flammable fluids

• Hull deck and Cargo tanks top areas

• Riser Porch areas

The FPSO fire water ring main system shall be a permanently pressurised pipe work system supplying firewater by feeders to the deluge systems, foam systems, monitors, hydrants and hose reels.

The firewater main will be supplied by fire water pumps sized to provide the maximum fire water demand. The Process fire zone (i.e. Zone D) or in certain cases the hull deck (Fire Zone E) can be expected to provide this maximum calculated fire water demand for the FPSO. In order to rationalise this maximum demand by fire water management, Fire Zone D comprising of the process modules and the Fire Zone E comprising top of the hull tanks and the fore peak, shall be divided into separated sub deluge zones. In addition the whole of the central pipe rack on the FPSO deck process areas shall be classified as a separate individual sub deluge zone.





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The Firewater management policy for the Fire Zone D is that on fire detection in a sub deluge zone, the deluge system for the affected sub deluge zone and the deluge systems for the most adjacent sub deluge zones and the whole of the central piperack on the FPSO deck process area shall be automatically initiated. The worst case scenario shall be used to determine the maximum fire water demand as sum of the following:

• Deluge and foam protection for the affected sub deluge zones.

• Deluge and foam protection for the adjacent sub deluge zones to be deluged.

• Deluge for the central pipe rack in the process areas .

• 120 m3/h for one fire monitor.

• 60 m3/h for fire hydrants.

The methodology to define the extent of each sub deluge zones and to determine the number of adjacent sub deluge zones to be deluged for the potential scenarios is given in Appendix 1 of this General Specification. The results of the Fire Risk Analysis shall also be used to determine the requirements for any ESD valves on any of the hydrocarbon lines crossing one or many sub deluge zones, to prevent the escalation of a fire event to sub deluge zones, which are not being deluged in a fire event.

The deluge requirements for the cable trays can be excluded if the electric cables are fire resistant or flame retardant as specified in GS EP ELE 001 and GS EP ELE 021.

The water requirement for the foam coverage of the total or partial areas of Hull Deck is defined in section 7.9.4 of this General Specification. The water requirement for the hull deck is excluded from the calculated maximum fire water demand for the fire zone D, because of the plated lower decks of the process areas.

7.9.2 Fire Water Mains and Distribution Network The fire water main design shall comply with GS EP SAF 321 and shall be arranged in the form of a loop around Process areas and the hull deck feeding ring arrangements around each sub deluge zone of Process fire zone, (i.e. Process areas and hull deck on top of the tankers).

This is to ensure that each sub deluge system shall be served by two water supplies fed from separate isolatable headers from the ring main and each of these feed shall provided with an individual deluge control valve. Deluge valves shall be located at a safe distance from the protected area, controlled by the F&G system and activated by confirmed fire detection. They shall also have the facility to be activated from the CCR or a local push button. In addition, each sub-deluge zone shall have pressure sensing arrangements and isolation valves with manual and remote operation facilities.

During normal operations when fire pumps are not running the fire main shall be pressurised by a jockey pump with a minimum capacity of 30 m3/h.

Dynamic surge analysis based on approved computer models shall be carried out in the Detailed Engineering phase to evaluate the water hammer effects and to verify the fire water ring main sizes, water velocities, pressure drops and the impact of the surge analysis.

Firewater monitors shall be located to cover the FPSO topside areas including the Diesel loading areas, the methanol storage tanks and the methanol loading area. The monitors shall be capable of remotely controlled operation.





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The helideck shall be protected by at least two foam/water monitors, located to take advantage of the prevailing wind.

Hose reels shall be provided in the LQ, workshops, and more generally where hydrocarbon inventory and electricity are not the primary hazards. Hose reels shall be located so that any location where a fire may exist shall be reachable by at least 2 hose reels. The hose reels shall also be located away from the potential sources of hazard, preferably close to access ways.

7.9.3 Water Pumps The FPSO fire water system shall be supplied by four fire water pump sets. In this case each fire water pump shall have a minimum rating of 35% of fire water demand. If the individual pump maximum capacity exceeds that specified in GS EP SAF 321, a derogation application shall be submitted to formalise this arrangement.

Each fire water pump set shall have a two stage arrangement of hydraulic submersible lift pump and a deck mounted booster pump energised by a dedicated diesel engine. Pump characteristics shall be in accordance with NFPA 20 and GS EP SAF 321.

The four pump sets shall be located in the following locations:

• One at forward starboard

• One at forward port

• One at aft starboard

• One at aft port

The fire pump sets except the lift pump shall be located in pressurised enclosures with F&G detection or in a non hazardous area. All Diesel pump packages shall be self-contained stand-alone units that are independent of external services for operation. They shall be fitted with a Diesel oil tank of sufficient capacity for 18 hours running time at full capacity

The lift pumps shall be located in external caissons attached to the hull and protected against wave action and mechanical damage. Due to unfavourable site environmental conditions location of the lift pump caissons in internal caissons shall only be permitted if these caissons are located in a cofferdam.

In addition, a Derogation application shall be required and this application shall be supported by an evaluation to confirm the integrity of the cofferdam against ingress of seawater.

Fire water pumps shall be started automatically according to a pre-determined sequence by:

• Low ring main pressure (via Pressure Transmitters installed on the firewater ring main),

• Confirmed fire detection via the F&G system.

Each fire water pump unit shall have its own local panel to control and monitor the driver engine and pumps in accordance with NFPA 20. Their status shall be indicated in the CCR. Pushbuttons shall be provided to start the fire pumps manually from the CCR and on a local pump controller. Firewater pump stop shall be manual only, local to the pumps.

Confirmed gas detection at the combustion air intake shall inhibit pump start-up, but shall not stop the pump if it is already running.





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7.9.4 Fixed water / foam deluge systems The foam system arrangements and design shall comply with GS EP SAF 334. Foam storage and injection facilities shall be provided to inject foam into the following systems:

• Deluge systems, monitors and hydrants serving process areas.

• Deluge systems, monitors and hydrants serving the Hull deck (i.e. top of the tanks).

• Helideck monitors.

• Monitors in Diesel loading areas.

Facilities shall be provided in the CCR to initiate the start of the foam pumps and to initiate the injection of foam into the fire water deluge systems

The foam concentrate shall be stored in an atmospheric storage tank located in a safe area. The stored quantity shall correspond to 20 minutes operation at maximum demand, in accordance with SOLAS requirements, plus an operational contingency factor of similar duration to allow for losses due to spurious system initiation.

The foam system for the helideck monitors shall be in accordance with ICAO requirements. Elsewhere, it shall be designed in accordance with GS EP SAF 334 and NFPA codes.

7.9.5 Hull deck foam system Transverse coaming be installed on the hull deck, across the boundaries of each three set of longitudinal hull tanks to limit an oil spill or pool fire escalation potential along the hull deck to adjacent areas.

The fixed deluge arrangements shall be designed for delivering foam to the entire hull deck area as well as into any cargo tank the deck of which has been ruptured. In this case the deluge system shall be divided to enable selective deluging of the top of the tanks.

The rate of supply of water and foam solution shall not be less than the greatest of the following three cases:

• 0. 6 l/min per square meter of cargo tanks deck area, where cargo tanks deck area means the maximum breadth of the ship multiplied by the total longitudinal extent of the cargo tank spaces.

• 6 l/min per square meter to cover the sum of the following areas

Longitudinal horizontal area of the Port , Centre and the Starboard tanks where the confirmed fire has been detected

The total longitudinal extent of adjacent forward and aft rows of Port , Centre and the Starboard cargo tanks

Port and Starboard Riser Porch areas

• 3 l/min per square meter of the area protected by the largest monitor, such area being entirely forward of the monitor.

7.9.6 Total flooding extinguishing systems Total flooding inert gas fire extinguishing arrangements are specified in COMPANY specification GS EP SAF 331 with both automatic and manual initiation with a selector switch arrangement for override facilities shall be provided for the following rooms and enclosures:





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• Internal areas of the E/I buildings

• Electrical Equipment Rooms (internal area and floor void)

• Instrument Equipment Rooms (internal area and floor void)

• Emergency Electrical Equipment Room (internal area and floor void)

• Power generator & compressor gas turbine hoods

• Emergency Diesel generator (EDG) room

• Essential Diesel generator room

• Fire pump enclosures

• Machinery enclosures

• Within fired water heater enclosure

Total flooding inert gas fire extinguishing arrangements with only manual initiation facilities shall be provided for the following spaces:

(a) FPSO Central Control Room (floor void) (b) Computer Rooms (floor void) (c) Telecom Rooms (floor void)

It shall be possible to release all automatic systems from manual stations located outside the area or room covered by the system and from the FPSO CCR. Signals for activation shall be energised to actuate and faults monitored.

7.9.7 Portable and mobile fire fighting equipment Portable and mobile fire extinguishers shall be located in strategic places throughout the FPSO including near the access doors of rooms, on access stairways, near escape ways and adjacent to the helideck. The locations, selection and specification for these fire extinguishers shall comply with GS EP SAF 311.

7.10 Passive Fire Protection

7.10.1 General The PFP materials and arrangements to be used shall comply with the COMPANY Specification GS EP SAF 337 and latest SOLAS requirements. This General Specification defines the additional or specific Passive fire Protection requirements for a FPSO.

All PFP arrangements except inside the Accommodation and in the hull machinery spaces, shall be suitable for protection against hydrocarbon jet fires and these PFP arrangements shall be subject to COMPANY approval. These PFP arrangements include the following:

• Fire protection coatings applied to walls, bulkheads, decks and structural members of the FPSO

• Prefabricated fire panels

• Demountable GRP or GRE boxes or fire blankets, which shall be used for the protection ESD valves and their actuators





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7.10.2 Default PFP Requirements The default fire protection ratings as listed below are considered by the COMPANY as the minimum requirement. The applicability of these ratings to the Project FPSO shall be verified by the Fire Risk Analysis before the end of the Basic Engineering phase.

(a) Two hours protection against Jet Fires shall be provided for external bulkheads on the internal turret areas and external turret areas, separating these turrets from the adjoining Fire Zones.

(b) One hour protection against Jet Fires for:

• Hydrocarbon risers and their ESDV's

• Actuators of the riser ESDV's

• ESDV’s and their actuators on the deck areas

• Critical structural members supporting the Accommodation

• Fire/blast partitions between the process and utility areas, with extension down to the hull deck

• Faces of the E/I Buildings on the deck facing the process areas plus a wrap around of 3 meters. The remaining sides, the aft face and the bottom deck shall have a minimum passive fire protection rating of A60

• Muster stations at the forward areas

• All firewater distribution piping including joints in the vicinity of the hydrocarbon risers

(c) 30 minutes protection against Jet Fires for:

• Critical structural members supporting the process and utility modules

• Critical Pipe racks and their supports

• Flare tower base up to about 20 meters height

Although the Accommodation Block is a significant distance from the hydrocarbon areas, the following minimum levels of passive fire protection shall be applied:

• The supporting structures, roof (to protect against potential incidents on the helideck), the forward bulkhead and a wrap around of 3m along the side bulkheads, shall be a minimum hydrocarbon rating of H60 suitable for jet fire protection.

• The remaining side and rear walls shall be a minimum PFP rating of A60.

All E&I Rooms located within the Accommodation shall be rated A60 minimum. The latest SOLAS fire protection requirements shall apply to the Accommodation internal areas including:

• Stairways, decks and their supporting structures

• Partitions and corridor bulkheads

The bow secondary muster shelter and electrical and local instrument equipment rooms adjacent to the process pancakes shall also be minimum rated to H60/J30.





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7.11 Explosion Overpressure Protection

7.11.1 Hull Deck The FPSO hull deck shall have a minimum blast overpressure resistance capability of 1.0 bar static.

The forward bulkheads and structural supports of the Accommodation Block shall have a minimum blast overpressure resistance capability of 0.5 bar static. The port, starboard bulkheads and the roof of the Accommodation Block shall have a minimum blast overpressure resistance capability of 0.25 bar static.

However, the results of the explosion modelling shall be used to verify the adequacy of the above ratings.

7.11.2 Explosion Overpressure Resistance The results of the 3D computational fluid dynamics (CFD) explosion modelling shall be used to determine the design explosion overpressure resistance values for the topsides and the critical structural elements.

The loads shall be based on an explosion with an estimated occurrence frequency of once per ten thousand years. The minimum required structural resistance to explosion overpressures for the following shall be identified by this approach or alternatively the prescriptive minimum blast (static) resistance shown below shall be used.

• The external bulkheads of the internal turret areas and external turret areas, separating these turrets from the adjoining Fire Zones – 1.0 bar

• Bulkheads and decks in the process area – 0.7 bar

• Critical structures in the process areas including the Flare structure – 0.8 bar

• Supports and decks of the Process and Utility modules – 0.8 bar

• Supports and forward Exterior bulkheads E/I Buildings on the deck – 0.8 bar

• Drag load for process vessels and piping in the process area – 0.5 bar

• Drag load for equipment and piping in the process and utilities areas – 0.5 bar

• Risers and their attachments to the hull – 0.7 bar

• Vertical partitions between Utility and Process areas – 0.8 bar.

• ESDV’s on the decks and risers – 0.5 bar

• Aft muster shelter – 0.5 bar

• Critical component of FPSO mooring system above the sea level – 0.5 bar

7.12 Flare System and Stack The FPSO flare system shall be designed to comply with GS EP SAF 262 to handle normal process venting, emergency process relief, blocked outlet, emergency depressurisation and limited continuous flaring (if found to be necessary). It shall comprise two separate HP and LP sub-systems. The two flare tips are separate enough from one another to prevent combustion interference.





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The flare stack location and height of the flare tip shall be designed to ensure that the maximum radiation levels specified in GS EP SAF 262 are not exceeded where personnel are present during normal FPSO operations.

For a closed flare system the following requirements shall be implemented:

• A fast opening valve shall be installed on the High Pressure Flare System on the line from the knock-out drum to the flare to reduce the risk of overpressure. This valve will be classified as an Emergency Blowdown Valve and shall have two solenoid valves to accept separate signals from the ESD 1 system and the process system ( PSHH in the flare knock out drum with SIL3 reliability )

• In addition to the fast opening valve (with SIL 3 reliability), two bursting discs shall be installed in parallel on the High Pressure Flare System on the line from the knock-out drum to the flare to reduce the risk of overpressure.

• Two bursting discs shall be installed in parallel on the Low Pressure Flare System on the line from the knock-out drum to the flare or a SIL3 High Pressure trip arrangement shall be provided.

If a pellet ignition system (minimum SIL2 reliability) is to be used, the following requirements shall be implemented:

• The integrity of the air supply for the pellet launch shall i.e. connected to the main instrument air supply which is at steady pressure and where failure would be revealed to operations staff immediately,

• A back-up air supply shall be available for the pellet ignition system, on loss of primary air supply.

• The results of the dispersion analysis (CFD) carried out during Basic Engineering shall be used to optimise the height and location of the flare stack to prevent vapor cloud touch-down on the FPSO and to allow for safe dispersion.

• A procedure shall be developed to run with permanently ignited flare during periods when closed flare operation is not practicable, e.g. start up and abnormal operation conditions).

7.13 Drains Systems Drainage systems for the FPSO topsides, hull machinery spaces and the hull tanks, i.e. closed and open drains, shall be designed according to GS EP SAF 228 and GS EP STR 651.

Firewater and rainwater will be directed overboard.

Non-hazardous open drains shall be provided for water collected from utility areas and other non-hazardous locations.

There shall be no permanent connection between the open and closed drains, and systems must be designed to prevent hydrocarbons going from a classified to a non-classified area.

7.14 Noise and Vibration

7.14.1 Noise Noise levels throughout the FPSO including the internal areas of the Accommodation Block, hull spaces and the deck areas shall be minimised to be below the limits defined in GS EP ENV 500, GS EP SAF 221 and in Bureau VERITAS specifications. In case of any





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inconsistencies between these documents, the area noise limits based on BV specifications shall be applied to the FPSO.

7.14.2 Noise-induced pipe fatigue Valves with High Mass flows of gas and/or high-pressure drops can generate high noise levels within downstream pipework. Examples of such valves are pressure relief, depressurisation and re-cycle valves. Start-up or abnormal operation can also result in valves being used at more arduous duty than during normal operations.

The noise generated inside piping downstream of PSV's and BDV's shall be checked to ensure that noise-induced fatigue does not occur in the system during venting depressurisation of the process systems based on a credible scenario to be identified in the Basic Engineering phase. Thick wall pipework, forged fittings and supports shall be specified where necessary.

7.14.3 Vibration Levels of vibration on the FPSO shall be controlled to ensure acceptable conditions for equipment and personnel in working and accommodation areas. Vibration limits shall be based on Appendix 5 ‘Admissible displacement and vibrations’ of GS EP SAF 221.

All rotating equipment shall be balanced to acceptable industrial standards. Reciprocating machinery, including Diesel engines, shall be mounted on anti-vibration mountings in accordance to decouple vibration. Special consideration shall be given to all rotating equipment in the hull and LQ spaces to limit vibration and structure-borne noise.

To sustain sympathetic movement in the structure, the equipment must be able to transmit enough energy to the structure. Therefore, rotating or reciprocating equipment shall be examined and the natural frequency of the supporting structural beams calculated in each case. Under base (skid) stiffening of the equipment shall be performed where necessary. The design of the Piperacks and pipe supports shall allow an allowance to cater for the movements of the FPSO.

8. FPSO Accommodation Building Requirements

8.1 Layout Safety The layouts and construction of all the internal areas of the Accommodation Block shall comply with the latest edition of the SOLAS requirements.

8.2 HVAC Systems Different HVAC systems, classified in three categories shall be provided, for the internal areas of the Accommodation block:

• The “Non-Essential HVAC system” shall serve the rooms where failure of the HVAC equipment will not cause any safety concerns.

• The “Essential HVAC system” shall serve rooms where heating and/or ventilation and/or air conditioning and/or pressurisation must be continuously maintained during the following periods:

The essential power supply is available

The main power supply is available





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• The “Emergency HVAC systems” shall serve critical rooms where air conditioning and/or heating and/or ventilation and/or pressurisation are required for safety reasons (life support) and by SOLAS in an Emergency situation.

8.3 Flammable gas detection within critical areas of the Accommodation Building Rooms deemed ‘critical’ within the Accommodation Building are grouped together and served by an Essential HVAC system and shall be monitored by dedicated gas detectors, in accordance with GS EP SAF 312. These rooms shall include the Central Control Room and the areas with facilities required in an emergency situation including Telecoms, Emergency Power, Battery Rooms and UPS supplies.

Upon gas detection at HVAC Air Inlet of the Accommodation:

• The “Non Essential” HVAC system is stopped and associated dampers closed

• All equipment located in the Non Essential areas are de-energised

• The Essential HVAC system is kept running in ‘recycling’ mode

Equipment located in critical rooms are de-energised in cases of gas detection in these rooms. Rooms shall be arranged in order to rationalise the associated gas detection and air distribution.

The gas detectors in areas containing essential Telecom equipment shall be supported by Post ESD 0 Shutdown panels.

8.4 Fire detection in the Accommodation Block The following strategy shall be employed for fire detection in the living quarters:

• Smoke detectors shall be provided inside rooms, corridors, stair wells and under raised floors or false ceilings containing large numbers of cables. They shall also be provided for air locks and HVAC inlets.

• High Sensitivity Smoke Detection Apparatus (VESDA or equivalent) may be installed in the Telecoms Equipment Room (TER) , in addition to conventional smoke detectors.

• Rate-of-rise heat detectors shall be provided in relevant kitchen areas.

Smoke and heat detectors shall raise an alarm in the CCR. It shall be possible for the operator to quickly identify the room or area where fire has been detected,

Smoke detection at HVAC intakes shall shutdown the affected systems and closes the intake and discharge dampers.

8.5 Fire detection in Hull Machinery spaces and Technical Rooms Smoke and heat detectors will be provided in the Technical rooms and machinery rooms located inside the hull. They shall be wired on a minimum of two loops.

Single fire detection shall raise an audible alarm locally and in the control room. Confirmation of fire detection by at least one smoke detector from each of two associated loops will, in addition to the above alarm initiate the following actions:

• Raise a common fire alarm on the fire panel,

• Initiate the isolation of the power supplies (including battery power) to the room

• Close the fire dampers,





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• Stop the HVAC system,

• Initiate the release of the fixed fire protection system for room after an appropriate time delay.

8.6 Fire detection in workshop and other buildings Heat and smoke detectors shall be installed in the workshops, laboratory, paint stores, machinery rooms and other buildings. They shall initiate an alarm in the CCR.

9. FPSO Hull and Mooring System

9.1 Management of Main Hazards

9.1.1 Collision and Impacts Protection arrangements shall be identified and implemented as per GS EP STR 651, to protect the FPSO hull and its mooring system against collision impact risks due to the vessels visiting the installation and the field, including the following:

• Bunkering Tankers (Methanol, Chemicals, Diesel, Water) which will berth side by side to the FPSO

• Surfer Crafts to the FPSO

• Oil export tankers to the oil export buoy or visiting other installations in the field

• Supply vessels to the FPSO

• Oil export tankers to the FPSO (for tandem offloading)

9.1.2 Methanol and Diesel Handling Special detection and protection systems shall be implemented to cover the tandem loading of methanol from carrier tankers at the bow of the FPSO, taking into account potential Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas created by these products.

Special safety and emergency management procedures shall be implemented during side by side loading of Diesel and Chemicals from supply boats to the FPSO, taking into account potential hazards that can be created by Diesel fuel.

9.1.3 Loss of Mooring and/or Station Keeping Refer to section 9.3

9.2 Specific protection measures for cargo handling

9.2.1 Cargo monitoring The cargo handling monitoring equipment shall be located in the CCR and centralised with the FPSO monitoring system. It shall include all necessary status monitoring, remote control and command systems to safely operate the FPSO in normal and emergency cases, including the following systems:

• The cargo handling, transfer and offloading systems.





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• Ballasting system.

• Tank gauging system displays and records cargo oil and ballast water tank levels.

• Flare gas recovery and hull tanks blanketing system.

• Inert gas supply and blanketing system including the inert gas deck valves.

• Meter/proverb system.

• Loading computer which indicates stress on the hull, for all conditions of loading cargo oil and ballasting water.

9.2.2 Prevention of gas blow by to hull tanks This section shall apply if liquids from the 2nd Stage Separator or other process systems are routed to Process Tank(s) in the Hull. The hull process tanks vent system shall be designed to handle potential gas blow by from the 2nd Stage Separator, although this is an undesirable event. This design shall ensure that the total liquid height in the hull process tank (combined oil and water leg) to be maintained at a level sufficient to prevent such an occurrence. The height of this liquid level shall be monitored and alarm facilities shall be provided in the Central Control Room to alert the Operators of any drop in this liquid level below the predetermined required safety level.

The potential gas blow by scenarios from the topsides Process to the Hull Process tanks shall be identified and the worst case gas blow by rates shall be calculated. Based on the calculated worst case gas venting rates, an overpressure protection system consisting of the following shall be provided:

• High pressure pre-alarms to alert the operator to the abnormal operating conditions.

• High pressure trips which will initiate isolation of the high pressure sources from the Hull systems.

• High-velocity vent valves on the tanks (as specified in section 9.2.4) which will relieve excess gas from the Hull and prevent the design pressure of the Hull systems from being exceeded.

In addition the following actions shall be completed before the end of Basic Engineering:

• Confirm that all overpressure and venting scenarios have been highlighted by a HAZOP.

• Perform detailed calculations for the required vent rates.

• Determine if additional means exist to reduce the vent rates.

• Determine the required size of the vent valves and vent headers.

• Determine the vent termination locations for the normal vents and the “failure” case vents (based on gas dispersion calculations for the normal vents).

• Perform dynamic simulation of the gas blow by events to confirm that the proposed system will prevent over pressurisation of the Hull.





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9.2.3 Gas Blanketing of Tanks This section shall apply if the hull tanks containing hydrocarbons are inerted by recovered hydrocarbon gas (HG). Cargo, process and slop tanks shall be provided with the hydrocarbon gas blanketing for normal operations, with provision for a 100% back-up by an inert gas blanketing system. Separate hydrocarbon gas and inert gas headers shall be provided.

Cargo offloading and transfer operations shall be automatically shut when both tanks inerting systems are lost.

The backup Inert gas generation and distribution system shall comply with the Classification rules and SOLAS Regulation 62. This Inert gas system shall have a minimum total generation capability equal to 125% of the total capacity of the crude transfer pumps.

Ballast tanks and void spaces adjacent to cargo areas are not required to be inerted continuously, but provision shall be made for them to be inerted using hoses connected to the inert gas system. Protection shall normally be ensured by periodic analysis of the ambient atmosphere in the tanks, and provision shall be made to facilitate this analysis, either by manual or automatic arrangements using flammable gas detection.

The following instrumentation and safeguards shall be provided for the hull tanks blanketing system:

• A gas regulating valve is to be fitted in the hydrocarbon blanket gas supply line upstream of the shutdown valve.

• In addition to instrumentation devices and alarms required by the cargo tank vapour recover (COTVR) system, the following continuous monitoring arrangements and safeguards shall be provided:

Pressure in each individual cargo tank protected by the hydrocarbon blanket gas system. Automatic shutdown of the shutdown valves of the hydrocarbon blanket gas system shall be arranged on predetermined limits being reached by the Pressure in the tank.

Automatic shutdown of the cargo offloading or transfer pumps shall be initiated on predetermined limits being reached by the Temperature of the hydrocarbon blanket supply gas.

The oxygen content in each individual cargo tank blanketed by the hydrocarbon blanket gas system and the inert gas system shall be monitored. Automatic shutdown of the cargo offloading or transfer pumps shall be initiated, when the oxygen content exceeds 5% by volume, as specified by SOLAS Regulations.

The alarms from the above instrumentation shall be provided in the FPSO Central Control Room.

9.2.4 Hull Tanks Venting Systems Arrangements for the venting of dirty inert gas and hydrocarbon blanket gas systems from cargo, slop, methanol, process and continuous settling tanks during operation shall be provided to ensure that gas is vented clear of all gas turbines and diesel engines, process equipment and HVAC intakes.





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The recommended configuration of the vent and over pressurisation protection system for the blanketed tanks in the Hull is shown in the table below. This configuration will need to be confirmed before end of Basic Engineering.

Normal Vent Failure Case Vent Isolated Vent Process Tank HVV1 HVV2 PVSV on each

tank Other Blanketed HVV1 HVV3 PVSV on each

tank

During normal operation, any vent gas from all of the blanketed tanks due to an overpressure condition, is collected in the HC Blanket Gas Header and is routed to a set of high velocity vent valves (HVV1 in the table above) located on the flare tower (i.e. downwind of the prevailing wind direction). This is to prevent the potential for vented gas to set off gas alarms under adverse wind conditions. Two (HVV1) valves are provided with staggered set points to ensure good gas dispersion.

The potential failure case scenarios shall be evaluated to determine if the vent rate can significantly exceed the normal venting rate. If found to be required, high velocity vent valves shall be provided on each of the Process Tanks (HVV2 in the table above) and on the HC Blanket Gas Header (HVV3 in the table above).

The location of these high velocity vents shall be based on the results of gas dispersion calculations to ensure that gas releases from these vents cannot cause any harm to the accommodation or other buildings in the topsides or affect the helicopter paths. The above vents shall also be located to prevent the potential for vented gas to set off gas alarms under adverse wind conditions or to ignite if routed within the vicinity of the flare.

All tanks provided with gas blanketing shall be protected against potential under or overpressure by means of individual Pressure Vacuum safety valves (PVSV) These valves shall be designed to provide protection in the scenario where the tank is isolated from the HC Blanket Gas Header and shall be sized to comply with the operational conditions of the protected tank and Classification Society requirements.

These PVSV’s shall also be designed to handle the vapour relief associated with the maximum tank loading rate and any overpressure / vacuum resulting from thermal effects. The outlets of these PVSV’s shall be routed and discharged at a safe location downwind of process modules.

9.3 Safety Requirements for FPSO Mooring System

9.3.1 General safety requirements for Mooring Arrangements Requirements of this section apply to spread moored systems and to internal turret or external turret mooring systems for FPSO station keeping.

At least two monitoring systems shall be provided to identify any abnormal excursion of the FPSO from the station. For this purpose the mooring lines tension and the GPS position shall be monitored to detect any abnormal offset of the FPSO and/or failure of one or more of the mooring line.

An Emergency Response and Evacuation Procedure shall be prepared to address the requirements resulting from failure of one or more of the mooring lines. In case of a single mooring line failure the production will be shut down by manual initiation The Emergency Procedure shall include remedial measures to be implemented, such as de-tensioning of the





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other mooring lines and summoning external support and inspection assistance. An evaluation shall be carried out with the Class representatives to determine cause of the failure and potential escalation of the failure.

As per the specification GS EP STR 661, a two mooring line broken condition shall be investigated for 1 year and 100 year storm conditions, in order to confirm the possibility to resume oil production with a damaged mooring system until the repair of the broken line is carried out. The production operations shall be re-started only if the risk to have multiple mooring line failure is found to be acceptable.

Also, the dynamic behaviour of a damaged system should be analysed to check that the maximum excursions are within the umbilical and riser limitations.

The effects of mooring line failures and /or adverse weather conditions, in terms of FPSO offset shall be addressed in the design of the risers suspended from the FPSO. The maximum FPSO offset excursion limits shall be determined based on the type of risers, proximity of the installations and other applicable site conditions to determine maximum FPSO excursion limits, for the following actions:

• Alarm and Manual production shutdown

• Automatic Shutdown of the production

An FMEA study, or an integrity analysis, of the FPSO moorings system shall be carried out in Detailed Engineering to assure system integrity and to identify the weak links to be rectified.

9.3.2 Specific Safety Issues for Spread Mooring Arrangements The FPSO is maintained on station by a spread system of four legs of semi-taut mooring lines. Mooring stations are located port and starboard at the stern and the bow respectively. Mooring chains shall be protected against a fire on the sea surface by locating chain stoppers below sea level.

The protection of the mooring chain shall be considered in relation to the risk of collision with tandem export tankers and supply boats.

9.3.3 Safety Issues for Turret Mooring Arrangements The following issues shall be addressed and resolved if an internal or external Turret mooring arrangement is to be used for the FPSO station keeping. In this case the hydrocarbon risers’ umbilicals will be routed through the internal moon pool of the Turret and connected to the FPSO through a swivel arrangement:

• The moon pool is an enclosed area that has a high number of potential leak sources in terms of flanges, valve, bends etc. An undetected hydrocarbon release which ignites within this area has the potential to result in a significant explosion. A 3D CFD explosion modeling shall be carried out to determine the consequences on this structural integrity of the FPSO vessel, taking into consideration the magnitude of the overpressure and the location of the moon pool area.

• Enclosed internal area of the turret shall be mechanically ventilated with air from an unclassified (safe) area.

• All areas of the Turret including the enclosed internal area of the turret shall be monitored by the Fire and Gas detection which shall initiate an automatic ESD1 shutdown of the FPSO in case of detection.





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• The inspection and maintenance facilities and escape routes for the internal areas of the moon pool shall comply with GS EP SAF 351.

• Each hydrocarbon riser shall have two ESD valves and the outboard ESD valve shall be located inside the Turret enclosed area accommodating the risers.

• The location and layouts of the turret shall be subject to safety reviews, risk assessments and approval by the COMPANY.

10. FPSO Safety Support Systems

10.1 Communications Systems Systems shall be provided to fulfil all external and internal offshore voice and data communications requirements onboard and around the FPSO (supply boats, shipping, helicopters) and for long distance voice and data communications with other installations and onshore bases. In addition, security surveillance data communications requirements onboard and around the FPSO shall be provided.

According to the Telecom Philosophy and GS EP SAF 371, the following systems shall be provided for the above communications and safety purposes:

• Long range communications

Optical fibres connection to the Offshore Optic Cable backbone

Satellite link for towing, hook-up, start-up and back-up communications

Sat phones and HF/MF for ultimate voice communications

GMDSS to comply with SOLAS regulation, including EPIRB, SART and VHF for lifeboats

• Local communications

Telephone network

UHF Radio trunk system with intrinsically safe hand-portable

IT and data network for files management, email, etc )

Telephone and IT services to remote units (rigs, supply boats, etc)

Third parties internet access

• Safety

Redundant PAGA, broadcasting both General Alarm and PAPA through loudspeakers and flashing beacons

CCTV

• Security

Access control system for dedicated areas (bunkerised offices, technical rooms)

Intrusion detection system

CCTV

Radar and AIS to allow target detection in a 24 Nm range





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Radar beacon

• Logistics

Electronic POB management system, including e-mustering function

Marine VHF

Air VHF

Non directional beacons

Meteo-ocean system

Vessels tracking system

• Marine operations

Redundant wired / radio communication link between the FPSO and the offloading buoy

Berthing aid system, including a portable unit when approaching the offloading tanker

ROV video transmission systems

DGPS and gyrocompass for FPSO positioning

10.2 Essential and Emergency Power

10.2.1 Essential power generation In addition to the FPSO main power generation system, essential service generators and their associated switchboards shall be sized to cover operating requirements for the subsea preservation systems and other systems designated as essential for FPSO operations.

The design of the Essential Power system shall comply with GS EP ELE 021.The Essential Power system shall be supplied by Diesel driven generator(s) located inside the hull machinery spaces. The loads supplied from the Essential services switchboard shall include:

• Ventilation fans serving the muster areas, radio room, UPS equipment room, Central Control Room, hospital, emergency switchgear rooms, stairs and elevator shafts.

• The ballast pumps.

• Diesel Transfer Pumps

10.2.2 Emergency Diesel power generation An Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Switchboard shall be located in a non hazardous location on or above the Hull deck. This Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Switchboard shall comply with the latest SOLAS Regulations and GS EP ELE 021. When the main power supply is lost, the EDG shall supply within 45 seconds and for 18 hours minimum the following loads required during emergency conditions:

• Auxiliaries required to start the essential Generators.

• Control and safety systems.

• Life support.

• Navaids.





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• Communications systems.

• Foam injection pumps.

• Enclosures of Fire Water Pumps.

• Control Panels of Fire Water Pumps.

• Emergency Lighting. In order to assure sufficient light in case of a loss of main power during night time, approximately 30% of the lighting shall remain in service.

10.2.3 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) When main power supply is lost, the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) shall ensure a continuous power supply to emergency users until the emergency generator starts.

If the emergency generator fails to start or trips while running, the UPS will supply power to the following systems for a minimum period of 90 minutes:

• Fire and Gas detection and protection systems

• Process control and shutdown systems

• Emergency Shutdown systems

• Essential (life support) services

Other essential UPS system consumers shall include:

Systems associated to means of escape

Helideck lighting panel, non-directional beacon, sea surface floodlights and embarkation stations

Telecommunication All telecommunications systems including VHF marine, VHF aeronautical, UHF network, satellite, but except GMDSS (dedicated UPS) and PAGA and POB (dedicated UPS).

Hospital Power outlets intended for medical equipment

Lighting • Light fittings to enable emergency management and evacuation activities for two hours and hospital lighting.

• Outside lighting shall be available for 90 minutes. • Evacuation route light fittings shall have individual batter back up to run or at least

90/120 minutes when outside/inside the LQ They shall be installed above principal doors, at corridor ends, at each stairway and alongside landings and at junctions to escape ways.

Navaids To be available for 96 hours according to SOLAS requirements

10.3 Navigation Aids FPSO markings and marine navigation aids shall conform to the requirements of the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities and IMO COLREG.

Navaids shall be located such that they can be maintained without scaffolding.

Marking and lighting of the helicopter landing area and aviation obstacles shall comply with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requirements.





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For warning a helicopter pilot in case of the presence of flammable gas (leakage or flare flame-out), the FPSO shall be equipped with a flashing beacon linked to the gas detection system and to flow sensors in the flare system.

The offloading buoy shall be marked at night by one or more flashing lights visible from all directions. An audible fog warning system shall also be provided.

11. Escape and Rescue

11.1 Escape Evacuation and Rescue

11.1.1 General Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) facilities on the FPSO shall be designed to comply with GS EP SAF 351. These facilities shall cater for the complete FPSO lifetime, including periods of:

• Construction, hook-up, pre-commissioning and start-up

• Drilling, simultaneous operations on wells and production

• Scheduled maintenance

• Presence of Flotel Accommodation unit

These periods will require additional persons on board and hence all manning scenarios must be addressed in the EER facilities design, including the maximum possible POB on board for the above maintenance campaigns.

EER analyses shall be carried out in the Basic Engineering phase to confirm the adequacy of the proposed EER facilities, and shall be developed and updated in Detailed Engineering.

A medical centre (sick bay) as per the requirements of GS EP MED 060 shall be provided in the Accommodation Block.

11.1.2 Escape Escape routes shall be provided to enable personnel to rapidly escape in critical situations from any part of the FPSO to the primary and secondary muster stations, and thereafter to the TEMPSC embarkation areas. One primary escape route to each muster station shall be available at all times, easily identified, and protected or segregated as far as possible from major hazards.

There shall be four main routes running the length of the FPSO from forward area to the aft area as follows:

• Port side on the Hull deck

• Starboard on the Hull deck

• Portside on the Process deck

• Starboard on the Process deck

In addition secondary routes shall run port to starboard. All deck levels shall be connected by multiple stairways.





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All spaces in the hull, such as tanks, cofferdams, double hull and other void spaces, shall be provided with at least two exits located with due consideration of the topsides risks.

Escape routes on the hull deck shall be at least 3 m from sources of release (vents, PV breakers, etc.) and with a non-slip surface. In areas where spillage might occur, self-draining grating or similar shall be provided.

Escape route signs and floor markings shall be provided along the escape routes to direct personnel to the primary and secondary muster stations.

The dimensions, design and the floor markings for escape and access routes shall be in accordance with the GS EP SAF 351.

Primary Muster Area Primary muster area shall be a designated room in the Accommodation Block. It may normally be used for other purposes, but the cumulative floor area must accommodate the maximum POB on the basis of 0.5 m² / person, taking into account the room furnishings space. It shall be equipped with reliable means of two-way communication with the control and radio rooms. Lifejackets for 120% of maximum POB shall be located in or adjacent to the muster room.

Evacuation routes from the Primary muster area to the lifeboats shall be located inside the Accommodation Block and sized for the rapid transfer of large numbers of personnel.

Alternative muster facilities shall also be provided, in the form of an external muster area on the main deck adjacent to the Accommodation, for incidents internal to the Accommodation Block.

Secondary Muster Area A secondary muster station shall be provided at the FPSO bow for people unable to reach the primary muster area. It shall be located in a shelter, suitably protected against explosion, smoke, fire, noise and thermal radiation from the flare for at least 60 minutes. It shall be designed for the capacity of the Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) at the forward end. This muster station shall be sized on the basis of 0.35 m² / person and equipped with reliable means of two-way communication with the control and radio rooms. Lifejackets, smoke hoods and/or escape BA sets for 120% of its design manning capacity shall be located in the shelter.

Escape routes leading from/to this shelter to the forward lifeboats shall be protected.

11.1.3 Evacuation of Personnel Evacuation facilities shall be designed to allow the safe evacuation of all personnel from the FPSO, irrespective of their location.

The primary method of evacuation shall the permanently stationed stand-by vessel, which is a COMPANY requirement. This stand-by vessel shall have capacity to accommodate the maximum POB of the FPSO.

Facilities shall be available for, helicopters to be used for medical evacuation of injured or sick personnel.

The secondary method of evacuation means shall be the freefall Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Crafts (TEMPSC), designed according to the SOLAS requirements.

Sufficient number of TEMPSC’s shall be provided to comply with the following arrangement:





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• Lifeboats station at stern: (i.e. N+1) freefall lifeboats where :

N = Maximum Persons On Board (POB) divided by the Capacity (C) of the lifeboat

• Secondary station at bow: One freefall lifeboat of capacity (C) that must be shielded from heat radiation, fire and blast if necessary.

All the TEMPSC’s shall be of the same and this capacity shall not exceed 60 Persons. The launching height shall be determined by the capacity of the TEMPSC’s.

The tertiary evacuation means shall comprise life rafts for at least 100% of the maximum POB, on each side of the FPSO. Davit-launched and throw-over life rafts (capacity: 20 persons each) shall be provided at each ends of the FPSO according to SOLAS. Access to throw-over life rafts and to the sea shall be by means of scramble nets.

11.1.4 Rescue The recovery of personnel, evacuated from the FPSO via the secondary or tertiary means, shall be primarily done by the stand-by vessel. The stand-by vessel shall have a capacity of at least 100% of the FPSO’s maximum POB, and shall be equipped to assist in emergencies such as evacuation, anti-pollution operations, fire fighting, man overboard, etc. Reference shall be made to section 6.1.2 of GS EP SAF 351 for a full summary of the required design features of the stand-by vessel.

In accordance with GS EP SAF 351, the stand-by vessel permanently located in the field shall be equipped with a fast rescue craft complying with SOLAS regulations. This craft shall be deployed for man overboard recovery.

In addition, a fast rescue craft (FRC), complete with the launching arrangement shall be located on the FPSO, near the Accommodation Block.

11.2 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment As a minimum, the following miscellaneous safety equipment shall be provided on the FPSO to comply with GS EP SAF 351 and latest SOLAS Requirements:

• Escape to Sea devices

• Life Jackets

• Lifebuoys

• Smoke Hoods

• Safety Showers

• Fireman’s Equipment

• Helicopter Crash Rescue Kit

• First Aid facilities and Stretchers

In addition, FPSO specific requirements given in this section shall apply.





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11.2.1 Lifejackets Lifejackets shall be provided throughout the installation as follows:

Primary muster point 120% maximum POB

Bow secondary muster shelter 120% maximum of shelter design capacity

For each freefall TEMPSC - 20% TEMPSC capacity at the embarkation

- 10% TEMPSC capacity stored onboard

For each davit-launched TEMPSC / forward life raft embarkation area

- 20% maximum secondary muster shelter capacity

- 10% of each TEMPSC capacity stored onboard

Intermediate life raft embarkation areas on each side of the FPSO 10% maximum POB

The life jackets shall be as per SOLAS requirements or offshore type 150, foul weather clothing.

11.2.2 Lifebuoys The number and locations of lifebuoys on the FPSO shall, as a minimum, be in accordance with SOLAS requirements. As a general principle, sufficient lifebuoys shall be provided such that the maximum distance to a lifebuoy on each deck shall be no greater than 30m.

11.2.3 Emergency Escape Breathing Devices A quantity of 2 off emergency escape breathing devices shall be located within the CCR and a minimum of 2 off devices shall be located at each level of the hull machinery spaces and near the chemicals tanks.

11.2.4 Stretchers Stretchers shall be included in the sick bay, in each muster areas and in the hull aft machinery space.

11.2.5 Firemen’s Equipment Dedicated fire crew changing room(s) shall be located within the Accommodation. to allow the fast and easy donning of fireman’s equipment.

11.2.6 11.2.6 First Aid facilities First aid facilities as per SOLAS 2001 requirements shall be provided throughout the FPSO and shall include all levels of the hull machinery spaces, the accommodation, the sick bay, the laboratory and in the utility areas of the process deck.





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12. Export Systems and Pipelines

12.1 Crude oil export system

12.1.1 General Oil is normally discharged from the FPSO tanks through Oil Offloading Lines (OOLs) to an Oil Offloading Terminal (OOT) which is a Single Point Mooring (SPM) or Caternary Anchor Leg Mooring buoy from where it is discharged to the export tanker via floating offloading hose(s). When not connected to a tanker the hose(s) will remain floating idle on the sea surface.

The offloading hose shall be fitted with a quick connect and disconnect (QCDC) coupling. On both sides of the hose, an isolation valve and a blind flange shall be provided to prevent oil release upon disconnection. The QCDC couplings shall be of double closure type, which means that they will close the flexible hoses at either side of the rupture point and thus minimise the oil spill.

Offloading operation system shall be controlled from the FPSO CCR. Emergency pushbuttons shall be provided in the CCR and at the offloading station for emergency stop of the crude offloading pumps and closure of the offloading ESDV on the FPSO.

An overpressure protection system on the SPM or CALM Buoy shall be provided to detect the sudden pressure raise caused by a surge and to send a signal to instantaneously stop the FPSO offloading pumps and close the SPM or CALM Buoy SDV. The SPM or CALM Buoy piping (including the swivel), shall be designed to withstand the full surge pressure.

A surge tank, sized for the worst case spill due to a surge, shall be provided on the SPM or CALM Buoy as protection arrangement.

In addition the requirement for a high integrity overpressure protection system (HIPS) shall be considered to ensure the necessary protection of the offloading system.

12.1.2 SPM or CALM Buoy Design SPM or CALM Buoy structure shall be designed to the requirements of GS EP STR 631. SPM or CALM Buoy structure shall be able to withstand the colliding kinetic energy, determined by vessel collision risk analysis based on the potential scenarios during the oil offloading operations. In addition, the internal areas of the SPM or CALM Buoy shall be divided into a series of watertight compartments whose size and number will allow the SPM or CALM Buoy to stay afloat and stable in case of accidental flooding. The watertight compartments shall be provided with sounding pipes in each compartment. A bilge pump system shall be provided to allow de-watering of compartments, if deemed necessary.

12.1.3 Buoy Operations An exclusion zone shall be defined around the FPSO floating facilities (FPSO and SPM or CALM Buoy). Traffic within the exclusion zone shall be under the control of a marine supervisor.

From arrival on site until departure, the tanker shall be controlled by assistance tugs connected at its bow and stern during approach and connection to the SPM or CALM Buoy.

During offloading, one or two assistance tugs shall maintain the hawser under tension and keep the tanker away from the SPM or CALM Buoy. Upon disconnection, the tanker shall still be escorted by the assistance tugs.





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To limit the risk of collisions between the export tankers and the SPM or CALM Buoy, an experienced pilot/berthing master shall assist, the tanker manoeuvres from arrival on field until departure. The pilot/berthing master shall be equipped with a portable unit with all necessary information including the following:

• Marine operations

• Relative positions of vessels, including tanker, tugs, FPSO and SPM or CALM Buoy

• Position, speed and heading of tanker

• Tension in hawsers

• Status of Quick Release Hawser (QRH)

• Offloading data at SPM or CALM Buoy including flow rate, pressure, volume of oil, etc

12.1.4 Tandem Offloading Provision for tandem oil offloading to a tanker as a back-up shall be included in the FPSO design. A dedicated safety review shall be performed in the Basic Engineering phase to evaluate:

• The risk of collision between the export tanker and FPSO, including its mooring chains.

• Impact of Flare radiation, gas dispersion and liquid carryover (‘golden rain’) on the off take tanker.

• Emergency shutdown of offloading facilities.

The safety arrangements for the tandem arrangements shall comply with the following:

• A fixed water deluge system covering the area of chain stoppers and hose couplings shall be provided. Air vent pipes to the forepeak tank should be located as far as practicable from areas where gas could be present.

• An emergency quick-release (QCDC) system shall be provided for the cargo hose and mooring systems.

• The hawser system of the off take tanker shall be provided with a tension meter continuously indicating the tension in the hawser system during the loading operation.

• An operation manual describing emergency procedures such as activation of the emergency quick release system and precautions in case of high tension in the hawser system shall be provided on board.

12.2 Gas Export The following issues and protective measures shall be addressed during the Engineering phases.

• Evaluation of all overpressure scenarios in the gas line from the FPSO to the Gas Export network to identify any additional over pressure protection required.

• Evaluation of the isolation requirements for the gas export line from the FPSO at the tie-in point to the gas export pipeline system.





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12.3 ESD and Alarm Interfaces The following interface actions between the FPSO, the offloading SPM or CALM Buoy and other installations shall be provided by the telecommunications systems:

• An ESD including confirmed fire or gas detection on the SPM or CALM Buoy shall initiate an alarm in the FPSO Central Control Room and initiate the shutdown of the oil export ESDV on FPSO following a time delay.

• An ESD including confirmed fire or gas detection on any of the installations feeding the common gas export shall initiate an alarm in the FPSO Central Control Room.

12.4 Interfaces with the Off take Tankers A control panel with the telemetry functions listed below shall be fitted in the FPSO CCR to interface with the telemetry system on the off take tanker. The control panel on the off take tanker is to be located in a central position, usually the bridge or the cargo control room on the off take tanker. These control panels shall have a green (pumping permit) light which shall be automatically turned on when all systems are ready. In addition the following shall be annunciated on these control panels

• ESD1 on the FPSO.

• Fire alarm for the FPSO and the tanker

• High hawser tension

• High-high hawser tension

• Cargo hose couplers open (quick release)

• Hydraulic pressure alarm

• Valves open

• Telemetry failure alarm

• Ready to pump (light)

An ESD1 on the FPSO shall initiate the following actions

• Oil export pumps stop (on the FPSO installation)

• FPSO Oil export riser ESDV close

• Cargo hose coupler disc-valve closes (at the ship/hose interface)

13. Simultaneous Operations

13.1 General Construction activities during development may be required to run simultaneously with Drilling activities. Drilling activities will also run simultaneously with production. These operations may require a FLOTEL in the field. Hazards associated with these and other simultaneous (SIMOPS) operations shall be identified and assessed.

The appropriate SIMOPS Procedures including protection measures, constraints and procedures shall then be adopted to minimise the associated risks.





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These SIMOPS Procedures shall apply to construction and other non routine marine activities carried out within the FPSO Restricted area, which is defined as all areas of the FPSO and inside the 500 meters exclusion zone around the FPSO.

13.2 Anchors of Vessels Anchor horizontal clearance between an anchor of a vessel in the field and the FPSO mooring lines should not be less than 150 m when the load would drag the anchor away from it and 250 m when the load would drag the anchor towards it. Lower clearances may be considered, subject to the COMPANY approval with the following considerations:

• Duration at location

• Prevailing weather direction and seasonal weather

• Other work locations and emergency stand-off location

• Type of soil conditions

• Anchor system and loading

• Planned movement of vessel both towards and away from structure

• Tidal and current variations

• Additional measures are implemented to prevent damage

13.3 Safety Distances Location for Drilling Rigs, Flotel and other vessels involved in simultaneous operations FPSO shall be subject to ensuring that the minimum safety distance between the FPSO and the subject vessel in the vicinity, as identified by a safety study is ensured. This safety distance is to ensure that the consequences of credible hazardous events on the FPSO shall not impact the subject vessel to the extent where their integrity could be put at risk.

In addition the impact of the subject vessel onto the FPSO (i.e. gas dispersion towards FPSO while performing a well clean up, or gas dispersion in a blowout scenario) shall be evaluated to determine the minimum safety distance.

14. Handling of Emergencies on Site

14.1 Principles All necessary emergency control facilities as defined in GS EP SAF 371 shall be provided on the FPSO.

An Emergency Response Plan for the FPSO shall be prepared and implemented. Emergency Response Plans for other offshore installations in the field shall be updated to cover the emergency response requirements and procedures for the FPSO.

14.2 Crisis Control Centre A Crisis Control Centre shall be provided on the FPSO, with the facilities to communicate with the Crisis Control Centre for offshore installations of the country.





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14.3 Mutual Help The provisions and arrangements for mutual help between the FPSO and other offshore installations in the vicinity, during an emergency affecting one or more of the installations shall be developed in the Engineering phases.

14.4 Security measures for the installation In accordance with COMPANY commitment to comply with the International Security of Ports and Ships (ISPS) Code, the relevant sections shall be applied to the FPSO. Detailed engineering shall develop specifications and management systems to ensure that the security system and associated security equipment of the FPSO is verifiable against section 19.1 of Part A of the ISPS code.

The FPSO shall comply with the applicable requirements of Chapter X1-2 of the International Convention of the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 as amended.

The installation shall be provided with a security plan and a security management room.

The following areas of the FPSO shall be specified as exclusion areas with restricted access:

• Area local to surveillance means (Radar, GPS etc)

• Control Rooms, ITT room, Radio room, E&I room

• Fire pump rooms

• Generator rooms

• Water treatment rooms

• Ventilation/Air Conditioning systems

• Spaces with access to equipment, pumps or manifolds

• Hull tanks access points (hatches, ports, piping)

• Cargo storage spaces (including access points)

• Spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances

• Mechanical handling equipment (cranes, rails)

• Access points to the FPSO (Boat landings, helideck landing area)

• Food storage areas

• Medical facilities

To ensure these spaces can be monitored, the FPSO shall be provided with the following security equipment as specified by ISPS requirements:

• Automatic Identification System (AIS) “Friend or Foe”

• Electronic access control systems/Electronic POB

• Radar surveillance systems

• CCTV

• Lighting Systems





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• Communications systems dedicated to security

• Gates

• Suitable lockable gates/hatches shall be provided at all boat landings.

• Spy Glasses

Spy glasses will be required for the doors for the Radio Room, Telecommunications Room and Control Room.

• Lockable Safe

Lockable safes will be required for the person responsible for Safety and Environment on Site (RSES) and the Port Facility Security Officer of the FPSO.

• Room Locks

Room locks shall be provided for the Radio Room, Telecommunication Room and Control Room (these shall be operable by swipe cards). To allow co-ordination of these systems the FPSO is provided with a dedicated security room.

15. Derogations The Derogations from COMPANY specifications that will need to be applied for as part of a FPSO Project have been identified and are given in the table below. If these derogation requests are found to be required for the Project FPSO then they must be actioned before the end of the Basic Engineering phase. Also it is anticipated that more Derogations may be required with the development of the design in the Basic Engineering phase.

Title Deviation Related CR/GS Flare System and Blanket Gas Recovery System

An actuated block valve is required in the flare system and because of the flare gas recovery system there is a need for inter connection between the HP and LP flare systems (both are connected to the flare gas recovery system). Both of these elements are contrary to the current TOTAL specifications.

GS-EP-ECP 103GS-EP-SAF 262

Flare Ignition System

Requirement for a closed flare system to allow a zero flaring system. The closed flare system requires a system of ignition unless there is a permanently lit pilot. To adopt a zero flaring policy a continuous pilot cannot be used. For this the FPSO need to adopt a palletised pyrotechnic ignition system.

GS-EP-SAF 262

Arrival Facilities HIPS

In common with most subsea tie-backs there is a requirement for an instrumented protection system for the hydrocarbon arrival facilities from the wells. In the event of the mal operation of a valve on the arrival facilities with a packed flowline upstream, the potential surge of fluids and pressure to the first stage separator will greatly exceed the relieving capacity. For this case it is required to have an instrumented system that will ensure the separator is isolated in the case of high upstream pressure.

GS-EP-SAF 260





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Title Deviation Related CR/GS Active Fire Protection

Process Fire zone Fire water demand management by the utilisation of sub deluge zones and selective deluging of these sub deluge zones. A derogation may be required if ESD valves are not installed on hydrocarbon lines crossing several sub deluge zones.

GS-EP-SAF 321 GS-EP-SAF 322

Active Fire Protection

A derogation to use one of the fire pumps for sea water service supply during the tow.



Increased firewater velocities in the firewater main above 3 meters per second may be required, to meet the maximum fire water demand



An increase in the Deluge control valves diameter above 8 inches may be required, to meet the maximum fire water demand





Appendix 1


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Appendix 1 Methodology

Methodology for defining selective deluging of the Sub Deluge Zones on a FPSO and rationalising the maximum firewater demand on FPSOs. 1) The following definitions of the Process Fire Zone / Sub Deluge Zones and Modules are used:

UtilitiesFZ

Process FZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone Sub Deluge Zone Module

UtilitiesFZ

Process FZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDVUtilitiesFZ

Process FZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone Sub Deluge Zone Module Figure 1 - Definitions

• Module – An individual sub structure / plant unit. Each module shall be supplied with its own deluge via a dedicated FW deluge valve.

• Sub Deluge Zone – A group of Modules (selected according to the location of the fire scenario) that shall be deluged simultaneously in the event of a specified fire scenario.

• Fire Zone – All modules / sub deluge zones forming the boundary of the Fire Zone. Within a Fire Zone an event (ref GS SAF 253) in any module shall not escalate beyond the Fire Zone boundary by virtue of the separation / segregation provided.

2) In order to limit the maximum firewater demand, the FPSO Process Fire Zone above the process deck may be split into a number of sub deluge zones. This arrangement is represented in figure 2 below, and the sub deluge zone is represented by all green shaded modules

UtilitiesFZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDVUtilitiesFZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Figure 2 – Sub Deluge Concept




Appendix 1


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In this case, depending on the location of the fire, the minimum number of modules requiring deluge, within the sub deluge zone, shall be as follows:

a) The Module on fire

b) Modules bordering the module on fire

3) It shall be demonstrated by Fire Risk Analysis that the consequences of any single module design basis fire - (GS EP SAF 253) - does not extend beyond the limit of the applied deluge. This demonstration is required to be performed on a module by module basis, see figure 3.

UtilitiesFZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

UtilitiesFZ

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Figure 3 – Consequences of fire in Module

4) Where a process line has potential to feed the module on fire – originating from outside of the sub deluge area – then ESDV isolation shall be fitted at the module boundary of such lines in addition to the existing equipment SDV. Note this only applies to liquid HC lines as it is assumed that gas process lines will be automatically depressurised via the EDP system. Process lines crossing modules within the sub deluge zones shall require SDV isolation only, in this case SDVs shall have the same valve body as ESDVs and specified as being spring return, fail closed, fire-safe valves, thus with actuator specification as for ESDVs.

This arrangement is represented in figure 4 below

UtilitiesFZ ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

SDV SDV

SDVSDV

SDVUtilitiesFZ ESDVESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

Fire Zone

ESDV

SDVSDV SDVSDV

SDVSDVSDVSDV

SDVSDV

Figure 4 – Isolation of Sub Fire / Deluge Zones with ESDV / SDV

5) A Fire Risk Assessment shall be carried out for each module, within the Fire Zone, to demonstrate that the risk of escalation beyond the adjacent module boundary is acceptable.

Note that for the case where additional ESDV is identified as a requirement, based on 4) above, but the Fire Risk Assessment demonstrates that the liquid HC line is of sufficiently low hazard to not significantly impact escalation - then it may be justifiable to provide SDV isolation (only).