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GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS COS-3-08 NOVEMBER 2021 SEMS AUDIT & CERTIFICATES SHARING INDUSTRY KNOWLEDGE GOOD PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS & REPORTING

GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

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GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

COS-3-08

NOVEMBER 2021

SEMS AUDIT & CERTIFICATES

SHARING INDUSTRYKNOWLEDGE

GOOD PRACTICEDEVELOPMENT

DATA COLLECTION,ANALYSIS & REPORTING

Copyright © 2021 American Petroleum Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY2.

SPECIAL NOTESAPI publications necessarily address issues of a general nature. With respect to particular circumstances, local, state, and federal laws and regulations should be reviewed. The use of API publications is voluntary. In some cases, third parties or authorities having jurisdiction may choose to incorporate API publications by reference and may mandate compliance.

Neither API nor any of API’s employees, subcontractors, consultants, committees, or other assignees make any warranty or representation, either express or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained herein, or assume any liability or responsibility for any use, or the results of such use, of any information or process disclosed in this publication. Neither API nor any of API’s employees, subcontractors, consultants, or other assignees represent that use of this publication would not infringe upon privately owned rights.

Users of this standard should not rely exclusively on the information contained in this document. Work sites and equipment operations may differ. Users are solely responsible for assessing their specific equipment and premises in determining the appropriateness of applying the guidance. At all times users should employ sound business, scientific, engineering, and judgment safety when using this guidance.

API is not undertaking to meet the duties of employers, manufacturers, or suppliers to warn and properly train and equip their employees, and others exposed, concerning health and safety risks and precautions, nor undertaking their obligations to comply with authorities having jurisdiction.

API publications may be used by anyone desiring to do so. Every effort has been made by the Institute to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in them; however, the Institute makes no representation, warranty, or guarantee in connection with this publication and hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility for loss or damage resulting from its use or for the violation of any authorities having jurisdiction with which this publication may conflict.

API publications are published to facilitate the broad availability of proven, sound engineering and operating practices. These publications are not intended to obviate the need for applying sound engineering judgment regarding when and where these publications should be utilized. The formulation and publication of API publications is not intended in any way to inhibit anyone from using any other practices.

TABLE OF CONTENTS1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2. SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3. DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

4. INFORMATIVE REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

5. PURPOSE AND APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

6. APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

7. BARRIER OWNERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

8. BARRIER INFORMATION AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

9. BARRIER VERIFICATION METHODOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

10. BARRIER VERIFICATION FREQUENCY AND SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

11. KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS OF VERIFICATION PERSONNEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

12. VERIFICATION RESULTS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Resultsofbarrierverification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Communicationofbarrierverificationresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Respondingtoverificationresults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

13. APPENDIX – EXAMPLES AND SEMS ELEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Examplecases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Examplesofbarriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

SEMSElementsfromAPI RP 75, 4th Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS 3.

4. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

1. INTRODUCTIONFortheoffshoreoilandgasindustry,noobjectiveismoreimportantthansafeoperation.Effectivebarriersareessentialtothepreventionofmajorincidents.Barriersprotecttheoffshoreworkforceaswellastheenvironmentandassets.Most,ifnotall,majorincidentsinvolveafailureofoneormoreofthesebarriers,eitherduetoinadequatedesign,fabrication,installation,maintenance,inspection,testing,oractivation.Failurescanbeduetoalackofknowledgeofthepurposeandfunctionofabarrieranditsimportanceinthesequenceofamajorincidentscenario.Thisemphasizestheimportanceofconfirmingthatbarriersareperformingorwillperformtheirintendedfunctionondemand.This‘verification’isthesubjectofthisdocumentwhichprovidesguidancetohelpcompaniesverifythattheirexistingbarriershaveintegrityandareorwillbeeffective.

Thisdocumentisnotintendedtosupersedeanyapplicableregulatoryrequirements.

2. SCOPEAPIRecommendedPractice(RP)75,4thEdition,Safety and Environmental Management System for Offshore Operations and Assets,statesinitsRiskAssessmentandRiskControlselementthatacompanyshouldidentifyhazards,assessrisk,anddetermineandimplementRiskControlsforitsassets,activities,andtasks.ARiskControlistheactions,equipment,oradministrativemeasurestobeestablished,implemented,ormaintainedtoeliminate,reduce,ormitigatetherisk.SafeguardisanothertermusedbyindustryandisgenerallyinterchangeablewithRiskControl.BarriersareasubsetofRiskControlswithspecificcharacteristics:

• CAPABLE–canfullypreventtheunintendedeventoreffectivelymitigatethespecifiedundesiredconsequence(s)

• INDEPENDENT–canfunctionindependentoftheinitiatingeventandthedesignoroperationofanyotherBarriers

• VERIFIABLE-evidenceexiststhatthebarrierisreal,present,andwillfunctionasintended

Thisdocumentfocusesontheactivityofverifyingthatexistingbarriersthatareintendedformajorincidentpreventionandmitigationhaveintegrityandareorwillbeeffective.Itincludesbothhumanandhardwarebarriers,bothpreventiveandmitigative.Existingmeansthatthebarrierisinserviceoristobetakenoutofserviceformaintenance,inspection,ortesting.Thisdocumentdoesnotfocusontheotherstagesofthebarrierlifecycle:design,fabrication,installation,commissioning,operation,ordecommissioning(See Figure 1).

Whilethefocusofthisdocumentisonpreventingormitigatingmajorincidents,itsprinciplescanalsobeappliedtopreventingormitigatinglesssevereincidents.Eachcompanyshoulddeterminehowtobestapplytheguidance.

Theprimaryaudienceforthisdocumentisoilandgasindustrypersonnelwhohaveresponsibilitytoverifybarriersoffshoreandthosewhoestablishverificationmethodologies.Thisincludes(butisnotlimitedto)fieldandofficeengineers,linemanagement,andpersonnelwhocoordinateandoverseeSafetyandEnvironmentalManagementSystem(SEMS)componentsrelatedtobarriers.Whilenotinscopeforthisdocument,itisrecognizedthattherearenumerousSEMSprogramsandpracticesthatunderpintheeffectivenessofexistingbarriers.Theseincludebutarenotlimitedtoshifthandover,routineinspections,personnelcompetence,safetyculture,contractorinterface,etc.

5. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

3. DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMSTermsnotdefinedinthissectionshouldbeassumedtohavethecommondictionarydefinition.

DEFINITIONS ASSET (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Theequipment(individualitemsorintegratedsystems)orsoftwareusedoffshore.

BARRIER -ABarrierisaRiskControlthatmeetsallthefollowingcriteria:

a. Capable–canfullypreventtheunintendedeventoreffectivelymitigatethespecifiedundesiredconsequence(s)

b. Independent–canfunctionindependentoftheinitiatingeventandthedesignoroperationofanyotherBarriers

c. Verifiable-evidenceexiststhatthebarrierisreal,present,andwillfunctionasintended.

EFFECTIVE (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Theextenttowhichthedesiredresultoroutcomeisachieved.

HARDWARE BARRIERS (IOGP Report 544)-Primarycontainment,processequipment,andengineeredsystemsdesignedandmanagedtopreventLOPCandothertypesofassetintegrityorprocesssafetyeventsandmitigateanypotentialconsequencesofsuchevents.Thesearecheckedandmaintainedbypeople(incriticalactivity/tasks).

HAZARD (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Anobject,physicaleffect,orconditionwiththepotentialtoharmpeople,theenvironment,orproperty.

HUMAN BARRIERS (IOGP Report 544)-BarriersthatrelyontheactionsofpeoplecapableofcarryingoutactivitiesdesignedtopreventLOPCandothertypesofassetintegrityorprocesssafetyeventsandmitigateanypotentialconsequencesofsuchevents.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Systematicapplicationofknowledgeandlearningstoimprovemanagementsystemsandtheinteractionsofindividualswitheachother,equipment,andsystemsasanenablerofsafetyandenvironmentalperformance.

INTERFACE AGREEMENT (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-AgreementthatprovidesclarityonwhichSEMSpolicies,processes,practices,orprocedureswillbefollowedfortheperformanceofwork.

KNOWLEDGE (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Aperson’sunderstandingoftherequirementsneededtoperformaroleorfulfillanactivity.

MAJOR INCIDENT (IOGP 456)-Hazardouseventthatresultsin:

a. multiplefatalitiesorsevereinjuries,or

b. extensivedamagetostructure,installation,orplant,or

c. large-scaleimpactontheenvironment(e.g.,persistentandsevereenvironmentaldamagethatcanleadtolossofcommercialorrecreationaluse,lossofnaturalresourcesoverawideareaorsevereenvironmentaldamagethatwillrequireextensivemeasurestorestorebeneficialusesoftheenvironment).

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA (IOGP Report 6.36/210)-Performancecriteriadescribethemeasurablestandardssetbycompanymanagementtowhichanactivityorsystemelementistoperform.

6. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

PROCEDURE (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Approvedanddocumentedinstructionsaboutaspecifictaskoractivitythatisusedtoenablethesafeandconsistentexecutionofthattaskoractivity.

RISK (IOGP Report 6.36/210)-Theproductofthechancethataspecifiedundesiredeventwilloccurandtheseverityoftheconsequencesoftheevent.

RISK ASSESSMENT (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Anactofidentifyinghazards,evaluatingtherisksposedbythehazards,includingthepotentialconsequencesandlikelihoodofsuchconsequences,andidentifyingriskcontrols.

RISK CONTROL (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Theactions(humanorotherwise),equipment,oradministrativemeasurestobeestablished,implemented,ormaintainedtoeliminate,reduce,ormitigatetheidentifiedsafetyandenvironmentalrisks,includingrisksfromtheinteractionsofindividualswitheachother,equipment,processes,andsystems.

ROLE (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Afunctionassignedtoaperson.

SKILL (API RP 75, 4th Edition)-Aperson’sabilitytoapplyknowledgeanddemonstrateproficiencyinperformingaroleorwork.

ACRONYMS API RP 75 –AmericanPetroleumInstituteRecommendedPractice75

COS VEB WG –CenterforOffshoreSafetyVerifyingExistingBarriersWorkGroup

BOP –BlowoutPreventer

LOPC–LossofPrimaryContainment

OEM–OriginalEquipmentManufacturer

OIM–OffshoreInstallationManager

P&ID–PipingandInstrumentationDiagram

SEMS–SafetyandEnvironmentalManagementSystems

7. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

4. INFORMATIVE REFERENCES

API RP 75, 4th Edition–SafetyandEnvironmentalManagementSystemforOffshoreOperationsandAssets(2019)

Bow Ties in Risk Management (CCPS),Chapter6–BarrierManagementProgram(2018)

IOGP Report 544–StandardizationofBarrierDefinitions(2016)

PSA 29.01.2013–PrinciplesforBarrierManagementinthePetroleumIndustry(2013)

API RP 14C, 8th Edition (2017)

5. PURPOSE AND APPLICATION

Thepurposeofthisdocumentistohelpcompaniespreventormitigatemajorincidentsbyverifyingtheintegrityandeffectivenessofexistingbarriers.Itisintendedtobeusedaspartofthedevelopmentand/orimprovementofacompany’sSEMS.

Figure1showsthelifecycleofatypicalbarrier.Asindicatedinpurple,theareaofverifyingexistingbarriersisoneofmanyaspectsoftheoveralllifecycleofabarrier.EachoftheaspectslistedunderVerificationareaddressedinthisdocument.

8. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS8.

6. APPROACH ThisdocumentisalignedwithAPI RP 75, 4th EditionandisintendedtosupportcompaniesastheyimplementSEMS.ThefollowingisapartiallistoftopicswithinthisdocumentandhowtheylinktoSEMS(APIRP75).

• BarrierinformationlinkstotheSEMSInformationelement

• BarrierownershiplinkstotheLeadershipandSEMSInterfaceManagementelements

• BarrierinspectionsandtestinglinkstotheProceduresandAssetDesignandIntegrityelements

• CertainmitigativebarrierslinktotheEmergencyPreparednessandResponseelement

• BarrierverificationlinkstotheEvaluationandImprovementandtheKnowledgeandSkillselements

• Compromised,defective,ordegradedbarrierslinktotheRiskAssessmentandRiskControlselement

ThisdocumentassumesthatthecompanyhasdefinedandidentifieditsbarriersaccordingtotheirSEMSandthattherewillbesomevariabilitybetweencompaniesinthenumberandtypeofbarriers.Withthoseassumptions,thedocumentisintendedtohelpthecompaniessystematicallyandreliablyverifytheintegrityandeffectivenessofthoseexistingbarriers.

The following is a partial list of human and hardware barriers for illustrative purposes. A more extensive list is provided in the appendix.

• HARDWARE BARRIERS

Preventive

•Pressuresafetyvalve

•Blowoutpreventer

•Safetyinstrumented systems

Mitigative

•Fireandgasdetector

•Ignitioncontrols

•Firefightingequipment

•Lifeboat

• HUMAN BARRIERS

Preventive

•Followinganoperating, maintenance,inspection,ortestingprocedure

•Activatingablowoutpreventer

•Respondingtoanalarm

Mitigative

•Firefighting

•Mustering

•Decisiontoabandon

•Deployingalifeboat

9. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS 9.

7. BARRIER OWNERSHIP Eachbarriershouldhaveadesignatedowner.Theownershouldhavetheabilitytoactivelymonitorthebarrierandtheauthoritytotakeactiontoaddressanydeficiencies(e.g.,sitesupervisor).Theownerisresponsibleforunderstandingtheroleofthebarrierinpreventingormitigatingamajorincident,forregularlymonitoringtheintegrityandeffectivenessofthebarrier,andforengaginglinemanagementtoaddressanydeficiencies.Thebarrierowner isnotnecessarilytheOffshoreInstallationManager(OIM),althoughtheOIMdoeshaveultimateworkauthorityfor thefacility.

Thebarrierownerand/ordelegate(s)shouldverifythatbarrierintegrityandeffectivenessisconsistentwiththeperformancecriteriaspecificforthatbarrier(e.g.,testing,routinesurveillance/inspections,verificationofhumanperformancefactors,etc.).Whenpersonneldiscoverthatabarrierdoesnotmeettheperformancecriteria,thebarrierownershouldbenotifiedimmediately.Thisdiscoverycouldbemadebyanemployee,apartner,oracontractor,soit’simportantthatallentitiesunderstandtheneedandmechanismtonotifythebarrierowner.

8. BARRIER INFORMATION AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIAForbarriersthatalreadyexist,thereshouldbeinformationavailabletoandaccessiblebypersonnelwhohaveownershipandresponsibilityfortheprocessofverifyingthatthebarriersareeffectiveorwillbeeffectiveondemand.ThisinformationisgeneratedorobtainedthroughmanyoftheelementsoftheSEMSandshouldinclude:

• Documentationontheroleorfunctionofthebarrieranditsrelationshiptootherbarriersinagivenincident scenario

• Documentationonhowthebarrierpreventsormitigatesathreatorconsequencewithintheincidentscenario

• Documentationonthesystemsthebarrierdependsontofunction

• Documentationonhowthebarrierisoperatedoractivatedanditsoperatinglimits,includinginterfaceswith peopleandtheperformancecriteria

• Documentationonbarriermaintenanceprocedures

• Documentationonhowtorespondifthebarrieris:

Compromised, defective, or degraded

Placed out of service

Changed

Bypassed

10. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

• Documentationonthehistoryofthebarrier,bothgeneralregardingthebarriertype,andspecific,meaning thisexactbarrier,suchaslearningsfromfailuresandmanagementofbarrierchanges

• Interfaceagreementswhichmaydefinethesourceonmuchofthedocumentationabove

The information above is essential to the personnel responsible for barrier verification. Of particular importance is the role of the performance criteria. The performance criteria should include:

• Theessentialactionoractivitythebarrierisexpectedtoperformwithacertaincapacityandeffectiveness (e.g.,operatorexpertise,bubble-tightvalveclosure)

• Availabilityofthebarrierwhenneeded(e.g.,reliability,survivability)

• Thebarrier’sabilitytofunctionunderrelevantincidentscenariosandloads(e.g.,loadresistance,robustness)

• Thebarrier’sfailure/acceptancecriteria(e.g.,corrosionallowance,industrycodes,companystandards, regulatoryrequirements)

Forahardwarebarrier,theperformancecriteriacanincludeitemssuchasintegritystatus(e.g.,acceptablepiping wallthickness),maintenance(e.g.,lastscheduledPMperformedperschedule),andavailability(e.g.,reliefvalveincorrectposition).

Forahumanbarrier,theperformancecriteriacanincludeitemssuchastraining(e.g.,proceduretrainingcompletedontime),collectivecompetency(e.g.,sufficientskillsonthefacility),independentverification(e.g.,supervisorpresentduringcriticaltask),andEmergencyResponsedrillcompletion(e.g.,executedonscheduleandperplan).

9. BARRIER VERIFICATION METHODOLOGIESOncethebarrierinformationandperformancecriteriaareestablished,barrierverificationcanbeperformed.Thecurrentstatusofeachbarriershouldbeevaluatedagainstitscorrespondingperformancecriteria.Theperformancecriteriashouldbedocumentedinawaythatenablesclearandstraightforwardverification.

Barrierverificationcanbeachievedthroughavarietyofmethodologies,someofwhicharedescribedbelow.Eachcompanyshouldusearisk-basedapproachtodeterminetheoptimalmethodforverifyingitsexistingbarriers.Learningsovertimemayleadtoadjustmentstotheapproach.

Somebarrierscanbeverifiedbydirecthumanobservation.Anexamplewouldbeanindividualonroundsmakingaweeklycheckthataspecificreliefvalveisintheopenpositionandcarsealedopen.ItwouldnotbesufficientonlytorelyontheP&IDtoverifythatthevalveisavailable.Anotherexamplewouldbeasupervisorbeingpresentandoverseeingacriticalstepinaprocedurebeingperformed.Whiletheindividualmighthavethesufficientknowledgeandskills,independentverificationprovidesamethodtoreducethelikelihoodofhumanerrorduringthecriticalstep.

Anotherverificationmethodispreventativemaintenance,inspection,andtesting.Examplesincludefirewaterpumpmaintenance,blastwallstructuralinspection,andBOPpressureandfunctiontests.Whentheseactivitiesareperformedontimeandperprocedure,itprovidesverificationthathardwarebarriershaveintegrityandareexpectedtoperformasintended.

11. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

Otherbarrierscanbeverifiedbymonitoring.Forexample,thefluidcolumncanbemonitoredduringwellinterventionactivity.Barrierverificationcanoccurbothinthefieldandintheoffice,whicheverismostappropriate.

SEMSauditsmayalsoserveasamethodtosurveythemanagementsystemelementsrelatedtomaintainingbarriers,aswellashowthemanagementsystemissupportingbarrierhealthoverall.

10. BARRIER VERIFICATION FREQUENCY AND SCHEDULEThefrequencyofverificationwillbespecifictoeachparticularbarrier.Thesefrequenciesshouldbeestablishedbysubjectmatterexpertsandapprovedbymanagement,andconsiderOEMrecommendationsandindustrystandards,asapplicable.Frequencyschedulesshouldalsocomplywithapplicableregulatoryrequirements.Thisappliestobothhardwareandhumanbarriers.Thesefrequenciesshouldbebasedonriskandmayvaryfrompre-use,daily,weekly,monthly,yearly,ormulti-year.

Atypicalworkteamfacesongoingchallengestocompletetasksrelatedtomaintenance,inspection,testing,andongoingoperations.Scheduledplansareroutinelyrationalizedandadjusted,andworkreprioritizationisaregularoccurrence.Whenasite’sschedulebecomeschallenged,itisnormaltoextendtargetdatesfortheseplannedactivities.However,giventheimportanceofbarriersinpreventingormitigatingmajorincidents,siteleadershipshouldprioritizebarrierverificationactivitiesaccordingly.Priortobarrierverificationbeingdeferredfromtheestablishedschedule,thebarrierownershouldbeinformedtodetermineifariskassessmentisneededandwhethertheoperationshouldcontinuewiththedeferral.

11. KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS OF VERIFICATION PERSONNEL Verificationofexistingbarriersshouldbeperformedbypersonnelwiththeappropriateknowledgeandskillstoverifywhetherthebarrierismeetingperformancecriteriaoriftherearedeficiencies.Thepersonnelverifyingbarriersshouldunderstandthebasicintentofthebarrier,thefunctionofthebarrier,anditsroleintheoverallbarrierstrategy.Forexample,ifthebarriertobeverifiedisareliefvalve,theverifiershouldhaveknowledgeofhowthevalveworks,whatresultsoccurwhenthevalveisactivated,andtheconsequencesofvalvefailure.Inaddition,theverifiershouldbefamiliarwithperformancecriteriaassociatedwiththisvalve.

Inmostcases,personnelwiththerequiredknowledgeandskillstoverifyexistingbarriersareavailablewithinthecompany.Insomecases,theremaybeaneedtoenhanceanindividual’sskillsandknowledgetoenablecompletionofarequiredverification.Thecompanyisresponsiblefordeterminingtheappropriateknowledgeandskillsrequiredforeachverificationactivity,identifyingandtrainingtheindividual(s)whowillconductthoseverifications,andassuringtheappropriatelevelofknowledgeandskillsismaintained.

12. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERSCENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY

12. VERIFICATION RESULTS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESPONSEAftertheverificationactivityhasoccurred,theresultsshouldinitiatefollow-upcommunicationandresponse.

RESULTS OF BARRIER VERIFICATIONVerification results typically indicate one of the following:

1. Barriermeetsperformancecriteria

2. Barrieriscompromised,defective,ordegraded

3. Barrierisoutofservice

4. Barrierisbypassed

Resultsshouldbedocumentedtoenablecommunicationtothebarrierownerandanyotherappropriatepersonnel,aswellasstewardshipofanyactionitems.

Ifabarrierdoesnotmeetperformancecriteria,theremaybedegreesofdeviationthatintroducevaryinglevelsofrisk(e.g.,scheduledmaintenanceoverduevs.criticalsafetyvalveinoperable).Thetimingofcommunicationandresponseactivitiescanbeestablishedbasedontheassociatedrisk.

COMMUNICATION OF BARRIER VERIFICATION RESULTSStopWorkAuthorityshouldbeappliedforanyinstancewhereverificationresultspresentanimminentrisk.

Verificationresultsthatdonotmeetperformancecriteriashouldbepromptlycommunicatedtothedesignatedbarrierownerandtomanagementtodeterminetheneedforanyfollow-upactionsandthecorrespondingurgencytoaddressthem.

VerificationresultsthatmeetperformancecriteriashouldbecommunicatedtothebarrierownerandtomanagementonaregularbasisasagreedbymanagementtoprovideinsighttotheongoingperformanceofSEMSasrelatedtoverifyingeffectivebarriers.

Managementshouldestablishcriteriaforusingthecollectiveverificationresultstoinformfutureverificationschedulesandactivities.

Criteriaforcommunicationofbarrierverificationresultsbeyondthebarrierowner,asneeded,shouldbeestablishedandimplemented.

RESPONDING TO VERIFICATION RESULTSForverificationresultsthatdonotmeetperformancecriteria,thebarrierownershouldworkwiththeappropriatetechnical,operations,andmanagementrepresentativestodetermineactionitemstoaddressanygaps.Actionitemsshouldbeassignedtoaresponsiblepersonandthenstewardedtoclosure,atwhichpointthebarrierwillmeetthe

13. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

performancecriteria.

Verification results should be evaluated for opportunities to improve applicable documents, processes, and programs, such as:

1. Riskmanagement

2. Barrierstrategy

3. Barrierdesign

4. Barrierinformationandperformancestandard

Forbarriersthatarenotreadilyabletobebroughtintolinewiththeperformancecriteria,ariskassessmentshouldbeperformedtodetermineiffurtheractionisappropriate.

Managementshouldperiodicallyanalyzeverificationresultstorespondtopotentialindicationsofrisk.

13. APPENDIX – EXAMPLES AND SEMS ELEMENTS

EXAMPLE CASESEXAMPLE CASE #1 (HARDWARE BARRIER): SHUTDOWN VALVE ACTUATOR FAILURE

Onahypotheticaloffshoreplatform,SDV-123isaboardingvalve(firstvalveon)andisconsideredanexistingbarrierforthefacility.Inthecaseofalossofcontainmentontheplatform,itsfunctionistoisolatetheinventoryofhydrocarbonsfeedingtheprocess.

ThemaintenancesupervisorontheplatformhasbeenassignedastheownerforSDV-123.Heunderstandstheimportanceofthevalveandregularlymonitorsitsstatus.TheperformancecriteriaforSDV-123includescompletingpreventativemaintenanceandfunctiontestingaccordingtotheCompany’sSEMS.Asthebarrierowner,themaintenancesupervisorcheckedtherecordstoverifythatthepreventativemaintenanceforSDV-123wascompletedonscheduleandthatthemostrecenttestwassuccessful.Becausethemaintenancesupervisorhassharedthedocumentedperformancecriteriawiththecrewandreinforcedthedetailsthroughregularcommunications,theyhavebeeninstructedtoinformhimofanycircumstanceswhentheperformancecriteriaforSDV-123isnotbeingmet.Themaintenancesupervisorperiodicallyreviewstheperformancecriteriawiththecrewtoreinforcetheirunderstanding.

However,duringaplannedshutdown,theactuatorforSDV-123fails,renderingthevalveunavailabletoperformitsfunction.Thetechnicianwhoidentifiedthefailureimmediatelynotifiesthemaintenancesupervisorsinceheisthebarrierowner.ThemaintenancesupervisorimmediatelyconferswiththeOIM,andtheOIMnotifiestheassetmanager.SincetheperformancecriteriaforSDV-123includesavailabilitytofunctionondemand,theydecidetopostponestart-upoftheplatformuntilthesituationcanberesolved.TheypromptlyorderareplacementactuatorfromshoreandtheOIMrequestsariskassessmenttohelpdetermineifthereisanoptiontostartupsafelyintheinterimuntilthereplacementactuatorcouldbedeliveredandinstalledinafewdays.

14. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

Followingtheriskassessment,theassetmanagerdeterminesthattheplatformcansafelyberestartedwithinterimmitigationsinplace.AlternativebarriersareprovidedbytwofunctioningSDVsdownstreamofSDV-123,andtheteamconfirmsthattheconditionofthepipingdownstreamofSDV-123isadequate.Regularrounds/surveillanceattheaffectedareaareincreased.Communicationprotocolbetweentherelevantplatformteamsareupgradedandtested.Theteamalsolimitscargooff-loadingto/fromtheplatformtomust-doitemsonlyuntilSDV-123canberestored.Anycriticalliftrequirementduringthisperiodwillbeescalatedtotheassetmanagerforapproval.Allotherrelatedbarriersareevaluatedanddeemedtobeacceptable.

TheOIMwidelycommunicatesthestatusandplanstopersonnelontheplatform.

Theassetmanagerinformstheassetleadershipteamofthesituationandthedecisiontostartupwithinterimmitigationsuntiltheactuatorcanbereplaced.

EXAMPLE CASE #2 (HUMAN BARRIER): SHUTTING IN A WELL UPON INFLUX BELOW BOP

Onahypotheticaloffshoredrillingrig,certainactionstakenbytheDrillerareconsideredtobeabarriertopreventingasurfaceblowout.IntheeventofaninfluxbelowtheBOP,theDrillermustrespondbyshuttinginthewelltopreventuncontrolledhydrocarbonreleasetotherigfloor.ThisactionbytheDrillerisconsideredahumanbarrier.

The Company established the following performance criteria for the barrier of shutting in the well:

• Wheneverflowisdetected,theDrilleristoself-initiateshut-inofthewellwithoutanyfurtherapproval

• Allpersonnelauthorizedtoactivatethesystemareincludedinthedrillsandtrainedtooperatethewellshut-in system.

• Wellcontroldrillsareconductedtoensurethatdrillingpersonnelcanshut-inthewellintheshortesttime possible.Thedrillsareheldatleastweeklywitheachcrew.Theresultsofdrillsareassessedandrecordedin thedailydrillingreports.

• Detailedrigandwell-specificshut-inproceduresaredevelopedandpostedontherigfloor.Thisprocedureis practicedduringdrills,soallcrewmembersknowtheirrolesandresponsibilities.

TheCompanyhasassignedtheWellsSupervisortobethebarrierowner.Assuch,sheregularlychecksontheperformancecriteriatoensurethattheyarebeingmet.Sheknowsthatifanyoftheperformancecriteriaarenotbeingmetsheneedstoengagetheassetleadershiptodetermineifoperationsshouldcontinue,ifariskassessmentshouldbeperformed,and/orifadditionalinterimbarriersshouldbeestablished.

Some of the activities undertaken by the Wells Supervisor to confirm barrier status include:

• checkingdrillrecordstoverifythattheyareoccurringweeklyandthattheappropriatedrillingpersonnelare includedindrills

• periodicallywalkingtherigfloortoverifythattheshut-inproceduresareclearlyposted

• conversingwiththedrillerstoverifythattheyunderstandtheirroleasahumanbarrierforthisscenario

15. CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY COS-3-08(FirstEdition)GUIDANCE FOR VERIFYING EXISTING BARRIERS

EXAMPLES OF BARRIERSTheseexamplesareprovidedasreferenceandarenotintendedtobeallinclusive.

EXAMPLES OF HARDWARE BARRIERS

• Subsurfacesafetyvalve

• Surfacesafetyvalve

• Underwatersafetyvalve

• Pipelineisolationvalve

• Boardingshutdownvalve

• HIPPS(surfaceandsubsea)

• ESD

• Ventedgasdetectionsystem

• Pressuresafety/reliefvalves/blowdown systems

• SurfacegasliftSDV

• Firedetection

• Surfaceandsubseablowoutpreventer

• DiverterwhenusedwithsurfaceBOPriser

• Snubbingunitpressurecontrolsystem

• CoiledTubingpressurecontrolsystem

• Wirelinepressurecontrolsystem

• Logicsolver(orothersoftwarethatsupports hardwarebarriers)

• Lifeboats/TEMPSCs

• Stationkeepingsystems

• Emergencydisconnectsystems

EXAMPLES OF HUMAN BARRIERS

• Actionstoactivateahardwarebarrier,for example:

BOP

ESD

EDS(EmergencyDisconnectSystem)

• Responsetoprocessalarmsandupset conditions(e.g.,outsidesafeenvelope)

• Responsetoemergencies(e.g.,decisionto abandonfacility)

• Competencytoperformacriticaltask,for example:

Breakingcontainment

Energyisolation

Performingacriticalliftoverliveprocess equipment

• Operatinginaccordancewithprocedures (performingcriticalstepsintheprocedure)

SEMS ELEMENTS FROM API RP 75, 4TH EDITION• Leadership

• ManagingInterfaces

• RiskAssessmentandRiskControls

• Procedures

• SafeWorkManagementandSafeWorkControls

• KnowledgeandSkills

• AssetDesignandIntegrity

• ManagementofChange

• Pre-StartupReview

• EmergencyPreparednessandResponse

• IncidentInvestigationandLearning

• EvaluationandImprovement

• SEMSInformation

Copyright 2021 – Center for Offshore Safety, all rights reserved. Center for Offshore Safety and the COS logo are either trademarks or registered trademarks of the Center for Offshore Safety in the United States and/or other countries. API Global Marketing and Communications: 2021-076 | 09.13 | PDF

CENTER FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY