International Phenomenological Society
Gelb-Goldstein's Concept of "Concrete" and "Categorial" Attitude
and the Phenomenology of Ideation Author(s): Aron Gurwitsch Source:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Dec.,
1949), pp. 172-196 Published by: International Phenomenological
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GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF "CONCRETE" AND "CATEGORIAL" ATTITUDE
AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF IDEATIONWRITTEN IN HONOR OF KURT
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER AND THE FRIEND, ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 70TH
BIRTHDAY, NOVEMBER 6,
1948
Husserl's theoryof universalsas generalobjects and specificideal
entitieshas very soon acquired widespreadnotoriety not,
however,without too often being grossly misinterpreted and
misrepresented, partly on account of the not veryfortunately
chosentermof "intuitionof essences" ("Wesenserschauung").When
Husserl establishedhis theoryof ideation timein
LogischeUntersuchungen, hardlywentbeyondassertforthe first he ing
the specificnature and irreducibility those acts throughwhich of
universalsin contradistinction particularthingsare meant and
appreto hended and, correspondingly, the specific also natureand
irreducibility of the objects apprehendedthroughthe acts in
question. For this purpose, in Husserl had to engage himself a
thoroughgoing analysis and discussion of the theoriesof abstraction
in prevailing the tradition classical British of Most of the
essentialideas whichHusserl developedin the course of his
criticaldiscussionand refutation the empiricistic of theoriesof
abstraction have been fullyconfirmed the resultsto whichGelb and
Goldsteinhave by been led in theirstudiesof
braininjuries.Considering that Gelb and Goldsteincarriedout
theirinvestigations within mereneurological psychoa and
pathological settingand in complete independenceof phenomenological
and, quite in general, philosophicalpoints of view and
theories,their of corroboration the pertinent
viewsofHusserlappearsthe moresignificant and conclusive.Afterhaving
set forth the convergence betweenHusserl's and Gelb-Goldstein's
theories,we shall embarkupon formulating further phenomenological
problemsof ideation which arise on the basis of the mentioned
convergence, takingalso into account Husserl's later contributions
towardsthe problemunder discussion.I. CATEGORIAL EQUALITY AND
QUALITATIVE HOMOGENEITY empiricism.
Empiricistictheoriesdeny universalsas ideal entitiesand objects
sui of Ideation is reducedto, or, at least, explainedby
apprehension generis. similarityor likeness
betweenparticularthings. General termsare, acheld to denote classes
of similarparticularthings.When a gencordingly, 172
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
173
the of eral termis predicatedofa particular thing, meaning
suchpredication can be but the assertionthat the given
thingbelongsto a certainclass, or i.e., bears similarity likenessto
otherparticular things. of In his refutation the empiricistic
theories,Husserl points out that or of between everyrelation
similarity likeness particular things presupposes a point of view
from,and a respectin, which the particularthingsare the similaror
alike'. If two thingsare alike as to theircolor or theirform, to
point of view with reference whichthe relationof likenessobtains
is, in the formercase, the elaos of color, in the latter case, that
of form; both el3q have to be consideredas identicalideal
entities.Every object to to bears similarity a greatmany objects;
to some in one respect, others in a different respect.To put it
otherwise, everyobject belongsto a great many classes comprising
objects whichare similarto each other.Emphaor on but the
sizingtheclassesfounded similarity likeness, denying identical to
or ideal dl6oswith reference which the relationsof similarity
likeness as obtain, one is confronted, Husserl shows, with the
insuperablediffiand of cultyof accountingforthe constitution
unification the veryclasses and also forthat which separates the
classes fromeach otherand keeps themapart. A red sphereis similarto
both a greensphereand a red cube; kind. Hence simiinvolvedin
eithercase are of a different the similarities in laritiesproveto
admit of differences kind.As the objects themselves, so
betweenobjects may be comparedwith each otherand thus similarities
fromeach other.Similarities or turnout to be similar alike or else
to differ be too may, therefore, groupedand classified accordingto
species. Again to the problemarises as to the point of view with
reference whichsimieach other.In otherwords, very the laritiesare
similar or different to, from, from the problemof the >en
fromwhichwe started is but transferred obtain to the similarities
themselves. objects between which similarities denialof the e'l6h
identicalideal units as of On the grounds the empiricistic to
thereremainsbut the resorting similarities betweensimiand entities,
in is larities,and thisshows that a regressus infinitum
unavoidableon the mentioned grounds. to Equality or likenesswith
reference an eltos as point of view or, as we shall likewisesay,
categorialequality or likenessis defined Husserl by which obtains
betweenobjects as fall under one and as that relationship the same
species.2Since every Jr6os necessarilyconstitutesand defines1
Husserl,LogischeUntersuchungen to as (referred hereafter Log.
Unt.), Vol. II, rendering M. Farber, The Foundation by II, chap. I;
cf. the condensedbut faithful ofphenomenology (Cambridge, Mass.,
1943),chap. IX A. ist das VerhAltnis Gegen2 Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol.
II, 1, p. 113,"Gleichheit der und stande, welche einer und
derselbenSpecies unterstehen";cf. also Erfahrung der
einesAllgemeinen...." nur Urteil, 393 ". .. Gleichheit ein Korrelat
Identitat p.
174
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
a class, namely the class of objects which fall under it,' the
relation of categorialequality may be said to obtain between
objects by virtue of to the latter'sbelonging one and the same
class. For any objects to state that they belong to the same class
or that they stand in the relationof categorialequality are but two
expressionsof the same state of affairs. Objects betweenwhich the
relation of categorialequality is ascertained, in to obtain,are not
taken in themselves all theirindividualities and parwith reference
a certainspeciesas but are ratherconsidered to ticularities, of of
particularizations the latter,or as representatives the class to
which virtueoftheiractualizingthe eltos in question. theybelongby
From equality in the categorialsense there is to be distinguished
the the latter sensuousfactorof equality ("das sinnliche
Gleichheitsmoment"), what "figurale Momente" by means
ofwhichpluralities beingto theformer are as are perceptually
recognized to pluralities apprehended through genuFor of in ine
representation.4 the apprehension a plurality the lattermode,
containselements,each there are requiredas many acts as the
plurality one of these acts; in additionto these
elementbeingapprehended through there is furthermore acts of
individual apprehension, requiredan act of synthesisthroughwhich
the individuallyapprehendedelementsare colof ligatedand
united.5Such genuineapprehension a plurality means of by cannot be
assumedto occurwhen,e. g., lookingat the explicitcolligation see a
sky we instantaneously "many" stars or entering hall perceiveat a
of glance "a lot" of people.' To account forthe apprehension
pluralities whichprecludeexplicitcolligation,Husserl refers to
under circumstances Momente"or "figurale Momente"as
perceptualfeatures "quasi-qualitative exhibitedby certaingroups.'
In speakingof the perceptionof a "row of trees," a "columnof
soldiers,"a "swarmof birds,"etc., we renderby the terms"row,"
"column,""swarm" a certainaspect,a certaincharacteristic form
withwhichthe groupin questionpresents or property organizational
Geometricalconfigurations, kinds of all itselfin very
sense-experience.3 Id.,
der Phitlosophie Arithmetik, 79 f. pp. Id., ibid.,pp. 219ff.
7Id. ibid.; pp. 228 ff.;cf. also Farber, loc. cit., pp. 46 ff.In
the presentcontext we cannot dwell at some lengthon Husserl's
conceptof "figurale Momente"; we to to wish,however, pointout that
the phenomena referred by Husserlare thesame whichChr. v. Ehrenfels
studiedin his consequentialarticle "Ueber Gestaltqualittaten" in
Vierteljahrsschrift wissenschaftltiche fazr Philosophie,Vol. XIV
(1890). the between Concerning complete agreement Husserland v.
Ehrenfels to thetheoas of in reticalinterpretation the phenomena
question,cf. A. Gurwitsch, "Quelques de aspects et quelques
d6veloppements la Psychologiede la Forme" pp. 415 ff.in de Normale
Pathologique, Journal Psychologie et Vol. XXXIII (1936).6 Id.,6
4Id., Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1 p. 282 note.
Erfahrung Urteitl, 423. und p.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
175
of arrangements points and lines belonghere as well as the
characteristic the natureof a rhythm, melody,. a
aspectofthechess-board pattern, specific denote etc.
"FiguraleMomente" characters, properties, aspectsofgroups, and than
are no moreand no less a matter meresense-experience thegroups of
the consist. and themselves the"elements" which groups of
Amongsuchgroupand it deservesspecial attentionin aspects theremust
also be reckoned, the of the present context, perceptualfeature
qualitativehomogeneity. We see at a glance "a heap ofapples" or "a
heap ofnuts,"without resorting to, 1) com2 cm The groupin question
involved.8 parisons,n beingthe numberof elements of displays the
perceptualfeatureof qualitative homogeneity a specific kind, by
virtue of whichthe "heap of apples" presentsa group-aspect that ofa
"heap ofnuts." Qualitative from different is homogeneity involved
in in both cases, but is differently specified either. of There is
thena mereperceptualapprehension equalityin the sense of
whichneitherrequiresnor impliesany reference qualitative
homogeneity to an Elaos.Sensuous equalitybetweenthe membersof a
perceivedgroup is exhibited the groupas a specific by
perceptualcharacterof its own,as a Moment" of a special kind. By
the same token, the group"figurales and recharacterin question,as
every "figurales Moment," is confined strictedto the very group as
experiencedin actual perception.Suppose of of the perception a
certainnumber red objects,all ofidenticalchromatic to hue,
brightness, of properties (as etc.). For the perception such a
group, of qualitative homogeneity the perceptual apprehension
specifiedin a Still the perception the is characteristic.
determinate certain manner, of is group in question with its
characteristic group-aspect not onlyentirely or but different from,
does not evenconvey foundtheidea of theclass of red no morethan
that ofthe class ofred objects ofa certaincompletely objects, Such
a class, understoodas the particularizedchromaticdetermination. of
a concept or olios,which is a necessarycorrelate the d&os of
extension an infinitely whateverobjects have is essentially open
class, comprising or in whether not theyhappento be givenin actual
theproperties question, as Consideredas that perceptualphenomenon
which it preexperience.9 on account of its senitselfin experience,
sents qualitative homogeneity, to consuous nature and the
ensuingrestriction actual sense-experience, actual perception,
particular in tains no motivation toward leadingbeyond the idea of
a class in the conceptualsense. On the otherhand, a genuinely
cannotbe conceptualclass, e.g.,that ofredobjects,which,as shown
before, and, in most cases, withouteven being able to resortto n(n8
Husserl,Philosophie p. derArithmetik, 233.
und 9Id., Erfahrung Urteil,?82 and pp. 422 f.
176
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
to constitutedand unifiedexcept with reference an d~os does
obviously or not presentitselfas an experiential perceptualwhole.10
unityis not Its ofa sensuousnature,but is derivedfrom unityofa
categorialintention, the of It the class itselfbeingthe correlate
that intention. follows that in conto tradistinction
sensuousequality or qualitative homogeneity, categorial between
objects which belong to a equality, definedas the relationship
certainclass or, what amountsto the same, fall under the
corresponding eldos,proves a mere conceptual
relationshipestablished by categorial of and not a relationship
sensuousor perceptualnature. thought, As the resultof Husserl's
discussionsand distinctions, may state the we of unaccountability
ideation in terms of equality, insofaras categorial and is
renderedpossible by the apprehension an of equality presupposes,
does not found the presentation whereas qualitative homogeneity
e1dos, of of a class in the conceptualsense,at least not withoutthe
intervention mental activitiesand operations. specificII.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN' S ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF AMNESIA OF COLOR-NAMES
unnoticedcorroboration GelbHusserl's views have foundhitherto by
Goldstein's concepts of "categorial" and "concrete" attitude,
concepts authorshave laid down on the basis of theirstudies
whichthe mentioned cases presenting most various symptoms. of
numerouspsychopathological and brevity, shall essentially we
limitourselves For the sake of conciseness into theiranalysis of a
case of amnesia of color-names;"1 the symptoms volved being
closelyrelatedto the phenomenadealt withby Husserl. a. The symptoms
theperceptual and experience thepatient of Gelb-Goldstein's the in
patient, Th., manifested familiar difficulty naming of a
colorshownto him;even the suggestion the correctnamewas of little,
withcolor-samples requested choosea sample ifany,avail. Presented
and to Th. to utteredthename,but it seemedthat fitting a
color-name, repeatedly the wordhad no meaningforhim. He could no
moreindicatethe name of the color of an object whichwas mentionedto
him than he was able to to point out a color corresponding a
color-name.If, however,instead of being asked to name the color of
an object, the patient was requestedto to choose a sample fitting
the object in question,he succeeded very well due to his
excellentvisualization,provided a fitting specimenwas there. He
neverchose a wrongcolor.If the specimendid not matchperfectly the
colorof the mentioned and continuedlooking object, Th. was not
satisfied ones. forbetterfittingLog. Unt.,Vol. II, 1, pp. 282f. 11
Gelb and K. Goldstein,"Ueber Farbennamenamnesie ." in
Psychologische A .. Vol. Forschung, VI (1924).10 Id.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
177
Particularly interesting and revealingwas the behaviorof the
patient, whenhe was givena color-specimen (e.g., a red one) and was
requestedto in sortout all those speciminaas agreedwiththe former
hue, thoughthey mightdiffer to brightness, as warmth, etc."2 Th.
proceededwithmuchuneasiness and hesitation.Sometimeshe triedto
assort speciminaof equal or verysimilarhue, sometimes speciminaof
different which,however, hue It agreedas to brightness. happenednot
infrequently that,havingalready chosena correctspecimen(a red one),
he laid it aside or that he paid no attentionat all to the red
specimina.Some of his choices appeared quite incomprehensible.
There arose the impression, rejected,as we shall see, by Gelb and
Goldstein,that the patient was unable to abide by his prinfrom and
shifted to one principle any other;assorting ciple ofcoordination
The pasometimes accordingto hue, sometimesaccordingto brightness.
was farfromsatisfied his own procedure.Having made a tienthimself
by selectionof specimina,he again and again comparedeach one of the
first until he finally selectedspeciminawiththe sample of reference
accepted a not withoutexpressing doubts as to few, but very few
only, as fitting, he whether mightnot findstill betterfitting ones.
The meticulosity with which the patient proceededin choosinga
color-specimen corresponding or to the colorof an object
eitherpresented merelymentioned, reappeared For Th. to be satisfied
withhis choice,the color-specimina in his assorting. had to agreein
bothcolorand brightness, to be identical.In fact,when i.e., his
task was to match identicalnuances, the patient succeededperfectly.
from procedure theirpatientin assorting of the Starting
color-specimina, Gelb and Goldsteinexplain all the symptoms
presentedby Th. as well as of by otherpatientswho had been studied
by various authors,as effects a generalreductionfromthe level of
"categorial" behavior and attitude with a color-specimen, pato that
of "concrete"attitude.Confronted the in tienthas of the lattera
characteristic perceptualexperience which,acto the cording the
objectivequalitiesofthe specimen, factorofhue, that of or
brightness, some otherfactormay prevail."3 It is by
thatcharacteristic withits individuality particularity
thepatientabidesand and that experience of
cannothelpabiding.When,e.g., in the experience the specimenof
referwhereasin that of anothersample ence the factorof hue is
predominant, which Th. compareswith the former, the factor of
brightness prevails, to the patient cannot persuade himself group
the two specimina,on acin count of the difference brightness,
though both are of the same hue, whenthe factorofbrightness say
red. Conversely prevailsin the experience and whenthe latterare
ofthe same, or nearlythe same, of eitherspecimen the patient
considersthem as fitting brightness, together,the eventual12 Id.,
13 Id., ibid.,pp. 148f.
ibid., I, ?3.
178
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
It goeswithout thatTh. somein saying difference hue
notwithstanding. or in times grouped specimina agreeing hue.Whether
nottwocolor-specentirely exclusively and iminaappearto himas
fitting together depends of agreement, accordance, or uponwhether
nothe hastheexperience concrete of on andcoherence ("konkretes
Kohdrenzerlebnis")account theparticular, the individual to
characteristic present him.In aspectswhich specimina the concrete
thecase ofidentical obviously experiences specimina, patient and he
hence is prompt unhesitato agreement thehighest possible, degree;
On suchspecimina. the other hand,whenthe samples tingin assorting
but are selected thepatient notidentical, merely closetoeachother,
very by of on of them account his experience concrete accordance.
he stillassorts to himas notquiteperfect somehow and in'Thelatter,
however, appears he satisfied withhis choice. therefore does not
feelcompletely creasable; of accordance If in thecase
ofTh.,theexperience concrete depended upon it hue or brightness,
could,and did in other like also be factors cases,14 for to etc.
attached esthetic purposes, effects, suitability practical taskas
thepatient, thetaskofgrouping with Confronted thesame viz., to
assorts unhesitatingly color-specimina according hue,thenormal
person the the rather dark, other two,say,redspecimina, though
onemaybe very of is bethe In bright. so doing, normal person
notunaware thedifference out to the tween specimina. given him,
however, Carrying theassignment in doesnottakethespecimina their
and particularity the normal person a but sees case ofredness.
express To individuality, rather in either special the does not
dependforhis it in Husserl's terminology, normal person but
assorting upon sensuous equalityor likeness, may,and does,group in
of to which sense, specimina according therelation equality
thecategorial in the and between specimina question insofar only
insofar the obtains as and as of latterare considered
particularizations actualizations the ethos the In is to ofredness.
hisgrouping, normal by person notconfined abiding of features
perception, theimmediately experiential including among given of
the and He the latter experience concrete agreement accordance. may
of a he impose principle classification thedataofperception,
mayconupon in a siderthesedata from certain discussion pointofview,
thecase under of the from point viewofhue. the It is just this
attitude, "categorial" that brain-injured attitude, unableto adopt,
inability an are to which, according Gelb patients utterly the
defines essential difference between normal and Goldstein, and
persons of to Confined the content perception actually as
experienced, patients. in abideby thatcontent all its singularity
particularity; and thepatients to of or are they unable
seeinittherepresentativea color-species ofa cate14 Cf. K.
Goldstein,"L'analyse de l'aphasie et l'etude de l'essence du
langage,'I du Psychologie Langage(Paris 1933),pp. 480f.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
179
the or To gory class of'colors."5 thepatient's mind,
givencolor-specimen itself perceptual in out as stands as thatas
which, exactly it,presents and to without reference whatsoever any
thingbeyond experience any itself. Especially, patients the
cannotregard their perceptual experience the in to or of extraneous
thatperceptual light under perspective a principle the in
experience thesensethatit is notembedded but somehow in, imposed
their Hencethepatients actualexuponthelatter. proveunableto refer
to take a standor a perience anyideal or.conceptual order;
theycannot not to viewwithregard their perceptual experience, to
speakofvarying to viewsso that,according the viewtaken,sometimes
these, sometimes of content other features the perceptual appearas
particularly relevant or essential." to a regression the
Everybrain-injury entails, according Goldstein,"7 to and attitude.
levelof merely concrete behavior Onlythatexistsforthe in Within
content which the offers itself perceptual of patient experience.
between experiential the actualexperience, there no differentiation
is feaAll of as and tures to their relevancy significance. features
theperceptual for each ofthesefeatures are content ofequal
importance thepatient; is that in for reason itisencounteredactual
ofparamount importance themere and overwhelmed overpowered The are
perception. patients somehow by of actualexperience itself from
imposing uponthem a force constraint by themselves. Thus the
patients unable are which theycannot emancipate or in to conceive
eventual of conchanges modifications the experiential from of as
tent, to conceive thelatter possibly i.e., beingdifferent whatit
cannotmakeor is. actually This goes so farthatbrain-injured
patients withactual experience whichare at variance even
repeatstatements as, is the e.g.,repeating sentence
"Todaytheweather bad and it is raining," All can whenin
factthesunis shining.18 thatthesepatients do is act (in the and
senseoftheword)under suggestions imperatives thebroadest as To to
the situation. theextent which arisefrom givenconcrete problems and
can be solvedin thisdirect immediate way,thepatients succeed, for
with to oriented regard and dictated theexperienced contheir
actions, by the crete situation, prove adequateto thelatter. When,
however, patients with that be areconfronted problems cannot solved
actions by and directly15 Gelb and Goldstein, loc. cit.,pp. 152f.;
Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 453 ff.and 473 Formen, Vol. III, pp. 258
ff., ff.;cf. also E. Cassirer,Philosophieder symbolischen
(Berlin,1929). 16 Cassirer, loc. cit.,pp. 261ff. 17 Goldstein,
(Haag, 1934), loc. cit.,pp. 453f. and 470; Der Aufbaudes Organismus
pp. 18 ff. 18 Cassirer,loc. cit., pp. 295 f. and 314; cf. also W.
Hochheimer, "Analyse eines Forschung, Vol. XVI (1932),
Seelenblinden von der Sprache aus," Psychologische pp. 30 f.
180
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
situation,they always fail. induced by the very experiential
immediately mightsay, the patientsare at the mercyof actualitiesso
as not to be One a or able to conceiveofpossibilities to look at
the givensituationfrom distance."9The latter attitude requires and
implies a certain detachment situationwhich,withoutlosingits
character concrete from experienced the suband reality,yet loosens
its grasp upon the experiencing of actuality undervaryject's mindso
as to permithimto considerthe givensituation pointsof view, and to
displaysome initiativein ing angles,fromdifferent it has
becomeimpossible the patientsto detach themfor its respect.Since
and to look at the latterfroma distance, selves fromthe given
situation theyprove deprivedof any initiativewhatever.
interpretations b. Theoretical Consideredin the lightof Gelb and
Goldstein'sgeneralcharacterization the behaviorof theirpatient of
the "concrete"and "categorial" attitudes, becomes
understandable.Already holding color-samples Th. in assorting as in
his hand a sample agreeingwith the specimenof reference to hue, as
mentionedabove,20not infrequently put the "correct" the patient,
hue, sample aside to choose anotherone of different but of equal or
nearly It as equal brightness the specimenof reference. must not be
concluded from principle classione of shifted that herefrom
thepatientinconsistently to withreference a principle to fication
another.To assortcolor-specimina of classification requiresadoption
of the "categorial" attitude,whether is i.e., the principleof
classification adheredto consistently, fora certain thattheir
moment oftimeor is adoptedfora brief only.Maintaining length Gelb
and Goldunable to adopt the "categorial"attitude, is utterly
patient at stein conclude that he has no principleof classification
all.2' Hence and successionupon Th.'s behaviorhas to be explainedby
an alternation each other of different experiencesof
concreteagreement.Suppose the in to of reference be experienced
concreteagreementas to hue specimen another sample witha specimen
and thepatientto noticeat thismoment a, b which,thoughof different
hue, is highlysimilarto the specimenof reeven moresimilarin the
mentioned respectthan as ference to brightness, of prevailedin
theexperience a is as to hue. Whilethefactor hue had thusfar now
becomespredominant. that ofbrightness ofthe specimenof reference,
supersedesthe An experienceof concretecoherencebased on brightness
of coherence based on hue. Guided exclusively previousexperience
concrete19Goldstein, sur p. Der Aufbaudes Organismus, 19; Gelb,
"Remarques gdndrales l'utilisationdes donndespathologiquespour la
psychologieet la philosophicdu du langage,"Psychologie Langage
(Paris, 1933),pp. 415f. 20 Supra, p. 176ff. 21 Gelb and Goldstein,
loc. cit.,pp. 149ff.;Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 409f.
OF GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS ATTITUDE
181
of and more by that experience concrete
accordancewhichprovesstronger imperative, patientis thus led to
prefer to a. the b This interpretation borne out by Gelb and
Goldstein'sobservations is of theirpatient Hac.22 Requested to sort
out those color-samples which seemed to him to fitwith a
givenspecimenof reference, Hac., differently fromTh., selected a
rathergreat number.A closerexamination Hac.'s of
choicesrevealedthat any two speciminaselectedin immediatesuccession
were highlysimilarto each otheras to certainoptical qualities
(e.g., hue, and to formulate), hardto describe brightness, warmth,
other and properties to so that theymay well have been experienced
be in concreteaccordance. was not thecase whenall
theselectedspeciminawerecomSuch, however, In sampared withthe
givenspecimenof reference. the courseof assorting to ples, Hac., in
contradistinction Th., did not abide bythegivenspecimen of
reference. specimenof reference His momentto momentin varied from
that at any moment samplewhichhe had last chosenbecame the specithe
for one men of reference the subsequentselection. Th. performed
single in his processof selection that he persistently referred
choicesto the given and thus,aftermany vacillations and
hesitations, specimenof reference he came to assemble onlyvery
fewsamples,since onlythese fewwere exWhen Hac. periencedin
concreteaccordancewith specimenof reference. a selecteda
greatmanyspecimina and established seriesin whichtwoneighstand to
each otherin the relationof concrete bors, but only neighbors, he
accordance,it is because,insteadof one singleprocessof selection,
pera withvaryingspeciminaof reference, formed setofpartialchoices
looking out at each choice fora sample as agreedwiththat whichhe
had selected in just before.Whateverthe difference the procedureof
the two patients, in both of them were determined
theirchoosingentirely and exclusively of and coherence. by the
experience concreteagreement To gain more insightinto the
procedureof assortingcolor-samples on of the experience
concreteaccordance,let us describethe phethe basis of nomenalaspect
ofthat experience. Gelb and Goldsteinpointout23 that the of
experience concretecoherence must not be misconstrued a secondary
as to experiencesupervenient those of the speciminathemselvesand
their chromatic qualities.In otherwords,it is not that the
speciminain question of are first experienced independently each
other,each one determined by chromatic definite of related
properties its own and are then,subsequently, by
concreteaccordance.Rather the speciminain questionare experienced
the but within relation concrete coherence. This is to say, the
speciminaof forthe sake of simplicity us assume thereare but
two-present themlet selves as membersor "parts" of a contexture
which,on accountof its of22 23
Gelb and Goldstein, loc. cit.,pp. 171f. Id., ibid.,p.
153,note2.
182
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
and distincthe agreement thespecific is of uniformity,
phenomenon concrete of From the point of view of the specimina,
uniformity the the tive feature. of contexture whichtheyare "parts"
appears as qualitativehomogeneity. on The two
speciminapresentthemselvesas platforms the same plane, the withno
tensionbetweenthem. withno riseor fallfrom one to the other, holds
for the speciminabut as members Obviously this characterization in
the of the contexture question which offers typical aspect of a
levelWithinthis contexture, eitherspecimenoccupies a definite
phenomenon.24 rolewhich,to be sure,is the same forboth specplace
and plays a specific the It of iminain a contexture the kind as
hereconsidered. is from contexwhichthe latterhas of its own and
withreference turewiththe properties that each one of the members
to all the othermembersof the contexture and that qualification
which definesits significance derivesits functional
phenomenalstatus in a given concretecase. All the examples to which
for for Momente"and v. Ehrenfels "GestaltqualithHusserlrefers
"figurale with charactersand properties theirown, though, of ten"
are contextures as of course,not all of them are of the type of the
"level-phenomenon," an this is easily seen in the case of a
melody,a rythm, ascendingscale, all have not etc. Accordingly, the
componentmembersof a contexture forthe memHowever,what holds
significance. always the same functional of bers of any contexture,
whatevertype and kind, is that each member with, and as definedby,
a specificfunctionalsignificance is experienced in turn,is
determined the role whichthe memberplays within by which, in of has
to be the contexture question. The structure such contextures
termsofthekindofthosewhichwe have accountedforin gestalttheoretical
of clarification these termsis not withinthe scope of the used. A
further presentdiscussion. on the subcolor-specimina the basis of
concreteagreement, Assorting of looks forsamples as lend themselves
best to forming contexture a ject kind together All withthe
specimenof reference. he has to mentioned the as together do is to
selectsuch speciminawhichare experienced belonging of reference the
sense of concreteagreement the in to with the specimen For that
purpose,the subject does not need to go highestpossibledegree. of
In it beyondthe veryexperience concreteagreement. particular, is
not for him to analyze the latter experienceand to recognizethe
necessary It agreementas agreementby equality of, say,
brightness.25 may well that the agreement in fact based upon the
factorof brightness is happen the Still the factor whichthus
actually determines perceptualexperience.24 As to level-phenomenon
contradistinction step-phenomenon K. Koffka, in cf. to to The
Psychological "Perception:An Introduction the Gestalt-Theorie,"
Bulletin, Vol. XIX (1922), pp. 540 ff.Koffkahas introducedthese
concepts in discussing quite different problems. 25
Cf. Gelb, loc. cit., p. 411.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS ATTITUDE OF
183
of brightness, so to speak, but silently is, The effective.
subject acts under the imperatives its silenteffectiveness, of
withoutdisengaging and apprehendingthe factorof the brightness
to.the role whichit actually plays as forthe experienceof
concretecoherence. When, on the otherhand, specito mina are
assortedwith reference brightness point of view and prinas ciple of
classification, theremay again occur,at the outset,an experience of
concreteagreement.Here, however,the subject does not
merelyexperience concretecoherence,but proceeds fromthat
experiencetoward the for disengaging factorwhichis constitutive
that very experience. Apthe as prehending concrete agreement
founded upon equalityofbrightness, the subject disclosesthe
factorof brightness its effectiveness may in and then choose the
factorthus thematizedas principle classification. of The difference
betweenconcretecoherence is foundedin fact on brightness and
concrete coherence and apprehended thus founded, as explicitly
recognized betweenthe factorof brightness and the thematization
actually effective of that factorin its determinant role.
Previously26 mentioned certain we a from to detachment situationsas
prerequisite the adoptionof experienced the "categorial"
attitude.Such detachment the permits normalpersonnot the merelyto
experience actual situationand to undergothe effectiveness but of
operating factors, also to explicatethe givensituation, apprehend
to to and thematizeeffective factors, and, eventually, orienthis
actionswith respectto factorsthus'renderedexplicit.Reduced as the
patients are to situationsin theiractualityand to acting
passivelyacceptingexperiential only under theirdirectinducements,
explicationand thematization have become
operationsimpossibleforthemto perform. If Gelb and
Goldstein'spatient Th., who had an excellentcapacity of foundno
difficulty all in choosinga specimenwhosecolor at visualization,
matchedthat of an object pointedout or mentioned him,it is because
to the "categorialattitudeis not requiredforthat purpose.Evokinga
mental image of the object in question,all the patient had to do
and did in fact was to selecta specimenwhose colorwas experienced
himto be in conby creteaccordancewiththat of the object.27 Normal
personsdo not act difwhentheyare confronted withthe same task.
ferently of Requiredto sortout specimina thesamecoloras thatofa
certain object, we
select,likethepatient,veryfewshadesonly,viz.,thoseas exactlyfitand
coherewiththe colorofthe object. Asked,e.g., to pointout the
concretely colorofblood,we do not accept a pinkspecimen, any
morethana green not one. Actual mental visualizationof the object
in questionis not even inof dispensable for the accomplishment the
task under discussion.28 The selectionmay and, more oftenthan not,
does take place on the basis of26 27 28
Id., ibid.,pp. 135f.
Cf. Gelb and Goldstein, loc. cit., I ?2.
Supra, pp. 178f.
184
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
of with the color of the object, no mere recognition a
specimenas fitting and is alone mentalimage of the latterbeing
evoked. What is important, important, the occurrenceof the
immediately"intuitiveexperienceof is fittingness" ("das
anschaulicheErlebnis des Passens"), whetheron the It basis of
visualizationor mere recognition. is obviouslywith respectto
thatthementioned experience takes place, whereas
onlyveryfewspecimina otherspeciminaof the same hue, but of
brightness, saturation,and other from different chromatic those of
the object in questionappear properties and incongruous. Under
certain circumstances, the face in inappropriate of
certaintasks,normalpersonsalso adopt the "concrete"attitude.When,
to however,we are given the assignment assort samples of the same
hue we as a certainspecimenof reference, selectall speciminaas
fallunderthe Preventedfromadopting class represented the specimenof
reference. by the "categorial" attitude,Th. resortsto the same
procedurewith respect betweenthe behaviorof the to eithertask.
Hereinreappearsthe difference patientand that of normalpersons.29
the whichGelb and Goldstein Finallywe have to mention
interpretation of are give of the affections speech proper.Since
these affections the most had exconspicuoussymptomsin amnestic
aphasia, older theoreticians of diffiplainedthe latterby a
deficiency words,at least by a considerable certain
words.Againstthisexplanacultyon thepart ofthepatientsto find tion,
Goldsteinpoints out that the very same words which the patients
circumstances spontaneously are and easily are unable to
findundercertain Whetheror not a certainword is circumstances.30
utteredunder different but foundby a patientdoes notdependupon
theworditself, uponthemeaning with whichthe word is to be used in a
concretesituationof speech.3" like "red," "blue," etc., do not
designateindividualand parColor-names they ratherdenote ticular
chromaticphenomenain all theirsingularity; classes or categoriesof
colors. It is with this categorialmeaningthat the subject has to
use the termsin questionwhenhe is asked to name a color shownto him
or to point out a colorto whicha givenname applies. Since
fromamnesia of color-names are not able to consider patients
suffering of a given color as representative a class of
colors,wordswhose significations are of an as predominantly
conceptualnatureas is the case of colorThe inabilityof the patients
to names, have lost all meaningforthem.32Gelb and Goldstein,
cit.,p. 150. loc. loc. Goldstein, cit.,pp. 471 ff.;cf. also pp. 449
f. 31 As to thisview,first cf. advocatedby H. Jackson,
Cassirer,loc. cit.,pp. 245ff. 32 Gelb and Goldstein, loc. cit., I
?5; Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 411 f.; Goldstein,loc. cit., of also
eideticsignification color-names appearsin that pp. 475 ff. The
preeminently hardly by color-name, evenits utterance thepatient
himself, mentioning correct the in to producesany effect
contradistinction cases of amnesia of names of objects loc. (Gelb
and Goldstein loc.cit.,pp. 184ff.;Goldstein, cit.,pp. 487if.). This
notonly2930
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS ATTITUDE OF
185
and use wordswhichhave an essentially eideticsignification
theircharacteristic behaviorin assorting color-specimina thus
appear, accordingto Gelb of modification, and Goldstein,
twomanifestations thesame fundamental as viz.,regression from
"categorial"to the "concrete"level. Neithermanithe festation,
however, mustbe considered the cause of,or in any sense prias
marywith respectto, the other.Both must be regardedas coordinateto
modieach otherand must equally directly referred the fundamental be
to of fication attitude. he as uses expressions "grassy"
(grassarWhenTh. speaks ofcolors, often "like a violet"
("veilchenartig"), tig"), "like a cherry" ("kirschartig"),that she
consistently etc.33 anotherpatientGoldsteinreports Of used colorto
names like "red," "green," etc., with reference only a few
determinate shades, mostlyhighlysaturated ones. As to othershades,
the mentioned like "dark termsdid not apply; in theirstead, the
patienthad expressions yellow" ("jaune fonq6"),"brightblue" ("bleu
clair"), "leaf-green"("vert feuille"), or "fashioncolor" ("couleur
mode"), "spring color" ("couleur If fromthe verbal formulations the
paof printanibre"), etc.34 inferences tients to their
chromaticexperiencesare warranted,one mightpresume that colorsdo
not appear to the patientsas "pure qualities" but as attrito of
butes and properties objects,in attachment and adherencein objects.
Tendenciesto designatecolorsafterobjectshave also been
observedamong We furthermore referto the thesis of Pradines who
primitive peoples.35 fromthe genetic,especially the phylogenetic
point asserts the priority, relatedto agentsand obofview, of
colorsas well as sounds as essentially and thus jects over colors
and sounds divested of objective significance to giventhe status of
"pure qualities."36 According Pradines, "pure qualities" are no
primarydata, not even data at all, but ratherproductsof is
mentaloperations means ofwhichthe realm of sensibility surpassed.
by to It thus seemsthat theirreduction the "concrete"level of
behaviorandleads to the question,discussedby Gelb and Goldstein, to
whether terms as all Which have by this verytokena
genuineeideticsignification; are of generalapplicability it also
gives rise to the problemas to whether with reference all there are
e1657 to objects, of whateverkind and description, and to all
properties, attributes, characters, etc., of any objects. In the
presentcontext,we must confine ourselvesto notingthat a
problemdebated in Platonismas well as in platonizing philosophies
(e.g., that ofMalebranche)also arises out of a
merepsychopathological discussion. 33Gelb and Goldstein, loc.
cit.,pp. 133f.; Goldstein, cit.,p. 476. loc. 34Goldstein, loc.
cit.,pp. 480 f. and 483 f. As to both denominating assorting and
the of colors,the patientexhibited symptoms amnesticaphasia. 36 Cf.
D. Katz, Der Aufbauder Farbwelt (Leipzig, 1930),pp. 4 f.;
Cassirer,loc. loc. cit.,pp. 265ff.;and also the remarks Gelb and
Goldstein, cit.,p. 134. by 36M. Pradines,Philosophiede la
Sensation,Vol. I (Paris, 1928),Livre I, chap. de (Paris, 1945),p.
352, IV; cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, Ph~nomenologie taPerception
between"couleur-fonction" "couleur-qualitd." who distinguishes
and
186
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
a not onlyto consider given for attitudepurports the patientsthe
inability to color as memberof a class, i.e., to perceivethe color
with reference a of species,but also to severthe relatedness the
colorto some object whose for it and attribute is. Such severanceis
necessary the conception property as of a purelyqualitative
order,i.e., an orderin whichcolorsfigure mere objectsto which as
phenomena, "pure qualities," detachedfrom chromatic that if
patients,reducedto they adhere. We thus venturethe hypothesis
essentialreferthe "concrete"attitude,speak of colorsin
termsimplying to ence to objects,it is because theirconfinement
acceptingactual experimental operapreventsthemfromperforming ence
in all its concreteness in tions upon the data of experience, the
case under discussion,divorcing colors fromthe objects whose
attributesthey are and thus experiencing perhaps,of phenomena,with
the exception, the colors as pure chromatic to case of identityof
shades or similarity such high degreeas the limiting bordersupon
identity.The propoundedconceptionof colors as originally
attributesof objects also makes understandablethe fact and
primarily pointedout that evennormalpersonsdo not adopt the
"catepreviously37 gorial" attitudewhen they are requiredto assort
speciminawhose color to matchesthat of some object mentioned them.
Under the conditionsof the the assignment, color reassumesits
primaryfunction;it is perceived so to withreference some object; it
is experienced, to speak, as an envelope in mannerannouncesitself
the very ofthe latterwhichin a certainspecific impliedness of A
experience. closerexamination the phenomenal chromatic of and
involvement objects in colorsor, forthat matter,in sounds,cannot
the here.It has its place within broaderframeofthe phenombe
attempted enologyof perception.III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF
IDEATION
views a. Convergence Husserl's and Gelb-Goldstein's of
betweenequality in the categorialsense and senHusserl's distinction
as theory, a special suous equalityappears,in the lightof
Gelb-Goldstein's in betweenacts whichare performed the "categorial"
case ofthe distinction attitude and those which belong to the
"concrete".attitude. We cannot and, ifso, in whichsense,the same
here discussthe questionas to whether betweenmultiplicities through
apprehended holds forHusserl's distinction whichin very senseacts
of genuineexplicitcolligationand multiplicities Momente." Sensuare
experience perceivedas such by means of "figurale is ous equality,
as previouslymentioned,38 counted by Husserl among betweensensuous
Momente." When we speak of the distinction "figurale and
categorialequality as of a special case of that between
"concrete"37 pp. 38 P.
183 f. 175.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
187
two and "categorial" acts,it is becausethelatter concepts
comprise much more thanthephenomena which, thesakeofthediscussion,
to be for had context. in emphasized thepresent of in Guided
hisassorting color-specimina theexperience concrete by of and
agreement, coherence, accordance, inHusserl's i.e., terminology,the
by of to experience sensuous equality the highest Gelb and possible
degree, unableto conceive the relationship Goldstein's of patients
proveutterly in Thisobservation Gelband Goldstein's ofequality
thecategorial sense. of conclusion to the impossibility accountfor
as bearsout ourprevious to ideation apprehension equality.39
Husserl's Gelb-Goldstein's by of Both and theories converge towards
recognizing ideation an actsui generis a speas with of nature its
own.Patients thekindhereconsidered cific of have become an to acts
which unable perform ofideation, inability also appears that in
when haveno longer meaning color-names, usedinan eidetic sense, any
for that It act them. is thespecific ofideation renders the
possible apprehension of or ofa particular withreference thing of a
plurality particular things the of the to, or under perspective an
EdLOS.4O Among latter acts,there are thosethrough which particular
a to be included is thing conceived as of in to with is to
belonging a classwhich, turn, constituted respect an EI6oS. and
ideasfurther distinctions theoretical and Husserl's clarify
complement Gelband Goldstein's concepts. in Th.'s and Expounding
procedure assorting color-specimina emphasizing between patient's
the and thedifference procedure thatofa normal person, ... Gelb
writes: "Rapprocher les teintes 6galement claires, parcequ'elles
c'est s'accordent en fait,-et que momentan6ment ce rapprochement et
non tel autrequi s'impose-esttouteautrechoseque de connaitre ces en
teintes tantqu'analogues la clarte, cettepropri6t6 par puis de
choisir de This of comme principe classement."'4' argument Gelb'sis
reminiscent "all of discussion thelogicalpresentation A." For
thelatter ofHusserl's to it in presentation be conceived is
notsufficientsurvey factall A, even to in of ifthenumber
theindividuals question finite. is "WievieleEinzelheiten und wir
wir. . . durchlaufen, wie eifrig sie kolligieren bestenfalls m6gen,
des wirklich wren, wenndie Ersch6pfung Begriffsumfanges all
gelange, und A vorgestellt, dochwren nicht A vorgestellt, logische
die aile VorstelIn lungwarenicht vollzogen."42 bothGelb'sand
Husserl's arguments, refof is which propose term we erence madeto
an operation consciousness to and thematization, of meaning
herebydisengagement disclosure factors to in which are to
previously theoperation question present consciousness39Pp. 175
f.40
42 Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1, p. 173; of.also Farber,loc.
cit. p. 268.
41 Gelb, loc. cit., 411. p.
Cf. Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, II, ?1; cf. also Farber,loc.
cit.,pp. 246f.
188
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
in a ratherimplicitform.In Gelb's example,the nature of
thematization transition the factor of is quite obvious. It
denotesthe afore-mentioned43 ofequalityby brightness from state of
silenteffectiveness determinthe in ing the phenomenal aspect of
perception the state of explicitapprehento which cannot be
performed the case of in sion. It is just this transition amnesia
of color-names. to the example referred by Husserl, it is As to
conceivablethat in proceedingfromone A to anotherand thus actually
exhaustingthe extensionof the concept,the experiencing subject is
not all aware at all ofhis covering A. Undertheseconditions,
thereis no themato tization,not any morethan a motivation formthe
logical presentation all A. We therefore considerthe case in
whichat the end ofhis surveythe subject is aware of all A
havingbeen covered.Still the logical presentation all A cannotbe
conceived,the totalityof the A cannot be explicityly apprehended
and stated,unless the mentioned awarenessis rendered explicit in
and thematized,ratherthan accompanying, an implied and involved in
the form, act of consciousness experienced the finalphase of the
survey. of and the processof ideation,the To both the apprehension
logical forms Concernedwithideation,we operationof thematization
provesessential.44 of its have to assignto the operation
thematization systematic place within the whole of the processof
ideation. basis ofideation b. The problem theperceptual of To
obtain an idea of the phenomenalaspect which the heap of colorto
speciminapresents theirpatient,Gelb and Goldsteinhad a fewnormal
forthand back over the heap.45 personsmove the specimenof reference
wereinstructed look at theheap as passivelyas possible to These
observers fromplacing themselvesat a point of view or and
especially to refrain of adoptinga principle classification.
Speciminaidenticalwith,or extremely similarto the specimenof
reference appear in concreteaccordance and coherencewith the
latter.When there are no identical or highlysimilar
fluctuaspecimina,the heap sometimes presentsan aspect of
instability, between color-samples tion, unrest and agitation.
Incipient contextures are formedand dissolved almost at once.
Different groupingsof colorwitheach other.Experiencesof
concreteagreement and speciminaconflict accordanceofvarious
descriptions competewith,and supersedeupon each supra, 182ff. pp.
to the apprehension logical forms, Husserl, Formaleund Transzenof
cf. dentaleLogik, pp. 69 f. Husserl's operationof
"nominalization"(Log. Unt.,Vol. II, V, ??35 f. and Ideen zu einer
reinenPhanomenologie und phdnomenologischen to as
Philosophie(referred hereafter Ideen) ??119ff., 134,148) seems to
us a special case ofthatofthematization. 45 Gelb and Goldstein,
ibid., pp. 151ff.43 Cf. 44 As
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
189
aspect that Gelb and Goldother.It is moreor less
underthisphenomenal the to steinpresume heap ofcolor-specimina
appear to theirpatient.When, e.g., that to assort all however,
underthe influence a givenassignment, of passive attitude, red
specimina, normalpersonabandonshis heretofore the the the
instability and agitationof the heap of color-specimina,
vacillation of conflicting contextures,the alternation between and
fluctuationof etc., all at once inchoate groupings, dissolved
almost as soon as formed, give way to a reorganized
perceptualfield.All red speciminaacquire predominanceand
emergefromthe rest which in turn formsa more or less
irrelevantbackground.Since the organizationand groupingof colors is
to not immaterial the phenomenal appearanceofthe latter,Gelb and
Goldfromthe stein conclude that their patient's experienceof colors
differs chromaticexperiencewhich the normal person has, when he
adopts the In the "categorial"attitude.46 Gelb and
Goldstein'stheory, behaviorofthe as viz., the loss of patient is
not interpreted a mereintellectualdeficiency, while the very the
ability to subsume perceivedcolors under categories, of
perceptualexperience colorsremainsunaltered,i.e., is with the
patient the same as withnormalpersons.Merleau-Ponty47 hereinthe
"existensees tialist" ratherthan "intellectualist"characterof
theirtheory:". .. l'actiavant d'6treune pens6e ou une connaissance,
une cerest vite categoriale,, de se rapporterau monde, et
correlativement style ou un taine manibre de ". une configuration
1'experience." Accordingly, . . le troublede la pensee . . .
concerne moinsle jugementque que l'on decouvreau fondde l'amnesie
oA le milieud'exp6rience le jugement prendnaissance,moinsla
spontan6ite sur que les prisesde cettespontaneite le
mondesensibleet notrepouvoir de en figurer lui une intention
quelconque." between the chromaticexperienceof their Emphasizingthe
difference and that of a normalperson adopting the "categorial"
attitude, patient Gelb and Goldsteinstill seem to admit, at least
in theirarticle on "Farbetweenthe chrothat thereis hardlyany
difference bennamenamnesie," ofthepatientand thatofa normal the
person, provided Tatmaticexperience the"concrete" Gelb and
Goldstein's teradopts attitude.This is borneout by perception
explanationof the failureto detectanomaliesin the chromatic
methods.48 What is of theirpatient by means of
certainophthalmological of examinedby the methodsin questionis but
the experience homogeneity betweencolors.For that experience,
adoptionofthe the and inhomogeneity attitudeis not required.To the
extentto whichthe normal "categorial" person perceivescolors in a
mere intuitive,i.e., "concrete," attitude,his is subchromatic
experience not assumedby Gelb and Goldsteinto differ47
Merleau-Ponty, loc.
Gelb and Goldstein, cit.,p. 162. loc. cit., pp. 222 ff. 48 Gelb
and Goldstein, loc. cit.,pp. 161f.46
190
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
subsequently from that oftheirpatient.Yet in an articlewritten
stantially the Gelb cautionsagainstassimilating to that on
"Farbennamenamnesie," the normal person has when he perceptionof
the patient to that which From the fact that the normalperson
adopts the "concrete" attitude.49 may,and withrespectto
certaintasks,does adopt the "concrete"attitude, and acts the
conclusionmust not be drawn that the patient experiences
attitude.Whereasthepatient likethenormalpersondoes in the
"concrete" to is reduced and confined the "concrete" attitude,the
latteris with the process,it is intenormalpersonbut one phase of a
more comprehensive grated into a total process of experiencewhich
also comprisesphases of froma distance. and contemplation
"categorial" attitude,of detachment In the lifeof the
normalperson,the "categorial"and "concrete"attitudes and
direct,more "manual"-fecundate each -the latter moreimmediate into
the total process of experience otherand it is fromthis integration
that eitherderivesits fullmeaningand significance. to it Gelb's
remarks, seems to us, mustnot be construed mean that the in
questionis but a factascertainable an onlooking observer, by
integration we On the contrary, submit subject himself. and not by
the experiencing in that a perceptionexperienced the "concrete"
attitudeappears in itself characterized a phase as into a
widercontext, descriptively is as integrable more comprehensive
process.For a perceptionthus to presentitself, of a
phenomenaltingeor featureby means of which it must include a
specific whichthe possibility contextis referred through to, a
moreencompassing and anticipatedin of the "categorial" attitudeis
somehowpreannounced in the "concrete" attitude. the very
perceptionexperienced more preciselywhat we mean by the inclusionin
an act To formulate to the "concrete" attitude of a possible
"categorial" attitude, pertaining to let us proceedby way of
contrast.Confined abidingby perceptualdata such data the
themselves, patientcannotexperience as theyactuallypresent upon
formin whichthey imposethemselves in that organizational except
whichcontainsno identical as in the case ofa heap ofcolor-samples
him.If, or highlysimilarshades, the perceptualfieldexhibitsno
unambiguously with the fieldappears unstable and fluctuating
determined organization, each other.The normalperson,on the
superseding conflicting groupings contrary, may adopt the
"categorial" attitude,and imposeupon the performwhich that
fielddoes not possess in ceptual fieldan organizational of own
right.He may even imposeupon the fieldvaryingforms organits the
perization accordingto different pointsof view. As we have seen,50
fieldaccepts organizational determined the point ofview forms by
ceptual at whichthe subjectchoosesto place himself.49Gelb, loc.
cit.,pp. 413 ff. 50 Pp. 188 f.
OF GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS ATTITUDE
191
In the perception the normalperson,thereis then a
certainreadiness of of to receiveforms organization imposedfrom
without, certainambiguity a. and plasticity which are in marked
contrastto the rigidity characteristic of the perceptionof the
patient. To the normalperson'smind,the things perceiveddo not
appear as mereactual data and facts,as they do to the patient,but
rather,withoutin the least being divestedof theircharacter as as of
real thingsgiven in actual experience, eventual examples, potential
Even whenthe normalpersondoes not adopt the varieties an invariant.
of "categorial" attitude,his perceptionis not mere perceptionin a
"pure" is state,but,we tentatively submit, pervaded and permeatedby
some conto sciousness or awareness of possibilities,of possible
reference a nonperceptualorder.Such consciousnessof
possibilitiesdoes not necessarily exist in an entirely explicitand
distinctstate; more oftenthan not it asand implicitness. or
sumesthe formof greater lesserinarticulation, latency, The
reference especiallyin the lattercase, to the realm of
possibilities is, To or thanto any specified as suchrather
possibility. a greater lesserdegree the perceptualexperience the
normalpersonis oriented of of implicitness, ordersand possibilities
that, even when so withrespectto non-perceptual a thingis
perceivedin itselfand forits own sake, withoutactual reference as
to to a conceptualorder,it still is experienced referable such an
order; even when it is not perceivedas an example,it still appears
as thus perAll is ceivable. perceptual-experience encompassedby the
horizonof an at least potential consciousnessof possible
non-perceptual perspectives.In in the "concrete" attitude,thereis
implied everyperceptionexperienced and inarticulateconsciousnessof
and a more or less vague, indistinct, to to reference a
possibletransition the "categorial" attitude.It is by the whichthe
normal plasticityin the sense as just sketchedthat experiences
personhas, whenhe happensto adopt the "concrete"attitude,seem to us
from those of the patientwho by virtueof the proto differ
substantially whichhe has undergone confined the "concrete" is to
foundmodification attitude. c. The operation "freevariation" of
Husserl mentionsthe operationof Already in LogischeUntersuchungen
the "freevariation." To be sure,in LogischeUntersuchungen,
operationin and question is not introducedin orderto account forthe
apprehension of constitution e'Ch, but ratheras a method
forestabphenomenological lishinga priorilaws betweened6l,as, e.g.,
between the e6os of color and In of that of extension.5' the very
performance "free variation," certain becomeapparentwhichthe
operation underdiscussion bound is limitations to respect.Eidetic
laws a prioriare formulations such limitations. of Start61
Husserl,, Log. Unt.,Vol. II, III, chap. I; cf.Farber,loc.cit.,chap.
xA.
192
PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
we a ing,e.g., from coloredsurface, may imaginethe surfaceto
vary arbitrarilyas to size and shape, and still the color
remainsunaltered.When, the we however, go as faras imagining size
of the surfaceto decreaseuntil we vanishesaltogether, see that the
colorvanishesas well.52 the extension the It accidentally. appears
from do Color and extension not coexistmerely by experiment way of
"freevariation"that no instanceofcolorcan mental with an instanceof
extension.By virtueof an exist except in connection between
relationship a priorithereis an essentialand necessary eideticlaw
is extension. relationship foundedon the very e'Z3r, Because this
color and and color,it extendsto everyinstanceof eitherJ13os. of
extension the some actual experience, operationof "free Even whenit
startsfrom which see-to forms leads-of necessity,as we shall
presently variation" whichforempirical not been given in actual
experience, are not and have Since eideticscience reasonswill,
perhaps,neverbe actually experienced. the in not interested
mattersof fact,but in possibilities, eventualexistin of
formsarrivedat in the process of "freevariation" ence or
inexistence whichis an eidetic science itGeometry, is of no
relevancywhatsoever.53 form his passingfrom sets the
example.Arbitrarily modifying figures, self, is the
transformations, mathematician not in by to form way ofcontinuous
or withthe questionas to whether not the productsof the least
concerned in to correspond something empiricalreality. imagination
his geometrical it-Isboth necessaryand validityof these forms To
assure the geometrical that they may be contrivedin the process of
"free variation" sufficient the situationis not In orientedin a
certaindirection. othereidetic fields, different. Setting out to
disclose the eltlos"material thing,"we may be led to
considergoldenmountainsand wingedhorses.As faras theirfuncthe of
tionas exemplifications the d~os in questionis concerned, mentioned
than are productsof the fancyare no more and no less valid
possibilities Since 'Lanare exemplified stones and trees given in
actual experience.54 the as in factsof actual experience well as in
creationsof the imagination, of "free variation" is not bound to
start fromreal existents. operation as Products of the
imaginationmay serve as starting-points well.55At the whateverits
starting-point, operationof "free variation" any event,62 This
argument has been advanced by C. Stumpf,Ueberden psychologischen
Taking overthe argument, (Leipzig,1873),pp. 112fF. der Ursprung
Raumvorstellung Husserl (Log. Unt.,Vol. II, III, ??4
ff.),presentsit in an ontologicalratherthan setting. psychological
53Cf. Husserl,Ideen, ??4,7, 70; Meditations sect. 34. Cartesiennes,
54Id., Ideen,?149. 55Id., ibid., p. 12, (Wir) "konnen... ., ein
Wesenselbst und originar erfassen, zu aber auch erfahrenden
Anschauungenausgehen, ebensowohl von entsprechenden 'bloss
einbildenden' Anvielmehr nicht-daseinserfassenden, von
nicht-erfahrenden,
chauungen."'-
GELI3-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE
193
must lead to, and pass through,
merelyimaginaryforms.Otherwisethe to processwouldbe confined
actualitieswhichform but a subclass ofpossibilities,whereasit is
the verypurposeof the processof "freevariation"to yield a survey of
what is possible in a certaindomain, regardlessof its
actualizationin empiricalreality.Imaginationthus provesthe "organ"
of The eideticknowledge.56 processof "freevariation"by meansof
whichnot only eideticlaws and relationsbetweenel'a are established,
but e'7f themis selves are apprehendedand constituted, carriedout
in imagination. If the processof "freevariation" leads to the
constitution EL67, it is of and structures because certainfeatures
proveto remainunalteredthroughfrom musicalsound,whether a out
theprocessin question.Starting actually we or a experienced merely
imagined, engender seriesofauditory phenomena
whichoriginatefromeach otherby way of variationand transformation.
of in All members the seriesprovecongruent a certainrespectby
whichthe fromthe membersof that series membersof the
mentionedseries differ if whichwould have been engendered, we had
startedfrom colorand apa plied to it the process of variation and
transformation. Throughoutall in varietieswhich are encountered the
very process of "free variation," there appears an
invariantgeneralform,an invariantstructure exhibited in of as by
everymember theseries.Different themembers questionare from each
otherand mustbe on accountoftheirorigination, theyall
exhibitconidentical withothermembers content.57 gruityas to an
invariant Congruity of the seriesas to the invariantis the
conditionforany memberto belong to the seriesin question,the
latterbeing conceivedas generatedby "free of variation"and
transformation a certainexemplar, e.g., a musicalsound. Ideation
reaches withthedisengagement, final completion disclosure, explicit
thematization the invariantin question.This inapprehension,
briefly, of variant is the ltios,in the Platonic sense, to be
conceived without any connotation. metaphysical itselfin the very
process Constitutedas an invariantwhich manifests of "free
variation," the ci1os presents itself in genuine apprehension as in
relatednessto e ePrt TroAXXv, in oppositionand therefore, necessary
i.e., of fromeach other,are a multiplicity
varietieswhich,howeverdiffering The dtLos apprehendedas form.58 is
all actualizationsofthe same invariant and to an identicalideal
entityin contradistinction, withreference an in"On Imagination,"pp.
372f. in Philosophy Phenomeno66 Cf. Fr. Kaufmann, and
logicalResearch, Vol. VII (1947). 6 Husserl,Erfahrung und
Urteil,?87 a and e. 58 Id., ibid.,?87c; Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 2, p.
162". . . gegenilber derMannigfaltigkeit von einzelnenMomenteneiner
und derselbenArt, diese Art selbst,und zwar als vor eineund
dieselbe Augenstehenkann ... wirwerden uns ... auf Grundmehrerer
individueller Anschauungen IdentitAt Allgemeinen der des
bewusst.....
194
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
of finite multiplicity possible varieties. Since the
significance the eJaos of withregardto all possiblevarietiesofa
certain lies in that it is an invariant can domain,e.g., that of
musical sound,the reference obviouslynot be to in those
varietiesonlyas have actuallybeen considered a givenprocessof
"freevariation"which,like any processactuallyperformed, by
necessity is finite.Though the processis in fact brokenup aftera
certainnumberof that it can be concarriedout withthe consciousness
steps,it is, however, of It that tinuedad libitum.59 is
thisconsciousness a possible continuation of renderspossiblethe
reference the eldos not only to the varietieswhich have actually
been taken into account,but also to more varieties to be of
constitution the d1o , The veryphenomenological ad contrived
libitum. whichherewe can but roughly sketch,accountsforthe
above-mentioned60 and its extensionas an infinitely between the
elhos essential correlation in open class. It also appears that the
extension questiondoes not comprise but rather pure possibilities,
i.e., real objects and their real properties, possible varietiesA6
If it is justifiedto speak of an empiricalextensionof and if
eidetic relationships an ethos, hold, and hold even necessarilyand
a priori,formattersof fact,it is because everyreal occurrence may,
and as must,be considered a possiblevarietywhichhappens to be
actualized. insisted, By the same token,the distinction, upon
whichwe previously62 which betweena class in the conceptualsense
and a perceptualgrouping exhibitsthe "figuralesMoment" of, e.g.
qualitative homogeneity, finds hereits ultimatevalidation. the
process of "freevariation" is carriedout in As alreadymentioned,
All the forms whichoriginate from each other way
oftransimagination. by theirrolesas, and onlyas, possiblevarieties,
and formation variation,play This holds withoutexception i.e., as
possiblycontrivablein imagination. foreverymemberof the
seriesgeneratedin the processunder discussion. from whichthe
processstarts,even whenthe It also holds forthe member in question
happens to be a real occurrence. For the process of member the
ideationto apply to an object givenin actual experience,
latterobject mustbe subjectedto what Husserl occasionallycalls
"eideticreduction."63 the real existentis divested of its
actuality,of its By eidetic reduction, from which it determinations
existentialcharacter,its spatio-temporal59Id., Erfahrung und
Urteil,?87b, "Es kommt... daraufan, dass die Variation selbst eine
Beliebigkeitsgestalt als Prozess der Variantenbildung habe, dass
der von Prozess im Bewusstsein sei." beliebiger Fortbildung
Varianten vollzogen 60 Cf. supra,p. 175. 61 Husserl,Erfahrung und
Urteil,??90f. 62 Supra, pp. 175if. 63 Husserl, Ideen, p. 4.
"Eidetic reduction," must be stressed emphatically, it
withphenomenological transcendental oughtnot to be confounded or
reduction.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
CONCEPTS
P ATTITUDE'
195
derivesits individualization, and also of all those charactersas
accrue to it on accountofits integration thereal world.A4 into
Every real existent can be regardedas an actualized possibility.
Under the eideticreduction, the fact of its actualizationis
consideredas immaterialand, hence, is disregarded.What is
encountered a matterof fact,is "irrealizec"; i.e., conas sideredas
to its imaginableness, not as to its actuality;it is transformed
and into a "pure possibility"among otherpossibilities.65 From the
status of a real existent, is transferred that of an example or
exemplarlending it to itselfto "freevariations" and thus
becomingapt to function starting as point foran infinitely open
series of possible,i.e. imaginable,varieties.66 Eidetic reductionis
obviouslya necessaryconditionfora real existentto play a role in
ideation. Only possibilities can findinsertion into a process whose
very purpose is to yield a surveyof what is possible in a certain
domain. Recalling Goldstein'scharacterization the modification of
undergone by we brain-injured persons,67 can, in the lightof the
resultswhichwe have now attained,understand incapacityof the
mentioned the patientsto perform whichinvolvesideation.Overwhelmed
the actuality any operation by of factual experience, the patients
in question are unable to conceive of possibilities;
theycannotimagineany actual experience be possiblydifto from ferent
what is actuallyis.68In the case of the patients,the verypreof
condition ideation,whichwe foundto be conception factsas actualized
of and freevariabilityofthe latterin and by imagination, not
possibilities is realized. Expressingit in Kantian
terms,Merleau-Ponty69 speaks of an of affection
productiveimagination ratherthan understanding ("entendement"). By
its very structure, perceptualexperienceof the patients the
resistsbeing subjected to imaginationaloperations, processes,and
transformations. Thus we are brought back beforethe rigidity the
perception in ofthe patientsin contrast withwhat we tentatively
describedas plasticity in the perceptualexperienceof
normalpersons.70 When we referto psyit chopathological findings, is
because, by way of contrast,these findings permitus to
discloseconditions which,just on account of theirrealization in the
case ofnormalpersons, likelyto be takenforgrantedand, hence, areCf.
Husserl,Ideen, ?2; Erfahrung Urteil,?89. und Id., Meditations
Cartesiennes, 59 f. pp. und pp. 661d.,Erfahrung Urteil, 410 f. 67
Cf. supra,pp. 178ff. 68 We wish to stressthat the modification
questionis not peculiarto amnesia in of color-names alone.
Impairment imagination the mentioned of in sense has been observed
Gelb and Goldstein numerous by on patientsexhibiting
mostdiversified the symptoms. (9 Merleau-Ponty, cit.,p. 224. loc.
70 Cf. supra,pp. 190f,64 65
196
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
to be overlooked.The structure perceptualexperience, of
proves,we submit,a necessary condition ideationand, therefore,
important of an problem forthe phenomenology ideation.It is to
thisproblem of that we wishto call attention. ARON GURWITSCH.
BRANDEISUNIVERSITY. EXTRACTO Al establecer teoria de la ideaciony
mantener naturaleza especifica su la y la irreductibilidad los
universalescomo objetos ideales, Husserl hubo de entrela igualdad
categorial, sea la igualdad con referencia de distinguir o a un
puntode vista odbos, y la igualdad sensibleo inmediatamente
percepLa tiva y experiencial. distincion Husserl la confirman de
plenamente los sobrelos efectospsicol6gicos las
lesionescereanalisisde Gelb-Goldstein de brales,como se indica en
el ejemplode un paciente que sufreamnesia de los nombresde colores.
Gelb y Goldsteininterpretan sintomasdel paciente como manifestalos
ciones de una reducciongeneral del nivel de la actitud "concreta."
En contrast con las personasnormales, cuales pueden imponer sus
camlas a unas formas organization de pos perceptivos que aquellos
no presentan por si solos, el pacientese limitaa una realidad
perceptivesin mas, y tienela incapacidad de concebirnada
puramenteposible. Esto nos conduce a la hipotesisde que la
personanormal,inclusocuando adopta la actitud "concreta,"
experiment sus datos perceptivos, por lo menos implicitamente, al
comoreferencias reinode las posibilidades a los ordenes
perceptivos, no y o sea como ejemplospotenciales
variantespotenciales una invariable. y de Sugerimosque la
mencionadaestructurade la percepci6n normalpermte la operaciondel
procesoimaginative la "variacionlibre,"procesoal cual de Husserl
consider una condicionfenomenologica necesariade la ideacion.
