H The Recording Statute in Texas (and the Innocent ... · PDF fileTHE RECORDING STATUTE IN TEXAS (AND THE INNOCENT PURCHASER DOCTRINE) ... The Recording Statute in Texas (and the Innocent

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THE RECORDING STATUTE IN TEXAS (AND THE INNOCENT PURCHASER DOCTRINE)

STEVEN C. HALEY Moorman Tate Haley Upchurch & Yates, LLP

207 East Main Street P.O. Box 1808

Brenham, Texas 77834 Telephone: 979-836-5664

Fax: 979-830-0913 [email protected]

www.moormantate.com

24TH ANNUAL

ROBERT C. SNEED TEXAS LAND TITLE INSTITUTE December 4-5, 2014

San Antonio

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STEVEN C. HALEY Moorman Tate Haley Upchurch & Yates, LLP

207 E. Main Brenham, Texas 77833

979-836-5664 FAX: 979-830-0913

[email protected]

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION EDUCATION

B.S., Agricultural Economics, cum laude, Texas A&M University, 1978 J.D., cum laude, Bates College of Law, University of Houston, 1981 Articles Research Editor, Houston Law Review

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Partner, Moorman Tate Haley Upchurch & Yates, LLP Admitted to the State Bar of Texas, 1981 Admitted to practice in Texas in the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, U. S. District Courts for the Northern, Eastern,

Southern, and Western Districts of Texas General Counsel, Texas Department of Agriculture (1981 82) Senior Staff Attorney, Texas A&M University System (1982-85) Member: Texas College of Real Estate Attorneys (Chairman 2002-2003)

American College of Real Estate Lawyers State Bar of Texas' Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Council(REPTL) (1998-2003) State Bar of Texas' Real Estate Forms Committee (1997 ) State Bar of Texas' Agricultural Law Committee (Chairman 1997 98) College of the State Bar of Texas American Agricultural Law Ass'n Washington County Bar Ass'n (President 1986-87) Texas Aggie Bar Ass'n (President 2005 06) Texas Super Lawyer, Texas Monthly Magazine

Named in Texas’ Best Lawyers - 2013 Edition LAW RELATED PUBLICATIONS AND HONORS

State Bar of Texas, Jerry Charles Saegert Award, Best Real Estate CLE Paper 2009, 2008, 2004 State Bar of Texas, Advanced Real Estate Law Course, Best Speaker 2009 Co-Course Director for the University of Texas School of Law and Texas Mortgage Bankers' Association; Texas

Mortgage Lending Institute 2001 Co-Course Director for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course, 2000 Co-Course Director for the South Texas College of Law; Real Estate Conference, 2002 Co-Course Director for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course, 2006 Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course 2014; The Recording Statute in Texas

(and the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine) Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course, 2013; Texas Homestead Law Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course 2009; Material Alteration of Documents Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course 2009; Strumpet Flourish, Temple

Houston and the Soiled Dove Defense Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course 2008; Lis Pendens in Texas Author/speaker for the University of Texas School of Law and Texas Mortgage Bankers' Association; Texas Mortgage

Lending Institute 2005; The Recording Statute in Texas Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course, 2003; Drafting Hunting and

Agricultural Leases Author/speaker for the Southern Methodist University; Real Estate Transactions in Depth, 2000; Texas Abstracts of

Judgment and Judgment Liens Author/speaker for the South Texas College of Law; Real Estate Law Conference, 1999; Texas Law of

Acknowledgments Author/speaker for the University of Texas School of Law and Texas Mortgage Bankers Association; Texas Mortgage

Lending Institute, 1998, Sale or Disposition of Personal Property Collateral Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Advanced Real Estate Law Course, 1997; Homestead Update Author/speaker for the University of Texas School of Law and Texas Mortgage Bankers Association; Texas Mortgage

Lending Institute, 1997, Creative Ways To Get To The Homestead: Resulting And Constructive Trusts Author/speaker for the University of Texas at Austin; Texas Mortgage Lending Institute, 1996, Texas Law of

Acknowledgments Author/speaker for the University of Texas at Austin; Texas Mortgage Lending Institute, 1994, Homestead Update

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Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Agricultural Law Seminar, 1994, Texas Farm Products as Collateral Author/speaker for the State Bar of Texas; Agricultural Law Seminar, 1993, Distinguishing the Rural and Urban

Homestead

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Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................. 1

A. Registration Generally Permissive ................................................................................................................................. 1 B. Registration Generally Not Necessary to Effectiveness of Instrument .......................................................................... 1

1. Documents Which Release, Transfer, Assign, Etc. a Previously Recorded Document. ....................................... 1 2. Contractual Liens for Improvements Against Homestead .................................................................................... 1

a. Residential Homesteads ................................................................................................................................. 1 3. Extensions of Liens ............................................................................................................................................... 1 4. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens (Constitutional) .................................................................................................... 2

a. Residential Homesteads ................................................................................................................................. 2 5. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens (Statutory) ............................................................................................................ 2

a. Residential Homesteads ................................................................................................................................. 2 6. Bankruptcy Debtor-in-Possession ......................................................................................................................... 2 7. Release of Tax Lien. ............................................................................................................................................. 2 8. Transfers of Tax Lien. ........................................................................................................................................... 2

C. The Common Law Rule Regarding Priority of Conveyances ........................................................................................ 2 D. General Thrust and Intent of Recording Statute ............................................................................................................. 2 E. The Elements of the General Recording Statute ............................................................................................................ 3 F. Special Recording Statute for Court Orders and Judgments Affecting Title to Land .................................................... 3 G. Special Recording Statute for Extensions of Liens ........................................................................................................ 3 H. Special Recording Statute for Lis Pendens .................................................................................................................... 3 I. Special Recording Statute for Destroyed or Lost Public Records .................................................................................. 3 J. Special Recording Statute for Purchaser at Execution Sale ........................................................................................... 3 K. Special Recording Statute for Involuntary Mechanics’ Liens ........................................................................................ 3 L. Special Recording Statute for Partitions of Marital Real Property ................................................................................. 4 M. History of the General Recording Statute ...................................................................................................................... 4 N. Construction of the General Recording Statute .............................................................................................................. 4

1. No Equitable Estoppel Exception to the Recording Statute. ................................................................................. 4 O. The Innocent Purchaser Doctrine ................................................................................................................................... 4 P. Construction of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine .......................................................................................................... 4

II. CONVEYANCES SUBJECT TO RECORDING STATUTE ............................................................................................. 4

A. Conveyance Required .................................................................................................................................................... 4 B. Liens ............................................................................................................................................................................... 4 C. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens ........................................................................................................................................ 5 D. Life Estates ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5 E. Timber Deeds ................................................................................................................................................................. 5 F. Leases ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5 G. Mineral Interests ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 H. Restrictive Covenants ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 I. Easements ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5

1. Easements by Estoppel .......................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Easements Implied by Prior Use ........................................................................................................................... 5

J. Wills and Estates ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 1. Unrecorded Deed By Decedent ............................................................................................................................. 5

K. Deeds by Minors ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 L. Written Express Trusts ................................................................................................................................................... 5 M. Equitable Interests Are Not Subject to Recording Statute ............................................................................................. 6

1. Resulting Trusts .................................................................................................................................................... 6 2. Constructive Trusts ............................................................................................................................................... 6 3. Parol Trusts ........................................................................................................................................................... 6 4. Executory Contracts of Conveyance ..................................................................................................................... 6 5. Equitable Right of Reformation ............................................................................................................................ 7

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6. Parol Partitions ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 7. Equitable Liens ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 8. Equitable Subrogation ........................................................................................................................................... 7

N. Equitable Interests Are Subject to the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine .............................................................................. 7 1. Resulting Trusts .................................................................................................................................................... 7 2. Constructive Trusts ............................................................................................................................................... 7 3. Executory Contracts of Conveyance ..................................................................................................................... 8 4. Equitable Right of Reformation ............................................................................................................................ 8 5. Parol Partitions ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 6. Equitable Liens ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 7. Equitable Subrogation ........................................................................................................................................... 8 8. Parol Dedication .................................................................................................................................................... 8 9. Parol Boundary Line Agreement .......................................................................................................................... 8 10. Parol Gift ............................................................................................................................................................... 8 11. Conditional Sale .................................................................................................................................................... 8 12. Parol Trust ............................................................................................................................................................. 8

O. Limitations Title Not Subject to Recording Statute/Innocent Purchaser Doctrine ......................................................... 8 1. Prescriptive Easements ......................................................................................................................................... 9

P. Governmental Units Are Subject to the Recording Statute ............................................................................................ 9 1. Exception – Ad Valorem Tax Liens. ..................................................................................................................... 9

Q. Financing Statements ..................................................................................................................................................... 9

III. VOID AS TO SUBSEQUENT CREDITOR OR PURCHASER ........................................................................................ 9

A. Class of Persons Protected by the Recording Statute ..................................................................................................... 9 B. General Recording Statute ............................................................................................................................................. 9

1. Right of Redemption ............................................................................................................................................. 9 C. Innocent Purchaser Doctrine .......................................................................................................................................... 9 D. Unrecorded Judgments ................................................................................................................................................... 9

IV. LIEN CREDITORS ................................................................................................................................................................ 9

A. Creditor Refers to Lien Creditor .................................................................................................................................... 9 B. Creditor Not Limited to Subsequent Lien Creditor ........................................................................................................ 9 C. Creditor Refers to Lien Creditor Without Notice ........................................................................................................... 9 D. Lien Creditor Under the Recording Statute Need Not Pay Valuable Consideration .................................................... 10 E. Types of Lien Creditors Covered by Recording Statute............................................................................................... 10

1. Judgment Creditors Levying By Writ of Execution or Attachment .................................................................... 10 2. Judgment Creditors Filing an Abstract of Judgment ........................................................................................... 10 3. Trustee in Bankruptcy ......................................................................................................................................... 10 4. Bankruptcy Debtor-in-Possession ....................................................................................................................... 10 5. Judicial Foreclosure ............................................................................................................................................ 10 6. Mechanic=s Liens ............................................................................................................................................... 10 7. Landlord=s Liens ................................................................................................................................................ 10 8. Tax Liens ............................................................................................................................................................ 10

F. Creditor=s Lien Attaches To All Apparent Interest of Debtor ..................................................................................... 10 1. When Lien Creditor Has Notice of a Prior Unrecorded Conveyance ................................................................. 10 2. When No Apparent Title is in the Judgment Debtor ........................................................................................... 11

G. Creditor=s Rights Under Recording Statute Are Fixed At Time Lien Attaches .......................................................... 11 H. Lien Creditors Under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine ............................................................................................... 11

V. INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION .............................................................................. 12

A. Innocent Purchaser ....................................................................................................................................................... 12 1. Innocent Purchaser Status a Legal Conclusion ................................................................................................... 12 2. Purchase Required............................................................................................................................................... 12

a. Merger Not a Purchase ................................................................................................................................. 12 3. Good Faith Required ........................................................................................................................................... 12

a. Titles Acquired by Speculation .................................................................................................................... 12

b. Titles Subject to Litigation ........................................................................................................................... 13

c. Titles Acquired by Inequitable Conduct ...................................................................................................... 13

d. Effect of Inadequate Consideration .............................................................................................................. 13

e. Time for Determination of Good Faith ........................................................................................................ 13

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4. AApparent Title@ Must be Acquired ................................................................................................................... 13 a. Apparent Title Must Deraign by Series of Conveyances ............................................................................. 13

b. Apparent Title Must Deraign by Written Conveyances ............................................................................... 13 5. Must Apparent Title Be Legal Title? .................................................................................................................. 13 6. Innocent APurchaser@ Includes Mortgagees ....................................................................................................... 14 7. Mineral Interests ................................................................................................................................................. 14 8. Forged Deed ........................................................................................................................................................ 14 9. Void Instrument .................................................................................................................................................. 14 10. Void Judgment/Voidable Judgment .................................................................................................................... 14 11. Deed Procured by Fraud/Fraudulent Conveyance ............................................................................................... 14 12. Deed Executed by Accident or Mistake .............................................................................................................. 14 13. Deed by Person Under Disability ........................................................................................................................ 14 14. Deed by Unauthorized Person ............................................................................................................................. 14

a. Void Trustee=s Sale ..................................................................................................................................... 15

b. Voidable Trustee=s Sale .............................................................................................................................. 15 15. Deed by Fiduciary or Trustee .............................................................................................................................. 15 16. Deed to Corporation Not Authorized to Act ....................................................................................................... 15 17. Deed Not Intended For Delivery ......................................................................................................................... 15 18. Simulated Transaction Involving Homestead ..................................................................................................... 15 19. Deed By Person With Identical/Deceptively Similar Name ............................................................................... 15 20. Remote Purchasers (the AShelter Rule@) ............................................................................................................ 16

a. Reconveyance to a Person Not an Innocent Purchaser ................................................................................ 16 B. Valuable Consideration ................................................................................................................................................ 16

1. Consideration a Question of Law or Fact? .......................................................................................................... 16 2. Acceptable Proof of Valuable Consideration ...................................................................................................... 16 3. Sufficiency of Consideration ............................................................................................................................... 16

a. Gift Deeds .................................................................................................................................................... 17

b. Property Acquired by Inheritance ................................................................................................................ 17

c. Antecedent Debt Not Valuable Consideration ............................................................................................. 17 4. Promissory Note as Valuable Consideration ....................................................................................................... 17 5. Surrender of Legal Right as Consideration ......................................................................................................... 18 6. Unlawful Consideration ...................................................................................................................................... 18 7. Consideration Must Be Paid Before Notice of Competing Claim ..................................................................... 18 8. Pro Tanto Protection of Innocent Purchasers...................................................................................................... 18 9. Conveyances for Which Valuable Consideration Must Be Shown ..................................................................... 19 10. Valuable Consideration - Purchase at Execution Sale (Innocent Purchaser Doctrine) ....................................... 19

VI. WITHOUT NOTICE ............................................................................................................................................................ 19

A. Generally ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19 1. Notice May Be Actual or Constructive ............................................................................................................... 19

a. Abstracts of Judgment.................................................................................................................................. 19 2. Constructive Notice Generally a Question of Law ............................................................................................. 19 3. Actual Notice Generally a Question of Fact ....................................................................................................... 19 4. Evidentiary Presumptions Regarding Notice ...................................................................................................... 20 5. Timing of Notice ................................................................................................................................................. 20

a. Date That Junior Interest is Created ............................................................................................................. 20

b. Effect of Notice Before the Junior Interest is Created ................................................................................. 20

c. Effect of Notice After the Junior Interest Created ....................................................................................... 21 6. Notice Must Be Reliable? ................................................................................................................................... 21 7. Notice Must Be Specific to Senior Title ............................................................................................................. 21 8. Notice to Agent ................................................................................................................................................... 21 9. Notice to Principal .............................................................................................................................................. 22 10. Notice to Title Company. .................................................................................................................................... 22 11. Notice to Predecessor in Title ............................................................................................................................. 22 12. Notice of Successor in Title ................................................................................................................................ 22 13. Notice to Joint Purchaser/Mortgagee .................................................................................................................. 22 14. Notice to Partner ................................................................................................................................................. 22 15. Notice to Predecessor Entity ............................................................................................................................... 22 16. Duty of Inquiry ................................................................................................................................................... 22

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a. Threshold Level of Notice Triggering Duty of Inquiry ............................................................................... 23

b. Extent of Duty of Inquiry ............................................................................................................................. 23

c. Tolling the Duty of Inquiry .......................................................................................................................... 29 B. Actual Notice ............................................................................................................................................................... 29

1. Claims in Litigation ............................................................................................................................................ 29 2. Boundary Lines ................................................................................................................................................... 29 3. Effect of Bankruptcy on Actual Notice ............................................................................................................... 30

C. Constructive Notice By Form/Timing of Conveyance ................................................................................................. 30 1. Quitclaim Deeds .................................................................................................................................................. 30

a. Effect of Shelter Rule................................................................................................................................... 30

b. Sheriff=s or Constable=s Deeds .................................................................................................................. 30

c. Deeds by Personal Representative ............................................................................................................... 30 2. Deeds of Limited Warranty ................................................................................................................................. 30

D. Constructive Notice by Registration ............................................................................................................................ 30 1. Buyer May Rely on the Truth of Each Recorded Instrument .............................................................................. 31 2. Buyer May Rely Upon Construction of Instrument According to Commonly Accepted Meanings ................... 31 3. Class of Persons to Whom Registration is Notice ............................................................................................... 31

a. Limitations Statutes ..................................................................................................................................... 31 4. Documents Authorized to be Recorded .............................................................................................................. 32 5. Records Not Giving Constructive Notice of Land Titles .................................................................................... 32

a. Tax Records ................................................................................................................................................. 32

b. Estate Administration Proceedings .............................................................................................................. 32

c. Testamentary Instruments (Testator Not Yet Deceased) ............................................................................. 33

d. Litigation/Court Records ............................................................................................................................. 33

e. Courthouse Postings .................................................................................................................................... 33

f. Legal Notices in the Newspaper .................................................................................................................. 33

g. Municipal Ordinances and Records ............................................................................................................. 33

h. Marriage Records ......................................................................................................................................... 33

i. Railroad Commission Records..................................................................................................................... 33

j. Documents Not Authorized to be Recorded ................................................................................................ 33 6. Instrument Must Be in Buyer=s Chain of Title ................................................................................................... 33

a. Instrument by Interloper in Title .................................................................................................................. 34

b. Instrument With Inadequate Property Description ....................................................................................... 34

c. Instrument Apparently Expired or Barred .................................................................................................... 35

d. Void Instruments .......................................................................................................................................... 35

e. Conveyance Recorded Before Grantor Has Acquired Record Title. ........................................................... 35

f. Conveyance Recorded While Grantor Has Record Title ............................................................................. 36

g. Conveyance Recorded After Grantor Has Parted With Record Title ........................................................... 36

h. Released Lien Instrument ............................................................................................................................ 36

i. Instrument Relating to Different Tract ......................................................................................................... 36

j. Unrecorded Instrument ................................................................................................................................ 37

k. Recorded Plat ............................................................................................................................................... 38 7. Instrument Must Affect Buyer=s Title ................................................................................................................ 38 8. Extent of Constructive Notice Given By Instrument .......................................................................................... 38

a. Purchaser Charged With Notice of All Recitals in Instrument .................................................................... 38

b. Purchaser Charged With Notice of Documents Referenced by Instrument ................................................. 40 9. Notice Must Be of an Interest in Apparent Conflict with Purchaser=s Title ...................................................... 41 10. Estoppel .............................................................................................................................................................. 42

E. Constructive Notice by Possession .............................................................................................................................. 42 1. The General Rule ................................................................................................................................................ 42 2. Instances Where No Duty of Inquiry To Possessor Arises ................................................................................. 42

a. No Person in Possession .............................................................................................................................. 42

b. Possession Must be Accompanied by an Interest in the Property ................................................................ 42

c. Record Title Owner in Possession ............................................................................................................... 42

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d. Possession After Junior Title is Acquired .................................................................................................... 44

e. Possession Before Junior Title is Acquired ................................................................................................. 44

f. Deed Out of Possessor Absolute on its Face (the AEylar Rule@) ................................................................ 44

g. Possession Insufficiently Evident ................................................................................................................ 46

h. Possession by Stranger ................................................................................................................................. 47 3. Duty of Inquiry Arises From Fact of Possession Not Purchaser=s Knowledge of Possession ........................... 47 4. Extent of Duty of Inquiry .................................................................................................................................... 47

a. Possession Notice of Unrecorded Lien? ...................................................................................................... 47

b. No Duty to Inquire of Landlord if Tenant in Possession Without Notice of Unrecorded Deed .................. 47 5. Effect of Failure to Pursue Inquiry of Possessor ................................................................................................. 47

a. Possessor Without Knowledge of Status of Title ......................................................................................... 47

b. Possessor Misrepresenting Status of Title .................................................................................................... 48

c. Claims to Property Adverse to Possessor ..................................................................................................... 48 6. Effect of Possession of Only Part of the Property ............................................................................................... 48 7. Possession Through Tenant ................................................................................................................................ 48

a. Possession of Tenant as Notice of Landlord=s Rights ................................................................................. 48

b. Possession of Tenant as Notice of Tenant=s Rights .................................................................................... 48 8. Possession by Agent ............................................................................................................................................ 49 9. Possession by Co-Tenant .................................................................................................................................... 49 10. Possession by Affiliated Entity. .......................................................................................................................... 49

F. Constructive Notice By Lis Pendens ............................................................................................................................ 49 G. Constructive Notice By Physical Conditions on the Property ...................................................................................... 49

1. Recent Construction ............................................................................................................................................ 49 2. Evidence of Mineral Production or Exploration ................................................................................................. 50 3. Boundary Encroachments ................................................................................................................................... 50 4. Easements ........................................................................................................................................................... 50 5. Uniform Development As Notice of Deed Restrictions ...................................................................................... 50 6. Signs on Property ................................................................................................................................................ 50

VII. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF INSTRUMENTS .............................................................................................. 50

A. Effect of Recordation of an Unproved Instrument ....................................................................................................... 50 1. Inadequately Proved Instrument - Actual Notice ................................................................................................ 50 2. Inadequately Proved Instrument - Referenced by Another Instrument Which is Adequately Proved ................ 51

VIII. DUE RECORDATION......................................................................................................................................................... 51

A. Place of Recordation .................................................................................................................................................... 51 1. Effect of Subsequent Subdivision of the Property. ............................................................................................. 51 2. Rerecording Instrument Originally Filed in Wrong County ............................................................................... 51

B. English Language ......................................................................................................................................................... 51 C. Address of Grantee ....................................................................................................................................................... 51 D. Duties of Clerk Upon Filing of Instrument .................................................................................................................. 51

1. Filing ................................................................................................................................................................... 51 a. Constructive Notice of Instrument Effective Immediately Upon Filing ...................................................... 52

2. Recording ............................................................................................................................................................ 53 3. Indexing .............................................................................................................................................................. 53 4. Return of Instrument ........................................................................................................................................... 53

E. Documents Destroyed or Lost Before Recorded .......................................................................................................... 53 F. Recording of Judgments ............................................................................................................................................... 53

1. Recording a Judgment From Justice Court ......................................................................................................... 53

IX. ACTIONS INVOLVING THE RECORDING STATUTE ............................................................................................... 53

A. Pleading ........................................................................................................................................................................ 53 B. Burden of Proof ............................................................................................................................................................ 53

1. Recording Statute ................................................................................................................................................ 53 2. Innocent Purchaser Doctrine ............................................................................................................................... 54 3. Recording Statute for Judgments and Orders ...................................................................................................... 54

C. Jury Issues .................................................................................................................................................................... 54

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Registration Generally Permissive

The recordation of instrument concerning real property is ostensively permissive in nature.1 However, recordation is the prudent course,2 as it can have an effect on the priority of an instrument.3 Recordation, although extremely advisable, is not a required duty.4

B. Registration Generally Not Necessary to Effectiveness of Instrument

The purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties of the existence of an instrument affecting title to real property.5 Generally, the registration of an instrument is not necessary to its effectiveness as a conveyance or its enforceability between the immediate parties thereto.6 However, this general rule is subject to some notable refinements:

1. Documents Which Release, Transfer, Assign, Etc. a Previously Recorded Document.

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a) provides:

To release, transfer, assign or take another action relating to an instrument that is filed, registered, or recorded in the office of the County Clerk, a person must file, register, or record another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as the original instrument was required to be filed, registered, or recorded.7

The plain language of this provision has been interpreted to create a duty requiring recordation of any instrument releasing, assigning, transferring, or taking any other action with respect to an instrument previously filed with the County Clerk.8 While the consequences of failing to comply with this statutory directive are not completely clear,9 the failure to record such an amendatory instrument is generally not considered to be essential to its validity.10 The mandatory language of this statute is considered to be an administrative requirement for clerks, requiring that a party seeking to file an amendatory instrument file a wholly new amending instrument rather than a mere annotation or alteration made on the original document.11

The members of the mortgage banking industry have created an electronic mortgage tracking system (MERS) to facilitate the rapid transfer of mortgage loans among their members and to avoid the need to record these transfers in county property records.12 Under the MERS system, transfers of mortgage loans are tracked electronically on the MERS website, avoiding millions of dollars of recording

fees.13 In Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.,14 this tracking method, without real property recording, was held violative of TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192,007(a),15 potentially exposing MERS to suit for damages on theories of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.002 (filing fraudulent lien), fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy.16

2. Contractual Liens for Improvements Against Homestead

As a general rule, a contractual lien for improvements, like any other contractual lien, need not be recorded to be effective between the immediate parties to the transaction.

a. Residential Homesteads

However, this rule is complicated by special constitutional and statutory protections accorded to residential homesteads. There is a dispute among the authorities whether recordation is a requirement to make a contractual lien for improvements to a residential homestead effective between the immediate parties. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 requires, as a precondition to establishing an involuntary mechanic’s lien by operation of law on a residential homestead, that a written contract for improvements be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the homestead is located.17 This condition (for an involuntary lien) is not specifically adopted by reference for application to contractual liens for improvements by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b)(3).18 Some authorities have concluded that the filing requirements of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.254 are inapplicable to a contract lien.19 But other cases have applied the recording requirement to a contract lien. For example in In re Sorrell,20 a mechanic’s lien contract was ineffective when no evidence was presented that the contract had been filed and recorded in the county where the homestead was located.21 Sorrell also concluded that in order for a contractual lien against a residential homestead to be valid, the contract must be recorded before the commencement of work on the improvements.22 This reasoning is dubious. There is no express constitutional or statutory requirement to this effect.23

3. Extensions of Liens

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.036 provides that the parties primarily liable on a debt secured by a real property lien may suspend the limitations period for the lien by written extension agreement filed of record.24 This provision has been construed as a recording statute made for the benefit of subsequent purchasers or encumbrances.25 Recordation of such a renewal and extension is not necessary to the effectiveness of the renewal between the immediate parties thereto.26

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4. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens (Constitutional)

TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 37 creates a lien for mechanics, artisans, or materialmen upon buildings or articles made or repaired by them.27 This constitutional lien is said to be self executing and requires no recordation to make the constitutional lien valid between the owner and the contractor.28 Generally, the provision of notice to third parties is the only purpose for recording a constitutional mechanic’s lien.29


An exception to this general rule applies when perfecting an involuntary mechanic’s lien (constitutional) against a residential homestead. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 requires, as a condition to fixing an involuntary mechanic’s lien against a residential homestead,30 that the owner and the person providing the labor or materials enter into a written contract setting forth the terms of the agreement.31 That written contract must be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the homestead is located.32

There is no requirement that the written contract create or attempt to create a contractual lien. While the underlying written contract for improvements is a prerequisite to fixing an involuntary mechanic’s lien, it is not the source of that lien.33 Rather, the constitutional lien arises from the performance of the work and the satisfaction of all applicable constitutional and statutory requirements for the perfection of the lien.

With an involuntary mechanic’s lien (constitutional), the only filing requirement is that pertaining to the written contract between the owner and the original contractor. There is no requirement that contractor file a mechanic’s lien affidavit to make the lien enforceable between the contractor and the owner.34

5. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens (Statutory)

An involuntary mechanic’s lien (statutory) cannot be perfected or enforced, even between a contractor (or subcontractor) and the owner, unless a mechanic’s lien affidavit meeting all statutory formalities is filed within the required deadlines.35


In addition to the required lien affidavit, an involuntary mechanic’s lien (statutory) against a residential homestead must be supported by a written contract for the improvements setting forth the terms of the agreement and filed with the county clerk in the county in which the homestead is located.36 The filed contract must contain all of the formalities set out in TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 50(a)(5) and TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254.37

6. Bankruptcy Debtor-in-Possession

A bankruptcy debtor-in-possession is a separate juristic person than the pre-petition debtor. A bankruptcy debtor in possession has the same innocent purchaser status as a bankruptcy trustee.38 As a result, a lien must be recorded to be effective against a bankruptcy debtor in possession, although an unrecorded lien would have been effective against the same debtor outside of the bankruptcy context.39 In In re Earnest and Associates, Inc.,40 an unfiled constitutional mechanic’s lien, though perfected against the pre-petition debtor, was precluded by the innocent purchaser status of the debtor-in-possession after the bankruptcy was filed.41 This rule was applicable even though the debtor had actual notice of the lien claim and even though that actual notice, under general Recording Statute doctrine, would have rendered recordation unnecessary against the pre-petition debtor.42

7. Release of Tax Lien.

A release of a tax lien must be recorded in each county in which any part of the property is located.43

8. Transfers of Tax Lien.

A transfer of a tax lien by a taxing authority must be recorded in the county where the property is located in order to be enforceable by the transferee.44 The failure to record any such transfer may render a subsequent foreclosure sale voidable.45

C. The Common Law Rule Regarding Priority of Conveyances

The common law rule regarding the priority of conveyances is prior tempore potior jure - the first instrument executed (the “senior conveyance”) will prevail over any later executed and conflicting instrument (the “junior conveyance”).46 Under the common law rule, the junior interest takes the property subject to the senior title.47

D. General Thrust and Intent of Recording Statute

However, seniority does not always establish superiority.48 One such instance is when the Recording Statute is implicated. The Recording Statute is essentially an affirmative defense49 which, if satisfied, partially abrogates the common law rule for the priority of instruments and allows a junior conveyance to prevail over a conflicting senior conveyance.50 Recording statutes began in early Colonial America and have been present in Texas long before statehood.51 The Recording Statute is a specialized form of statutory estoppel which precludes the assertion of a senior title to the detriment of a junior title when the holder of the senior title has, willfully or negligently, failed to place same of record in a manner as would allow persons who deal with the property to be aware of the existence of the senior claim.52

Registration is intended to provide a comprehensive, convenient, and effective method of exhibiting publicly the

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condition of land titles.53 The law favors recorded instruments to preserve the stability and certainty of real property titles.54 Public policy requires that matters affecting title of real property be placed upon the public records so that potential purchasers and mortgagees may safely judge the status of the title.55 The Recording Statute is intended to expose the chain of title to inspection by examination of real property records56 and by this means protect innocent junior purchasers and lenders from injury or prejudice from secret titles and the subsequent fraud attendant to such titles.57 The law exacts from a buyer a duty to place his title of record to entitle him to the full advantage of his purchase,58 and failing to do so, the senior title must yield to a junior interest that the senior owner has assisted to mislead59 by concealing the evidence of his ownership.60 This rule fosters the security of land titles by allowing persons to rely on the apparent status of title as it may appear from the real property registry of the county where the land is located.61 A good faith purchaser should not lose title to real estate when he has exercised diligence to verify the seller’s ownership.62 As against an innocent purchaser apparent title becomes title in fact.63

An additional purpose of the Recording Statute is to protect senior titles from subsequent purchasers by disclosing them of record.64 The Recording Statute is a means by which a buyer may fix and secure his title against the world.65 While application of the recording statute can be harsh doing great injury to buyers whose good faith cannot be questioned, sympathy cannot be extended to a purchaser who was plainly notified of the opposing claim by a proper record.66 It may be said that such a buyer deservedly sustains any loss that results.67

E. The Elements of the General Recording Statute

The general recording statute is found at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 13.001(a). The Recording Statute provides:

(1) A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a mortgage or deed of trust

(2) is void (3) as to a [lien] creditor (4) or to a subsequent purchaser for valuable

consideration (5) without notice (6) unless the instrument has been acknowledged,

sworn to, or proved (7) and filed of record as required by law.68

F. Special Recording Statute for Court Orders and Judgments Affecting Title to Land

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005(a) supplements the general recording statute by providing that a court order partitioning or allowing recovery of title to land must be recorded with the county clerk of the county in which the land is located in order to be admitted into evidence to support a claim of right claimed under the order.69 This statute has been construed to be a recording statute not a rule of evidence.70

In Prewitt v. United States,71 a divorce decree awarded to former wife certain real property of the marriage.72 An IRS tax lien filed against the husband after entry of the decree but prior to its recordation was superior to the wife’s unrecorded interest in the property.73

G. Special Recording Statute for Extensions of Liens

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.035 16.037 supplement the general recording statute by providing that the 4 year statute of limitations applicable to the judicial or non-judicial foreclosures of real property liens is not suspended against an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer who acquires an interest in the property after the foreclosure is apparently barred by limitations except by written extension duly recorded in the county where the property is located.74 Otherwise, the extension is void as to a subsequent innocent purchaser for value.75 These provisions have been construed in part as a recording statute.76

H. Special Recording Statute for Lis Pendens

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12.007 12.008 supplement the general recording statute by providing that subsequent buyers or encumbrancers may be constructively notified of pending litigation affecting title to real property by recording a notice of lis pendens in the real property records of the county where the property is located.77

I. Special Recording Statute for Destroyed or Lost Public Records

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 19.008 19.009 supplement the general recording statute by providing special rules for re-recording instruments when public records are lost or destroyed. Adherence to these special rules continues in effect the constructive notice afforded by the destroyed or lost record.78

J. Special Recording Statute for Purchaser at Execution Sale

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 34.046 supplements the general recording statute by providing that a purchaser at an execution sale will be considered an innocent purchaser without notice the same as if the sale had been one voluntarily and in person by the judgment debtor.79

K. Special Recording Statute for Involuntary Mechanics’ Liens

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. Chapter 53, Subchapter C sets out the contents and filing deadlines for involuntary mechanic’s liens (statutory). These requirements are generally accepted to be prerequisites to the creation and perfection of such a statutory lien rather than a recording statute for the benefit of subsequent purchasers or encumbrances. However, some authorities suggest that the subchapter has an additional role. With respect to an involuntary mechanic’s lien (constitutional), the filing

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requirements are in the nature of a recording statute.80 These authorities suggest that the statutory filing requirements and deadlines must be complied with in order for there to be constructive notice of the constitutional lien to subsequent purchasers.81

L. Special Recording Statute for Partitions of Marital Real Property

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.106(b) supplements the general recording statute by providing that a partition and exchange agreement between spouses of marital real property is constructive notice to a good faith purchaser for value or creditor without notice if the instrument is acknowledged and recorded in the county in which the real property is located.82

M. History of the General Recording Statute

The recording statute has provided a means for notice of ownership in Texas land since the early proceedings of the Republic of Texas (1840).83 Prior to the recording statute, our present system of registration was unknown to common law.84

At the time of the adoption of Recording Statute there existed the related common law “Innocent Purchaser Doctrine”. The Recording Statute supplements but does not replace the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine. The common law Innocent Purchaser Doctrine still has present vitality in many transactions which fall outside the express statutory terms of the Recording Statute.

N. Construction of the General Recording Statute

Because it is in derogation of common law and equitable principles, the Recording Statute is strictly construed.85 Nevertheless, the law favors the Recording Statute.86 For cases coming within the statute, the innocent purchaser is a peculiar favorite of the law whose rights are jealously guarded.87 The defense of innocent purchaser is a strong one vigorously enforced. The equities underlying the defense are said to be among the most favorable that exist at law,88 and the innocent purchaser defense an impregnable legal fortress, a juristic Gibraltar resting on the strongest considerations of public policy.89

1. No Equitable Estoppel Exception to the Recording Statute.

The Recording Statute defines the elements of innocent purchaser status for all cases coming within its operation.90 The courts may not disregard or rewrite it even when they believe a straight application would be inequitable.91 There is not an equitable estoppel exception to the Recording Statute.92

O. The Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

An innocent purchaser who is not protected from a senior conveyance by the Recording Statute, may nevertheless claim the protection of equity by invoking the

Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.93 This equitable rule is an affirmative defense94 which operates independently of the Recording Statute.95

The Innocent Purchaser Doctrine provides that:

(1) a good faith purchaser of apparent legal title to real property

(2) who pays valuable consideration therefore (3) without notice (actual or constructive) of a

competing equitable interest (4) will be protected against others who may have

equitable title in the property purchased.96

Like the Recording Statute, the basis of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine is estoppel.97 When an owner has omitted or done something by which it is possible that his property has come into the hands of an innocent purchaser by an apparently valid title, it is deemed just to estop him from asserting his ownership and, by this means, protect an innocent purchaser.98 Equity will in such cases visit the loss upon the party who was negligent in allowing his title to be obscured or unknown and provide relief to the innocent party charging his position to his detriment in reliance on the record.99

P. Construction of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

The Innocent Purchaser Doctrine, as an equitable doctrine, has no hard and fast rule of narrow application.100 The rule is equitably and liberally applied.101

II. CONVEYANCES SUBJECT TO RECORDING STATUTE

A. Conveyance Required

In order to invoke the Recording Statute against a senior title, the senior title must have arisen by virtue of a conveyance required or permitted to be recorded.102 Without conveyance, the Recording Statute is not implicated.103 A “conveyance” is construed to mean any writing that affects title to land.104 It will pertain to any character of assignable interest in real property.105 Personal property interests are not effected by the Recording Statute.106

The recordation of an instrument not authorized or required to be recorded is a nullity and imparts no constructive notice.107 In Smalley v. Octagon Oil Co.,108 the senior claimant’s recordation of an ex parte affidavit claiming an interest in certain oil and gas leases was not an instrument authorized to be recorded therefore it imparted no constructive notice.109 However, in Turrentine v. Lasane,110 or affidavit of heirship was an instrument affecting title to land and properly recordable.111

B. Liens

Contractual liens on real property are subject to the Recording Statute.112 Mortgages, vendor’s liens, and deeds

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of trust are subject to registration.113 Contractual liens for improvements must also be registered.114

Instruments creating, releasing, transferring, subordinating,115 or assigning a contractual lien must likewise be recorded to be effective against a junior interest.116 The effect is that innocent mortgagees and contractual lien holders have the same protection under the Recording Statute as innocent purchasers.117 As a corollary to this rule, a release of lien by its record owner will protect an innocent purchaser against the later assertion of that lien against the purchaser or his successors.118

In Allen v. Hall,119 Hall purchased vendor’s lien notes in good faith without actual notice of any defense to them.120 However, prior to Hall’s purchase of the notes, a release of the liens had been duly recorded.121 The release was a recordable instrument which charged Hall with constructive notice that the liens were released.122 Hall did not acquire good title to the liens.123

There is a difference among the authorities regarding whether the assignment of a negotiable note secured by a lien must be recorded. Grand Court of Order of Calanthe of Texas v. Ebeling124 concluded that when a recorded deed of trust recited that it secured a series of negotiable bearer notes, that the transfer of these notes did not require a written recorded transfer to put a buyer on a duty of inquiry to determine the identity of the current holder of the bearer notes before acquiring an interest in the property.125 However, the better authority is that negotiable notes and the liens that secure them are severable.126 While the negotiable notes themselves are personal property and may be transferred by unrecorded assignment,127 the negotiable quality of the note does not govern the lien securing it.128 The law of notice (as embodied in the Recording Statute and the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine) controls in determining the rights of competing parties to the lien.129 The owner of a negotiable note secured by a lien on real estate must record his interest in the lien to protect himself against an innocent purchaser.130

C. Involuntary Mechanic’s Liens

Involuntary mechanic’s liens, both statutory and constitutional131 are not strictly conveyances but are subject to being precluded by a junior interest under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine. An involuntary mechanic’s lien may be protected from an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer by filing a lien affidavit under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052.132

D. Life Estates

A conveyance of a life estate is a conveyance within the ambit of the Recording Statute.133

E. Timber Deeds

Timber deeds conveying an interest in standing timber convey and interest in land subject to the Registration Statute.134

F. Leases

Real property leases and the assignment of same are subject to the Recording Statute.135

G. Mineral Interests

Mineral interests are interests in land are subject to the Recording Statute.136

H. Restrictive Covenants

Instruments creating restrictive covenants on real property are instruments affecting title to land and are subject to the Recording Statute.137

I. Easements

Express easements are conveyances of land which are subject to the Recording Statute.138

1. Easements by Estoppel

An easement by estoppel arising by operation of law, may not be imposed against a subsequent innocent purchaser for value buying without notice of the easement.139

2. Easements Implied by Prior Use

Likewise, an easement implied by prior use may not be enforced against a subsequent innocent purchaser for value buying without notice of the easement.140

J. Wills and Estates

1. Unrecorded Deed By Decedent

A purchaser from an estate or from the heirs of a decedent may claim the protection of an innocent purchaser.141 Such a purchaser from an estate will be protected against an unrecorded inter vivos deed by the deceased.142 This rule applies even if the purchaser is also an heir of the decedent buying out the interests of other heirs.143

K. Deeds by Minors

There is no exclusion in the Recording Statute exempting deeds by or on behalf of minors from the operation of the Recording Statute.144

L. Written Express Trusts

The authorities are not in accord whether the Recording Statute applies to an interest in land created by written but unrecorded express trust. In Johnson v. Darr,145 property was deeded to F.B. Jones by the Woodmen of the World (WOW) for a nominal consideration.146 Contemporaneously with the deed, Jones executed an unrecorded agreement to hold the property in trust for WOW and to reconvey it as directed.147 Held that this

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contemporaneous agreement was not a conveyance requiring registration under the Recording Statute.148 However, see an opposite result involving a similar unrecorded agreement to reconvey in Stephens v. Keating.149

Martin v. Cummer Mfg. Co.150, determined that a written declaration of trust was not an instrument authorized or required to be registered.151 As a result, its recordation did not give constructive notice of its contents.152

M. Equitable Interests Are Not Subject to Recording Statute

The Recording Statute is not applicable to an equitable interest in real property acquired independent of legal title.153 That is because equitable title arises by operation of law and exists independent of the execution of a deed such that a deed is not essential to the effectiveness of the conveyance of equitable title.154 It is reasoned that the owner of such an equitable interest does not have the opportunity nor is he required to spread his title on the record to the same extent as one owning some species of legal title.155 As a result, the Recording Statute is unavailable to the owner of a junior interest seeking to prime a more senior equitable interest.

Examples of equitable interests in real property which are not subject to the Recording Statute include:156

1. Resulting Trusts

The person who furnishes the consideration for the purchase of property may be deemed by equity to be its true owner notwithstanding that ostensive legal title is held by another.157 By the equitable remedy of a resulting trust, the owner of a beneficial interest in land may require its conversion into legal title.158 Until that equitable title is so converted, it will not be lost to a junior interest by operation of the Recording Statute.159

For example in Estelle v. Hart,160 L.C. Estelle bought property in his name with the separate property funds of his wife, Fanny Estelle.161 Hart obtained a judgment against L.C. Estelle and attempted to foreclose a judgment lien against the property.162 The foreclosure was denied because beneficial title to the property was reposed in the separate estate of Fanny Estelle under a resulting trust theory.163 Fanny’s heirs were not precluded by the Recording Statute from raising their equitable title in defense of the judgment lien.164

A different rule applies if the resulting trust is settled by a conveyance placing legal title in the trust beneficiary.165 Once the legal and equitable titles are united in one person the Recording Statute takes effect immediately.166 In Calvert v. Roche,167 P.R. Trial bought property with funds belonging to Roche creating a resulting trust in favor of Roche.168 The trust was later settled by unrecorded deed out of Trial and into Roche.169 When Trial’s judgment creditors attached a judgment lien to the

property, Roche was not exempt from the Recording Statute.170 The resulting trust ended with the deed in settlement thereof. That deed was required to be recorded the same as any other conveyance of legal title.171

2. Constructive Trusts

The equitable remedy of constructive trust rests on unjust enrichment. The remedy can be used to right a wrong when the person holding legal title to property is under an equitable duty to convey it to another. If property is acquired in an unconscientious manner, equity will not allow the legal owner to retain what rightfully should belong to another.172 As a shambling creature of equity, this remedy exists on a fenceless field with hazy boundaries.173 There are many different factual situations which may support the imposition of such a trust.174 The basic function of the remedy is wrest legal title to property away from a wrongdoer and vest it in the wronged party through the legal fiction of a trust. So long as the interest of the beneficiary of such a trust remains equitable, it is not subject to the Recording Statute.175

3. Parol Trusts

A beneficial interest owned under a parol or unrecorded express trust is not subject to the recording statute.176 In Henderson v. Rushing,177 P. Henderson agreed to buy land for H. Henderson taking the property in the name of P. Henderson.178 When P. Henderson’s judgment creditor levied execution against the property, the lien creditor was not an innocent purchaser as to the equitable interest of M. Henderson in the land arising under the parol express trust between the Hendersons.179

4. Executory Contracts of Conveyance

An executory contract for the conveyance of real property places in the buyer superior equitable title to property and leaves the seller as the holder of naked legal title.180 It has generally been determined that the Recording Statute has no application to the buyer’s equitable title obtained under a Contract for Deed.181 Such a sale is not considered a bargain, sale, or conveyance which passes an interest in real property.182

The Property Code requires the seller to record an executory contract to convey real property used or to be used as a residence by either the purchaser or a close family member of the purchaser.183 Has this statutory development now placed residential contracts for deed within the coverage of the Recording Statute? This question is not yet answered.

In Smith v. Sumcer Homes, Inc.,184 Shaddock contracted to purchase property from Landstar, paid the purchase price at closing, and otherwise fully performed.185 However, through oversight, no deed from Landstar to Shaddock was executed or recorded.186 As the result of this transaction, equitable title passed to Shaddock which could not be precluded by the Recording Statute.187

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5. Equitable Right of Reformation

A conveyance which by fraud, accident, or mutual mistake fails to reflect the true intentions of the parties may be reformed in equity to correct its terms.

While reformation is an equitable remedy, equitable title sufficient to be exempt from the Recording Statute refers to a present right to legal title which is available in a statutory action of trespass to try title.188 This type of equitable title is distinguished from a mere equitable right to reform a deed not absolutely void.189 Authorities have determined that reformation, as a right or title arising in equity, is subject to being precluded by the Recording Statute.190

Henderson v. Odessa Bldg & Loan Ass’n,191 determined that an equitable right of a prior buyer to reform a mistaken deed to read “lot 2, block 102" instead of “lot 2, block 103" was inferior to a judgment lien abstracted by the vendor’s judgment creditor against the lot intended to be conveyed when the lien creditor had no notice of the mistake at the time that the lien was abstracted.192

6. Parol Partitions

Parol partitions of property made by mutual agreement of co tenants create an equity in favor each to enforce the agreed upon division. This equity collides with the Recording Statute when an interest intervenes between the parol partition and its enforcement. It is generally accepted that the equitable right created by a parol partition is not within the operation of the Recording Statute.193 In Allday v. Whittaker,194 Frank and Cobb owned as cotenants 50 acres bisected by a railroad right-of-way.195 Frank and Cobb orally agreed to a partition with Frank taking all of the property west of the railroad and Cobb taking all to the east.196 Held a purchaser deraigning title through an intervening lien creditor of Frank could not disrupt the title of Cobb in the easterly tract by use of the Recording Statute.197

7. Equitable Liens

When a third party advances purchase money to a buyer upon an oral promise that the buyer will execute a mortgage and give a lien as security, an equitable lien arises in favor of the lender.198 Likewise, an equitable vendor=s lien arises in favor of the seller to secure any deferred purchase consideration without any special agreement to that effect.199 Such an equitable lien is not subject to the Recording Statute.200

In IRS v. Fagin,201 Fagin borrowed money from his parents for a down payment on his house promising them a deed of trust lien on the house in return.202 This promise gave rise to an equitable lien in favor of the parents which was superior to a later filed federal tax lien.203

8. Equitable Subrogation

Under certain conditions, when one party pays the mortgage lien debt of another, the payor is equitably subrogated to the rights of the lien holder although no assignment of the lien is recorded.204 This equitable right is not capable of registration and falls outside the coverage of the Recording Statute.205 In Rusk v. Parmer,206 a wife paid off a community mortgage with her separate property funds to become subrogated to the lien of the original mortgagee.207 When a judicial lien later attached to the property, the Recording Statute did not preclude her from asserting her prior equitable subrogation lien rights.208

N. Equitable Interests Are Subject to the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

While a senior equitable title cannot be defeated by use of the Recording Statute, the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine can be used to supercede a preexisting equitable title.209 This is the context where the Doctrine is most often employed. In such a contest between two competing equities, the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine is said to be a perfect defense in equity to a senior equitable estate.210

Examples of equitable title which can be subjected to the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine include:

1. Resulting Trusts

Although a resulting trust is not subject to registration, it is not proof against an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the preexisting yet unexpressed equitable interest.211 In Hawley v. Geer,212 Hobdy purchased a lot in his name using funds belonging to Freeman.213 Hobdy never claimed or controlled the land.214 Freeman occupied and improved the property.215 Under these facts a trust resulted in favor of Freeman although he had no record title to the lot.216 Geer, a remote vendee of Hobdy claimed title to the lot under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.217 While the doctrine was available to estop the assertion of title deraigning from a resulting trust, Geer failed to demonstrate that she was an innocent purchaser without notice.218

2. Constructive Trusts

An innocent purchaser for value is not affected by a deed in his chain of title which, though regular on its face, was procured by fraud or other deception.219 If one defrauded or otherwise wronged asserts the equitable remedy of constructive trust to recover legal title, a bona fide purchaser for value will prevail over such a preexisting equitable interest.220 In Blair v. Hennessey,221 Blair acquired legal title to 1,175 acres in Leon County.222 Unknown to Blair an instrument in his title was derived by fraud.223 The successor of the defrauded party sought to impose a constructive trust to recover legal title to the property.224 Blair defended under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine claiming that he acquired his interest in the property for value without knowledge of the fraud.225 While a bona fide purchaser for value can prevail over a

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party claiming equitable title under a constructive trust, Blair failed to qualify as an innocent purchaser.226

3. Executory Contracts of Conveyance

An executory contract for conveyance places superior equitable title in the buyer, with the seller retaining naked legal title.227 While the buyer’s equitable interest may not be subject to registration,228 it can be precluded by bona fide purchaser for value under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.229 In Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,230 Martin purchased property from Joyce under an unrecorded executory contract of conveyance.231 Joyce later executed a deed of trust to Reynolds Mortgage Company on the same property after Martin had paid all sums due on the contract for deed.232 Reynolds, as an innocent mortgagee for value without knowledge of Martin’s equitable title, had a superior interest in the property.233

4. Equitable Right of Reformation

An equitable right to seek reformation of an instrument which by fraud, accident, or mutual mistake of the parties fails to reflect their true intentions is subject to preclusion by the Recording Statute. Refer to II(M)(5) supra. The same is true with the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.234 In Cetti v. Wilson,235 Mahone by mutual mistake conveyed a one half undivided interest in 640 acres to Gregg instead of the one fourth undivided interest intended.236 Cetti acquired by deed Mahone’s interest in the mistakenly conveyed one fourth undivided interest.237 However, prior to the recordation of Cetti’s chain of title, a judgment creditor of Gregg levied execution on Gregg’s record title to same. The property was sold at execution sale to Blount for cash consideration.238 Blount had no knowledge of the mistake in the original Mahone transaction.239 Under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine, Blount’s legal title was superior to Cetti’s equitable right to reform the mistaken Mahone deed.240

In Mansfield v. Roy,241 a deed absolute on its face was actually intended as a mortgage.242 However, once title passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser without knowledge of the true nature of the instrument, the buyer acquired the property free of the interest of the mortgagor.243

5. Parol Partitions

A parol partition of property, while outside the operation of the Recording Statute, is subject to the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.244 In Allday v. Whittaker,245 Frank and Cobb owned as co tenants 50 acres bisected by a railroad right-of-way.246 Frank and Cobb orally agreed to a partition. Frank took all property west of the railroad. Cobb took all to the east.247 A lien creditor of Frank levied execution on the easterly tract and sold it at a sheriff’s sale to Allday.248 Allday paid valuable consideration with no knowledge of the parol partition.249 Held that the parol partition was ineffective against an innocent purchaser for value.250

6. Equitable Liens

An equitable vendor’s lien arises in favor of a seller who sells land for a deferred consideration notwithstanding that no express lien is retained and notwithstanding that the deed is absolute on its face.251 This equitable lien may be precluded by the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.252

7. Equitable Subrogation

A junior lien can become superior to a senior lien by equitable subrogation.253 Under equitable subrogation, a third party will succeed to the rights of the senior lender when the third party satisfies the borrower’s obligation to the senior lender.254

8. Parol Dedication

In Adoue & Lobit v. Town of LaPorte,255 an innocent purchaser for value took property free of a parol dedication of part of the property for a city park made by a prior vendee.256

9. Parol Boundary Line Agreement

In Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Dupuy,257 a parol boundary line agreement was ineffective against a subsequent innocent purchaser for value.258

10. Parol Gift

In Massey v. Lewis,259 an innocent purchaser for value took free of a prior parol gift of the property.260

11. Conditional Sale

In Tuerpe v. George W. Saunders Livestock Comm=n Co.,261 the innocent purchaser doctrine precluded the enforcement against a subsequent purchaser of an unrecorded agreement to reconvey the property back to the grantor of a deed absolute on its face within a specified time.262

12. Parol Trust

An innocent purchaser for value without notice takes free of a parol trust on the property.263 For example, in Fidelity Lumber Co. v. Bendy,264 when property was conveyed to Haralson with a parol agreement that Haralson was to hold timber in trust for others and reconvey it upon request with all profits to be split among the beneficiaries, a subsequent purchaser of the timber for value without notice of the parol trust took the property free of the trust.265

O. Limitations Title Not Subject to Recording Statute/Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

The defense of innocent purchaser is not available against an owner whose title has been perfected by limitations.266 If the limitations claimant has been in possession of the property for the statutory period, his title is perfect against the record title holder. The limitations

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claimant is vested with ownership of the land as fully as with any other character of title.267 Limitations title does not flow from a contract between parties which could be reduced to writing and recorded.268 Thus it is not subject to registration.269 As a result, a purchaser from the legal title owner is not entitled to innocent purchaser protection from a competing title acquired by limitations.270 A party buying paper title receives in such cases only the interest of his grantor, and, if that has been lost by adverse possession, the buyer receives nothing.271

1. Prescriptive Easements

Prescriptive easements are a form of limitations title which cannot be defeated by an innocent purchaser under the Recording Statute.272

P. Governmental Units Are Subject to the Recording Statute

A governmental unit, like an individual, is subject to having its title precluded by an innocent purchaser under the Recording Statute.273

1. Exception – Ad Valorem Tax Liens.

An ad valorem tax lien is perfected and has priority regardless of whether it is recorded by the taxing authority.274

Q. Financing Statements

The Recording Statute is not applicable to a financing statement or a security agreement filed as a financing statement or to any continuation statement for a financing statement.275

III. VOID AS TO SUBSEQUENT CREDITOR OR PURCHASER

A. Class of Persons Protected by the Recording Statute

The Recording Statute only protects creditors and subsequent purchasers for value without notice.276 Beyond that, it offers no protection against unrecorded instruments.277

B. General Recording Statute

Under the Recording Statute, an unrecorded senior conveyance is deemed “void” as to a subsequent creditor or innocent purchaser for value.278 As to the party claiming the benefit of the Recording Statute, the instrument does not exist.279 The effect as to that party is the same as if there had been no senior conveyance at all.280

1. Right of Redemption

Void means void. The senior title generally cannot force the innocent purchaser to give up his rights in the property by any equitable right of redemption.281

However, in reference to ad valorem tax liens, the rule is different. The redemption provisions of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06 mitigate the harsh effect of a transferred tax lien foreclosure by allowing the holder of a “first lien”, in addition to the owner of the property, a specified period to redeem the property from the purchaser after the sale at foreclosure of such a transferred tax lien.282 In ABN Amro Mtg. v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land,283 a transferred tax lien was foreclosed on property encumbered by an unrecorded deed of trust.284 Held the unrecorded senior lien was not void for the limited purposes of the redemption statute and remained a “first lien” with a right to timely redeem the property from the purchaser at the tax sale.285

C. Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

The rule under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine is essentially the same.286 As to an innocent purchaser for value, the elder instrument has no effect.287

D. Unrecorded Judgments

The special recording statute for judgments affecting title to land at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005 recites that unrecorded judgments are inadmissible in evidence as opposed to “void” as in the case of unrecorded instruments.288 While authorities have construed this Property Code provision as a recording statute,289 there is dispute in the cases whether inadmissibility is exactly the same functional concept as void.290

IV. LIEN CREDITORS

The Recording Statute may be invoked by (1) a “creditor” or (2) a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration if either are without notice of the senior interest.291 Both are accorded equal protection under the Recording Statute.292

A. Creditor Refers to Lien Creditor

A “creditor” within the meaning of the Recording Statute refers to a lien creditor who has acquired a lien by a proceeding at law.293 It does not refer to a general creditor294 or one holding a contract lien.295

B. Creditor Not Limited to Subsequent Lien Creditor

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) makes a transaction void as to a creditor or subsequent purchaser.296 “Subsequent” modifies purchaser not creditor.297 Existing lien creditors whose interest preceded the unrecorded transaction are protected by the Recording Statute.298

C. Creditor Refers to Lien Creditor Without Notice

While the language in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 13.001 is far from clear, decisional authorities have determined that Acreditor@, as used in the Recording Statute, refers to a creditor without notice of the senior title

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(the same requirement imposed on a subsequent purchaser).299

It is wholly immaterial whether the lien creditor has actually examined the records as to the title of his debtor or not.300 The advantages of the Recording Statute will inure to the lien creditor irrespective. The rule is one of statute not equity.301

D. Lien Creditor Under the Recording Statute Need Not Pay Valuable Consideration

Unlike the holder of a contract lien, a lien creditor need not show the payment of valuable consideration to invoke the Recording Statute.302 Blum v. Schwartz303 reasoned that if the rule were otherwise, it would always require the lien creditor to bid in the property for his debt at a forced sale of the property when he ought to be entitled to money.304 Such a rule would effectively destroy competitive bidding at such sales.305

In Baker v. West,306 Baker filed an abstract of judgment after obtaining a judgment against Ramsey.307 Baker later obtained a writ of execution and bought the property at the subsequent sheriff=s sale for $50 of which $37.50 was a credit against the judgment.308 It was immaterial that Baker paid part of the purchase price as a credit against the judgment. Under the Recording Statue, Baker, as a lien creditor, was not required to show payment of valuable consideration.309

E. Types of Lien Creditors Covered by Recording Statute

Lien creditors qualifying as Acreditors@ under the Recording Statute include:

1. Judgment Creditors Levying By Writ of Execution or Attachment

A judgment creditor who has levied upon the property by writ of execution or attachment is a Acreditor@ under the Recording Statute.310

2. Judgment Creditors Filing an Abstract of Judgment

A judgment creditor who has attached a lien on a property by filing an Abstract of Judgment is also a creditor under the Recording Statute.311

3. Trustee in Bankruptcy

A trustee in bankruptcy, as a fictional lien creditor, is a creditor within the meaning of the Recording Statute.312 A bankruptcy trustee also qualifies as an innocent purchaser.313

In In re Atravasada Land and Cattle, Inc.314 Atravasada Land and Cattle executed a mineral deed to its principal stockholder on February 20, 1979 which was not recorded until March 15, 1982.315 Atravasada, in the interim, had filed bankruptcy with a trustee being appointed on March

17, 1981.316 The unrecorded deed was void as to the bankruptcy trustee who occupied the position of a fictional lien creditor.317

4. Bankruptcy Debtor-in-Possession

A bankruptcy debtor-in-possession is a separate juristic person from the pre-petition debtor having the same innocent purchaser status as a bankruptcy trustee.318

5. Judicial Foreclosure

In McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co.,319 Aultman & Taylor Machinery Co. (Aultman), as beneficiary under a deed of trust, filed suit to judicially foreclose a deed of trust lien.320 When a judgment was entered in the suit judicially foreclosing the lien and providing for an Order of Sale, Aultman became a Acreditor@ within the meaning of the recording statute.321

6. Mechanic=s Liens

The holder of a statutory mechanic=s lien is a creditor for the purposes of the Recording Statute.322

7. Landlord=s Liens

The holder of a statutory landlord=s lien is a creditor for the purposes of the Recording Statute.323

8. Tax Liens

Federal and state tax liens make the filing agency a creditor within the meaning of the Recording Statute.324

F. Creditor=s Lien Attaches To All Apparent Interest of Debtor

The lien of a lien creditor attaches to all apparent interest of the debtor in a property.325 By this means, a judgment lien takes precedence over a prior unrecorded instrument unless the lien creditor had notice by any means of that instrument at or before the time that the lien was fixed on the property.326 In this situation, the lien creditor can obtain a higher title in the property than his debtor has.327 The lien creditor=s interest in the property can continue even after the debtor=s interest has terminated.328 For Example, in Gibraltar Sav. Ass=n v. Martin,329 the judgment debtor, Charles Floyd, conveyed all of his 2 undivided interest in a property to J.D. Martin by deed dated November 24, 1981.330 On September 14, 1986, Gibraltar Savings Association recorded an abstract of judgment against Floyd.331 Floyd=s deed to Martin was later recorded on October 30, 1987.332 Held that Gibraltar=s judgment lien was superior to the legal title of Martin under the unrecorded deed.333

1. When Lien Creditor Has Notice of a Prior Unrecorded Conveyance

A different result in Folkes v. Wyatt,334 when a judgment creditor had actual knowledge of an unrecorded

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deed at the time of levy. The judgment lien and the title of the purchaser at the execution sale was inferior to that prior unrecorded deed.335

2. When No Apparent Title is in the Judgment Debtor

In some cases, there may be no recorded conveyance either into or out of the judgment debtor at the time that a judgment lien attaches. For example, in Lewis v. San Antonio Belt & Terminal Ry.,336 the property was involved in a series of sales: (1) L.A. Dolan sold to H.E. Hildebrand by deed dated November 15, 1913 and recorded August 16, 1915; (2) H.E. Hildebrand sold to Thomas A. Reynolds by deed dated July 7, 1914 and recorded on August 16, 1915; and (3) Thomas A. Reynolds sold to San Antonio Belt & Terminal Ry. by deed dated July 22, 1914 and recorded on March 3, 1915.337 An abstract of judgment was recorded against Hildebrand on July 20, 1915.338 Held the Recording Statute did not allow the lien to attach to the property even though the deed out of Hildebrand was unrecorded when the abstract was filed.339 The rule allowing a judgment lien creditor to prevail over an unrecorded deed is inapplicable unless record title is in the judgment debtor at the time that the abstract of judgment is filed or thereafter.340

Similarly, in Steele v. Harris,341 Steele purchased certain property on January 27, 1927. He conveyed the property to his brother on the same day.342 Neither the deed into or out of Steele was recorded until June 30, 1927.343 On June 18, 1927, Harris abstracted a judgment against Steele.344 Held that because Steele was not the record owner of the property, the Recording Statute was inapplicable.345

G. Creditor=s Rights Under Recording Statute Are Fixed At Time Lien Attaches

The rights of the lien creditor are fixed under the Recording Statute at the moment that the lien attaches to the property.346 This may be by the levy of a writ of execution, the filing of an abstract of judgment, or (in the case of the fictional lien of a bankruptcy trustee) at the petition date of a bankruptcy.347 Any successor of the lien creditor=s rights, for example a purchaser at a subsequently-held execution sale, inherits the equities and priority position established by the lien creditor when the lien originally attached to the property.348 Thus, when the lien creditor has no notice of a preexisting unrecorded right at the time the lien attaches, the creditor takes a right superior to that of the unrecorded owner and a purchaser under a sale enforcing that lien takes good title even though notice of the unrecorded interest is given at a time after the lien attaches.349

H. Lien Creditors Under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

Only bona fide purchasers for value may invoke the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.350 Lien Creditors are a class of protected junior title holders only for cases falling within the ambit of the Recording Statute.351 Lien creditors are not considered to be innocent purchasers for value.352 The

rationale for this rule lies in the failure of the lien creditor to expend new value at the time that the lien attaches.353 If the lien creditor=s lien fails, the creditor is in no worse position than he occupied when the lien was fixed.354 As a result, there is not consideration expended by the lien creditor which justifies equity in giving that creditor a superior right.355 The lien creditor is not in the same attitude as a true innocent purchaser for value who has actually expended his money in good faith to the amount of the purchase price and is more justly entitled to be held harmless.356

The common law Innocent Purchaser Doctrine operates when the senior interest in conflict with the judgment lien is an equitable title.357 At common law, the rule was stated that a judgment lien attached only to the actual interest that the record title holder owned in the property at the time that the lien attached.358 Such a lien, under the common law rule, did not attach to a greater interest in the land than the debtor owned even though the deed records erroneously disclosed that the debtor owned a greater interest.359 Stated another way, liens arising by operation of law are not superior to a senior and conflicting equitable title.360 The title acquired by the purchaser at the sale is subject to every equity against the land that could have been enforced against the holder of legal title on the date that the lien attached.361

In Cadle v. Harvey,362 Kelly sold property to Harvey under an executory contract of conveyance.363 A later judgment against Kelly was abstracted on the same property by Cadle.364 Held the equitable interest of Harvey in the property was superior to that of the judgment lienholder.365 This was true through Harvey had not completed payment of the deferred consideration specified by the executory contract of conveyance at the time that Harvey took possession.366 The result was not altered when Harvey completed payment of the deferred consideration and received a deed from Kelly conveying to Harvey legal title to the property. Harvey held equitable title before receiving legal title and that initial interest was superior to that of the lien creditor.367

In Gaona v. Gonzales,368 Rachel Gonzales entered into an executory contract of conveyance to sell property to Gaona.369 Gaona paid part but not all of the agreed consideration.370 Rodolfo Gonzales then abstracted a judgment lien against Rachel.371 Held the equitable title of Gaona under the executory contract of conveyance was superior to the judgment lien of Rodolfo.372 However, the retained legal title of Rachel, together with the right to receive the remaining unpaid portion of the deferred purchase consideration from Gaona, could be reached by the judgment lien.373 Rodolfo could recover the remaining unpaid purchase price from Gaona after Gaona was notified of Rodolfo=s interest.374

If the judgment lien is actually foreclosed and the property sold at a sheriff=s or constable=s sale to an innocent purchaser for value, a preexisting equitable title may be precluded under the common law rule.375 The Innocent Purchaser Doctrine may be invoked either by the

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lien creditor, if the creditor is the successful bidder at the sale, or by a third-party purchaser.376 The rule of notice is no different than in the case of a voluntary sale.377 A buyer at an execution sale will be an innocent purchaser if that buyer would have been so at a voluntary sale.378

Unlike cases under the Recording Statute, the relevant time for determining innocent purchaser status is on the date of sale not the date that the lien attached.379 In Caldwell v. Bryan=s Executor,380 a writ of attachment was levied on property standing in the name of the judgment debtor, C.H. Beauchamp, Sr. on December 2, 1887.381 An execution sale was later conducted at which sale the buyer was given notice of Ella Beauchamp=s claimed but unrecorded interest in the property.382 Held that if the nature of Ella Beauchamp=s interest was a resulting trust (requiring the application of the common law Innocent Purchaser Doctrine) then the notice given at the sale was sufficient to prevent the buyer from being an innocent purchaser even if the creditor had no notice of Ella Beauchamp=s claim at the time that the writ of attachment was levied.383 However, if Ella Beauchamp=s interest amounted to legal title under an unrecorded deed (requiring application of the Recording Statute) then notice of Ella Beauchamp=s interest given after the levy of the writ of attachment was irrelevant as the purchaser at the sale would be unaffected by notice given after the lien was fixed.384 An examination of the facts determined that the property was originally acquired in the name of C.H. Beauchamp, Sr. in part with property belonging to Ella Beauchamp.385 As a consequence, a pro tanto trust resulted in favor of Ella.386 However by the time of that the writ of attachment was levied, C.H. Beauchamp, Sr. had given Ella an unrecorded deed in settlement of the trust.387 This placed legal title with Ella, bringing her title within the operation of the Recording Statute.388 As with any other grantee under an unrecorded deed, Ella=s interest was precluded when the lien creditor, having no knowledge of her interest, levied a writ of attachment on the property.389 Notice given after the writ was levied was ineffective.390

In Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Lewis,391 a buyer at an execution sale learned of a preexisting equitable vendor=s lien prior to the execution sale.392 As a result, the buyer was not an innocent purchaser. The buyer acquired the property subject to the equitable lien.393

V. INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

A. Innocent Purchaser

1. Innocent Purchaser Status a Legal Conclusion

The determination that a buyer or mortgagee is an innocent purchaser is generally a legal conclusion.394

2. Purchase Required

To qualify as an innocent purchaser, the buyer must acquire an interest in real property by legitimate purchase.

a. Merger Not a Purchase

An entity succeeding to the rights and property of another entity by merger or consolidation is not entitled to the protections of an innocent purchaser but succeeds only to the rights of the former entity.395

3. Good Faith Required

A person cannot be an innocent purchaser without (1) valuable consideration, (2) absence of notice, and (3) good faith.396 All three of these elements must be present.397 The good faith requirement is one distinct from and in addition to the issue of consideration or notice.398 A person may have no knowledge of the senior conflicting claim yet lack good faith as when a purchaser remains purposefully unaware of facts which he would have learned had he been scrupulous about the rights of others.399

Texas law does not provide a definitive explanation of what constitutes good faith sufficient to make one an innocent purchaser in the acquisition of real property.400 Generally, it can be said that the inquiry centers on whether the purchaser is aware of circumstances (independent of the chain of title) that would put him on notice of an unrecorded claim.401 Something that would excite suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence.402 Good faith may be defined generally as a state of mind consisting of (1) honesty of belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one=s duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage.403 The standard may vary from situation to situation.404 Good faith is a mental state405 and must usually be proven by circumstantial evidence.406 The presence or absence of good faith is proven by any competent means including fair presumptions and inferences as to the real object and interest of the parties.407

In Texas, there is a rebuttable presumption that business transactions are performed in good faith and for an honest purpose.408 In In re Harydzak,409 a loan was made in good faith when adequately collateralized (the loan was in an amount 60% of the value of the collateral) and made to a repeat borrower with a successful track record of repaying its obligations.410

a. Titles Acquired by Speculation

The good faith requirement is meant to thwart those who would speculate on land by attempting to acquire through the benefit of the Recording Statute a title which they do not really believe that their vendor actually owns.411 Speculation within the meaning of this rule means a purchase out of the ordinary course of business involving unusual or hazardous risk of loss at a chance of large gain or profit.412

In Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc.,413 Alamo Fireworks bought a lot adjacent to one owned and used as a retail outlet by its competitor.414 Alamo was aware that it was common in the fireworks

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industry for companies to tie up adjacent tracts with unrecorded leases not likely to show up on a title search.415 Alamo took its deed subject to broad exceptions to Aanything outstanding@ choosing to make no inquiry of the seller.416 Alamo had in the past been the victim of a predatory purchase in reverse by the same competitor at a different location.417 These facts evidenced an effort by Alamo to remain purposefully ignorant of competing claims demonstrating a lack of good faith.418 In Richerson v. Moody,419 a purchaser=s purposeful failure to inspect the land for fear of finding a possessor with knowledge of a conflicting claim prevented innocent purchaser status.420

However, in Strong v. Strong,421 when Sun Oil took leases without having an abstract of title done or sending someone into the area to make an investigation, this did not show any want of good faith.422

b. Titles Subject to Litigation

A buyer who acquires a claim to property for the purposes of asserting title to it in a judicial proceeding cannot be deemed an innocent purchaser.423 In Hopper v. Tancil,424 Kleas was not an innocent purchaser when he habitually dealt in speculative titles, was told up front that this purchase was a Aspeculation@, paid little for the property for a chance of considerable gain, and knew the property was in litigation.425

c. Titles Acquired by Inequitable Conduct

The good faith element may likewise be destroyed by proof of inequitable conduct on the part of the buyer in the transaction.426 This may include proof of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or bad faith.427 A party claiming to be an innocent purchaser must come into a court in equity with absolutely clean hands.428

In Cohen v. Hawkins,429 a buyer was not a good faith purchaser when he knowingly participated in a transaction where the owner=s attorney-in-fact sold the property for the benefit of the attorney-in-fact only and contrary to the duties of that agent under the power of attorney.430

d. Effect of Inadequate Consideration

While the good faith of a buyer is an element of innocent purchaser proof separate and apart from the requirement for valuable consideration, the adequacy of consideration may be considered as one circumstance in determining the issue of good faith.431

e. Time for Determination of Good Faith

Good faith status is determined at the time the subsequent purchaser acquires his interest in the property.432

4. AApparent Title@ Must be Acquired

To be an innocent purchaser for value it is essential that the purchaser have acquired by conveyance some form

of apparent title.433 The title of the innocent purchaser must apparently deraign though a chain of legitimate conveyances traceable back to a holder of legal title to the property.434 If the purchaser=s grantor never had title nor apparent title, the issue of innocent purchaser does not arise.435

ATitle@ in the context of apparent title refers to what appears to be title from the written record, though the vendor may have no actual right in the land.436 Apparent title has no reference to the real beneficial ownership of the property (else no one would ever be an innocent purchaser).437

In Blocker v. Davis,438 Blocker=s title to certain minerals related back to a deed from Mrs. N.W. Davis.439 Proof showed Mrs. N.W. Davis never owned the minerals. The minerals were actually owned by N.W. Davis, her deceased husband.440 Though the names were deceptively similar, Blocker never acquired apparent legal title traceable back to the sovereign. Blocker could not be an innocent purchaser for value.441

a. Apparent Title Must Deraign by Series of Conveyances

Like any chain of title, apparent title is dependent upon a series of conveyances commencing with the sovereign and deraigning to the present apparent owner. A mere recital in an instrument regarding title to a tract not purporting to effect a conveyance of the property cannot support a claim of apparent title. For example in Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,442 Ellen Smith and Louisa Moseley executed and recorded a deed to G.B. Turner of the west 100 acres of a 200 acre tract and reciting in the description of the property that it abutted the east 100 acres which had been previously sold by Smith and Moseley to Alf Simon.443 This mere recital did not place apparent title to the east 100 acres in Alf Simon as it did not purport to be a conveyance to Simon of the easterly tract.444

b. Apparent Title Must Deraign by Written Conveyances

The instrument from which apparent title is derived must take written form and be capable of being recorded.445 In Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v. Dawkins,446 an oral assignment of oil and gas leases would not support a claim of innocent purchaser.447

5. Must Apparent Title Be Legal Title?

There is a division of authority on whether the title relied upon by an innocent purchaser must be legal title. Some cases have determined that an innocent purchaser of apparent equitable title to land is as much entitled to the protection of the Recording Statute as the purchaser of apparent legal title.448

However, other authorities have determined that the title relied upon by the innocent purchaser must be legal title.449 These cases take the position that where the purchase is of equitable title only, that the property is taken

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with all imperfections and equities notwithstanding that valuable consideration is paid and the buyer had no notice of any equity or defense against the buyer=s title.450 For example, in Slaughter v. Coke County,451 a buyer under a contract for deed acquired only equitable title and therefore could not raise the innocent purchaser defense.452 Likewise the assignee of an unconsummated earnest money contract holds only equitable title and may not be an innocent purchaser.

Texas Consolidated Compress & Mfg. Assn= v. Dublin Compress & Mfg. Co.,453 suggests that an exception to the requirement that the innocent purchaser acquire legal title occurs when the purchaser acquires some form of equitable title to which the Recording Statute is applicable.454

6. Innocent APurchaser@ Includes Mortgagees

APurchaser@ within the meaning of the Recording Statute and Innocent Purchaser Doctrine refers to mortgagees as well.455 An innocent mortgagee is entitled to the same protection as an innocent purchaser.456 However, the rights of a mortgagee are not greater than that of a purchaser.457

7. Mineral Interests

Purchasers of mineral interests acquire an estate in land sufficient to invoke the innocent purchaser rule,458 as in the case of an oil and gas lease.459

8. Forged Deed

A forged deed is a nullity. It passes no title, legal or equitable, to the grantee. It is void and has no affect.460 The recording of a forged deed does not give it any vitality.461 As a result, a party whose title descends from a void deed cannot be an innocent purchaser for value.462 In the case of a forged deed, innocent purchaser status is immaterial.463

9. Void Instrument

Generally the claim of an innocent purchaser may not be based on a chain of title containing a void instrument or conveyance.464 With a void conveyance, no amount of good faith, ignorance, or payment of valuable consideration can affect the title of the senior claim.465 For example in Burton v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,466 a will void as an attempt to disinherit pretermitted heirs could not support a chain of title sufficient to establish innocent purchaser status.467

10. Void Judgment/Voidable Judgment

The general rule is stated that title deraigned from a void judgment, order, or process will not support an innocent purchaser claim,468 while a judgment, order, or process which is merely voidable can support the innocent purchaser defense.469 An innocent purchaser relying upon a judgment, order, or process regular on its face will be

protected470 even in cases where the court failed to obtain jurisdiction for want of actual service.471 Such a judgment is considered to be voidable not void.472

However, where the invalidity of the judgment, order, or process is apparent from the record, the buyer cannot be an innocent purchaser.473 In DeGuerra v. DeGonzalez,474 when the record of the proceedings showed the Sheriff of the wrong county conducted the foreclosure sale, the buyer relying on that title was not an innocent purchaser.475

A purchaser under a deed executed under authority of a judgment or order is not bound to examine all of the proceedings in the case.476 It is sufficient for the purchaser to examine the record to determine that there was a suit upon which the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties and that there was a valid judgment, order, or process issued to conduct the sale.477

11. Deed Procured by Fraud/Fraudulent Conveyance

A deed executed or procured by fraud is voidable not void.478 Its presence in the chain of title of a buyer will not preclude the assertion of the innocent purchaser defense.479 A transferee without notice of circumstances tending to show fraudulent intent is a bona fide purchaser.480 The bona fide purchase is protected because he was a stranger to the fraudulent transaction.481 It is not necessary to show that the defrauded party was negligent in permitting himself to be swindled in order to establish the innocent purchaser defense.482

However, a transferee who takes property with knowledge of such facts as would excite the suspicions of a person of ordinary prudence and put him on inquiry of the fraudulent nature of the alleged transfer does not take the property in good faith and is not an innocent purchaser.483

12. Deed Executed by Accident or Mistake

A deed executed by accident or mistake is voidable not void. Its presence in the chain of title will not preclude the claim of an innocent purchaser.484

13. Deed by Person Under Disability

A deed by a person under a disability or without capacity (such as a minor, ward under guardianship, insane person, or a person otherwise incapacitated) passes no title even to a purchaser unaware of the disability.485 A subsequent purchaser cannot qualify as an innocent purchaser.486

14. Deed by Unauthorized Person

A deed by a person unauthorized to act for the holder of legal title is void for want of capacity by the vendor to convey.487 The vendee under such a void deed cannot set up the defense of innocent purchaser.488

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a. Void Trustee=s Sale

The authorities are inconsistent whether title deraigning from a void trustee=s sale can support the claim of a good faith purchaser for value.489 In Bowman v. Oakley,490 a substitute trustee under the deed of trust conducted a foreclosure sale wholly unauthorized by the beneficiary of the deed of trust.491 The purchaser at the substitute trustee=s sale had no knowledge that the sale was unauthorized.492 The substitute trustee=s deed recited the sale was carried out at the request of the note holder.493 Irrespective, the power of sale had no existence without the beneficiary of the deed of trust authorizing the sale.494 The deed was void for want of legal capacity in the vendor. The vendee did not have innocent purchaser status.495 A purchaser at a trustee=s sale assumes that the trustee has power to make the sale at the purchaser=s peril, and when the trustee is without power, the purchaser acquires no title as an innocent purchaser.496

In Henke v. First Southern Properties,497 a substitute trustee=s sale conducted when the note secured by the deed of trust was not in default was void.498 As a result the buyer at the void sale could not be an innocent purchaser for value.499 In Hart v. Estelle,500 the unauthorized appointment of a substitute trustee caused the sale to be void.501 The buyer acquired no rights as an innocent purchaser.502

However Gholson v. Peeks,503 determining that claim that substituted trustee was not properly appointed was not effective against an innocent purchaser for value because execution of deed of trust made it possible for the trustee to create the appearance of good title in the purchaser at the trustee=s sale.504 Also see Schneider v. Sellers,505 a trustee=s sale rendered void because the deed of trust lien had been previously released nevertheless supported an innocent purchaser defense made by a subsequent vendee.506

Martin v. Cadle Co.507 determined that the key factor in determining whether a void trustee=s sale will support a plea of innocent purchaser is whether the invalidity of the sale appears of record.508 In Cadle Co., a deed of trust was foreclosed on behalf of Evelyn Johnstone notwithstanding that the note was not transferred to Johnstone until after the sale had been conducted.509 The timing of this transfer put the buyer on notice of possible defects in the sale and imposed a duty of inquiry.510

b. Voidable Trustee=s Sale

A purchaser of title acquired at a voidable trustee=s sale may occupy the position of an innocent purchaser.511 If the sale is properly authorized by the holder of the note but held in violation of a parol agreement or fraud upon the debtor by the note holder (as in violation of a parol agreement to extend the indebtedness), the property may pass to an innocent purchaser for value.512

15. Deed by Fiduciary or Trustee

If a vendor=s capacity as a fiduciary or trustee appears from recorded instruments; a buyer takes title with constructive notice of all limitations on the vendor=s capacity to convey legal title.513

16. Deed to Corporation Not Authorized to Act

A deed to a corporation which has forfeited its corporate charter but retains the right to reinstate the charter is voidable not void.514 As a voidable (not void) instrument it is effectual to convey title to an innocent purchaser from the grantee.515

In Schneider v. Sellers,516 a corporation purchased property under a corporate charter that did not authorize the corporation to hold real estate.517 Held the defect in the corporate charter did not, without more, deprive the corporation of innocent purchaser status.518

17. Deed Not Intended For Delivery

A deed not intended to be delivered generally vests no rights in an innocent purchaser.519 However if the grantor negligently permits the deed to be delivered or recorded, a subsequent vendee may set up a defense of innocent purchaser.520

If a grantor learns that a deed not authorized for delivery has been recorded, the duty of the grantor does not extend to requiring active steps by the grantor to protect subsequent purchasers or encumbrances from ensuing harm.521 Negligence by the grantor, in this regard, will not sustain the defense of innocent purchaser.522

18. Simulated Transaction Involving Homestead

A simulated or fictitious transaction purporting to sell or encumber the homestead for a purpose not permitted by the Texas Constitution may nevertheless be the basis for a claim of innocent purchaser should title be transferred to one without knowledge of the deception.523 In Quillin v. State Trust Co.,524 Quillin created a simulated mechanic=s lien on this homestead to borrow money from Oil Center Lumber Co. for business purposes.525 When the note and lien were assigned to State Trust Co. without knowledge of the deception, State Trust could defend the homestead claim as an innocent purchaser.526

19. Deed By Person With Identical/Deceptively Similar Name

A purchaser assumes the risk that a deed in his chain of title was not executed by the grantee in the preceding conveyance but by one whose name is deceptively similar or identical therewith.527 In Blocker v. Davis,528 Blocker bought minerals via a chain of title deraigning from AMrs. N.W. [email protected] However, the minerals were not owned by her but her deceased husband, N.W. Davis, Sr. Blocker was not an innocent purchaser.

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20. Remote Purchasers (the AShelter Rule@)

A purchaser who buys from an innocent purchaser for value or any subsequent vendee takes the property free from the claims of a senior title. It is immaterial that the remote purchaser could not himself qualify as an innocent purchaser for value.530 Once the property passes into the hands of an innocent purchaser, the property is sheltered from the claims of the senior title, and the innocent purchaser obtains a complete jus disponendi to alienate the property to subsequent purchasers free of all preexisting claims.531 The basis for this rule is that the full protection of an innocent purchaser require that such protection be extended to his vendees.532 If the rule were otherwise, the value of the title of an innocent purchaser would be severely impacted.533

In Dorsey v. Temple,534 the Federal Land Bank (FLB) took its liens to a property free of preexisting claims although the FLB had notice of such claims when the proof showed that the FLB=s vendor had no notice of the claims and qualified as an innocent purchaser.535

The same rule obtains for a purchaser at a lien foreclosure sale. If the lien being foreclosed was taken by an innocent lienholder, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale takes free of any conflicting senior claims irrespective that the purchaser had knowledge of the preexisting claims or paid a grossly inadequate price.536

a. Reconveyance to a Person Not an Innocent Purchaser

An exception to the Shelter Rule applies if the property is ever conveyed back to a former owner who was charged with notice of the preexisting claim.537 For example, if A, holding with notice of the senior title, conveys to B, an innocent purchaser, and A afterwards takes a reconveyance back to himself, all equities of the senior title are said to revive and attach to the land in A=s hands.538

The rule appears to be different if a person, who has once qualified as an innocent purchaser, conveys the property away then receives a reconveyance of the property with notice of the preexisting senior claim.539 In Clark v. Hoover,540 Clark purchased a property for value without notice of a preexisting unrecorded claim.541 Clark conveyed the property to another then later received a reconveyance of the same tract.542 By the time of the reconveyance, an instrument relating to the senior title had been recorded.543 Held the innocent purchaser status of Clark was unaffected by the reconveyance.544

B. Valuable Consideration

Payment of valuable consideration is an essential element for the junior claimant545 to claim the benefits of an innocent purchaser.546 An unrecorded instrument will be binding on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay valuable consideration.547 It is the injury resulting from payment of money that creates the equity supporting the preference given to the junior title.548 Equity will favor a

party who innocently parted with their money over a person whose negligence was the occasion of it.549

1. Consideration a Question of Law or Fact?

What constitutes legal consideration is generally a question of law.550 However, whether the consideration was actually paid is a question of fact.551 The issue of whether the consideration paid is grossly inadequate is likewise a fact issue to be determined from the totality of the circumstances of the case.552

2. Acceptable Proof of Valuable Consideration

A buyer claiming the status of an innocent purchaser for value must show that the purchase money was actually paid.553 Recitals of consideration contained in the buyer=s deed are not sufficient proof that the consideration was paid.554 Some evidence of the payment of valuable consideration must be from a source independent of the deed.555 However, such recitals can be considered in conjunction with other evidence as part of circumstantial proof of the payment of valuable consideration.556

Evidence of consideration is not limited to direct proof.557 Circumstantial proof may be used to show that valuable consideration was truly paid.558 In Davidson v. Ryle,559 sufficient circumstantial evidence was introduced to prove the payment of valuable consideration when evidence showed that the seller and buyer were strangers to each other.560 These circumstances militated against a gift, fraudulent conveyance, or transaction in payment of an antecedent debt.561 In Skarr v. Brooks,562 the junior titleholder=s payment of taxes on the property and ejection of trespassers was circumstantial proof tending to show the payment of valuable consideration.563 However, in Johns v. Wear,564 circumstantial proof showed that there was a lack of valuable consideration when the vendee was only 17 years old at the time of the transaction, the vendee later received a gift deed to the same property, the vendee never asserted an interest in the property, and the land was not inventoried in the vendee=s estate.565

3. Sufficiency of Consideration

Payment of valuable consideration does not require proof of a full and adequate consideration.566 However, the level of consideration must be sufficient to demonstrate a fairness and good faith purchase on the part of the buyer.567 A grossly inadequate consideration, it is reasoned, puts the buyer on notice of a defect in title and destroys the buyer=s good faith.568 Usually the question is a matter for the fact finder.569 However, if the consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court, the court may make a determination that the consideration is inadequate.570 The good faith of the purchaser is determined by the facts known to the purchaser and his intent at the time of the subject transaction.571

A determination of whether a grossly inadequate consideration was paid requires an evidentiary comparison of the sale price with the cash fair market value of the

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property.572 Proof of cash fair market value is indispensable to a claim of grossly inadequate price and failure to produce such proof is fatal to a determination of the question.573

Sales held to be for grossly inadequate consideration have included sales made for .06%,574 .62%,575 1.5%,576 2.31%,577 3.48%578, and 5.53%579 of market value.

Valuable consideration does not necessarily require the payment of money.580 Consideration may consist of services and acts, even those performed after the conveyance.581 Valuable consideration may likewise involve an exchange for other property.582

Payment of valuable consideration does not require payment of the full agreed upon consideration.583 For example, in Tobin v. Benson,584 Keys sold property to Benson in exchange for Benson providing certain legal services and for Benson=s agreement to pay certain back taxes due on the property.585 Benson provided the agreed upon legal services but did not pay the taxes.586 The failure of Benson to fully perform did not prevent Benson from being an innocent purchaser for want of valuable consideration.587

a. Gift Deeds

A deed of gift is not for valuable consideration.588

b. Property Acquired by Inheritance

An heir acquiring property by inheritance does not pay valuable consideration and cannot be an innocent purchaser.589

c. Antecedent Debt Not Valuable Consideration

If the consideration for a conveyance is credit on an antecedent debt only, this will not be valuable consideration sufficient to support a claim of innocent purchaser for value.590 This is because the purchaser parts with no new value at the time of the conveyance and still has his debt if the conveyance fails.591 Unless the buyer is in a worse position than before the purchase or at some disadvantage by the sale, there is no equity arising requiring the application of the Innocent Purchaser Rule or Recording Statute.592

A lien granted to secure a preexisting debt is not supported by valuable consideration.593 In Bailey & Pond v. Tindall,594 Pierce executed a deed of trust to Bailey & Pond on December 24, 1873 to secure an earlier note executed to Bailey & Pond on June 5, 1873.595 The deed of trust was given to secure an antecedent debt. Bailey & Pond were not innocent mortgagees for value.596

(1) Exception - When Antecedent Debt is Prejudiced or Lost

The basis for rejecting an antecedent debt as valuable consideration is inapplicable when the extinguishment of

that preexisting debt prejudices the buyer.597 If the buyer can=t be placed in as good a position as before the sale because the preexisting debt is barred by limitations, the debtor is insolvent, the original collateral is released, or other good cause, the rule should not exclude the buyer as an innocent purchaser for value.598 In Dunlap v. Green,599 Phillips bought land in consideration of an antecedent debt valid at the time of the sale but barred by limitations at the time of the assertion of the senior title.600 Held the antecedent debt under these circumstances was valuable consideration because the assertion of the senior title would deny the buyer the right to reassert the antecedent debt.601

(2) Exception - When Antecedent Debt Owed by Third-Party

The release of an antecedent debt owed by a third party (not the purchaser or mortgagor) is valuable consideration.602 It is only when the conveyance is for the antecedent debt of the immediate vendor or mortgagor that there is an absence of valuable consideration.603 For example, in Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer,604 Whiteman executed a deed of trust to Bank in consideration of a release by Bank of all debt owed to Bank by Latimer.605 This release of antecedent debt owed by a third party was valuable consideration.606

(3) Other Valuable Consideration Combined With Antecedent Debt

A sale or lien given in consideration of an antecedent debt will not prevent innocent purchaser status unless the antecedent debt is the only consideration. If, in addition to the preexisting debt, some other consideration or value is given for the execution of the deed or mortgage, the person claiming under such instrument is protected as an innocent purchaser.607 Thus a lien given to secure an antecedent debt will support innocent purchaser status if the lender makes additional concessions such as an extension of time to pay the debt,608 the settlement of a disputed claim,609 the release of prior security,610 or the extension of further credit.611 These additional concessions must be bargained for by the debtor not gratuitously given by the creditor as a pretense to secure a preexisting debt.612

(4) Foreclosure of Valid Lien Not a Transfer for Antecedent Debt

If a creditor has a valid lien upon property which is foreclosed resulting in the creditor himself purchasing at the foreclosure sale using as a credit the remaining indebtedness owed, this not a sale for an antecedent debt.613 The creditor=s rights (as respects the value of consideration given) is determined at the time that the lien is acquired - not at the time of its subsequent foreclosure.614

4. Promissory Note as Valuable Consideration

The execution of a negotiable promissory note for purchase money is valuable consideration.615

Likewise, a buyer=s assumption to pay a promissory note or other obligation of the grantor is also valuable

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consideration.616 The assumption of the debt must be a binding obligation from which the buyer cannot by law withdraw.617 In LaFon v. Grimes,618 Grimes bought property agreeing in consideration to assume a prior indebtedness owing by the grantor. To prevail as an innocent purchaser, it was necessary for Grimes to show that Grimes was contractually bound to assume the indebtedness prior to the time that Grimes had actual or constructive notice of the senior title.619

5. Surrender of Legal Right as Consideration

The surrendering of a legal right ordinarily represents a form of valuable consideration.620

6. Unlawful Consideration

The doing of an unlawful act is not valid consideration.621 In Ballard v. Allen,622 James Allen conveyed property to his ex-wife in consideration of her release of Allen for sums due for back child support.623 Held that it was the exclusive province of the Court to determine child support obligations.624 Allen and his wife were prohibited by law from private settlement of Allen=s child support obligations.625 When there was no evidence that the Court approved the settlement, there was no valuable consideration.626

7. Consideration Must Be Paid Before Notice of Competing Claim

To be innocent purchaser for value the valuable consideration must be paid before the buyer knew of the conflicting right.627 Payment of consideration is made when the buyer parts with the consideration in such a manner as to place it beyond the buyer=s control to recall.628

In Antwine v. Reed,629 Antwine contracted to purchase certain land from Bank without notice of a prior competing contract for sale.630 However, by the time the transaction closed and the consideration was paid, Antwine was aware of the prior contract.631 Antwine was not an innocent purchaser for value.632

In Sparks v. Taylor,633 the buyer placed funds in escrow prior to any knowledge of a conflicting claim.634 However, by the time that the funds were delivered by the escrow agent to the seller, there was constructive notice of a conflicting claim.635 Held, the buyer had sufficiently parted with control of the consideration prior to the notice to qualify as an innocent purchaser.636 In City of Houston v. Ritchie,637 Ritchie took a deed to certain lots from Chew agreeing in consideration to care for Chew in his last illness.638 Ritchie provided the bargained for care through the date of Chew=s death.639 After Chew=s death, Ritchie learned of an unrecorded deed to another party.640 Held Ritchie had completed all bargained for valuable consideration prior to notice of the competing senior title.641

In Masterson v. Crosby,642 an attorney agreed to provide legal services in exchange for an interest in the

property made the subject of the litigation before he was aware of the competing senior claim.643 These services were valuable consideration.644 But see Davis v. Bell,645 where services provided by an attorney to purchase an interest in property, when provided after notice of the conflicting senior claim, were not valuable consideration.646

In Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co.,647 Nellius bought property without knowledge of a competing senior claim paying part of the consideration in cash and giving the seller two promissory notes.648 When at the time of suit the seller still retained the promissory notes, Nellius was an innocent purchaser only to the extent that he made actual payment on the notes before receiving notice of the senior claim.649

8. Pro Tanto Protection of Innocent Purchasers

An innocent purchaser will be protected only to the extent of his payment of the purchase price with valuable consideration.650 That payment must be before the buyer has notice of the conflicting senior title.651 The buyer has no innocent purchaser protection for amounts paid after the buyer has knowledge of the senior conflicting claim.652 However, if partial payment is made before notice of the conflicting title, the buyer is afforded pro tanto protection to the extent of payment made.653

In Campbell v. Crowley,654 Crowley, an innocent purchaser, purchased a property making a cash down payment and executing a note for the deferred consideration.655 Crowley was protected as an innocent purchaser to the extent of his cash down payment and the amount of his note if he could not be relieved of its payment.656

The implementation of the remedy of pro tanto protection for an innocent purchaser paying only part of the purchaser price will vary depending on the facts and equities of each individual case.657 In some cases the land will be partitioned with the innocent purchaser retaining a portion of the land in proportion to the purchase money paid.658 Another possible outcome is to make the parties co-tenants pro tanto.659 Another remedy may be awarding the land to the holder of the senior title with a lien in favor of the innocent purchaser in the amount of the purchaser money paid.660 Some cases may warrant awarding all of the land to the innocent purchaser with the obligation of the purchaser to pay the unpaid purchase price to the holder of the senior title.661 There is no hard and fast rule on this. Each case will depend on its own facts.662 Weight factors to consider in determining which remedy should apply include: (1) the susceptibility of the tract to partition, (2) whether the buyer has placed valuable improvements on the property, (3) whether the agreed purchase consideration was comparable to market value, (4) the payment of taxes, (5) the collection of rents and revenues, (6) the amount of court costs incurred, (7) the relative fault/diligence/negligence of the parties, and (8) any appreciation in the value of the land after purchase by the innocent buyer.663

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9. Conveyances for Which Valuable Consideration Must Be Shown

To establish innocent purchaser status, it is necessary only that the buyer pay valuable consideration to his immediate vendor.664 The law does not require proof of payment of valuable consideration by all antecedent parties in the buyer=s chain of title.665 Rather, the character of an innocent purchaser is established by payment of valuable consideration in good faith by the party claiming the benefits of the rule.666

10. Valuable Consideration - Purchase at Execution Sale (Innocent Purchaser Doctrine)

Under the common law rule, a creditor who purchases property at his own execution sale crediting his bid against the amount of his judgment does not pay valuable consideration.667 Such a bid is considered to be a cancellation of an antecedent debt not the advancement of new consideration upon the faith of the purchase.668 In Cetti v. Wilson,669 Lewis and Blount jointly purchased property at an execution sale.670 Lewis, the judgment creditor, bid as a credit on his judgment.671 Blount bid cash.672 Under these facts, Blount could invoke the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine. Lewis could not.673

VI. WITHOUT NOTICE

The estoppel-based remedy of the Recording Statute and of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine cannot be raised by a person with knowledge of the senior conflicting title.674 An unrecorded conveyance is binding on those who have knowledge of that conveyance.675 Absence of notice is essential to the benefits of these remedies.676 A purchaser with knowledge of the senior conflicting claim takes no better title than that of his grantor and is assumed to accept the risk that his title may be defeated by the senior claim.677

The absence of notice is an innocent purchaser requirement which is independent of a showing of good faith and valuable consideration.678 Notice of itself will destroy innocent purchaser status.679

A. Generally

1. Notice May Be Actual or Constructive

Notice is broadly defined.680 Notice in law may be of two kinds - actual or constructive.681 Either actual or constructive notice will prevent a party from being an innocent purchaser.682

Actual notice rests on personal information or knowledge.683 Actual knowledge of a fact is said to exist when the affected party has express information of the fact; where the knowledge of it is brought home to him by direct communication.684 Stated another way, actual notice is information concerning a fact that is actually communicated to a person.685

Constructive notice exists where knowledge of the fact is inferred or imputed to the person by presumption of law, because of existence of qualifying circumstances.686 Constructive notice creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice in some circumstances.687

Actual and constructive notice are equal and coordinate concepts.688 Proof of either is anathema to innocent purchaser status.689 If the junior purchaser has knowledge of the senior claim, it is immaterial how he obtained the information.690 Thus, actual notice of a conflicting senior interest eliminates any need to show that constructive notice of that interest was given by due registration.691 Actual notice has the same effect as registration.692 If a buyer has actual notice of the senior interest, the purposes of registration are fully accomplished and the buyer does not stand in need of the Recording Statute.693 Thus in Jones v. Smith,694 when the claimant was present in the room when the deed was signed, he had notice of its contents irregardless of whether the deed was recorded.695

Likewise, proof of constructive notice is sufficient to defeat innocent purchaser status in the absence of actual notice.696 Constructive notice is said to create an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice.697

a. Abstracts of Judgment

The general rule that either actual or constructive notice is effective to defeat innocent purchaser status does not apply to abstracts of judgment. Actual knowledge of a judgment lien is unavailing against a claim of insufficient registration.698 Special statutory requirements for filing, recording, and indexing an abstract of judgment operate for the dual purpose of (1) brining the lien into existence and (2) providing constructive notice of the existence of the lien.699 Unless the statutory requirements for filing, recording, and indexing are met, there is no judgment lien.700

2. Constructive Notice Generally a Question of Law

Constructive notice is generally a question determinable as a matter of law,701 a legal presumption not to be controverted.702

3. Actual Notice Generally a Question of Fact

The existence or absence of actual notice sufficient to disqualify a buyer as an innocent purchaser is generally said to be an issue of fact.703 There are no fixed rules on what facts or circumstances will be sufficient to show actual notice.704 Each case is governed by its own circumstances.705 However actual notice becomes a question of law where there is no room for reasonable minds to differ as to the proper conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.706

In Hicks v. Loveless,707 the uncontraverted proof showed that the buyer was given a copy of unrecorded deed restrictions at closing and that he executed a copy of

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same.708 This conclusively showed actual notice of the restrictions as a matter of law.709

In In re Harydzak,710 a lender had actual knowledge that the trust borrower was not the true owner of the property when there were Ared flags@ in the lender=s own file indicating there were other owners claiming a homestead interest in the property.711 These red flags included: (1) indication in the lender=s appraisal that the Aborrowers@ were individuals, (2) the “consent of beneficiaries” to the borrower was unsigned at closing, and (3) the proximity to closing of a sale of the property should have prompted an investigation of the preceding homestead interests.712

In O=Ferral v. Coolidge,713a title fact disclosed in the debtor=s financial statement to lender was not actual notice as a matter of law to lender.714 It was a question of fact under the circumstances of the case whether lender=s failure to discover the fact was such a want of caution as to amount to notice.715

4. Evidentiary Presumptions Regarding Notice

In cases where (1) the parties to the subject transaction are dead and (2) proof of the payment of valuable consideration is made, an evidentiary presumption arises that the buyer bought without notice of the conflicting senior conveyance.716 The presumption is not conclusive but may prevail in the absence of controverting evidence.717

5. Timing of Notice

There is a temporal aspect to the notice element of the Recording Statute which is of significant importance.718

a. Date That Junior Interest is Created

The conveyance creating the junior interest is effective upon delivery of the deed or mortgage.719 The law presumes that delivery occurs on the date that the instrument was executed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.720

In Hicks v. Loveless,721 Wallace purchased a lot by deed dated August 24, 1978.722 However, evidence showed that the closing did not occur until August 25, 1978.723 The purchase, for the purposes of the Recording Statute, occurred on August 25.724 Wallace was not on constructive notice of deed restrictions not filed until August 29, 1978.725

The time that the junior interest is created is not at the time that the junior deed is recorded.726 In Matthews v. Houston Oil Co.,727 the innocent purchaser status of the junior title was unaffected when the senior deed was recorded after the junior deed was executed but before the junior deed was recorded.728

The time to determine if the purchaser or mortgagee had notice of the competing senior claim is at the time that the junior interest is acquired or created.729

(1) Liens Subsequently Foreclosed

If the junior interest is a lien or mortgage that is subsequently foreclosed to place fee title in the buyer at foreclosure, the time to examine the notice question is when the original lien was created.730 Notice of the senior interest acquired after the lien was created but before the foreclosure has no effect on innocent purchaser status.731

(2) Effect of Future Advances

A mortgagee advancing credit without notice of a conflicting senior interest is protected against all credit extended on the date that the deed of trust is delivered. However, if the deed of trust further secures anticipated future advances, the mortgagee is an innocent purchaser as to future advances only if the mortgagee had no notice of the conflicting claim on the date that each such future advance was made.732

In J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Citizen=s Nat=l Bank of Odessa,733 J.M. Radford Grocery Co. obtained a deed of trust to secure an extension to pay an existing unpaid account.734 The deed of trust additionally secured any future trade advances made to the debtor.735 J.M. Radford Grocery Co. was not an innocent purchaser as to future advances made when it failed to adduce proof that on the date that future advances were made it was without notice of a conflicting senior lien.736

b. Effect of Notice Before the Junior Interest is Created

The effect of notice of a conflicting claim received before the junior interest is created is to destroy innocent purchaser status.737 A buyer cannot be an innocent purchaser beyond the time that the buyer acquired notice.738

(1) Involuntary Mechanic=s Liens (Constitutional)

While an involuntary mechanic=s lien (constitutional) is generally said to be self-executing between the owner and contractor, such a lien must generally be recorded to give constructive notice of the lien to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. Some authorities, not particularly well-reasoned, suggest that, in order for that recordation to be constructive notice, it must be accomplished within the recording deadlines set out in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052; that simply recording an affidavit evidencing an involuntary mechanic=s lien (constitutional) prior to the creation of the junior interest is insufficient.739 Other authorities have concluded that an affidavit evidencing an involuntary mechanic=s lien (constitutional) need only be filed prior to the creation of the junior interest in order to be effective as constructive notice.740

(2) Contractual Liens for Improvements

Contractual liens for improvements are effective as constructive notice so long as filed prior to the creation of

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the junior interest. The filing deadlines for mechanic=s liens at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052 are inapplicable to contractual liens.741

c. Effect of Notice After the Junior Interest Created

Notice subsequent to the creation of the junior interest is ineffective to defeat innocent purchaser status.742 A buyer is not required to make a continuous search of the real property records for interests subsequently recorded.743

(1) Involuntary Mechanic=s Liens

An involuntary mechanic=s lien is unique in that its priority is determined by the date that construction is commenced on the project (or the delivery of materials thereto),744 while its recordation comes later and is determined by reference to the date on which the indebtedness to the contractor or supplier accrues.745 This statutory preference given to contractors and suppliers is facially inconsistent with the general scheme of the Recording Statute and the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine as it fails to protect by constructive notice a junior title intervening between the date that the construction project commences and the date that the affidavit evidencing the involuntary mechanic=s lien is recorded. For example, in Schultze v. Alamo Ice & Brewing Co.,746 Patterson advanced money upon and took a mortgage against property in San Antonio after construction had been commenced by a contractor, Schultze.747 A check of the real property records by Patterson revealed no prior liens.748 When Schultze later asserted an involuntary mechanic=s lien dating from the commencement of construction, Patterson asserted that he was an innocent purchaser.749 Held that the unique statutory preference extended to involuntary mechanic=s liens overrides the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine and Recording Statute and allows an unrecorded mechanic=s lien to be superior to the claims arising after the commencement of construction and before the mechanic=s lien is timely recorded.750 Constructive notice is imputed during the statutory period during which a contractor could file a lien affidavit to perfect his lien.751

Justification for this preference may be rationalized by considering that the Recording Statute and Innocent Purchaser Doctrine are estoppel-based concepts arising from the failure of the senior claimant to timely record his interest to the prejudice of later purchasers.752 With involuntary mechanic=s liens, the failure to record the lien from the inception of construction does not rest upon any negligence or fault of the contractor or supplier.753 Additionally, this priority or preference is extended only if construction is visible on the property.754 With visible construction, the subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer is deemed to have notice of the possibility of a mechanic=s lien, thereby obviating the need for recorded notice of the mechanic=s lien.755

Another way that involuntary mechanic=s liens (statutory) are contrary to the general scheme of the

Recording Statute and Innocent Purchaser Doctrine concerns the relative priority of competing mechanic=s liens on the same project. All such perfected liens have equal priority irrespective of the date that the mechanic=s lien affidavits are filed.756

6. Notice Must Be Reliable?

Some authorities suggest that for notice to be effective it must be from a proper and reliable source.757

7. Notice Must Be Specific to Senior Title

To lose innocent purchaser status, notice to the purchaser must be notice relating specifically to the claimed senior title.758 Innocent purchaser status is not lost because of notice generally of an unrelated title defect.759

Even if the notice directs the purchaser to the senior claimant, the notice must excite inquiry to the specific title claim made by that claimant. In Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State,760 a recitation in a prior deed to the AVillareal Grant@ was a reference to legal title and did not create a duty of inquiry of an unrelated equitable title asserted by successors of Villareal.761

8. Notice to Agent

General agency principles of notice apply in the context of the Recording Statute and the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine. Notice to a buyer=s agent is equivalent to notice to the buyer,762 even if the agent never communicates that information to the principal.763 Thus notice to the buyer=s attorney is the same as notice to the buyer.764 If the buyer chooses to conduct the transaction through an agent, he is not allowed to avail himself of that circumstance to say that although his agent was aware of the conflicting senior title, the principal himself was an innocent purchaser.765

In Woodward v. Ortiz,766 Hidalgo County hired attorney Hollis Rankin to prosecute a tax suit for delinquent taxes.767 Rankin in turn hired Hidalgo County - Starr County Abstract Company, owned by W.F. Tinkler, to furnish an abstract on the subject tract.768 Index cards in the title plant of the title company created by Tinkler=s daughter referred to a conflicting senior claim.769 Held that under agency principals that express notice of the senior claim by Tinkler=s daughter was notice to Hidalgo County.770

For the notice of the agent to be imputed to the principle, the knowledge must have been acquired by the agent in the transaction of the principle=s business during the existence and within the scope of the agency and not otherwise.771 In Ives v Culton,772 knowledge of an unrecorded deed acquired by the buyer=s lawyer in an unrelated matter and before the lawyer was hired by the buyer was not notice to the buyer.773 Conversely, for the principal to be charged with the knowledge of the agent, the agent must have had the knowledge at the time of the

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transaction.774 The principal is not affected by facts known to the agent after the transaction.775

Also, notice to an agent of the buyer is notice to the buyer only if the agent has authority to act for the principal with reference to that very subject matter.776 Notice will not be imputed to the buyer if the agent had authority to act in a similar but different capacity.777 In J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Citizen=s Nat=l Bank of Odessa,778 the credit manager for J.M. Radford Grocery Co. negotiated to secure an account debt with a deed of trust on the debtor=s real property without knowing the property was previously encumbered by unrecorded deed of trust to Bank.779 A traveling salesman for J.M. Radford Grocery Co. with no authority to adjust or collect open accounts was aware of the prior unrecorded deed of trust.780 Held notice to the traveling salesman was not imputed to the company in a matter he was not empowered to handle.781

Another situation where the principal is not chargeable with the knowledge of the agent is where the agent colludes with other parties to defraud his principal.782 For example in Campbell v. Crowley,783 when a lender=s agent conspired with homestead claimants to create a simulated sale, the agents= acts were not binding on the lender nor was the lender chargeable with the true facts of the transaction.784

In situations where the principal conducts the purchase through an agent who has no knowledge of the conflicting interest but the principal does know the facts, the principal is bound by the knowledge available to the principal.785 In Carter v. Converse,786 Carter bought a house through the agency of her attorney.787 Carter was aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice that a previous deed on the property had been intended as a mortgage.788 Carter could not claim innocent purchaser status by claiming her attorney was not aware of these facts.789

9. Notice to Principal

In certain cases, under general agency principals, notice to a principal may be imputed to the principal=s agent for the purposes of preventing the agent from being an innocent purchaser.790

However, when the agent is employed as a special agent with authority to act for the principal in a succinct matter only, notice to the principal is not generally imputed to the agent on matters of the principal=s business in which the agent has no authority to act.791 For example, in Hampshire v. Greeves,792 when Landry was the trustee of Beaumont National Bank under a deed of trust, this was not a general agency such that notice to the bank on an unrelated title matter was imputed to Landry.793

10. Notice to Title Company.

A title company acting as an escrow agent is the agent of the buyer, seller, and lender with a fiduciary duty of full disclosure to each.794 Knowledge acquired by the title company is notice to its principal.795

11. Notice to Predecessor in Title

Unlike agency, a buyer is not chargeable with notice of facts known to his predecessors in title.796

12. Notice of Successor in Title

A buyer is not charged with any knowledge of title possessed by his successor in title.797 The knowledge of the successor in title will not affect the innocent purchaser status of a prior vendor.798

13. Notice to Joint Purchaser/Mortgagee

If a property if bought jointly by two parties one who has notice of the senior unrecorded title and one who does not, the notice of the one buyer is not imputed to his co-buyer.799 In such a case, the joint buyer with notice will hold his title subject to the senior title and the joint owner without knowledge holds a title superior to the senior claim.800

14. Notice to Partner

If the relationship of the co-buyers has proceeded to the extent that a partnership is formed between them, notice to one partner of the senior title will constitute notice to all partners.801 In Jackson v. Waldstein,802 Crane and Thorton entered into an agreement to form a partnership to acquire all interest of Bullian in certain lands in Texas and to prosecute any litigation necessary to perfect title.803 When Hume bought out Thornton=s interest in the enterprise, he took with knowledge of title defects known to his new partner, Crane.804

15. Notice to Predecessor Entity

If an interest in real property is transferred from one entity not qualifying as an innocent purchaser to a successor entity owned by the same principals, the transfer does not create an innocent purchaser.805 In Mellette v. Hudston Oil Corp.,806 Hudston and Stanfield formed a partnership to hold oil and gas leases at a time when Stanfield was aware of an outstanding senior equitable interest in the leases.807 This knowledge was imputed to his partner, Hudston.808 When Hudston and Stanfield later incorporated and transferred the oil and gas leases from the partnership to the corporation, neither the corporation nor the shareholders were innocent purchasers.809

16. Duty of Inquiry

The maxim of caveat emptor applies to purchasers of real estate.810 A buyer has a duty to search the real property records which are the primary source of information as to title.811 To qualify as an innocent purchaser, it is not sufficient to demonstrate an absence of actual knowledge of the conflicting senior interest itself.812 A buyer must additionally demonstrate that he was unaware of any fact giving rise to a duty of inquiry which if properly pursued with reasonable diligence would have disclosed the

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existence of the senior title.813 Inquiry notice is a form of constructive or implied notice.814

a. Threshold Level of Notice Triggering Duty of Inquiry

Before a duty of inquiry arises, the buyer must have become aware of some fact of sufficient import and reliability to trigger a duty to investigate.815 There is no hard and fast rule, no uniform standard, on when this duty arises.816 It is a matter of great doubt and uncertainty to determine what circumstances are sufficient to put a party upon inquiry.817 Every real estate transaction has its own unique set of circumstances.818 Each case depends largely on its own facts.819 The degree of diligence exercised must fit the situation.820

The general rule is that inquiry is triggered by any fact known to the buyer which would have fairly and reasonably prompted a reasonably prudent man desirous of protecting himself and dealing fairly with others to investigate further.821 It is said that the slightest notice of an adverse interest is sufficient.822 Information which is in itself a fragmentary, incomplete, ambiguous, or uncertain may nevertheless invoke inquiry depending on the context in which it is received.823 However, the fact must be sufficiently authentic and clear to excite inquiry in the mind of a prudent man and put him upon his guard.824

In Baird v. Laycock,825 sufficient facts were present to excite inquiry on whether a deed into the buyer=s immediate vendor was actually intended as a mortgage when the buyer knew that the grantors under the prior deed had lived on the property for a long time without interruption, the grantors were not sophisticated, the grantors said only a small amount was owed on the place and they didn’t=t intend to sell their home, grantors Adeed@ had never been recorded, and vendor had a dubious reputation regarding lending practices.826

In Carter v. Converse,827 facts known to buyer were sufficient to require buyer to investigate if prior deed was intended as a mortgage when grantor remained in possession after the Adeed@, Athe ratification of deed@ was notarized by a person having an affair with the husband, the ratification deed was acknowledged in Texas at a time when the wife was in Pennsylvania, and husband arranged to receive all proceeds from the sale.828

In Jackson v. Waldstein,829 a duty of inquiry was triggered when the seller told the buyer that he was unsure whether he had or had not previously sold this tract.830 But see Meek v. Skeen,831 where several statements by debtor to purchaser at an execution sale that he had previously sold Aall his property@ was not specific enough to raise a duty of inquiry.832

(1) Rumors and Reputation

To trigger a duty of inquiry, the facts known by the buyer must be sufficiently reliable. Vague indeterminate rumors or common reputation do not invoke a duty to investigate.833 Such proof is insufficiently reliable and

suffers the fallibility of hearsay.834 It does not provide the buyer with any positive information, any tangible clue, by aid of which he may commence and successfully prosecute an inquiry.835 Titles to land should not be dependent upon the existence or nonexistence, truth or untruth of common reputation, notoriety and rumor.836 The spirit of the registration laws is antagonistic to title by inquiry, reputation, or hearsay.837 Nor does suspicion, even strong suspicion, require further investigation.838 In Hawley v. Bullock,839 statements regarding the efficacy of the vendor=s title made by the county clerk were sufficiently reliable to have excited inquiry.840 In City of Dallas v. Leake,841 presale discussions in which the seller mentioned a potential outstanding claim in a third party was sufficient to put buyer on duty of inquiry.842

Generally, what distinguishes rumor and suspicion from facts sufficient to impose a duty of inquiry is particularity. Information of a particular identifiable title defect is more than general rumor or suspicion and imposes on the buyer a duty to inquire into the truth of the matter.843

(2) Industry Custom

In re Jones,844 considered whether the oil and gas industry custom of multiple working interests and participating royalty interests for a well were sufficient to put a buyer on notice to search for any such unrecorded interests.845 Held mere customs of the trade did not impart notice of an unrecorded interest.846

(3) Fact v. Opinion

To trigger a duty of inquiry, the buyer must have notice of a fact requiring further investigation of the title.847 A mere opinion is not a fact sufficient to excite inquiry.848 In Meador Bros. v. Hines,849 a buyer talked to a lawyer prior to purchasing a property and received from the lawyer the unsupported opinion that he would not buy the property without the joinder of the seller=s wife.850 The lawyer knew of no fact requiring investigation but gave the advise as an opinion of law.851 Held this mere opinion (having no factual basis) was insufficient to invoke a duty of inquiry.852

(4) Source of Notice

It is not necessary that notice of an adverse senior claim come directly from the adverse claimant.853 It is immaterial whether the notice comes directly from the senior claimant or a stranger to the title.854

b. Extent of Duty of Inquiry

(1) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Generally

After a duty of inquiry is triggered, the extent to which the inquiry must be taken is also measured more or less on a negligence standard.855 Whether or not investigation is made, the buyer will be charged with constructive notice of all facts that could have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence having due regard for his own rights and the rights of others.856 The duty does

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not require the buyer to be the safest, most cautious buyer that could be theorized.857 A presumption arises that the buyer would pursue the investigation successfully to its final result.858 The duty of inquiry will extend as far as those matters naturally and reasonably suggested by the circumstances of the case or the facts known to the buyers;859 that is facts to which the known facts are said to furnish a clue.860 As each clue is presented, the buyer is bound to follow up the inquiry, step by step, from one discovery to another and from one instrument to another, until a complete knowledge of all matters referred to and affecting the title is obtained.861 A buyer cannot stop the inquiry short of the point to which a prudent man would take it862 and by that means engage in purposeful863 or negligent ignorance.864 The duty to make reasonable inquiry, when with the means to the knowledge are at hand, is the equitable equivalent of knowledge itself.865

If inquiry is pursued, whether that inquiry has been pursued with reasonable diligence is a fact issue to be ascertained in light of all circumstances in the particular case considered.866 There is no rote formula of inquiry applicable to every case.867

In Foster v. Bullard,868 the buyer had actual knowledge that the property was subject to a right of first refusal.869 The buyer was not an innocent purchaser without knowledge that the right of first refusal was not extinguished when buyer failed to make diligent inquiry into the written notices given to the holder of this right to assure compliance with the terms of the right of first refusal.870

The duty of reasonable diligent inquiry is not limitless.871 It connotes a reference to the means of information at hand, what can be learned from readily available sources.872 The search must be such as would be made by a person of ordinary intelligence.873 This duty does not contemplate a search that is extraordinary, exhaustive, or unduly burdensome.874 Nor does the investigation need to extend as far as every possible speculation or conjecture.875 In Portman v. Earnhart,876 a buyer used reasonable diligence in inquiring regarding a prior deed by an apparent interloper in the title when the deed=s grantor was dead, the grantee could not be located, the deed gave no address for the grantee, and the deed made no assisting reference to the grantor=s source of title.877 Resort to the means of knowledge at hand did not require the buyer to inquire of every remote vendor in his chain of title, nor did it require inquiry to be made to the notary taking the acknowledgment on the deed in question.878

The buyer=s inquiry need not be perfect. In some cases even a diligently pursued inquiry will not disclose the existence of the senior claim.879 It is possible for a buyer to be on inquiry about a particular title defect that in fact does exist and still be an innocent purchaser if diligent inquiry into the truth of the information received would satisfy a prudent man that the defect to which his attention had been directed did not exist or would not be enforced.880 The presumption of constructive notice only extends to facts obtainable upon prudent inquiry and no further.881 The

result is the same even if no inquiry is pursued if the proof establishes that, had the inquiry been made, notice of the senior claim would not have been discovered.882 However, the burden is with the buyer claiming innocent purchaser status to show that the inquiry, if reasonably pursued, would not have given him the true facts.883

What amounts to prudent inquiry largely depends on the facts of each case.884 In Loomis v. Cobb,885 the title that Loomis acquired was dependent on a municipal ordinance of the City of San Elizario long since abolished. A search for the ordinance revealed that the ordinance was lost or destroyed.886 Held that the failure of Loomis to search for alternate sources that might give the contents of the ordinance was a failure to make due inquiry.887

What constitutes reasonably diligent inquiry may require an examination of any actions by the holder of the senior title which may have the effect of chilling inquiry. In Miller v. Flattery888, the buyer knew a prior deed recited it was made for cash but that notes had been substituted as consideration.889 Notice of this conflicting information would normally have put the buyer on a duty of inquiry.890 However, when the vendor under the prior deed had apparently acquiesced in the substitution of the notes for cash for a time without complaint, this altered the case.891 Under all these facts, no duty of inquiry was imposed upon the buyer to resolve the conflicting information regarding consideration for the transaction.892 In North v. Caughran,893 a prior deed reserved all right to certain improvements in a former vendor.894 When a purchaser, on notice of this reservation, went to the vendor to inquire of the nature of his interest, he stated he no longer had an interest in the property.895 This was sufficient inquiry by the buyer to be an innocent purchaser.896 In Wiedeman v. Houston Bldg. & Loan,897 a lender asked the occupier of the encumbered premises who Aowned@ the property.898 When the occupier claimed an unrecorded interest yet remained silent regarding this interest, the lender was an innocent purchaser.899

(2) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Identical for Purchasers and Mortgagors

There is no difference in the duty of purchasers or lenders to pursue inquiry.900 What is notice to one is notice to the other.901 In Bank of America v. Schwartz,902 Bank argued that it had a lesser duty of inquiry than did a purchaser because lending institutions were only interested in record title and value, and because a full duty of inquiry would make the lending process unduly onerous and costly.903 Held the duty of inquiry is identical for lenders and purchasers.904

(3) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Duty to Inquire of Neighboring Landowners or Local Community?

There is no duty of a purchaser to make inquiry to neighboring landowners regarding possible competing claims.905 Nor is there a duty to inquire of the ownership reputation of the land within the neighboring community.906

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However, the notoriety of the competing senior claim in the community may be admissible as a circumstance tending to show actual notice.907 But notoriety of which the buyer is unaware does not charge the buyer with a duty of inquiry.908

(4) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - To Whom Should Inquiry Be Made?

In order to qualify as an innocent purchaser or innocent mortgagee, a party with some notice of an antecedent claim must pursue the inquiry with a reliable and disinterested person.909 It is not sufficient to pursue inquiry to the vendor or other person who may have a motive for misleading the inquirer.910

In Dodd v. First State Bank & Trust of Hollis Oklahoma,911 a mortgagee was aware of prior vendors lien notes against property which appeared by the record to be owned by the mortgagor.912 To determine if the notes and supporting liens were outstanding in a third party, the mortgagee pursued inquiry only to the extent of asking the mortgagor=s agent about these liens.913 This agent, who was doubtless interested in closing the loan, was not a disinterested and reliable party.914 Ending the inquiry with this agent was not reasonable diligence sufficient to make the lender an innocent mortgagee.915 If the buyer=s inquiry directs him to a specific adverse claimant, inquiry must be pursued directly to that person or to someone with authority to represent that person.916 Otherwise, the inquiry is not sufficiently pursued and the buyer will be charged with all facts that direct inquiry would have disclosed.917 In Marshburn v. Stewart,918 the buyer inquired of the claims of certain heirs by talking to attorneys representing the heirs in a former suit since dismissed.919 This inquiry convinced the buyer that the heirs= claims were abandoned.920 However, complete inquiry to the heirs themselves would have shown that the heirs= claims were still viable.921 Held the buyer was not an innocent purchaser.922

(5) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Family History

The policy of protecting purchasers against secret titles, legal or equitable, is fully fulfilled by allowing purchasers to rely on apparent title - that is title apparent from the recorded instruments of record.923 Purchasers without specific controverting notice are not required to inquire into the family history of the vendor to root out secret titles or trusts held by other family members.924

(6) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Community/ Separate Character of Property

Undisclosed Community Property Interest. When property is acquired during marriage in the name of only one spouse, the property is nonetheless presumptively community property.925 The one spouse named as grantee holds legal title.926 However, equitable title will result in favor of the unnamed spouse in an equal proportion.927 The property may be conveyed free of this resulting trust under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine by a sale by the named

spouse to a purchaser paying value unaware of the interest of the other spouse holding only equitable title.928

Critical to determining the innocent purchaser status of the buyer is an examination of whether the buyer was aware that community funds were used to acquire the property. A purchaser of land is not automatically charged with knowledge of the marital history of all grantors in his chain of title.929

A deed into and out of one spouse only with no mention of marriage or of the other spouse is not notice of the equitable title of the unnamed spouse.930 However, when other matters are recited in the deed or otherwise known to the vendee, the issue of notice becomes one of fact. For cases in this area discussing notice from recitals in previous instruments, refer to

VI(C)(3)(a) infra.

In Alexander v. Harris,931 H.C. Alexander acquired certain property in his name during his marriage to Lizzie Alexander.932 Three children were born of the marriage.933 H.D. sold the property to John G. Harris after Lizzie=s death.934 Harris claimed innocent purchaser status against the equitable title of the Alexander children.935 Harris had constructive notice of the dates of the deeds into H.C. Alexander.936 Harris was also Awell acquainted@ with the Alexander family sufficient to put him or inquiry that the deeds were taken during the Alexander marriage.937 This imposed upon him a duty to determine the identity of all heirs of Lizzie.938 H.C.=s representations that the tract was his separate property coupled with Harris= reliance on H.C.=s honesty did not relieve Harris of the duty of inquiry.939 Harris was not an innocent purchaser.940

Undisclosed Separate Property Interest. If the purchaser is aware that a vendee was married at the time of the deed into that vendee, the purchaser is on notice of the potential community character of the property.941 A presumption prevails that the tract is community if title is taken in the name of both spouses or even if title is taken in the name of one spouse only.942 If the deed into the named spouse does not recite separate property consideration or an intention to convey as separate property, a purchaser for value without notice that the property was acquired with the separate means of one spouse may purchase the property on the faith of that community property presumption without further inquiry.943 Thus when title appears to be in the community, the separate property interest of one spouse may be lost if the property is acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.944

In Markley v. Martin,945 the presumption of community property was overcome putting the buyer on inquiry whether wife owned the property as her separate estate when buyer knew the wife and the wife alone rendered it for taxes, rented it to tenants, and collected all rents.946

(7) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Heirs of Deceased Owner

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A purchaser from the heirs of a deceased owner is on a duty of inquiry to discover all of the decedent=s apparent heirs.947 This includes all natural children and all children legally adopted.948 A failure to discover all apparent heirs is at the peril of the buyer.949 The buyer will generally be charged with knowledge of the identity of all such heirs.950 The rationale for this rule lies in the notion that, while the statutes of decent and distribution are effective in their operation as a conveyance in passing apparent title,951 they are not subject to registration. There is no want of diligence in the heir by failing to record his claim.952 This rule may be relaxed in cases where the unknown heirs are guilty of estoppel or some act calculated to mislead the purchaser.953 But see Turner v. Germany,954 (grantor=s representation in a deed that the grantors were the Asole children and heirs@ of the decedent did not relieve the grantee from determining the identity of all heirs.955

In Cooke v. Caswell,956 Love purchased property at a time when a prior decree of partition was of record awarding the property to the Aheirs of Worthy [email protected] Love was charged with a duty to investigate the identity of these heirs. This could have been done by examining the pleadings in the partition action.958

(8) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Fiduciary Transactions

(a) Self-Dealing by Fiduciary.

If a buyer=s chain of title charges the buyer with notice that a vendee holds title in a fiduciary capacity, a subsequent conveyance by that fiduciary to himself may be sufficient on its face to charge the buyer with notice of a fraud on the trust or of self-dealing by the fiduciary.959 In Steves v. United Serv. Automobile Ass=n,960 a buyer=s chain of title revealed a conveyance of property to Marshall Steves, as trustee of the Steves Sash & Door Company, Inc. Profit Sharing Trust.961 A later deed was made by the trustees of the profit sharing trust to Marshall Steves individually.962 This deed was sufficient to put a subsequent buyer on inquiry whether Steves had engaged in self-dealing with trust property.963

(b) Effect of Bare Conveyance to Vendee Aas Trustee@

A conveyance to a grantee followed by the designation Atrustee@ without designation of a beneficiary does not put a purchaser on inquiry of the existence of a trust relationship and the extent and limitations of the grantee=s authority with respect to the property.964

In Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co.965 a conveyance to C.M. AJoiner, Trustee@ did not give constructive notice that Joiner held the interest for the benefit of another.966

(9) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Deed By Agent or Attorney-in-Fact

A purchaser who claims title under an instrument executed by the agent or attorney-in-fact of the grantor has a duty to inquire into the extent of the agent=s authority.967

The buyer and his successors in title are charged to know the extent and/or limitations of the agent=s true authority968 and must interpret any provisions which are not clear at the buyer=s peril.969

In Green v. Hugo,970 a conveyance by an agent of a corporation exceeded the scope of his authority granted by corporate resolution.971 Held a remote vendee was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the agent=s lack of authority.972 The purchaser was on a duty of inquiry to investigate the extent of the agent=s authority to convey.973

If Principal Represents That Agent Lacks Authority to Convey. A Buyer is relieved of the duty to inquiry of the agent=s authority if the principal holds the agent out as having the necessary authority or power to so act.974

(10) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Equitable Adoptions

The duty the discover the heirs of a deceased owner does not extend to equitably adopted children.975 The reason for this rule is that the claim of an equitably adopted child is not apparent.976 There are neither birth nor adoption records which the purchaser can consult to protect himself.977 In Fleming v. Ashcoft,978 J.K. Pierce and Susan Pierce acquired a property during their childless marriage.979 The couple took in a young child that they raised but never formally adopted.980 When Mr. Pierce died, Ashcroft, et al purchased the property from Mrs. Pierce for value.981 Held that on these facts that there was no constructive notice that the child raised by the Pierces had any interest in the property via a claim of adoption by estoppel.982

(11) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Judgment/Order of Sale Regular on Its Face

When one of the links in the chain of title is an adjudication or order regarding title, this will not prevent a purchaser from being a bona fide purchaser.983 The effect of the adjudication of title is the same as if the true owner had been written on the face of the effected instrument.984 A person taking title to land in reliance on a judgment or order of sale regular on its face is considered an innocent purchaser and may rely on that judgment or order without inquiry into matters which contradict that record.985

In Crow v. Van Ness,986 Crow recovered certain lands from Van Ness by judgment.987 Wilkinson bought the land from Crow on the strength of the judgment placing title in Crow.988 Wilkinson claimed innocent purchaser status.989 Van Ness later attacked the judgment as one obtained as part of a conspiracy by Crow and others to deprive her of her property.990 Although Wilkinson was aware that Van Ness had a potential claim in the property as an heir of the original owner, Wilkinson could rely on the regularity of the judgment without further inquiry.991 In Finley v. Hartsook,992 a purchaser at a probate sale regular on its face was an innocent purchaser.993

(12) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Inconsistent Instrument

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To the extent that the recitals or stated effect of an instrument are in inherent conflict, a purchaser is put on a duty of inquiry to investigate the conflict.994 In First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones,995 a purported release of liens mistakenly recited that the subject note had been paid in full.996 However, the release of lien released some, but not all, of the properties covered by the referenced deed of trust.997 Held this was an inconsistency apparent on the face of the instrument.998 A subsequent buyer relying on release was not an innocent purchaser.999

In Martin v. Cadle Co.,1000 Jack Pratt and Jack Pratt, Sr. bought property in undivided shares after abstracts of judgment had been recorded against the younger Pratt.1001 The property was purchased subject to an existing deed of trust lien in favor of Compass Bank.1002 On May 7, 1997 Compass Bank executed a Release of Lien on the property reciting full payment of its note.1003 However, two weeks after the Release, a Notice of Trustee=s Sale was issued stating the Evelyn Johnstone was the holder of the released note.1004 At a July 1, 1997 trustee=s sale, Jack Pratt, Sr. bought the property.1005 One week later Compass Bank executed and recorded a ATransfer of Lien@ to Johnstone in Asubstitution@ of its earlier Release of Lien.1006 Held that a subsequent purchaser on this record was not on inquiry on the effectiveness of the Release of Lien.1007 The Bank=s attempt to substitute the Transfer of Lien for the Release of Lien was no evidence that the parties to the release were mistaken about its content or effect at the time that the release was executed.1008

(13) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Unreleased Lien

When a release of lien is recorded this ends the duty of inquiry as to the continued existence of the lien.1009 However, a party has constructive notice of a recorded but unreleased vendor=s lien or deed of trust and a duty of reasonable inquiry to determine the status and current owner of the lien created by that instrument.1010 This should include inquiry into whether the deed of trust has or could be released, extended, renewed, satisfied, extinguished, or foreclosed.1011

In Matter of Hamilton,1012 Hamilton filed bankruptcy on May 5, 1995.1013 An outstanding deed of trust on Hamilton=s property had been foreclosed by trustee=s sale on May 2, 1995 at which Realty Portfolio was the successful bidder.1014 Realty Portfolio did not record its trustee=s deed until May 16, 2005.1015 Held the bankruptcy trustee was not an innocent purchaser as to Realty Portfolio=s unrecorded interest in the property if a reasonably diligent inquiry regarding the status of the deed of trust by the trustee on the petition date using the information at hand would have disclosed the interest of Realty Portfolio.1016

In Matthews v. Rains County,1017 a buyer was charged with notice of an unrecorded deed of trust that was in his chain of title.1018 When this deed of trust was lost and replaced with a duplicate deed of trust, the buyer was charged with knowledge of the duplicate deed of trust as well.1019 Knowing of the unpaid deed of trust lien, the

buyer is on notice that that instrument could be renewed, extended, assigned, transferred, or duplicated by the original parties or their privies.1020

But see Mansur & Tebbetts Implement Co. v. Beer,1021 where Landman sold property to Scogan for $500 in cash plus four $500 notes by recorded deed reserving a vendor=s lien.1022 Two of the four notes were transferred to a third party by unrecorded assignment.1023 Scogin later reconveyed the property to Landman for the recited consideration of A$2,000".1024 Held that while there was no release of the vendor=s lien at the time of this transaction that a later buyer was entitled to a mistaken but legitimate inference or reasonable deduction that the $2,000 was a cancellation of the notes secured by the original vendor=s lien.1025 The later buyer was an innocent purchaser.1026

(a) Lien Apparently Barred by Limitations. Under the special recording statute for lien extensions and renewals (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 16.035-16.037), when a lien appears to be barred by limitations at the time of a subsequent transaction, and no renewal or extension is recorded, a subsequent buyer or encumbrancer may be an innocent purchaser against an unrecorded extension or renewal.1027 Such a purchaser is entitled to a statutory presumption that the debt secured by the lien has been paid and that the lien has ceased to exist.1028 In The Cadle Co. v. Butler,1029 the stated maturity date of a promissory note secured by a lien was November 19, 1988.1030 The lien was apparently barred by limitations 4 years later on November 19, 1992.1031 An abstract of judgment was recorded on the same property on May 12, 1993.1032 An extension of the original note and lien was later recorded on November 2, 1993.1033 Held the judgment lienholder was an innocent purchaser against an unrecorded extension of the original lien apparently barred by limitations.1034 This result was not changed by the failure of the recorded deed of trust for the original lien to specify a maturity date for the note.1035 The absence of a maturity date in the deed of trust did not require the subsequent creditor to review the promissory note and additionally inquire after the possibility of an unrecorded renewal or extension.1036

In Hart v. Winsett,1037 a subsequent buyer was an innocent purchaser with respect to a senior lien apparently barred by limitations even though the limitations period had been tolled prior to expiration due to the absence of the debtor from the state.1038 The result was the same as in the case of an unrecorded extension.1039

The special protections of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 16.035-16.037 are inapplicable if the senior lien is not apparently time barred at the time of creation of the junior interest.1040 For example, in Mercer v. Daoran Corp.,1041 Mercer obtained and abstracted a judgment against Ducroz in 1975.1042 At the time, the property was subject to a prior deed of trust created in 1974.1043 The deed of trust was later apparently time barred for a time before a renewal and extension was recorded.1044 This set of facts did not allow the Ducroz judgment lien to become superior to the senior deed of trust lien.1045 This was

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because the senior deed of trust lien did not appear to be time barred until after the judgment lien attached.1046

The special protections of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 16.035-16.037 are likewise inapplicable if the junior claimant has actual or constructive notice of facts sufficient to put him on a duty of inquiry regarding the possibility of an unrecorded extension of the senior lien.1047 For example, in Martin v. Thaxton,1048 a junior deed of trust lien was taken when a prior lien was apparently barred by limitations.1049 At the time that the junior lien was given, the senior deed of trust had actually been extended by unrecorded renewal.1050 The owner of the property advised the junior lienholder at the time that the later lien was created that he still considered himself bound to repay the earlier debt.1051 The junior lienholder was not an innocent purchaser.1052 The owner=s statements were sufficient to put the junior lienholder on a duty of inquiry regarding the possibility of an unrecorded extension of the senior lien.1053

(b) Future Advances Clause. As a general rule, if the property is subject to a deed of trust with a future advances or dragnet clause providing that the deed of trust will additionally secure future advances made to the debtor, the buyer is under a duty to investigate what advances may have been made which might be encompassed by this clause.1054 This investigation must extend to an inspection of the record and beyond so far as ordinary diligence and common prudence would require.1055 The senior encumbrancer may rely on its future advances provision to support a superior lien against junior claimants to the full extent of advances provided for even if agreed upon verbally.1056 It does not matter if the advances are made before or after the creation of the junior claim.1057 Nor is it necessary that the senior deed of trust specify any particular or definite sum which it is to secure.1058

However, a future advances clause is proof against a junior claim only to the extent of the future indebtedness reasonably within the contemplation of the immediate parties to the deed of trust.1059 The future advances clause (without more) will not give constructive notice of claims or debt of the mortgagor owed to third parties and later acquired by the mortgagee.1060 For example, in Wood v. Parker Square State Bank,1061 Bank loaned Lincoln Enterprises, Inc. $125,000 on August 1, 1962 secured by a deed of trust on 34.6 acres in Wichita County.1062 The deed of trust contained a general future advances/dragnet clause .1063 Bank later acquired by purchase another $21,248.46 unsecured note executed by Lincoln Enterprises to Horton.1064 Held the future advances/dragnet clause of the deed of trust was not constructive notice to a junior lien holder that the property additionally secured the Horton note.1065

(14) Extent of Duty of Inquiry – Possibility of Future Springing Lien.

In some cases a lien instrument may create the possibility of a springing lien which may arise from future circumstances. For example, restrictive covenants often provide for the possibility of a springing future lien as when

there is a default in the future payment of property maintenance dues. In such a case, the filing of the original restrictions are sufficient to provide constructive notice and a duty of inquiry of the possible existence of such a lien. It is not necessary that the association later record a supplemental lien document recording a liquidated lien claim.1066

(15) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Equitable Vendor=s Liens

An equitable lien arises in favor of a seller who sells land for a deferred consideration notwithstanding that no express lien is retained.1067 A purchaser may be put on notice of the possibility of such an unrecorded equitable lien by a recital in a deed that the payment of the purchase money is deferred. For example, in Fennimore v. Ingham,1068 Ingham sold property to Howe with a deed that recited that the land was Afree and clear@ except for a $500 Avendor=s lien [email protected] No express vendor=s lien was retained in the deed, nor any deed of trust executed to secure the note.1070 When Howe later sold the property to Gray, Gray was not an innocent purchaser.1071 Though record title reflected no lien, Gray was on notice of the existence of the note and the possibility of the existence of an equitable vendor=s lien to secure its payment.1072 Reasonable prudent inquiry would have disclosed that the note was still outstanding and in the hands of an assignee.1073

(16) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Unrecorded Instrument in Buyer=s Chain of Title

If there are unrecorded deeds or other instruments in a subsequent buyer=s chain of title, this ordinarily is not a circumstance which requires the buyer to push inquiry concerning the title beyond the deed itself.1074

(17) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Conflicting Instruments

If the purchaser has notice of a title fact from two references which are conflicting, the purchaser is on a duty of inquiry to resolve the conflict and determine the verity of the references.1075

In Moore v. Rockport Hotel Co.,1076 a buyer contended that a recorded release of vendor=s lien notes gave the false impression that it was releasing a deed of trust securing notes that were very similar in description, date, and amount.1077 However, a detailed comparison of the vendor=s lien notes released and the notes secured by the deed of trust showed discrepancies and differences between the two distinct sets of notes in several important particulars.1078 The buyer had no right to assume that the notes were the same.1079 The differences in the descriptions of the notes put the buyer on a duty of inquiry that if pursued would likely have disclosed the true facts to him.1080 This prevented him from being an innocent purchaser.1081

Texas Dept. of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply1082 considered the effect of a conflicting but apparently superseded instrument. A buyer bought land with

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knowledge of both a 2003 and 2004 judgment affecting title to the property. Both were duly recorded.1083 The 2004 judgment purported to render the 2003 judgment null and void.1084 Held the buyer could not be an innocent purchaser as to the apparent conflicts between the 2003 judgment and the 2004 judgment.1085 The Recording Statute protects purchasers from unrecorded instruments.1086 A buyer cannot be innocent of a recorded document in his chain of title even if apparently rendered meaningless by a later and contradictory instrument.1087

(18) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Ambiguous Information

If a purchaser has notice of a title fact which is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations having effect on the status of title, the purchaser is on a duty of inquiry to determine the correct interpretation of the ambiguous term.1088 In O=Mahoney v. Flanagan,1089 a prior deed recited that it was given in consideration of payments to the grantor by Sallie Flanagan Apaid at various times her [email protected] A missing word was obviously missing between Atimes@ and [email protected] If the missing term was Abefore@, the property was separate property.1092 If the missing term was Aduring@, the property was community.1093 The missing term made the deed recitation sufficiently ambiguous to put a buyer on a duty of inquiry.1094

(19) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Applicable Law

In the absence of knowledge that the law of another state governs a title issue, a buyer is justified in presuming that Texas law controls.1095 In Marshburn v. Stewart,1096 Cyrus Aiken, an Alabama resident, acquired property while married to Mildred Aiken.1097 The couple died childless.1098 The disposition of the property was controlled by Alabama law which resulted in a different disposition than Texas law.1099 However when the property was acquired by an innocent purchaser with no knowledge of Aiken=s Alabama residence, the buyer was justified in presuming the application of Texas law to determine how the property descended.1100

(20) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - Necessity of Obtaining Estoppel Certificates

One effective method by which a buyer may seek protection from a potential conflicting claim is to obtain an estoppel certificate from the potential claimant disclaiming any superior interest.1101 However, the failure to seek and obtain such a certificate does not preclude innocent purchaser status.1102

(21) Extent of Duty of Inquiry - MERSCORP Registered Mortgages

The members of the mortgage banking industry have created an electronic tracking system (MERS) to facilitate the rapid transfer of mortgage loans among members and to avoid the need to record these transfers in the county property records.1103 A deed of trust intended for MERSCORP electronic registration typically names

MERS as the beneficiary of the instrument and nominee of the lender.1104 This reference to MERS in the recorded instrument puts a subsequent buyer on inquiry notice requiring that buyer to go to MERS database to determine the current owner and disposition of the debt and lien though subsequent assignments and transfers of the lien are unrecorded in the real property records.1105

c. Tolling the Duty of Inquiry

If a duty of inquiry arises under a set of facts actually or constructively known to the buyer, that duty, though extant at one point in time, may be tolled by later developments which chill that inquiry.

B. Actual Notice

Actual notice by a buyer of facts sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry will affect him with notice of all that that inquiry would have developed.1106

1. Claims in Litigation

Litigants may give constructive notice of a claim against real estate which is in litigation by filing a lis pendens.1107 However, lis pendens filings are not the exclusive means by which a purchaser may be charged with notice of a senior claim against property which is in litigation.1108 Actual notice of the senior claim in litigation is just as effective as a lis pendens notice to defeat innocent purchaser status.1109

In Hexter v. Pratt,1110 a purchaser knew by reading the abstract for a property tract that a prior claim had been asserted by suit against the property but that the claim had been dismissed for want of prosecution.1111 This was sufficient to put buyer on notice of the claim.1112 Further

investigation of the claim was not excused because the suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution.1113 Such a dismissal was not an adjudication of the claim relieving the buyer of inquiry.1114

In Kelly v. Blakeney,1115 the buyer was served with suit by the senior claimant prior to purchase.1116 The suit alleged the substance of the senior claim to the property.1117 This was sufficient to give notice of the senior claim.1118

In Svoboda v. Bank of America, N.A.,1119 a demand letter to the mortgagor explaining that the mortgage had been assigned was sufficient to give the mortgagor actual notice of the unrecorded assignment.1120

2. Boundary Lines

In Gilmore v. O=Neil,1121 the buyer was taken upon the ground and shown the boundary lines of the property.1122 These lines conflicted with those shown in the property description in buyer=s deed.1123 This was sufficient to put buyer on actual notice of a potential senior claim to the conflicted area.1124

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3. Effect of Bankruptcy on Actual Notice

In bankruptcy, a trustee, without regard to any pre-petition actual knowledge, may avoid any obligation of the debtor that could be avoided by a hypothetical innocent purchaser.1125 A bankruptcy debtor-in-possession has the benefit of the same rule.1126 This rule eliminates the effectiveness of pre-petition actual notice on the part of either the bankruptcy trustee or the debtor-in-possession to defeat innocent purchaser status.1127 For example, in In re Earnest and Assoc., Inc.,1128 a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession was an innocent purchaser as to a pre-petition unfiled involuntary mechanic=s lien (constitutional), notwithstanding the debtor=s obvious knowledge of the obligation and the right of the contractor to assert such a lien under TEX. CONST. art. XVI ' 37.1129

This special bankruptcy provision on actual notice has no effect on the application of constructive notice principles against a bankruptcy trustee.1130

C. Constructive Notice By Form/Timing of Conveyance

In certain situations, the non-conventional or questionable form or timing of documents in the chain of title may give rise to a duty of further investigation or may otherwise give constructive notice of the senior title.1131

1. Quitclaim Deeds

A purchaser with a quitclaim deed in his chain of title may not raise the defense of innocent purchaser.1132 This rule obtains against any senior conflicting claim (except that of the grantor of the quitclaim deed)1133 which was in existence at the time that the quitclaim deed was executed.1134 It is the form of the instrument itself that gives constructive notice of all defects in the buyer=s antecedent chain of title.1135

In Tobin v. Benson,1136 the junior and senior title descended through a common source.1137 There was a quitclaim deed in the chain of title prior to the common source.1138 Held that this quitclaim deed did not prevent innocent purchaser status by the junior claimant as the senior title was not yet in existence at the time of the quitclaim deed.1139

a. Effect of Shelter Rule

While normally a buyer is prevented from being an innocent purchaser by a quitclaim deed in his chain of title, the result is different if the shelter rule applies.1140 In Laffare v. Knight,1141 Laffare acquired property from Brown, an innocent purchaser for value via quitclaim deed.1142 While Laffare could not claim to be an innocent purchaser under the quitclaim deed (which by its form gave notice of the conflicting senior title), his position as a vendee of an innocent purchaser for value protected him regardless of the quitclaim deed.1143

b. Sheriff=s or Constable=s Deeds

Some cases have determined that a Sheriff=s or Constable=s Deed conveying only the interest or title of the judgment debtor in the subject property are properly classified as quitclaim deeds incapable of supporting the claim of an innocent purchaser.1144 However, the better authority is probably that such a deed, made consistent with the statutory form prescribed for such deeds, is not constructive notice of a defect in title and is sufficient to support a claim of innocent purchaser.1145

c. Deeds by Personal Representative

Advancing similar logic, Arrowood v. Blount1146 determined that an administrator=s deed in usual form and containing all statutory requirements, was not a mere quitclaim deed and therefore could support the claim of an innocent purchaser.1147

2. Deeds of Limited Warranty

No covenant of warranty is necessary to entitle a vendee to claim the innocent purchaser defense.1148 A special warranty deed or deed without warranty, unlike a quitclaim deed, does not conclusively impute to the purchaser knowledge of prior defects in title.1149 However, the limited warranty of the deed is a weight factor that may be considered by the fact finder in determining if the buyer is without notice.1150

In Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc.,1151 Alamo Fireworks bought property Asubject to all validly existing encumbrances, conditions, and [email protected] This broad exception was sufficient to put Alamo on a duty of inquiry to determine if the property was tied up by an unrecorded lease to a rival fireworks company.1153

In Padgitt v. Still,1154 Stovall conveyed property to Cone with a general warranty to 2/3 of the tract but warranted the title to the remaining 1/3 only during the natural life of Stovall.1155 This parceling of the warranty was sufficient to put Cone and Cone=s successors in title on duty of inquiry of the possibility that equitable title to 1/3 of the tract was in others.1156

D. Constructive Notice by Registration

The registration of a duly-proved instrument in the real property records is generally constructive notice to all persons of the existence of the recorded instrument.1157 It is a conclusive presumption of law that the proper and legal recording of a deed in the buyer=s chain of title in the county where the land is located is constructive notice of the deed=s existence.1158 Any person dealing with the property contrary to such a recorded instrument does so at his peril.1159

A purchaser of property must search the real property records as the primary source of information on title.1160 The subsequent purchaser will be charged with constructive

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knowledge of the existence, legal effect, recitals, facts, references, conditions, restrictions, exceptions, reservations, and contents appearing in all instruments in the buyer=s chain of title and that affects his title.1161 The buyer is charged with constructive notice of instruments in his chain of title although he has not read them and never had actual notice of their contents.1162 A buyer cannot make himself an innocent purchaser by the simple expediency of declining to review instruments recorded for his benefit and open to his examination and by that means remain ignorant of all that those instruments would reveal.1163

In Cooksey v. Sinder,1164 Cooksey made an owner-financed sale of property to Michael Sinder by Warranty Deed with Vendor=s Lien retaining a vendor=s lien and superior title to the property to secure the payment of Sinder=s promissory note.1165 When Michael Sinder sold the same tract to Allen Sinder two years later, Allen Sinder was charged with notice of the prior deed in his chain of title and of recitals therein regarding the vendor=s lien retained.1166 Allen Sinder was not an innocent purchaser taking the property free of the unpaid vendor=s lien.1167

In Herman v. Shell Oil Co.,1168 a deed restriction appeared in a remote deed in the buyer=s chain of title but not in immediate deed into the buyer.1169 The buyer was nevertheless charged with notice of this deed restriction.1170 If the rule were otherwise interests in real property could disappear by the simple expediency of eliminating the interest as an exception to later deeds.1171

1. Buyer May Rely on the Truth of Each Recorded Instrument

A buyer may rely on the truth of each recorded instrument and the recitals contained therein.1172 In Masterson v. Ross,1173 Masterson agreed to sell 1,000 acres in Brazoria County to Pye for $25,000 with $10,000 to be paid in cash and $15,000 payable in two vendor=s lien notes of $7,500 each.1174 A deed was prepared reciting this consideration.1175 At closing, Pye could not fund the $10,000 down payment resulting in Masterson agreeing to take some additional notes from Pye.1176 However, the originally prepared deed was recorded reciting only two $7,500 notes.1177 When Pye later sold the property to Peter Bros., it was an innocent purchaser as to the outstanding additional notes not recited in the deed.1178 Peter Bros. could rely on the verity of the recorded deed.

But see Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,1179 when Ellen Smith and Louisa Mosely executed a deed to G.B. Turner for the western 100 acres of a 200 acre tract, the deed recited in the property description that the property abutted the eastern 100 acres previously sold to Alf Simon.1180 Held this mere recital, unsupported by any recorded conveyance to Simon was insufficient to be relied upon by a subsequent buyer as placing apparent title to the easterly 100 acres in Alf Simon.1181

2. Buyer May Rely Upon Construction of Instrument According to Commonly Accepted Meanings

A buyer of property may rely upon a construction of an instrument in his chain of title according to the commonly accepted meaning of the terms employed.1182 A subsequent buyer may be an innocent purchaser against a more constricted construction if he is without knowledge that the parties to the instrument intended to employ a term differently than its usual and customary meaning.1183

3. Class of Persons to Whom Registration is Notice

The concept of constructive notice extends only as far as its purpose. When the rationale for imposing constructive notice is lacking, real property records do not create a presumption of notice.1184 The registration of a deed is not necessarily notice to the whole world. Rather, the instrument is constructive notice only to those persons who are bound to search for it, as with subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.1185 For example, in Lane v. First Nat=l Bank of Canyon City,1186 a maker of a note secured by a vendor=s lien who paid it off to the wrong party without knowledge of an unrecorded transfer, could not raise the Recording Statute as a defense to the note. The maker was not a subsequent purchaser of the property.1187 In EEC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin,1188 constructive notice of a misrepresented/undisclosed fact was not a defense in a suit against the vendor and broker for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.1189 But see Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison,1190 holding that constructive notice provided by real property records was a defense to fraud suit where the true facts could by this means have been discovered with reasonable diligence.1191

a. Limitations Statutes

Well-reasoned authorities suggest that the Recording Statute cannot as a matter of law be relied upon as notice of a claim sufficient to commence limitations accruing against a party other than a subsequent purchaser of the property.1192

In Johnson v. Prudential Relocation Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership,1193 home purchasers brought an action against various defendants under the DTPA, for negligence, and for gross negligence, for failure to disclose high pressure gas pipelines in the buyer=s backyard.1194 Held that the recording of the easements was not constructive notice of buyer=s claims for the purposes of commencing the limitations period against the buyer.1195 Similarly, in Boucher v. Wallis,1196 the recordation of a mineral deed was not constructive notice to Wallis of the fraud of Boucher in getting Wallis to sign an instrument sufficient to start limitations running on Wallis= fraud claim.1197

In Cox. v. Clay,1198 Cox was not affected with notice of a recorded deed by his mother mistakenly conveying both her interest and Cox=s interest in a property sufficient to commence limitations against him.1199 Cox was not a

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subsequent purchaser bound to examine the records.1200 Therefore, the recorded deed was not notice to him.1201

In American Freehold Mortgage Co. v. Pace,1202 Pace executed a deed of trust to American Freehold Mortgage Co. which by mutual mistake contained an error in the property description.1203 The recordation of this deed of trust was not constructive notice to Pace of its mistaken contents sufficient to commence the limitations period for an action to reform the instrument.1204 It is not the purpose of the Recording Statute to charge the immediate parties to an instrument with constructive notice of its precise contents.1205 Rather the intent of the statute is to charge subsequent purchasers and mortgagees with notice of the instrument.1206

In Runge v. Gilbough,1207 Runge conveyed property to Gilbough retaining a vendor=s lien for the deferred purchase price.1208 Gilbough=s subsequently recorded deed to Hampton was not constructive notice to Runge of the repudiation of Runge=s title.1209 Runge was not a subsequent purchaser against whom the constructive notice of the Recording Statute operated.1210 But see Perry & Perry Builders, Inc. v. Galvan,1211 where the recordation of a payment bond was constructive notice to a subsequent claimant of a statutory mechanic=s lien sufficient to commence the limitations period running for filing suit on the bond.1212

However, the case law is far from consistent in this area. Many other authorities can be located that rely upon constructive notice to commence limitations running against a party not occupying the position of a subsequent purchaser of the subject property.1213

For example, a consideration number of cases suggest that the registration into or out of a cotenant of a conveyance purporting to effect a sale or encumbrance of the entirety of the property can be constructive notice to the other cotenant(s) sufficient to constitute an ouster for the purposes of commencing limitations running for adverse possession.1214 These cases strain the concept of constructive notice by charging a party, not a subsequent purchaser, with notice of an instrument not in his chain of title. Not surprisingly there are authorities which adopt a dissenting view on similar facts.1215

4. Documents Authorized to be Recorded

Generally any instrument containing the proper proof may be recorded if it concerns real property.1216

5. Records Not Giving Constructive Notice of Land Titles

Not all public records impart constructive notice.1217 Generally, for an instrument to give constructive notice, it must be recorded in the real property records.1218

a. Tax Records

Records on the payment of ad valorem taxes are not constructive notice of title to real property.1219 Nor are federal income tax returns constructive notice of title to land.1220

b. Estate Administration Proceedings

Generally, records filed in estate administration proceedings are not constructive notice of title to real property.1221 This is true even if the proceeding is in the county where the land is located.1222 However this general rule is subject to some notable exceptions:

(1) When Junior Title Deraigns From An Estate

When the junior title claiming innocent purchaser status deraigns from an estate, the person is in privy with the estate proceedings.1223 The buyer and his successors are charged with notice of all terms of the will and of all probate proceedings..1224 This is regardless of whether the will has been recorded and regardless of whether the will has been recorded and regardless of whether the estate proceedings were in a county other than county where the property is located.1225

However, a purchaser of land who does not deraign title through a proceeding in the probate court is not chargeable with notice of that proceeding or the recitations contained in the probate pleadings, judgments, or orders.1226

(2) Persons Interested in Estate

Persons interested in an estate are charged with constructive notice of the contents of public records relating to that estate.1227

(3) Domestic Wills

Domestic wills are properly and effectively filed, for the purposes of constructive notice, when recorded in the probate records of the county where the will is probated.1228 Domestic wills and proceedings appertaining thereto may be but are not required to be recorded as deeds are.1229 In Howth v. Farrar,1230 a buyer of Erath County property from the heirs of the decedent was not an innocent purchaser against a senior devisee of the same property when the Decedent=s will was duly probated in Austin County.1231

In King v. Ruvalcaba,1232 Dyson, Sr. died testate with a will duly probated and authorizing his independent executor to sell real property of the estate with or without economic necessity.1233 Dyson, Jr. was a beneficiary of the will with outstanding abstracts of judgment against him.1234 When the executor sold property to Ruvalcaba, there was no constructive notice to Rubalcaba of the pending abstracts of judgment against Dyson, Jr.1235 These judgment liens were not in Ruvalcaba’s chain of title.1236

(4) Foreign Wills

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Foreign wills probated in another jurisdiction are subject to a different rule. Foreign wills and attendant probate proceedings are not constructive notice.1237 For example, in Slaton v. Singleton,1238 a purchaser of property for value without knowledge from the heirs of a decedent whose will was probated in another state was an innocent purchaser against the devisees under that will when no notice of the will or attendant proceedings was recorded in the real property records of the county where the property was located.1239

(5) Unregistered Wills

Whether domestic or foreign, a will not filed for probate is generally not constructive notice of its contents.1240 A purchaser from the decedent=s heirs at law may be an innocent purchaser as against the devisees claiming under a will not probated until after the purchase.1241

c. Testamentary Instruments (Testator Not Yet Deceased)

The recordation of a will or other testamentary instrument prior to the death of the testator conveys no estate a praesenti and therefore gives no constructive notice of its contents.1242

d. Litigation/Court Records

Court records or judgments entered on the minutes of a judicial proceeding are not constructive notice of their contents as they may affect the title to real property.1243 In Benn v. Security Realty & Dev. Co.,1244 a divorce decree vested Sabra Benn with a 2 undivided interest in certain property.1245 However, the fact that the decree was in the minutes of the district court was not constructive notice of its contents to a subsequent purchaser.1246

In In re Tilton,1247 a bankruptcy trustee=s status as a fictional lien creditor was fixed at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Later filed bankruptcy schedules listing a lien against the debtor=s property were not constructive notice of the continued existence of a lien apparently barred by limitations.1248

Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv.1249 determined that an order of sale, and constable=s filed return of execution in the records of a Harris County Court at Law was not constructive notice of the sale of the property at execution.1250

The rule that litigation records do not constitute notice of title issues is not altered when there is one clerk performing both offices, as with a single officer serving as both county and district clerk.1251 The duties and records kept by such an officer are distinct and separate.1252

A different situation is presented if the junior claimant is a party to the suit. A party to a judicial proceeding is on constructive notice of all matters in the suit and any judgments or orders therein.1253 For example, in J.M. West

Lumber Co. v. Lyon,1254 when Bank appeared in a prior bankruptcy proceeding by filing a proof of claim, Bank was on constructive notice of a prior order in the bankruptcy for the sale of the subject property.1255

Likewise, a party may be put on constructive notice of judicial proceedings by lis pendens.1256

e. Courthouse Postings

Courthouse postings not in the real property records generally are not constructive notice.1257

f. Legal Notices in the Newspaper

Legal notices in a newspaper are generally not constructive notice.1258

g. Municipal Ordinances and Records

In Lesley v. City of Rule,1259 an ordinance filed in the minutes of the city council opening an alley across a property was not constructive notice of the existence of the alley.1260 A municipal ordinance is not an instrument required or permitted to be recorded in the real property records.1261In City of Richland Hills v. Bertelsen,1262 an unrecorded subdivision plat in the city records was not constructive notice of its contents.1263

h. Marriage Records

The records of marriages kept by the County Clerk are likely not constructive notice of the title to real property unless recorded in the real property records.1264

i. Railroad Commission Records

While the records of the Texas Railroad Commission regarding oil and gas activity, etc. are generally not constructive notice of their contents,1265 if a buyer has actual notice of the contents of the records, they may be sufficient to impart notice of the rights of parties mentioned in those records.1266

j. Documents Not Authorized to be Recorded

A document filed of record without statutory authorization does not impart constructive notice.1267 In Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard,1268 a notice of lis pendens was not constructive notice of the pending suit to which it referred when filed contrary to law (the subject matter of the suit did not directly involve title to real property as to authorize a lis pendens filing).1269

6. Instrument Must Be in Buyer=s Chain of Title

The recordation of a deed by a person not shown by the record to have been connected with the title under which a subsequent purchaser claims is not constructive notice.1270 To be effective as constructive notice, the

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instrument in question must be an essential link in the subsequent buyer=s chain of title,1271 that is the successive chain of conveyances commencing with the sovereign, each being a perfect conveyance of title down to and including the present owner.1272 Chain of title refers to documents which show the successive ownership history of the property.1273 Knowledge of an instrument outside the buyer=s chain of title is not imputed to a buyer.1274 Generally speaking, a buyer is not required to look any further than his own chain of title to determine the status of title.1275

This rule obtains because the only practical facilities available to the buyer to check title are the indices for grantor and grantee.1276 If the rule were otherwise, the law would effectively impose upon buyers to duty to make a general search of every instrument filed of record.1277 Such a duty would be onerous indeed.1278 Therefore, an instrument is constructive notice only to those claiming under the grantor by whom the deed was executed.1279

In Nelson v. Bridge,1280 when property was purchased from the administrator of an estate, the decedent=s will was not a necessary or proper link to the buyer=s title as the purchaser=s title was not deraigned from the will.1281

In Cherry v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co,1282 a vendor=s lien was retained by a remote vendor=s deed.1283 This lien constituted a branch off the title which was later transferred to Kemper who instituted a trespass to try title action resulting in an award of full title to and possession of the land.1284 Kemper then sold to Webel who sold to Cherry.1285 This chain of lien/suit/conveyances was in the chain of title for a subsequent buyer acquiring the property after the original lien was retained.1286

In Rork v. Shields,1287 Rork bought property from Burke in 1894 who had in turn acquired the property from the Houston and Texas Central Railroad Company (H&TC) in 1881.1288 However, H&TC has previously sold the same property to Carrington in 1875 by recorded conveyance.1289 From Carrington, the property had been conveyed through 14 different links in title to Shields.1290 One of these subsequent links in the Carrington chain was by instrument not effectively recorded.1291 The failure to effectively record one subsequent deed in the Carrington chain was immaterial.1292 Rork was on constructive notice of the branch off title initiated by the Carrington deed and was bound to determine the current ownership of that title.1293

a. Instrument by Interloper in Title

A deed is constructive notice only to those claiming title through the grantor of that deed.1294 If the chain of title is broken such that a subsequently filed instrument cannot be mated up with a prior owner in a regular chain of conveyances, it is considered an interloper title that does not impart constructive notice.1295

In Brown v. Ackerman,1296 Thames executed an option contract to McColl to purchase certain land.1297 McColl was the owner of practically all of the stock of Rio Grande

Development Company (Rio Grande).1298 No conveyance was executed under the option contract but there was a later deed from Rio Grande to Brown.1299 Brown=s deed was not constructive notice as it came from an apparent interloper or stranger in title.1300 There was no showing that legal title descended to Brown through a regular chain of conveyances.1301 In Bryant v. Buckner,1302 E.T. Watson conveyed certain property to his wife, Eveline Watson, by an 1858 deed not recorded until 1883.1303 Eveline died in 1859.1304 In 1878, Margaret Graham, a daughter of Eveline conveyed the property to Holland in deed reciting that she inherited the property from Eveline.1305 This deed and those subsequent to it were not constructive notice to one acquiring the interest of E.T. Watson prior to 1883.1306 There was nothing of record to link up the Graham deed to the title of E.T. Watson.1307 For record title purposes, Graham=s was an interloper title.1308

In Frank v. Heidenheimer,1309 Lee Reed conveyed a property to William Reed, et al by deed never recorded.1310 William Reed et al, unable to pay for the property, later reconveyed the property to Lee Reed by recorded instrument reciting that the William Reed et al notes were not satisfied.1311 This deed of reconveyance was not constructive notice to a later purchaser of the notes as it was not in the chain of title.1312 A recorded deed is only notice from a subsequent purchaser from the same vendor. If the vendor=s first deed is not of record, a recorded reconveyance does not give notice of the original sale.1313 Similarly, in McCreary v. Reliance Lumber Co.,1314 when a deed from Holland to McCreary, et al was not recorded, a deed of trust back from McCreary, et al was not in the chain of title of a subsequent purchaser from Holland.1315

(1) Unrecorded Community Interest.

In Zimpelman v. Robb,1316 Singleton Thompson acquired property in his name only while ostensively married to Elizabeth Thompson.1317 Held a senior conveyance by the abandoned Elizabeth was in the chain of title to the property.1318 Elizabeth, if married to Singleton Thompson, was not a stranger to the title.1319

b. Instrument With Inadequate Property Description

To constitute constructive notice, an instrument must reasonably identify the subject property.1320 If the property description is missing,1321 inadequate, or incorrect, this may cause the instrument to fail as constructive notice.1322 The inadequacy or discrepancy in the property description must be of a substantial nature calculated to mislead a buyer.1323 A property description which is incorrect but similar to the correct description may be sufficient to impart constructive notice.1324

Generally, to give constructive notice of a conflicting senior claim, the instrument must contain a property description which reasonably demonstrates by fair construction an overlap or conflict of the senior claim with the junior claim.1325 That overlap or conflict must appear on the face of the deed.1326 A latent ambiguity or mistake does not excite inquiry.1327 If resort must be made to facts

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outside of the recorded deed to demonstrate the conflict, there is no constructive notice.1328 In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry Co. v. Gill,1329 a senior recorded deed described the property as a block on an unrecorded map.1330 The description was so indefinite as to cause the deed to give no constructive notice.1331 In Dickerson v. McFarland,1332 a prior recorded deed intended to describe a tract which encompassed part of a 47-1/2 acre tract later purchased by Rowland.1333 However one mistaken directional call of Aeast@ rather than Awest@ described a tract which did not overlap or conflict with that of Rowland. There was insufficient evidence of this mistake appearing on the face of the prior deed.1334 Rowland was an innocent purchaser.1335 In Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool v. Clark,1336 the mistaken description of a property as lying in ASurvey No. 2" rather than ASurvey No. 42" caused the instrument to fail as constructive notice.1337

However, if the property description is ambiguous, contradictory, imperfect, erroneous, inadequate, or inconsistent to the extent that it naturally excites inquiry, there may arise a duty in the buyer to make inquiry.1338 The application of this rule is largely dependent on the individual facts of the case.1339 There is a noticeable lack of harmony in decisions in this area.1340 In Carter v. Hawkins,1341 when a metes and bounds description with an erroneous call did not close, this improbable description was enough to constitute constructive notice. The buyer had a duty a further inquiry to resolve this obvious error.1342 Similarly, in Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear,1343 a prior lease with blanks in a directional call gave an incomplete east line for the property.1344 This was sufficient to put a subsequent lessee on duty of inquiry regarding the land intended to be described.1345 In Republic Nat=l Bank of Dallas v. Eiring,1346 a blank left in the property description of a deed in vendee=s chain of title was sufficient to prevent him from being an innocent purchaser.1347

A duty of inquiry will also arise from an instrument with a conflicting property description.1348 For example, if the tract is described as the east 2 of a lot but the metes and bounds description describes a different tract, a subsequent buyer cannot close his eyes to this discrepancy.1349 The buyer is on constructive notice if either of the conflicting descriptions conflicts with the title he proposes to purchase.1350 The buyer cannot discard one description in favor of another and by this means make himself an innocent purchaser.1351

A property description otherwise insufficient to give constructive notice may be cured if the person claiming innocent purchaser status has peculiar knowledge of the property or its surroundings that would allow that buyer to interpret the incomplete record and give it the meaning it was intended to convey.1352 The sufficiency of the property description can be dependent on the circumstances and relative situations of the parties.1353

c. Instrument Apparently Expired or Barred

An instrument apparently expired, released, or time barred is not constructive notice.1354

In Brown v. Ackerman,1355 Thames executed an option to McColl to purchase certain land.1356 A later conveyance in consequence of a purported exercise of the option came after the option and extensions had expired.1357 This deed was not constructive notice because the option was expired.1358

d. Void Instruments

A void instrument conveys no title and is not within the chain of title.1359

e. Conveyance Recorded Before Grantor Has Acquired Record Title.

An instrument out of a grantor recorded before that grantor or remote grantor acquired record title to the property is not in the purchaser=s chain of title.1360 The purchaser is not required to search the records before his vendor or remote vendor acquired the property.1361

(1) Effect of After-Acquired Property Clause

In First Nat=l Bank of Chicago v. Southwestern Lumber Co.,1362 Delta Land & Timber Co. (Delta) executed and recorded a deed of trust in 1922 containing provisions that the debt was additionally secured by any after-acquired properties of Delta.1363 Delta later purchased certain tracts which were in turn conveyed by Delta to Southwestern Lumber Co. (Southwestern).1364 Held the 1922 deed of trust with after-acquired property clause was not constructive notice of the lien for distinct properties acquired by Delta after the deed of trust was recorded.1365 Southwestern was an innocent purchaser. The after-acquired property clause did not change the general rule that Southwestern was not required to examine records for a conveyance out of Delta prior to the time that Delta acquired the title to the disputed properties.1366

(2) Effect of Doctrine of After-Acquired Title

In Caswell v. Llano Oil Co.,1367 Lockhart acquired two sections of land by recorded instrument in 1924.1368 To secure the purchase price of the land, Lockhart gave a deed of trust of even date to the seller.1369 In 1925, Lockhart executed an oil and gas lease to Patterson which was later acquired by Llano Oil.1370 In 1927, Lockhart defaulted on the purchase money debt and lost the property to a trustee=s sale.1371 However, Lockhart later reacquired the property in 1927 then gave a second oil and gas lease to Caswell.1372 Llano Oil claimed a superior right to the minerals under the doctrine of after-acquired title.1373 Caswell claimed he had no constructive notice of the Llano Oil lease as it was recorded before Lockhart reacquired the property.1374 Held that the inception of Lockhart=s title dated from his original acquisition of the property and because of the warranty of title given by Lockhart in the 1925 Patterson lease, Caswell was on constructive notice of Llano Oil=s superior claim under the doctrine of after-acquired title.1375 The registration of an instrument containing warranty of title affects subsequent purchasers with constructive notice provided that the title acquired by the grantor after the

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instrument was executed originated prior to the execution of the instrument.1376

f. Conveyance Recorded While Grantor Has Record Title

After a party has acquired record title and before that same party has parted with such title, a purchaser will be charged with notice of all instruments executed by the record owner and affecting title.1377

g. Conveyance Recorded After Grantor Has Parted With Record Title

An instrument is considered outside of the chain of title if it is recorded after a grantor has by record parted with his title.1378 A buyer must search the record for conveyances out of his immediate grantor and out of any remote vendors up the chain of title before they parted with record title but not after.1379 In White v. McGregor,1380 John Crum conveyed to Jane Dickerson (recorded April 23, 1864) who conveyed to Reuben Crum (recorded October 30, 1888) who conveyed to Aura White (recorded December1892).1381 A sheriff=s deed resulting from the levy of a writ of execution on the property of John Crum recorded on August 4, 1885, was not constructive notice to White.1382 Although the deed was recorded prior to the date of the deed into White, the sheriff=s deed was long after Crum apparently parted with the title by selling to Dickerson.1383 White was under no duty to search for conveyances out of John Crum after Crum sold the property to Dickerson.1384

In Joe T. Garcia=s Ent. v. Snadon,1385 Snadon sold property to King and Sampson on May 5, 1977.1386 Two months later, Snadon filed a Acorrection deed@ adding deed restrictions to the property.1387 Garcia acquired an option to purchase the property on March 25, 1982.1388 The correction deed, made after Snadon parted with title, was not in Garcia=s chain of title, therefore, not constructive notice to Garcia of the claimed restrictions.1389

In Fitzgerald v. Legrande,1390 a Sheriff=s Deed was not in Skelly Oil=s chain of title because recorded after a deed out of Skelly=s remote grantor.1391 However, the Sheriff=s Deed contained recitals referring to the Deed of Trust, judgment of foreclosure, and order of sale preceding the sheriff=s sale. The deed of trust referred to preceded the date of the deed out of Skelly=s remote grantor.1392 This did not matter. It was the recording date of the Sheriff=s Deed not recitals contained therein that determined whether it was in Skelly Oil=s chain of title.1393

But see Raley v. D. Sullivan & Co.,1394 holding that when M.H. Poor sold a property to R.W. Coleman but retained a vendor=s lien and superior title to secure the purchase money indebtedness of Coleman, that a later deed of the same property by M.H. Poor to D.M. Poor was in the chain of title of the subsequent purchaser because M.H. Poor still held superior title to the property at the time of the later deed to D.M. Poor.1395

An innocent purchaser is not affected by instruments recorded after he acquired his interest in the property.1396 Such an instrument is not in the buyer=s chain of title and therefore not constructive notice to one whose rights in the property have already vested.1397 The buyer is under no duty to search the real property records to ascertain subsequent filings.1398 In Biswell v. Gladney,1399 Biswell purchased notes and supporting vendor=s liens.1400 The liens were partially released on part of the property in a subsequent sale. However, the partial release was not recorded until after Biswell bought the notes and liens.1401 The partial release was not effective to prevent Biswell from claiming the status of an innocent purchaser.1402 In Openheimer v. Robinson,1403 the senior deed was recorded after an abstract of judgment was recorded but before the property was purchased at execution sale by Openheimer.1404 Held the deed was not constructive notice to Openheimer as it came after the judgment lien attached which was the basis of Openheimer=s later sheriff=s deed.1405

In Brandt v. Roxana Petroleum Corp.,1406 Poole executed an oil and gas lease to Roxana Petroleum in 1924.1407 In 1925, Poole executed a deed to part of the affected tract to Brandt.1408 Roxana Petroleum was not on constructive notice of the later deed as required Roxana to atorn to the new owner.1409

h. Released Lien Instrument

A lien instrument or deed of trust, once released, is no longer constructive notice of its contents if a subsequent buyer=s title is not derived from the released lien.1410 An affirmative declaration (or an act equivalent to such declaration) by the record owner that the lien has been paid, satisfied, released, or extinguished will protect a later buyer dealing with the land in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice against an assignee of the lien holding under unrecorded assignment.1411 In Fleming v. Adams,1412 Adams, a developer reserved as unrestricted a 4 acre-tract from an adjacent 40 acre development for which restrictive covenants were filed.1413 Adams later mortgaged the 4 acre tract by deed of trust providing that the 4 acres were subjected to the restrictions.1414 Adams later paid the debt off and the deed of trust was released.1415 Adams later conveyed part of the 4 acres to Canter.1416 Held the deed of trust, though recorded prior to Canter=s deed, was not constructive notice to Canter of the restrictions.1417 Prior to Canter=s purchase, the deed of trust was released.1418 Because Canter=s title did not derive from the released deed of trust, it was not in Canter=s chain of title.

In Apex Fin. Corp. v. Brown,1419 a lien waiver releasing a contractual mechanic=s lien eliminated the mechanic=s lien as constructive notice as a matter of law.1420

i. Instrument Relating to Different Tract

Generally, a purchaser is only required to look for conveyances made prior to his purchase by his vendor or

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remote vendors through whom he derives title.1421 The recording of an instrument is notice only to those who subsequently acquire some interest or right in that same property.1422 For constructive notice principles to apply, it is not sufficient that the instrument in question be in the chain of title of any property acquired by the buyer.1423 The instrument must be an essential link to buyer=s title to the specific property affected by the senior claim.1424 In Haley v. Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co., a deed to buyer contained recitals relating to an unrecorded senior deed affecting an adjacent tract also acquired by buyer.1425 This deed was not in buyer=s chain of title on the adjacent tract, therefore did not give constructive notice of the competing senior claim.1426

(1) Residue Tracts

When the buyer is purchasing a residue tract, prior deeds conveying excluded parcels are within the buyer=s chain of title (because necessary to define the residue tract).1427 In Gilmore v. O=Neil,1428 a buyer purchased the Aunsold@ portion of a 50 acre tract. This placed all previous deeds out of the parent tract into the buyer=s chain of title as necessary to determine the property included in the residue grant.1429 When these deeds revealed a discrepancy in the acreage of one excluded tract, this put the buyer on notice of a potential senior claim to a strip of land included in the property purchased.1430

In Cunningham & Stringfellow v. Buckingham,1431 Buchanan, et al sold to Cunningham, et al all of their Aremaining interest@ in the Mirror Addition.1432 This deed was construed to convey only the lots then owned by Buchanan and not lots conveyed by previous unrecorded conveyances.1433 Cunningham et al were not innocent purchasers of land not intended to be conveyed or excepted from this subsequent deed.1434

(2) Constituent Tracts

If the tract purchased is an amalgamation of several constituent tracts, each instrument in the chain of title for each constituent tract is in the buyer=s chain of title.1435 In Tuggle v. Cooke,1436 Tuggle purchased a 160 acre tract comprised of several smaller parcels.1437 All instruments in the chain of title of each of the smaller tracts were in Tuggle=s chain of title.1438

(3) Multiple Instruments Construed as One Deed

In Jones v. Fuller,1439 B.D. Douthitt conveyed all of his rural property to his children. Each of the deeds, save one, granted easements of access to all tracts conveyed to these children.1440 All deeds recited that each was part of several deeds of even date conveying the property of Douthitt to his children.1441 Held the deeds by their express terms were executed as part of a single transaction and were to be construed as a single instrument.1442 As a result, the execution of the deeds created an express easement in favor of the grantee of the deed which failed to expressly mention an easement.1443 The recordation of the intertwined deeds

was constructive notice of the easement in favor of this grantee.1444

(4) Deeds to Other Lots in Restricted Subdivisions

Painter v. McDonald1445 suggests that a purchaser in a subdivision is charged with notice of the registration in prior deeds to other lots if such deeds were recorded and by their terms applied to all other lots in the addition.1446

(5) Partitioned Tracts

If a tract is subjected to a parol partition, there is a difference among the authorities whether subsequent deeds adopting this partition scheme may give constructive notice of the partition although not pertaining the specific tract upon which the innocent purchaser defense is asserted. In Massie v. Yates,1447 Link sold a 2 undivided interest in 640 acres to W.R. Yates by recorded deed.1448 Link and Yates later partitioned the property by parol partition with W.R. Yates taking the South 2 and Link retaining the North 2.1449 Link then sold the North 2 to Walter Yates by recorded deed.1450 When a lien creditor of Link later recorded an abstract of judgment on Link=s ostensive undivided interest in the South 2, held the deed out of Link to Walter Yates on the North 2 was sufficient to put the lien creditor on duty of inquiry whether the South 2 had been the subject of a parol partition.1451 But see a different result on similar facts in Temple Lumber Co. v. Kirby Lumber Co.1452

j. Unrecorded Instrument

Generally, an instrument affecting title that is not recorded is not in the buyer=s chain of title and cannot constitute constructive notice.1453

In Cambridge Shores Homeowners Ass=n v. Spring Valley Lodge Co.,1454 deed restrictions were imposed on a lot by an unrecorded contract for deed later released.1455 This contract provided no constructive notice of the restrictions to a subsequent buyer.1456

(1) When Unrecorded Instrument is Essential Link in Junior Title

However, when an unrecorded instrument is an essential link in establishing the junior claimant=s own title, the junior claimant is charged with notice of the unrecorded instrument, its content, effect, and recitals.1457 This is regardless of whether the junior title claimant has ever seen it, read it, or had any knowledge of it.1458 If the junior title holder claims through an instrument it is his duty to thoroughly examine each link necessary to establish his own title.

In C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Holbert,1459 Holbert conveyed property to Walker on August 7, 1928 by unrecorded deed retaining a vendor=s lien for the deferred consideration.1460 On August 14, 1928 Walker gave C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. a contractual mechanic=s lien on the same property.1461 C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. was

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not an innocent mortgagee as it was bound to examine all recorded and unrecorded links in its essential chain of title.1462

It is immaterial to the innocent purchaser question that no deed of trust was recorded to further document the lien.1463 The reservation of a vendor=s lien in the unrecorded deed was sufficient constructive notice of the intended lien to all subsequent purchasers for whom the deed was an essential link in their title.1464

Buckley v. Runge,1465 extended the constructive notice effect of unrecorded instruments in the buyer=s essential chain of title to unrecorded vendor=s lien notes which recited that liens were retained to secure their repayment (the deed recitals were unknown as the deed given in exchange for the notes was lost in the 1900 Galveston hurricane).1466

In Johnson v. Marti,1467 Marti bought from G.W. Potter who held title through two strands of title (one strand through recorded instruments and one strand through unrecorded deeds).1468 Held that recitals in the unrecorded deeds were not constructive notice to Marti as these instruments were not essential links in Marti=s title when apparent recorded title proceeded from another source.1469

k. Recorded Plat

A recorded plat affecting the property is in the buyer=s chain of title.1470

7. Instrument Must Affect Buyer=s Title

While a buyer must take notice of all instruments in his chain of title, this notice extends only to instruments affecting the buyer=s title.1471 In Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake Utilities Co.,1472 an exclusive utility service agreement was an agreement restricting the use of land only in a collateral way.1473 It did not create an equitable servitude against the property which bound subsequent purchasers under constructive notice principles.1474 In Munawar v. Cadle Co.,1475 an exclusive sales agreement between a remote vendee and gasoline supplier relating to the installation of gasoline dispensing equipment did not relate to title to the land and therefore was not in buyer=s chain of title.1476

8. Extent of Constructive Notice Given By Instrument

a. Purchaser Charged With Notice of All Recitals in Instrument

An instrument in a purchaser=s chain of title is constructive notice of not only of its effect but of all recitals, references, descriptions, and reservations contained therein.1477 Any such recital or reference requires step-by-step inquiry from one discovery to another and from one instrument to another until the entire chain is exhausted and complete knowledge of all referenced matters affecting the property is obtained.1478 The

purchaser is presumed to have prosecuted the inquiry to its final result.1479

The recitals to which this rule applies includes recitals and references made in any part of the instrument, inclusive of any acknowledgment or proof to the instrument.1480 The buyer may accept the recitals contained in a recorded instrument as true.1481

In Bolton v. Baldwin,1482 purchaser was charged with notice of pending litigation involving the property by recitals in the purchaser=s deed referring specifically to the pending suit.1483

(1) Recitals Must Accurately and Directly Relate to the Conveyance

For a recital to impart constructive notice it must accurately and directly relate to the object and effect of the conveyance.1484 Recitations which are collateral or foreign to the intended conveyance are not notice.1485

In Martin v. Marquardt,1486 recitals in an instrument stated that Martin had a deed to the property recorded in the real property records of Hidalgo County.1487 While Martin claimed senior title through an equitable lien, Martin never had the recited deed to the property.1488 The false recital was insufficient to put a subsequent buyer on constructive notice of Martin=s unrelated equitable lien claim.1489

(2) Purchaser Also Charged With Notice of All Facts Reasonably Deducible From Recited Facts

A junior purchaser is bound not only by the actual recitations contained in each instrument in his chain of title but of other and further facts not specifically recited, but about which the recited facts excite suspicion, inference, or deduction and which could be learned by the buyer upon reasonable inquiry.1490 The standard required is a reasonable diligent inquiry using the facts at hand in the recorded instrument.1491 What recited facts are sufficient to excite further inquiry and what reasonable inferences and deductions a prudent man should draw from the recited facts is question of fact.1492 The difficulty in most cases in this area is to properly apply the general rule to the facts of a particular transaction.1493

The harsh result of imputing knowledge of an unrecited fact has caused courts to be cautious in this area. A mere vague illusion to something that may or may not lead to an interest in land is not sufficient.1494 Where the circumstances or inferences are equally supportive of some other conclusion than the one with which the buyer is sought to be charged, constructive notice will not apply.1495 In W.C. Belcher Land Mortgage Co. v. Norris,1496 existing leases recited that they were given in part consideration for the release of all rights under previous leases (the lessor under the previous leases was not recited).1497 There was nothing in this bare recital to raise inquiry with a subsequent mortgagee that the lessor on the released leases was an adverse claimant by unrecorded deed.1498 The natural and logical inference was that the lessor under the

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previous leases was someone connected with the record title.1499

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Unrecorded Transfer of Lien. In Gibson v. Morris,1500 property was sold by a trustee=s deed Asubject to@ certain outstanding notes. The purchaser at the sale was the record owner of the notes who had previously assigned the notes to another by unrecorded transfer.1501 A subsequent purchaser claimed innocent purchaser status as to the unrecorded transfer.1502 The holder of the notes (via the unrecorded transfer) claimed that the sale of the property to the record holder of the notes by deed made Asubject to@ the notes was sufficient to put a subsequent buyer on inquiry whether the notes had been assigned to another.1503 The trustee=s sale had been advertised as offering the property subject to the notes. It was proper that the trustee=s deed conform to this advertising even if the deed was to the ostensive holder of the notes.1504 This circumstance did not excite inquiry about an unrecorded assignment of the notes.1505

Also in Gibson v. Morris,1506 Texas Mortgage Company (TMC) sold land to Morris in 1922 in consideration of a series of 7 promissory notes by deed retaining a vendor=s lien to secure payment of the notes.1507 TMC assigned these notes to 4 different holders by unrecorded assignment.1508 In 1925, TMC advanced more money to Morris by 5 additional notes secured by a deed of trust on the property reciting that TMC had Aadvanced@ $4,432 in payment of sums due to the Aholder@ of the 1922 notes.1509 Some of the 1925 notes were sold to Ella Gibson who claimed innocent purchaser status as to the unrecorded holders of the 1922 notes and supporting liens.1510 Held that Gibson was charged with notice of the unrecorded assignment of the 1922 notes.1511 The deed of trust recital that TMC had Aadvanced@ money to the Aholder@ of the 1922 notes was sufficient to excite inquiry that TMC no longer held the notes itself.1512

In H.O. Wooten Grocer Co. v. Lubbock State Bank,1513 Braddy sold property to Gregg expressly reserving a vendor=s lien to secure a series of ten promissory notes given as part of the purchase consideration.1514 Gregg later reconveyed the property to Braddy reciting that Gregg had an Ainability to pay the outstanding notes@ and reciting that Braddy would be Aliable to pay all debts against the [email protected] Some of the ten notes were assigned to others by unrecorded assignments prior to the reconveyance.1516 The recitations reserving the vendor=s lien put all subsequent mortgagees on notice of the notes and vendor=s liens and charged them with a duty to inquire as to ownership of all of these notes unless the record owner of the notes affirmatively declared them released or satisfied.1517 The recitals in the reconveyance that Braddy would Aassume all debts@ did not impart a release or merger of the notes, but inferred that the notes were outstanding in the hands of third parties.1518 Subsequent mortgagees were not innocent purchasers.1519

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Unrecorded Community Interest. A deed into and out of one spouse only with no mention of marriage or of the other spouse is

not notice of the equitable title of the unnamed spouse.1520 However, the result may be different if other facts are recited in from which the unnamed spouse=s community interest in the property could be deduced.

In Brown v. Stumpff,1521 T.H. Scudday and wife acquired by purchaser 50 acres during their marriage.1522 T.H. Scudday was the only grantee named in the 1923 deed.1523 Mrs. Scudday died in 1930.1524 In 1933, T.H. Scudday executed an oil and gas lease on the property to Stumpff which described Mr. Scudday as a [email protected] Mrs. Scudday=s heirs claimed that their equitable interest was not subject to the lease.1526 Stumpff claimed that these heirs were estopped to raise their title because of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine.1527 Held that the designation of T.H. Scudday as a Awidower@ only showed that he had been married and that his wife was dead.1528 This did not give positive notice that T.H. Scudday had a wife in 1923 when the property was deeded to him.1529

In Bordages v. Stanolind Oil Co.,1530 property was conveyed to Elizabeth Hamshire during her marriage to John Hamshire.1531 The deed did not mention John.1532 After John=s death, Elizabeth conveyed the property by deed referring to her as AMrs. Elizabeth Hamshire widow of the late John Hamshire.@1533 This reference was not sufficient to apprise the buyer of the outstanding equitable title of the heirs of John Hamshire.1534 It did not definitely show that Elizabeth Hamshire was married to John Hamshire on the date that the property was originally purchased.1535 But in Peavy v. Smith,1536 when deed into AMrs. Fannie Henderson@ described her as the Awife of Sam Henderson Esq.@ this was constructive notice that the property was presumptively community property.1537

In Gilmer=s Estate v. Veach,1538 property was acquired in the name of John A. Veatch only during his first marriage.1539 A later deed from Veatch=s descendants describing them as Aheirs@ was not sufficient to put the buyer on notice that Veatch had a wife at the time that the property was acquired.1540

In McBride v. Moore,1541 a recitation that property was the Ahomestead@ of the vendor did not excite inquiry that the vendor had acquired the property while married.1542

In Clayborn v. Gambill,1543 Cain Clayborn purchased property in 1877.1544 At the time, he was married to Ann Clayborn.1545 The title was taken in the name of Cain only.1546 Ann died in 1900, survived by Cain and 5 children (4 by Cain, 1 by her previous marriage).1547 In 1904, Cain conveyed the property to Will Rather by deed naming Cain and 4 of his children as grantors but executed only by Cain.1548 Held that the inclusion of some of Ann=s children=s names in the deed to Will Rather was not notice of the equitable interest held by Ann=s heirs.1549 But see Yates v. Buffalo State Bank,1550 where property was acquired during the marriage of E.A. Swayzie and Mary Swayzie but taken in the name of E.A. Swayzie only.1551 After Mary=s death, E.A. Swayzie conveyed the property to Johnson joined by some but not all of their eight children.1552 Held the appearance of seven additional

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signatories/grantors on the Swayzie deed, many having the last name of ASwayzie@, in addition to E.A. the legal title owner should have been sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry whether or not there were others, besides those signing, who owned an equitable interest in the property.1553

In Elliott v. Wallace,1554 William Cooper married Martha Elliott, a widow, in 1865.1555 At that time, Martha had children by her prior marriage (the AElliott Heirs@).1556 In 1866, William acquired by purchase property in his name only.1557 The marriage of William and Martha produced more children (the ACooper Heirs@).1558 Martha died in 1898.1559 After her death, the Cooper Heirs (but not the Elliott Heirs) conveyed all of their interest in the property to William.1560 After William=s death in 1907, the Cooper Heirs conveyed the property to Blackwell by deed specifically referring to the other deed by the Cooper Heirs to William and reciting details regarding the marriage of William and Martha.1561 Blackwell was not an innocent purchaser for value as to the equitable interest of the Elliott Heirs.1562 His deed sufficiently apprised him that William was married to Martha at the time that the property was originally acquired in 1866.1563 Blackwell was on notice to determine the identity of all heirs of Martha.

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Unrecorded Separate Property Interest. In Montgomery v. Noyes,1564 a surviving wife took a deed from her late husband=s heirs which recited as its consideration that the heirs were withdrawing all claim to other lands formerly owned by the couple.1565 Held this recital was sufficient to excite inquiry whether the property was the separate property of the wife.1566

Recited Facts in Property Description Exciting Inquiry of Competing Interest. In Gwin v. Griffith,1567 a deed of trust property description described a boundary along the Asoutheast edge of the William Moseley [email protected] This was not notice that Moseley claimed an equitable interest to a larger tract including a part of the property described in the deed of trust under an unrecorded plat of the Moseley property inconsistent with the description in the deed of trust.1569 The total acreage recited in the deed of trust property description was consistent with the calls and distances in its field notes.1570 The mortgagee, without more, was not required to go to each adjoining land owner recited to determine the extent of the neighbor=s claim.

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Prior Unrecorded Sale of Property. In Abernathy v. Puckett,1571 a deed in the purchaser=s chain of title to Lots 11, 13, and 15, Block 118 referred to the property conveyed as Aall the lots now owned by me...in Block 118".1572 This was sufficient to excite inquiry regarding an unrecorded conveyance out of the same grantor of Lots _____, Block 118.1573

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Unrecorded Lien. An equitable vendor=s lien arises in favor of a seller who sells land for a deferred consideration notwithstanding that no express lien is retained and notwithstanding that the deed is absolute on its face.1574 If a deed recites deferred

consideration, this is sufficient to excite inquiry by the buyer of the existence of a vendor=s lien.1575 In Crews v. Taylor,1576 a deed recited that it was given in consideration of unpaid deferred consideration.1577 This charged a subsequent vendee of the possible existence of a supporting vendor=s lien.1578

In Hughes v. Graham Nat=l Bank,1579 a deed of trust recited that it was Asubject to all existing liens on said [email protected] This was sufficient to put a lienholder on inquiry regarding the possibility of prior liens.1581

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Inadequacy of Consideration. It is possible that recitations in prior deeds in a buyer=s chain of title may charge the buyer with notice of the inadequacy of the recited consideration so as to put the buyer on inquiry of a title defect.1582 However, this rule may be inapplicable when the conveyance for which consideration is recited was executed a number of years before.1583 Recitations of a grossly inadequate consideration may be effective notice for a reasonable time after the deed is made but after remaining of record for some time without being questioned, the buyer may assume that the consideration was legitimate.1584

In Ramirez v. Bell,1585 a prior deed (executed one month prior to the subject transaction) reciting a consideration a to 2 of what was paid in a prior sale of the property 13 years before was sufficient to excite inquiry about the transaction.1586

Recited Facts Exciting Inquiry of Trust. Recitations in deeds may have the effect of exciting inquiry that a vendee in the chain of title held the property in trust for another. In Golson v. Fielder,1587 James Roger acquired a deed for property with the recited consideration being a transfer of a judgment by Rogers as Aagent of E.F. Golson & [email protected] Held this recital was sufficient to excite inquiry in a subsequent purchaser whether Rogers held title in trust for Golson & Go.1589

b. Purchaser Charged With Notice of Documents Referenced by Instrument

If an instrument in the buyer=s chain of title makes reference to another instrument, notice is imputed to the buyer of the effect and recitals of the referenced instrument.1590

In Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owners Ass=n,1591 sales contracts for lots in a subdivision referred to restrictive covenants.1592 The contracts referred to the restrictions as being attached to the contracts but there was no evidence that the restrictions were ever so attached.1593 Notwithstanding, mere reference to the restrictions was sufficient to put the buyers on inquiry regarding the restrictions.1594

(1) Serial References

Constructive notice may extend to multiple instruments if one instrument contains a reference to

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another instrument which in turn refers to another, and so on. The borrower must follow each reference to another instrument and follow the inquiry from one instrument to another until the entire series is exhausted and all matters referred to are obtained.1595 For example in Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,1596 a July 24, 1928 oil and gas lease referred to a July 16, 1928 deed which in turn referred to a May 29, 1928 deed containing a recital disclosing the existence of a senior conflicting title.1597 This chain of references was sufficient to impart constructive notice.1598 Similarly, in Guevara v. Guevara,1599 a deed in the chain of title referenced an unrecorded purchase money note.1600 The note in turn referenced a right of rescission in favor of the City of Laredo contained in a city ordinance.1601 These instruments were sufficient notice to a subsequent vendee of the right of rescission set out in the city ordinance.1602

(2) Referenced Instrument Need Not Be Recorded

The referenced instrument need not be recorded to impart constructive notice.1603 For example in Gordon-Sewall & Co. v. Walker,1604 a reference to an unrecorded deed of trust in a recorded instrument was constructive notice of the existence of the deed of trust.1605 In Hi-Mountain Energy Corp. v. Avra Oil Co.,1606 an assignment of an oil and gas lease had boilerplate provisions assigning Aall obligations under operating [email protected] This was sufficient to prevent the assignee from being an innocent purchaser as to provisions contained in an unrecorded operating agreement.1608 In Waggoner v. Morrow,1609 reference in a deed to an unrecorded partition put the buyer on a duty of inquiry to examine the unrecorded plat for the partition and such reference was sufficient to put the buyer on notice of an easement disclosed on that plat.1610 In Wilkerson v. Ward,1611 reference to a lot on an unrecorded plat of the Town of San Angelo was constructive notice of what the plat would reveal. This especially when the unrecorded plat was in common use for town lot transactions.1612

(3) Referenced Instrument May be Recorded Elsewhere

The referenced instrument imparts constructive notice even if recorded elsewhere in the wrong records.1613 In Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,1614 a deed essential to the senior title was recorded in the wrong county but referenced in an instrument in the junior chain of title.1615 Held, this was sufficient to defeat innocent purchaser status.1616

(4) Referenced Instrument Need Not Be in Chain of Title

The referenced instrument imparts constructive notice even if it would not otherwise be in the buyer=s chain of title.1617 For example, in Hicks v. Loveless,1618 a deed in the buyer=s chain of title was made subject to Aall restrictions, covenants, conditions, easements, and reservations of [email protected] Buyer had constructive notice of deed restrictions even though recorded after Buyer=s vendor acquired the property.1620 A referenced document need not be in the buyer=s chain of title.1621

(5) Recording Information for Referenced Instrument Need Not be Complete

In H.H. Holloway Trust v. Outpost Est. Civic Club,1622 a deed purported to be subject to restrictions filed at AClerk=s File No. ___, in Vol. ___, Page [email protected] Even without the recording information filled in, this reference was sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser on notice of the restrictions.1624

(6) AIncidental@ Reference to Another Instrument

Some authorities have determined that a reference to another instrument is not constructive notice of the contents of the referenced instrument if the reference is Aincidental@ - that is a bare reference to the instrument stating nothing that would arouse suspicion that the referenced instrument creates or refers to an outstanding senior interest in the property.1625

Authorities are not in agreement whether reference to an unrecorded promissory note in a deed or deed of trust is sufficient to put a buyer on notice of the contents of the note. In Clementz v. M.T. Jones Lumber Co.,1626 a recorded mortgage referenced the note it secured giving its essential terms except for the original principal amount.1627 Notwithstanding, the deed of trust was constructive notice of the terms and conditions of the referenced note.1628 In Zeigel v. Magee,1629 a reference to a purchase money promissory note in a deed was sufficient to give constructive notice of the vendor=s lien retained in the unrecorded note.1630 But see Hall v. Read,1631 where reference to a note in recorded deed and deed of trust was not sufficient constructive notice of a provision in the note reserving a lien for attorney=s fees.1632

A different rule obtains when the referenced note has been expressly assumed by a subsequent purchaser. In the case of an assumed note, the subsequent purchaser will always be charged with the contents of the note assumed.1633

In Garner v. IRS,1634 Lorraine Garner conveyed all of her interest in a property to Lloyd Garner as part of the couple=s divorce by Special Warranty Deed reciting that it was Apursuant to the Final Decree of [email protected] The Final Decree of Divorce reserved a lien in favor of Lorraine to secure a money judgment in her favor.1636 Lorraine failed to record a Deed of Trust formalizing this lien.1637 Held that the deed reference to the divorce decree which in turn provided for the lien was Aincidental@ - a bare reference to the decree without mention of a debt owing by Lloyd to Lorraine.1638 The deed failed to provide constructive notice of the lien in favor of Lorraine.1639

9. Notice Must Be of an Interest in Apparent Conflict with Purchaser=s Title

Registration of the senior title is not sufficient to defeat innocent purchaser status unless the registered senior title is in apparent conflict with the purchaser=s title.1640

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In Barfield v. Holland,1641 Hemus, Inc. acquired an undivided royalty interest in 100 acres.1642 At the time of this purchase, Holland had record title to a 1/3 mineral interest but claimed the remaining 2/3 (to the exclusion of Hemus) by unrecorded equitable title.1643 Holland asserted that Hemus had constructive notice of Holland=s expanded claims because of a prior recorded mineral lease from Holland.1644 The lease did not specify the mineral interest of Holland.1645 Included in the lease was a standard proportionate reduction clause adjusting lease benefits in proportion to Holland=s actual mineral interest in the entire fee estate.1646 Held that the recorded lease gave no constructive notice to Hemus that Holland was claiming an expanded mineral interest conflicting with that of Hemus.1647

10. Estoppel

In certain situations the holder of the senior title may be estopped to assert the presumption of constructive notice by registration. For example, in Wickshire-Mitchell Royalty Trust v. Taylor,1648 McDaniel=s representations to the vendee that there was no prior lien on the mineral estate estopped him from later asserting that such a lien in his favor existed and that the vendee was on constructive notice of its registration.1649

E. Constructive Notice by Possession

Another form of constructive notice (sometimes referred to as inquiry notice)1650 chargeable to the buyer arises out of possession of the property at the time of purchase.1651 Possession is viewed as prima facie evidence of title.1652 It implies a claim of right.1653 Possession is said to be the functional equivalent of registration,1654 and renders the question of constructive notice by registration immaterial.1655 Both forms of notice are of equal dignity.1656 A buyer cannot qualify as an innocent purchaser if the facts of possession of the property at the time of the purchase would have provided notice of a preexisting and conflicting claim to the property.1657

Notice by possession to some extent impairs the value and effectiveness of the Recording Statute by recognizing the superiority of titles which are not recorded.1658 This detracts from the security of land titles. However, there are situations where the ends of justice and common honesty require the buyer to recognize title outside of the records.1659 This rule is justified by the presumption that the additional burden on buyers/mortgagees is slight. It is reasoned that the truth about title can be easily obtained from the person in possession.1660

1. The General Rule

As a general rule, actual possession provides constructive notice of all rights of the party in possession of the property.1661 Possession can be the equivalent of registration.1662 When a person other than the seller/mortgager occupies the property, that possession puts the buyer/mortgagee on notice of a possible adverse claim on the property.1663 This rule applies even if the possession

by a person other than the seller is consistent with seller=s title (as with a tenant of the seller).1664

Possession is effective as notice whether or not the buyer has actual notice of the possession.1665 Possession is notice in fact without further inquiry as to extent that the buyer was aware of the possession.1666

Generally it is said that the fact of possession puts the buyer or mortgagee on a duty of inquiry.1667 This rule requires that the buyer go to the possessor and determine the source, nature, and extent of his claim.1668 In the absence of that inquiry being made, the law charges the buyer with knowledge of all claims of the possessor on the presumption that diligent inquiry would have disclosed them.1669 Having omitted the duty of inquiry, the buyer will not be heard to say that he had no notice of a fact he had a duty to ascertain.1670 The means of knowledge together with the duty of using that knowledge are deemed the equivalent of knowledge itself.1671

2. Instances Where No Duty of Inquiry To Possessor Arises

The duty to inquire of the possessor about the nature of his title is not in every case required.1672 There are exceptions to the general duty to inquire:

a. No Person in Possession

There is no duty of inquiry if there is no person in possession of the property to whom inquiry can be made.1673

b. Possession Must be Accompanied by an Interest in the Property

Possession is not constructive notice of a title which has not yet been created.1674 For example, in Cervantes v. Bayview Loan Serv., LLC,1675 Cervantes moved onto a property in 2000 with an oral agreement to buy it.1676 A contract for deed was later executed with Cervantes effective 2003.1677 A deed of trust executed in 2002 was superior to Cervantes= equitable title arising under the contract for deed.1678 Cervantes= possession of the property prior to the creation of his title was not constructive notice of it.1679

c. Record Title Owner in Possession

Texas authorities are inconsistent on the extent of inquiry required of a buyer finding the record title owner in possession of the property.

(1) Majority Rule

When the record title owner of the property is in possession , it may be assumed, in the absence of anything appearing to the contrary, that he is claiming under his record title and no other way.1680 Possession consistent with record title is not notice of an unrecorded claim.1681 In such a case, a buyer or mortgagee is under no duty of

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inquiry further than to consult record title.1682 Record title being consistent with the owner=s possession serves to stifle suspicion and inquiry.1683 Possession in such cases is not notice. There is no duty to question the owner to see if he has some other unrecorded conveyance or hidden title in his pocket.1684

In Jackson v. Berliner,1685 Jackson and Baer were in the possession of property belonging to Page after Page=s death.1686 Page=s probated will left the property to Jackson and Baer placing record title in them at his death.1687 Their possession of the property under these facts was not notice of their title to the property under an unrecorded deed to them made by Page prior to his death.1688

In Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg,1689 Wunderlich conveyed a gin and lot to Thorton by unrecorded deed dated April 16, 1918.1690 Thorton conveyed the property by unrecorded deed to Smith on April 18, 1918.1691 Smith mortgaged1692 the property to Cranfill by unrecorded instrument dated May 13, 1919.1693 Cranfill then conveyed the property to his corporation, Dallas Land & Loan by unrecorded deed dated May 23, 1919.1694 Dallas Land then obtained a quitclaim deed from Wunderlich recorded on May 13, 1919.1695 The company then placed Crow in possession of the property as a tenant on August 5, 1919.1696 On November 27, 1918, Sugg obtained a judgment against Smith which was abstracted on August 5, 1919, after Crow took possession.1697 Sugg claimed innocent purchaser status as the mortgage out of Smith to Cranfill was unrecorded.1698 Dallas Land contended that possession via its tenant Crow put Sugg on a duty of inquiry as to the nature of Crow=s occupation.1699 Held that on these facts that Sugg had no duty to make inquiry from Crow.1700 Crow=s occupation was consistent with the recorded quitclaim deed ostensively conveying the property directly from Wunderlich to Dallas Land.1701 Sugg, as a lien creditor, had no duty to see if Dallas Land had title deraigning from some other unrecorded chain of conveyances inconsistent with record title.1702 Crow=s possession did not prevent Sugg from being an innocent purchaser.

In Dillard v. Broyles,1703 the Dillards purchased property from Sanchez and executed a deed of trust in favor of Sanchez.1704 When Dillard defaulted, Sanchez foreclosed the deed of trust selling the property to Broyles.1705 Dillard remained in possession of the property asserting an equitable right to recover the property because of wrongful foreclosure.1706 Broyles asserted that he was an innocent purchaser without knowledge of the Dillard=s equitable claim of title.1707 The recorded deed of trust provided that in the event of foreclosure that any continued occupation of the property by Dillard would be as a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser at the trustee=s sale.1708 As a result, Dillard=s continued possession after the foreclosure was consistent with record title. It gave no constructive notice of the Dillards= claim of equitable title.1709

(2) Minority Rule

Some limited authorities have concluded that a prospective purchaser of real property cannot simply rely on the recitations contained in the real property records even when the possessor=s possession appears to be consistent with those deed records.1710 Under the minority rule, even when the possessor=s possession is consistent with the record title, there is still a duty to go to the possessor and ascertain the nature and extent of his claims.1711

In Hamrick v. Ward,1712 Hamrick bought property traversed by a dirt road leading to a 2 acre tract belonging to Ward.1713 The road passed along an unrecorded implied easement by prior use created by a 1953 partition of a parent tract originally containing the 2 acre tract.1714 The road was referenced in a Aspecial restriction@ supplementing the restrictive covenants for the subdivision in which the Hamrick tract was located and restricting its width and allowed uses.1715 Held that Hamrick was not necessarily an innocent purchaser as to the unrecorded 1953 easement implied by prior use just because the existence of the road was partially explained by the recorded Aspecial [email protected] Notwithstanding the recordation of the special restriction, Hamrick was still required to inquire of Ward as to the full nature and extent of Ward=s claim to use the road.1717

(3) Undivided Interests

When the record title in the possessor is only an undivided interest, decisional authorities are inconsistent whether a greater duty of inquiry is imposed upon a prospective purchaser or lien creditor.1718 Some authorities suggest that although possession by a tenant in common is technically consistent with record title, it does not eliminate the duty to inquire of the possessor of the exact nature of his claim and possession.1719 For example, in Collum v. Sanger Bros.,1720 Narciss Cates died in 1893, leaving her property in equal undivided shares to C.D. Cates, R.D. Cates, D.C. Cates, Mont Cates, and Collum.1721 In 1895, C.D. Cates and D.C. Cates sold their undivided interests to Collum by unrecorded deed.1722 In 1900, Sanger Bros. abstracted a judgment against C.D. Cates.1723 Sanger Bros. claimed the status of an innocent purchaser. Held that the possession of Collum (through her tenants) put Sanger Bros. on a duty of inquiry to determine the entire nature and extent of Collum=s interest in the property.1724 The possession of Collum, though technically consistent with her record title to a 1/5 undivided interest, was notice of her other undivided interest acquired by unrecorded conveyance.1725

But see Gibraltar Sav. Ass=n v. Martin1726, on similar facts, possession of property by a tenant of the record owner of 2 undivided interest was not notice of that tenant=s acquisition of all interest of the other undivided owner by unrecorded conveyance.1727 There was no duty of inquiry to determine the entire nature of the interest of the occupying co-tenant.1728

(4) Undivided Interests - Parol Partition

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Difficult to reconcile with the rule that possession by a tenant in common does not relieve the buyer of a duty of inquiry as the exact nature of the co-tenant=s claim, are cases involving a parol partition of property among co-tenants. Possession of the property by one co-tenant is not itself notice of a parol partition.1729 There is nothing about the occupation of the property by a co-tenant which places a purchaser on a duty of inquiry regarding the possibility of a parol partition.1730 In Ebner v. Nall,1731 Susanna Ebner died and devised by her will a 180 acre tract to her heirs in undivided shares.1732 Shortly after Susanna=s death, the heirs effected an oral partition of the tract partitioning unto Adolph Ebner a 10 acre property.1733 Nall later acquired a conflicting interest in the property and claimed innocent purchaser status.1734 Held Adolph=s occupation of the property as a co-tenant gave no notice to Nall of the parol partition in the absence of other evidence showing actual segregation of the 10 acres on the ground.1735

d. Possession After Junior Title is Acquired

For possession to be effective as notice of the conflicting senior title, the possession has to be in effect at the time the junior interest is acquired.1736 Possession by the senior interest taken after the conveyance to the junior title holder will not put the junior title holder on inquiry.1737

e. Possession Before Junior Title is Acquired

To be effective as constructive notice, possession must be present at the time that the junior title is acquired.1738 Possession prior to the sale to an innocent purchaser but discontinued by the time of the sale is not notice of the possessor=s rights in the property.1739 Possession is notice only during its continuance.1740 In Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co.,1741 former possession by an owner by unrecorded deed did constitute notice nor impose a duty to inquire of the rights of the former occupier as to the nature of his interest.1742

f. Deed Out of Possessor Absolute on its Face (the AEylar Rule@)

Under the long established rule of Eylar v. Eylar,1743 if a grantor, after executing a deed absolute and unconditional on its face, remains in possession of the property, a purchaser or creditor from his grantee may rely upon the terms of the deed as a declaration that the grantor has parted with title and is relieved as a matter of law of any further duty of inquiry regarding the nature of grantor=s right of possession of the property.1744 The buyer may assume that the deed out of the possessor speaks the truth of the conveyance to which it relates.1745 The deed in effect amounts to an affirmative declaration by the vendor that he no longer has any interest in the property.1746 This affirmative representation is of higher dignity and weight than the notice accorded by possession.1747 The vendor cannot be permitted to place of record a document inconsistent with the claim that the vendor asserts while still retaining a secret trust in the property to the detriment of an innocent purchaser.1748

(1) Disguised Mortgage

A common application of the Eylar Rule is in the case of a disguised mortgage. See, e.g., Causey v. Handley1749 where Corrie Causey executed a deed to her homestead to J.F. Waddell on July 8, 1903.1750 The instrument, though in the regular form of a deed, was intended as a mortgage.1751 Causey remained in possession of the property.1752 On October 7, 1903, Waddell conveyed the property to Handley who had no notice of the real nature of the transaction between Causey and Waddell.1753 Under the Eylar Rule, the deed absolute on its face from Causey to Waddell excused Handley of any duty of inquiry of Causey to determine the true nature of Causey=s claim to the property.1754 Handley was an innocent purchaser taking free of Causey=s retained interest.1755

(2) Exception to Eylar Rule: Occupation by Tenant in Possession

The Eylar Rule is not applicable if the grantor executes an absolute conveyance of the property then retains possession, not by personal occupation, but by and through a tenant.1756 In such a case, possession by a tenant will not excuse but rather excite a duty of inquiry by the buyer of the rights under which the tenant claims possession.1757

(3) Exception to Eylar Rule: Deed Not Intended for Delivery

Generally, the application of the Eylar Rule is limited to cases where the possessor is at fault for placing a deed of record divesting the possessor of title such that the possessor has voluntarily aided in misleading an innocent purchaser.1758 The rationale for the rule is not present when the possessor executes a deed but does not authorize its delivery or recordation. In such cases, the Eylar Rule does not apply.1759 In Cardwell v. Shiflett,1760 an elderly Brown embarking upon a journey to Iowa executed a deed to his 15 year old daughter.1761 He delivered the deed to a notary asking the notary to deliver the deed to his daughter=s guardian should anything happen to him.1762 Notwithstanding these instructions, the deed was placed of record.1763 The daughter married an older and shiftless spouse who induced a sham deed intended as a mortgage.1764 Brown returned and remained in possession.1765 Held Eylar was inapplicable to excuse a remote purchaser from inquiring of the nature of Brown=s possession.1766 Brown had no fault in placing the misleading instrument of record.1767

However, for the possessor to be excused of the effects of the Eylar Rule because of a deed not authorized for delivery and recordation, the possessor himself must be wholly innocent of any act producing the injurious effect to the innocent buyer.1768 If the possessor bears some fault in the delivery and recordation of the unauthorized deed, equity will protect, as between two wronged parties, the one least at fault.1769 If it is shown that the possessor negligently enabled the unauthorized deed to be recorded such that an innocent purchaser is injured, the possessor

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must sustain the loss.1770 In Busby v. Smith,1771 the Smiths executed a mineral deed to Busby to be held in escrow until Busby performed certain conditions.1772 The deed went to a deputy district clerk for acknowledgment before placement with the escrow agent, Everett Banking Company.1773 Busby obtained the deed from the clerk without authority and had it recorded.1774 Busby then deeded the mineral interest to Sorrelle and Fails who had no notice that the deed was conditionally delivered.1775 Held that Sorrelle and Fails were innocent purchasers taking free of the claims of the Smiths.1776 As between the buyers and Smith, Smith was most at fault for the misdelivery of the deed.1777

(4) Exception to Eylar Rule: Deed Out of Possessor Not Recorded

There is dispute among the authorities whether the Eylar Rule applies when the deed out of the possessor is not placed of record. Some authorities suggest that the estoppel basis of Eylar is inapplicable unless there is an additional showing that the party claiming innocent purchaser status, actually examined title, located the deed absolute on its face, and was misled by it.1778 However, Guaranty Bond State Bank of Mt. Pleasant v. Kelley,1779 determined that the application of the Eylar rule was justified even when the deed out of the possessor was not recorded when the purchaser had actual knowledge of the deed and the possessor represented it to be a valid instrument.1780

(5) Exception to Eylar Rule: Deed Containing Mutual Mistake

The Eylar Rule will not apply when the possessor has only mistakenly placed a conveyance of record parting with his title.1781 In Bumpas v. Zachary,1782Zachary owned Lots 5 and 8 and occupied Lot 5.1783 Zachary sold Lot 8 to Mathews but by mistake the deed ostensibly conveyed Lot 5.1784 Bumpas ultimately acquired the lot and claimed innocent purchaser status. Held the Eylar Rule did not in this case relieve Bumpas of the duty of inquiry regarding the occupation of the lot by Zachary.1785 The deed out of Zachary absolute on its face resulted from mistake not an omission of duty.1786

(6) Exception to Eylar Rule: Long-Standing Possession

Cameron v. Romele,1787 suggests that one rationale for the Eylar Rule was that the bare fact of possession for a time less than reasonably necessary for the possessor to remove from the premises does not charge the buyer with notice of the possessor=s secret retained interest.1788 If the possessor stays on the property for a long period of time after executing a deed absolute on its face, the basis for the Eylar Rule becomes less compelling.1789 In Anderson v. Barnwell,1790 George and Ella Anderson executed a deed to Rembert National Bank in 1925.1791 Though absolute on its face, it was intended as a mortgage.1792 The Andersons remained in possession.1793 Six years later, an oil and gas lease was executed by a remote vendee of the Bank.1794 The owners of this lease claimed innocent purchaser status.1795 Held the Eylar Rule did not in this case excuse the oil and gas lessee from inquiring of the Andersons

regarding the nature of their interest in the property.1796 The long-continued possession by the Andersons for six years after their deed was recorded was so inconsistent with the earlier deed as to place the lessee on notice of the Andersons= claim.1797 First Sav. & Loan Ass=n of El Paso v. Avila,1798 declined to apply this exception to Eylar when the period of possession between the deed absolute on its face and the conveyance to the party claiming innocent purchaser status was only 10 months.1799

(7) Exception to Eylar Rule: Buyer With Other Notice That Deed Not Intended to be Absolute

If the buyer has notice from some source independent of possession that a deed absolute on its face was not so intended, the buyer cannot be an innocent purchaser.1800 In such a case the buyer cannot rely on the deed out of the grantor in possession to trump the actual notice he has from other sources.1801 Actual notice of other facts sufficient to put the buyer on notice regarding the verity of the transaction imposes a duty of inquiry to ascertain the possessor=s rights.1802

In Baird v. Laycock,1803 the buyer went out to the property before purchase and spoke with the possessor.1804 Facts obtained in this interview and other pre-sale activity indicated that the deed out of the possessor was a sham.1805 The buyer could not rely on Eylar to relieve him of a duty of inquiry arising from facts independent of the bare fact of possession.1806

In Harris v. Hamilton,1807 A.D. Harrison claimed innocent purchaser status under a deed absolute in form out of the possessor.1808 However, before his purchase, Harrison knew that recited consideration in the prior deed had not been paid and that the tenants on the property were paying their rent to the grantor of that deed.1809 Held this was sufficient to put Harrison on inquiry of a secret retained interest by the possessor.1810

In Matter of Rubarts,1811 the Rubarts approached First Texas about a second mortgage on their homestead for operating capital for their company, Diversified Industries (Diversified).1812 They were turned down because such a loan could not be properly secured by the homestead.1813 Rubarts then conveyed the property to Diversified by absolute deed but remained in possession.1814 The Rubarts then reapproached First Texas for a loan to Diversified secured by the property.1815 It was evident from the long-standing relationship between the parties, statements made in the loan application, and conversations between the Rubarts and First Texas, that First Texas was on actual notice that this was a sham conveyance to Diversified as a devise to obtain a second mortgage for a purpose prohibited by homestead laws.1816 Eylar did not relieve First Texas of its duty of inquiry to determine the true rights of Rubarts in the property when that duty arose from facts independent of the fact of continued possession.1817

In Cameron v. Romele,1818 Amelia Romele conveyed certain property by absolute deed to Maher upon Maher=s promise to reconvey it to her after certain judgment

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creditors of Romele should cease their collection efforts against the property.1819 Maher was commonly known to be indigent and to have no means.1820 Maher immediately sold the property in violation of his trust to Cameron while Romele yet remained in possession.1821 Cameron claimed the benefit of the Eylar Rule.1822 Romele claimed Cameron=s knowledge that Maher was indigent and without means to buy the property put Cameron on notice that the deed was a sham.1823 Held that knowledge that Maher was without means was not sufficient to put Cameron on notice of the secret interest retained by Romele.1824

g. Possession Insufficiently Evident

Not every form of possession by a person other than the record owner will invoke a duty of inquiry by the purchaser.1825 Possession of land is sometimes notice of the real right and title of the possessor and sometimes not.1826 No duty to inquire will arise unless the possession is sufficiently evident.1827 Possession which meets a minimum threshold sufficient to excite inquiry has been alternatively described as: Aopen@,1828 Avisible@,1829 Anotorious@,1830 Aactual@,1831 Aunequivocal@,1832 and [email protected] It is not clear whether these factors are independent and equal or whether all are preferable to the exclusivity of the possession.1834 The sufficiency of the possession may vary from case to case depending on the locality, use to which the property may be applied, the situation of the parties, and a variety of other circumstances.1835

(1) Open Possession

Open, visible, and/or notorious means possession which is compelling of observation.1836 This means possession indicating distinctly to a prudent observer a different possessor than the record owner.1837

Generally growing a crop upon land, standing alone, is insufficient to excite inquiry of the possessor.1838 In Jackson v. DeGuerin,1839 a person other than the record owner grow cotton seasonally on the property. There were no significant fences or structures.1840 No one lived on the property.1841 This possession not sufficient to excite inquiry.1842 Same result if the possessor occasionally cuts wood on the subject property.1843 Enclosing property with a fence is not sufficient possession to give notice of the senior claim.1844 However, in Ellerd v. Ellison,1845 grazing cattle on fenced land with tanks and windmills was sufficiently open and visible possession to require a duty of inquiry of the possessor.1846

In Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza,1847 Garza occupied an industrial property acquired by unrecorded deed.1848 He daily parked trucks on the property emblazoned with his business name, washed and repaired trucks, and occupied through employees an office on the property.1849 This possession was sufficiently open and visible to put a buyer on notice of Garza=s unrecorded interest.1850

Residence upon the tract is not required to excite a duty of inquiry,1851 however a circumstance nearly always requiring inquiry is a sole possessor who resides on the property.1852 In Bank of America v. Schwartz,1853 Henderson bought a house from Hayes in 1997 by oral contract.1854 Henderson paid all of the purchase price.1855 He lived in the house with his family to the exclusion of Hayes.1856 Henderson made substantial improvements, parked his car in the driveway, received mail there, registered his phone to the address, used the front yard, and came and went from the property in a manner customary to ownership.1857 This was possession sufficiently visible and open to excite inquiry.1858

Another factor to be examined is the visibility of the occupier being on and traveling to and from the property.1859

(2) Actual Possession

Actual possession means possession that is not constructive.1860 Actual possession connotes occupancy.1861 If the party with the claim of right lives at another location and is on the property only casually or occasionally or for a special or temporary purpose, this militates against the sufficiency of the possession.1862 In Gough v. Home Owner=s Loan Corp,1863 Gough=s casual residence on the property staying 3-4 weeks at a time was not sufficient to give notice of his unrecorded interest in the property.1864 In Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Neal,1865 a vendee was not in possession of the property by appointing an agent to rent the property who had a key to the house but was not occupying it.1866

(3) Exclusive/Unequivocal Possession

Exclusive and unequivocal possession refers to exclusive dominion over the property that is adverse to the record owner.1867 It is a visible set of circumstances inconsistent and incompatible with right of the record owner to transfer good title.1868 Generally, joint occupancy of a property by two or more persons, one of whom is the record owner, does not put a prospective purchaser on inquiry of an adverse claim.1869 Possession raises no duty of inquiry if it is ambiguous or appears compatible with or subservient to the rights of the record owner.1870 However, the requirement for unequivocal possession should not be read so strictly as to mean that if one could envision any set of facts by which the possession is consistent with record title, that no duty of inquiry arises.1871 Such a rule would eviscerate the doctrine of notice by possession.1872

In Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt,1873 Northcutt leased 480 acres out of a 1,183 acre ranch under an unrecorded oil and gas lease.1874 While there were other oil and gas operators on other parts of the 1,183 acre ranch, Northcutt was the only lessee on the 480 acre parcel.1875 Held that Northcutt=s possession was sufficiently exclusive to impart constructive notice of the unrecorded lease.1876

In Astin v. Martin,1877 M.N. Martin, the record owner of a property, conveyed it to her son by unrecorded

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deed.1878 Thereafter, for a time, both mother and son jointly occupied the property.1879 This joint occupation by a member of the family of the record owner was not sufficiently exclusive and unequivocal to give notice of the son=s unrecorded title.1880 Same results in Norton v. Dunston1881 for a resident boyfriend of the owner.1882

In Bank of America v. Schwartz,1883 possession of a single unit residence was sufficiently unequivocal when the occupant lived in the house as his permanent residence to the exclusion of the record owner.1884 However, in Madison v. Gordon,1885 Gordon=s possession as a tenant in a multi-unit structure was not sufficiently unequivocal to give constructive notice of his unrecorded ownership claim.1886

In In re Batros,1887 Mitchell Batros owned an 88 acre tract in Comal County used by the Batros family as a weekend retreat.1888 Occupying the property was Maria Pavila, a paid caretaker who cleaned the house and kept the grounds.1889 In 1987, Mitchell Batros executed an unrecorded gift deed for the property to his daughter, Stacy.1890 After the unrecorded deed, Mitchell continued to pay Maria.1891 Mitchell=s name remained on the mailbox.1892 To any outsider, the use of the property appeared unchanged.1893 Held the facts of possession did not give rise to a duty of inquiry.1894

In Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C.,1895 the presence of a billboard on the property was equivocal and no sufficient notice of an unrecorded lease when the billboard was in disrepair and appeared to be abandoned.1896

h. Possession by Stranger

For possession to be constructive notice of the interest of the senior title holder, the possession must be by the senior claimant or someone in privity with the senior claimant.1897 Possession by a stranger to the holder of the senior title is not notice of the senior unrecorded deed.1898

3. Duty of Inquiry Arises From Fact of Possession Not Purchaser=s Knowledge of Possession

If the fact of sufficient possession is present, it is not necessary to show that the buyer/mortgagor had knowledge of that possession.1899 The law conclusively presumes that the buyer knew of the possession.1900

4. Extent of Duty of Inquiry

If possession is sufficiently evident, it is not conclusive on the issue of notice.1901 It merely puts the proposed purchaser upon a duty of inquiry.1902 The extent to which that duty of inquiry must be pursued is that degree of inquiry that would have been made by an ordinary prudent person under similar circumstances.1903

a. Possession Notice of Unrecorded Lien?

While some authorities suggest that possession provides constructive notice of all rights of the possessor,

possession may be sufficient to put a buyer on notice of an unrecorded lien claim. In Openshaw v. Dean,1904 Openshaw was in possession of a property at the time of a sale to a subsequent purchaser.1905 Openshaw claimed a fee interest in the property under a parol sale and a lien against the property under an unrecorded deed of trust.1906 Held Openshaw=s possession was not constructive notice of his claims under the unrecorded deed of trust.1907

b. No Duty to Inquire of Landlord if Tenant in Possession Without Notice of Unrecorded Deed

If a tenant is in possession of a property, the duty of inquiry ends with the tenant if the tenant is without knowledge of an unrecorded deed affecting landlord=s title.1908 In Bowles v. Belt,1909 Dillard conveyed property to Faulk by unrecorded deed dated June 18, 1910.1910 On that date, Shackelford was occupying the property as a tenant of Dillard.1911 Shackelford knew nothing of the sale.1912 A lien creditor of Dillard then levied execution of the property claiming innocent purchaser status.1913 Shackelford=s occupation was not notice of the conveyance to Faulk because Shackelford never attorned to or was aware of Faulk=s interest.1914 There was no duty by the lien creditor to make additional inquiry to Dillard, as landlord, because record title was in Dillard.1915

5. Effect of Failure to Pursue Inquiry of Possessor

Generally, in absence of inquiry being made regarding the rights of the possessor, the law charges the buyer with knowledge of all claims of the possessor on the legal presumption that proper inquiry would have disclosed them.1916 Common prudence and honesty demands this course.1917 Having foregone an opportunity to exercise prudence, the buyer will not be heard to say that he had no notice of facts about which he was bound to inquire.1918

The presumption that the buyer would learn of all rights of the possessor by inquiry rests upon the further presumption that the possessor, if asked, would truthfully disclose the status of the title.1919 But in reality, possession is notice only of those facts which inquiry of the possessor would naturally disclose,1920 and any omission of inquiry is material only when the inquiry, if it had been pursued, would have led to the knowledge of which the buyer is sought to be charged.1921

Notice is ordinarily a question of fact.1922 Thus, the presumption of imputed notice can be rebutted by evidence showing that if inquiry had been pursued with the possessor, the possessor would not or could not have disclosed the true status of title.1923

a. Possessor Without Knowledge of Status of Title

A purchaser will not be charged with notice of facts which the possessor himself did not know or assert.1924 In Downing v. Jeffrey,1925 H.F. Downing and his wife bought property that was community.1926 Of the marriage was born Howell Downing.1927 Mrs. Downing died in 1917 and Howell inherited in part her interest in the property.1928 In

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1934, H.F. Downing and his second wife sold the property to Jeffrey.1929 At the time of the conveyance, Howell was residing on the property.1930 Howell made statements contemporaneous to the sale to the effect that he no longer claimed an interest in the property as he had previously sold his interest to his father.1931 Howell moved off the place to allow Jeffrey to take possession.1932 Jeffrey made no inquiry of Howell when he bought the property.1933 Howell=s contemporaneous statements caused the jury to conclude that Howell would have not have claimed any interest in the property at the time of the sale had he been questioned by Jeffrey.1934 Under these facts, Jeffrey was an innocent purchaser.1935

In Aurelius v. Stewart,1936 Ward sold property to Stewart, a former tenant, in 1918 on an unrecorded contract.1937 Stewart lived some distance away.1938 Stewart put his foreman, Newman, in charge of the place.1939 Newman, being the only representative of Stewart present, knew nothing of the contract.1940 In 1919, Ward executed an oil and gas lease on the property to Maud Oil who made no inquiry regarding possession.1941 Held that possession by foreman Newman was not notice of Stewart=s unrecorded interest in the property because Newman knew nothing of the sale.1942

b. Possessor Misrepresenting Status of Title

The presumption that if inquiry is pursued with the possessor that the possessor would disclose the true nature of the possessor=s claim does not operate if it is shown that the possessor either did or would have misrepresented the true nature of his right of possession.1943 In Brooker v. Wright,1944 the Wrights sold lots in Fort Worth constituting their homestead to Magness by deed absolute on its face but in reality a disguised mortgage.1945 The vendor=s lien note created by the Asale@ was secured by a deed of trust on the property.1946 Brooker bought the property at a trustee=s sale carried out under the power of sale of the deed of trust.1947 Before purchasing the property, Brooker investigated the lots and found Briscow in possession.1948 Briscow, though a tenant of the Wrights, misrepresented that he was paying rent to another - even signing an affidavit to this effect.1949 Held that Brooker was under no obligation to pursue his inquiries regarding possession beyond the misrepresentations of Briscow.1950

c. Claims to Property Adverse to Possessor

Possession is not notice of any claims adverse to the possessor.1951 A buyer will not be charged with notice of an unrecorded interest in the property by one claiming adversely to the possessor.1952

6. Effect of Possession of Only Part of the Property

The notice charged by possession does not go beyond the land actually possessed.1953 If only part of the subject property is in the possession of a person other than the record owner, the notice effected by that possession does not go beyond the extent of that possession.1954

7. Possession Through Tenant

a. Possession of Tenant as Notice of Landlord=s Rights

Possession by a tenant is notice of whatever rights the landlord has in the property from all sources as fully as would the landlord=s possession in person.1955 Putting a tenant in possession is functionally the same thing as having the owner in possession.1956 A purchaser has a duty to inquire of the tenant in possession as to the nature of his right.1957

A buyer may not assume that the tenant in possession is occupying in subordination of record title.1958 Nor may the buyer assume that the tenant has possession by the same right as when the tenant originally entered into possession.1959

In Mainwarring v. Templeman,1960 a tenant entered possession of a 259 acre tract belonging to Atcheson.1961 Atcheson sold the property by unrecorded deed to Mainwarring.1962 The same tenant then attorned to Mainwarring.1963 There was nothing of record to show the change in the title or in the character by which the tenant held possession.1964 However, the possession by tenant was notice of Mainwarring=s title.1965 This is true though the tenant=s occupation was wholly consistent with record title and the landlord=s rights were wholly inconsistent with record title.1966

In League v. Snyder,1967 Snyder initially occupied a tract as a naked trespasser in 1882.1968 Later, he attorned and paid rent to Parks, the owner under an unrecorded deed.1969 Still later, League acquired the same property.1970 League was not an innocent purchaser as Snyder=s occupation was sufficient to impart notice of Park=s pre-existing unrecorded title.1971

b. Possession of Tenant as Notice of Tenant=s Rights

A tenant=s possession of property is also effective to give notice of all of the tenant=s unrecorded interest in the property (whether under the unrecorded lease or otherwise).1972 In Astin v. Martin,1973 A. Martin entered onto the property of his mother, M.N. Martin originally as tenant under an oral lease.1974 Later M.N. Martin conveyed the property to A. Martin by unrecorded deed.1975 A. Martin occupied the property.1976 Held A. Martin=s possession was sufficient notice of his unrecorded title originating after he occupied the property as a tenant.1977 Possession by a tenant is notice of all of tenant=s title.1978 A later buyer/creditor had no right to assume that the right by which A. Martin originally occupied the property was the same right by which his occupancy continued.1979

But see Kelly v Blakeney,1980 a tenant in possession of land under a lease who buys the property by unrecorded deed has a duty to record the deed and notify the public that he has changed his relationship to the land.1981 A buyer of the property, in the absence of some circumstance tending to show the tenant=s status has changed, is under no duty to inquire of the tenant as to the position he occupies toward

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the land.1982 Similarly, in Linthicum v. Greer,1983 possession by a tenant during the term of a recorded lease was not notice of tenant=s unrecorded extension of that lease.1984

8. Possession by Agent

Possession by the agent of an unrecorded owner may be sufficient to give constructive notice of that owner=s rights.1985

9. Possession by Co-Tenant

The possession of a property by one co-owner is possession by all owners. Such possession charges the buyer with notice of the interest of all co-tenants.1986 Thus, in Marshburn v. Stewart,1987 possession by a tenant of one joint owner was notice of the unrecorded interest of the other joint owners.1988

When a creditor levies upon the interest of a co-tenant of record who is in possession of the property, there is no duty to inquire as to a change in the nature of that co-tenant=s interest.1989 In Mueller v. United States,1990 Clint Mueller was a record co-tenant in property at the time IRS tax liens were filed against him and the property. Although Mueller had earlier conveyed this undivided interest in the property to his fellow co-tenant, the IRS was under no duty of inquiry to determine if Clint=s interest in the property had changed.1991 In Temple Lumber Co. v. Kirby Lumber Co.,1992 a co-tenant=s possession of a property was not constructive notice of a prior unrecorded partition.1993 In In re Wilson,1994 possession by one cotenant was not constructive notice that the cotenant in possession had an unrecorded lien against the other cotenant=s interest in the property.1995 This is because the possession was entirely consistent with the continued ownership of an undivided interest.1996

However, when a purchaser is buying or levying upon the interest of a cotenant not in possession of the property, the purchaser must inquire of the person in possession as to the nature of that person=s claim.1997

10. Possession by Affiliated Entity.

Possession of a property by an affiliated but separate and distinct legal entity to the record owner does not eliminate a duty of inquiry to determine by what right the possessor holds the property.1998

F. Constructive Notice By Lis Pendens

For interests in property which are in litigation, a specialized form of constructive notice is prescribed by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN

' 12.007 (Vernon 2004). A discussion of the law of lis pendens notice is beyond the scope of this article. For a complete discussion of notice by lis pendens see Haley, Lis Pendens in Texas, State Bar of Texas, Advanced Real Estate Law Course (20____).

G. Constructive Notice By Physical Conditions on the Property

A purchaser is bound to make a reasonably careful inspection of a property before purchase.1999 Circumstances existing on the property may create a duty in the purchaser to ascertain the rights of a third party.2000 The law will impute to that buyer such knowledge as he would have acquired by the inspection and by reasonable diligent inquiry into matters raised by that inspection.2001

Notice by physical circumstances on the property is ordinarily a question of fact.2002 It becomes a question of law only when the evidence is such that there is no room for ordinary minds to differ on the conclusion to be drawn.2003

1. Recent Construction

Involuntary mechanic=s liens (whether constitutional or statutory) have a unique statutory priority which relates back to the date that construction was first commenced or materials first supplied though the lien is yet unrecorded.2004 Because a mechanic’s lien attaches on the day the work begins, but need not be recorded until after the work concludes, there can be notice problems.2005 A party relying solely on the real property records will be unaware of a mechanic’s senior lien until after the mechanic’s lien is filed.2006 The visible evidence2007 of the construction on the property fills this potential notice gap.2008 A purchaser or encumbrancer of property is charged with notice of the possibility of such a springing mechanic’s lien.2009 Even, when a lien affidavit is filed after the property is sold by the owner who contracted for the improvements, the purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of the contractor=s right to assert a lien for the statutory period, even when the statutory period commenced prior to the purchase.2010 The purchaser is under a duty to investigate whether recent labor has been performed or material supplied for which payment has not been made as might support a future mechanic=s lien filing within the period prescribed by statute.2011 This duty extends to an examination of physical conditions on the property evidencing recent construction.

On-going or newly constructed improvements observable at the time that a purchaser or encumbrancer acquires an interest in the property puts the buyer or mortgagee on constructive notice of the possibility of outstanding liens which proper inquiry would have disclosed.2012 This is constructive notice that the person providing the labor or materials may yet file a lien affidavit within the statutory period resulting in a mechanic=s lien which relates back to the inception of the construction.2013 Constructive notice by this means would expire when the statutory period within which a lien may be filed expires.2014 After this, constructive notice is only accomplished under traditional Recording Statute concepts by properly recording a lien affidavit.2015

In re NETtel2016 suggests that constructive notice arising by virtue of recent construction and pertaining to the possibility of a future springing mechanic=s lien expires for constitutional mechanic=s liens on the same date as the

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deadline for filing a statutory mechanic=s lien.2017 The bright line period of constructive notice obviates any need by the purchaser to engage in any further search to ferret out any unrecorded automatic constitutional mechanic=s lien.2018

For this type of constructive notice to operate, it is not necessary that the work by the lien claimant be made at or after the date of purchase.2019 Nor is it necessary that the purchaser know the exact identity of the lien claimant performing the work.2020

2. Evidence of Mineral Production or Exploration

Physical evidence of activity for the production or exploration of minerals may put a buyer on constructive notice of outstanding unrecorded mineral interests affecting a property.2021 In Robert Oil Corp. v. Jones,2022 the presence of flow lines and pull rods upon the property were sufficient to put a subsequent buyer on such a duty of inquiry.2023 In Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt,2024 lease signs at various locations assisted to give constructive notice of the rights of a lessee under an unrecorded oil and gas lease.2025 Physical evidence of activity for the production and exploration of minerals for which labor, materials, or supplies are being furnished may also be sufficient to put a buyer on notice of the possibility of unrecorded mechanic=s or mineral liens.2026

3. Boundary Encroachments

A buyer is not an innocent purchaser as to claims evidenced by boundary encroachments existing at the time of purchase.2027 The encroachments onto the property lines recited in the deed coupled by the possession of the neighboring owner, puts a buyer on constructive notice of a possible senior competing claim to the effected property.2028

4. Easements

A buyer is chargeable with notice of an unrecorded easement if its use at the time of purchase is open and visible.2029 This particularly when there are visible material objects such as roads, wires, poles, etc. that reasonably suggest the existence of an easement.2030 In Lesley v. City of Rule,2031 apparent conditions on the ground at the time of purchase raised a fact issue whether the buyer was on a duty of inquiry concerning an alley/easement encumbering the property.2032 In Lake Meredith Dev. Co. v. City of Fritch,2033 a fact issue of notice was raised when visible manholes and soil settling gave evidence of an easement for an underground pipeline easement.2034 However, in Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co.,2035 there was no notice of a pipeline easement when the pipeline was buried with no surface indication that there was a pipeline across the property.2036 In Oneok Westex Transmission L.P. v. Castor Oil, Inc.,2037 evidence supported the claims of an innocent purchaser regarding an unrecorded pipeline when pipeline vents located just off the subject property were obscured by weeds and failed to indicate the direction of travel of the pipeline.2038

5. Uniform Development As Notice of Deed Restrictions

The appearance of a uniform development may put a buyer on duty of inquiry as to deed restrictions on the development.2039

6. Signs on Property

In In re Spring Creek Inv.,2040 an unrecorded transfer of a subdivision property was made to several parties including Donald Allison.2041 Allison then placed 60 signs on the property reading AFor Sale, Don Allison, [email protected] Held these signs were not inconsistent with the record title owner=s title sufficient to warrant further inquiry.2043

VII. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF INSTRUMENTS

To be eligible for recordation an instrument must be proved, acknowledged, or sworn to according to law.2044 An instrument may be proved by several methods:

(1) acknowledgment (2) jurat (3) acknowledgment by witness (proof of subscribing witness) (4) acknowledgment by handwriting (5) proof by suit (6) proof by curative statute. An extended discussion of the proof of instruments is

beyond the scope of this paper. For a more thorough discussion of proofs of instruments, see Haley, Texas Law of Acknowledgments, Mortgage Lending Institute 1996.

A. Effect of Recordation of an Unproved Instrument

County clerks are directed not to accept for recordation instruments which are inadequately proved.2045 However, defects of proof can be subtle and difficult of determination. Instruments will get recorded which are later determined to be inadequately proven. The effect of recording an instrument not proven as required by law is illegal and a nullity.2046 The effect is the same as if the instrument had never been recorded. The instrument is not constructive notice of its contents.2047

1. Inadequately Proved Instrument - Actual Notice

Though an instrument inadequately proved is not constructive notice of its contents, it will still as notice sufficient to defeat innocent purchaser status to all who have actual notice of the existence of the instrument.2048

In Farmers Mut. Royalty Syndicate v. Isaaks,2049 a recorded affidavit not adequately proved was insufficient to impart constructive notice but when included in an abstract reviewed by the buyer=s attorney before closing was sufficient to impart actual notice of its contents.2050

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However, the result is different when the wrongdoing of the party relying on such an instrument as actual notice is the proximate cause of the unlawful recording.2051 For example, in In re Anloc,2052 when Talone materially altered a document to make it ostensively recordable, Talone could not claim that the unlawfully recorded document was sufficient to import actual notice.2053

2. Inadequately Proved Instrument - Referenced by Another Instrument Which is Adequately Proved

An exception to the general rule that only duly-proven instruments impart constructive notice exists when the unproven instrument is adopted by reference by a second instrument which contains sufficient proof.2054 In such a case, the adopted instrument becomes part of the second instrument for all purposes irrespective of the failure of proof of the adopted instrument.2055

VIII. DUE RECORDATION

To be constructive notice of its contents, an instrument must be filed of record as required by law.2056

A. Place of Recordation

To be effectively recorded, an instrument relating to real property must be filed in the county in which part of the property is located.2057 If one property is located in two different counties, recordation in one of those two counties is sufficient,2058 even if only an insignificant part of the land lies in the county of recordation.2059 This rule applies only if the tract at issue is a contiguous parcel located in more than one county.2060 This does not mean that registration of an instrument which affects title to several separate and distinct parcels of land situated in different counties in a county where some of the tracts are situated is sufficient.2061 Such a deed must be registered in each county where a distinct tract is located.2062 However, if there is one contiguous parcel in two counties it may be recorded in only one of the counties even though described in constituent parcels as ATract1,@ ATract 2,@ etc.2063

The recordation of an instrument in the wrong county under a mistaken belief as to the locality of the property is not effective registration.2064 Registration is a purely statutory procedure and is not extended by equitable consideration.2065 In cases of doubt as to the location of county lines, the purchaser must ascertain at his peril what county the land is located in.2066 Recordation in all possible counties is the safe practice.2067

1. Effect of Subsequent Subdivision of the Property.

If a contiguous tract lies in two different counties, a filing in one of those counties remains effective even after a subsequent subdivision of the tract creates a constituent parcel lying wholly within the county in which nothing was originally placed of record relating to the parent tract.2068 In Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co.,2069 an oil and gas lease covering a tract of several hundred acres lying in Tarrant and Wise Counties was recorded in Wise County

only.2070 A subsequent division of the tract created a 182.024 acre tract bought by Aston Meadows and lying wholly within Tarrant County.2071 The oil and gas lease was not reflected in Aston Meadows= title policy. Aston Meadows claimed innocent purchaser status as to the lease.2072 Held the subsequent subdivision of the original parent tract into a distinct parcel located in Tarrant County only had no effect on the effectiveness of the original recordation of the oil and gas lease in Wise County.2073 Aston Meadows was not an innocent purchaser.2074

2. Rerecording Instrument Originally Filed in Wrong County

An instrument originally recorded in the wrong county may be rerecorded in the correct county.2075 Either the original instrument or a certified copy of the instrument may be rerecorded.2076 However, the constructive notice effect of the filing will date only from the time that the instrument is rerecorded in the correct county.2077

B. English Language

An instrument is not eligible for recordation unless it is in the English language or, for instruments executed before August 22, 1897, contains a certified English translation.2078

C. Address of Grantee

An instrument executed after December 31, 1981 may not be recorded without penalty unless it contains the mailing address of the grantee either on the instrument itself or on an attached writing signed by both grantor and grantee.2079 2080

D. Duties of Clerk Upon Filing of Instrument

1. Filing

The priority of an instrument may be determined by the date of its filing. Filing refers to the delivery of an instrument into the possession of the Clerk. Upon filing, the Clerk must give a certified time dated receipt at the fact of the instrument showing the date and time that the instrument was filed.2081 The receipt must further include the clerk=s signature and seal of office together with the specific location in the clerk=s records where the instrument is located.2082

There is no prescribed method by which a document is deposited with the clerk for filing.2083 The deposit may be by mail, messenger, or personal delivery.2084 Filing occurs when delivery is actually made to the clerk not when the clerk acts to accept the document for filing or give receipt of it.2085 It is possible for two different documents to be filed at the same time as with the arrival of two competing filings in the same batch of mail or when multiple early filings are made while waiting for the clerk=s office to open for a day of business.2086

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a. Constructive Notice of Instrument Effective Immediately Upon Filing

An instrument duly proved and filed with the clerk is immediately deemed recorded and at that moment is constructive notice of its contents to all persons.2087 It is the order that an instrument is filed that determines its priority not the order that it is recorded. The authorities are not consistent in reference to the effect of instruments filed simultaneously. For example, in Wilson v. Curry,2088 when two deeds were filed simultaneously it was of no significance that one of the deeds was recorded by the clerk a few minutes before the other.2089 However, in Williams v. Nationstar Mtg., LLC,2090 when deeds of trust were filed simultaneously, the deed of trust with the sequentially lower recording number had priority.2091

(1) Effect of Clerk=s Error in Recordation

An instrument is considered to be recorded from the time that it is filed.2092 The instrument constitutes constructive notice immediately upon its filing notwithstanding that the clerk fails to properly record it.2093 For example, in Hudson v. Randolph,2094 a deed of trust in correct form, with a correct property description, and duly proved was recorded with County Clerk of Johnson County.2095 However, the clerk, when the instrument was recorded, left out a vital call from the property description.2096 Held the deed of trust was constructive notice of its contents.2097 Filing the deed of trust was equivalent to actual registration.2098 The filing party was under no duty to see that the clerk properly recorded the instrument or responsible for the clerk=s error or neglect.2099

Abstracts of Judgment. Abstracts of judgment are an exception to this general rule. Special statutory provisions unique to abstracts of judgment require that abstracts be filed and recorded to be effective.2100 In Belbaze v. Ratto,2101 an abstract of judgment was filed on February 15, 1886 but not recorded until March 6, 1886.2102 The priority of the abstract was determined by the latter date. The abstract was not constructive notice to a lender taking a deed of trust on the same property filed on March 5, 1886.2103

Involuntary Mechanic=s Lien (Statutory). Involuntary mechanic=s liens (statutory) are subject to similar provisions requiring that an affidavit perfecting such a lien be filed and recorded.2104 However, curative provisions unique to the statute provide that any failure by the clerk to properly record the affidavit does not invalidate the lien.2105

Instrument Recorded in the Wrong Set of Records. Generally, an instrument is effective as constructive notice when filed though recorded by the clerk in the wrong set of records.2106 This general rule may be modified by special statute relating to a specific type of instrument. For example, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.254 requires that a contract for improvements to a residential homestead be

recorded by the county clerk Ain records kept for that [email protected] The effect of this language was considered in Lignoski v. Crooker,2108 when a county clerk recorded a contract for improvements in the deed records.2109 The clerk kept no separate book for mechanic=s lien records but filed all such contracts in the deed records.2110 Held that the statute was complied with. There was no requirement that contracts for improvements be recorded in a book kept exclusively for that purpose.2111

(2) Effect of Clerk=s Error in Indexing

Generally, it is not a requirement that a deed be properly indexed before it is effective constructive notice of its contents.2112 The mere filing of a deed with the clerk gives constructive notice notwithstanding the clerk=s failure to properly index the instrument.2113

Abstracts of Judgment. Because of special statutory provisions unique to abstracts of judgment, abstracts are not effective as constructive notice until filed and properly indexed by the clerk.2114 For example, in Willis v. Nichols,2115 when an abstract of judgment was recorded with an inadequate index on June 28, 1887, it was not constructive notice to a subsequent buyer under a deed filed January 1, 1887.2116

Involuntary Mechanic=s Liens (Statutory). Involuntary mechanic=s liens (statutory) are subject to similar provisions requiring that an affidavit perfecting such a lien be filed and indexed.2117 However, curative provisions unique to the statute provide that any failure by the clerk to properly index the affidavit does not invalidate the lien.2118

(3) Effect of Subsequent Removal or Destruction of Public Records

Under common law, once filed an instrument was effective as constructive notice irrespective that the public records into which it was incorporated were subsequently removed or destroyed.2119 Once a deed was recorded it was always recorded.2120 The common law rule reasoned that such a result was necessary to prevent the alienation of property from being impeded by the destruction or loss of public records.2121

However, the common law rule has been partially abrogated by special statute. Under TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. ' 19.008, a destroyed or lost record fails as constructive notice unless it is rerecorded after lost, destroyed, or removed.2122 If rerecorded within the 4-year grace period, the constructive notice effect of the rerecorded instrument relates back to the date of its original recordation.2123 Any purchaser buying within the 4-year grace period is not an innocent purchaser if the senior deed is rerecorded within 4-years.2124 If the senior title is rerecorded after the expiration of the 4-year grace period, its effect as constructive notice dates from the date of its rerecordation.2125 If the instrument is never rerecorded, its constructive notice effect is lost as if it were never recorded.2126

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Either the original instrument or a certified copy of the senior instrument may be rerecorded.2127 If neither is available for rerecordation, authorities suggest that the common law rule may then apply.2128 However, the operation of the statutory rule is aided by a presumption that the original deed continues to exist until evidence to the contrary appears.2129

2. Recording

County clerks are charged with a duty of recording real property documents filed with them.2130 Recording refers to the process of enrolling or incorporating the instrument into the records of the county clerk.2131 An instrument must be recorded correctly and within a reasonable time after filing.2132 Instruments Arelating to the same property are recorded in the order that instruments are filed.2133

3. Indexing

Upon filing all instruments relating to real property must be indexed by direct and indirect (grantor and grantee) alphabetical index showing the location in the clerk=s records where the instrument is located.2134

4. Return of Instrument

Upon completion of the recording and indexing process, the clerk is directed to return the original instrument to the party who filed it of record.2135

E. Documents Destroyed or Lost Before Recorded

A document effecting title to real property which is destroyed or lost prior to recordation may be proved up and put of record by procedures set out in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. Chapter 19.2136 To do so, a person files an application with the district clerk of the county where the document was destroyed or lost (or in the case of a judgment, order, or decree, with the clerk of the court to which the record belonged.)2137 The application must be in writing and set forth the facts entitling the applicant relief.2138 Citation is then issued to all interested parties as with civil cases.2139 Upon hearing, if the court is satisfied from the parol proof of the previous existence and content of the document, the court will enter an order containing its findings and a description of the contents of the document.2140 A certified copy of that order may then be recorded in the property county in lieu of the original.2141 The recorded order then has the same effect as the original document.2142

Other methods of recording a lost or destroyed document are available.2143 For example, if a photocopy of the document exists, it can be filed by attaching the photocopy to an original affidavit providing the necessary proof or providing other acceptable proof.2144

F. Recording of Judgments

A judgment recorded in the real property records can be constructive notice2145 if rendered by a qualifying court and attested under the signature and seal of the clerk of the court that rendered the judgment.2146 A qualifying court is one: (1) expressly created and established under the laws of Texas or the United States, (2) of a foreign country that is recognized by an Act of Congress or treaty to which the United States is a party, or (3) created by any other territory, jurisdiction, or protectorate entitled to full faith and credit under the United States Constitution.2147

The signed and sealed certificate of the clerk accompanying the judgment as recorded must include: (1) the identity of the case; (2) the date of the case; (3) the names of the parties in the case; (4) a description of the land involved that is located in the county of recording; (5) the name of the party to who the land is decreed.2148

A judgment not properly recorded is no more effective as constructive notice than an unrecorded deed.2149

1. Recording a Judgment From Justice Court

A certified transcript of a judgment or writ of execution from a justice court may be recorded in the same manner as a deed, which recordation shall have the same effect as a recorded deed.2150

IX. ACTIONS INVOLVING THE RECORDING STATUTE

A. Pleading

Ordinarily, there is no presumption that a purchaser paid valuable consideration without notice.2151 Therefore, the Recording Statute and Innocent Purchaser Doctrine, as affirmative defenses, must be pleaded to be asserted.2152 Although both doctrines are based in estoppel, a plea of innocent purchaser for value is sufficient without expressly pleading estoppel.2153

B. Burden of Proof

1. Recording Statute

Under the Recording Statute, the burden of proving the superiority of the junior title asserted by an innocent purchaser is on the proponent of the junior title.2154 In a dispute between two legal titles, the junior purchaser has the weaker title and must assume the burden of proof to resist an elder legal title.2155

In Ackers v. Frazier,2156 Ackers, as holder of a junior interest sought to invoke the Recording Statute.2157 Ackers showed that he had no constructive notice of a prior unrecorded deed but failed to offer any proof that negated actual notice.2158 Ackers failed to meet the burden of proof under the Recording Statute.2159

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2. Innocent Purchaser Doctrine

Under the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine, the burden of proof is reversed. The senior equitable title has the burden of showing that the junior legal title holder is not an innocent purchaser for value.2160 The senior title holder also has the burden to submit jury issues to the fact finder on whether the junior title holder is an innocent purchaser for value.2161 Failing to submit issues may waive the senior claim.2162

Because of the Shelter Rule,2163 it is incumbent on the holder of the senior equitable title to show that none of the subsequent purchasers was an innocent purchaser for value.2164 In Davidson v. Renfro,2165 the holder of a senior equitable title failed to meet the required burden of proof by a showing that some but not all subsequent vendees knew of the existence of the senior claim.2166

3. Recording Statute for Judgments and Orders

Under TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 12.005(a) (Recording Statute for Judgments and Orders), the burden is on the junior title to introduce a prima facie case by showing that he acquired his title while the judgment was unrecorded.2167 After this prima facie proof is given, the burden shifts to the senior title to show that the subsequent buyer is not an innocent purchaser.2168

C. Jury Issues

The party asserting the innocent purchaser defense waives the defense unless a jury issue is submitted to the Court on this affirmative defense.2169

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1 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.001 (Vernon 2004). See also Croteau v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 119968 at *9 (E.D. Tex. 2014); Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *16 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 (S.D. Texas. 2012); In re Saldivar, 2013 WL 2452699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

2 Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

3 Croteau v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 119968 at *9 (E.D. Tex. 2014); Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

4 Onyekwere v. Bank of America, N.A., 2014 WL 1032447 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Koger v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 897339 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Dallas County v. MERSCorp, Inc., 2014 WL 840016 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *16 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

5 Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 377, 6 S.W. 843, 844 (1887); Hancock v. Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex. 225, 232 (1885); Watson v. First Nat’l Bank of Coleman, 285 S.W. 1050, 1052 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Hughes v. Sloan, 62 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1933, writ ref’d); South Texas Lumber Co. v. Nicoletti, 54 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1932, writ dism’d).

6 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(b)(Vernon 2004). See also Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 377, 6 S.W. 843, 844 (1887); Rogers v. Burchard, 34 Tex. 442, 452 (1870); Barrett v. Barrett’s Admr., 31 Tex. 344, 349 (1868); Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 223 (1867); Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859).

7 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a)(Vernon 2008).

8 Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 722 F.3d 700 n. 27 (5th Cir. 2013); Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *16 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Morales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 6057853 at *10 (W.D. Tex. 2013); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

9 Dallas County v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2014 WL 840016 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Miller v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 825, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 888 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

10 See Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 722 F.3d 700, n. 27 (5th Cir. 2013); Onyekwere v. Bank of America, N.A., 2014 WL 1032447 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Koger v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 897339 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Dallas County v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2014 WL 840016 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Hudson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 5306786 at *2 (5th Cir. 2013).

11 Hudson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 5306786 at *2 (5th Cir. 2013); Koger v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 897339 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Dallas County v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2014 WL 840016 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Green v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 937 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 WL 5781208 at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

12 Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Chavez v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 1335611 at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Huml v. Mortgage Elec. Registration System, 2012 WL 5984821 at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. 2012).

13 Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

14 2013 WL 335398 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

15 Id. at *16.

16 Id. at 3-20.

17 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(e) (Vernon 2007).

18 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2013) adopts by reference the requirements of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(a) (c) but not (e).

19 Cavazas v. Munoz, 305 B.R. 661, 679 n. 28 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 56

20 292 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002).

21 Id. at 286. See also PermaStone - Surfa Shield Co. v. Meredith, 722 S.W.2d 224, 228 30 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1988, no writ); In re Davila, 2006 WL 2578868 (S.D. Tex. 2006).

22 In re Sorrell, 292 B.R. 276, 287 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002).

23 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(e) (Vernon 2007) requires only that the contract for the improvements be executed before the material is furnished or the labor performed.

24 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.036 (Vernon 2002).

25 Sewell v. Wilcox, 290 S.W. 264, 265 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, no writ).

26 Jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 118 Tex. 58, 72, 10 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928); Cherry v. Corban, 119 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1938, no writ); Beeler v. Harbour, 116 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1938, writ ref’d); Standard Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Davis, 85 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1935, writ ref’d); Pittman v. Continental Southland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 75 S.W.2d 991, 993 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1934, writ ref’d).

27 In re Bigler, 458 B.R. 345, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).

28 Brick & Tile v. Parker, 143 S.W.2d 383, 385, 186 S.W.2d 66, 67 (1945); Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 529, 35 S.W. 1054, 1056 (1896); Moore v. Carey Bros. Oil Co., 269 S.W. 75, 78 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Villareal v. Villareal, 2005 WL 3116218 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005); Rosen v. Peck, 445 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1969, no writ). But See Lyon v. Elser, 72 Tex. 304, 305, 17 S.W. 177, 178 (1888).

29 First Nat’l Bank of Paris v. Lyon Gray Lumber Co., 194 S.W. 1146, 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1917), aff’d, 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919); Texas Builders Supply Co. v. National Loan & Inv. Co., 54 S.W. 1059, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, writ ref’d).

30 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 (Vernon 2007) is part of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN., Chapter 53, Subchapter K which applies only to “residential construction projects”. The provisions of this Subchapter are not applicable to a business homestead. See Cavazos v. Munoz, 305 B.R. 661, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2004). A residential construction project is defined at TEX. PROP. CODE

ANN. § 53.001(10) (Vernon 2007).

31 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(a) (Vernon 2007). See also Cavazos v. Munoz, 305 B.R. 661, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

32 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(e) (Vernon 2007). See also Cavazos v. Munoz, 305 B.R. 661, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

33 See Cavazos v. Munoz, 305 B.R. 661, 679 n. 28 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

34 Id. at 683.

35 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052 (Vernon 2007). See also First Nat’l Bank of Paris v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 172, 217 S.W. 133, 134 (1919); William Cameron & Co. v. Marshall, 65 Tex. 7, 11 (1885); CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 47 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Tex. App. - Austin 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 95 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002); Herrington v. Luce, 491 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1973, no writ); Lebo v. Dochen, 310 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

36 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 (Vernon 2007).

37 TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 50(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2013); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 (Vernon 2007)

38 In re Earnest & Assoc.,Inc., 59 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).

39 Id.

40 59 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).

41 Id. at 498.

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42 Id. at 497.

43 TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(b)(Vernon Supp. 2013).

44 Id. at § 32.06(d). See also ABN Amro Mtg. v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land, 200 S.W.3d 774, 777-79 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

45 BAC Home Loan Serv. v. Texas Realty Holdings, 901 F. Supp. 884, 912 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

46 LaCoste v. Odam, 26 Tex. 458, 459 (1883); Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex. 606, 609 (1866); Wilson v. Williams, 25 Tex. 55, 63 (1860); Cervantes v. Bayview Loan Serv., 2012 WL 6017712 at *2 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2012); Williams v. NationStar Mtg., LLC, 349 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, pet. denied).

47 In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).

48 Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. v. Kothman, 359 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. 2011).

49 McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 39614 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *2 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Medley v. Medley, 683 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Citibank v. Cavazos, 2014 WL 710687 at n. 3 (S.D. Tex. 2014).

50 Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *2 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Wells v. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass’n, 825 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Sigmar v Anderson, 2006 WL 3040760 (Tex. App. - Austin 2006); Patton Street Corp. v. NAB Asset Venture, III, 2002 WL 31682118 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2002).

51 Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548, n. 22 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, pet. filed). Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at n. 1 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

52 Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 590, 17 S.W. 909, 911 (1891); Kempner v. Comer, 73 Tex. 196, 199, 11 S.W. 194, 195 (1889); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 114 15 (1883); Donley v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 328 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Barton v. Parks, 127 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1939, writ ref’d).

53 Steele v. Duke, 2012 WL 1034649 at *3 (Tex. App. – Waco 2012); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc., 288 S.W. 3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 2009, rev’d on other grounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011); McNary v. Reeves, 461 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

54 HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1998); Saunders & Worley v. Hartwell & Chambers, 61 Tex. 679, 685 (1884); Aston Meadows v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 339 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, pet. denied).

55 Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 87, 216 S.W. 382, 383 (1919); Moran v. Wheeler, 87 Tex. 179, 184, 27 S.W. 54, 55 (1894); Copelin v. Shuler, 6 S.W. 668, 671 (Tex. 1887); Hancock v. Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex. 225, 232 (1885); Henderson v. Pilgrim, 22 Tex. 464, 476 (1858).

56 Pondrum v. Gray, 298 S.W. 409, 410 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, holding adopted); Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, pet. denied); Smith v. James, 54 S.W. 41, 43 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, writ ref’d); Mason v. Bank of America, N.A., 2013 WL 1313900 at *4 (E.D. Tex. 2013).

57 Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tex. 1988); Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1978); Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 51, 175 S.W.2d 401, 407 (1943); Kimball v. Houston Oil Co., 100 Tex. 336, 342, 99 S.W. 852, 855 (1907); Edwards v. Brown, 68 Tex. 329, 334, 5 S.W. 87, 88 (1887).

58 Bryan v. Crump, 55 Tex. 1, 13 (1881); McEvoy v. Ron Watkins, Inc., 105 B.R. 362, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1987).

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59 La Pice v. Key, 88 Tex. 209, 212, 30 S.W. 867, 867 (1895); King v. Elson, 30 Tex. 246, 255 (1867); McEvoy v. Ron Watkins, Inc., 105 B.R. 362, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1987).

60 Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

61 Pustejovsky v. K.J.Z.T., 124 Tex. 504, 504 05, 79 S.W2d. 1084, 1084 (1935); Kempner v. Comer, 73 Tex. 196, 199, 11 S.W. 194, 195 (1889); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 114 (1883); Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1978); Donley v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 328 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The registration laws are predicated upon the possibility that a vendor may assign or sell a right or title consistent with his apparent right to sell but exceeding his actual title or right. Pustejovsky v. K.J.Z.T., 124 Tex. 504, 508, 79 S.W2d. 1084, 1086 (1935).

62 McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. App. - Houston 2009, no pet.).

63 New England Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Harrell, 39 S.W. 142, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref’d).

64 Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 456 (1877); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); TMS Mortgage, Inc. v. Golias, 102 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2003, no writ).

65 Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth v. Taylor, 40 S.W. 876, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897), aff’d, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 966 (1897).

66 Lubbock State Bank v. H.O. Wooten Grocery Co., 179 S.W. 1141, 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1915), rev’d on other grounds, 215 S.W. 835 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

67 Id. at 1142.

68 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Deco-Dence, L.L.C. v. Robertson, 2011 WL 2937439 at *2 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2011); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 75 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *2 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); Oncak v. Westex Transmission, L.P., 2007 WL 547768 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 2007).

69 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Rutland Sav. Bank v. Isbell, 137 Tex. 432, 437, 154 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1941); Kinsey v. Dutton, 100 S.W.2d 1025, 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1936, writ dism’d).

70 Rutland Sav. Bank v. Isbell, 137 Tex. 432, 437, 154 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1941); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 457, 107 S.W.2d 564, 571 72 (1937); Callahan v. Hendrix, 79 Tex. 494, 498, 15 S.W. 593, 594 95 (1891); Henderson v. Lindley, 75 Tex. 185, 189, 12 S.W. 979, 980 (1889); Russell v. Farquhar, 55 Tex. 355, 363 (1881).

71 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).

72 Id. at 1354.

73 Id. at 1357.

74 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.035 16.037 (Vernon 2002).

75 Id.

76 Hughes v. Hess, 141 Tex. 511, 516, 172 S.W.2d 301, 304 (1943); Novosad v. Svrcek, 129 Tex. 34, 39, 102 S.W.2d 393, 396 (1937); Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Cohen, 138 Tex. 464, 469, 159 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942, opinion adopted); Yates v. Darby, 133 Tex. 593, 603, 131 S.W.2d 95, 100 01 (Tex. Comm’n App. - 1939, opinion adopted); Jasper State Bank v. Braswell, 130 Tex. 549, 561, 111 S.W.2d 1079, 1085 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1938, opinion adopted).

77 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12.007 12.008 (Vernon Supp. 2013, Vernon 2004).

78 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 19.008 19.009 (Vernon 2008).

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79 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.046 (Vernon 2008).

80 McEvoy v. Ron Watkins, Inc., 105 B.R. 362, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1987).

81 Moore v. Carey Bros. Oil Co., 269 S.W. 75, 78 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Operators’ Oil & Gas Co., 37 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1931, writ dism’d).

82 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.106(b)(Vernon 2006). See also Feurbacher v. Moser, 2012 WL 1070138 at *14 (E.D. Tex. 2014).

83 Alkas v. United Sav. Ass’n of Texas, 672 S.W.2d 852, 859 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi, 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

84 Ball v. Norton, 238 S.W. 889, 890 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted).

85 Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc., 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 2009, rev’d on other grounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011); Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ); Davis v. Harman, 29 S.W. 492, 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).

86 Farias v. Vara, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010).

87 Sanger v. Calloway, 61 S.W.2d 988, 992 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Davis, 296 S.W. 285, 287 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

88 Henderson v. Pilgrim, 22 Tex. 464, 478 (1858).

89 Id.

90 Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, 397 S.W.3d 102, 169 (Tex. 2013).

91 Id. at 169.

92 Id.

93 Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 672 73, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886).

94 Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist. 2011, no pet.); Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2011, no pet.); Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

95 Cetti v. Wilson, 168 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d).

96 Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W.616, 619 (Tex. 1910); Daniels v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240, 244, 78 S.W. 161, 162 (1899); Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610, 613 (1884); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

97 Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 610 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d); Busby v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev’d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

98 Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 610 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d); Busby v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev’d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

99 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 168 Tex. 555, 564, 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 (1917); Berry v. Chadwick, 137 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1940, writ dism’d jdgmt cor.); Globe Indemnity Co. v. West Texas Lumber Co., 345 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1930, no writ); LaFon v. Grimes, 86 F.2d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 1936).

100 LaFon v. Grimes, 86 F.2d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 1936).

101 Id. at 812.

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102 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Paris Grocer Co. v. Burk, 101 Tex. 106, 112, 105 S.W. 174, 176 (1907); Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Thompson v. Corbin, 137 S.W. 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1940, no writ); Texas Consolidated Compress & Mfg. Ass’n v. Dublin Compress & Mfg. Co., 38 S.W. 404, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, no writ); Prewitt v. U.S., 792 F.2d 1353, 1356 (5th Cir. 1986).

103 Compass Bank v. Veytia, 2011 WL 6046530 at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2011).

104 Wright v. Lancaster, 48 Tex. 250, 257 (1877); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Park Central Bank v. JHJ Inv., 835 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, no writ); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ).

105 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Davis, 282 S.W. 930, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev’d on other grounds, 296 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

106 See Berthelot v. Brinkman, 322 S.W.3d 365, 372-74 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2010, pet. denied).

107 Wright v. Lancaster, 48 Tex. 250, 257 (1877); Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203, 237 (1846); Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ); Harvey Co. v. Braden, 260 S.W. 655, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1924, no writ).

108 85 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, writ dism’d).

109 Id. at 1052.

110 389 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1965, no writ).

111 Id. at 337. See also Bashara v. Glasscock, 289 S.W. 128, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ ref’d).

112 See Biswell v. Gladney, 213 S.W. 256, 257 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Allen v. Hall, 52 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1932, no writ); Beeler v. Terrell, 245 S.W. 459, 461 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1922, no writ); Price v. Traders’ Nat’l Bank, 195 S.W. 934, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1917), rev’d on other grounds, 223 S.W. 160 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

113 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Moran v. Wheeler, 87 Tex. 179, 183, 27 S.W. 54, 55 (1894); Brown v. Thompson, 79 Tex. 58, 62 (1890); Wood v. Sparks, 59 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Lubbock State Bank v. H.O. Wooten Grocery Co., 179 S.W. 1141, 1144 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1915), rev’d on other grounds, 215 S.W. 835 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Drumm Comm’n Co. v. Core, 105 S.W. 843, 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref’d).

114 E. Nelson Mfg.& Lumber Co. v. Roddy, 34 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1930), rev’d on other grounds, 51 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, holding adopted); Globe Indemnity Co. v. West Texas Lumber Co., 345 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1930, no writ).

115 Pustejovsky v. K.J.Z.T. Lodge, 124 Tex. 504, 508, 79 S.W.2d 1084, 1086 (1935); Lewis v. Ross, 95 Tex. 358, 361 62, 67 S.W. 405, 406 (1902); Ratliff v. Russek, 59 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1933, writ ref’d).

116 See Pustejovsky v. K.J.Z.T. Lodge, 124 Tex. 504, 508 09, 79 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1935); Rogers v. Houston, 94 Tex. 403, 405, 60 S.W. 869, 870 (1901); Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Brakett, 91 Tex. 44, 47 48, 40 S.W. 719, 721 (1897); Moran v. Wheeler, 87 Tex. 179, 183, 27 S.W. 55, 55 (1894); Saunders & Worley v. Hartwell & Chambers, 61 Tex. 679, 689 (1884). But see In re Bridgewater, 295 F. 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1923).

117 See Kirby v. Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 453 (1892); New England Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Harrell, 39 S.W. 142, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref’d).

118 Steele v. Orts, 390 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Hico, 127 S.W. 844, 845 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1910, no writ); In re Tri Sonic, Inc., 1 B.R. 138, 145 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1979).

119 52 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1932, no writ).

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120 Id. at 663.

121 Id.

122 Id.

123 Id.

124 129 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1939).

125 Id. at 719 20.

126 McCarty v. Allen, 113 S.W.2d 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ); Hill v. Engel, 89 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, writ ref’d); Ratliff v. Russek, 59 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1933, writ ref’d). But see Smith v. New Waverly State Bank, 76 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934, writ dism’d).

127 South Texas Lumber Co. v. Nicoletti, 54 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1932, writ dism’d).

128 McCarty v. Allen, 113 S.W.2d 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ).

129 Wood v. Sparks, 59 S.W.2d 361, 362-63 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); McCarty v. Allen, 113 S.W.2d 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ).

130 McCarty v. Allen, 113 S.W.2d 974, 977 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ).

131 Hoarel Sign Co. v. Dominion Equity Corp., 910 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1995, pet. denied); Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs, 612 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1981, no writ); Irving Lumber Co. v. All Tex Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64, 72 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1969), aff’d, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); Black, Sivalls & Bryson v. Operators’ Oil & Gas Co., 37 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1931, writ dism’d); DeBruin v. Santo Domingo Land & Irrigation Co., 194 S.W. 654, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1917, no writ).

132 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052 (Vernon 2007). See also In re Kleibrink, 346 B.R. 734, 758 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Earnest and Assoc., Inc., 59 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).

133 Estelle v. Hart, 55 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, jdgmt adopted).

134 Grogan - Cochran Lumber Co. v. McComb, 192 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1945, writ ref’d); McVey v. United Timber & Kaolin Ass’n, 270 S.W. 572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925, no writ).

135 In re Tri-Sonic, Inc., 1 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1979).

136 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Davis, 296 S.W. 285, 288 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); T Vestco Litt Vada v. Lu Cal One Oil Co., 651 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Woods v. Rolls, 268 S.W. 988, 990 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1924), aff’d, 291 S.W. 532 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); United North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith, 258 S.W. 559, 555 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923), aff’d, 272 S.W. 124 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).

137 Clements v. Taylor, 184 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1944, no writ).

138 Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App. - Waco 1993, pet denied); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1988, writ denied); Latimer v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d 996, 997 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1944, writ ref’d).

139 Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 229 (Tex. App. - Austin 2002, no pet); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App. - Austin 1988, writ denied).

140 Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

141 White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66, 71, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 459 (1877); Arrowood v. Blount, 294 S.W. 616, 617 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927), aff’d, 121 Tex. 52, 41 S.W.2d 412 (1931); Saunders v. Isbell, 34 S.W. 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1892, no writ).

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142 Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 96, 103 04, 11 S.W. 1070, 1073 (1889); Slaton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 212, 9 S.W. 876, 877 (1888); Holmes v. Johns, 56 Tex. 41, 52 53 (1881); Zimpelman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 274, 282 (1880); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 459 (1877).

143 Branch v. Weiss, 57 SW. 901, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).

144 See Bryan v. Texas Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W. 163, 165 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, writ dism’d).

145 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925).

146 Id. at 1098.

147 Id.

148 Id. at 1099. See also Citizens Nat’l Bank at Brownwood v. Turner, 14 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Tex. 1936) (equitable title created by an unrecorded trust instrument not subject to the Recording Statute).

149 17 S.W. 37, 39 (Tex. 1891).

150 259 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1924), rev’d on other grounds, 272 S.W. 771 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).

151 Id. at 244.

152 Id.

153 Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Aycock v. Kimbrough, 71 Tex. 330,334, 12 S.W. 71, 72 (1887); Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 672, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610, 613 (1884); Calvert v. Roche, 59 Tex. 463, 464 (1883).

154 Smith v. Sumeer Homes, Inc., 2013 WL 2467252 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013).

155 Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ); Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Russell v. Nall, 23 S.W. 901, 901 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ).

156 Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

157 Hellmann v. Circle C Prop. I, Ltd., 2003 WL 22897220 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2003); Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Pierce, 546 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1977, no writ); Knox v. Long, 251 S.W.2d 911, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1952), rev’d on other grounds, 257 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1953); Telle v. Sawtelle, 246 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1952, writ ref’d); Johnston v. Winn, 105 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, writ dism’d).

158 See Hellmann v. Circle C Prop. I, Ltd., 2003 WL 22897220 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2003). For a more thorough discussion of the equitable remedy of resulting trusts refer to Haley, Creative Ways to Get to the Homestead: Resulting and Constructive Trusts, 31st Mortgage Lending Institute (1997).

159 Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Hawley v. Geer, 17 S.W. 914, 916 (Tex. 1891); Stephens v. Keating, 17 S.W. 37, 39 (1891); Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 673, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884).

160 55 S.W2d 510 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, jdgmt adopted).

161 Id. at 514.

162 Id. at 511.

163 Id. at 514.

164 Id. See also Hellmann v. Circle C Prop. I, Ltd., 2003 WL 22897220 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2003).

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165 Calvert v. Roche, 59 Tex. 463, 465 (1883); Brinkman v. Tinkler, 117 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1938, writ ref’d); Caldwell v. Bryan’s Executor, 49 S.W. 240, 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, no writ).

166 J.S. Brown Hardware v. Marwitz, 32 S.W. 78, 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).

167 59 Tex. 463 (1883).

168 Id. at 464-65.

169 Id. at 465.

170 Id.

171 Id. See also J.S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Marwitz, 32 S.W. 78, 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).

172 Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 373, 341 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1960); Fitzgerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 29, 50, 237 S.W.2d 256, 263 (1951); Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 21 22, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (1948); Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 138 39, 189 S.W.2d 471, 472 73 (1945); Newman v. Link, 866 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App. - Houston 1993, writ denied).

173 Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 n. 3 (Tex. 1980).

174 For a more thorough review of the many bases of this equitable remedy refer to Haley, Creative Ways to Get to the Homestead: Resulting and Constructive Trusts, 31st Annual Mortgage Lending Institute (1997).

175 See Kuehn v. Kuehn, 259 S.W. 290, 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924, writ dism’d); In re Rosenberg, 4 F.2d 581, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1925).

176 Henderson v. Rushing, 105 S.W. 840, 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref’d); Long v. Fields, 71 S.W. 774, 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no writ); Citizens Nat’l Bank at Brownwood v. Turner, 14 F.Supp. 495, 496 97 (N.D. Tex. 1936).

177 105 S.W. 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref’d).

178 Id. at 840.

179 Id. at 841.

180 Cadle Co. v. Harvey, 46 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); Gaona v.Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 87 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ); Bracken v. Haid & Kyle, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

181 Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ); Bracken v. Haid & Kyle, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

182 Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ).

183 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.076 (Vernon 2004).

184 2013 WL 2467252 (Tex. App. 2013).

185 Id. at *1.

186 Id.

187 Id. at *4.

188 Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); North East I.S.D. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1975, write ref’d n.r.e.).

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189 Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); North East I.S.D. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1975, write ref’d n.r.e.); United States v. FDIC, 1987 WL 43096 (N.D. Tex. 1987).

190 Henderson v. Odessa Bldg. & Fin. Co., 24 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Davis, 296 S.W. 285, 286 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); North East I.S.D. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). But see First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 631, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916); Carlisle v. Holland, 289 S.W.116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, writ ref’d); Cetti v. Wilson, 166 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d).

191 24 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).

192 Id. at 394. See also Garrison v. Crowell, 67 Tex. 626, 628 (1887); Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); United States v. Creamer Ind., Inc., 349 F.2d 625, 628 29 (5th Cir. 1965).

193 Aycock v. Kimbrough, 71 Tex. 330, 334, 12 S.W. 71, 72 (1887); Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 672, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Citizens’ Nat’l Bank of Waco v. Billingsley, 300 S.W. 648, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1927, writ ref’d).

194 66 Tex. 669, 1 S.W. 794 (1886).

195 66 Tex. at 671, 1 S.W. at 794 95.

196 66 Tex. at 671, 1 S.W. at 795.

197 66 Tex. at 672-73, 1 S.W. at 796. See also Aycock v. Kimbrough, 71 Tex. 330, 334, 12 S.W. 71, 72 (1887).

198 IRS v. Fagin, 252 B.R. 118, 120 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

199 Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259, 264 (1883); Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768, 773 (1870).

200 Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259, 264 (1883); Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768, 772 (1870); Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Davis v. Wheeler, 23 S.W. 435, 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ); United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1957).

201 252 B.R. 118 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

202 Id. at 119.

203 Id. at 120.

204 Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism’d).

205 Id. at 681. See also Murray v. Cadle Co., 257 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

206 114 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism’d).

207 Id. at 680.

208 Id. at 681.

209 Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610, 612 (1884); Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1964, no pet.); NRG Exploration, Inc. v. Rauch, 671 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. App. - Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Sugg v. Mozoch, 293 S.W. 907, 910 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ ref’d); Cetti v. Wilson, 168 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d).

210 Blair v. Hennessey, 138 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911), aff’d, 177 S.W. 871 (Tex. 1915).

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211 Hawley v. Geer, 17 S.W. 914, 916 (Tex. 1891); Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 673, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Murphy v. Johnson, 54 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1932, writ dism’d); Chalk v. Daggett, 204 S.W. 1057, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1918), rev’d on other grounds, 257 S.W. 228 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).

212 17 S.W. 914 (Tex. 1891).

213 Id. at 915.

214 Id.

215 Id.

216 Id. at 915-916.

217 Id. at 916.

218 Id.

219 See Cameron v. Romele, 53 Tex. 238, 242 (1880); Baylor v. Ramos, 290 S.W. 273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dixon v. Cargill, 104 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, writ ref’d); Ford v. Wallace, 283 S.W. 934, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1926, writ ref’d); Blair v. Hennessey, 138 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911), aff’d, 177 S.W. 871 (Tex. 1915).

220 See Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 390, 84 S.W. 417, 421 (1905); Dixon v. Cargill, 104 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, writ ref’d); Alexander v. Harris, 254 S.W. 146, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1923, writ ref’d); Blair v. Hennessey, 138 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911), aff’d, 177 S.W. 871 (Tex. 1915).

221 138 S.W. 1076 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911), aff’d, 177 S.W. 871 (Tex. 1915).

222 Id. at 1078.

223 Id. at 1077.

224 Id. at 1078.

225 Id.

226 Id. at 1078 79.

227 Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

228 But see exceptions to this at n. 56 and accompanying text.

229 See Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 157 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1941, writ ref’d); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004); In re Sheets, 277 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).

230 157 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1941, writ ref’d).

231 Id. at 149-50.

232 Id. at 152.

233 Id.

234 See Carlisle v. Holland, 289 S.W. 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, writ ref’d); Cetti v. Wilson, 168 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d); In re Scott, 157 B.R. 297, 315 n.13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).

235 168 S.W. 996 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d).

236 Id. at 996-97.

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237 Id. at 997.

238 Id.

239 Id.

240 Id. at 998.

241 1999 WL 1015543 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999) (not designated for publication).

242 Id. at *3.

243 Id.

244 See Allday v. Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 673, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Collett v. Collett, 217 S.W.2d 60, 62 63 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

245 66 Tex. 669, 1 S.W. 794 (1886).

246 66 Tex. at 671, 1 S.W. at 794-95.

247 66 Tex. at 671, 1 S.W. at 795.

248 66 Tex. at 670-71, 1 S.W. at 794.

249 66 Tex. at 673, 1 S.W. at 795.

250 66 Tex. at 672-73, 1 S.W. at 796. See also Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber, 125 Tex. 284, 291, 83 S.W.2d 638, 642 (1935).

251 Fennimore v. Ingham, 181 S.W. 513, 515 16 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1915), modified on other grounds, 215 S.W. 956 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1957).

252 See Knox v. Gruhlkey, 192 S.W. 334, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref’d); United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1957); MJ Capital Partners II, L.P. v. Reed, 1998 WL 760278 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Beatty v. White, 1992 WL 141063 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002) (not authorized for publication).

253 See, e.g., AM Mtg. Serv., Inc. V. Watts, 260 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2008, no pet.).

254 Id.

255 124 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref’d).

256 Id. at 135.

257 113 S.W. 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ dism’d).

258 Id. at 976. See also McCabe v. Moore, 38 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1932, writ dism’d).

259 281 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

260 Id. at 477.

261 259 S.W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1924, writ dism’d).

262 Id. at 651.

263 Fidelity Lumber Co. v. Bendy, 245 S.W. 981, 984 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922, writ dism’d).

264 245 S.W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922, writ dism’d).

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265 Id. at 984.

266 Bowles v. Bryan, 247 S.W. 276, 279 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Kinney v. Johnson, 135 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1939, writ dism’d jdgmt cor.); Chandler v. Stewart, 90 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1935, writ dism’d); Marshburn v. Stewart, 295 S.W. 679, 688 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927, writ dism’d); Heard v. Bowen, 184 S.W. 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1916, writ ref’d).

267 Bowles v. Bryan, 247 S.W. 276, 279 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); MacGregor v. Thompson, 265 S.W. 649, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).

268 Heard v Bowen, 184 S.W. 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1916, writ ref’d); MacGregor v. Thompson, 265 S.W. 649, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).

269 Bowles v. Bryan, 247 S.W. 276, 279 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Heard v. Bowen, 184 S.W. 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1916, writ ref’d); MacGregor v. Thompson, 265 S.W. 649, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).

270 Bowles v. Bryan, 247 S.W. 276, 279 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Chandler v. Stewart, 90 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1935, writ dism’d).

271 Heard v. Bowen, 184 S.W. 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1916, writ ref’d).

272 Id.

273 San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref’d).

274 ABN AMRO Mtg. v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land, 200 S.W.3d 774, 779 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

275 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 13.001(c) (Vernon 2004).

276 Calvino v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 2013 WL 4677742 at *4 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Morales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 6057853 at * 10 (W.D. Tex. 2013).

277 Calvino v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 2013 WL 4677742 at *4 (W.D. Tex. 2013).

278 Id. at § 13.001(a). See also Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 455, 107 S.W.2d 564, 570 (1937); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Garner v. Boyle, 97 Tex. 464, 465, 79 S.W. 1066, 1068 (1904); Thorn v. Newsom, 64 Tex. 161, 164 (1885); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884).

279 Garner v. Boyle, 97 Tex. 464, 465, 79 S.W. 1066, 1068 (1904); Roeser & Pendleton v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 138 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1940, writ ref’d); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref’d).

280 Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref’d).

281 Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Robertson, 102 S.W. 141, 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref’d).

282 ABN Amro Mtg. v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land, 200 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)

283 200 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

284 Id. at 775-76.

285 Id. at 780-81.

286 Boswell v. Farm & Home Sav. Ass’n, 894 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

287 Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 223 (1867).

288 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.005(a) (Vernon 2004).

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289 Refer to text at I(E) and accompanying notes.

290 Compare Callahan v. Hendrix, 79 Tex. 494, 498, 15 S.W. 593, 595 (1891) with Haines v. West, 101 Tex. 226, 230 31, 105 S.W. 1118, 1119 (1907).

291 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Barrett v. Barrett’s Admr., 31 Tex. 344, 346 (1868); Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548, n. 23 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, pet. filed); Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.); McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co., 243 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1951, writ ref’d); HSBC Bank USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 565, 568 (N.D. Ala. 2011).

292 Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 459 (1877); United States v. FDIC, 1987 WL 43096 (N.D. Tex. 1987); HSBC Bank USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 572 (N.D. Ala 2011).

293 Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 485, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884); McKeen v. Sultenfuss, 61 Tex. 325, 328 (1884); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 116 (1883); Henderson v. Odessa Bldg. & Fin. Co., 24 S.W.2d 393, 393 94 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted). But see Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.); In re H.B. Leasing Co., 188 B.R. 810, 814 (E.D. Tex. 1995).

294 R.A. Brown & Co. v. Chancellor, 61 Tex. 437, 444 (1884); Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548, 558 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, pet. filed); Gossett v. Vaughn, 173 S.W. 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1914, no writ); In re Lindahl, 59 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1932); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Dahlberg, 2011 WL 710604 at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2011).

295 David v. State Bank of Groom, 238 S.W. 979, 984 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1922, no writ). But see Omohundro v. Jackson, 36 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2001, no writ); In re Pioneer Austin East Dev. I, Ltd., 2012 WL 487087 (N.D. Tex. 2012).

296 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004).

297 In re H.B. Leasing Co., 188 B.R. 810, 813 (E.D. Tex. 1995).

298. Barrett v. Barrett=s Admr., 31 Tex. 344, 349 (1868); In re H.B. Leasing Co., 188 B.R. 810, 813-14 (E.D. Tex. 1995).

299. McKeen v. Sultenfuss, 61 Tex. 325, 328 (1884); Mbank Abilene, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1986, no writ); Sinton State Bank v. Odem, 75 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934, writ dism=d); United States v. Davidson, 139 F.2d 908, 910 (5th Cir. 1943); In re Bridgewater, 295 F. 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1923); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Dahlberg, 2011 WL 710604 at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2011). But see Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

300. In re Bridgewater, 295 F. 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1923).

301. Id. at 842.

302. Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 485, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892). But see Mbank Abilene, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1986, no writ).

303. 20 S.W. 54 (Tex. 1892).

304. Id. at 56. See also Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 116-17 (1883).

305. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 116-17 (1883).

306. 120 Tex. 113, 113, 36 S.W.2d 695 (1931).

307. 120 Tex. at 115, 36 S.W.2d 695.

308. 120 Tex. at 115-16, 36 S.W.2d 695.

309. 120 Tex. at 120, 36 S.W.2d 695. See also Wallace & Co. v. Campbell, 54 Tex. 87, 90 (1880); Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism=d). However a different result if the conflicting senior title is an equitable one requiring the application of the Innocent Purchaser Doctrine. Refer to V(B)(7).

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310. See Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Tex. 440, 441-42 (1877); Grimes v. Hobson, 46 Tex. 416, 418 (1877); Grace v. Waid & Mains, 45 Tex. 522, 525 (1876); McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co., 243 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1951, writ ref=d).

311. See Park Central Bank v. JHJ Inv., 835 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, no writ); Gibraltar Sav. Ass=n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1981, no writ); North East I.S.D. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1975, writ ref=d n.r.e.); McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co., 243 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1951, writ ref=d).

312. See Gee v. Parks, 193 S.W. 767, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, no writ); Dallas Cabana v. Collier, 469 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1972); Del Rio Bank & Trust Co. v. Correll, 57 F.2d 142, 143 (5th Cir. 1932); Cooper Grocery Co. v. Park, 218 F. 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1914); In re Atravasala Land and Cattle, Inc., 308 B.R. 255, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).

313. In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 AT *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re Atravasada Land and Cattle, Inc., 308 B.R. 255, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008; In re Earnest & Assoc., Inc., 59 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985); In re Boots Builders, Inc., 11 B.R. 635, 640 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).

314 308 B.R. 255 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).

315 Id. at 260.

316 Id. at 267.

317 Id. at 268.

318. In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Earnest & Assoc., Inc., 59 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985); In re Boots Builders, Inc., 11 B.R. 635, 640 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).

319. 243 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1951, writ ref=d).

320. Id. at 193-94.

321. Id. at 195.

322. Id. See also Perry & Perry Builders, Inc. v. Galvan, 2003 WL 21705248 (Tex. App. - Austin 2003) (not designated for publication).

323. Id. at 195.

324. United States v. Creamer Ind., Inc., 349 F.2d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 1965); Hanafy v. United States, 991 F.Supp. 794, 800 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Magna Funding Corporation v. Homevestors, Inc., 1999 WL 446075 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Mueller v. United States, 1996 WL 490162 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Paul Rochester Inv. Co. v. United States, 692 F.Supp. 704, 712 (N.D. Tex 1988).

325. In re Rosenberg, 4 F.2d 581, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1925).

326. Baker v. West, 120 Tex. 113, 119, 36 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1931); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 110, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Central City Trust Co. v. Waco Bldg. Ass=n, 95 Tex. 48, 51, 64 S.W. 998, 998 (1901); Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 484, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); John B. Hood Camp Confederate Veterans v. De Cordova, 92 Tex. 202, 207, 47 S.W. 522, 524 (1898).

327. Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160,163 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Whitaker v. Hill, 179 S.W. 539, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1915, no writ).

328. Whitaker v. Hill, 179 S.W. 539, 540 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1915, no writ); Prewitt v. U.S., 1985 WL 1632 (W.D. Tex. 1985).

329. 784 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied).

330. Id. at 556.

331. Id.

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332. Id.

333. Id. See also Berry v. Chadwick, 137 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Christian v. Sam R. Hill Lumber Co., 113 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1938, no writ); Whitaker v. Hill, 179 S.W. 539, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1915, no writ).

334. 126 S.W. 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

335. Id. at 960. See also Holt v. Hunt, 44 S.W. 889, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1898, no writ).

336. 208 S.W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1919, writ ref=d).

337. Id. at 553.

338. Id.

339. Id. at 553-55.

340. Id. at 554-55. See also Peurifoy v. Weibusch, 132 Tex. 36, 41-42, 117 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1938, opinion adopted); Sugg v. Mozoch, 293 S.W. 907, 909 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ ref=d); Parks v. West, 274 S.W. 164, 165 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1925, no writ).

341. 2 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1928, no writ).

342. Id. at 537.

343. Id.

344. Id.

345. Id. See also Hooker v. Eakin, 176 S.W. 80, 81-82 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1915, writ ref=d).

346. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Calvert v. Roche, 59 Tex. 463, 465 (1883); Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205, 211-12 (1879); Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Tex. 440, 442 (1877); Deco-Dence, L.L.C. v. Robertson, 2011 WL 2937439 at *3 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2011).

347. Grimes v. Hobson, 46 Tex. 416, 419 (1877); Donald v. Davis, 208 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1948, writ ref=d); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Lewis, 28 S.W. 101, 103 (Tex. Civ. App 1894, writ ref=d).

348. See Senter v. Lambeth, 55 Tex. 259, 263 (1883); Wallace & Co. v. Campbell, 84 Tex. 87, 90 (1880); Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205, 211-12 (1879); Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Tex. 440, 442 (1877); Grimes v. Hobson, 46 Tex. 416, 419 (1877).

349. See McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884); Senter v. Lambeth, 55 Tex. 259, 262-63 (1883); Wallace & Co. v. Campbell, 84 Tex. 87, 90 (1880); Grimes v. Hobson, 46 Tex. 416, 419 (1877); Donald v. Davis, 208 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1948, writ ref=d).

350. See Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tex. 1892); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 117 (1883).

351. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tex. 1892); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 117 (1883); In re Bridgewater, 295 F. 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1923).

352. Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 116-17 (1883); Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism=d); Carlisle v. Holland, 289 S.W. 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, writ ref=d).

353. Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism=d); Carlisle v. Holland, 289 S.W. 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, writ ref=d); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004); In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 865 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).

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354. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 631, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916); Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no writ); Park Central Bank v. JHJ Inv., 835 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, no writ); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ); Berry v. Chadwick, 137 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

355. Carlisle v. Holland, 289 S.W. 116, 116 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1926, writ ref=d).

356. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 630, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916); Berry v. Chadwick, 137 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Barton v. Parks, 127 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1939, writ ref=d); Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1938, writ dism=d); Hirt v. Werneburg, 191 S.W. 711, 713 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1917, writ ref=d).

357. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 631, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916); Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tex. 1892); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Lewis, 28 S.W. 101, 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d); HSBC Bank USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 572 (N.D. Ala. 2011).

358. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 631, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916); Willis v. Heath, 18 Tex. 801, 803 (1891); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 117 (1883); Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259, 264 (1883); Calvert v. Roche, 59 Tex. 463, 464-65 (1883).

359. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 631, 183 S.W. 874, 876 (1916).

360. See Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tex. 1892); Ross v. Kornrumpf, 64 Tex. 390, 394 (1885); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 117 (1883); Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768, 772 (1870); Cadle Co. v. Harvey, 46 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).

361. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 117 (1883); Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259, 264 (1883); Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768, 772 (1870); Oberthier v. Stroud, 33 Tex. 522, 524 (1870).

362. 46 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).

363. Id. at 286.

364. Id. at 284.

365. Id. at 287. See also Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 118 (1883).

366. Id. at 288.

367. Id.

368. 997 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no pet.).

369. Id. at 785.

370. Id.

371. Id.

372. Id. at 786-87.

373. Id. at 787.

374. Id.

375. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tex. 1892); Orme v. Roberts, 33 Tex. 768, 773 (1870); Penman v. Blount, 264 S.W. 169, 170 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1924, no writ); Kenley v. Robb, 193 S.W. 375, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1916), rev=d on other grounds, 245 S.W. 68 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Aycock v. Thompson, 146 S.W. 641, 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1912, no writ).

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376. See Bonner v. Grigsby, 84 Tex. 331, 332, 19 S.W. 511, 512 (1892); Holt v. Love, 131 S.W. 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1910, writ dism=d); Ward v. League, 24 S.W. 986, 988 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

377. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ' 34.046 (Vernon 1997). See also Lissner v. State Mortgage Corp., 29 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1930, writ dism=d); Spence v. State Nat=l Bank of El Paso, 294 S.W. 618, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1927), aff=d, 5 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Woody v. Strong, 100 S.W. 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ); HSBC Bank USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 568 (N.D. Ala. 2011).

378. McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 653 (1884); Plumb v. Kleimann, 234 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1950, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Harvey v. Humphries, 178 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1944, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Love v. R.S. Allday Supply Co., 106 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, writ dism=d); Rogers v. Houston, 60 S.W. 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1900, no writ).

379. See John B. Hood Camp Confederate Veterans v. De Cordova, 92 Tex. 202, 207, 47 S.W. 522, 524 (1898); Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. 1892); Yoe v. Montgomery, 68 Tex. 338, 340-41, 4 S.W. 622, 624 (1887); Ross v. Kornrumpf, 64 Tex. 390, 394 (1885); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 651 (1884).

380. 49 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).

381. Id. at 241.

382. Id. at 242.

383. Id. See also Yoe v. Montgomery, 68 Tex. 338, 340-41, 4 S.W. 622, 624 (1887); Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356, 357, 3 S.W. 307, 308 (1887); Bonner v. Stephens, 60 Tex. 616, 619 (1884); Senter v. Lambeth, 59Tex. 259, 264 (1883); Price v. Cole, 35 Tex. 461, 471 (1872).

384. Caldwell v. Bryan=s Executor, 49 S.W. 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).

385. Id. at 241-42.

386. Id. at 242.

387. Id.

388. Id. at 243.

389. Id.

390. Id. at 242-43. See also Bova v. Wyatt, 140 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1940, writ ref=d).

391. 28 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d)

392. Id. at 102.

393. Id. at 103. See also Roeser & Pendleton v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 138 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1940, writ ref=d); Phillips v. Wilson, 280 S.W. 228, 231 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1926, no writ).

394. Boswell v. Farm & Home Sav. Ass=n, 894 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1994, pet. denied).

395. Vogel v. Zipp, 90 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1936, writ dism=d).

396. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 179, 181, 135 S.W. 1149, 1152 (1911); Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 421, 90 S.W. 485, 488 (1906); Hunter v. Eastham, 95 Tex. 648, 653, 69 S.W. 66, 68 (1902); Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 369164 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013).

397. Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ); In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

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398. Houston Oil Co. of Texas. v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 179, 181-182, 135 S.W. 1149, 1152 (1911); Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 387, 84 S.W. 417, 420 (1905); Hume v. Ware, 87 Tex. 380, 384, 28 S.W. 935, 936 (1894); Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Kokernot v. Gilstrap, 180 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1944), rev=d on other grounds, 143 Tex. 595, 187 S.W.2d 368 (1945).

399. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 179, 182, 135 S.W. 1149, 1152-53 (1911); Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

400. Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008).

401. Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 75 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

402. Id.

403. Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 at *5 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008); In re Harydzak, 400 B.R. 499, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

404. Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 at n. 4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008).

405. Id. at *5.

406. Id.

407 Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

408. In re Harydzak, 408 B.R. 499, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

409. 406 B.R. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

410. Id. at 511.

411. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 179, 182, 135 S.W. 1149, 1153 (1911); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 477, 98 S.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

412. Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70-71 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

413. 2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

414. Id.

415. Id.

416. Id.

417. Id.

418. Id. See also Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 477, 98 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted).

419. 42 S.W. 317, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).

420. Id. at 318.

421. 128 Tex. 470, 477, 98 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted).

422. 128 Tex. at 477, 98 S.W.2d at 349.

423. Langley v. Norris, 167 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1942), aff=d, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.W.2d 454 (1943); Johnson v. Johnson, 207 S.W. 202, 204 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1918, writ ref=d).

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424. 3 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

425. Id. at 69-71. See also Clarkson v. Ruiz, 140 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

426. Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 387, 84 S.W. 417, 420 (1905); Scoggin v. Mason, 103 S.W. 831, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ).

427. Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 387, 84 S.W. 417, 420 (1905); Scoggin v. Mason, 103 S.W. 831, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ).

428. Scoggin v. Mason, 103 S.W. 831, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ).

429. 2008 WL 1723234 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008).

430. Id. at *5-6.

431. Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 478, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted).

432. Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

433. Mast v. Tibbles, 60 Tex. 301, 305 (1883); Valentine v. Colley, 294 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956, no writ); Mineral Holding Trust v. Stovall, 288 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 94, 299 S.W.2d 279 (1956); Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Kokernot v. Gilstrap, 180 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1944), rev=d on other grounds, 143 Tex. 595, 187 S.W.2d 368 (1945).

434. Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

435. Smith v. Huff, 164 S.W. 429, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1914, no writ); Mortimer v. Jackson, 155 S.W. 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1913), aff=d, 206 S.W. 510 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1918, jdgmt adopted); Houston Oil Co. v. Bayne, 141 S.W. 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911, writ ref=d).

436. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 42, 173 S.W. 871, 873 (1915); Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 590-91, 17 S.W. 909, 911 (1891).

437. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 42, 173 S.W. 871, 873 (1915); Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 590-91, 17 S.W. 909, 911 (1891).

438. 241 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

439. Id. at 700.

440. Id.

441. Id.

442. 134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W.2d 226 (1938).

443. 134 Tex. at 334, 114 S.W.2d at 234.

444. 134 Tex. at 334, 114 S.W.2d at 234.

445. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v. Dawkins, 230 S.W. 525, 527 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1921, no writ).

446. 230 S.W. 525 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1921, no writ).

447. Id. at 527.

448. Batts & Dean v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59, 63 (Tex. 1873). See also Luckel v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 243 S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted) (Holder of equitable title may invoke the innocent purchaser doctrine if the competing senior title is also an equitable title).

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449. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 42, 173 S.W. 871, 873 (1915); National Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Tex. 586, 592, 68 S.W. 979, 981 (1902); York=s Administrator v. McNutt, 16 Tex. 13, 16 (1856); Valentine v. Colley, 294 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956, no writ); Mineral Holding Trust v. Stovall, 288 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 94, 299 S.W.2d 279 (1956).

450. York=s Administrator v. McNutt, 16 Tex. 13, 16 (1856); Slaughter v. Coke County, 79 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d); Texas Consolidated Compress & Mfg. Ass=n v. Dublin Compress & Mfg. Co., 38 S.W. 404, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, no writ).

451. 79 S.W. 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d).

452. Id. at 865-66. See also York=s Administrator v. McNutt, 16 Tex. 13, 16 (1856); Taylor v. Turner, 230 S.W. 1031, 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1921, no writ); Spotts v. Whitaker, 157 S.W. 422, 424 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

453. 38 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, no writ).

454. Id. at 409.

455. McKeen v. Sultenfuss, 61 Tex. 325, 329 (1884); Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist. 2011, no. pet.); WMC Mtg. Corp. v. Moss, 2011 WL 2089777 at *3 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2011); Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, writ denied).

456. Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 486, 61 S.W. 923, 925 (1901); Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Pope v. Beauchamp, 206 S.W. 928, 930 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1918, jdgmt adopted); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Graves v. Guaranty Bond State Bank, 161 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1942, no writ).

457. Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

458. Deaton v. Rush, 252 S.W. 1025, 1033 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Hodges v. Miller, 244 S.W. 634, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1922), aff=d, 260 S.W. 168 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).

459. Deaton v. Rush, 252 S.W. 1025, 1033 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Hodges v. Miller, 244 S.W. 634, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1922), aff=d, 260 S.W. 168 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted). But see Panhandle Refining Co. v. Swope, 241 S.W. 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1922, no writ); Varnes v. Dean, 228 S.W. 1017, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1920, no writ).

460. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 44, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (1915); Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied); Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exp. Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); 1st Coppell Bank v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, no writ); Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool v. Cruze, 191 S.W.2d 47, 54 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1945, no writ).

461. Beasley v. Burns, 7 S.W.3d 768, 769 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999, writ denied); Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exp. Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool v. Cruze, 191 S.W.2d 47, 54 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1945, no writ)

462. Tex. Dept. Of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, 387 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. 2013); Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 44, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (1915); Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied); 1st Coppell Bank v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, no writ).

463. Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied); 1st Coppell Bank v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, no writ).

464. Bryan v. Crump, 55 Tex. 1, 13 (1881); Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1997, pet. denied); Burton v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 72 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1934, writ ref=d); King v. Diffey, 192 S.W. 262, 264 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1916, no writ); Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909, writ ref=d).

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465. Bryan v. Crump, 55 Tex. 1, 13 (1881).

466. 72 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1934, writ ref=d).

467. Id. at 322.

468. Henderson v. Lindley, 75 Tex. 185, 189, 12 S.W. 979, 980 (1889); Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209, 211 (1882); Nyman v. Eggert, 154 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1941, no writ); Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 610 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref=d); Burton v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 72 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1934, writ ref=d).

469. Nyman v. Eggert, 154 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1941, no writ); Day v. Johnson, 72 S.W. 426, 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ dism=d); Fox v. Robbins, 62 S.W. 815, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, writ ref=d).

470. Spence v. State Nat=l Bank of El Paso, 294 S.W. 618, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1927), aff=d, 5 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

471. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Mineral Holding Trust, 157 Tex. 54, 63-64, 299 S.W.2d 279, 285-86 (1956); Heck v. Martin, 75 Tex. 469, 473, 13 S.W. 51, 52 (1889); Collins v. Miller, 64 Tex. 118, 120 (1885); Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209, 212-13 (1882); Warne v. Guaranty State Bank of Colmesneil, 239 S.W. 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922, no writ); Crow v. Van Ness, 232 S.W. 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1921, no writ). But see Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731, 735-36 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1919, writ ref=d) (innocent purchaser not protected by judgment regular on its face though obtained without service if the result is an unconscionable profit to purchaser and purchaser can be made whole by return to status quo).

472. Williams v. Young, 90 S.W. 940, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref=d).

473. Irvin v. Ferguson, 83 Tex. 491, 496, 18 S.W. 820, 821 (1892); Hart v. McDade, 61 Tex. 208, 212 (1884); Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209, 212-13 (1882); Tudor v. Orr, 179 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1944, no writ); DeGuerra v. DeGonzalez, 232 S.W. 896, 901 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, no writ).

474. 232 S.W. 896 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, no writ).

475. Id. at 901. See also Collins v. Miller, 64 Tex. 118, 120 (1885); Hart v. McDade, 61 Tex. 208, 212 (1884); Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209, 212-13 (1882).

476. Spence v. State Nat=l Bank of El Paso, 294 S.W. 618, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1927), aff=d, 5 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

477. Id. at 622.

478. Sydnor v. Roberts, 13 Tex. 598, 622 (1855); Ramirez v. Bell, 298 S.W. 924, 928 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927), modified on other grounds, 299 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927).

479. Swann v. Rotan State Bank, 115 Tex. 425, 429, 282 S.W. 789, 790 (1926); Boswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433, 441-442, 180 S.W. 593, 597 (1915); Tyler Bldg. & Loan Ass=n v. Biard & Scales, 106 Tex. 554, 561, 171 S.W. 1200, 1200 (1915); Martin v. Robinson, 67 Tex. 368, 381 (1887); Hardy v. Broaddus, 35 Tex. 668, 687 (1872).

480 Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

481. Levy v. Roper,230 S.W. 514, 517 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921), modified, 113 Tex. 356, 256 S.W. 251 (1923).

482. Mooneyham v. Cornick, 294 S.W. 894, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1927, no writ).

483 Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); GE Capital Commercial, Inc., 2011 WL 124237 (N.D. Tex. 2011); In re Pace, 456 B.R. 253, 275 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).

484. Lynn v. McCoy, 200 S.W. 885, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1917, no writ).

485. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 44, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (1915); Daniels v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240, 245, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (1896); Tompkins v. American Republics Corp., 248 S.W.2d 1001, 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1952, no writ); White v.

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Holland, 229 S.W. 611, 613 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1921, no writ); Mitchell v. Inman, 156 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1913, writ ref=d).

486. Hennessey v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39, 44, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (1915); Daniels v. Mason, 90 Tex. at 240, 245, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (1896); Jones v. Lind, 211 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1948, no writ); Bolton v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1945, no writ); Dallas Bldg. & Loan Ass=n v. Henry, 98 S.W.2d 1030, 1035 (Tex. Civ. App. - Forth Worth 1936, writ dism=d).

487. Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, writ ref=d).

488. Id.

489. Henke v. First Southern Properties, 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.). But see Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 389, 84 S.W. 417, 421 (1905).

490. 212 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, writ ref=d).

491. Id. at 550-51.

492. Id. at 550.

493. Id. at 551.

494. Id.

495. Id. at 552. See also Wesley v. Amerigo, Inc., 2006 WL 22213 (Tex. App. - Waco 2006); Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

496. Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723-24 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Henke v. First Southern Properties, 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, writ ref=d).

497. 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

498. Id. at 620.

499. Id.

500. 34 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1930), aff=d, 55 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1932, jdgmt adopted).

501. Id. at 669.

502. Id.

503. 224 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1949, writ ref=d).

504. Id. at 782.

505. 98 Tex. 380, 84 S.W. 417 (1905).

506. 98 Tex. at 389, 84 S.W. at 421.

507. 133 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

508. Id. at 905. See also Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 346-47, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942); Randolph v. Citizens Nat=l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

509. Martin v. Cadle Co., 133 S.W.3d 897, 905 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

510. Id.

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511. See Gutherie v. Gossett, 142 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1940, no writ).

512. Id.

513. Montgomery v. Trueheart, 149 S.W. 284, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1912, writ ref=d); Mansfield v. Wardlow, 91 S.W. 859, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1906, writ ref=d); Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Hunt, 38 S.W. 1134, 1135 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, writ ref=d).

514. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

515. Id. at 601.

516. 98 Tex. 380, 84 S.W. 417 (1905).

517. 98 Tex. at 387-88, 84 S.W. 420-21.

518. 98 Tex. at 387-88, 84 S.W. 420-21.

519. Steffian v. Milmo Nat=l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 518, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (1888); Unsell v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, 138 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1940, writ dism=d by agreement); Neal v. Pickett, 269 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925), rev=d on other grounds, 280 S.W. 748 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Hapgood v. City Nat=l Bank, 230 S.W. 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1921, no writ); Lynn v. McCoy, 200 S.W. 885, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1917, no writ).

520. Link v. Page, 72 Tex. 592, 596-97, 16 S.W. 699, 701 (1889); Steffian v. Milmo Nat=l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 518-19, 6 S.W. 823, 825 (1888); National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Sugg v. Johnson, 284 S.W. 705, 716 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1925, no writ); Hapgood v. City Nat=l Bank, 230 S.W. 775, 779 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1921, no writ).

521. Spotts v. Whitaker, 157 S.W. 422, 424 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

522. Id. at 424.

523. Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); Vogel v. Zipp, 90 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1936, writ dism=d); Quillin v. State Trust Co., 50 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1932, writ ref=d); Tuerpe v. George W. Saunders Livestock Comm=n Co., 259 S.W. 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1924, writ dism=d); Dowdy v. Furtner, 198 S.W. 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1917, no writ).

524. 50 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1932, writ ref=d).

525. Id. at 880-81.

526. Id. at 883. See also, Cain v. Bonner, 149 S.W. 702, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1912), aff=d, 109 Tex. 399, 194 S.W. 1098 (1917).

527. Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

528. 241 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

529. Id. at 700.

530. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1978); Omohundro v. Jackson, 36 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2001, no writ); Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1966, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Popplewell v. City of Mission, 342 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

531. Hunley v. Bulowsky, 256 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1953, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Harper v. Over, 101 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ); Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass=n v. Howard, 61 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1933), aff=d, 94 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Kinard v. Sims, 53 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1932, writ ref=d); Thomason v. Berwick, 113 S.W. 567, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908, no writ).

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532. Murski v. Kowalski, 45 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1931, no writ).

533. Id. at 750.

534. 103 S.W.2d 987 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1937, writ dism=d).

535. Id. at 993.

536. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1978); Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank, 847 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1993, no writ); Gill v. First Nat=l Bank of Harlingen, 114 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1938, no writ); Harper v. Over, 101 S.W.2d 830, 831-32 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

537. Downing v. Jeffrey, 173 S.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Tex. Civ. App.- Galveston 1943, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Slaughter v. Qualls, 149 S.W.2d 657, 657 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1941), aff=d, 139 Tex. 340, 162 S.W.2d 671 (1942); Walling v. Rose, 2 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1928, no writ).

538. Ellis v. Singletary, 45 Tex. 27, 41 (1876); Downing v. Jeffrey, 173 S.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Tex. Civ. App.- Galveston 1943, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Walling v. Rose, 2 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1928, no writ).

539. See Clark v. Hoover, 110 S.W. 792, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref=d).


541. Id. at 795.

542. Id.

543. Id.

544. Id.

545. Conn v. Southwest Settlement & Dev. Co. 222 S.W. 612, 613 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1920, no writ). Consideration is only required for the junior deed. Medley v. Medley, 683 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

546. Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 267, 18 S.W. 727, 731 (1892); Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593, 606 (1864); Beaty v. Whitaker, 23 Tex. 526, 528-29 (1859); Nickels v. Casburg, 2009 WL 1708830 at *11 (Tex. App. – Austin 2009); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ).

547. Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Texoma Advertising Co. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); Jones v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. App. – Houston 2009, no pet.).

548. Beaty v. Whitaker, 23 Tex. 526, 529 (1859).

549. Id.

550. Ballard v. Allen, 2005 WL 1037514 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2005, no pet.).

551. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Neal, 56 S.W. 91, 92 (Tex. App. - 1900, no writ).

552. See Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 469, 54 S.W. 347, 351 (1899).

553. Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1910); Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 600, 145 S.W. 700, 700 (1890); H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Chaffin, 60 Tex. 553, 555 (1883); Batts & Dean v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59, 63 (1872); Moore v. Curry, 36 Tex. 668, 668 (1871).

554. Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1910); Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 484, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 267, 18 S.W. 727, 731 (1892); Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892); H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Chaffin, 60 Tex. 553, 555 (1883).

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555. Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1910); Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892); Wallace v. Crow, 1 S.W. 372, 373 (Tex. 1886); Bremer v. Deffenbaugh, 60 Tex. 151, 153 (1883); Rodgers v. Buchard, 34 Tex. 442, 454 (1870).

556. Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S.W. 612, 623 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1913, writ ref=d).

557. Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1910).

558. Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1910); Holland v. Nance, 102 Tex. 177, 185, 114 S.W. 346, 349 (1908); Starr v. Brooks, 222 S.W. 660, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1920, no writ); Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S.W. 612, 613 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1913, writ ref=d).

559. 124 S.W. 616 (Tex. 1910).

560. Id. at 620.

561. Id.

562. 222 S.W. 660, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1920, no writ).

563. Id. at 661.

564. 230 S.W. 1008 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1921, no writ).

565. Id. at 1010.

566. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 183, 135 S.W. 1149, 1153 (1911); Eastham v. Hunter, 102 Tex. 145, 147, 114 S.W. 97, 97 (1908); Hume v. Ware, 87 Tex. 380, 384, 28 Tex. 935, 936 (1894); Nichols-Steuart v. Crosby, 87 Tex. 443, 453, 29 S.W. 380, 382 (1895); Phillips v. Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1975, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

567. Carpenter v. Anderson, 77 S.W. 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref=d); Rowland v. Klepper, 189 S.W. 1033, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1916), modified on other grounds, 227 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Downs v. Stevenson, 119 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d); Hanrick v. Gurley, 48 S.W. 994, 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), modified on other grounds, 93 Tex. 485, 54 S.W. 349 (1899).

568. Hill v. Foster, 143 Tex. 482, 489, 186 S.W.2d 343, 347 (1945); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 182, 135 S.W. 1149, 1153 (1911); Eastham v. Hunter, 102 Tex. 145, 147, 114 S.W. 97, 97 (1908); Nichols-Steuart v. Crosby, 87 Tex. 443, 453, 29 S.W. 380, 382 (1895); Hume v. Ware, 87 Tex. 380, 384, 28 Tex. 935, 936 (1894).

569. Downs v. Stevenson, 119 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d); Huff v. Maroney, 56 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ ref=d).

570. Chestnut v. Specht, 272 S.W. 830, 832 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925, no writ); Downs v. Stevenson, 119 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d).

571. Downs v. Stevenson, 119 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d).

572. Gainesville Oil & Gas Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 847 S.W.2d 655, 663 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1993, no writ).

573. Id. at 661, 663.

574. Lissner v. State Mortgage Corp., 29 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1930, writ dism=d).

575. McAnally v. Panther, 26 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1930, no writ).

576. Chestnut v. Specht, 272 S.W. 830, 832 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925, no writ).

577. Carpenter v. Anderson, 77 S.W. 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref=d).

578. Green v. Robertson, 70 S.W. 345, 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref=d).

579. See Phillips v. Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1975, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

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580. Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State, 196 S.W. 287, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), aff=d, 111 Tex. 200, 231 S.W. 683 (1921).

581. La Pice v. Key, 88 Tex. 209, 212, 30 S.W. 867, 868 (1895); Norton v. Ball, 225 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston, 1920), aff=d, 238 S.W. 889 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State, 196 S.W. 287, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), aff=d, 111 Tex. 200, 231 S.W. 683 (1921); Tobin v. Benson, 152 S.W. 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

582. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Neal, 56 S.W. 91, 92 (Tex. App. - 1900, no writ). But see Nichols v. Casburg, 2009 WL 1708830 at *11 (Tex. App. – Austin 2009).

583. See Tobin v. Benson, 152 S.W. 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

584. 152 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

585. Id. at 644.

586. Id.

587. Id.

588. Eaton v. Husted, 141 Tex. 349, 360, 172 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1943); Painter v. McDonald, 427 S.W.2d 127, 135 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968), rev=d on other grounds, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969); Temple v. City of Coleman, 245 S.W. 264, 269 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1922, writ dism=d); Shannon v. Buttery, 140 S.W. 858, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1911, no writ); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Garza, 894 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (S.D. Tex. 1995).

589. Eaton v. Husted, 141 Tex. 349, 360, 172 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1943).

590. Swann v. Rotan State Bank, 115 Tex. 425, 430, 282 S.W. 789, 789 (1926); Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 485, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); Webb v. Burrey, 70 Tex. 322, 325, 7 S.W. 841, 843 (1888); Steffian v Milmo Nat=l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 517, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (1888); Laurens v. Anderson, 1 S.W. 379, 380 (Tex. 1886).

591. Swann v. Rotan State Bank, 115 Tex. 425, 430, 282 S.W. 789, 790 (1926); Steffian v Milmo Nat=l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 517, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (1888); Kokernot v. Gilstrap, 180 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1944), rev=d on other grounds, 143 Tex. 595, 187 S.W. 368 (1945); Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 223, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); Tobin v. Benson, 152 S.W. 642, 645 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

592. Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453, 463 (1880); McGahey v. Ford, 563 S.W.2d 857, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1978, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 223, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ); Ridgill v. E.L. Wilson Hardware, 178 S.W. 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1915, writ dism=d).

593. Black v. Caviness, 21 S.W. 635, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).

594. 59 Tex. 540 (1883).

595. Id. at 540.

596. Id. at 541-42.

597. Dunlap v. Green, 60 F. 242, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1893).

598. Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453, 464 (1880); Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 223, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); Dunlap v. Green, 60 F. 242, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1893).

599. 60 F. 242 (5th Cir. 1893).

600. Id. at 248-49.

601. Id. at 249. See also Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453, 464 (1880); Tobin v. Benson, 152 S.W. 642, 645 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

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602. Smith v. Westfall, 76 Tex. 509, 512, 13 S.W. 540, 540 (1890); Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); Swenson v. Seale, 28 S.W. 143, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, writ ref=d).

603. Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ).

604. 110 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ).

605. Id. at 238.

606. Id.

607. Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Johnson v. Masterson, 193 S.W. 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1916, writ ref=d); Watts v. Corner, 27 S.W. 1087, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

608. Steffian v. Milmo Nat=l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 517, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (1888); Adkins - Polk Co. v. Rhodes, 24 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Red River Nat=l Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1937, no writ); White v. Hix, 104 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1937, writ dism=d); Tom v. First Nat=l Bank of Midland, 104 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1937, writ dism=d).

609. Jiles v. Citizens= Nat=l Bank, 257 S.W. 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1923, writ dism=d); Knox v. Gruhlkey, 192 S.W. 334, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d).

610. Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1982, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Jiles v. Citizens= Nat=l Bank, 257 S.W. 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1923, writ dism=d); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ); Tobin v. Benson, 152 S.W. 642, 645 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d); McLane v. Sullivan, 69 S.W. 191, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), aff=d, 96 Tex. 144, 70 S.W. 949 (1902).

611. White v. Hix, 104 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1937, writ dism=d); Ingenhuelt v. Hunt, 39 S.W. 310, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d).

612. Id. at 311.

613. Jackson v. Berliner, 127 S.W. 1160, 1162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

614. Id. at 1162.

615. Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 600, 14 S.W. 700, 700 (1890); Essex v. Mitchell, 183 S.W. 399, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915, writ ref=d); Keenon v. Burkhardt, 162 S.W. 483, 487 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, writ ref=d); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d); Beavers v. Baker, 124 S.W. 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d). But see McAnally v. Panther, 26 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1930, no writ) (non-negotiable note is not valuable consideration).

616. La Pice v. Key, 88 Tex. 209, 212, 30 S.W. 867, 868 (1895); Clemmons v. McDowell, 5 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1927), aff=d, 12 S.W. 955 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Essex v. Mitchell, 183 S.W. 399, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915, writ ref=d); LaFon v. Grimes, 86 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 1936).

617. LaFon v. Grimes, 86 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 1936).

618. 86 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1936).

619. Id. at 813.

620. Ballard v. Allen, 2005 WL 1037514 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2005, no pet.); Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Commercial State Bank v. Blackwell, 61 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1933, no writ); Watts v. Corner, 27 S.W. 1087, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

621. Ballard v. Allen, 2005 WL 1037514 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2005, no pet.).

622. 2005 WL 1037514 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2005, no pet.).

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623. Id.

624. Id.

625. Id.

626. Id.

627. Bailey & Pond v. Tindall, 59 Tex. 540, 541 (1883); Morton v. Lowell, 56 Tex. 643, 645 (1882); Beaty v. Whitaker, 23 Tex. 526, 529 (1859); Jones v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Antwine v. Reed, 194 S.W.2d 614, 617-18 (Tex. Civ. App. -Waco 1946), rev=d on other grounds, 199 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1947).

628. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 421, 90 S.W. 485, 488 (1906).

629. 194 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1946), rev=d on other grounds, 199 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1947).

630. Id. at 617.

631. Id.

632. Id. at 648.

633. 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906).

634. 99 Tex. at 421-22, 90 S.W. at 488.

635. 99 Tex. at 421-22, 90 S.W. at 488.

636. 99 Tex. at 422, 90 S.W. at 488.

637. 191 S.W. 362 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1916, writ ref=d).

638. Id. at 363.

639. Id.

640. Id. at 364.

641. Id. at 365. See also Norton v. Ball, 225 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1920), aff=d, 238 S.W. 889 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted).

642. 152 S.W. 173 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1912, no writ).

643. Id. at 175-76.

644. Id. at 176.

645. 128 S.W. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ).

646. Id. at 661. See also Morton v. Lowell, 56 Tex. 643, 646 (1882).

647. 156 S.W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d).

648. Id. at 260.

649. Id.

650. Beavers v. Baker, 124 S.W. 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

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651. Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 601, 14 S.W. 700, 700 (1890); English v. Plumlee, 291 S.W. 922, 923 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1927, no writ); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d).

652. Fraim v. Frederick, 32 Tex. 294, 308 (1869); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d); Bullock v. Sprowls, 54 S.W. 657, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899), aff=d, 93 Tex. 188, 54 S.W. 661 (1899).

653. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654, 17 S.W. 388, 389 (1891); Rawles v. Perkey, 50 Tex. 311, 315 (1878); Batts & Dean v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59, 63 (1872); Fraim v. Frederick, 32 Tex. 294, 308 (1869). But see Fraim v. Frederick, 32 Tex. 294, 309-10 (1869) (Payments made by purchaser after notice of senior title, if not thereafter applied to retiring the senior title, may disqualify the buyer from even claiming pro tanto innocent purchaser status for consideration paid before receiving notice of the senior interest).


655. Id. at 374.

656. Id.

657. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654-55, 17 S.W. 388, 389 (1891); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d).

658. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654, 17 S.W. 388, 389 (1891); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d).

659. Durham v. Scrivener, 259 S.W. 606, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923), aff=d, 270 S.W. 161 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).

660. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654, 17 S.W. 388, 389 (1891); Durham v. Scrivener, 259 S.W. 606, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923), aff=d, 270 S.W. 161 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d).

661. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654, 17 S.W. 388, 389 (1891); Durham v. Scrivener, 259 S.W. 606, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923), aff=d, 270 S.W. 161 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d); Nellius v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 156 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, writ ref=d).

662. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durham v. Scrivener, 259 S.W. 606, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923), aff=d, 270 S.W. 161 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d). For example, see yet another remedy imposed in Rawles v. Perkey, 50 Tex. 311, 316 (1878).

663. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 427, 90 S.W. 485, 491 (1906); Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 654-55, 17 SW. 388, 389 (1891); Hines v. Meador, 193 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d).

664. Downs v. Stevenson, 119 S.W. 315, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d).

665. Id.

666. Id.

667. Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S.W. 54, 56 (Tex. 1892); McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648, 654 (1884); Delespine v. Campbell, 52 Tex. 4, 12 (1879); Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593, 606 (1864); Rio Delta Land Co. v. Johnson, 475 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1971, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

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668. Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453, 463 (1880); Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593, 606 (1864); Hicks v. Pogue, 76 S.W. 786, 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref=d); Masterson v. Burnett, 66 S.W. 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref=d); J.S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Marwitz, 32 S.W. 78, 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).

669. 168 S.W. 996 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref=d).

670. Id. at 998.

671. Id.

672. Id.

673. Id.

674. TEX. Prop. CODE ANN. ' 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Garner v. Lockhart, 285 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1955), aff=d, 156 Tex. 580, 298 S.W.2d 108 (1955); Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96, 101-02 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), aff=d, 86 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ); Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

675. Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Jones v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Oneok Western Transmission, L.P. v. Castor Oil, Inc., 2007 WL 547768 at *1 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2007); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755,758 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).

676. Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 223 (1867); Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 448 (1859); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Detering Co. v. Green, 989 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, writ denied); Mann v. Old Republic Nat=l Title Ins. Co., 975 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

677. Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); McLean v. Smith, 112 S.W. 355, 363 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908, writ ref=d).

678. Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref=d).

679. Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref=d); In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).

680. Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).

681. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Hume v. Ware, 87 Tex. 380, 384, 28 S.W. 935, 936 (1894); Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 149 (1856); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013).

682. Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

683. McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011; no pet.); Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending); Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2011, no pet.).

684. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 223 (1867); Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 149 (1856); Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009).

685. Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.).

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686. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 149-50 (1856); Quarles v. Hardin, 249 S.W. 459, 462 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *4 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).

687. Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

688. Crews v. Taylor, 56 Tex. 461, 466 (1882); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Hannaman v. Gordon, 261 S.W. 1006, 1009 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted); Quarles v. Eaton-Blewett Co., 249 S.W. 465, 465 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass=n of Beaumont v. Stewart Title Co., 732 S.W.2d 98, 110 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1987, writ denied).

689. See Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *4 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Foster v. Buchele, 213 S.W.2d 738, 744 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Davis, 282 S.W. 930, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 296 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

690. Wilson v. Williams, 25 Tex. 55,56 (1860).

691. Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 79, 237 S.W.2d 286, 291 (1951); Stiles v. Japhet, 84 Tex. 91, 98, 19 S.W. 450, 452 (1892); Lundy v. Pierson, 67 Tex. 233, 236-37, 25 S.W. 737, 739 (1887); Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859); Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203, 238 (1846).

692. Barnett v. Squyres, 52 S.W. 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), rev=d on other grounds, 93 Tex. 193 (1899).

693. Kimball v. Houston Oil Co., 100 Tex. 336, 342, 99 S.W. 852, 855 (1907); Russell v. Farquhar, 55 Tex. 355, 363 (1881); Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203, 228 (1846); Starr v. Brooks, 222 S.W. 660, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1920, no writ); Barnett v. Squyres, 52 S.W. 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), rev=d on other grounds, 93 Tex. 193 (1899).

694 291 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

695 Id. at 554.

696. Harris v. Masterson, 91 Tex. 171, 177, 41 S.W. 482, 484 (1897); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Quarles v. Hardin, 249 S.W. 459, 462 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Hammonds v. Flewellen, 48 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932, no writ); Holloman v. Oxford, 168 S.W. 437, 438 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, no writ).

697. Mooney v. Harlan, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Neill v. Yett, 746 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tex. App. - Austin 1988, writ denied); United States v. Commercial Technology, Inc., 354 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2003); Wamco XXVIII, Ltd. v. Casa Grande Cotton Finance Co., 314 F.Supp. 655, 657 (N.D. Tex. 2004).

698. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Banque Aribe Internationale D=Investissment, 747 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ); McGlothlin v. Coody, 39 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1933), aff=d, 59 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Glasscock v. Stringer, 32 S.W. 920, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, no writ).

699. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Banque Aribe Internationale D=Investissment, 747 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ); Buton Lingo Co. v. Warren, 45 S.W.2d 759, 751 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1931, writ ref=d); McGlothlin v. Coody, 39 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1933), aff=d, 59 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted).

700. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Banque Aribe Internationale D=Investissment, 747 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ); McGlothlin v. Coody, 39 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1933), aff=d, 59 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted).

701. Martin v. Thaxton, 105 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1937, writ dism=d); Dalmer v. First Nat=l Bank in Rhome, 77 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1934, writ ref=d); Hexter v. Pratt, 283 S.W. 653, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 290 S.W. 734 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

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702 Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 923 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2011, no pet).

703. Callahan v. Hendrix, 17 Tex. 494, 498, 15 S.W. 593, 595 (1891); Littleton v. Giddings, 47 Tex. 109, 116 (1877); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 923 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2011, no pet.); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

704. Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owners Ass=n, 895 S.W.2d 779, 788 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ).

705. Simms v. Lakewood Village Property Owners Ass=n, 895 S.W.2d 779, 788 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Shear Co. v. Stuth, 248 S.W. 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1923, no writ).

706. O=Ferral v. Coolidge, 149 Tex. 61, 65, 228 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1950); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Laws v. Bailey, 2002 WL 31318207 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002); Hicks v. Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

707. 714 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

708. Id. at 32.

709. Id. at 33.

710. 406 B.R. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

711. Id. at 512.

712. Id. at 512-14.

713. 225 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949), aff=d, 149 Tex. 61, 228 S.W.2d 146 (1950).

714. Id. at 584.

715. Id.

716. McCollum v. Buckner=s Orphans= Home, 117 S.W. 886, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref=d); Ryle v. Davidson, 116 S.W. 823, 828 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908), rev=d on other grounds, 103 Tex. 209, 124 S.W. 616 (1910); Dean v. Gibson, 79 S.W. 364, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d); West v. Loeb, 42 S.W. 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, no writ); Illies v. Frerichs, 32 S.W.915, 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).

717. Dean v. Gibson, 79 S.W. 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d).

718 Chesapeake Exploration v. Valence Operating Co., 2008 WL 4240486 at *10 (S.D. Tex. 2008).

719. Hicks v. Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Cartwright v. La Brie, 144 S.W. 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1912, writ ref=d).

720. Id. at 32. But see Cartwright v. La Brie, 144 S.W. 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1912, writ ref=d) (when deed dated June 20, 1889 but not delivered until July 8, 1889, buyer was bound by any knowledge received between these dates).

721. 714 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

722. Id. at 32.

723. Id.

724. Id.

725. Id.

726. Matthews v. Houston Oil Co., 299 S.W. 450, 455 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927, no writ).

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727. 299 S.W. 450 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927, no writ).

728. Id. at 455.

729. See Southern Bldg & Loan Ass=n v. Brackett, 91 Tex. 44, 47, 40 S.W. 719, 721 (1897); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Standford v. Dumas, 137 S.W. 1071, 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Marshburn v. Stewart, 295 S.W. 679, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927, writ dism=d); Cunningham & Stringfellow v. Buckingham, 111 S.W. 766, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref=d).

730. Von Hutchins v. Pope, 351 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1961, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Hall v. Wilson, 215 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Johnson v. Bingham, 251 S.W. 529, 536 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1923), aff=d, 265 S.W. 130 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted); Barrett v. Eastham Bros., 86 S.W. 1056, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ); Keyser v. Clifton, 50 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).

731. Von Hutchins v. Pope, 351 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1961, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Kirby v Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 454 (1892); Barrett v. Eastham Bros., 86 S.W. 1056, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ); Colonial & U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Tubbs, 45 S.W. 623, 625 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1898, no writ). But see ABN Amro Mortgage Group v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land Investements, 200 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

732. J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Citizen=s Nat=l Bank of Odessa, 37 S.W.2d 1080, 1082-83 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1931, writ dism=d).


734. Id. at 1081.

735. Id. at 1082.

736. Id. at 1082-83.

737. Stone v. Pitts, 389 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1965, no writ); Shield v. Donald, 253 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Carnes v. Swift, 56 S.W. 85, 87 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1900, no writ); Mansfield v. Garrison, 48 S.W. 554, 554 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1898), aff=d, 92 Tex. 546, 50 S.W. 335 (1899).

738. Stone v. Pitts, 389 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1965, no writ).

739. Black, Sivalls & Bryson v. Operators= Oil & Gas Co., 37 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1931, writ dism=d); McEroy v. Ron Watkins, Inc., 105 B.R. 362, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re NETtel Corp., 458 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

740. See In re Marquee East Inv., Ltd., 74 B.R. 499, 501 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

741. Farrell v. Palestine Loan Ass=n, 30 S.W. 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, no writ).

742. Stanford v. Dumas, 137 S.W.2d 1071, 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); McVey v. United Timber & Kaolin Ass=n, 270 S.W. 572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925, no writ); Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1921, no writ); Houston Oil Co. v. Bayne, 141 S.W. 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911, writ ref=d); Barrett v. Eastham Bros., 86 S.W. 1056, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ).

743 Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 885 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Vanderbilt Mtg. and Fin., Inc. v. Flores, 692 F.3d 358, 367 (5th Cir. 2012).

744. Tex. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.124(a) (Vernon 2007).

745. Id. at ' 53.052(a), (b).


747. Id. at 163.

748. Id.

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749. Id.

750. Id. See also University Sav. & Loan Ass=n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 294 (Tex. 1967); Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 280, 24 S.W. 275, 276 (1893); Keating Implement & Machine Co. v. Marshall Elec. Light & Power Co., 74 Tex. 605, 607-08, 12 S.W. 489, 490 (1889); Trammell v. Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 215, 4 S.W. 377, 379 (1887); Yeager Elec. & Power Co. v. Gaines, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).

751. In re NETtel Corp., 458 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

752. Refer to text at I(C) and accompanying notes.

753. Schultze v. Alamo Ice & Brewing Co., 21 S.W. 160, 163 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ).

754. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.124(b) (Vernon 2007).

755. Refer to text at VI(G)(1) and accompanying notes.

756. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.122(a) (Vernon 2007). See also Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 280, 24 S.W. 275, 276 (1893).

757. Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).

758. See Knox v. Gruhlkey, 192 S.W. 334, 337 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d); Allen v. Anderson & Anderson, 96 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ).

759. Knox v. Gruhlkey, 192 S.W. 337, 337 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo, 1917, writ ref=d); Allen v. Anderson & Anderson, 96 S.W. 54, 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ); Taylor v. Callaway, 27 S.W. 934, 936-37 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, writ dism=d).

760. 196 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), aff=d, 111 Tex. 200, 231 S.W. 683 (1921).

761. Id. at 295.

762. Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 80-81, 237 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1951); Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47, 49, 29 S.W. 1057, 1058 (1895); Catlin v. Bennatt, 47 Tex. 165, 171 (1877); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

763. Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 81, 237 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1951).

764. Lundy v. Pierson, 67 Tex. 233, 234, 2 S.W. 737, 738 (1887); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted);Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 at *6 (Tex. App. - Houston 2008); Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

765. Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47, 49, 29 S.W. 1057, 1058 (1895); Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

766. 150 Tex. 75, 237 S.W.2d 286 (1951).

767. 150 Tex. at 78, 237 S.W.2d at 289.

768. 150 Tex. at 78, 237 S.W.2d at 289.

769. 150 Tex. at 80, 237 S.W.2d at 289-90.

770. 150 Tex. at 80-81, 237 S.W.2d at 291. But see Tamburine v. Center Sav. Ass=n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (Title company providing only the services of a title insurer and escrow agent but not abstractor is not an agent of the buyer. Notice of title defects known to the title company are not imputed to the buyer).

771. Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47, 49, 29 S.W. 1057, 1058 (1895); Wilcox v. Dillard, 3 S.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1927, writ ref=d); Ives v. Culton, 197 S.W. 619, 620 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917), aff=d, 229 S.W.

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321 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Smith v. Smith, 55 S.W. 541, 546 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, no writ); Rand v. Davis, 27 S.W. 939, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

772. 197 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917), aff=d, 229 S.W. 321 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

773. Id. at 620. See also Dowdy v. Furtner, 198 S.W. 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1917, no writ); Campbell v. Crowley, 56 S.W. 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1900, no writ); Rand v. Davis, 27 S.W. 939, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ); Taylor v. Callaway, 27 S.W. 934, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, writ dism=d).

774. Rand v. Davis, 27 S.W. 939, 941-42 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

775. Id.

776. Tamburine v. Center Sav. Ass=n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Citizen=s Nat=l Bank of Odessa, 37 S.W.2d 1080, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1931, writ dism=d).

777. Id. at 1080.


779. Id. at 1081.

780. Id. at 1082.

781. Id.

782. Pickett v. Dallas Trust Sav. Bank, 24 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 106 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, writ dism=d); Zeigler v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, 86 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1935, writ dism=d); Engell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 81 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1935, no writ); Humphreys v. Standard Sav. & Loan Ass=n, 80 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1935, writ ref=d).


784. Id. at 374. See also Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 106 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, writ dism=d); Humphreys v. Standard Sav. & Loan Ass=n, 80 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1935, writ ref=d). But see Socony Mobil Oil Corp. v. Belveal, 430 S.W.2d 529, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1968, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

785. Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Hichler v. Scanlan, 39 S.W. 633, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref=d).

786. 550 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

787. Id. at 327.

788. Id. at 331.

789. Id. at 329.

790. See Hampshire v. Greeves, 104 Tex. 620, 627, 143 S.W. 147, 151 (1912).

791. 104 Tex. at 627, 143 S.W. at 151.

792. 104 Tex. 620, 143 S.W. 147 (1912).

793. 104 Tex. at 627-28, 143 S.W. at 151.

794. In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 514 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

795. Id.

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796. See Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State, 111 Tex. 200, 231, 231 S.W. 683, 693 (1921); Bryant v. Buckner, 2 S.W. 452, 455 (Tex. 1886); Moore v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 85 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1935, writ dism=d); Duckworth v. Collie, 235 SW. 924, 926 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1921, no writ); Nelson v. Bridge, 85 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ).

797. Brown v. Elmendorf, 25 S.W. 145, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), aff=d, 87 Tex. 56, 26 S.W. 1045 (1894).

798. Id.

799. Norton v. Ball, 225 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1920), aff=d, 238 S.W. 889 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Ives v. Culton, 197 S.W. 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917), aff=d, 229 S.W. 321 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

800. Id.

801. Littleton v. Giddings, 47 Tex. 109, 111 (1877); Mellette v. Hudston Oil Corp., 243 S.W.2d 438, 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Norton v. Ball, 225 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1920), aff=d, 238 S.W. 889 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Jackson v. Waldstein, 27 S.W. 26, 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d); Felsher v. Halenza, 68 S.W. 838, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1902, writ dism=d).


803. Id. at 28.

804. Id.

805. Mellette v. Hudston Oil Corp., 243 S.W.2d 438, 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.)

806. 243 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.)

807. Id. at 440.

808. Id. at 452.

809. Id. But see Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 387, 84 S.W. 417, 419-20 (1905).

810. Temple Lumber Co. v. Broocks, 165 S.W. 507, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1914, writ ref=d).

811. HSBC Bank, USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 561 (N.D. Ala 2011).

812. Fox v. Robbins, 62 S.W. 815, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, writ ref=d).

813. Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Edmundson v.Williams, 295 S.W. 295, 295-96 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1927, no writ); West v. Jennings, 119 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1938, no writ); Essex v. Mitchell, 183 S.W. 399, 402 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1915, writ ref=d).

814. In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

815. In re Spring Creek Inv., 71 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D. C. 2011).

816. Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

817. Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 222 (1867); Martel v. Somers,26 Tex. 551, 560 (1863); Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856); O=Ferral v. Coolidge, 225 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949), aff=d, 149 Tex. 61, 228 S.W.2d 149 (1950); Robert Oil Corp. v. Jones, 23 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1929, writ denied).

818. Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856); Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

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819. Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551, 560 (1863); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); O=Ferral v. Coolidge, 225 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1949), aff=d, 149 Tex. 61, 228 S.W.2d 146 (1950); Robert Oil Corp. v. Jones, 23 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1929, writ denied); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

820. Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

821. Hill v. Stampfli, 290 S.W. 522, 525 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding approved); McDonald v. Franklin Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *3 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

822. Farmer=s Mut. Royalty Syndicate v. Isaaks, 138 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, no writ); Palacios v. Hernandez, 277 S.W. 714, 714 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1925, writ dism=d).

823. T-Vestco Litt-Vada v. Lu-Cal One Oil Co., 651 S.W.2d 284, 293 (Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

824. John v. Battle, 58 Tex. 591, 596 (1883); Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551, 561 (1863); Kelly v. Blakerey, 212 S.W. 651, 652 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Palmer v. First Nat=l Bank in Rhome, 77 S.W.2d 902, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1934, writ ref=d); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Griggs, 181 S.W. 833, 838 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1915), aff=d, 213 S.W. 261 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

825. 94 S.W.2d 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936, writ dism=d).

826. Id. at 1189.

827. 550 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

828. Id. at 331.


830. Id. at 28.

831. 60 F. 322 (5th Cir. 1894).

832. Id. at 325-26.

833. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 222 (1867); Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551, 660 (1863); Bacon v. O=Connor, 25 Tex. 213, 226 (1860).

834. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); In re Jones, 77 B.R. 541, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

835. Meador Bros. v. Hines, 165 S.W. 915, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, writ ref=d).

836. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); In re Jones, 77 B.R. 541, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

837. Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

838. Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856); Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ); G.E. Capital Commercial, Inc. v. Wright & Wright, Inc., 2011 WL 124237 (N.D. Tex. 2011).

839. 29 Tex. 216 (1867).

840. Id. at 223. See also Bowles v. Belt, 159 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d).

841. 300 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1957, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 93

842. Id. at 143.

843. Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551, 660 (1863); W.L. Moody & Co. v. Martin, 117 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909, no writ).

844. 77 B.R. 541 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

845. Id. at 546-47.

846. Id. at 547. See also In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). But see, Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc., 2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

847. Meador Bros. v. Hines, 165 S.W. 915, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, writ ref=d).

848. Id. at 919.

849. 165 S.W. 915 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, writ ref=d).

850. Id. at 919.

851. Id.

852. Id.

853. Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551, 560-61 (1863).

854. Id. at 560-61.

855. Hill v. Moore, 85 Tex. 336, 347, 19 S.W. 162, 167 (1892); Bacon v. O=Connor, 25 Tex. 213, 226 (1860); Uvalde Co. v. Tribble, 292 S.W. 932, 933 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1927, writ dism=d); Lawson v. Armstrong, 227 S.W. 687, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1921, writ dism=d); Wilkerson v.Ward, 137 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1911, writ ref=d).

856. Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982); Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 79, 237 S.W.2d 286, 291 (1951); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 217, 132 S.W.2d 553, 568 (1939); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber, 125 Tex. 284, 291, 83 S.W.2d 638, 642 (1935); Hill v. Moore, 85 Tex. 336, 347, 19 S.W. 162, 167 (1892).

857. In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 791-96 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

858. W.T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1935, writ dism=d).

859. Commercial State Bank v. Blackwell, 61 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1933, no writ); In re Spring Creek Inv., 71 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

860. In re Spring Creek Inv., 71 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

861. Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, 397 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex. 2013); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 532 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Stowe v. Head, 728 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1987, no writ); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).

862. Bacon v. O=Connor, 25 Tex. 213, 226 (1860); Hopper v. Tancil, 3 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); W.L. Moody & Co. v. Martin, 117 S.W. 1015, 1017 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909, no writ).

863. See Hill v. Stampfli, 290 S.W. 522, 525 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding adopted); West v. Jennings, 119 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1938, no writ); Temple Lumber Co. v. Brooks, 165 S.W. 507, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1914, writ ref=d); Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc., 2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

864. Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Stowe v. Head, 728 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1987, no writ); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 620 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 94

1981), rev=d on other grounds, 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982); Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

865. Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Hill v. Stampfli, 290 S.W. 522, 525 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding adopted); Apex Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 7 S.W.3d 820, 831 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Stowe v. Head, 728 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1987, no writ).

866. Hill v. Moore, 85 Tex. 336, 347, 19 S.W. 162, 167 (1892); Marshburn v. Stewart, 113 Tex. 507, 516, 254 S.W. 942, 945 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.); In re Tilton, 297 B.R. 478, 484 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003).

867. 113 Tex. at 516, 254 S.W. at 945.

868. 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1973), modified, 554 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

869. Id. at 735.

870. Id.

871 In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).

872. Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Matter of Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 300 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

873. In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

874. Kenedy Pasture Co. v.State, 111 Tex. 200, 232, 231 S.W. 683, 694 (1921); Matter of Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re Villareal, 2011 WL 6826827 at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).

875. In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re Tilton, 297 B.R. 478, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003); In re Spring Creek Inv., 71 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

876. 343 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.)

877. Id. at 299.

878. Id. at 299-300.

879. Day v. Johnson, 72 S.W. 426, 427 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1903, writ dism=d).

880. Hill v. Moore, 85 Tex. 336, 347, 19 S.W. 162, 167 (1892); Bacon v. O=Connor, 25 Tex. 213, 226 (1860); Wilson v. Williams, 25 Tex. 55, 63 (1860); Marshburn v. Stewart, 113 Tex. 507, 516, 254 S.W. 942, 945 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 798 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1982), rev=d on other grounds, 656 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1983).

881. Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

882. Pipkin v. Ware, 175 S.W. 808, 811 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1915, no writ).

883. Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).

884. Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

885. 159 S.W. 305 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

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886. Id. at 308.

887. Id.

888. 171 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1914, writ dism=d).

889. Id. at 255.

890. Id.

891. Id.

892. Id.


894. Id. at 166.

895. Id.

896. Id.

897. 120 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1938, writ dism=d).

898. Id. at 886.

899. Id.

900. Cardwell v Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

901. Cardwell v Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Aldridge v. Northeast ISD, 428 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d); Long Falls Realty Co. v. Anchor Elec. Co., 405 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1966, no writ); Brown v. Moss, 265 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Kelly - Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

902. 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

903. Id.

904. Id.

905. Bounds v. Little, 75 Tex. 316, 320, 12 S.W. 1109, 1110 (1889); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); DeGuerin v. Jackson, 50 S.W.2d 443, 448 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), aff=d, 77 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted); Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical, and Blooded Stock Ass=n v. Kit, 31 S.W. 1080, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d); Dolbear v. Gulf Prod. Co., 268 F. 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1920). But see Fordtran v. Perry, 60 S.W. 1000, 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ); Markham v. Parker, 31 S.W. 82, 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ ref=d).

906. Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc., 2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002); HSBC Bank, USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555 n.2 (N.D. Ala. 2011). But see Littleton v. Giddings, 47 Tex. 109, 116 (1877).

907. Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 476, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Galbraith v. Howard, 32 S.W. 803, 808 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d); Berry v. House, 21 S.W. 711, 711 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1892, no writ); Alamo Fireworks, Inc. v. Truckload Fireworks, Inc., 2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

908. Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 476, 98 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); In re Sheets, 277 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 96

909. See Dodd v. First State Bank & Trust of Hollis Oklahoma, 64 S.W.2d 1021, 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1933, no writ); Grand Court of Order of Calanthe of Texas v. Ebeling, 129 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1939, no writ); New York & Texas Land Co. v. Hyland, 28 S.W. 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d); Matter of Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 301 n.11 (5th Cir. 1997).

910. H.O. Wooten Grocer Co. v. Lubbock State Bank, 215 S.W. 835, 838 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Citizens Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Spencer, 105 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1937, writ dism=d); Dodd v. First State Bank & Trust of Hollis Oklahoma, 64 S.W.2d 1021, 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1933, no writ); West v. Peters, 287 S.W. 81, 86 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1926, no writ); Merrill v. Bradley, 121 S.W. 561, 563 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908, writ ref=d). But see Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *6 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010).

911. 64 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1933, no writ).

912. Id. at 1022.

913. Id.

914. Id. at 1023.

915. Id.

916. Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).

917. Id. at 335.

918. 240 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).

919. Id. at 335.

920. Id.

921. Id.

922. Id.

923. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1978).

924. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1978); Edwards v. Brown, 68 Tex. 329, 332-33, 4 S.W. 380, 381 (1887).

925. Kirby v. Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 453 (1892); Wallace & Co. v. Campbell, 54 Tex. 87, 89 (1880); Cooke v. Bremond, 27 Tex. 457, 459 (1864); Harvey v. Humphries, 178 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1944, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Ellett v. Mitcham, 145 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

926. Realty Trust Co. v. Craddock, 131 Tex. 88, 93, 112 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1938); Mitchell v. Schofield, 106 Tex. 512, 514, 171 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1915); Kirby v. Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 453 (1892); Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 593, 17 S.W. 909, 911 (1891); Pouncy v. May, 76 Tex. 565, 566, 13 S.W. 383, 383 (1890).

927. Realty Trust Co. v. Craddock, 131 Tex. 88, 93, 112 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1938); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 564, 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 (1917); Armstrong v. Hix, 107 Tex. 194, 199, 175 S.W. 430, 431 (1915); Mitchell v. Schofield, 106 Tex. 512, 514, 171 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1915); Kirby v. Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 453 (1892).

928. See Realty Trust Co. v. Craddock, 131 Tex. 88, 93-94, 112 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1938); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 564, 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 (1917); Armstrong v. Hix, 107 Tex. 194, 199, 175 S.W. 430, 431 (1915); Mitchell v. Schofield, 106 Tex. 512, 514, 171 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1915); Kirby v. Moody, 84 Tex. 201, 203, 19 S.W. 453, 453 (1892).

929. Stahl v. Westerman, 250 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1952, no writ).

930. Edwards v. Brown,68 Tex. 329, 332-33, 4 S.W. 380, 381 (1887); Mitchell v. Schofield, 106 Tex. 512, 514, 171 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1915); Howard v. Commonwealth Bldg. & Loan Ass=n, 127 Tex. 365, 368, 94 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Comm=n App.

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1936, opinion adopted); Buckalew v. Butcher-Arthur, Inc., 214 S.W.2d 184, 193 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Harvey v. Humphries, 178 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1944, writ ref=d w.o.m.). But see Bradley v. Bradley, 540 S.W. 2d 504, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (different result when buyer had actual knowledge from another source of the marital status of his grantor).

931. 254 S.W.146 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1923, writ ref=d).

932. Id. at 146-47.

933. Id. at 147.

934. Id.

935. Id.

936. Id. at 149.

937. Id. at 149-50. See also Freeman v. Pierce, 250 S.W. 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1922, no writ).

938. Id. at 150.

939. Id.

940. Id.

941. Hunt v. Matthews, 60 S.W. 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, no writ).

942. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 n.2 (Tex. 1978); Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 385, 186 S.W.2d 66, 67 (1944); Sanburn v. Schuler, 86 Tex. 116, 117, 23 S.W. 641, 642 (1893); Stiles v. Japhet, 89 Tex. 91, 95, 19 S.W. 450, 451 (1892); Word v. Box, 60 Tex. 596, 599, 3 S.W. 93, 96 (1886).

943. Sanburn v. Schuler, 86 Tex. 116, 117, 23 S.W. 641, 642 (1893); Stiles v. Japhet, 89 Tex. 91, 95, 19 S.W. 450, 451 (1892); Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111, 114 (1883); Kirk v. Houston Direct Nav. Co., 49 Tex. 213, 215 (1878); Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 385, 186 S.W.2d 66, 67 (1944); French v. Strumberg, 52 Tex. 92, 109 (1879).

944. Openheimer v. Robinson, 87 Tex. 174, 178, 27 S.W. 95, 96 (1894); Cooke v. Bremond, 27 Tex. 457, 460 (1864); Foster v. Christenson, 67 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1934, holding adopted); Elmore v. Saulnier, 233 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1921, writ ref=d); Douthitt v. Farrar, 159 S.W. 182, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1913, writ ref=d).

945. 204 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1918, writ ref=d).

946. Id. at 124-26.

947. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tex. 1978); Sanburn v. Schuler, 86 Tex. 116, 118, 23 S.W. 641, 642 (1893); Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 173, 175, 19 S.W. 1090, 1091 (1892); Cooke v. Caswell, 81 Tex. 678, 683, 17 S.W. 385, 387 (1891); Green v. Crawford, 662 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1983, writ ref=d n.r.e.). But see different result in Pouncy v. May, 76 Tex. 565, 566, 13 S.W. 383, 383 (1890) (when buyer did know anything about the family history of the vendor.)


949. Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 591, 17 S.W. 909, 9121 (1891); Stahl v. Westerman, 250 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1952, no writ); Peavy v. Smith, 250 S.W. 197, 198 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1923, writ dism=d).

950. Green v. Crawford, 662 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1983, writ ref=d n.r.e.); McDougall v. McDougall, 316 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1958, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Kelly - Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1130 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1938), aff=d, 134 Tex. 506, 137 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1940, opinion adopted); Turner v. Germany, 94 S.W.2d 1177, 1182 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936), rev=d on other grounds, 152 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted).

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951. Sanburn v. Schuler, 86 Tex. 116, 118, 23 S.W. 641, 642 (1893).

952. New York & Texas Land Co. v. Hyland, 28 S.W. 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d).

953. Id. at 209.

954. 94 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936), rev=d on other grounds, 152 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted).

955. Id. at 1182.

956. 81 Tex. 678, 17 S.W. 385 (1891).

957. 81 Tex. at 683, 17 S.W. at 387.

958. 81 Tex. at 683, 17 S.W. at 387.

959. See DeEverett v. Henry, 67 Tex. 402, 404-05, 3 S.W. 566, 567 (1887); Steves v. United Serv. Automobile Ass=n, 459 S.W.2d 930, 934-35 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1970, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Wilkerson v. Ward, 137 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1911, writ ref=d); Canadian & American Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Edinburgh - American Land - Mortgage Co., 41 S.W. 140, 143 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, no writ).

960. 459 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1970, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

961. Id. at 931.

962. Id.

963. Id. at 935. See also DeEverett v. Henry, 67 Tex. 402, 404-05, 3 S.W. 566, 567 (1887).

964. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 101.001 (Vernon 2007). See also Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 196, 164 S.W.2d 488, 494 (1942).

965. 139 Tex. 183, 164 S.W.2d 488 (1942).

966. 139 Tex. at 196, 164 S.W.2d at 494.

967. Green v. Hugo, 81 Tex. 452, 457, 17 S.W. 79, 80 (1891).

968. 81 Tex. at 457, 17 S.W. at 80. See also Miller v. Lowrie, 25 S.W.2d 984, 986 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1930), rev=d on other grounds, 45 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1932, holding adopted).

969. Miller v. Lowrie, 25 S.W.2d 984, 986 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1930), rev=d on other grounds, 45 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1932, holding adopted). See also Grand Court of Order of Calanthe of Texas v. Ebeling, 129 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1939, no writ).

970. 81 Tex. 452, 17 S.W. 79 (1891).

971. 81 Tex. at 456-57, 17 S.W. at 79.

972. 81 Tex. at 457, 17 S.W. at 79.

973. 81 Tex. at 457, 17 S.W. at 80.

974. 81 Tex. at 457, 17 S.W. at 80.


976. Id.

977. Id.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 99

978. 142 Tex. 41, 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943).

979. 142 Tex. at 50, 175 S.W.2d at 406.

980. 142 Tex. at 50, 175 S.W.2d at 406.

981. 142 Tex. at 50, 175 S.W.2d at 406.

982. 142 Tex. at 51, 175 S.W.2d at 407. See also Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tex. 1978).

983. Miller v. Hedges, 260 S.W. 168, 171 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).

984. Id.

985. See Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 137 Tex. 353, 360, 153 S.W.2d 571, 575 (1941); Harvey v. Humphries, 178 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1944, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Brown v. Shamburger, 104 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1937, no writ); Snell v. Knowles, 87 S.W.2d 871, 881 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1935, writ dism=d); Warne v. Guaranty State Bank of Colmesneil, 239 S.W. 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922, no writ).

986. 232 S.W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1921, no writ).

987. Id. at 540.

988. Id.

989. Id.

990. Id.

991. Id. at 542.

992. 63 F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Tex 1945).

993. Id. at 100. See also Gardner v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 159 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1942, writ dism=d w.o.m.); Brown v. Shamburger, 104 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1937, no writ).

994. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 107 Tex. 623, 632, 183 S.W. 874, 877 (1916).

995. 107 Tex. 623, 183 S.W. 874 (1916).

996. 107 Tex. at 631, 183 S.W. at 877.

997. 107 Tex. at 631-32, 183 S.W. at 877.

998. 107 Tex. at 631-32, 183 S.W. at 877.

999. 107 Tex. at 632-33, 183 S.W. at 877.

1000.133 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, pet denied).

1001.Id. at 900.

1002.Id.

1003.Id.

1004.Id.

1005.Id. at 901.

1006.Id.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 100

1007.Id. at 903.

1008.Id.

1009 See, e.g., AMC Mtg. Serv., Inc. v. Watts, 260 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2008, no pet.).

1010.See e.g., Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 924-25 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2011, no pet.); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *4 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 790 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

1011.Robertson v. Guerin, 50 Tex. 317, 323 (1878); Matthews v. Rains County, 206 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Texas Co. v. Tucker, 129 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1939, writ ref=d); Russell-Coleman Oil Mill v. Johnson, 287 S.W. 134, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1926, no writ); R.B. Templeman & Son v. Kempner, 223 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1920, writ ref=d). But see Price v. Traders= Nat=l Bank, 195 S.W. 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1917), rev=d on other grounds, 223 S.W. 160 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted) (no duty to investigate unreleased lien which the record showed to be barred by limitations).

1012.125 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1997).

1013.Id. at 294.

1014.Id.

1015.Id.

1016.Id. at 302. See also Bank of America v. Babu, 340 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2011, no pet.); Clarkson v. Ruiz, 140 S.W. 2d 206, 210 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1940, writ dism=d); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710507 at *9-13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re Villareal, 2011 WL 6826827 at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). But see In re Elam, 194 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).

1017.206 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1018.Id. at 854-55.

1019.Id. at 855.

1020.Id. See also Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Gunter, 205 S.W.2d 110,114 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1947, no writ).

1021.45 S.W. 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref=d).

1022.Id. at 972.

1023.Id.

1024.Id.

1025.Id. at 973.

1026.Id.

1027.Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1984); First Nat=l Bank in Canyon v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 118-19, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted); Belt v. Point Venture Property Owner’s Ass;n, 2008 WL 2938879 at *4 (Tex. App. – Austin 2008); The Cadle Co. v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 901, 909 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Lund v. Emerson, 204 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, no writ).

1028.Woodside Assur. v. N.K. Resources, 175 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no writ); Stewart v. Stewart, 205 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1947, writ ref=d); Lund v. Emerson, 204 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, no writ); Yates v. Darby, 103 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1937), aff=d, 133 Tex. 593, 131 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted).

1029.951 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 101

1030.Id. at 910.

1031.Id.

1032.Id.

1033.Id.

1034.Id. See also First Nat=l Bank in Canyon v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 119, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted).

1035.The Cadle Co. v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 901, 910-13 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

1036.Id. at 910-13.

1037.164 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1942), rev=d on other grounds, 141 Tex. 312, 171 S.W.2d 833 (1943).

1038.Id. at 785-86.

1039.Id.

1040.See Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 679 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1984); Hughes v. Hess, 141 Tex. 511, 515-16, 172 S.W.2d 301, 303-04 (1943); Novosad v. Svrcek, 129 Tex. 34, 38, 102 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1937); Yates v. Darby, 133 Tex. 593, 603, 131 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1939, opinion adopted); Bellah v. Dennis, 129 Tex. 367, 369, 104 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1937, opinion adopted).

1041.679 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1984).

1042.Id. at 581.

1043.Id.

1044.Id.

1045.Id. at 582. See also Novosad v. Svrcek, 129 Tex. 34, 38, 102 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1937); Caffareli Bros. v. Pearce, 34 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted); Richardson v. Hughes, 146 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1046.Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 679 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1984). See also W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Terrell, 171 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1943, writ ref=d).

1047.Hughes v. Hess, 141 Tex. 511, 516, 172 S.W.2d 301, 304 (1943); Richardson v. Hughes, 146 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Martin v. Thaxton, 103 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1937, writ dism=d).

1048.103 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1937, writ dism=d).

1049.Id. at 877-78.

1050.Id. at 877.

1051.Id. at 879.

1052.Id.

1053.Id. See also Richardson v. Hughes, 146 S.W.2d 255, 258(Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1054.First Nat=l Bank of Corsicana v Zarafonetis, 15 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1929, writ ref=d); Poole v. Cage, 214 S.W. 500, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1919, writ ref=d); Willis v. Sanger Bros., 40 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 102

1055.Patton Street Corp. v. NAB Asset Venture III, 2002 WL 31682118 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (not authorized for publication); Willis v. Sanger Bros., 40 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d).

1056.First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass=n v. Stewart Title Co., 732 S.W.2d 98, 110 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1987, writ denied); Coke Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First Nat=l Bank in Dallas, 529 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1975, writ ref=d); First Nat=l Bank of Corsicana v. Zarafonetis, 15 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1929, writ ref=d); Jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 15 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1929, writ ref=d); Poole v. Cage, 214 S.W. 500, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1919, writ ref=d).

1057.First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass=n v. Stewart Title Co., 732 S.W.2d 98, 110 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1987, writ denied); Coke Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First Nat=l Bank in Dallas, 529 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1975, writ ref=d); Jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 15 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1929, writ ref=d); Poole v. Cage, 214 S.W. 500, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1919, writ ref=d); Willis v. Sanger Bros., 40 S.W. 229, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d).

1058.Willis v. Sanger Bros., 40 S.W. 229, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d)

1059.Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. 1966).

1060.Id. at 902.

1061.400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966).

1062.Id. at 899.

1063.Id.

1064.Id.

1065.Id. at 901-02.

1066 See Belt v. Point Venture Property Owner’s Ass’n, 2008 WL 2938879 at *5 (Tex. App. – Austin 2008).

1067.Fennimore v. Ingham, 181 S.W. 513, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1915), modified on other grounds, 215 S.W. 956 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1068.181 S.W. 513 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1915), modified on other grounds, 215 S.W. 956 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1069.Id. at 514.

1070.Id. at 516.

1071.Id. at 515.

1072.Id. at 515-16.

1073.Id. at 515. See also Willis v. Gray, 48 Tex. 463, 470 (1878); Graham v. West, 26 S.W. 920, 921 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).

1074.Martin v. Granger, 204 S.W. 666, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1918, writ ref=d).

1075.Lubbock State Bank v. H.O. Wooten Grocery Co., 179 S.W. 1141, 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1915), rev=d on other grounds, 215 S.W. 835 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1076.174 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1915, writ ref=d).

1077.Id. at 839.

1078.Id. at 840.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 103

1079.Id. But see Mansur & Tebbetts Implement Co. v. Beer, 45 S.W. 972, 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref=d).

1080.Moore v. Rockport Hotel Co., 174 S.W. 837, 840 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1915, writ ref=d).

1081.Id. at 840-41.

1082.397 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2013).

1083.Id. at 168.

1084.Id. at 165.

1085.Id. at 168-69.

1086.Id. at 168.

1087.Id. at 168-69.

1088.See O=Mahoney v. Flanagan, 78 S.W. 245, 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).

1089.78 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).

1090.Id. at 246.

1091.Id.

1092.Id.

1093.Id.

1094.Id.

1095.Marshburn v. Stewart, 113 Tex. 507, 513-14, 254 S.W. 942, 944 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Mayor v. Breeding, 245 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1929, writ ref=d).

1096.113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).

1097.113 Tex. at 511, 254 S.W. at 942.

1098.113 Tex. at 511, 254 S.W. at 942.

1099.113 Tex. at 512, 254 S.W. at 943.

1100.113 Tex. at 514, 254 S.W. at 944.

1101.Patton Street Corp. v. NAB Asset Venture II, 2002 WL 31682118 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (not authorized for publication).

1102.Id.

1103 Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 335398 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Huml v. Mortgage Elec. Registration System, 2012 WL 5984821 at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. 2012).

1104 Richard v. CIT Group, 2012 WL 3030348 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

1105 In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

1106.See Luckel v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 74 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934), aff=d, 130 Tex. 476, 109 S.W.2d 960 (1937); Mansfield v. Roy, 1999 WL 1015543 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999) (not designated for publication).

1107.See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN ' 12.007 (Vernon Supp. 2013). Refer to VI(F) infra.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 104

1108.See Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

1109.Id. at 694.

1110.10 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

1111.Id. at 694.

1112.Id.

1113.Id.

1114.Id.

1115.212 S.W. 651 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1116.Id. at 651.

1117.Id.

1118.Id. at 652.

1119 2013 WL 4017904 (W.D. Tex. 2013).

1120 Id. at *9.

1121.107 Tex. 18, 173 S.W. 203 (1915).

1122.107 Tex. at 30, 173 S.W. at 208.

1123.107 Tex. at 30, 173 S.W. at 208.

1124.107 Tex. at 30, 173 S.W. at 208.

1125.McEvoy v. Ron Watkins, Inc., 105 B.R. 362, 364 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. 2013); In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr D.C. 2011).

1126.In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Earnest & Assoc. Inc., 59 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).

1127 In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

1128.59 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).

1129.Id. at 497-98.

1130 In re Perry, 2013 WL 504859 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013); In re Munoz, 2011 WL 710501 at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011).

1131.See e.g., In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 532 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

1132.Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 83, 237 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (1951); Bryan v. Thomas, 365 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. 1963); Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,134 Tex. 332, 345, 114 S.W.2d 226, 234 (1938); Cook v. Smith, 174 S.W. 1094, 1095 (Tex. 1915); White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66, 71, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897).

1133.See Meacham v. Halley, 103 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1939).

1134.Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Niles, 255 S.W. 604, 610 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Hall v. Tucker, 414 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1967, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Hagaman v. Shaklee, 243 S.W. 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1922, writ ref=d); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Williams, 124 F.Supp. 456, 462 (E.D. Tex. 1954).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 105

1135.Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 523, 29 S.W. 757, 759 (1895); Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 365, 3 S.W. 444, 447 (1887); Wallace v. Crow, 1 S.W. 372, 374 (Tex. 1886); Miles v. Martin, 310 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1958), rev=d on other grounds, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); City of Dallas v. Leake, 300 S.W.2d 135, 143 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1957, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1136.152 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1912, writ ref=d).

1137.Id. at 643.

1138.Id.

1139.Id.

1140.See, Laffare v. Knight, 101 S.W. 1034, 1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).


1142.Id. at 1036.

1143.Id. See also Reagan v. Andrews, 241 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, no writ).

1144.Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, 23 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Smith v. Morris & Co, 694 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref=d n.r.e.); AIC Mgmt. v. Baker, 2003 WL 22724629 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (not authorized for publication).

1145.Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1966, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1146.294 S.W. 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1927), aff=d, 121 Tex. 52, 41 S.W.2d 412 (1931).

1147.Id. at 617.

1148.Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 366, 3 S.W. 444, 447 (1887); Johnson v. Marti, 214 S.W. 726, 730 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, writ ref=d); Padgitt v. Still, 192 S.W. 1110, 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1917, writ ref=d); Stanley v. Hamilton, 33 S.W. 601, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

1149.Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619-20 (Tex. 1910); White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66, 70, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Holmes v. John, 56 Tex. 41, 53 (1881); Huling v. Moore, 194 S.W. 188, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1917, writ ref=d); Keenan v. Burkhardt, 162 S.W. 483, 487 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, writ ref=d).

1150.Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 619, 619 (Tex. 1910); White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66, 70, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Padgitt v. Still, 192 S.W. 1110, 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1917, writ ref=d); Dean v. Gibson, 79 S.W. 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d); Richerson v. Moody, 42 S.W. 317, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).

1151.2002 WL 313191 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

1152.Id.

1153.Id. See also Ellett v. Mitcham, 145 S.W.2d 917, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); West v. Jennings, 119 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1938, no writ) .

1154.192 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1917, writ ref=d).

1155.Id. at 1111.

1156.Id.

1157.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 13.002(1) (Vernon 2004). See also Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988); Miller v. Dyess, 137 Tex. 135, 142, 151 S.W.2d 186, 189 (1941); Kerr v. Galloway 94 Tex. 641, 647, 94 S.W. 858, 860 (1901); Copelin v. Shuler, 6 S.W. 668, 671 (Tex. 1887); Crews v. Taylor, 56 Tex. 461, 466 (1882).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 106

1158.Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007); Quarles v. Hardin, 249 S.W. 459, 462 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Co., 2013 WL 396164 at *3 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Wolf v. Highland Haven Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 WL 4821473 at *6 (Tex. App. – Austin 2013); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).

1159.Potka v. Potka, 205 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1947, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1160.Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Swanson v. Grassedonia, 647 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Hoover v. Redwine, 363 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1962, no writ); Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1161.Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, 397 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex. 2013); Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007); Inwood North Homeowners= Ass=n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982); Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978). But see Adams v. West Lumber Co., 162 S.W. 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1913, writ ref=d).

1162.Quarles v. Hardin, 249 S.W. 459, 462 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 532 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Matthews v. Rains County, 206 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, writ ref=d n.r.e.); W.T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1935, writ dism=d); Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 918 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934), modified on other grounds, 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935).

1163.Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 90, 216 S.W. 382, 384 (1919); Clarkson v. Ruiz, 140 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1949, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1164.682 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1984).

1165.Id. at 253.

1166.Id. See also Texas Co. v. Dunlap, 41 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).

1167.Id. See also Cornish v. Yarborough, 558 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1977, no writ); Braxton v. Haney, 82 S.W.2d 984, 986 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, writ ref=d); Bankers= Mortgage Co. v. Higgins, 45 S.W.2d 102, 106-07 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1927), rev=d on other grounds, 13 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).

1168.93 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

1169.Id. at 608.

1170.Id. See also Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Cohen, 138 Tex. 464, 466, 159 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1942, opinion adopted).

1171.Id.

1172.See Moran v. Wheeler, 87 Tex. 179, 182, 27 S.W. 54, 55 (1894); Adams v. Williams, 248 S.W. 673, 677 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Bower v. Nelson, 138 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1940, writ ref=d); Ragan v. Day, 94 S.W.2d 1207, 1209 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1936, writ ref=d).

1173.152 S.W. 1156 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, no writ).

1174.Id. at 1157.

1175.Id.

1176.Id.

1177.Id.

1178.Id. at 1158.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 107

1179.134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W.2d 226 (1938).

1180.134 Tex. at 345, 114 S.W.2d at 324.

1181.134 Tex. at 345, 114 S.W.2d at 324.

1182.West v. Hermann, 104 S.W. 428, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ).

1183.Id. at 431. See also Rhima v. White, 829 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

1184.HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1998).

1185.Swanson v. Grassedonia, 647 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 485 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1972), rev=d on other grounds, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Sheaner, 297 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 508, 305 S.W.2d 150 (1957); Hutchins v. Birdsong, 258 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1953, writ ref=d n.r.e.); D.T. Carroll Corp. v. Carroll, 256 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1953, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1186.155 S.W. 307 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1913, no writ).

1187.Id. at 309.

1188.748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).

1189.Id. at 450-51. See also Lewis v. Nolan, 105 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); SMB Partners Ltd. v. Oslaub, 4 S.W.3d 868, 873 n.3 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no writ); Johnson v. Prudential Relocation Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership, 918 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1996, pet denied); Holmes v. P.K. Pipe & Tubing, Inc., 856 S.W.2d 530, 542 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), aff=d, 775 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1989); Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Cheatham, 764 S.W.2d 315, 321 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1988, writ denied).

1190.138 Tex. 84, 156 S.W.2d 963 (1941).

1191.138 Tex. at 91, 156 S.W.2d at 967.

1192.See Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 884 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Johnson v. Prudential Relocation Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership, 918 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1996, pet. denied); Wert=s Heirs v. Vick, 203 S.W. 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1918, writ dism=d); Runge v. Gilbough, 87 S.W. 832, 836 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1903), aff=d, 99 Tex. 542, 915 S.W. 566 (1906); Vanderbilt Mtg. and Fin., Inc. v. Flores, 692 F.3d 358, n. 4 (5th Cir. 2012).

1193.918 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1996, pet. denied).

1194.Id. at 68.

1195.Id. at 70. See also Lewis v. Nolan, 105 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Salinas v. Gary Pools Inc., 31 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2000, no pet.); Lightfoot v. Weissgarber, 763 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1989, writ denied).

1196.236 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1197.Id. at 526. See also Matter of Estate of Matejek, 928 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).

1198.237 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1950, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1199.Id. at 803-04.

1200.Id. at 804.

1201.Id.


{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 108

1203.Id. at 377.

1204.Id. at 385. But see Texas Osage Cooperative Royalty Pool v. Colwell, 205 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1947, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1205.Boucher v. Wallis, 236 S.W.2d 519, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Stroud v. Pechacek, 120 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ); American Freehold Mortgage Co. v. Pace, 56 S.W. 377, 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ ref=d). But see McMeens v. Pease, 878 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1994, pet. denied).

1206.Boucher v. Wallis, 236 S.W.2d 519, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); American Freehold Mortgage Co. v. Pace, 56 S.W. 377, 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ ref=d).

1207.87 S.W. 832 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1903), aff=d, 99 Tex. 542, 91 S.W. 566 (1909).

1208.Id. at 833.

1209.Id. at 836.

1210.Id. See also Mitchell v. Simons, 53 S.W. 76, 77 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, no writ).

1211.2003 WL 2170548 (Tex. App. - Austin 2003) (not designated for publication).

1212.Id. at *9. See also Fondren Constr. Co. v. Briarcliff Housing Dev. Assoc., 196 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

1213.See e.g.; Long v. City of Nacogdoches, 942 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. App. - Tyler 1997, writ denied); Veltman v. Damon, 696 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1985), aff=d, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985); McMeens v. Pease, 878 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1944, pet. denied); Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124, 135 (Tex. App. - Austin 1987, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Andress v. Condos, 672 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1214.Moore v. Knight, 127 Tex. 610, 617, 94 S.W.2d 1137, 1140 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 S.W. 462, 467 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Matter of J.S., 602 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1980, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, 239 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1215.See e.g., Towery v. Henderson, 60 Tex. 291, 297 (1883); Arrington v. McDaniel, 14 S.W.2d 1009, 1012 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); McCarthy v. George, 623 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1981, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Hardin v. Cotton, 300 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1957, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Brooks v. Shaw, 159 S.W.2d 206, 209-10 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1942, writ ref=d w.o.m.).

1216.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 12.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Pearson v. Wicker, 746 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. App. - Austin 1988, no writ) (authorizing recordation of joint venture agreement to build houses on two lots).

1217.Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007); McDonald v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 396164 at *3 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2013); Wolf v. Highland Haven Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 WL 4821473 at *6 (Tex. App. – Austin 2013).

1218.Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D & M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 80 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

1219.Cetti v. Wilson, 168 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1914, writ ref=d); Cartwright v. La Brie, 144 S.W. 725, 732 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1912, writ ref=d).

1220.Mueller v. United States, 1996 WL 490162 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

1221.Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 445, 73 S.W. 490, 505 (1934); Holland v. Nance, 135Tex. 600, 685, 114 S.W. 346, 349 (1908); Allen v. Atchison, 26 Tex. 616, 628 (1863); Sun Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Oatman, 911 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1995, writ denied); Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

1222.Baker v. Culpepper, 56 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932, writ ref=d); Thompson v. Rust, 745 S.W. 924, 925 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1903, writ ref=d).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 109

1223.Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

1224.Gaston & Thomas v. Dashiell, 55 Tex. 508, 516 (1881); Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

1225.Gaston & Thomas v. Dashiell, 55 Tex. 508, 517 (1881); Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1226.Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 208-09 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

1227.Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1995); Mooney v. Harlan, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981); Neill v. Yett, 746 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tex. App. - Austin 1988, writ denied); Matter of Estate of Diggs, 733 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1987, writ denied); Estate of Ross 672 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1984, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1228.See King v. Ruvalcaba, 2010 WL 4008392 at *2 (Tex. App. – Waco 2010); W.C. Belcher Land Mortgage Co. v. Clark, 238 S.W. 685, 688 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1922, writ ref=d); Howth v. Farrar, 94 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1938).

1229.Id. at 657.

1230.94 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1938).

1231.Id. at 657.

1232 2010 WL 4008392 (Tex. App. – Waco 2010).

1233 Id. at *2.

1234 Id. at *1-2.

1235 Id. at *2.

1236 Id.

1237.Slaton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 212, 9 S.W. 876, 877 (1888); Howth v. Farrar, 94 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1938).

1238.72 Tex. 209, 9 S.W. 876 (1888).

1239.72 Tex. at 212, 9 S.W. at 877.

1240.March v. Huyler, 50 Tex. 243, 253-54 (1878).

1241.Id. at 253-54.

1242.Payne v. Brown, 172 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1943), rev=d on other grounds, 142 Tex. 102, 176 S.W.2d 306 (1943).

1243.Woodward v. Ortiz, 150 Tex. 75, 79, 237 S.W.2d 286, 289 (1951); Ball v. Norton, 238 S.W. 889, 890 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 78-79 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Dutton v. Kinsey, 124 S.W.2d 446, 446 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1938, no writ); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1131 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1938), aff=d, 134 Tex. 506, 137 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1940, opinion adopted).

1244.54 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1932, writ ref=d).

1245.Id. at 150.

1246.Id. See also Ross v. Beall, 215 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1131 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1938), aff=d, 134 Tex. 506, 137 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1940, opinion adopted); Corley v. Renz, 24 S.W. 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ); Prewitt v. U.S., 792 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir. 1986). But see Freeman v. Pierce, 250 S.W. 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1922, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 110

1247.297 B.R. 478 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003).

1248.Id. at 485-86.

1249.340 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

1250.Id. at 78-79.

1251.Id. at 80.

1252.Id.

1253.J.M. West Lumber Co. v. Lyon, 110 S.W. 652, 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909, writ ref=d).


1255.Id. at 655.

1256.Refer to VI(F) infra.

1257 In re Villareal, 2011 WL 6826827 at n. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).

1258 Id.


1260.Id. at 314.

1261.Id. See also Uvalde Co. v. Tribble, 292 S.W. 932, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1927, writ dism=d).

1262.724 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1987, no writ).

1263.Id. at 430.

1264.But see Freeman v. Pierce, 250 S.W. 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1922, no writ).

1265 See Dernick Resources, Inc. v. Wilstein, 312 S.W.3d 864, 885 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); In re Villareal, 2011 WL 6826827 at n.5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).

1266.See e.g., Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt, 2007 WL 2204170 at *3 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007).

1267 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App. – Austin 2007, pet. denied).

1268 240 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. – Austin 2007, pet. denied).

1269 Id. at 4-7.

1270.Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Woods, 449 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1970); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Swanson v. Grassedonio, 647 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Sheaner, 97 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 508, 305 S.W.2d 150 (1957).

1271.Davis v. Lund, 41 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 37 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1931, no writ); Brown v. Ackerman, 17 S.W.2d 771, 771 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).

1272.Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Munawar v. Cadle Co., 2 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.); Joe T. Garcia Ent. v Snadon, 751 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Havis v. Thorne Inv. Co., 46 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1932, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 111

1273.Munawar v. Cadle Co., 2 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

1274.Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Woods, 449 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1970); Word v. Box, 60 Tex. 596, 600, 3 S.W. 93, 97 (1886); Russell & Seisfeld v. Kirkbride, 62 Tex. 455, 460 (1884); Jones v. Siler, 129 Tex. 18, 23, 100 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1937, opinion adopted); Davis v. Lund, 41 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted).

1275.Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 80 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Chesaspeake Exploration, LLC v. Valance Operating Co., 2008 WL 4240486 at *10 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

1276.Lone Star Gas Co. v. Sheaner, 297 S.W.2d 855, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 508, 305 S.W.2d 150 (1957).

1277.Lone Star Gas Co. v. Sheaner, 297 S.W.2d 855, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1956), rev=d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 508, 305 S.W.2d 150 (1957); Williams v. Slaughter, 42 S.W. 327, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, no writ) .

1278 See Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Valence Operating Co., 2008 WL 4240486 at *10 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

1279.White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 557, 50 S.W. 564, 565 (1899); Lynch v. Lynch, 130 S.W. 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1910, writ ref=d).


1281.Id. at 887.

1282.160 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1942, opinion adopted).

1283.Id. at 909.

1284.Id.

1285.Id. at 909-10.

1286.Id. at 911.


1288.Id. at 1032.

1289.Id.

1290.Id.

1291.Id.

1292.Id. at 1033.

1293.Id.

1294.Bryant v. Buckner, 2 S.W. 452, 455 (Tex. 1886); Davis v. Lund, 41 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted); Biswell v. Gladney, 213 S.W. 256, 258 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Williams v. Slaughter, 42 S.W. 327, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, no writ).

1295.Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Woods, 449 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1970); Brown v. Ackerman, 17 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); McCreary v. Reliance Lumber Co., 41 S.W. 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897, writ ref=d); Peterson v. McCauley, 25 S.W. 826, 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). But see Oaklawn Assoc., Ltd. v. FBS Mortgage Corp., 1991 WL 237005 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1991) (not designated for publication).


{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 112

1297.Id. at 771.

1298.Id.

1299.Id.

1300.Id. at 772. See also Zimplemanm v. Robb, 52 Tex. 274, 282 (1880); Stanford v. Dumas, 137 S.W.2d 1071, 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1301.Id. See also Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Peterson v. McCauley, 25 S.W. 826, 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).

1302.2 S.W. 452 (Tex. 1886).

1303.Id. at 454.

1304.Id.

1305.Id. at 454-55.

1306.Id. at 455.

1307.Id. See also Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Woods, 449 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1970).

1308.See Id.

1309.84 Tex. 642, 19 S.W. 855 (1892).

1310.84 Tex. at 643, 19 S.W. at 855.

1311.84 Tex. at 644, 19 S.W. at 855.

1312.84 Tex. at 644, 19 S.W. at 855.

1313.84 Tex. at 644-45, 19 S.W. at 855.


1315.Id. at 488.

1316.53 Tex. 274 (1880).

1317.Id. at 280.

1318.Id. at 282.

1319.Id.

1320.Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 99, 174 S.W. 815, 816 (1915); Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool v. Clark, 314 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1958, writ ref=d); Texas Consolidated Oils v. Bartels, 270 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1954, writ ref=d); Smith v. Shamburger, 273 S.W. 645, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1925, writ dism=d).

1321.Keith v. Seymour, 335 S.W.2d 862, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1960, writ ref=d); Harvey Co. v. Braden, 260 S.W. 655, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1924, no writ).

1322.See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 86 Tex. 284, 286, 24 S.W. 502, 503 (1893); McLouth v. Hurt, 51 Tex. 115, 120-21 (1879); Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Masterson v. Ginner=s Mut. Underwriters Ass=n of Texas, 222 S.W. 263, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1920), aff=d, 235 S.W. 1081 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Higginbotham Bros. & Co. v. Breed, 160 S.W. 117, 119-20 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1913, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 113

1323.Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 99, 174 S.W. 815, 816 (1915); Carter v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 393, 395 (1884); Saunders & Worley v. Hartwell & Chambers, 61 Tex. 679, 687 (1884); Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Cooper v. First State Bank of Chilton, 121 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1938, no writ).

1324.Hughes v. Graham Nat=l Bank, 290 S.W. 150, 151 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

1325.Douthitt v. Robinson, 55 Tex. 69, 75 (1881); Dawson v. Hickman, 95 S.W.2d 1319, 1323 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936, writ ref=d); Smith v. Shamburger, 273 S.W. 645, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1925, writ dism=d).

1326.Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Dickerson v. McFarland, 152 S.W. 1140, 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1913, no writ).

1327.Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1328.Id. at 1142. But see Regan v. Milby, 50 S.W. 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, writ ref=d).

1329.86 Tex. 284, 24 S.W. 502 (1893).

1330.86 Tex. at 286, 24 S.W. at 503.

1331.86 Tex. at 286, 24 S.W. at 503.

1332.152 S.W. 1140 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1913, no writ).

1333.Id. at 1141.

1334.Id. at 1142. See also Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1335.Id.

1336.314 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1958, writ ref=d).

1337.Id. at 113. See also Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 99-100, 174 S.W. 815, 817 (1915); Bellah v. Dennis, 129 Tex. 367, 369, 104 S.W. 490, 491 (1937).

1338.Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 99, 174 S.W. 815, 816 (1915); William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 620, 625-26, 133 S.W. 241, 243 (1910); Miller v. Lemm, 276 S.W. 211, 214 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 532 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1339.Wilkerson v. Ward, 137 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1911, writ ref=d).

1340.Id. at 161.

1341.62 Tex. 393 (1884).

1342.Carter v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 393, 396-97 (1884); Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.); William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 122 S.W. 581, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909), aff=d, 103 Tex. 624, 133 S.W. 241 (1910).

1343.125 Tex. 530, 84 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted).

1344.125 Tex. at 533, 84 S.W.2d at 454.

1345.125 Tex. at 538-39, 84 S.W.2d at 457.

1346.240 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1951, no writ).

1347.Id. at 417.

1348.Carter v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 393, 395 (1884); West v. Houston Oil Co., 102 S.W. 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 114

1349.Id. at 396. See also West v. Houston Oil Co., 102 S.W. 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1907, no writ); Swearingen v. Reed, 21 S.W. 383, 384 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ).

1350.Id. See also Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Thompson v. Bracken, 93 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ ref=d); Lassater v. Hinson, 84 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1935, no writ).

1351.Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 100, 174 S.W. 815, 816 (1915); Carter v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 393, 396 (1884); Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Lassater v. Hinson, 84 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1935, no writ).

1352.Saunders & Worley v. Hartwell & Chambers, 61 Tex. 679, 688 (1884); Walter Connally & Co. v. Continental State Bank, 189 S.W. 311, 312-13 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1916, no writ).

1353.Walter Connally & Co. v. Continental State Bank, 189 S.W. 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1916, no writ).

1354.See Brown v. Ackerman, 17 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Coleman v. Looney, 83 S.W.2d 1061, 1062 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1935, writ dism=d).


1356.Id. at 771.

1357.Id.

1358.Id. at 772.

1359 In re Cornerstone E & P Co., 435 B.R. 390, 407 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).

1360.See Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 527, 136 S.W. 1047, 1048 (1911); Copelin v. Shuler, 6 S.W.668, 671-72 (Tex. 1887); Williams v. Cook, 282 S.W. 574, 575 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Anderson v. Farmer, 189 S.W. 508, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1916, writ ref=d); First Nat=l Bank of Chicago v. Southwestern Lumber Co., 75 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1935).

1361.Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 257, 136 S.W. 1047, 1048 (1911); Copelin v. Shuler, 6 S.W.668, 671-72 (Tex. 1887); Anderson v. Farmer, 189 S.W. 508, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1916, writ ref=d).

1362.75 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1935).

1363.Id. at 814.

1364.Id. at 816.

1365.Id.

1366.Id.

1367.120 Tex. 139, 36 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, opinion adopted).

1368.120 Tex. at 144, 36 S.W.2d at 209-10.

1369.120 Tex. at 144, 36 S.W.2d at 208.

1370.120 Tex. at 142, 36 S.W.2d at 208-09.

1371.120 Tex. at 142, 36 S.W.2d at 209.

1372.120 Tex. at 142-45, 36 S.W.2d at 209.

1373.120 Tex. at 146, 36 S.W.2d at 211.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 115

1374.120 Tex. at 146, 36 S.W.2d at 211.

1375.120 Tex. at 147, 36 S.W.2d at 211-12. See also Scott v. Cohen, 115 F.2d 704, 705 (5th Cir. 1940).

1376.Farmers Royalty Holding Co. v. Cherry, 142 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1940), aff=d, 138 Tex. 576, 160 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1942, opinion adopted); Scott v. Cohen, 115 F.2d 704, 705 (5th Cir. 1940).

1377.See O=Neal v. Terry, 252 S.W.2d 1006, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1378.White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 559, 50 S.W. 564, 566 (1899); Watson v. Chalk, 11 Tex. 89, 93 (1853); Swanson v. Grassedonio, 647 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Segal v. Saunders, 220 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1949, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Fitzgerald v. Legrande, 187 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1945, no writ).

1379.Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 108, 122 S.W. 533, 540 (1909); White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 558-59, 50 S.W. 565-66 (1899); Segal v. Saunders, 220 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1949, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Fitzgerald v. Legrande, 187 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1945, no writ); Delay v. Truitt, 182 S.W. 732, 736 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1916, writ ref=d).

1380.92 Tex. 556, 50 S.W. 564 (1899).

1381.92 Tex. at 557, 50 S.W. at 564.

1382.92 Tex. at 559-60, 50 S.W. at 566. See also Mansfield v. Roy, 1999 WL 1015543 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999) (not intended for publication).

1383.White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 559-60, 50 S.W. 564, 566 (1899).

1384.92 Tex. at 559-60, 50 S.W. at 566. See also Joe T. Garcia Ent. v. Snadon, 751 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied); Segal v. Saunders, 220 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1949, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Mansfield v. Roy, 1999 WL 1015543 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999) (not intended for publication).

1385.751 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied).

1386.Id. at 915.

1387.Id.

1388.Id.

1389.Id. at 917.

1390.187 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1945).

1391.Id. at 159.

1392.Id.

1393.Id. at 159-60.

1394.159 S.W. 99 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1913), rev=d on other grounds, 207 S.W. 906 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1395.Id. at 101.

1396.Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. 1967); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 108, 122 S.W. 533, 540 (1909); Davis v. Lund, 41 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted); Biswell v. Gladney, 213 S.W. 256, 258 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); The Cadle Co. v. Caamano, 930 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 116

1397.Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Costley v. Gracy, 52 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Civ.App. - Austin 1932, no writ); Brandt v. Roxana Petroleum Corp, 29 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1929); James v. Townsend, 1999 WL 190500 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999) (not designated for publication).

1398.Biswell v. Gladney, 213 S.W. 256, 258 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Campsey v. Jack County Oil & Gas Ass=n, 328 S.W.2d 912, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.); D.T. Carroll Corp. v. Carroll, 256 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1953, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Cox v. Clay, 237 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1950, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 14 S.W. 348, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1928), aff=d, 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).


1400.Id. at 256.

1401.Id. at 257.

1402.Id.

1403.87 Tex. 174, 27 S.W. 95 (1894).

1404.87 Tex. at 177-78, 27 S.W. at 96.

1405.87 Tex. at 178, 27 S.W. at 96.

1406.29 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1929).

1407.Id. at 981.

1408.Id.

1409.Id. at 982.

1410.Apex. Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 7 S.W.3d 820, 831 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Fleming v. Adams, 392 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1965, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1411.Pujejovsky v. K.J.Z.T. Lodge, 124 Tex. 504, 507, 79 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1935); Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162-63 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); McCarty v. Allen, 113 S.W.2d 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1938, no writ).

1412.392 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1965, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1413.Id. at 492.

1414.Id. at 492-93.

1415.Id. at 493.

1416.Id.

1417.Id. at 495.

1418.Id.

1419.7 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

1420.Id. at 831. See also Pujejovsky v. K.J.Z.T. Lodge, 124 Tex. 504, 507, 79 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1935); Traders= Nat=l Bank v. Price, 228 S.W. 160, 162-63 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

1421.Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 89, 216 S.W. 382, 384 (1919); Brandt v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 29 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1929). But see Rogers v. White, 194 S.W. 1001, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1917, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 117

1422.110 Tex. at 89, 216 S.W. at 384. See also Thompson v. Cole, 126 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1910, no writ).

1423.See Haley v. Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co., 150 S.W. 596, 599-600 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1912, writ ref=d).

1424.Haley v. Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co., 150 S.W. 596, 599-600 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1912, writ ref=d); Smith v. Smith, 55 S.W. 541, 545 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, no writ).

1425.Haley v. Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co., 150 S.W. 596, 599-600 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1912, writ ref=d).

1426.Id. at 599-600. See also Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). But see Rogers v. White, 194 S.W. 1001, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1917, no writ).

1427.See Luckel v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 74 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934), aff=d, 130 Tex. 476, 109 S.W.2d 960 (1937); Smith v. Unites States, 153 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1946).

1428.107 Tex. 18, 173 S.W. 203 (1915).

1429.107 Tex. at 30, 173 S.W. at 207-08.

1430.107 Tex. at 30, 173 S.W. at 208.


1432.Id. at 766.

1433.Id.

1434.Id. See Fuentes v. Hirsch, 472 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1971, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1435.Tuggle v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1436.277 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1437.Id. at 732.

1438.Id.

1439.856 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. - Waco 1993, pet. denied).

1440.Id. at 599-600.

1441.Id.

1442.Id. at 601.

1443.Id. at 603.

1444.Id.

1445.427 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968), rev=d on other grounds, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).

1446.Id. at 136.


1448.Id. at 1132.

1449.Id.

1450.Id.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 118

1451.Id. at 1133.

1452.42 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1931), rev=d on other grounds, 125 Tex. 284, 83 S.W.2d 638 (1935).

1453.Gensheimer v. Kneisley, 778 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1989, no writ); Etex Telephone Cooperative v. Sanders, 607 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1980, no writ); Cambridge Shores Homeowners Ass=n v. Spring Valley Lodge Co., 422 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1967, no writ).

1454.422 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1967, no writ).

1455.Id. at 12.

1456.Id.

1457.Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 132 S.W.2d 553 (1939); Williams v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Nav. Dist., 128 Tex. 411, 418, 99 S.W.2d 276, 280 (1936); Gilbough v. Runge, 99 Tex. 539, 542, 91 S.W. 566, 567 (1906); Spencer v. Jones, 92 Tex. 519, 519-20, 50 S.W. 118, 120 (1899); Robertson v. Guerin, 50 Tex. 317, 323 (1878).

1458.Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 217, 132 S.W.2d 553, 568 (1939); Gilbough v. Runge, 99 Tex. 539, 542, 91 S.W. 566, 567 (1906); Manana, LLC v. Summit Elec. Supply Co., 316 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2010, pet. denied); Smith v. Bowers, 463 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1970, no writ); Tuggle v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.).


1460.Id. at 615.

1461.Id.

1462.Id. See also Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114, 122 (1876); Thompson v. Litwood Oil & Supply Co., 287 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1926, no writ).

1463.Thompson v. Litwood Oil & Supply Co. 287 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1926, no writ).

1464.Id. at 281.


1466.Id. at 535-36.

1467.214 S.W. 726 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, writ ref=d).

1468.Id. at 728.

1469.Id.

1470.Adams v. Rowles, 149 Tex. 52, 59, 228 S.W.2d 849, 853 (1950); City of Richland Hills v. Bertelsen, 724 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Painter v. McDonald, 427 S.W.2d 127, 135 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968), rev=d on other grounds, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).

1471.Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake Utilities Co., 537 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1976), modified, 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977); Wilkerson v. Ward, 137 S.W. 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1911, writ ref=d).

1472.537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1976), modified, 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).

1473.Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utilities Co., 549 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1977).

1474.Id. at 388. See also Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 37 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1931, no writ).

1475.2 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 119

1476.Id. at 20.

1477.See Cooksey v. Sinder, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 217, 132 S.W.2d 553, 568 (1939); Gilmore v. O=Neil, 107 Tex. 18, 30, 173 S.W. 203, 207 (1915); Renick & Frazier v. Dawson, 55 Tex. 102, 109 (1881); Griggs v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 213 S.W. 261, 263 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1478.Martin v. Cadle Co., 133 S.W.3d 897, 905 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, pet. denied); Waggoner v. Morrow, 932 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.); Boswell v. Farm & Home Sav. Ass=n, 894 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); Mbank Abilene, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1986, no writ); Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934), modified on other grounds, 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935).

1479.Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934), modified on other grounds, 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935); City of Dallas v. Rutledge, 258 S.W. 534, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1924, no writ); Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d); Hi-Mountain Energy Corp. v. Avra Oil Co., 2002 WL 660891 (Tex. Apl. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication). But see Adams v. West Lumber Co., 162 S.W. 974, 976 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1913, writ ref=d).

1480.Griggs v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 213 S.W. 261, 263 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1481.Clemmons v. McDowell, 5 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1927), aff=d, 12 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).

1482.57 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1933, writ dism=d).

1483.Id. at 962.

1484.Knox v. Gruhlkey, 192 S.W. 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1917, writ ref=d).

1485.Id. at 338.

1486.111 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1937, writ dism=d).

1487.Id. at 286.

1488.Id.

1489.Id.

1490.See Griggs v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 213 S.W. 261, 263 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324-25 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Sun Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Oatman, 911 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1995, writ denied); Pearson v. Fort Worth Nat=l Bank, 564 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1978, writ ref=d n.r.e.). But see Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 345, 321 S.W.2d 62, 69 (1959); Wiseman v. Watters, 107 Tex. 96, 99, 174 S.W. 815, 816 (1915); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 457 (1877); Matter of Estate of Matejek, 928 S.W.2d 742,744 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 332 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1959, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (purchasers are only charged with constructive notice of facts actually appearing in the record).

1491.Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

1492.Gibson v. Morris, 47 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1932, writ ref=d).

1493.Griggs v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 213 S.W. 261, 263 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1494.Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Griggs, 181 S.W. 833, 838 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1915), aff=d, 213 S.W. 261 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1495.See Jones v. Guy, 71 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ dism=d); Houston Oil Co. v. Griggs, 181 S.W. 833, 838 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1915), aff=d, 213 S.W. 261 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 120


1497.Id. at 549.

1498.Id.

1499.Id.

1500.47 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1932, writ ref=d).

1501.Id. at 651.

1502.Id.

1503.Id.

1504.Id.

1505.Id.

1506.47 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1932, writ ref=d).

1507.Id. at 649, 651.

1508.Id. at 650-51.

1509.Id. at 652.

1510.Id. at 651.

1511.Id. at 652.

1512.Id.


1514.Id. at 836.

1515.Id.

1516.Id.

1517.Id. at 837.

1518.Id. See also Smith v. Farmer=s Loan & Trust Co., 51 S.W. 515, 516-17 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1899, writ ref=d).

1519.Id. at 837-38.

1520.Edwards v. Brown, 68 Tex. 329, 332-33, 4 S.W. 380, 381 (1887); Buckalew v. Butcher-Arthur, Inc., 214 S.W.2d 184, 193 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Baker v. Culpepper, 56 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932, writ ref=d). But see Bradley v. Bradley, 540 S.W. 2d 504, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (different result when buyer had actual knowledge from another source of the marital status of his grantor).

1521.123 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1938, no writ).

1522.Id. at 809.

1523.Id.

1524.Id.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 121

1525.Id.

1526.Id.

1527.Id. at 810.

1528.Id.

1529.Id. See also Strong v. Strong, 66 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1933), aff=d, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Turner v. California Co., 54 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1931).

1530.129 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1938, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1531.Id. at 788.

1532.Id.

1533.Id. at 789.

1534.Id. at 790, 793.

1535.Id. at 793. See also Griggs v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 213 S.W. 261, 263 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Lyster v. Leighton, 81 S.W. 1033, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ ref=d). But see Scripture v. Copp, 57 S.W. 603, 604-05 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1900, no writ) (An 1874 deed conveyed property to Edwin Copp during his marriage to Esther Copp. Esther was not named as a grantee. A later 1876 deed of a part of the property was executed by both Edwin and Esther and recited that they were married at the time of this later deed. Held this recital was sufficient to give notice of a possible community interest of Esther in the property though the recital made no reference to Edwin=s marital status in 1874.).

1536.250 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1923, writ dism=d).

1537.Id. at 198.

1538.102 Tex. 384, 117 S.W. 430 (1909).

1539.102 Tex. at 385, 117 S.W. at 430.

1540.102 Tex. at 286, 117 S.W. at 431.


1542.Id at 451-52.

1543.87 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1935, writ ref=d).

1544.Id. at 508.

1545.Id.

1546.Id. at 508-09.

1547.Id. at 509.

1548.Id. at 509, 511.

1549.Id. at 511. See also Moore v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 85 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1935, writ dism=d); Nelson v. Bridge, 87 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ).

1550.229 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1921, no writ).

1551.Id. at 620-21.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 122

1552.Id. at 621-22.

1553.Id. at 622.


1555.Id. at 110.

1556.Id.

1557.Id.

1558.Id.

1559.Id.

1560.Id.

1561.Id. at 110-11.

1562.Id. at 111.

1563.Id. See also Hardy Oil Co. v. Burnham, 124 S.W. 221, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ); McCoy v. Cunningham, 65 S.W. 1084, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ).

1564.73 Tex. 203, 11 S.W. 138 (1889).

1565.73 Tex. at 209, 11 S.W. at 138.

1566.73 Tex. at 209, 11 S.W. at 138-39.

1567.394 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1965, no writ).

1568.Id. at 195-96.

1569.Id. at 196.

1570.Id. at 196-97.


1572.Id. at 581.

1573.Id.

1574.Fennimore v. Ingham, 181 S.W. 513, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1915), modified on other grounds, 215 S.W. 956 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Farmers= & Mechanics= Nat=l Bank of Fort Worth v. Taylor, 40 S.W. 876, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897), aff=d, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 966 (1897).

1575.Crews v. Taylor, 56 Tex. 461, 466 (1882); Robertson v. Guerin, 50 Tex. 317, 322 (1878); McAlpine v. Burnett, 23 Tex. 649, 650 (1859); Brotherton v. Anderson, 66 S.W. 682, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1902, writ ref=d); Farmers= & Mechanics= Nat=l Bank of Fort Worth v. Taylor, 40 S.W. 876, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1897), aff=d, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 966 (1897).

1576.56 Tex. 461 (1882).

1577.Id. at 466.

1578.Id. See also Jackson & Chadwick v. Elliott, 49 Tex. 62 (1878); Elmendorf v. Beirne, 23 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).


{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 123

1580.Id. at 151.

1581.Id.

1582.Ramirez v. Bell, 298 S.W. 924, 928 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927), modified on other grounds, 299 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927).

1583.Id. at 928.

1584.Id.

1585.298 S.W. 924 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927), modified on other grounds, 299 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927).

1586.Id. at 928.


1588.Id. at 174.

1589.Id. at 175-75.

1590.See Elliott v. Wallace, 59 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Guevara v. Guevara, 280 S.W. 736, 736-37 (Tex. Comm=n App 1926, jdgmt adopted);World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alford, 3 S.W.3d 164, 169 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1999, writ denied); Munawar v. Cadle Co., 2 S.W.3d 12, 19 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

1591.895 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).

1592.Id. at 788.

1593.Id.

1594.Id. See also Urban Renewal Agency of City of San Antonio v. Bridges Signs, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1595.Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982); Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 660 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1998, writ denied); Harris v. Windsor, 279 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1955), aff=d, 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956); W.T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1935, writ dism=d).

1596.67 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1934), modified on other grounds, 126 Tex. 450, 67 S.W.2d 1077 (1935).

1597.Id. at 912.

1598.Id. at 919.

1599.280 S.W. 736 (Tex. Comm=n App 1926, jdgmt adopted).

1600.Id. at 736.

1601.Id. at 737.

1602.Id. See also Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d).

1603.Guevara v. Guevara, 280 S.W. 736, 737 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Hicks v.Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Tuggle v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729 731 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Steed v. Crossland, 252 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1952, writ ref=d); W.T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1935, writ dism=d).

1604.258 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1924, writ dism=d).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 124

1605.Id. at 237. See also Havis v. Throne Inv. Co., 34 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1932, no writ); Christian v. Hughes, 36 S.W. 298, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref=d).

1606.2002 WL 660891 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002) (not designated for publication).

1607.Id.

1608.Id. See also Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W. 903, 908 (Tex. 1982); Stable Energy v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 551 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, pet. denied); Mbank Abilene, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1986, no writ); Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1952, writ ref=d).

1609.932 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.).

1610.Id. at 632.


1612.Id. at 161. See also Nickels v. Casburg, 2009 WL 1708830 (Tex. App. – Austin 2009).

1613.Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *4 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009).

1614.2009 WL 1372970 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009).

1615.Id. at *4.

1616.Id.

1617.Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

1618.714 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1619.Id. at 31.

1620.Id. at 34.

1621.Hicks v. Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Tuggle v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Henningsmeyer v. First State Bank of Conroe, 192 S.W. 286, 291 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1917, writ dism=d).

1622.135 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, writ denied).

1623.Id. at 753.

1624.Id. at 756.

1625.Garner v. IRS, 632 F.Supp. 390, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1986).

1626.82 Tex. 424, 18 S.W. 599 (1891).

1627.82 Tex. at 428, 18 S.W. at 600.

1628.82 Tex. at 428, 18 S.W. at 600-01. See also Housman v. Horn, 157 S.W. 1172, 1174 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1913, no writ).


1630.Id. at 633.


{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 125

1632.Id. at 811. See also Dalton v. Rainey, 75 Tex. 516, 521, 13 S.W. 34, 36 (1889); Gray v. Fenimore, 215 S.W. 956, 957 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted); Seydler v. Keuper, 92 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1936, no writ); Standard Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Rowan, 158 S.W. 251, 252 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1913, no writ); Shannon v. Buttery, 140 S.W. 858, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1911, no writ).

1633.Seydler v. Keuper, 92 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1936, no writ).

1634.632 F.Supp. 390 (S.D. Tex. 1986).

1635.Id. at 390.

1636.Id.

1637.Id.

1638.Id. at 392.

1639.Id.

1640.See Barfield v. Holland, 844 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1992, writ denied).

1641.844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1992, writ denied).

1642.Id. at 768.

1643.Id.

1644.Id.

1645.Id.

1646.Id.

1647.Id. at 768-70.

1648.200 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1947, no writ).

1649.Id. at 443.

1650 See e.g., Startex First Equip., Ltd. v. Aelina Ent., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. App. – Austin 2013, pet. denied).

1651.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474-75, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 444, 73 S.W.2d 490, 504 (1934); Harold v. Sumner, 78 Tex. 581, 583, 14 S.W. 995, 995 (1890).

1652.Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 189-90, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Cardwell v. Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); First Sav. & Loan Ass=n of El Paso v. Avila, 538 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1976, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Aldridge v. Northeast I.S.D., 428 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d).

1653.Brown v. Moss, 265 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.); San Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v. Rabb, 155 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1941, writ ref=d w.o.m.).

1654.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 2001); Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 86 Tex. 284, 286, 24 S.W. 503 (1893); Blakenship v. Douglas, 26 Tex. 225, 230 (1862).

1655.Hudson v. Jones, 143 S.W. 197, 199 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1911, no writ).

1656.Wren v. Scales, 119 S.W. 879, 881 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1909), aff=d, 103 Tex. 304, 127 S.W. 164 (1910).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 126

1657.Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.).

1658.Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936).

1659.Wilson v. Wilbanks, 417 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1967, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1960, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1660.Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 475, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936).

1661.Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315, 319 (1883); Cardwell v Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt, 2007 WL 2204170 at *2 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alford, 2 S.W.3d 164, 169 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1999, writ denied); Boyd v. United Bank, 794 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1990, writ denied); Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1986, no writ). But see Turner v. Tuteur, 250 S.W. 458, 459-60 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1923, no writ).

1662.Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt, 2007 WL 2204170 at *2 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007); HSBC Bank, USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 561 (N.D. Ala. 2011).

1663.Startex First Equip. Ltd. v. Aelina Ent., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. App. - Austin 2006, pet. denied); Boyd v. United Bank, 794 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1990, writ denied); Gibraltar Sav. Ass=n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 307 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1957, no writ).

1664.Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 191, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Garth v. Stuart, 125 S.W. 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1665.Strong v. Strong, 66 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1933), aff=d, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted). But see DeBruin v. Santo Domingo Land & Irrigation Co., 194 S.W. 654, 657 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1917, no writ).

1666.Id.

1667.Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1978); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 190, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1936); Smith v. Miller, 63 Tex. 72, 75 (1885).

1668.Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Collum v. Sanger Bros., 98 Tex. 162, 165, 82 S.W. 459, 460 (1904); Jones v. Siler, 129 Tex. 18, 24, 100 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1937, opinion adopted); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Cardwell v. Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

1669.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. 2001); Mullins v. Wimberly, 50 Tex. 457, 464 (1878); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 784 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending; Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 at *5 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); Cohen v. Hawkins, 2008 WL 1723234 at n.6 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2008).

1670.Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 784 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Gibraltar Sav. Ass=n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied); Howard v. Leonard, 185 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1945, writ ref=d w.o.m.).

1671.Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 784 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

1672.Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Hollingsworth v. Fowlkes, 24 S.W. 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Smith, 185 S.W. 1068, 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1916, no writ).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 127

1673.See Davidson v. Ryle, 124 S.W. 616, 619 (Tex. 1960); Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Buckalew v. Butcher - Arthur, Inc., 214 S.W.2d 184, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1674.See Cervantes v. Bayview Loan Serv., LLC., 2012 WL 6017712 at *2-3 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2012.

1675.2012 WL 6017712 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2012).

1676.Id. at *1.

1677.Id. at *2.

1678.Id.

1679.Id. at *2-3.

1680.Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Jackson v. Berliner, 127 S.W. 1160, 1162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d); Sanger Bros. v. Collum, 78 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904), aff=d, 98 Tex. 162, 82 S.W. 459 (1904).

1681.Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184,191, 59 S.W. 258, 261 (1900); Linthicum v. Greer, 75 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1934, writ dism=d); San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref=d); In re Jones, 77 B.R. 541, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1682.Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); King v. Lane, 186 S.W. 392, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1916, writ ref=d); Jackson v. Berliner, 127 S.W. 1160, 1162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1683.Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 125 Tex. 284, 292, 83 S.W.2d 638, 643 (1935); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ ref=d); Jackson v. Berliner, 127 S.W.2d 1160, 1162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1684.Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 125 Tex. 284, 292, 83 S.W.2d 638, 643 (1935); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ ref=d); Jackson v. Berliner, 127 S.W.2d 1160, 1162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d). But see National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted).

1685.127 S.W.2d 1160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1686.Id. at 1161.

1687.Id.

1688.Id. at 1162.

1689.237 S.W. 955 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d).

1690.Id. at 956.

1691.Id.

1692.Smith deeded the property to Cranfill by deed later determined to be a mortgage. Id.

1693.Id.

1694.Id.

1695.Id.

1696.Id.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 128

1697.Id.

1698.Id.

1699.Id.

1700.Id. at 332-33.

1701.The quitclaim deed conveyed only ostensive title as Wunderlich had already conveyed the property to Thorton by the unrecorded deed of April 16, 1918. Id. at 332.

1702.Id. at 332. See also San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref=d).

1703.633 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1704.Id. at 639.

1705.Id. at 640.

1706.Id. at 644.

1707.Id.

1708.Id.

1709.Id.

1710.See Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 783 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

1711.Id.

1712.359 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

1713.Id. at 773-74.

1714.Id. at 773-77.

1715.Id. at 774.

1716.Id. at 783-84.

1717.Id.

1718.See Collum v. Sanger Bros., 98 Tex. 162, 165, 82 S.W. 459, 460 (1904); Aldridge v. Northeast I.S.D., 428 S.W.2d 447, 449-50 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Matthews, 78 S.W.2d 989, 991-92 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, no writ); Boedefeld v. Johnson, 201 S.W. 1027, 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1918, no writ).

1719.Aldridge v. Northeast I.S.D., 428 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d); Long Falls Realty Co. v. Anchor Elec. Co., 405 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1966, no writ); Kelly- Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1720.98 Tex. 162, 82 S.W. 459 (1904).

1721.98 Tex. at 164, 82 S.W. at 459.

1722.98 Tex. at 164, 82 S.W. at 459.

1723.98 Tex. at 164, 82 S.W. at 460.

1724.98 Tex. at 165, 82 S.W. at 460.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 129

1725.98 Tex. at 165, 82 S.W. at 460. See also Aldridge v. Northeast I.S.D., 428 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d); Kelly- Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Matthews, 78 S.W.2d 989, 991-92 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, no writ); Boedefeld v. Johnson, 201 S.W. 1027, 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1918, no writ).

1726.784 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1990, writ denied).

1727.Id. at 559.

1728.Id. See also Massey v. Lewis, 281 S.W.2d 471, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1955, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1729.Allday v Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 673, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 228 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), aff=d, 233 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1950); Ebner v. Nall, 127 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1730.See Allday v Whittaker, 66 Tex. 669, 673, 1 S.W. 794, 796 (1886); Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 228 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), aff=d, 233 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1950); Ebner v. Nall, 127 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1731.127 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1939, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1732.Id. at 506.

1733.Id. at 507.

1734.Id.

1735.Id.

1736.Gwin v. Griffith, 394 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1965, no writ); Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 14 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1928), aff=d, 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Gann v. Phillips, 268 S.W. 1060, 1067 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1924, no writ).

1737.Id.

1738.Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d).

1739.Id. at 895.

1740.Id.

1741.91 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d).

1742.Id. at 895.

1743.60 Tex. 315 (1883).

1744.Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315, 319-20 (1883); Smith v. Miller, 63 Tex. 72, 75 (1885); National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Guaranty Bond State Bank of Mt. Pleasant v. Kelley, 13 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1920, jdgmt adopted). But see In re Jay, 307 B.R. 864, 869-72 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).

1745.Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315, 319 (1883); Pondrom v. Gray, 298 S.W. 409, 411 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding adopted); Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 199 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1746.Dixon v. Cargill, 104 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, writ ref=d).

1747.National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Pondrom v. Gray, 298 S.W. 409, 411 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding adopted); Brown v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, 180 S.W.2d 647, 653 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1944, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Williams v. Daniels, 4 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1927, no writ); Hunter v. Hale, 233 S.W. 1005, 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1921, writ dism=d).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 130

1748.See Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Lowry, 31 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1930, no writ); Kelley v. Guaranty Bond State Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 2 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1928), modified on other grounds, 13 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Watkins v. Sproull, 28 S.W. 356, 357 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1894, no writ).


1750.Id. at 431.

1751.Id.

1752.Id.

1753.Id.

1754.Id. at 432. See also, Texas Loan Agency v. Hunter, 35 S.W. 399, 401-03 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, no writ).

1755.98 S.W. 431, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1906, no writ). See also Goodrich v. Second Nat=l Bank of Houston, 151 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1941, writ ref=d); Hunter v. Hale, 233 S.W. 1005, 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1921, writ dism=d).

1756.Moore v. Chamberlain, 109 Tex. 64, 68, 195 S.W. 1135, 1137 (1917); National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1920, jdgmt adopted); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass=n v. Panhandle Constr. Co., 80 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1935, writ dism=d); Williams v. Daniels, 4 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1927, no writ). But see Pondrum v. Gray, 298 S.W. 409, 410-11 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, holding adopted); Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pickett, 59 S.W.2d 1090, 1093 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1933, writ dism=d).

1757.National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass=n v. Panhandle Constr. Co., 80 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1935, writ dism=d); Brooker v. Wright, 216 SW. 196, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1758.Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1759.See Anglin v. Cisco Mortgage Loan Co., 118 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1940); National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429, 433-34 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Cardwell v. Shiflett, 294 S.W. 519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).


1761.Id. at 519.

1762.Id.

1763.Id.

1764.Id. at 519-20.

1765.Id. at 521.

1766.Id.

1767.Id.

1768.Busby v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev=d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

1769.Id. See also Hamilton v. Ingram, 35 S.W. 748, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).

1770.See Link v. Page, 72 Tex. 592, 596-97, 16 S.W. 699, 701 (1889); Carlisle v. MacDonald, 200 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1947), rev=d on other grounds, 206 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. 1947); Busby v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 138, 144-45 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev=d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 131

1771.53 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev=d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

1772.Id. at 139.

1773.Id.

1774.Id. at 141-43.

1775.Id. at 145.

1776.Id.

1777.Id.

1778.Williams v. Daniels, 4 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1927, no writ); Mason v. Olds, 198 S.W. 1040, 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1917, writ ref=d); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 99 S.W. 1135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), rev=d on other grounds, 101 Tex. 112, 105 S.W. 174 (1907).


1780.Id. at 70-71. See also Ramirez v. Bell, 298 S.W. 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927), modified on other grounds, 299 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927).

1781.See Bumpas v. Zachary, 34 S.W. 672, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).


1783.Id. at 672.

1784.Id.

1785.Id.

1786.Id. See also Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Lowry, 31 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1930, no writ).

1787.53 Tex. 238 (1880).

1788.Id. at 243.

1789.See First Sav. & Loan Ass=n of El Paso v. Avila, 538 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1976, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pickett, 59 S.W. 2d 1090, 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1933, writ dism=d); Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), aff=d, 86 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted).

1790.52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), aff=d, 86 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted).

1791.Id. at 97.

1792.Id. at 98.

1793.Id. at 102.

1794.Id. at 98.

1795.Id.

1796.Id. at 102.

1797.Id. See also Ramirez v. Smith, 56 S.W. 254, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), rev=d on other grounds, 94 Tex. 184, 59 S.W. 258 (1900).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 132

1798.538 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1976, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1799.Id. at 849. See also Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pickett, 59 S.W.2d 1090, 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1933, writ dism=d) (same result when interval between deed absolute on its face and conveyance to party claiming innocent mortgagee status was less than one month).

1800.See Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1920, jdgmt adopted); Baird v. Laycock, 94 S.W.2d 1185, 1189 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936, writ dism=d); Mason v. Olds, 198 S.W. 1040, 1045 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1917, writ ref=d); Texas Loan Agency v. Hunter, 35 S.W. 399, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, no writ).

1801.See Id.

1802.Id.

1803.94 S.W.2d 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1936, writ dism=d).

1804.Id. at 1189.

1805.Id.

1806.Id.


1808.Id. at 275.

1809.Id.

1810.Id.

1811.896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1990).

1812.Id. at 108, 113.

1813.Id. at 113.

1814.Id. at 108-09.

1815.Id. at 113.

1816.Id. at 113-14.

1817.Id. at 113-15.

1818.53 Tex. 238 (1880).

1819.Id. at 239.

1820.Id. at 242.

1821.Id. at 241-42.

1822.Id. at 242.

1823.Id.

1824.Id. at 244.

1825.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Sanger Bros. v. Collum, 78 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904), rev=d on other grounds, 98 Tex. 162, 82 S.W. 459 (1904).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 133

1826.Cooper v. Ford, 69 S.W. 487, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref=d).

1827.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Howard v. Leonard, 185 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1945, writ ref=d w.o.m.); Garth v. Stuart, 125 S.W. 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1828.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205, 213 (1879); Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 581, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted).

1829.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Blankenship v. Douglas, 26 Tex. 225, 230 (1862); Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 581, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted).

1830.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted) Parks v. West, 274 S.W. 164, 165 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1925, no writ); Ramirez v. Smith, 56 S.W. 254, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), rev=d on other grounds, 94 Tex. 184, 59 S.W. 258 (1900); San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref=d).

1831.Boyd v. United Bank, 794 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1990, writ denied); Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d); McWhorter v. Oliver, 2 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1927, writ dism=d); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Aurelius v. Stewart, 219 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1832.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 581, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 479, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted).

1833.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 190, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 474, 98 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted).

1834.Norton v. Dunston, 2001 WL 893708 (Tex. App. - Austin 2001) (not designated for publication).

1835.Ramirez v. Smith, 56 S.W. 254, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), rev=d on other grounds, 94 Tex. 184, 59 S.W. 258 (1900); Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical & Blooded Stock Ass=n v. Kit, 31 S.W. 1080, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

1836.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 2001); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 479, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); DeGuerin v. Jackson, 50 S.W.2d 443, 448 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), aff=d, 77 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted); Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Cooper, 67 S.W. 173, 175 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1910, writ ref=d).

1837.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Jackson v. DeGuerin, 77 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted); Howard v. Leonard, 185 S.W.2d 490, 491-92 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1945, writ ref=d w.o.m.).

1838.Id. at 1042.

1839.77 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted).

1840.Id. at 1041-42.

1841.Id. at 1042. See also Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical, & Blooded Stock Ass=n v. Kit, 31 S.W. 1080, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

1842.Id. See also Omohundro v. Jackson, 36 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2001, no writ) (raising a garden on the property with no structures erected was not notice of possession); Krause v. Young, 6 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1928, no writ) (land not used or enclosed by fence gave no notice of possession); Howard v. Leonard, 185 S.W.2d

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 134

490, 491-92 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1945, writ ref=d w.o.m.) (raising chickens and erecting chicken coop insufficient notice of possession). But see Gilroy v. Rowley, 210 S.W. 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1919, no writ) (cultivation of tract by tenant sufficient notice of tenant=s right to occupy the premises); Newman v. Phalon, 214 S.W. 958, 960 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1919, no writ); Burford v. Pounders, 192 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946), rev=d on other grounds, 145 Tex. 460, 199 S.W.2d 141 (1947) (cultivation of land and enclosing the land by fence was open and exclusive possession of property).

1843.Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 582, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted).

1844.Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 582, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted); Tolar v. South Texas Dev. Co., 153 S.W. 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1913, writ ref=d); Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical & Blooded Stock Ass=n v. Kit, 31 S.W. 1080, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

1845.165 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, no writ).

1846.Id. at 879-80. See also Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Markham v. Parker, 31 S.W. 82, 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ ref=d); League v. Buena Ventura Stock Co., 21 S.W. 308, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ). But see Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 582, 155 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1941,opinion adopted); Aurelius v. Stewart, 219 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ) (fencing alone not enough).

1847.155 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, no pet.).

1848.Id. at 235.

1849.Id. See also Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.) (storing equipment on property sufficient to excite duty of inquiry).

1850.Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, no pet.).

1851.Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.).

1852.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 2001); Jackson v. DeGuerin, 77 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1935, opinion adopted).

1853.2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1854.Id.

1855.Id.

1856.Id.

1857.Id.

1858.See also In re Harydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

1859.See Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *6 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, no pet.); Melvin R. Storm Family Partners, L.P. v. Northcutt, 2007 WL 2204170 at *3 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007)..

1860.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d); Ramirez v. Smith, 56 S.W. 254, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), rev=d on other grounds, 94 Tex. 184, 59 S.W. 258 (1900); In re Sheets, 277 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).

1861.In re Sheets, 277 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Spring Creek Inv., 71 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1862.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1962); Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d); Aurelius v. Stewart, 219 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ); In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 135

1863.135 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1939, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

1864.Id. at 772-73.

1865.56 S.W. 91, 93 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1900, no writ).

1866.Id. at 93.

1867.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 2001); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 479, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004); In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).

1868.Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 191, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Apex. Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, no pet.); Strong v. Strong, 66 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1933), aff=d, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); In re Sheets, 277 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).

1869.Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1966, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1870.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 2001); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 479, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *5 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010); Texoma Advertising Co. v. Siblings, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1660619 at *5 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).


1872.Id.

1873.2007 WL 2204170 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007).

1874.Id. at *1.

1875.Id. at *3.

1876.Id. at *4.

1877.289 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

1878.Id. at 443.

1879.Id. at 444.

1880.Id. See also Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111-12, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 479, 98 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1936, opinion adopted); Aguirra v. Reyna, 2004 WL 35472 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi - Edinburg 2004); Johnican v. Tamasino, 248 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1952, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Gough v. Home Owners= Loan Corp., 135 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1939, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.). But see Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 190, 59 S.W. 258,260 (1900).

1881.2001 WL 893708 (Tex. App. - Austin 2001) (not designated for publication).

1882.Id. at *2.

1883.2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1884.Id. See also In re Hrydzak, 406 B.R. 499, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).

1885.39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001).

1886.Id. at 607.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 136

1887.1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).

1888.Id.

1889.Id.

1890.Id.

1891.Id.

1892.Id.

1893.Id.

1894.Id.

1895.2009 WL 1660619 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).

1896.Id. at *5.

1897.Meyer v. Miller, 23 S.W. 993, 994 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, writ dism=d).

1898.Id. at 994.

1899.Hart v. Wilson, 281 S.W. 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1927), rev=d on other grounds, 288 S.W. 133 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted).

1900.Hart v. Wilson, 281 S.W. 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1927), rev=d on other grounds, 288 S.W. 133 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d).

1901.Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1902.Id.

1903.Kelley v. Guaranty Bond State Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 2 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1928), modified on other grounds, 13 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 294 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Markley v. Martin, 204 S.W. 123, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1918, writ ref=d); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).


1905.Id. at 992.

1906.Id.

1907.Id.

1908.See Bowles v. Belt, 159 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d).

1909.159 S.W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d).

1910.Id. at 886.

1911.Id. at 887.

1912.Id.

1913.Id. at 886-87.

1914.Id. at 887.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 137

1915.Id. at 888.

1916.Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 784 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending); Boyd v. United Bank, 794 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1990, writ denied); Bell v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1976, no writ); Aldridge v. Northeast I.S.D., 428 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1968, writ ref=d); Brown v. Moss, 265 S.W.2d 613, 616-17 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

1917.Collum v. Sanger Bros., 98 Tex. 162, 165, 82 S.W. 459, 460 (1904); Cardwell v. Shiflett, 294 S.W.519, 521 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004).


1919.Boyd v. United Bank, 794 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1990, writ denied); Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Bank of America v. Schwartz, 2004 WL 2926006 (W.D. Tex. 2004). But see In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (criticizing the presumption that the possessor would disclose the true status of title as resting on retrospective conjecture); In re NETtel, 468 B.R. 782, 793 (Bankr. D.C. 2011) (it was only speculative whether possessor would be forthcoming about unrecorded encumbrances against the property).

1920.Stanford v. Dumas, 137 S.W.2d 1071, 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Aurelius v. Stewart, 219 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1921.Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1922.Brown v. Moss, 265 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.). See also Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 784 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending).

1923.Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d)

1924.See Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Aurelius v. Stewart, 219 S.W. 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ)

1925.195 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1926.Id. at 697.

1927.Id.

1928.Id.

1929.Id.

1930.Id.

1931.Id. at 699.

1932.Id.

1933.Id. at 698.

1934.Id. at 697.

1935.Id. at 700.

1936.219 S.W. 863 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1937.Id. at 863.

1938.Id. at 865.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 138

1939.Id.

1940.Id.

1941.Id. at 863, 865.

1942.Id. at 865. See also Bowles v. Belt, 159 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d).

1943.See Federal Life Ins. v. Martin, 157 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1941, writ ref=d); Commercial State Bank v. Blackwell, 61 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1933, no writ); Tuerpe v. George Saunders Livestock Comm=n Co., 245 S.W. 741, 742 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1922, writ dism=d); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Brooker v. Wright, 216 S.W. 196, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1944.216 S.W. 196 (Tex. Civ. App - Fort Worth 1919, no writ).

1945.Id. at 196.

1946.Id.

1947.Id.

1948.Id. at 201.

1949.Id.

1950.Id. See also Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 157 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1941, writ ref=d). But see Fordtran v. Perry, 60 S.W. 1000, 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, no writ) (buyer required to pursue inquiry notwithstanding misrepresentations of possessor).

1951.Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1946, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

1952.Id.

1953.Conn v. Houston Oil Co., 171 S.W. 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1914, writ ref=d).

1954.Id. But see AMoore@ Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. 1973).

1955.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Moore v. Chamberlain, 109 Tex. 64, 68, 195 S.W. 1135, 1137 (1917); Glendenning v. Bell, 76 Tex. 632, 634 (1888); Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Choate, 232 S.W. 285, 288 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).

1956.Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205, 212-13 (1879); Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1920, jdgmt adopted); Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Lowry, 31 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1930, no writ); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S.W. 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1922, writ ref=d); Bowles v. Belt, 159 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d).

1957.Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859); Garth v. Stuart, 125 S.W. 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1958.First Sav. & Loan Ass=n of El Paso v. Avila, 538 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1976, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Ellerd v. Ellison, 165 S.W. 876, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1914, no writ).

1959.Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 209, 213 (1879); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Choate, 232 S.W. 285, 288 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); J.M. Radford Groc. Co. v. Matthews, 78 S.W.2d 989, 991 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, no writ); Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Garth v. Stuart, 125 S.W. 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d).

1960.51 Tex. 205 (1879).

1961.Id. at 210.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 139

1962.Id.

1963.Id.

1964.Id.

1965.Id. at 213. See also Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 112, 105 S.W. 174, 175 (1907); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Choate, 232 S.W. 285, 288 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); J.M. Radford Groc. Co. v. Matthews, 78 S.W.2d 989, 991 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, no writ); Simmons v. Eakin, 54 S.W.2d 1045, 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1932, no writ); Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted). But see San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1905, writ ref=d); In re Batros, 1992 WL 695898 (Bankr W.D. Tex. 1992).

1966.Houston Oil Co. of Texas. v. Choate, 232 S.W. 285, 288-89 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Garth v. Stuart, 125 S.W. 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref=d). But see In re Bill Heard Ent., 420 B.R. 860, 870-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).


1968.Id. at 826.

1969.Id.

1970.Id.

1971.Id.

1972.See Liedeker v. Grossman, 146 Tex. 308, 313, 206 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1947); Whitaker v. Allday, 71 Tex. 623, 627, 9 S.W. 483, 484 (1888); Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859); Zale Corp. v. Decorama, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1971, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Beutell v. United Coin Meter Co., 462 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1970, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Grossman v. Jones, 157 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1941, writ dism=d w.o.m.); Still v. Bennett, 71 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1934, writ ref=d); Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

1973.289 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).

1974.Id. at 443-44.

1975.Id. at 443.

1976.Id. at 444.

1977.Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 449 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Smith v. James, 54 S.W. 41, 43 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1896, writ ref=d).

1978.Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 462, 199 S.W.2d 141, 142 (1947).

1979.Astin v. Martin, 289 S.W. 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1926), rev=d on other grounds, 295 S.W. 584 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted). See also AMoore@ Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. 1972).

1980.172 S.W. 770 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1913), rev=d on other grounds, 212 S.W. 651 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).

1981.Id. at 772. See also Farias v. Vera, 2010 WL 2432096 at *6 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg 2010).

1982.Id. See also Dennison Lumber Co. v. Milburn, 107 S.W. 1161, 1162-63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ); Brown v. Roland, 33 S.W. 273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893), rev=d on other grounds, 45 S.W. 795 (Tex. 1898).

1983.75 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1936, writ dism=d).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 140

1984.Id. at 316-17.

1985.Shaver v. Nat=l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1962); Maxfield v. Pure Oil Co., 915 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1936, writ dism=d); Newman v. Phalen, 214 S.W. 952, 960 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1919, no writ).

1986.Ramirez v. Smith, 94 Tex. 184, 190, 59 S.W. 258, 260 (1900); Kelly- Springfield Tire Co. v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 195, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1940, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.); Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted); Davidson v. Green, 65 S.W. 1110, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ). But see In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1987.240 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).

1988.Id. at 334.

1989.See Mueller v. United States, 1996 WL 490162 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

1990.1996 WL 490162 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

1991.Id.

1992.42 S.W.2d 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1931), rev=d on other grounds, 125 Tex. 284, 83 S.W.2d 638 (1935).

1993.Id. at 1073. But see Citizens= Nat=l Bank of Waco v. Billingsley, 300 S.W. 648, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1927, writ ref=d).

1994.69 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1995.Id. at 964.

1996.Temple Lumber Co. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 42 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1931), rev=d on other grounds, 125 Tex. 284, 83 S.W.2d 638 (1935); In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1997.In re Jones, 77 B.R. 541, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

1998.HSBC Bank, USA v. Perkins, 451 B.R. 555, 564 (N.D. Ala. 2011).

1999.Lake Meredith Dev. Co. v. City of Fritch, 564 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1978, no writ); Fender v. Schaded, 420 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1967, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Luck v. Welch, 243 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).


2001.Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. pending); Lake Meredith Dev. Co. v. City of Fritch, 564 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1978, no writ); Fender v. Schaded, 420 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1967, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Luck v. Welch, 243 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.).


2003.Id.

2004.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.124(a)(Vernon 2007). See also Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 237 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. pending).

2005 Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W. 3d 221, 236-37 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. pending).

2006 Id. at 237.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 141

2007 There is no statutory involuntary mechanic’s lien unless the construction or materials are visible. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.124(b)(Vernon 2007). See also Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 237 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. pending).

2008 Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 237 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. pending).

2009.Sprowls v. Youngblood, 23 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1929), rev=d on other grounds, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted).

2010.In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

2011.Sprawls v. Youngblood, 23 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1929), rev=d on other grounds, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted).

2012.Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Marketing Co., 842 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. 1992); Texas Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter, 117 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2003, no writ); Apex Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 7 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs, 612 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1981, no writ); Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).

2013.Irving Lumber Co. v. All-Tex. Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64, 70 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1969), aff=d, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); In re Boots Builders, Inc., 11 B.R. 635, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).

2014.Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 237 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. pending); In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

2015.In re NETtel, 458 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

2016.458 B.R. 782 (Bankr. D.C. 2011).

2017.Id. at 792-96.

2018.Id. at 795.

2019.Texas Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter, 117 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2003, no writ).

2020.Id. at 106.

2021.Robert Oil Corp. v. Jones, 23 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1929, writ denied).

2022.23 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1929, writ denied).

2023.Id. at 479.

2024.2007 WL 2204170 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2007).

2025.Id. at *3.

2026.See Bovaird Supply Co. v. American Tank Co., 29 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1928).

2027.Garrison v. Crowell, 67 Tex. 626, 628, 4 S.W. 69, 70 (1887); Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307, 309-10 (1855).

2028.Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 309-10 (1855).

2029.Markley v. Christen, 226 S.W. 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1920, writ dism=d); Miles v. Bodenheim, 193 S.W. 693, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1918, writ ref=d).

2030.Halvorson v. Nat=l Title and Abstract Co., 391 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1965, no writ); Markley v. Christen, 226 S.W. 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1920, writ dism=d).


{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 142

2032.Id. at 315. See also Fender v. Schaded, 420 S.W.2d 468, 473-74 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1967, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Luck v. Welch, 243 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1951, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Markley v. Christen, 226 S.W. 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1920, writ dism=d); Miles v. Bodenheim, 193 S.W. 693, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1918, writ ref=d).


2034.Id. at 431.

2035.361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1962).

2036.Id. at 869-70.

2037.2007 WL 547768 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2007).

2038.Id. at *2-3. See also Oneak Westex Transmission, L.P. v. Castor Oil, Inc., 2007 WL 547768 at *1-3 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2007).

2039.Painter v. McDonald, 427 S.W.2d 127, 135 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1968), rev=d on other grounds, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).

2040.71 B.R. 157 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

2041.Id. at 158.

2042.Id. at 159.

2043.Id. at 160.

2044.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. '' 11.004(a)(1), 12.001 (Vernon 2004); TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.001(a) (Vernon 2008). See also Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. v. Kothman, 339 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex. 2011); Clapp v. Engledow, 82 Tex. 290, 296, 18 S.W. 146, 148 (1891); Coffey v. Hendricks, 66 Tex. 676, 679, 2 S.W. 47, 48 (1886); Holliday v. Cromwell, 20 Tex. 189, 194 (1862); Apex. Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2004, no pet.).

2045 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.001(b)(Vernon 2004). See also Kelly v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 874863 at *8 (N.D. Tex. 2013).

2046.Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 195, 164 S.W.2d 488, 494 (1942); Hill v. Taylor, 77 Tex. 295, 299, 14 S.W. 366, 367 (1890); Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114, 122 (1876); Dyson Descendent Corp. v. Sonat Exp. Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Tandy v. Dickison, 371 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1963, no writ).

2047.Hill v. Taylor, 77 Tex. 295, 299, 14 S.W. 366, 367 (1890); Hayden v. Moffat, 74 Tex. 647, 650, 12 S.W. 820, 821 (1889); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 457 (1877); Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114, 122 (1876); Boswell v. Farm & Home Sav. Ass=n, 894 S.W.2d 761, 766-67 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied). But see, Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 722 F.3d 700, n. 26 (5th Cir. 2013) (Defectively proved instrument is nevertheless constructive notice if the defect in the acknowledgment is not apparent on the face of the instrument.)

2048.See Hill v. Foster, 143 Tex. 482, 489, 186 S.W.2d 343, 347 (1945); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Denson v. First State Bank & Trust of Cleveland, 728 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1987, no writ); In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 836 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).


2050.Id. at 231-32.

2051 See In re Anloc, 487 B.R. 825, 836 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

2052 487 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

2053 Id. at 1936.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 143

2054.See Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 132 S.W.2d 553, 572 (Tex. 1939).

2055.Id.

2056.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also United States v. FDIC, 1987 WL 43096 (N.D. Tex. 1987).

2057.Id. at ' 11.001(a) (Vernon 2004). See also Hancock v. Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex. 225, 232 (1885); Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223, 226 (1883); Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 216, 222 (1867); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Noble Mtg. & Inv. v. D&M Vision Inv., 340 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

2058.Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Tom v. Kenedy Nat=l Farm Loan Ass=n, 123 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1938, no writ); Slaughter v. Hight, 239 S.W. 1018, 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1922, no writ); DeGuerra v. DeGonzalez, 232 S.W. 896, 900 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1921, no writ); Haines v. West, 102 S.W. 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), aff=d, 101 Tex. 226, 105 S.W. 1118 (1907).

2059.Id.

2060.Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).

2061.Hancock v. Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex. 225, 232 (1885).

2062.Id. at 232.

2063.Aston Meadows v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).

2064.Jones v. Powers, 65 Tex. 207, 214 (1885); Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223, 226 (1883).

2065.Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223, 226-27 (1883).

2066.Jones v. Powers, 65 Tex. 207, 214 (1885); Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223, 227 (1883); Slaughter v. Hight, 239 S.W. 1018, 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1922, no writ).

2067.Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223,227 (1883).

2068.See Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 862-63 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied).

2069.359 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 292, pet. denied).

2070.Id. at 858.

2071.Id.

2072.Id.

2073.Id. at 862-63.

2074.Id.

2075.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 13.003 (Vernon 2004).

2076.Id.

2077.Id.

2078.Id. at ' 11.002.

2079.Id. at ' 11.003.

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 144

2080.American Exchange Nat=l Bank of Dallas v. Colonial Trust Co., 186 S.W. 361, 363 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1916, no writ).

2081.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 11.004(a)(2) (Vernon 2004). TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.001(b) (Vernon 2008).

2082.TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.001(d) (Vernon 2008).

2083.Jones v. MacCorquodale, 218 S.W. 59, 61 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1920, writ ref=d).

2084.Id. at 61.

2085.Id.

2086.Id. See also Wilson v. Curry, 151 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1941, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

2087.TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 191.003 (Vernon 2008). See also William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 624, 627, 133 S.W. 241, 244 (1910); Lignoski v. Crooker, 86 Tex. 324, 327-28, 24 S.W. 278, 279 (1893); Kennard v. Mabry, 78 Tex. 151, 156, 14 S.W. 272, 274 (1890); Belbaze v. Ratto, 69 Tex. 636, 639, 7 S.W. 501, 502 (1885); Crews v. Taylor, 58 Tex. 461, 466 (1882).

2088.151 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1941, writ dism=d jdgmt cor.).

2089.Id. at 357.

2090 349 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, no pet.).

2091 Id. at 93.

2092.TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 191.003 (Vernon 2008). See also Industrial State Bank v. Oldham, 148 Tex. 126, 130, 221 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1949); William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 620, 627, 133 S.W. 241, 244 (1910); Bosley v. Pease, 22 S.W. 516, 518 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893), aff=d, 86 Tex. 292, 24 S.W. 279 (1893); Hanafy v. United States, 991 F.Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Tex. 1998).

2093.William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 624, 627, 133 S.W. 241, 244 (1910); Hanafy v. United States, 991 F.Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Tex. 1998). A special curative statute applicable to affidavits perfecting an involuntary mechanic=s lien (statutory) provides that such affidavits are effective irrespective of a failure by the county clerk to properly record them. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052(c) (Vernon 2007).

2094.66 F. 216 (5th Cir. 1894).

2095.Id. at 218.

2096.Id. at 218-19.

2097.Id. at 221-22. See also Hart v. Patterson, 43 S.W. 545, 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).

2098.Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex. 606, 609-10 (1866); Hudson v. Randolph, 66 F. 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1894). But see Sanger Bros. v. Hammonds, 248 S.W. 477, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1923, no writ).

2099.Id. at 219-22. See also William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 624, 627, 133 S.W. 241, 245 (1910); Bassett v. Bowers, 74 Tex. 554, 556, 12 S.W. 229, 230 (1889); Hanafy v. United States, 991 F.Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Tex. 1998). But see Sanger Bros. v. Hammonds, 248 S.W. 477, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1923, no writ); Dean v. Gibson, 79 S.W. 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d).

2100.See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 52.004 (Vernon 2007). See also Vidor v. Rawlins, 93 Tex. 259, 262, 54 S.W. 1026, 1027 (1900); Anthony v. Taylor, 68 Tex. 403, 405, 45 S.W. 531, 532 (1887); Askey v. Power, 36 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted); Hoffman, McBryde & Co. v. Heyland, 74 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Tex. App. - Dallas 202002, writ denied); Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ). This requirement is identical for federal judgments abstracted in Texas. See Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ).

2101.69 Tex. 636, 7 S.W. 501 (1888).

{12855.ADVRE14-00357271.DOC} 145

2102.69 Tex. at 637, 7 S.W. at 502.

2103.69 Tex. at 639, 7 S.W. at 502. See also Askey v. Power, 36 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1931, holding adopted).

2104.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052(c) (Vernon 2007).

2105.Id.

2106.Lignoski v. Crooker, 86 Tex. at 324, 327-28, 24 S.W. 278, 278-79 (1893); Bosley v. Pease, 86 Tex. 292, 294-95, 24 S.W. 279, 280 (1893); Kennard v. Mabry, 78 Tex. 151, 155-56, 14 S.W. 272, 273 (1890); Hamilton v. Green, 101 S.W. 280, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1902, no writ).

2107.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.254(e) (Vernon 2007).

2108.22 S.W. 774 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893), rev=d on other grounds, 86 Tex. 324, 24 S.W. 275 (1893).

2109.Id. at 774.

2110.Id. at 774-75.

2111.Id. at 777. See also Quinn v. Logan, 67 Tex. 600, 600, 4 S.W. 247, 247 (1887); Phelps & Bigelow Windmill Co. v. Parker, 30 S.W. 365, 366 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, no writ). Compare, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052(c) (Vernon 2007) requiring that a lien affidavit for an involuntary mechanic=s lien be recorded by the clerk in Arecords kept for that purpose@ but providing that a failure to so record the affidavit does not invalidate the lien.

2112.Hanafy v. United States, 91 F.Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Tex. 1998).

2113.Id. at 798-99.

2114.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 52.004 (Vernon 2007). See also Vidor v. Rawlins, 93 Tex. 259, 262, 54 S.W. 1026, 1027 (1900); Gullett Gin Co. v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 182, 185, 14 S.W. 451, 452 (1890); Ney v. Moody, 70 Tex. 434, 436-37, 8 S.W. 606, 607 (1888); Ney v. Gribble, 70 Tex. 458, 462, 8 S.W. 608, 610 (1888); Belbaze v. Ratto, 69 Tex. 636, 639, 7 S.W. 501, 502 (1888). An identical requirement pertains to federal judgments abstracted in Texas. See Reynolds v. Kessler,669 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1984, no writ).


2116.Id. at 1028.

2117.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 53.052(c) (Vernon 2007).

2118.Id. See also Royal Indemnity Co. v. American District Steam Co., 8 S.W.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1935, writ dism=d).

2119.Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336, 349 (1876); Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical & Blooded Stock Ass=n, 31 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

2120.See O=Neal v. Peltus, 79 Tex. 254, 255, 14 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1891).

2121.Tarrant County Agricultural, Mechanical & Blooded Stock Ass=n, 31 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1895, writ ref=d).

2122.TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ' 19.008 (Vernon 2008). See also Magee v. Merriman, 85 Tex. 105, 108, 19 S.W. 1002, 1003 (1892); Barcus v. Brigham, 84 Tex. 538, 540, 19 S.W. 703, 704 (1892); Greer v. Willis, 51 S.W. 1185, 1187 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1904, writ ref=d); Lanier v. Davis, 60 S.W. 1018, 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, writ ref=d); Weber v. Moss, 21 S.W. 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ).

2123.TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ' 19.008 (Vernon 2008). See also O=Neil v. Pettus, 79 Tex. 254, 256, 14 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1891).

2124.Salmon v. Huff, 80 Tex. 133, 135, 15 S.W. 256, 258 (1891); Lanier v. Davis, 60 S.W. 1018, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1901, writ ref=d).

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2125.TEX. CIV PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. '' 19.008, 19.009 (Vernon 2008). See also William Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 624, 626-27, 133 S.W. 241, 244 (1910); Weber v. Moss, 21 S.W. 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1893, no writ).

2126.Salmon v. Huff, 80 Tex. 133, 135, 15 S.W. 257, 258 (1897).

2127.O=Neil v. Pettus, 79 Tex. 254, 256, 14 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1891).

2128.TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ' 19.008, 19.009 (Vernon 2008). See also Magee v. Merriman, 85 Tex. 105, 108, 19 S.W. 1002, 1003 (1892); O=Neil v. Pettus, 79 Tex. 254, 256, 14 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1891).

2129.Magee v. Merriman, 85 Tex. 105, 108, 19 S.W. 1002, 1004 (1892).

2130.Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 3353948 at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

2131.Vidor v. Rawlins, 93 Tex. 259, 261-62, 54 S.W. 1026, 1027 (1900).

2132.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 11.004(a)(1) (Vernon 2004).

2133.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 11.004(a)(3) (Vernon 2004). TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.001(a) (Vernon 2008).

2134.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 11.004(a)(4) (Vernon 2004). TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.003 (Vernon 2008). See also Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 3353948 at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

2135.TEX. LOC. GOV=T CODE ANN. ' 193.012 (Vernon 2008).

2136 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN., Chapter 19 (Vernon 2008). See also Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc., 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011).

2137 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 19.003(a),(b)(Vernon 2008).

2138 Id. at § 19.003(c).

2139 Id. at § 19.004. See also Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc., 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011).

2140 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 19.005(a)(Vernon 2008). See also Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc., 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011).

2141 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 19.005(b)(Vernon 2008). See also Kothman v. Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. 288 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009), rev’d on other gounds, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011).

2142 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 19.006 (Vernon 2008). See also Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. v. Kothman, 339 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. 2011).

2143 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 19.007 (Vernon 2008). See also Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. v. Kothman, 339 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. 2011).

2144 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.0011(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2013). See also Genesis Tax Loan Serv., Inc. v. Kothman, 339 S.W.3d. 104, 109-10 (Tex. 2011).

2145.Johnston v. Stinson, 215 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1948, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ); Haines v. West, 102 S.W. 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), aff=d, 101 Tex. 226, 105 S.W. 1118 (1907).

2146.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 12.013 (Vernon 2004).

2147.Id. at ' 12.013(1).

2148.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ' 12.005(b) (Vernon 2004).

2149.Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1937, no writ).

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2150.TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. '' 12.015, 13.005 (Vernon 2004).

2151.Valley Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Valley State Bank, 227 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1950, no writ).

2152.Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 604 (Tex. 2001); Pickett v. Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank, 24 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Texas Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter, 117 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2003, no pet.); Alkas v. United Sav. Ass=n of Texas, 672 S.W.2d 852, 859 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs, 612 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1981, no writ). But see Keenan v. Burkhardt, 162 S.W. 483, 486 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1913, writ ref=d) (innocent purchaser defense could be raised even if only a general denial filed); McGowan v. Lowry 230 S.W. 465, 468 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1921, writ ref=d) (innocent purchaser defense available upon not guilty plea in a trespass to try title suit)..

2153.Busby v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1932), rev=d on other grounds, 87 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).

2154.Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 455, 107 S.W.2d 564, 570-71 (1937); Ryle v. Davidson, 102 Tex. 227, 231, 115 S.W. 28, 29 (1909); Kimball v. Houston Oil Co., 100 Tex. 336, 341, 99 S.W. 852, 854 (1907); Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 484, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (1901); Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 552, 40 S.W. 3, 5 (1897).

2155.Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 601, 14 S.W. 700, 701 (1890); McAlpine v. Burnett, 23 Tex. 649, 652 (1859); Disanti v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1372970 at *3 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009); Stewart v. Marshburn, 240 S.W. 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1922), aff=d, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S.W. 942 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1923, opinion adopted).


2157.Id. at 427-28.

2158.Id.

2159.Id. See also Jackson v. Waldstein, 27 S.W. 26, 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref=d) (buyer negated actual notice but did not negate constructive notice).

2160.See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. 1982); Amason v. Woodman, 498 S.W.2d 142, 143-144 (Tex. 1973); Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 344, 321 S.W. 62, 67 (1959); Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 51, 175 S.W.2d 401, 407 (1943); Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47, 50, 29 S.W. 1057, 1058 (1895).

2161.Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1968, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Connor v. Lane, 355 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1962, no writ).

2162.Id.

2163.See V(A)(18) supra.

2164.Wilson v. Meredith, Clegg & Hunt, 268 S.W.2d 511, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1954, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Davidson v. Renfro, 114 S.W. 449, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ); Thomason v. Berwick, 113 S.W. 567, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908, no writ).


2166.Id. at 450. See also Kinard v. Sims, 53 S.W.2d 803, 806-07 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1932, writ ref=d); Elliott v. Wallace, 42 S.W.2d 1058, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1931), aff=d, 59 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Davidson v. Renfro, 114 S.W. 449, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ); Thomason v. Berwick, 113 S.W. 567, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1908, no writ).

2167.Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 457, 107 S.W.2d 564, 572 (1937).

2168.Rutland Sav. Bank v. Isbell, 137 Tex. 432, 437, 154 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1941); Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 457, 107 S.W.2d 564, 572 (1937).

2169.Pickett v. Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank, 245 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).