Haemers_Governing and Gathering About the Common Welfare of the Town_L_R

8/18/2019 Haemers_Governing and Gathering About the Common Welfare of the Town_L_R

1/20

J HUniversity of Leuven

Governingand gatheringabout thecommon welfareofthetown...

Medievalists have regarded revolts and rebellions with a certain ambigu-ity. At the one hand, they argue that political conflicts in late medieval

times (a period of crisis!) were violent confrontations of people who wanted

to fight and even to destroy each other. If one reads, for instance, the overviewof Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff on ”les années revolutionaires”, as theyhave called a series of conflicts in the years 1378-81, one is struck on the focusboth authors put on the violence of medieval people, committed by both therebels as well as the repressive authorities. One is inclined to think that weare speaking about a ‘Calamitous Century’, as Barbara Tuchman has calledthe fourteenth century. In her bestseller of the same name, rebels are brutaloutcasts who aggressively battled against established powers. ough scholarsare well aware of the fact that Tuchman too naively has interpreted medievalchronicles, such as Jean Froissart’s, the image of a revolutionary mob still is

a very powerful one in the description of the political history of the MiddleAges.1 At the other hand, however, medievalists oen categorize medievalprotest as a conservative reaction of conformist people who stuck to theirprivileges. I admit my guilt. In an overview on patterns of urban rebellionin late medieval Flanders, Jan Dumolyn and I wrote that medieval rebels al-most never demanded structural changes of society because they just wanted

1. M. M; P. W, Ongles bleus, Jacques et Ciompi. Les révolutions populaires enEurope aux XIVe et XVe siécle. Paris, 1970; B. Tuchman, Te calamitous ourteenth century . NewYork, 1978.

Governing and gathering about the commonwelfare of the town. e petitions of the cra

guilds of Leuven, 1378


2/20

154 JELLE HAEMERS

concrete improvements in everyday life.2 ough I am still convinced of thefact that medieval rebellions and revolts are not revolutions, for medievalrevolts, in contrast to revolutions, did not result in a basic structural changeof society. But I changed my mind on the very nature of these conflicts for Ithink that late medieval rebels did more than primarily focussing on the de-fence and restoration of ancient liberties or privileges. Since some authors asfor instance, J. Elliot, albeit for early modern Europe, have argued that rebelsonly strived to restore an idealised ‘golden age in the past”, with an ideologyof renovation, not of innovation, many scholars seem to argue on the “con-servative” character of urban revolts in the later medieval period. In publica-tions on German and English revolts, for instance, the claims of late medievalrebels have more been seen as protest about the personal corruption of in-dividual town rulers rather than being generated by a clash of fundamentalpolitical principles or by a desire for structural change in town government.3 In short, the ambiguous approach on medieval revolts still influences the ac-tual debate on the topic.

In a recent article in: English Historical Review, Christian Liddy and I ap-proached urban protest from a more nuanced point of view. While comparinglate medieval revolts in Bruges with contemporary insurrection in York, weargued that rebels did not want to change fundamentally the societal order inboth towns. Yet, they did have demands that altered the policies of the urbanrulers, and the protesters also wanted to transform radically the functioning

of urban institutions. We argued that the protest of crasmen in both townsregularly tried and succeeded to modify the manner in which the city wasruled. It is clear that the crasmen strove for the defence of obtained rights,such as the custom to be judged only by the aldermen of town, privileges ofurban autonomy and corporate rights. But their desire for the observance ofthese rights lead to essential changes in urban government. Elementary prin-ciples, such as the accountability of rulers, the self-governance of corporatebodies, and the observance of a correct financial and fiscal government of thetown, were at the basis of their wishes. e text in this volume is in the spiritof our plea for more detailed and systematic research into popular protest

in other European towns, with the aim to find out if the shared forms, goalsand mentalities of popular protest that we discovered in York and Bruges

2. J. D; J. H, “Patterns of urban rebellion in medieval Flanders”, Journalo Medieval History , XXXI (2005), p. 371. In this context, we quoted Y.-M. B, Révoltes etrévolutions dans l’Europe moderne (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles). Paris, 1980, p. 252.

3. J. E, “Revolution and continuity in early modern Europe”, Past and Present , 24(1969), p. 44; R. R, “‘Social struggles’ or the price of power? German urban uprisings in thelate Middle Ages”, Archiv ür Reormationsgeschichte, 76 (1985), p. 69-70; J. W; S. R,“England: popular politics and social conflict”, S. R (Ed.) A companion to Britain in the later

Middle Ages. Oxford, 2003, p. 68.


3/20

GOVERNING AND GATHERING ABOUT THE COMMON WELFARE OF THE TOWN... 155

can provide an explanation of revolt which might apply to other urban cen-tres in late medieval Europe. erefore, this text focuses on a case study inanother city, namely the revolt of the cra guilds of Leuven in 1378, one ofthose “revolutionary years” distinguished by Mollat and Wolff. ough neverscrutinized in detail, the case-study presented in this article provides us withunique documents which give us clear insight into the demands and wishes ofthe rebels. A comparison with our findings on Bruges and York can thus helpus to discover general patterns of popular politics in wider Europe – which isone of the aims of this collection of essays.

e fact that Leuven differs in many ways from the cities of Bruges andYork makes it an excellent case to compare the socio-political demands andwishes of the crasmen across these towns. In distance, Leuven is not so farfrom Bruges (about 100 kilometres), but the social and political situation inboth towns clearly varies, for three reasons. First of all, Leuven is situated inanother region, namely the duchy of Brabant, while Bruges is located in theneighbouring county of Flanders. ough Brabant and Flanders will be ruledby the same dynasty in the fieenth century, both regions are at another sideof a “national” border. While Flanders largely made part of the kingdom ofFrance, the duchy of Brabant falls under the Holy Roman Empire. e factthat Emperor Charles IV himself granted the duchy to his relative Wenceslasin 1356 aer the death of the last descendant of the dukes of Brabant showsthat, in the Emperor’s eyes, the duchy was an important fief in the western

part of the Empire. Wenceslas was a descendant from the house of Bohemiaand was also duke of Luxemburg until his death in 1383.4 Secondly, the city ofLeuven has different economic characteristics than Bruges. While the latteris a financial centre and a port town in which international merchants soldtheir goods and organized long-distance trade, Leuven is an industrial textilecentre, and a gateway for regional trade. e city had c. 40,000 inhabitantsin the fourteenth century, but this number declined continuously as Leuvenincreasingly lost its pole position in the duchy’s economy (and politics) toBrussels and Antwerp. But, still, the city counted 45 cra guilds which had ac-cumulated a considerable wealth and rights of self-governance in the course

of the fourteenth century.5

In contrast to Bruges, and this is a third differencewith the Flemish town, these cras did not have political representation in1378. erefore, more than in Bruges, political representation was one of the

4. About the fourteenth-century history of Brabant: R. V U (Ed.), Geschiedenisvan Brabant, van het hertogdom tot heden Leuven, 2004, p. 103-12, 118-25; S. B, Medievalwarare in Brabant, 1356-1406 . Woodbridge, 2004.

5. About the city: R. V U (Ed.), Leuven, “de beste stad van Brabant”. Deel I: geschiedenis van het stadsgewest Leuven tot omstreeks 1600. Leuven, 1980, p. 195-237; and theemergence of its cra guilds: C. W, De oorspong der ambachten in Vlaanderen en Brabant .Brussels, 1951, passim.


4/20

156 JELLE HAEMERS

main stakes of the revolts of the crasmen in Leuven. ough the cras hadmanaged to install a new regime in 1360 aer having chased away the mightymerchant families and landlords in town (the so-called geslachten or Sint-Piet-ermannen), they lost their political power in the 1370s. In 1373, the geslachtenrecaptured the aldermanic seats, and with support of the duke they deprivedthe cra guilds of political power.6 As a consequence, one of the main stakesof the cras’ revolt of 1378 was to regain the right to influence the electionprocedure of the 7 aldermen of town. But the artisans not only wanted to re-store rights of political representation in 1378, they also asked for elementarychanges of urban government.

1. REVOLT IN LEUVEN, 1378

e revolt of Leuven of 1378 is actually one stage in a series of conflicts,which started with the revolt of 1360 and ended with a peace settlement in1385. is period of 25 years wasn’t a quarter century of permanent struggle,but it consisted out of many confrontations between the cra guilds (the am-bachten or neeringen in middle Dutch) and the elite of town (de geslechten or

goede lieden). Tension was at its height in 1360 and in 1378, when the craguilds succeeded in seizing power in town by establishing a “revolutionary re-gime”. In these two tumultuous years, many cities in the Low Countries, andelsewhere, had to cope with uprisings of crasmen. In 1360, in the neighbour-

ing county of Flanders, for instance, weavers of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres suc-ceeded in setting up an interurban alliance with the aim to drive political rivalsor competing cra guilds (such as the fullers) from town.7 is can explain whyalso the Leuven textile guilds started with an uprising on the eve of Saint Mag-dalene (22 July). ey occupied the market square and the city hall, where theyheld the aldermen as hostages. ese events, and also the date on which theystarted, make clear that also internal reasons were at the heart of the conflict.Annually, on 22 July, the urban government leased out the consumer taxes ofthe city (the so-called assizen), which were very hated by the urban commoners

6. About these turbulent times and the institutions of medieval Leuven: R. V U,“Peter Couthereel en de troebelen te Leuven van 1350 tot 1363. Kritische nota over de persoon

van een hertogelijk ambtenaar en zijn rol in de politieke geschiedenis van Brabant en Leuven”, Mededelingen van de Geschied- en Oudheidkundige Kring voor Leuven en Omgeving , 3 (1963),63-97; H. V L, Histoire de la constitution de la ville de Louvain au Moyen Age. Ghent,1892; J. C, Les institutions de la ville de Louvain au Moyen Age . Leuven, 1935.

7. V. F, “Les origines de la reforme constitutionnelle de Gand de 1360-1369”, Annales du XXe congrès de la édération archéologique et historique de la Belgique, 1907, p. 427-59; J. M,“Woelingen te Brugge tussen 1359 en 1361”, Album Carlos Wyffels. Brussels, 1987, p. 325-30; R.V, Geweld in Vlaanderen. Macht en onderdrukking in de Vlaamse steden tijdens deveertiende eeuw. Bruges, 2005, passim.


5/20


because they weighed heavier in their budget than in that of the elite. Fiscalrequirements, but also political ones, such as a demand of inspection of theurban accounts, and rights of representation in the urban government, wouldmotivate the insurgents to take up arms. e chronicle Brabantse Yeesten, whichnarrates the history of the dukes of Brabant, mentions that the commoners,called the ghemeinte, asked goede rekeninge (good accounts) of the ruling elite.ey also successfully strove to appoint the aldermen (the scepenen or the wet ).8 A charter of 1306 in which the geslechten had received the monopoly of theBrabantine duke to appoint the aldermen of Leuven, was symbolically cut intopieces in front of the city hall. ough the ghemeinte thus initially gained rightsof political participation, the abolition and renewal of these rights would be atstake during the following quarter of a century.

If one wants to understand why the conflict lasted so long, it is necessaryto know that the “25 year revolt” of Leuven was a time of changing coalitions,in which the duke of Brabant also got involved. e political situation in Leu-

ven was of great interest for the duke as it was one of the most important andwealthy towns in the duchy. erefore, the duke tried to intervene many timesinto the conflict, with the well-known phrase “divide and rule” as leadingmotto. In 1360, the cra guilds coalesced with Pieter Coutereel, the sheriffof town (meier in middle Dutch), a nobleman who belonged to the duchy’spolitical elite. He was supported by duke Wenceslas who saw in the rise of thecra guilds a means to diminish the power of the leading families in Leuven,

who had supported the Flemish count in a struggle against the inaugurationof Wenceslas as duke of Brabant in 1356. e leader of the revolt, Pieter Cou-tereel, seems to have belonged to a rivalling faction of the leading families intown (the geslechten). As in Flanders, factional divides within the Leuven eliteapparently lead to an alliance between one of the ostracized factions and rep-resentatives of the cra guilds, which used the factional split in the urban eliteto require for political demands.9 e power of the geslechten was howevernot to underestimate, as they possessed most land of the town, and they hadhuge financial reserves. is explains why duke Wenceslas accepted to recon-cile with the leading families of Leuven when they sought his aid to recapture

power in the city. In October 1361 the duke successfully negotiated to set upa peace settlement which compromised the geslechten and their political chal-lengers, but in April 1373 he agreed with the first to sign a document whichre-established their autocratic rule. e change of coalitions thus empoweredthe leading families who monopolised again the election procedure of the

8. Brabantsche Yeesten, ed. J.F. W. Brussels, 1843. Vol. II, verse 4684.9. An overview of factional struggle in Flanders, compared with findings on other regions

in Europe can be found in J. B ., “Factional conflict in late medieval Flanders”,Historical Research, 85 (2012), p. 13-31.


6/20

158 JELLE HAEMERS

aldermen, and of the deans of the Gilde, an institution which regulated theurban economics, thus without interference of the cra guilds.10

In 1378, however, a new wave of unrest that questioned the political au-thority of many elites in European towns, inspired the cra guilds to go onstrike again. In March, they handed over a first petition to the duke, whichinforms us in detail about the reasons why they rebelled. e duke did notgive in, which heightened tensions in the city and the duchy again. How-ever, he did not side with the rebels, as in 1360, neither did the relatives ofPieter Coutereel (who had died in 1373). A second petition was composedin the course of August, aer the cra guilds, again, had occupied the cityhall on the feast day of Saint Magdalene. Leuven was again in roere, as theBrabantsche Yeesten tells us.11 Moreover, the cra guilds appointed alder-men aer having chased away the geslechten from town; those who remainedin town became the victim of brutal repression. Confronted with the vio-lence and his need for cash, the duke granted a favourable charter to thecra guilds in September 1378.12 Still, however, the city remained a place oftumult, though information is scarce on the precise course of events. What-soever, on 25 January 1383 the cra guilds obtained a new ducal privilege,which principally confirmed the regulations of the charter of 1378.13 In 1385,minor issues which had remained unclear were arranged by the Duchessaer the death of her husband. Taken together, the ducal charters of 1378and 1383, together with the regulations of the duchess, gave the cra guilds

henceforth the right to appoint 3 of the 7 aldermen, two of the four urbanexchequers, and one of the two mayors of Leuven. ey were admitted tothe “Great Council” which decided about the levying of urban taxes, andthey could elect the half of the administration of the Gilde. Last but not least,their rights of self-governance were confirmed, and they obtained the rightto gather freely. In the end, the cra guilds were thus successful.

Before discussing the concrete wishes of the “25 year revolt” in detail,it is worth noticing that it wasn’t as violent as its counterparts in other re-gions of the Low Countries, and Europe. While in Ghent and Bruges cruelmurders and even military battles between the count and the cities would

determine the course of events in contemporary revolts, the violence in

10. See the lists of aldermen edited by J. C, “Documents inédits concernant lesinstitutions de la ville de Louvain au Moyen Age”, Bulletin de la Commission Royale d’Histoire,99 (1933), p. 269-296.

11. Brabantsche Yeesten, verse 7091.12. Edited by H. V L, Histoire de la constitution, p. 175-81; discussed in detail

by R. V U, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonomie te Leuven van de XIIe tot het einde der XVIeeeuw. Brussels, 1961, p. 21-6.

13. Edited by H. V L, Histoire de la constitution, p. 182-94; discussed by J.C, Les institutions de la ville, passim.


7/20


Leuven remained restricted. Dialogue, negotiations and petitions decidedthe conflict. Of course, force was used by rebels, such as in 1360 when theysurrounded the city hall and pushed the aldermen to resign. Yet, aerwards,the use of rituals, symbols and a strict hierarchy in the cra guilds seem tohave disciplined the common artisans, who obeyed to orders of the leadingcircles of their guild. e use of a common repertoire of collective action suchas the unfolding of banners (baniere), the ringing of bells (the stormklokke),and the ritual occupation (gathering or vergaderinghe) by crasmen in armsof central squares in the city, seemed to have calmed down the commoners.e fact that these rituals have given their names to the conflict shows howpowerful they were as a symbol of resistance. As can be easily compared withuproar in other cities in contemporary Europe, the conflict was named wape-ninge (armament), aweyte (watch or guard), beckergeslach (drum roll), banieredragen (bearing flags), etc.14 In 1378, however, violence reigned in the cityaer petitioning had failed in March. e burgomaster that was appointed bythe guilds, Wouter van der Leyden, was murdered, probably by bystanders ofthe geslechten. In an act of revenge, sixteen former aldermen and membersof the leading families of Leuven were thrown out of the window of the cityhall.15 It seems thus that frustration about the failure of finding a solution hadlead to a temporary outburst of extreme aggression, but aer a few weeks ofnegotiation the conflict was settled with a ducal treaty (mentioned above).Apparently, contemporaries knew that political dialogue and petitioning was

therefore a more efficient way to achieve a certain political goal.

2. PETITIONING “FOR THE COMMON GOOD”

e most frequently deployed collective actions of the commons’ “rep-ertoire” in late medieval cities involved the gatherings of crasmen and

14. A document that was composed by the ducal entourage with the aim to appease theconflict in 1378 hoped that “all people would stay good friends in the future”, and that the mentionedevents never would happen again: “ende dat hiermede alle wapeninghe die een jegen den anderen,

alle baniere dragen, hoetmanne, coninxtavele, beckergeslach ende aweyte te nyute syn ende altemaleageleght ” (edited by A. S, Analectes archéologiques, historiques, géographiques et statistiquesconcernant principalement la Belgique. Antwerp, 1857, p. 364). Compare with the rituals used inprotest in neighbouring principalities: P. A, “Crowds, banners and the market place: symbolsof defiance and defeat during the Ghent War of 1452-1453”, Journal o Medieval and RenaissanceStudies, 24 (1994), p. 471-97; M. B, “Armes, coursses, assemblees et commocions: les gens demétiers et l’usage de la violence dans la société urbaine flamande à la fin du Moyen Age”, Revue duNord , 87 (2005), p. 1-33; J. H, “A moody community? Emotion and ritual in late medievalurban revolts”, E. L-D ; A.-L. V B (Eds.), Emotions in the heart o thecity (14th-16 th century), Turnhout, 2005, p. 63-81.

15. Trow them out , the rebels cried (Worpt ons desen ende dien uut ); Brabantsche Yeesten, verse 7170.


8/20

160 JELLE HAEMERS

the petitions which were composed on these occasions. Petitioning wasa ubiquitous practice across Europe and within different types of polity.Petitions were presented “as written munitions” to regional lords and ter-ritorial princes, urban rulers and sovereign monarchs.16 In Leuven, as inBruges, York, and other places, the petition, written in the vernacular, wasthe standard means of making political complaint and seeking redress ofgrievances. In the Low Countries more widely, the petition was a politicalmedium which typically took the form of the so-called request, requête inFrench or rek(w)est in Dutch, a pamphlet listing and justifying complaints(called poente in Leuven) about government actions. Studies have shownthat petitioning was the main mechanism by which ordinary citizens, indi-

vidually and collectively, could influence the formulation of a city’s policiesthrough the issue of by-laws.17 As in the two petitions of Leuven of 1378, thedemands contained in these texts mostly were written in a judicial register,using familiar legal constructions, so that they could, if accepted, be incor-porated directly into a law. In fact, some points of the Leuven petitions areincluded literally in the charters which were granted by duke Wenceslas in1378 and 1383, others however were further negotiated. e first petitionwas handed over by the leaders of the cra guilds (die goede knapen ende

gesworne van den ambachten) to the aldermen of town and duke Wenceslasin March, the second was composed by the aldermen that the cra guildshad appointed aer the revolt of July. Both documents were handed over to

the duke on a meeting in the city. We do not dispose of the original docu-ments; both were copied by an anonymous ducal officer who made a reportof these meetings.18 A comparison with petitions that were composed incontemporary Bruges and Ghent shows that the Leuven complaints werehighly similar to those in these (and other) cities, both what concerns theform, as well as their contents. erefore they are an excellent source forthe study of the political beliefs and ideas of common crasmen. It strikesthe historian that the Leuven texts, just as their Flemish counterparts, are

16. For many case-studies on petitioning in late medieval cities, see H. M (Ed.),Suppliques et requêtes. Le gouvernement par la grâce en Occident (XIIe-XVe siècle) . Rome, 2003;C. N ; A. W (Eds.), Bittschrifen und Gravamina. Politik, Verwaltung und Justiz inEuropa (14.-18. Jahrhundert). Berlin, 2005; W. O et al. (Eds.), Medieval Petitions: Graceand Grievance . Woodbridge, 2009.

17. J. D, “‘Our Land is only founded on trade and industry’: economic discoursesin fieenth-century Bruges”, Journal o Medieval History , 36 (2010), p. 375-7. See also M. P,“Corporate Politics in the Low Countries: Guilds as Institutions, 14th to 18th Centuries”,M. P . (Eds.), Craf Guilds in the Early Modern Low Countries: Work, Power andRepresentation. Aldershot, 2006, p. 104.

18. e report was edited by A. S, Analectes archéologiques, p. 334-98 (petitions onp. 346-7 and 358-9).


9/20


scarcely studied, although many publications are already dedicated to urbanrevolts in the medieval Low Countries.19

e petitions contained four main requests. As in Bruges and York, thefirst point in the popular agenda of the rebels was an insistence upon theprinciple of political accountability. e processes of accountability had tobe both public and regular. is was important because, so long as urbangovernors were accountable to the citizenry (or at least were seen to be ac-countable), there was an expectation that civic magistrates would rule inthe interests of the whole community. It was the force of this logic whichimpelled the cras of Leuven to demand that the seal of the city would belead “into the hands of the good men, the cra guilds and the brothers of theGilde”.20 According to the cra guilds, the aldermen had sealed documentsthat were to the detriment of the city. erefore, a strict control on the useof the seal, and thus on the legal activities of the aldermen, would be thekeystone of the power the crasmen had gained during the revolt. e guildsalso called for “legal accounts” of the city (wittege rekeninghe), which had tobe written in the vernacular.21 With these documents, they could investigatewhat had happened with the urban revenues in the past. What concerns thenear future, the petition asked that the cras could appoint two exchequersof the city who should from then on receive and expend the “common goodof the city” (al tgemeen goet van der stat ) without interference of those whowere formerly responsible for it. Clearly, the cras wanted to install sufficient

“checks and balances” within the urban institutions which would guaranteethem that, henceforth, the city would be well governed, that is taking theirinterests into account.

e second part of the crasmen’s agenda elaborated on the financialaspect of the city’s government, for there was sustained popular dissatisfac-tion with the management of its corporate finances. is was only in partthe expression of a familiar pattern of suspicion and complaint directed atthe personal failings of individual members of the inner circle of urban gov-ernment. What happened in fourteenth-century Leuven, as in Bruges and

19. e exception are the studies of J. D, “‘Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen’.Twee Brugse documenten uit de grote opstand van 1436-1438”, Bulletin de la CommissionRoyale d’Histoire, 162 (1996), p. 297-323; W. P, “Conscience et perception de lacondition sociale chez les gens du commun dans les anciens Pays-Bas des XIIIe et XIVesiècles”, P. B ; R. D ; C. G (Eds.), Le petit peuple dans l’Occident médiéval.erminologies, perceptions, réalités. Paris, 2002, p. 177-89; and J. H, “Geletterd verzet.Diplomatiek, politiek en herinneringscultuur van opstandelingen in de laatmiddeleeuwse en

vroegmoderne stad (casus: Brugge en Gent)”, Bulletin de la Commission Royale d’Histoire, 176(2010), p. 5-55.

20. A. S, Analectes archéologiques, p. 347.21. Ibidem, p. 359.


10/20

162 JELLE HAEMERS

York in the last quarter of the fieenth century was something more system-atic, comprehensive and constructive than mere grumbling about fiscal mis-management of the “common good of town”. e grievances of the crasmen– and the solutions which they proposed to resolve them – reflected a fun-damental concern of taxpayers who believed that urban government shouldbe fiscally sound and stable and that it should not live beyond its means. Ac-cording to the petitioners, the fiscal stability had an economic goal that wouldbe in the interest of every citizen. In the past, they argued, many merchantsof Leuven were imprisoned outside the legal quarter of the city (that is thesurrounding countryside in which only the aldermen of Leuven could judgethe inhabitants) because the city had failed to pay its debts to creditors whohad bought rents and annuities on the total amount of urban revenues. Con-sequently, trade could no longer flourish because of the risk merchants runwhen they le the city. e petitions claimed that the city should pay its debts,and additionally it proposed a remedy for the acute shortages, namely theimmediate collection of fiscal contributions which were not paid in the lastyears. e petition of March planned an investigation of the accounts of theconsumer taxes with the aim to demonstrate whose debts (achterstelle) thecity could cash in the near future. In the meanwhile, the duke was requestedto extend the validity in time of a recent charter in which he had guaranteedfree circulation for Leuven citizens in the duchy.22 Furthermore, the crasmenwanted that the revenues of the consumer tax should be in the “hands of the

cra guilds” or of those who they would appoint. Each month, the petition-ers stated, these people should give a demonstration for “the common city”(die ghemeine stad ) what they had done with the collected contributions.23 Inshort, these fiscal measures, and the requirements concerning the politicalaccountability of rulers show that the cras had firm and sophisticated beliefson what the financial government of the city should be: their demands werenot just about remedying financial excesses of rulers, but also about profoundchanges in the administration of the “common good” of town. Clearly, therebels did not want an abolition of taxes, but they wanted to renegotiate thedecision making process of their expenditure.24

irdly, these financial concerns lead the petitioners to ask for a perma-nent representation in the city’s governmental institutions. It was a predict-able requirement, as the cra guilds had lost their political participation in

22. Ibidem, p. 346 and 359.23. Ibidem, p. 346.24. A comparison with the similar demands of rebels in other places can easily be made,

see for instance the analysis of a revolt in Norwich: C. L, “‘Bee war of gyle in borugh’.Taxation and political discourse in late medieval English towns”, A. G . (Eds.),Te Languages o political society. Western Europe, 14 th 17 th centuries. Rome, 2011, p. 470.


11/20


the urban affairs in the course of 1373. Remarkably, the cra guilds did notclaim to monopolize urban government as their political opponents had donein that year. In the petition of August, they proposed that, henceforth, thecouncil of the city would be hal van den goiden luden van de geslechte endehal van den goiden luden van der ambachten.25 Both quarreling parties of thelast year should thus be equitably represented in the city’s administration.e crasmen were well aware of the fact that the duke and his powerful ally(the geslechten) never would accept a domination of crasmen in town – thewishes of the Leuven crasmen are not comparable to those of the FlorentineCiompi who installed a monolithic urban regime by weavers during the revoltthat followed their grab for power in the same year.26 ough, a parallel be-tween Florence and Leuven can be drawn. Exception made for the radicals inthe textile guilds, the leaders of the cra guilds in both towns strove for a kindof “consensus politics”.27 A striking difference with Italian towns, however,is the fact that the cra guilds of Leuven, as those of others cities in the LowCountries, particularly wanted to be present in existing institutions, whilethe popolo in most Italian towns added new political institutions to old oneswhen gaining power. In Leuven, in contrast, the cra guilds wanted to shareurban government.

e ideas that motivated this specific political demand can be compared,too, with the Italian case. In their revolt, the cra guilds in Leuven, as those inItalian towns, criticized the former governors for moral deficiencies and fail-

ure to embrace justice and the common good, a concept that was identifiedwith the “good of the commune”, thus affirming the priority of the commune’swelfare over that of any individual, family or group. erefore, the petitiontook the idea that those who provided the common welfare of town shouldgovern it for granted. Such demands were quite common in European townsin which artisans had gained rights to govern themselves. According to thecras’ corporate beliefs, no city council could rule without extensive cooper-ation from those over whom it governed. e most obvious reason why theurban elite in Leuven, and elsewhere, gave in, was that the council normallylacked enough means of coercion to resist a military assembly of the guilds, as

they had access to weapons and arms. But, a more deep-routed explanationfor demands of political representation is that limitations on the powers of ur-ban elites should be seen as integral to the system of urban politics, a system

25. A. S, Analectes archéologiques, p. 358.26. A. S, La révolte des Ciompi. Les hommes, les lieux, le travail . Paris, 1993.27. John Najemy used this term to describe daily Florentine politics. For this, and what

follows, see J. N, A History o Florence, 1200-1575. Oxford, 2006, p. 182-7; E. C,“Cities and communes”, D. A (Ed.), Italy in the central Middle Ages. Oxford, 2004, p. 48-56; E. C-P, Eners et paradis. L’Italie de Dante et de Giotto. Paris, 2001, p. 198-201.


12/20

164 JELLE HAEMERS

in which different groups within the community attempted to pursue theirobjectives within a framework of traditional customs and expectations.28 Itis true, however, that cra guilds are selfish too, in the sense that they deniedpolitical participation of groups that did not belong to the corporative bodiesof town. As medievalists know, such a “collective selfishness” about personalfreedoms and legal self-determination among commoners was a characteris-tic of every city in medieval Europe and a central feature of the political and

judicial identity of townsmen.29

e right to govern itself and to determine the conditions of membershipof the cra guild was the basic assumption on which the cra guilds politicalpower was founded. For that reason, it is not a surprise that the petitions asksthat the craf guilds o the city shall govern themselves, and that they can gatherabout the common welare o town when they want .30 Related to this request,was the demand that the city should be well protected. For the petition of Au-gust asked that “headmen and constables” (hoetmannen ende conincstavele)should guard over their areas, on their own costs.31 ese officials were ap-pointed by the different districts in the city, which each separately paid for thedefense of the district and the military inspection of the adjacent part of thecity walls.32 Each corporate body, district and guild, should thus be governedproperly by those who constitute it. is military demand had of course to dowith the possibility of an armed attack by the duke and, more likely, by troopspaid by the geslechten in 1378. e political request to govern and gather with-

out the interference of the city’s administration, on the other hand, is a moreprofound utterance of the permanent desire for autonomy. Consequently,the cra guilds interpreted their tradition of self-government in terms of adeeply-held belief that their government should be in the hands of cras-men rather than outsiders and that the urban authorities (not to mention the

28. Compare with C. F, “Artisans and urban politics in seventeenth-centuryGermany”, G. C (Ed.), Te artisan and the European town, 1500-1900. Aldershot, 1997,p. 41-55; J. F, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. Cambridge, 2000; H. S, Medieval

Artisans: an urban class in medieval England . Oxford, 1989.

29. See, for instance, L. A, “Urban identity in medieval English towns”, Journal oInterdisciplinary History , 32 (2002), p. 571-2; B. D, “Freiheit der Bürger – Freiheitder Stadt”, J. F (Ed.), Die abendländische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert. DerWirkungszusammenhang von Idee und Wirklichkeit im europäischen Vergleich. Sigmaringen, 1991,p. 485-510; and A. B, Political thought in Europe, 1250-1450. Cambridge, 1992, p. 28-31.

30. “Item, dat dambachte van der stat henselven regeren selen ende vergaderen alsy willenomme tgemein orbor van der stat ” (A. S, Analectes archéologiques, p. 359).

31. Ibidem, p. 359.32. Raymond Van Uytven places the creation of the “conincstavels” in 1477, but presumes

that these are older institutions; the petition of August 1378 shows they are (R. V U,“Stedelijke openbare diensten te Leuven tijdens het Ancien Regime”, in Het openbaar initiatievan de gemeenten in België, historische grondslagen (Ancien Régime). Brussels, 1984, p. 27-8).


13/20


duke) should interfere as little as possible in the crasmen’s affairs. is was ofcourse not a particular concern of the Leuven crasmen, but more an expres-sion of widespread guild ideology in late medieval Europe. e general viewwas that guild officials might legislate and judge matters related to the tradeor cra; this followed from the principle that any corporation can make rulesabout its own economic and political businesses.33

3. TO ASSEMBLEE

e right to gather freely not only referred to the possibility of a meet-ing of the members of one cra guild, but also to the general gathering ofall cra guilds of Leuven. A remarkable charter that dates from 16 October1360 informs us about the exact meaning of the word gathering when it wasused by the Leuven crasmen. With a discursive framework that is typicalfor corporative thinking, the charter of 1360 sealed a treaty of the 45 craguilds of Leuven in which they promise that all of them would stay togetherin order “to have and to feed the love, peace and unity” among each other.34 e fact that the charter forbid one cra guild to part from the others, can il-lustrate that the unity among them was crumbling away in October 1360. Onits promulgation, the revolt against the aldermen was already three monthsago, and maybe some guilds doubted about their loyalty to the coalition thatgoverned Leuven. Whatsoever, the charter learns us two notable things about

their revolt and gatherings. Firstly, it demonstrates that the leaders of theguild were pulling the strings of their men. For one of the central points ofthe charter stipulated that no craf guild can gather, nor shall make a gather-ing, without the advice and the consent o their sworn men.35 We do not havethe names of these sworn men, who were the chosen leaders of the cras, butthis passage makes clear that the common crasmen had to obtain the per-mission of his superiors if they wanted to assemble. is shows that not onlythe artisans but also the course of events of the revolt was kept on a tight reinby these men. is observation reminds us at the revolts of the cra guilds inthe county of Flanders, which were lead by master artisans, called the urban

middle class. ese urban “middle classes” belonged neither to the patrician

33. A. B, Guilds and civil society in European political thought rom the twelfh centuryto the present , London, 1984, p. 24.

34. “Omme mine, pays ende geode eendrechtecheden onder ons the vuedene ende te hebbene”(edited by H. Sermon, Geschiedenis van Peeter Coutherele. Antwerp, 1860, p. 74). e seals of allcra guilds are attached to the charter. About its corporative discourse: J. D, “Privilegesand novelties: the political discourse of the Flemish cities and rural districts in their negotiationswith the dukes of Burgundy (1384-1506)”, Urban History , 35 (2008), 1-23.

35. “Item, dat negheen ambacht ghaderen en sal noch gaderinghe maken, sy en selent doenmet rade ende met consente van haren gheswoernen” (Sermon, Geschiedenis van Peeter , p. 75).


14/20

166 JELLE HAEMERS

elites, who based their power and status on commercial activities and landedproperty inside and outside the city, nor to the lower groups of humble wagelabourers. A social analysis of the leaders of the cra guilds and their rep-resentatives in the city benches (once they had gained power), showed thatthese people were relatively wealthy, but that they were not extremely rich.Mostly, they were in leading positions within their guild, being dean or swornmen.36 ough further research is needed, it seems that the Leuven revoltsalso were lead by those who had accumulated a certain wealth in the city, anda powerful position within their guild.

Secondly, the charter of 1360 informs us about the perception of thecrasmen about their collective actions. e term which they used to de-scribe their protest, namely gathering ( gaderinghe), is a more neutral one thanthose which chroniclers habitually used to depict revolts. While their notionssuch as commotion, upset , conspiracy , and rebellion contain a certain unfa-

vorable judgment about the meetings of crasmen, the term gathering showsthat the protest is considered to be a legal act. e use of the word rebel in thecharter of 1360 confirms this view. Rebel appeared twice in the text, namelywhen it condemned a cra guild that eventually would break the alliance, andalso when it described a crasman who would act against the will of thosewho govern the ‘ambacht ’. e document stipulated that all cra guilds willresist together against a cra guild which wanted to separate or make him-sel rebel against the others (sciede ochte rebel maecte). Likewise, it dictated

a single crasmen to obey the orders of the governors of his guild, withoutmaking rebel against it. Such phrases of course had to justify the punishmentof a deserter, and to prevent him to break the treaty in the first place, but itconfirms our conclusion that the protest was strictly organized by the leadersof the crasmen. In general, the charter shows that the cra guilds consideredthe privilege to gather freely, without the interference of the authorities, asa gained right. ough, the charter predicts that custom should be obeyed,namely the hierarchy within the cra needed to be respected. If not, the gath-ering was seen as an illegal act that was against the will of the leaders of theprotest. erefore, the charter implicitly gave the urban authorities the right

to repress a gathering that was not lead by the chiefs of the guilds. As a result,the latter presented themselves as the mouthpiece of the crasmen, and thosewho should be listened at by the urban governors.

36. J. D; J. H, Patterns o urban rebellion, passim; J. D, “Demiddenstand in opstand. Corporatieve aspiraties en transformaties in het zestiende-eeuwseGent”, Handelingen van de Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent , 57 (2003),p. 71-122; M. B, “Le comté de Flandre dans le long XIVe siècle: une société urbanisée faceaux crises du bas Moyen Age”, M. B; G. C; G. P (Eds.), Rivolte urbane erivolte contadine nell’Europa del recento: un conronto. Florence, 2008, p. 17-47.


15/20


A last word should be said about to the justification of the protest. Again,the charter of 1360 uses the welare and profit o the city and the community ocraf guilds as the ultimate motivation to join forces.37 Anthony Black’s read-ing of this well known phrase helps us to understand its regular use in thepetitions and charters of the cra guilds. His book, and numerous case-stud-ies for medieval and early modern Europe, have outlined that “the commongood” was the phrase most frequently used in official documents and phil-osophical treatises when referring to the goal or morality of government. Itcould refer to the need to maintain the fabric of society, a basis for good rela-tions between people, but oen procedural justice, and fair “equal” treatmentof all before the law was what was meant – private interests had to be putaside.38 Of course, the thinking about the “common good” was also frequentlyused by the urban authorities when they stipulated laws, or by the dukes ofBrabant when they repressed rebellions. erefore, we can consider the dis-course on the common good as a generally used justification of political ac-tion that referred to the collective character of government, or in the caseof the guilds, to a regime in which corporative interests should set the lines.is was not a revolutionary request in the second half of the fourteenth cen-tury, as cra guilds had fought already many years for the recognition of theirwishes and rights. But it can neither be considered as a conservative reactionto an attack on privileges. In the struggle of the Leuven cra guilds whichlasted for a quarter of a century, their gatherings and petitions had the aim

to change urban government. As in York, Bruges, and many other places, theLeuven artisans wanted to transform the autocratic regime of their town intoa corporative rule of collective welfare. Ideological notions, such as “the com-mon good”, had to justify this point of view.

4. CONCLUSION: CORPORATIVE LIBERTY

In a erudite, but also provocative book on popular protest in late me-dieval Europe, Sam Cohn argued that rebels in the post-plague fourteenthcentury strove “toward an implicit sense of equality”.39 According to Cohn, a

decade aer the first plague epidemic (1347-8) a new spirit for societal changeand a desire for liberty had become deeply rooted in the individuals that had

37. “Omme orber ende profit der stad ende der ghemeynte ambachte” (Sermon, Geschiedenisvan Peeter , p. 76).

38. A. B, Political thought , p. 25-9. Case-studies can be found in E. L-D; A.-L. V B (Eds.), De Bono Communi. Te discourse and practice o thecommon good in the European city, 13th-16th centuries. Turnhout, 2010.

39. S. C, Lust or liberty. Te politics o social revolt in medieval Europe, 1200-1425.Italy, France, and Flanders. Cambridge Mass., 2006, p. 239. See also my review of his book inSocial History , 33 (2008), p. 371-73.


16/20

168 JELLE HAEMERS

defined liberties as special corporate privileges since the central Middle Ages.Instead of defending conservative rights, peasants, artisans, and petty shop-keepers became emboldened with a new self- and class-confidence aer theBlack Death. In the opinion of Cohn his material proves that by 1355, medie-

val insurgents rebelled with increasing frequency to change the here and now,‘to gain liberty’.40 From this point of view, one must honestly admit Cohn’scommendable analysis rightly revaluates medieval revolts. In contrast to pre-

vious literature, the book shows that popular protests were not perpetratedby a revolutionary mad crowd or unstable elements that were ready to attackthe rights of the lord and the upper-class violently at any moment. Cohn alsobreaks with the tradition to describe the wishes of rebels as a conservativeclaim to restore lost privileges. Politics and the acquisition of political rightswere at the heart of these conflicts; rulers, not landlords, were the objects ofpeasant anger and urban resentment. As Cohn rightly argues, rational argu-ments and well-thought motivations inspired artisans and peasants to rebel,to gather and (in some cases) to govern the city.

But I disagree with Cohn on two points. Firstly, as studies on the pro-test in late medieval Flanders have shown, the chronological shi which hemeans to detect, is quite an imaginary one. Also in “pre-plague” Europe, re-bels strove for the acquisition of political rights, as they did in the second halfof the fourteenth century.41 In both periods, the same issues were at stake:political participation, the recognition of corporative rights, fiscal equality, et-

cetera. Secondly, the Leuven case shows that urban crasmen wanted to gain“rights” or “privileges” for their corporate group, not the same political andsocial rights as those who governed them. Corporate privileges remained thebasis of society, and the “liberty” rebels, among which the Leuven artisans,defended or wanted to gain, were privileged liberties, not a constitutionalsense of equality, nor political freedom as we understand it now. e Leuvenevidence seems to fit more into Anthony Black’s view, who wrote that libertywas indeed a basic political value. But for him, it concerned a widespreadstriving to secure for oneself, one’s family and descendants the social status offreedom. Freedom should be widely understood as immunity from seignio-

rial justice. is could be acquired through membership of an immune com-munity, such as a town. Cra guilds saw their right to corporate organization,which gave their members economic security through an exclusive right toply in a given area, as a form of liberty. Political communities had the right togovern themselves and this was a kind of liberty which could be vindicated,

40. S. C, Lust or liberty , p. 242.41. See for instance the synthesis on the medieval history of the urban society of the Low

Countries and its numerous political conflicts in M. B, A la recherche d’une modernitécivique. La société urbaine des anciens Pays-Bas au bas Moyen Age. Brussels, 2010.


17/20


by law or if necessary by force, against those seeking to suppress.42 In four-teenth-century Leuven, but presumably also in other places in the westernpart of the Holy Empire, as in York and Bruges in the fieenth century, sim-ilar ideas motivated crasmen to take up arms, and pencils, with the aim tochange urban government. e Leuven crasmen clearly wanted to reform itinto a regime that had a wider political basis, but also into one that remainedunequally open to all citizens. Namely, the common welfare which they strovefor, was above all a welfare in which corporative interests were taken intoaccount. In 1378, the Leuven crasmen petitioned to obtain rights for thosewho belonged to the corporative structures of town. ese corporative liber-ties were not granted to everyone.

42. A. B, Political thought , p. 29.


18/20


19/20

S


20/20