.Sociot Joytirr’ Ig(~5r’5/15h, Vol. 13. Nor; 2090

Placating the Powerless:Effects of Legitimateand Illegitimate Explanation on Affect,Memory, and Stereotyping’

Elizabeth L flames2and John I. Jost3

In an expcrimentalstudy involving power di/lerences between groups, the effects oflegitimate and illegitimate explanationsfor power were investigated on measnresof affect, stereotyping, and memory. We found that powerless groups reportedmore positive affrct (relative to negative afftct) when explanations vvere providedfor their powerlessness, whether these explanations were classified a priori aseither legitimate or illegitimate. Members of powerless groups also attributedgreater intelligence and responsibility to the outgroup when it vvas in a positionof high power rather than equal power; and these effects on stereotyping wereenhanced when explanations for the power differences were provided. Finally,research participants tended to misremember the reasons given for the powerdifferences as more legitimate than they actually were. These results support asystem justification theory of intergroup behavior (Jost and Banaji [1994] Br I.Soc. Psychol. 33:1—27) in that people seem to imbue placebic explanations withlegitimacy, use stereotypes to rationalize power di/frrences, and exhibit biases inmemory such that the statusquo is increasingly legitimized over time.

KEY WORDS: power; legitimacy; explanation; system josttlieation; interprooprelations.

Sinceat leastthe time of Machiavelli, theWesternworld has recognizedthat ifpowerfulgroupsandindividuals want to win theconsentandcooperationof theirsubordinates,theymust acquiresomelevel of legitimacy(e.g., ChristieandGeis,1970; Doob, 1983; Weber, 1947; Zelditch, in press).In this way, beliefs about

lcgitimacyprovidc an essential“cushionof supportfor authority” (Rasiuskiet al.,1985,p. 386), largely becausetheperceptionof legitimacyprovidesthepowerful

This articleisdedicatedto the memoryoftwo teacherswho inspirednsand pavedtheway for research

on powerand legitimacy ti orence‘Li ndy’’ Geis(1933—I993)andLeonardW. Doob (I 909—2000).2flepartmentof Psychology,Uitiversity of Washington,Seattle,Washington98195.3GradoateSchoolof Business,StanfordUniversity, Stanford,California 943(15.

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5555—14555)5/5555—52 I 59~I 555/5 2(11)1) t’ion~ t’s5Ii,5i~s (‘05,sio

22() Haines ttfl(I jost

with conYcutionallyacceptedmeansto exertsocial influenceoverothers(FrenchandRaven, 1959; Raven, 1993). In sociology,psychology,political science,andoroanizationalbehavior, an ever-increasingbody of researchindicatesthat le-gitimacy appraisalsare central to the acceptanceor rejectionof existingpowerdifferencesbetweenindividualsandgroups,and theseappraisalsdeterminetheeffectsof powerdifferenceson our thoughts,feelings,andactions(e.g.,FlsbachandSutton, 1992; Jost and Major, in press;Major, 1994; Ridgeway, in press;Shapiro,1991;Thjfel andTurner, 1986;Tyler, 1990;Weatherford,1992;Zelditch,in press).

As FreuchandRaven(1959)pointedoutover40yearsago,legitimacyfunc-tions as a primarybasisof social powerand influence,leading peopleto complywith everydayrequeststhat areapartandparcelof socialinteraction(Raven,1993;Yukl andFalbe,1991)as well asleadingthemto obeythe law and acceptthe rulesof authority (Rasinskiet al., 1985;Tyler, 1990).Legitimate poweralso seemstoactivatethe otherbasesof social poweridentified by Frenchand Raven(1959),sothat theperceptionof legitimacy enhancesperceptionsof referent,reward,co-ercive,andexpertpower(Carsonet al., 1993).In many ways, then, a legitimatesourceis an influential source(McGuire, 1985).

Mattersare mademorecomplicated,however,by the factthat subjectiveap-praisalsof legitimacy are often renderedunderconditionsof low certaintyandhigh ambiguity (cf. Weick, 1995). Becausesocial influence processesare criti-cal in determiningwhetherpowerdifferencesare deemedlegitimateor not (e.g.,Doob, 1983; Frenchand Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993), beliefs about legitimacymay bemanipulatedasa way of placatingpowerlessgroups.Insofaraslegitimacytypically requiresexplanation(Bies andSitkin, 1992;Rex, 1961),providingexpla-nationsfor powerdifferencesmay serveto maintainandjustify inequality amonggroupsandindividuals (ef. Hoffman andHurst, 1989;Jackmanand Senter,1983).Investigatingthe role of explanationsin preservingpower relationsin this con-text supplementsand extendsresearchin organizationalbehavioron theeffectsof explanationsin overcomingdeceit (Shapiro, 1991), failure (Bies andSitkin,1992), inequity (Greenberg,1990), job loss (Konovsky and Folger, 1991), andmismanagement(BlsbachandSutton, 1992).

Providingpeoplewith legitimatereasonsfor occupyinga position of power(suchasexperienceor expertise)shouldmakepeoplefeel betteraboutbeing out-comedependent,andit should help to gain their compliance.Whenmembersofpowerlessgroupslackan explanationfor their situation,they may feel less com-fortable, happy,and satisfiedin comparisonwith membersof powerful groups(SachdevandBourhis, 1985, 1991). A ratherextensivebody of researchin thejustice field (e.g.,Bies andSitkin, 1992;Greenberg,1990; Lind andTyler, 1988;Rasinski et al., 1985; Shapiro, 1991; Tyler, 1990) supportsthe conclusion thatprovidinga legitimatebasisfor theexerciseof poweror authority notonly makespeoplefeel betterabout inequality,but is also a most effective meansof gaining

Placating thePowerless 221

behavioralcomplianceon the partof subordinatesand,ultimately, in preservingthe existingsocial structure.

In general,it seemsreasonabletoexpectthattheconverseof thispropositionisalsotrue, namelythat illegitimatereasonsfor powerdifferences(suchasnepotismor favoritism) will leadto negativeaffectanda rejectionof thestatus quo. Manytheoriesofjustice,suchasequity theoryandrelativedeprivation,for instance,holdthatpeoplewill experienceangerin responseto theperceptionof unjusttreatment(e.g., Martin et al., 1984).Despitethe evidentsensibilityof the assumptionthatpeoplewill rejectinadequateexplanations(cf. Greenberg,1990; Konovsky andFolger,1991; Shapiro,1991),thereare two complementarylinesof researchsug-gestingthatpeoplemayacceptpseudo-explanationsor evenrelativelyillegitimateexplanationsfor powerdifferenceswithout necessarilyobjectingto them.

The first of thesehas to do with the well-known researchby Langeret al.(1978), in which uninformative,placebicexplanationswere sufficient for gainingcompliance.Merelyaskingpeopleataphotocopyingmachine,for example,“MayI use the xerox machine,becauseI haveto make copies?”wassufficient to pro-duceacquiescence.Although this work was notcast in termsof perceptionsofjustice, it suggeststhat peoplemay be relatively generousin grantinglegitimacyto others’explanations,especiallywhen they are operatingin a fairly “mindless”or nonreflectivestate.Researchby Schmittef al. (1992, Study4) also found thatpeoplewere relatively acceptingof others’ intrusionsinto the queue,especiallywhen a legitimatereasonwas providedfor the intrusion.

A secondreasonto expect that pseudo-explanationsmight be sufficient toplacatethepowerlesscomesfrom recenttheoryandresearchon thepsychologyof“systemjustification” (e.g.,lost,in press;JostandBanaji, 1994;JostandBurgess,2000). In this work, it is hypothesizedthat peopleare motivated to imbue thestatus quo with legitimacy andrationality,much asLerner(1980)arguedwith re-gardto the“belief in ajustworld.” A critical assumptionof the systemjustificationperspectiveis that evenmembersof disadvantagedor powerlessgroupstend toperceivesocial eventsin sucha way that hierarchicalarrangementsare perceivedas fair andjust, perhapsevennaturalandinevitable.Thus,whereasLangeret al’s(1978)perspectivestressesthe ways in which peoplepassivelyacceptothers’ le-gitimatingaccounts,thesystemjustificationperspectiveimpliesthat peoplemightactively engagein the legitimation of social reality, even if it meansjustifyingtheir own position of powerlessness.This meansthat peoplewill use cognitionand memoryto go “beyondtheinformationgiven” in ascribinglegitimacy toevenrelatively illegitimate actsandactors (seelost, in press).In partthis is becausepeopleattemptto makesenseof ongoingsocial reality (Weick, 1995),and in partthis is becausepeoplewant to preservethe sensethat outcomesare fair andjust(Lerner, 1980).

Systemjustificationtheory takesits impetusfrom researchon the toleranceof injustice andtheorizing on the conceptof “false consciousness”(Jost, 1995;

222 1-lamesand lost

Jost and-Banaji, 1994). It posits a motive to invest in and rationalize the statusquo, and this motive is thoughtto be presentevenamong membersof disadvan-tagedgroups,although typically to a lesserdegree.The theory is consistentwithresearchdocumenting“status quo biases” wherebypeopletend to favor what-everoptionis perceivedasthe currentoneandto avoidchoicesthat requirechange(SamuelsonandZeckhauser,1988).It isalsoconsistentwith researchon “outcomebiases”wherebypeopleattributepositivecharacteristicsto “winners” andnega-tive characteristicsto “losers” (Allison et al., 1996).Althoughthesephenomenaaretypically explainedin purelycognitivetermsby social psychologists,we arguethat thereis an ideologicaltenorto themthat addsa layerof political significanceand motivation to the basicinformation processingfunctions.

Systemjustificationtheorydiffers from othertheoriesof cognitiverestructur-ing, suchascognitivedissonancetheory,in thatthe systemjustificationperspectiveholdsthat peopledonotnecessarilyneedtofeelpersonallyresponsibleforanaver-sive action in orderto justify it. The argumentmadehere is that we often justifythedecisionsof lawmakers,administrators,bosses,andotherauthority figures(aswell asthingsthat happenwithoutany decisionsbeingmade),withoutnecessarilybeingpersonallyimplicatedin theway that cognitive dissonancetheorywould re-quire(CooperandFazio,1984).A broaderversionof cognitivedissonancetheoryarisesin connectionwith Weick’s work (Weick, 1995) on sensemaking,whichdescribesthe ways in which peopleassessand constructmeaningin responseto unexpectedsocial andorganizationalevents.But the senseinakingperspectivestressesthat peopleperceiveconsistencyby “seeingaworld on whichtheyalreadyimposedwhat they believe” (Weick, 1995,p. 15), whereasthe systemjustifica-tion perspectivestatesthat peopleperceivelegitimacyby seeinga world in whichstructuresand outcomesare fair anddeserved.The ideais that peoplenot onlyseekto imbuethe statusquo with rationalityand meaning,but theyoftenperformcognitiveandideologicalworkon behalfof thesocialsystemtopreservethesensethat authoritiesand institutionsare fair and legitimate(Jost, in press).

If thereis indeeda generalsocial psychologicaltendencyto exaggeratethelegitimacyof socialevents,thenpeoplemightrespondto illegitimate explanations(or placebicexplanations)as if they are more legitimate andjustifiedthan theyactuallyare,andsucheffectsshouldappearon measuresof affect, memory,andstereotyping.Fromthis perspective,pseudo-explanationsservenotonly tosmoothover social interactionand to increasebehavioralcompliance,as Langeret al.(1978)haveshown,but suchexplanationsmight also stimulatepeopleto activelyreconstructtheirjudgmentsof powerful othersandtheir memoryfor thelegitimacyof power differences.In the presentstudy,then, we explored thepossibility thatsimple social explanationsmay assistthe powerlesswith attemptsto rationalizetheir position,making them feel betterabout inequality andmaking them morelikely to engagein socialandpsychologicaljustificationsfor the inequality.

Specifically, we predictedthat explanationsand pseudo-explanationsshouldmake membersof powerlessgroupsfeel betterabouttheir situation,evenwhen

Placating the Powerless 223

thoseexplanationsdo notestablishan objectivelyvalid or legitimatebasisfor theexerciseof power.Thus,one hypothesiswas that the ratio of positive to negativeaiject tvould be higher when members f a powerless group are given an exj)lana-tion jbr their situ(itioii tItan when they (ire not. Thegeneral ideais thatprovidingjustificationsmakespeoplefeel morecomfortablewith inequalitiesof statusorpower,even when they are in a relatively disadvantagedposition. Thus, measonsand justificationsservea placatingfunction whenit comesto the preservationofpower.

Consistentwith the systemjustification approach,pastresearchsuggeststhatpeopledrawstereotypicalattributionsandinferencesin sucha way that inequalitiesof statusand powerbetweengroupsare explainedand rationalized(e.g.,Allisonet al., 1996; Eagly andSteffen, 1984; Hoffman and Hurst, 1989; JackmanandSenter,1983;Jostand Banaji, 1994;Ridgeway,in press).For instance,in a seriesof experimentalstudies involving real-world groups.,Just(in press)found thatpeoplejustified the socioeconomicsuccessof one group relativeto anotherbyaltering their stereotypes,so that the moresuccessfulgroup(whetherthe ingroupor the outgroup)was perceivedas more intelligent, moreindustrious,andmoreverbally skilled than the othergroup.Thesedifferenceswere especiallylikely toemergewhen peoplebelievedthat the socioeconomicsuccessdifferenceswerefair, legitimate,andjustifiable.

In thepresentresearch,wehypothesizedthat peoplewouldactivelyusestereo-types to rationalizepowerdifferencesbetweengroups,especiallywhenthey areprovided with an explanationfor the powerdifferences.Specifically, it waspre-

dictedthat (a)people wouldperceive the outgroup as more intelligent, responsible,(tnd deserving when that outgroup occupies a position ofpower than when it doesnot, and(b) people would be more likely to perceive the powerful outgroup asiittelligent, responsible, and deserving when they are given an explanation for the

power differences than when they are not. To the extentthat peopleare motivatedto preservethe legitimacyof powerdifferencesbetweengroups,they shouldat-tribute characteristicsof superioritysuchasenhancedintelligence,responsibility,anddeserviugnessto the powerful group (seeJost, in press).Thus,beliefsaboutthecharacteristicsof thepowerful groupshouldreflectsystemjustifyingconcerns,and the presenceof (even weak)explanationsshouldincreasesystemjustifyingtendencies.

Finally, it was also predictedthat therewould be a systemjustifying bias inmemory for the reasonsthat weregiven for the existenceof power differences.Specifically,weexaminedthe notion that peoplewould falsely rememberexpla-nationsaspossessingmore legitimacythan they actuallypossessed,sothatpeopleassigned to the ito explanation and illegitimate explanation conditions would ntis—remember that they had becit given legitimate reasons for the power di/ferences.This is consistentwith the notion that social coonition servessystemjustifyingends, even on an implicit or nonconsciouslevel (e.g., Jost, in press; Jost andBanaji, 1994).

224 Haines and lost

Thesethreehypotheseswereassessedin thecontextof anexperimentalstudyin which researchparticipantseitherdid or did not learn of a powerdifferencebetweentheir own group anda morepowerful outgroup,and,if apowerdifferenceexisted,theyeitherwereorwerenotprovidedwith arationalefor thepowerdiffer-ence.Subsequenttothemanipulationsof powerandexplanation,participantsratedtheirown affect,judgedthe stereotypicalcharacteristicsof thepowerful outgroup,andwere askedtorecall theoriginal rationalefor the intergrouppowerdifferences.

METHOD

Overview

Participantswereassignedto oneof four experimentalconditions.In the “NoPowerDifferences” condition, no mention was madeof a powerdifferencebe-tweenthe ingroup and the ontgroup.In the “No Explanation”condition,researchparticipantslearnedof a powerdifferencefavoring the outgroup,but they wereprovidedwith no rationalefor this difference. In the “Illegitimate Explanation”condition, the powerdifferencewas explainedin termsof friendshipandsocialconnections,which werejudgedin pretestingto be illegitimate reasonsforachiev-ing power. In the “Legitimate Explanation”condition,participantswere informedthat theoutgroupwasplacedin a position of powerbecauseof their greaterexperi-enceandexpertise.Following thesemachinations,participantswere askedto ratetheirown positiveandnegativeaffect, toassessthe responsibilityandintelligenceof thepowerful group,and linally to recall why theothergroup hadbeengiven theability to control their outcomes.This procedureenabledus to investigatesystemjustification processesin affect, stereotyping,andmemory.

ResearchParticipants

Researchparticipantsfor the studywere 194 male and femalestudentsfromHunterCollege in New York with agesrangingfrom 17 to 54 years(M — 20.5).The samplewas diversewith regard to ethnicity: 33.5%White/Caucasian,24%1-lispanic/Latino,16.5%Asian, 10% African American,8% WestIndian, and2%Indian. An additional 6 percenteitherdid not answerthe questionor classifiedthemselvesas“other” withoutgiving anyadditionalinformation.Gender,ethnicity,and agewereequivalentlydistributedin all of the experimentalgroups.Studentsparticipatedin theexperimentin order to fulfill a courserequirement.

Cover Story

The researchparticipants’ostensibletask in the presentstudywasto deter-mine the authenticityof suicide notes,which were takenfrom the book Cltfes toSuicide (ShucidmnanandFarberow,1957). This task hasbeentised previouslyin

Placating thePowerless 225

researchby Ross et al. (1975). Becauseof the difficulty in determiningwhichof the noteswere fictitious, the only way of evaluatingthegroup’s performancewas by making tise of the feedbackthat was relayedby the experimenterto thepowerlessgroup.

Manipulation of Power

In order to createa power(lifferential betweengroups,researchparticipantswere led to believe that studentsfrom anothercollege (Brooklyn College)werewaiting in an adjacentroom to determinewhethertheparticipantspossessedsuffi-

cient skill in the experimentaltask.Specifically,participantswere told that it wasup to the othergroup to decideon thebasisof theirperformancewhetherto allowthemto leaveearlyor stay for further instructions.Thus,the power manipulationwascreate(lby letting participantsknow that they wouldbe evaluatedby the othergroupan(l that their group’soutcome(in this case,time expenditure)wasdepen-dent upon the judgmentsof the outgroup.A control conditionwas included inwhichresearchparticipantswere told simply that BrooklynCollegestudentswerealsotakingpart in thesameexperiment(“No PowerDifferences”condition).Thus,

1-lunterCollegestudentseitherfaceda position of low powerrelativeto BrooklynCollegestudentsor they did not.

Manipulations of Legitimate and Illegitimate Explanations

Pretesting

Therelativelegitimacyof eighteendifferentreasonsfor why agroupcan-attainpoweroveranothergroupwasassessedin pretestingsessionsthat involved 47 stu-dent raters who wereenrolled in eitherof two psychologycourses.Raterswereaskedto determinethe illegitimacyor legitimacyof agroup’scontrollingpositionon Likert scalesrangingfrom0 (labeled“Illegitimate”) to 9 (labeled“Legitimate”).Expertise,experience,andability yieldedthehighestmeans(aggregateM = 6.88),andsothesewere the basesof powermentionedin the ‘legitimate Explanation”condition.Ratersindicatedthat beingfriendswith peoplein poweras areasonforacquiringpowerwas associatedwith very low levels of legitimacy (M = 2.04),andso this was usedin the “Illegitimate Explanation”or “pseudo-explanation”condition.A pairedsamplest-test, t(46) = 13.71, l~ < .0001,confirmed that the‘legitimate” reason(expertise)wasperceivedassignificantly morelegitimatethan

the ‘illegitimate” reason(friends).

M(tttipulatiotts

Therewere fotir conditionsof theexperimentaltogether,including thecon-trol conditionthat involved no powerdifferences,asdescribedearlier.The three

226 Haines and lost

remainingconditionsmadeuseof thesamepowermanipulationin whichBrooklynCollege studentswere said to havecontrol over the outcomesof HunterCollegestudents.Thesepowerdifferenceswere eitherleft unexplainedby theundergradu-ateexperimenter(“No Explanation”condition) or theywere explainedin termsofreasonsthat wereclassifiedas legitimateor illegitimate on thebasisof pretesting.In the “LegitimateExplanation”condition, theexperimenterinformedthepartici-pantsthat theBrooklyn Collegestudentswere upperdivision psychologystudentswho had six creditsin abnormalpsychologyand threecreditsin personalitypsy-chology and who also workedpart-timeat BellevueHospital in the suicidepre-ventionunit. In the ‘illegitimate Explanation”condition, the researchparticipantswere told that BrooklynCollege studentswould be evaluatingthem becausetheprincipalinvestigatorgraduatedfrom BrooklynCollegeandknewpeoplefrom thatschool.

DependentMeasures

Check on the Manipulation of Power

In orderto verify that researchparticipantsassignedto the threeconditionsinvolving powerdifferencesperceivedlessoutcomecontrol than did researchpar-ticipantsassignedto the conditioninvolving no powerdifferences,a singleitemwas usedas a manipulationcheck.Participantswere asked,“How much controldo you feel that the Brooklyn College group has over your group’s outcomesat the moment?”In responseto this question,they were askedto rate feelingsofpowerlessness/powerfulnesson a 10-pointscalefrom 0 (no control) to 9 (completecontrol).

Ratings ofPositive and Negative Affect

Beforeengagingin thesuicidenotetask,butafterlearningaboiiithepowcrdif-ferencesandtheallegedreasonsfor them,researchparticipantscompletedashort-cuedversionof Watson’s(1988) PositiveAffect NegativeAffect Scale(PANAS).They rated24 adjectiveson 5-pointscalesfrom 0 (not at all) to 5 (extremely), in-dicating how they felt “at the presenttime.” The 14 negativeaffectivestateswereafraid, contemptuous,guilty, jittery, ashamed,disgusted,scared,distressed,re-volted, nervous,irritable, upset,hostile,andscornful.The 10 positive stateswereinterested,strong, excited, alert, active,enthusiastic,attentive, proud, inspii~ed,an(l determined.Meanscoresfor positiveaffect andnegativeaffect werecalcu-lated for eachresearchparticipant,and a ratio of positive/negativeaffect wasthencalculated.

t’laeating the Powerless 227

- Stereotypical I3eliefi About the Outgroup

Following the conclusionof the suicidenote task,researchparticipantswereaskedto estimatelevels of intelligenceand responsibilityamongthe outgroupofBrooklynCollegestudentsandto indicatehowmuchright theyhadtojudgeHunterCollegestudentsin this situation.Thequestionsread(a) “How intelligentdo youthink theothergroup is?” (b) “How responsibledo you think theothergroupis?”and(c) ‘How much do you think the Brooklyn group has the right to judgeyourassessmentsof thesuicidenotes?”Responseswere madeon Likert scalesrangingfrom 0 (Not at all) to 9 (Very Much).

Memory for Reasons

At the end of the experiment,researchparticipantscompleteda multiple-choicequestionin which they were askedto rememberwhy the othergroup wasjudging their ability to assesssuicidenotes.The first two choicesthat were givenweretakenverbatim from theexplanationscontainedin theexperimenters’scripts.The possibleresponseswere (A) “Becausethey are upper division Psychologystudentsandwork in a suicidepreventionunit,” (B) “Becausethe principal in-vestigatorgraduatedfrom Brooklyn Collegeand knows peoplefrom BrooklynCollege,” (C) “We weren’ttold,” and (D) “I don’t remember.”The purposeof thisitemwas to determinewhetherpeoplemisrememberedthe reasonsfor the powerdifferencesas more legitimatethan theyactuallywere.

Procedure

Researchparticipantsarrived in groups ranging in size from 3 to 8 (M =

4.67). They weregreetedby an undergraduateexperimenter(whowas unawareofthe hypothesesof the study),and they were first askedto choosea group name.Thesegroup namesweredisplayedon nametagsworn throughoutthe study. Toincreasefeelingsof groupnessbeforetheexperimentbegan,theexperimentertooka Polaroidpictureof the groupto helpidentify theparticipantsasonegroup.Afterthe participantswere seatedin the laboratory,the experimenterinformed themthat theirparticipationin the study, whichinvolved assessingpredictorsof suicide,would providehelpful information to the healthcareindustry. The suicidenotetask wasthendescribed.

Next, the experimenterstatedthat anotheroroup was seatedin an adjacentroom, which displayeda sign prominentlyon its door. Participantswereinformedthat thisgroupwascomposedof studentsfromBrooklynCollege.In the “No PowerDifferences”condition,researchparticipantswere simply told that theseotherstu-dentswould alsobetaking partin thesamestudy. In the threeconditionsinvolving

228 1-tames and lost

power differencesbetweenthe groups,participantswere told that the BrooklynCollegestudentswould be evaluatingtheir performanceon the suicidenote taskandwoulddecidewhentheFlunterCollegestudentscouldleavethe laboratory.Par-ticipantswere given no explanationfor the powerdifferences,or they were giveneitherthe legitimateor the illegitimate explanationfor the powerdifferences.

Theexperimenterthen statedthat it wasnecessaryto assessthe moodsof theresearchparticipants,becausemoodcouldaffecthow peoplejudgetheauthenticityof the suicidenotes.Following the ratingsof positiveandnegativeaffect,partici-pantsweregivenpairs of suicidenotesandwereaskedas agroupto identify whichof the two noteswas theauthenticone.Upon the group’scompletionof the task,

participantscompletedindividual questionnairesthat containedquestionsabouttheir understandingof the othergroup’scharacteristics(measuresof stereotypicalbeliefs). Whenthe participantsfinished this questionnaire,theexperimentertooktheassessmentsof thesuicidenotesout of theroom, presumablyso that theother

groupcouldjudgetheir ability. Theexperimenterthen askedparticipantsto com-pleteanotherquestionnairewhile they waited, and this questionnairecontaineditemsabouthow they perceivedthepowerdifferenceandits legitimacy and theirrecall for the explanationaboutpower. After all of the participantshad cornplete4this questionnaire,the experimenterre-enteredthe room andnotified the groupsthat they had donevery well andcould leave immediately.Researchparticipantswere debriefedlater as agroup onceall of the datawere collected.

RESULTS

Check on the Manipulation of Power

To ensurethat researchparticipantsin the experimentalconditionsdid per-ceive a power difference betweentheir group and the other group, they wereasked,“How muchcontrol do you feel that the Brooklyn Collegegrouphasoveryour group’s outcomesat themoment?” Resultsindicatethat in the threecon-ditions in which a powerdifferenceexisted(Legitimate [M = 4.58], Illegitimate

[M = 4.671andNo Explanation[M = 4.29]groups),participantsbelievedthat theoutgrouppossessedsignificantly morecontrol over their outcomesthan when nomanipulationof power existed,M = 2.17, F(3, 187) = 8.92, p < .0001.Thus,the manipulationof powerwas effective.

Ratingsof Positiveand Negative Atfect

Reliability scoresfor the measuresof positiveandnegativeaffectwere high= .84 and .85, respectively).Mean scores on positive and negative affect

were calculatedfor eachparticipant. Overall, participantsreportedmore posi-tive (M = 3.08,SD = 0.72)than negativeaffect(M = 1.36, SD = 0.49),andthetwo dimensionswere positively but not significantly correlated(r = .09, n.s).

Placaming thePowerless 229

Becausec6rrelationsbetweenpositive and negativeaffect were in the positive(ratherthan negative)directionandbecausea strongpreponderanceof positiveaf~fect was m-eported,we decidedto calculatea ratio of positiveto negativeaffectfor eachresearchparticipantand to use this measureas the dependentvariable inconductinginferentialstatistics.

Resultsindicatedthattherewere no statistically reliabledifferencesbetween

the “Legitimate Explanation”condition (M = 2.92)and the “Illegitimate Expla-nation” condition (M = 3.40)on the ratio of positiveto negativeaf~fect, t(92) =

—-.68, u.s. Whenthesetwo conditionswerecombined(M = 3.17), it appearsthatthey were successfulin producing an improvementin affect over the ‘No Ex-

planation”condition (M = 2.32). BecauseLevene’stestfor equalityof variancesindicatedthat therewas asignificantdifference in the variancesassociatedwiththe Explanation”and“No Explanation”conditions,F(l, 142) = 3.82 p = 05a t-test in which unequalvariancesareassumedwas usedto calculatethediffer-encein affect betweentheseconditions.This analysisindicatedthat the ratio ofpositive to negativeaf~fectwasindeedsignificantly higherwhen anexplanationforthepowerdifferenceswasgiventhan whenit wasnot, t(108.59)= 2.35, p = .02,supportingthe lirst hypothesis.

Stereotypical Beliefs Ahout the Outgroup

Undervarious conditions of power andexplanation, researchparticipantswere askedto estimatehow intelligentandresponsiblethe outgroupof BrooklynCollegestudentswas andhow much right they hadto judgetheperformanceofHunterCollegestudentson the suicide task.Two typesof multivariateanalyseswereconductedon thesethreedependentvariablesof perceivedintelligence,re-

sponsibility, and“right to judge.” In the first case,the ‘No Power” condition wascomparedto the threeconditionsin which power differencesdid exist, to deter-

minewhetherthepresenceof apowerdifferentialaffectedthestereotypicalbeliefsabouttheoutgroup.In thesecondcase,thecondition in which apowerdifferenceexistedbut no explanationwasgiven for it (the‘No Explanation” condition)was

comparedto the two conditionsin which explanationsweregiven for the power(lifference.This analysisenabledus to determinewhetherproviding explanationsincreasedthe useof systemjustifying stereotypes.

When the ‘No Power” condition wascomparedto the threeconditions inwhich powerdiffemencesexisted,a multivariateanalysisindicatedthat therewasan overall effect of power on the threestereotypicalratings taken as a whole,F(l, 187) = 3.39, p < .02. Univariateanalysesindicatedthat the presenceof a

power differentialbetweenthetwo groupsled theingroupof HunterCollegesam-(lentsto ratethe morepowerfulgroupof Brooklyn Collegestudentsassignificantlymoreintelligentandmoreresponsiblebut notashavingmoreofasiohtto-mi-jo—u ii-ieirwork. Meansandunivariateresultsarepresentedin Table I. It appearsthatresearchparticipantsdid usestereotypesto justify thepowerdifferencesacrosstheboard.

230 tlainesand lost

IaI)le I. Effectsof PowerDifferenceson StereotypicalBeliefsAhoot the Ootgroop

No powerdifferenees(n ~- 46)

Powerdifferences(0 = 146)

Univariate I(df= 1,189)

IntelligentResponsihleRight tojaclge”

5.87 (109)576 (152)480 (247)

624(116)644 (146)448 (236)

365*7.40”0.63 (os.)

Note. Highernnmhersindieatethat the outgronpwas ratedto he more iittelligent, more responsihle,and ashavingmoreof a right to judge.”

‘p < 06; **p < .01.

‘l’able tt. EffectsofExplanatinit for the PowerDifferenceson StereotypicalBeliefsAhout the Ootgronp

No cxplanatiott (n = 48) Explanation(n 97) UnivariateF (df I , 143)

Intelligertt 594 (102) 637 (1.21)) 461’Responsihle 5.88 (142) 670 (1.40) IIRight to judge” 3.75 (223) 485 (2.36) 720*~

Note. Higher numhersindicate that the otitgronpwas ratedto he more intelligent, moreresponsihle,and ashaving moteof a right to judge”

‘p < 05; “p .01; ~ < (101.

Looking only at those conditionsin which powerdifferencesexisted,wecomparedthe “No Explanation” condition to the two conditions in which anexplanationwas given. (There were again no differencesbetweenthe “Legiti-mate” and“Illegitimate” explanationconditions.)The analysisyieldedan overallmultivariateeffect of explanationon thethreestereotypicalbeliefs, F(l, 141) =

4.79, p < .005. Univariate analysesindicated that providing an explanation(whetherlegitimateor illegitimate)significantly increasedthe degreeto whichtheoutgroupwas perceivedas intelligent, responsible,andhaving a “right tojudge.”Meansand univariateresultsfor theeffectof explanationarepresentedin TableII.Thesedatasupport the notion that people are more likely to apply stereotypesthat justify the useof powerwhenthey are providedwith an explanationfor thepowerdifferencesthanwhen theyarenot.Onceagain,evenarelativelyillegitimateexplanationappearedto work as well as a more legitimateone.

Memory for Reasons

At theconclusionof theexperiment,participantswere askedto recall therea-sonthatwasgivenfor thepowerdifferencesbetweenBrooklyn CollegeandHunterCollege.Fourpossibleresponsesweregiven in a multiple-choicefom~mat: (A) “Be-causetheyareupperdivision Psychologystudentsandworkin asuicidepreventionunit,” (B) “Becausethe principal investigatorgraduatedfrom Brooklyn Collegeandknows peoplefrom Brooklyn College,” (C) “We weren’t told,” and (D) “Idon’t remember.”The first choice correspondedto the “Legitimate Explanation”

Placating the Powerless

TableIII. PercentChoosingEachReasonfor the PowerDifference(Within EachExperimentalCondition)

Noexplanation II legit mateexplanation Legitimateexplanation(u = 48) In = 43) (0 = 31)

Becausethey haveexperience 33.3 30.2 80.6Becausethey arefriends with 0 41.9 3.2the Principal Investigator”

“We weren’t told” 47.9 18.6 9.7‘~Doit’t rememher” 188 9.3 6.5

Note. Correctresponsesareitalicized.

‘fable tV. Chi—Square Analysisof Participants’ Memory for Power Explanations”

Memory for reason Expeeted Dhserved Difference

Legitimatepower 29 54 ±25Illegitimate power 39 19 -21)No explanation 39 34 —5

“(‘hi-square = 32.45- df= __

“p < .0001.

condition, the secondchoice referredto the “Illegitimate Explanation”condition,andthethird choiceappliedaccuratelytothe “No Explanation”condition.Theper-centagesof researchparticipantsselectingeachresponsearepresentedin TableIII,on the basisof assignmentto experimentalcondition.As canbe seen,peoplere-memberedthe reasonsas being more legitimate than they actuallywere. Thus,including theconditions in which (A) was nor the correctanswer,peoplechosethis option between30% and81% of the time. By contrast,including the condi-tions in which(B) was thecorrectanswer,peoplechosethis option lessthan 42%of the time. Roughly a third of researchparticipantswho were either given noexplanationor givenan illegitimate explanationrecalledfalselythattheyhadbeengivenalegitimateexplanationfor thepowerdifferences,whereasone-tenthof thatnumberrecalledfalselythattheyhadbeengivenan illegitimate explanation-whenthey hadin fact receivedalegitimate one.

Overall, inspectingonly the threeconditionsin whichpowerdifferencesac-tually existed,respondentschosethe “Legitimate” explanation50% of the timeon average(11 = 54), the“Illegitimate” explanation18%of thetime (n = 19), andthe “No Explanation”choice32%of the time (n = 34). Theresultsof achi-squaretestof independencereveal that not only do peopleforget why theother grouphaspower over them, but theymisrementher illegitimate explanationsfor poweras legitimate explanationsx(2, n = 107) = 32.45, p < .0001. (Actual andex-pectedvaluesfor thechi-squaretestarelistedin Table IV.) Theseresultsindicatethat many more participantsrecalleda legitimatebasisfor the powerdifferencesthan was actually the case.

23t

232 1-lames and jost

DISCUSSION

In an experimentalstudy involving power differencesbetweengroups,wefound thatexplanationsthatwerepretestedas illegitimate in natureworkedjust aswell aslegitimate explanationsin makingmembersof powerlessgroupsfeel betterabouttheir plight andin increasingthe likelihood of stereotypingthe powerfuloutgr()upin favorableterms.Although pretestingindicatedthatprovidingsomeonewith poweron thebasisof friendship(as opposedto expertise)would beperceivedas an illegitimate explanation,it may be that whenpowerlesspeople are faced

with an actual(rather thana hypothetical)situation, they arefar more likely tolend legitimacyto a situation involving nepotism,insofaras theyaremotivatedto

providejustificationsfor theotherparty’spower.Thus,peoplemaybeinurewillingto acceptrelatively illegitimmtte accountsthan is commonly assumed,possiblybecausethey assumethat beingofferedsomekind of an explanationis at leastsomeindication that their perspectiveis beingconsidered.

Comparedwith a condition in which no explanationwasgivenfor thepowerdifferences,we found that providing thepowerlesswith either alegitimate or anillegitimate explanationincreasedthe ratioof positiveto negativeaffect thattheyreported.An illegitimate account,in other words, servedto placatethe powerless.

With regardto stereotypes,peopleassignedto conditionsin which the outgroupoccupiedaposition of relativepowerbelievedthat outgroupmemberswere moreintelligentandmoreresponsiblethanwhenthesameommtgroupdid notoccupyapo-

sition of power.Furthermore,providing anexplanation(legitimateor illegitimate)for thepowerdifferencesincreasedtheextentof suchstereotyping.

Finally, we found that peoplemisrememberedthe explanationsthat were

given to them asmore legitimate thanthey actually were. More than 30 percentof researchparticipantswho weregiven no explanationor given an illegitimateexplanationrecalled falsely that they had beengiven a legitimate explanationfor the power differences,whereasonly 3 percentof researchparticipantswhoweregivena legitimateexplanationrecalledfalsely that they had beengiven anillegitimate explanation.Thus, it appearsthat there is a tendencyin memorytorememberthingsasmorelegitimatethan theyactuallyare. To ourknowledge,thisis the first study to documentasystem-servingbias in memory.

All of thesefindings supportasystemjustification framework,in whichpeo-ple arehypothesizedto provide cognitive and ideological supportfor the statusquo,evenwhenthey arein astateof disadvantageorpowerlessness.Thus,systemjustification theorypredictsthat peoplewill be biasedto perceivesocialeventsandhierarchicalstructuresin such a waythat their legitimacyis preservedor en-hanced.We havereportedevidenceof this legitimmttion biason measuresof affect,stereotyping,andmemory. This supportsthenotion that cognition is deployedinthe serviceof thesocial system(Jost, in press).

Of course,therearesomelimitations of thestudy thatdeservemention.Foronething,membersof thepowerfulandpowerlessgroupsdid not actuallyinteract

Placating thePowerless 233

during the experimentalsession,and sotheirjudgmentsof the situationwererel-atively abstract.We do not know whetherbehavioralinteractionin this contextwould haveled to expectancyconfirmation and the strengtheningof powerdif-ferences(e.g., Copeland, 1994; Ridgeway, in press),or an opportunity for thepowerlessto questionandchallengetheothergroup’ssuperiority. A secondlimi-tati()nis thatthe taskandthenatureof theoutcomedependencewereprobablynotas personallyinvolving as in many “real world” examplesof power differencesbetweengroups.As a result, theremay havebeenmore “mindless” acceptanceof legitimating accounts(e.g., Langeret a!., 1978)than would be thecaseundermore consequentialcircumstances.A study by KonovskyandFolger (1991), forinstance,found that layoff victims werenotespeciallyswayedby theexplanationsgiven to them. A third limitation is that ourstudy doesnot distinguishfully be-tweenthetendencyto justify powerdifferencesbetweengroupsandthe tendency

to justify the powerof theexperimenter.It maybethat theillegitimate explanationwasacceptedat leastin partbecauseof amnotivatedtendencyto experiencetheex-perimenter’sauthority as legitimate.Finally, a fourthlimitation is thatourresearch

hasnot examinedsituationsin whichextremelyillegitimate accountsareofferedfor power differences.Although our instructionsfor the “illegitimate” conditionwereselectedon the basisof pretestingin which friendshipandfavoritism wereratedas very low in legitimacyas reasonsfor providing power, it seemsthat intheexperimentalsession,researchparticipantsdid not experience-the-screasons-asvery illegitimate. In manyways,this finding reflectswell thephenomenonof sys-temjustification, that is, the tendencyto enhancethe legitimacyof socialevents;

but, it is also the casethat an extremelyillegitimate basisfor power differences(suchas racialor genderpreferences)mieht havebeenlessreadily acceptedbyresearchparticipants.

Despitethe fact that further researchis neededbeforedrawing strongcon-clusionsaboutthe easewith which thepowerlessmay be placated,it seemsthatthis studydoesprovidesomeinsightinto socialpsychologicalresponsesto powerdifferencesbetweengroups.Specifically, we have found that providing peoplewith anexplanationmakesthem feel betteraboutbeingin aposition of low power,and it leadsthem to rationalizethe status quo to agreaterdegree.Our researchsuggests,furthermore,that membersof powerlessgroupsengagein an active aswell aspassiveacceptanceof theirposition, asreflectedin stereotypicaljudgmentsandmemorybiases.Thus,theacceptanceof illegitimate explanationsmaybemorethan mere“mindlessness,”as Langereta!. (1978)haveassumed.In somecases,acceptancemay reflect the systemjustifying propensitiesof potential targetsofsocial influence.

Theseresults,perhaps,provide woiTisomeencouragementfor the Machi-avelliansamongus (e.g.,ChristieandGeis, 1970),who might be inspiredby theknowledgethat, undersomecircumstancesat least,placebicexplanations(or evenrelatively illegitimate) explanationsfor power work just as well as legitimate cx-planations.In anycase,we havefoundthatproviding anexplanationmakespeople

234 Ilaines and lost

feel better~nd stereotypemorein systemjustifying waysthanwhen theyare givenno explanationfor powerdifferences.This techniqueof (pseudo-)explanationmay thereforebe addedto the list of proceduraltacticsthat servetoenhancelegiti-macyandincreaselevelsof obedienceandcompliance(e.g., Lind andTyler, 1988;Tyler, 1990).In the contextof respondingto powerrelationsamonggroups,ourresearchsuggeststhat peoplearenotassensitiveto the relativequalityoradequacyof explanationsas has beenfound in prior researchon social andpsychologicalresponseto deceit, paycuts,or layoffs (Greenberg,1990;Konovsky andFolger,1991;Shapiro,1991).

Thepresentresearchshould be useful, at the sametime, to anyonewho isinterestedin attemptingto changethe status quo, to the extentthat this kind ofresearchilluminatessomeof the psychologicalobstaclesto thedelegitimationofpowerdifferences.Theknowledgethat peopleexhibitsystemjustifyingbiaseswithregardto memoryand stereotyping,for instance,shouldbe integral to thework ofanyonewho is seekingto undo suchbiases.Similarly, an awarenessthat peoplecanbe placatedby relatively illegitimateexplanationsmight leadoneto be morevigilant in evaluatingthe quality andstrengthof explanationsthat are given forpowerdifferencesandtopromotewarningsaboutthepotenfialforpotiticaldarnagethat existswhen pseudo-explanationsare accepted.Although the presentstudysuggeststhat membersof a powerlessgroupare to someextent willing to grantlegitimacy in a relatively uncritical manner,it also helps to identify someof thepsychologicalprocessesthat mustbeovercomein orderfor groupconsciousness-raising to occur.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful to Vita Rabinowitz of the City University of New York forher assistancewith datacollectionandto RonaldDillehay, OrsolyaHunyady,andLarissaTiedensfor very helpful commentson earlierdraftsof this article.

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