HALLIN MANCINI Comparing Media Systems

8/19/2019 HALLIN MANCINI Comparing Media Systems

1/21

Comparing Media Systems

A Response to Critics

Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini

the preface to Comparing Media Systems we wrote that we would be satisfied if our book

e to spark a more developed discussion of theory and method in the comparative study of m

d politics, and inspire more comparative studies in that area. Several years after the publicati

book, we can “officially” declare that we are satisfied with the results. Comparing M

stems has been widely discussed, and the framework we propose has been used extensively in

oretical reflection and empirical research. Of course, not all the reactions to our book have

sitive, even if those who have commented on it have almost always acknowledged its impor

d its role in fostering comparative research on media and politics. In this paper we want to res

some of the criticisms that have been advanced and some of the issues that have arisen as our s been analyzed, applied, and tested. We will be selective: the range of responses is wide an

not have space to address all the issues that have arisen.

Our objective here is not so much to defend ourselves as to deepen the discussion about the t

dressed in the book which, as we have said, was our main enterprise to begin with. Actually, m

servations about the limitations of our book, which are advanced as criticisms, are points w

ppy to endorse. Our book does have limitations— many of them. Some of them we intended,

se out of the limits of our own knowledge, and some reflected the state of the field. We consi

portant to clarify these limits, and in some cases we have been as much troubled by endorsemour book that push our analysis beyond what it can reasonably be expected to do as by cr

mment on its limits. In what is probably the most critical commentary on the book we have

ppa Norris (2009) concludes that “the Hallin and Mancini framework suffers from several m

ortcomings that need to be addressed before we can conclude that this provides an approp

nceptual typology for the subfield” (p. 331). This is a conclusion we can certainly endorse, a

ver intended our book to be taken as providing a comprehensive conceptual framework fo

mparative analysis o f media systems. This is most obviously so because it dealt only with a na

nge o f cases— 18 wealthy capitalist democracies in North America and Western Europe. But

cause that would be too much for a single work to pretend, particularly in an emerging field w

re is a limited literature, both empirical and theoretical, on which to build. We intended our

begin a process of developing an adequate framework for comparative analysis in this area, n

d it.

We will discuss five main clusters of issues here: (1) problems related to classification of m

stems according to our three models; (2) the issue of “media system” as a unit of analysis; (3

estion of omitted variables in our analysis; (4) questions regarding the empirical validation o

ology; and (5) the issue of convergence or “homogenization.”


2/21

MODELS AND CLASSIFICATION

arting with the first discussions of Comparing Media Systems (Couldry, 2005; McQuail,

tterson, 2007) reviewers have raised questions related to the classification of media systems

typology provided by our three models. Three kinds of criticisms have been raised: the first

our view the most important, is related to fundamental question of whether classification of m

stems according to such a typology is really a useful way to approach comparative analy

cond set of criticisms has to do with issues concerning whether we correctly classified parti

ses we were analyzing; and a third, with the applicability of our typology to cases outside the

our original analysis. We will not elaborate on this last point here, which is extensively discu

a forthcoming edited book (Hallin & Mancini, 2012). We will only underscore the point we m

Comparing Media Systems, that, although we think the models we propose may be of some u

nts of comparison, particularly given their influence on other parts of the world, our mode

ended to identify particular patterns of media system development in Western Europe and N

merica, and we do not think they should be “applied” in any direct way to any but perhaps a

w cases1 outside the scope of our analysis. In the concluding lines of our book we w

ubstantial modifications would need to be made to our models to apply them” beyond their ori

ope, and that “they would be useful primarily as an inspiration for creating new models bas

ailed research into specific media and political systems” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 306).

On the second point too, we can be relatively brief. Our three models were conceived as

es: we were well aware that individual cases did not fit them exactly, and that schola

rticular countries might raise issues about the classification of particular cases. As Norris n

classification was not based on “standardized indicators or a set of explicit decision rules,” s

we noted in the book, the field has not developed and collected such indicators, nor is thereed-upon theoretical basis for weighting them 2 We proposed what we described as “tent

gments about the similarity [of the 18 cases] to the ideal types represented by our three mo

71). In the absence of the kind of indicators Norris refers to, we sent the manuscri

tinguished colleagues in all countries involved and asked if the classification of the parti

ses they studied seemed reasonable. No criticism was raised at this regard. Of course, this i

dence for the correctness of the analysis; we bring it up only to make clear how consciou

re about the risks involved in this kind of classification. Despite this procedure we fully exp

ues to be raised after the publication of the book, both because it is dificult to masteeratures on so many cases and because there are tensions inherent in the kinds of generalization

re putting forward, which can never do justice to all the specificities of particular cases. We

ually been pleasantly surprised that the objections have been relatively limited. Introducin

ted collection in which scholars from the Nordic countries debate the extent to which

mework can illuminate the media systems of their region, Strõmback, 0rsten, and Aalberg (2

us on this tension, arguing that, “while it might be reasonable from a global or internat

rspective,” our classification of those cases as relatively pure exemplars of a single Demo

rporatist model “triggered the question as to whether the Nordic countries really are so simi


3/21

ch other as suggested by Hallin and Mancini. Certainly from an everyday Swedish, Finni

nish perspective, the differences between one’s own country and the other Nordic countries m

en be as prominent as the similarities” (p. 14). Nevertheless, they concluded that “the indiv

untry chapters suggest that the Nordic countries, including Iceland, in many ways do fit Halli

ancini’s description of the democratic corporatist model” (p. 268).

Others have disagreed more strongly. Some of the criticisms seem to us to ignore our plea th

ouping of cases in relation to models “is not meant to substitute for the more complex discus

introduce in the second half of the book (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 71). Norris (2009), C011), and Humphreys (2011), for example, complain that we lump Britain and the U.S. tog

der the category of the Liberal model despite obvious and important differences like the exis

strong media partisanship and strong public service broadcasting in the UK. In introducin

ee models, however, we write “although the United States and Britain ... are often lumped tog

with good justification up to a point—as liberal systems we shall try to show that they are

ferent in important ways and that the common idea of an ‘Anglo-American’ model of journali

part a myth” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 69). We reiterate this point in the first paragraph o

apter on the Liberal model, and go on to describe Britain as a mixed case combining elemenberal and Democratic Corporatist models; we considered this point about the heterogeneity o

untries we grouped under the Liberal model as a central point of that section of our book. Sti

im of Norris (2009, p. 334) that media systems in Britain and the United States seem to

most nothing in common” seems hyperbolic. As Strombàck, 0rsten, and Aalberg (2008) note

the risks that comparative research has to avoid is that of taking one’s own country, o

rticular cases one knows, as a sort of universal reference, where distinctive features of those

me to take on exaggerated importance, preventing generalizations that might be more use

oader comparative analysis.

Certainly, however, many observations of the ways in which particular cases deviate from

al types are likely to prove important and to raise interesting theoretical questions. Schol

rtugal, for example (a country about which we had relatively limited information), have obs

t although Portugal may at one time have resembled our Polarized Pluralist model fairly close

s in recent years diverged significantly from it, moving away, for example, from the pol

ralle lism that characterizes Spain, Italy, or Greece. If this is right, it raises questions about h

count for a shift that our relatively path-dependent model would seem not to predict. Hump

011) points to the decentralized television system in Germany as a clear and important differ

th other systems we classify under the Democratic Corporatist model and also to the diff

sons that gave birth to commercialization in Greece if compared with the other Mediterr

untries (also noted in Kogen, 2010). Hardy points to a number of other issues with

ssifications, both in his book (Hardy, 2008) and his chapter (Chapter 11) in this Handbook.

Beyond the question of whether we have classified particular cases correctly, there is a

neral question about whether typologies of the sort represented by our three models are real

y forward in comparative analysis of media systems. Humphreys (2011), for example, ar

ther than expend time and energy on producing neat typologies, it is much more importa


4/21

plore in depth a more comprehensive range of variables” that bear on the complex media-po

ationship” (p. 154). The fact is that since Max Weber—as Patterson (2007) notes in a revie

mparing Media Systems — classifications have been used to study society. Classifications a

neralization: they serve to list and order features that are common to different realities, phenom

d situations. These observed features can be extended to cases beyond those that are

servation, allowing the generalization that is one of the main aims of scientific observation

oposed our three ideal types as a way of pointing out broad patterns in the development

ationship between media and political systems, which seemed to us an essential step in a fiich most scholars were still confined within the specificity o f particular systems they studied

spect that other scholars are likely to follow our example and propose other such ideal type

ove useful in identifying patterns that characterize significant numbers of cases.

We must confess, at the same time, that we are not happy in important ways with the use tha

en made of our three models, and we think that Humphreys‘ fear about “neat typolo

bstituting for detailed analysis is legitimate. Our three models were intended to illustrate the re

t could be accomplished through the application of the suggested interpretive schema based o

oposed lis t of variables. Instead, many scholars have taken our models to be, in themselveerpretive framework. We believe this is a reductive reading of our book, and we think it is in

cause of this “preferred” reading that many scholars have found our classifications unsatisfa

d limited. We have noticed, for example, that our typology is often used for selecting cases, th

holars will do a study of some phenomenon related to political communication and pick a

rresponding to each of our three models. To some extent, this makes sense— at least it

vance that the field is more aware now that systems differ, and that one may get different re

king cases that belong to different categories. Often, however, it seems to us that relatively

ught has been devoted to the question of how systems belonging to our different models cou

pected to differ with respect to the particular phenomenon in question, or to the ways the sp

ses chosen—which after all will not correspond to the ideal type in every detail—might or

t be distinctive with respect to those phenomena. We do not think that classification is an e

elf, and we did not intend our three models to be used mainly as a classification system

ended them to be used to think about patterns and why they exist and, precisely, for comparing

particular case fits or does not fit a pattern that characterizes other cases, and why? We d

vocate that comparative analysis be built primarily around such typologies.


5/21

COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS, OR WHAT?

e second issue has to do with the scope of our analysis. The book is called Comparing M

stems, but, as many have noted, it does not deal with media systems in their entirety. It doe

al with the film or television or music industries as such, for example. It is concerned wit

ationship between media and politics, and therefore focuses on news media and to some exte

dia regulation. Many have questioned whether the scope is clearly and properly defined, and

legitimate questions. Kraidy (2012) has argued that more attention should be paid to entertain

a factor in the relationship between media and politics, and Hardy makes a similar point in

ume in calling for more attention to the “cultural domain” beyond news and political journa

mphreys (2011) argues that if we separated the analysis of media policy specifically from

alysis of journalism we would get different results. Norris (2009) suggests comparing “syste

itical communication” rather than “media systems.” All of these are reasonable suggestions, a

it seems to be an open question to ask which elements of this domain would make sense to com

thin an analysis and for what purposes. Moving to narrow levels of analysis, as Hump

ggests, is likely to make sense for many purposes, but we are likely to want to ask at some

ether a broader context needs to be taken into account. Whatever system we deal with is

ely to prove complex and heterogeneous. Norris (2009), for example, worries “how we can d

media system across such disparate phenomena” (p. 328) as broadsheet newspapers, ta

wspapers, broadcasting, new media, etc. But would a system of political communication

volve less disparate phenomena? Would we not have to take into account all those same m

enomena plu s political parties, election campaigns, social movements, corporate public rela

d, as Kraidy says, entertainment? No doubt comparative analysis will have to proceed us

mber of different levels of analysis, with an awareness that no one delimitation of the scope old will be adequate for all purposes.

A related issue has to do with the concept of system, and the question of whether thinking in t

media systems involves assumptions of unity, coherence, and stability that distorts the varia

relations between media and politics (McCargo, 2012). We adopted this idea from the traditi

mparative politics and comparative sociology as it seemed to offer the possibility to analy

ole set of interconnections. As Almond & Powell (1966) state in their seminal wor

mparative politics, the concept of systems directs “attention to the entire scope of pol

ivities within a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be located” (pe reason we consider the comparative method important has to do with the fact that it offer

ssibility to deal with the impact of institutions and of culture at the macro-level, and in that sen

orrection to the dominance of the behaviorist tradition, with its individual-level focus, in emp

earch in communication. We do not mean to bring in the assumptions of structural-functiona

ich we would consider only one of many ways of thinking about social or political systems

we believe the concept of system needs to imply either stability or unity, but only pattern

erconnection. Bastiansen (2008) makes a good case for the use of the concept of media syste

torical studies of system change:


6/21

The purpose o f such studies will ... be to investigate the totality that emerges when one look

at the various interconnected mass media ... and focuses on the relations between them. Th

approach is usually based on the principle that the totality of such a system is more than th

sum of its parts: the interdependence that exists between different mass media is dificult t

identify as long as each medium is investigated separately. (p. 104)

We would add that the relevant system may also include non-media elements which also

ations of interdependence with mass media: political parties, for example, or the state. It is

wever, that other units of comparison are possible and may make sense in many cases, incl

mparisons o f particular kinds of events (political crises or decisions) or o f processes (Rouda

11), and we would not argue that all comparative research in media studies or pol

mmunication need focus on “media systems.”


7/21

a n a l y t i c v a r i a b l e s

e third issue has to do with the question of omitted variables. Our analysis is based on two s

alytical variables or dimensions, summarized by Hardy (Chapter 11, in this volume), which w

comparing media systems and for analyzing the political context that affects their develop

itics have raised many issues both about the conceptualization of the variables included in

alysis and about omitted variables. One reason we followed a “most similar systems” design

limit the number of variables we had to deal with, which we considered important in part bec

believed many of the concepts involved had not been thought through very fully in the ex

erature and needed extensive reconceptualization. This implies, of course, that the list of vari

consider, and the conceptualization of these variables—the particular values of them we di

is tied to the cases we analyzed. As a consequence, scholars studying other parts of the world

mplain about a “bias toward mature democracies” (Hadland, 2012)—and with good reason, a

in fact the scope of our analysis. Very clearly, new variables and new conceptualization

quired to extend the kind of analysis we carried out beyond the Western democracies that ar

cus. A project we carried out together with scholars working on a number of “non-West

stems deals more fully with some of the issues that have been raised in this context (Hall

ancini, 2012). To give one example of the kinds of conclusions that emerge from that project

ar that the discussion of political parallelism provided in Comparing Media Systems is cl

d to a particular Western history of mass political parties strongly rooted in social and econ

erests and competing in a pluralist political order. Once we expand the range of cases we cl

ve to deal with other kinds of party systems, including non-competitive ones, with systems in w

rties are weak or non-existent, and with systems in which contending political, social, and cu

ces are organized outside the framework of Western-style parties and interest groups, accorditions of an authoritarian elite, for example, or around racial or ethnic groups. This unders

rdy’s call (Chapter 11, in this volume) for more attention to the structure of civil society and

roader consideration of social actors and their communications.”

Even within the scope of our analysis, many legitimate issues have been raised. One of the

vious has to do with new media: Hardy (2008, and in this volume), Norris (2009), and a numb

her critics have noted the fact that new media are absent from our analysis. The first media sy

mension considered in Comparing Media Systems is the structure of media markets, and we

re primarily on newspaper markets, which differ sharply among the cases we considered, in believe are deeply rooted and strongly connected with differences in the cultural and pol

es of the media. There are many other aspects of media markets that might be considered, bu

st obvious element missing from our analysis is clearly an engagement with new media

son is simple enough: we didn‘t know of any significant body of comparative research at the

t addressed new media. Obviously, however, this has to be a priority for the field.

Another issue related to the structure of media markets, raised by numerous scholars incl

mphreys (2011), McQuail (2005), and Puppis (2009), has to do with market size. The argume

part, that the media systems of small countries are likely to be affected by neighboring or by r


8/21

d bigger countries, which may penetrate their media markets in various ways. Puppis (2009) a

t this reality has important implications for media policy in small states, and refe

tzenstein‘s (1985) hypothesis on corporatism in small countries stressing how corporatism

ect also the structure and the regulation of the mass media.

McQuail and Humphreys have noted that we did not include regional differences in the stru

media systems in our analysis. Humphreys is specifically pointing out the necessity to in

entralization vs. decentralization” as a variable, referring particularly to the German case.

ample illustrates the tension between generalization and specificity that affects much comparrk, and most obviously a broad synthetic analysis of the sort we had undertaken. In both Ger

d Spain the television system is organized on a regional basis, but this seemed to us to repres

ry specific feature of these two countries, important to understanding those cases, but less rel

others we were considering. Perhaps, however, this should be seen as a special case o

oader point Hardy makes (Chapter 11, in this volume) about “geo-cultural” patterns which de

m a “nation-centric” framework and which would also include the kinds of transnational

ich, as Puppis and others argue, affect small states, or which are clearly extremely important i

ab world (e.g., Kraidy, 2012; Lynch, 2006). Norris (2009; see also Norris, Chapter 22 , in this volume) argues that press freedom shou

egrounded as a criterion for distinguishing media systems, particularly since cross-nat

antitative measures are available from a variety of institutions. In our analysis, press freedom

cussed as a component of the role of the state, as well as in the historical discussion o

velopment of media markets. But it did not play a major role in distinguishing the three mo

ce the differences among them in this regard are small. As Norris notes, it would obvious

re important in a wider comparative analysis (Hadland, 2012). It is worth signaling some cau

re, however. In the first place, the quantitative measures Norris refers to, and relies on (in Ch

in this volume), are not based on systematic theoretical reflection rooted in comparative ana

d many issues remam to be resolved about how to compare press freedom across systems.3 Se

concept of press freedom has a strong normative inflection and as it has been used in m

dies over many years is essentially a measure of distance from a norm rooted in North Am

d Northern Europe. That doesn’t mean we should avoid it as a tool of comparative analysis,

es mean that a comparative analysis that foregrounds this dimension too much is likely to pro

kind of dichotomy that characterized the analysis of Four Theories o f the Press, in which

eral systems are understood primarily by what they are not. Furthermore, we may never get t

nt of analyzing in more detail the full range of social roles the state and media actually pl

se systems (Zhao, 2012).


9/21

EMPIRICAL VALIDATION

e issue of measuring press freedom leads directly to a fourth fundamental issue. One of the

portant critiques made by Norris (2009) is the charge that our analysis is “impressionistic”

ks “empirical validation.” She writes, “it remains unclear whether the concepts propose

llin and Mancini can be clearly related to broader theoretical concerns in mass communicatio

ll as operationalizable when applied to research” (Norris, 2009, p. 335). This is a poin

serves some discussion because it touches a central problem in comparative research in m

dies. At one level we can say that Norris is clearly right. We describe our analysis as a “tenta

d “exploratory” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 302) one that would need to be tested by emp

earch, and it remains very much open to question to what extent the tentative generalization

ke will stand up to empirical research or the conceptual framework more generally will p

eful for carrying it forward. Some elements of Norris’s (2009) discussion are troubling t

wever, and seem to suggest differences about how the field is likely to advance.

One thing that is worth clarifying at the outset is that because our book was not primarily foc

setting forth hypotheses, with much of our conceptual framework it will make less sense to

an it be verified?” than to ask, “Is it useful?” As Lakatos (1970, p. 137) argues, it often m

nse to appraise what he calls “research programs” not so much on the basis of whether they

en “verified”—many valuable ones never will be— but on the basis of their “heuristicpower

me cases, this will mean precisely the power of the framework to generate testable hypothes

case of our framework, this will probably be true less of the three models than of many embe

servations about relationships among variables; we certainly agree with Norris (2009) i

servation that it is important to “test rigorously how far the different dimensions actually c

ether in meaningful ways” (p. 334). For example, in the case of the difference in mrtisanship between the U.S. and Britain—which has generated so much angst among those who

t if they are both classified as “liberal,” they shouldn’t differ in such way—we can put forwa

pothesis that the degree of media partisanship depends not on the fact of commercialization (a

en been assumed) but on political culture and the nature of the party system, or (more likely

spect) on market structure, and in particular on whether there are multiple competitors in the

rket (as in the national British market) or few (as in the local U.S. one). In other cases, asking

eful” may mean asking, for example, whether our three models are useful as points of comparis

ether it is useful to compare East European media systems with Southern European ones, as abeginning to ask, “What is distinctive about the East European pattern and what is not?” Are

mmon patterns that might be generalizable? Are there differences that suggest new variabl

roduce? Or it may mean asking, “Is it useful to think of political parallelism as a def

mension of a media system?” Does it produce meaningful comparisons across systems, or secto

media system? Does it help us to conceptualize processes of change or the effects of new m

w far could we generalize the concept beyond the multiparty democracies of Western Eu

ould we learn something if we tried to?

The fact that we presented the analysis of Comparing Media Systems for the most part w


10/21

pirical validation had to do with two considerations. First, as we argued in the introduction t

ok, there is clearly a shortage of data on all the aspects we consider essential to compar

alysis of the relationships between mass media and political institutions. More fundamentally

ng behind this vacuum of data, is the fact that for the most part comparative research in m

dies has been carried out within a theoretical vacuum: data are collected in relationsh

ferent aspects of the structure and the performance of the mass media, but these data are no

thin a more comprehensive interpretive framework. In our view, it is this lack of theore

lection that ultimately lies behind the “Babelian” experience which Norris (2009) semparative research in media studies and very legitimately would like to rectify, or the frustr

t Livingstone (2003) notes as characteristic of many comparative projects, as each member

earch team represents and works on his or her own country, and it is never clear whether the

lly working within a common framework. We believed that conceptual clarification and th

lding had to come first, before empirical research could advance further, and that wa

phasis of Comparing Media Systems. Norris’s discussion seems to us to imply a kin

easurement first, conceptualization after,” approach—a rush to produce standardized measure

pothesis testing across large numbers of cases before we are really sure what we want to mead why, and an impatience with the kinds of interpretive research that would take the first ste

sing these issues—that makes us uncomfortable. Our hesitations about using existing measur

ess freedom without thinking through the conceptual basis of what we would consider a very

ncept is one example. Similarly, Norris (2009) writes about measuring professionalizati

rnalism through “proxy indicators” such as existence of journalism training departments

creditation procedures. Thinking through the concept ofjournalistic professionalism more fully

principal focus of Comparing Media Systems, and, although our conceptualization of the conc

course open to debate, we would consider these very superficial indicators which might or m

t be correlated with the things we conceive as defining the concept. (This evidence suggest

creditation of journalists—which in Western Europe would be characteristic particularly o f

d France—is negatively correlated with professionalization as we define it.)

Norris’s discussion also seems to us to identify empirical research too narrowly

antification. This is ironic in a way, because Norris spends a lot of time talking about how dif

s likely to be to quantify the things we care about in the study of media and politics—we mak

nt also in Comparing Media Systems — so much so that she comes close to convincing us t

insist on quantification the field will never be able to advance! We certainly do believe

antitative data will be important to operationalizing many of the things we want to stu

mparative analysis o f media systems (see Benson & Hallin, 2007). But we also suspect that a

progress in empirical research in our field will have to come from “qualitative” or p

alitative studies of various kinds, using ethnographic, historical, or case-study methods, w

ich the process of “structured, focused comparison” (George & McKeowan, 1985) cou

ried out. There are ersatz forms of quantification that are often used in large-N studi

mparative politics and comparative political sociology, of course, in which specialists on va

ses are asked to rate them on particular dimensions (press freedom ratings actually rely heavi


11/21

s kind of procedure). This approach could also be attacked as “impressionistic,” but it has va

these fields in part because they have long traditions of detailed research on particular cases

ry importantly, common conceptual frameworks that are the result of considerable theore

lection. It will be a gradual process to get to that point in the comparative study of media syste


12/21

CRITIQUE OF THE HOMOGENIZATION THESIS

e fifth issue concerns convergence. In the last chapter of Comparing Media Systems we ob

t “in 1970s the differences among the three groups of countries characterized by our three m

re quite dramatic; a generation later, by the beginning of the 21st century the differences

oded to the point that it is reasonable to ask whether a single global media model is displacin

ional variation of the past, at least among the advanced capitalist democracies discussed in

ok” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 251). We went on to offer an analysis of the forces of ch

thin European societies which had produced significant erosion of the national differences w

the main focus of our book. This shift can be seen roughly as a convergence toward the li

del in the sense that market forces have become more dominant in European media systems

dia forms rooted in the political world of parties and organized social groups have declined.

apter has been a focus of criticism, particularly by scholars who study parts of the world be

estern Europe (Hadland, 2012), and we have sometimes been characterized as putting forw

nd o f “end of history” prediction of a global triumph of the Liberal model (McCargo, 2012).

We were surprised at that interpretation, in part because that chapter had been added at the e

r book in response to early criticisms of our unpublished manuscript which took us to tas

cusing excessively on differences among Western media systems that may have been very sh

neration ago, but were less so today. What we stated at the beginning of the chapter—tha

ferences among the countries we studied had diminished over time—was simple and we r

ant it to be taken in that way. This seems to us to clearly be true. At one point in Contin

rope party newspapers were dominant, now commercial newspapers dominate everywhere; a

me only some of these countries had commercial broadcasting, now commercial broadcastin

largest market share virtually all across the region. Some elements of this process will be fouher regions; media have become more commercialized in much of the world, for instance

rnalistic practices rooted in the Liberal model have had important influence (e.g., Wais

00). One of the most fundamental premises of our book, though, is the idea that media pra

e their meaning within wider structural and cultural contexts; we do not believe that m

ctices or institutions can simply be transferred across contexts without being transformed, an

d not intend the discussion of convergence in Western media systems to be projected onto th

the world any more than any other part o f our analysis. Even within the scope of our analysi

d not mean to be taken as endorsing the idea that a “single global media model” would inplace all national differences. The subtitle of the chapter was “The forces and limi

mogenization [emphasis added],” and we concluded that “differences among media systems re

bstantial and are likely to prevent complete homogenization of media systems for the forese

ure” (p. 295). Our own research (Benson & Hallin, 2007) and research by others (Aalberg

lst, & Curran, 2010) has subsequently confirmed the persistence of the kinds of differences tha

main focus of our analysis. We also observed that convergence was not a one-way street, and

Liberal model was also in a process of flux, with journalistic professionalism declining i

S., especially with respect to information-centered journalism giving way to opinion-cen


13/21

rnalism and a rise in political parallelism.5 Finally, we offered a critique of straigh

olutionist conceptions of change in media systems which assume an inevitable movement to

ferentiation of media from other subsystems.

An aside here about differentiation and the Liberal Model in our analysis is worth adding

ok published just as our chapter was going to press, Curran (2011) argues that we prese

erly rosy view of the history of the Liberal—or, specifically the American media system, whi

real focus—as one of increasing differentiation of the media from the political system

mary focus is on U.S. media coverage of foreign policy. He reviews the extensive literature (it our own!) documenting the history of media deference to political elites as the U.S. has pe

imperial foreign policy in the Post-World war II period. And he concludes (p. 34) “Ame

dia may be independent of political parties, but they are tethered to America’s political class

sometimes strongly influenced by government). But this is exactly what we argue. Our sectio

role of the state in liberal systems concludes by developing the argument that structural lim

role of the state in Liberal systems do not mean that the state has less influence on the conte

ws, in part, though not exclusively, because of the imperial histories of the U.S. and Britain

e the same literature Curran reviews, and conclude that news content in liberal systemwerfully shaped by interpretive frameworks originating within the institutions of the stat

4).” Later, in our discussion of differentiation theory, we make the argument that although m

y have become more differentiated from political parties and social groups, it can be argued

came more integrated with the state, in different ways in the different systems we discuss, incl

Liberal. Curran goes on to charge us with “exaggerating the way [commercialization

couraged media independence from political power (p. 46).” Commercialization has obvi

creased the role of the state in Western Europe in important ways, as funder and regulator

ample, and has increased the centrality of media relative to parties. That does not mean, how

t it increases the independence of media from structures of power in any way, especially econ

wer. We try to make this clear in our critique of differentiation theory. We do, of course, con

effect of commercialization on media and social power an empirical question, and we w

nsider this a key area for comparative research.

In his discussion of our convergence chapter, Humphreys (2011) contrasts the converg

pothesis with what he calls a “historical institutionalist perspective” which in the study of m

licy has shown considerable continuity in national policy styles. We are very sympathetic to

proach, and indeed the main body of our book relies quite heavily on it. But it does seem ther

nger—as critics of our initial manuscript had argued—in advancing an argument that is too ri

h-dependent and does not offer the possibility to account for change. There is not a rigid c

tween the two perspectives. Change does take place, both through internal processes and th

ogenous forces, but it may be modified or take different routes in different systems. Profess

ctices and attitudes, or legislative or structural arrangements adopted from other countrie

ample, may be delayed or transformed by the limits that each government may put to this adop

by cultural resistance based on past experience, producing not pure continuity or convergenc

brid systems and multiple routes of change.


14/21

CONCLUSION

e are gratified by the wide use of our analysis, and at the same time well aware that it has m

mitations. We have tried here to clarify our intent on several points. First, we want to under

point that our analysis is tied to the 18 cases we analyzed, and we did not intend it to be “app

yond those cases; we believe that new theory applying to other media systems will have to ari

r framework did, out of concrete analysis of those systems. Second, we did not imagine th

alysis provided a fully comprehensive and elaborated framework for comparative analys

dia systems. We saw it as a beginning, and we hope that other scholars will try to build on i

t, once again, simply “apply” it. Third, many commentators have expressed reservations abou

e of our three models for classifying media systems, fearing that it leads to overly broad

neral (and hence simplistic) analysis. And in truth we share that concern. We believe our m

useful as a starting point for thinking about similarities and differences in patterns of m

stem development, and the extremely wide use of those models seems to confirm that we were

out their heuristic power. But we share the concern that an overemphasis on these models an

ssification of media systems as an end in itself is a potential danger. Third, and related to

nt, we want to underscore our plea in the book that the categorization o f media systems unde

the three models was not intended to substitute for the more detailed discussion of their simila

d differences and the reasons for these. Finally, we want to clarify that our chapter on converg

s not intended to be taken as a claim that in fact we were headed to a complete eliminati

ferences among media systems.

We would like to conclude with some reflections about how we see the route ahea

mparative analysis o f media systems or media and politics. The first thing to say is simply th

ume methodological pluralism is legitimate and indeed essential. We expect that there winy styles o f comparative analysis, with different units o f analysis, for example, or different s

ranging from large N-studies to single case studies, some quantitative and some “qualitative,”

re focused on hypothesis-testing and some on conceptual clarification or rethinking. Th

rmal; this is how a field should develop.

We have a particular interest in analysis at the broad level of the system as a whole, a

derstanding how the development of media systems can be understood in the context of so

litical, and cultural development more generally. In this sense, we would see our work as

uch in the tradition of what Humphreys calls a “historical-institutional” approach. Our use of mstem “models”—much imitated and much criticized, as we have discussed above— is related t

ncern, and we do think that if approached carefully this can be very valuable. We are particu

erested to see this kind of analysis carried forward on a wider range of systems—not, as we

essed, by scholars trying to fit other systems into our categories, but by scholars trying to

ough what other patterns of media systems exist and what social and historical context exp

m At the same time, we are well aware that models can become reified and do no

ssification per se as particularly valuable for advancing comparative analysis. We are

mpathetic to those who have argued that constructing typologies should not distract us from


15/21

ward with the analysis of relations among variables.

One aspect of our approach we would like to stress is its focus on interdisciplinary theori

urnalism and media studies have generally, in our view, remained much too isolated from

nches of social science, and too often we see scholars trying to write about the role of journ

politics in a certain region of the world without any reference to the existing literatures o

ure of the state in that region, the nature of civil society, the development of political culture, o

tern of economic development. To us, this is crucial: comparative analysis of media syste

out understanding those systems in the context of history, culture, and social and political strure generally, and this means that scholars of communication need to be in dialogue with

lds, including comparative politics, political sociology, and political anthropology. We are

erested, for example, in rational-legal authority and its relationship to the major variables i

dy, especially journalistic professionalism and political parallelism. We suspect that thin

ough this relationship would be very useful for understanding democratic transitions (and

nsitions or hybridizations). Rational-legal authority is something that is simultaneously struc

d cultural and has been theorized in a number of different branches of social science; addre

s kind of issue requires moving across disciplinary boundaries.The question of quantification, finally, leads us to some important observations about

ward in comparative analysis. It is clear that better quantitative data, across a wider ran

stems, are crucial to advancing the field. They offer possibilities, especially for exploring

ecisely the relationship between variables, as for example, in Aalberg, van Aelst, and Cur

010) study of the relationship between media commercialization and political content in the n

s true, of course, that many of the things political communication and media scholars are inter

are likely to prove difficult to quantify, including our dimensions of political parallelism

rnalistic professionalization, which certainly present challenges in operationalization. But i

w, it is often precisely those things that are difficult to quantify that are important and intere

d we need to figure out ways to study them, quantitatively or not. In the case of political parall

re are some kinds of quantitative data already available on many systems that are very useful

re could certainly be more of this sort o f data produced on a wider range of systems. This inc

rvey data on the partisan affinities of media audiences as well as the very valuable data prod

Donsbach and Patterson (2004) on such things as the relationship between partisanship

urnalists’ career paths. As Norris (2009, pp. 335-336) observes, however, we can only go so

dying media partisanship without looking at content, “a massive undertaking,” she worries, an

arly “open to problems of interpretation.” It is true enough that content analysis across m

stems poses many methodological problems, but it can clearly be done, and has been in a numb

e studies (e.g., Semetko et al., 1991; Ferree et al., 2002). Content analysis across systems, g

comparative theory, is in our view one of the most fundamental needs in our field. The undert

es not have to be massive: unless we move immediately to the level of large-N studies bu

ieve a lot can be accomplished with more modest, small-N comparisons (Mancini & H

12).

There will, of course, still be “problems of interpretation” including the subjectivity and con


16/21

pendent nature (Mancini & Hallin, 2012) of assessments o f partisanship in media content. To

precisely in thinking through these “problems of interpretation” that comparative analys

eresting and valuable. We would like to see the field directly engage with, among other th

rtisanship and professionalism and confront them both conceptually and methodologically.

y require putting quantitative data in context using other methods, looking not only, for examp

ntent but also at the interaction of journalists with other social actors in the production o

ntent, or at audience reception. In the case of journalistic professionalism, it would mean no

king at things we might quantify—patterns of recruitment of journalists, or attitudes we asure in a survey—but also doing field observation and case studies to observe the profess

utines and patterns of interaction of reporters and politicians. We believe, in other words

ailed, multi-method case studies, informed by comparative theory and designed to common i

th other such studies, will be fundamental to the progress of the field.


17/21

(NI

l

NOTES

1 One might be Australia, as discussed in Jones and Pusey (2010).

We make this point in relation to the placement o f points on our “triangle diagram,” Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 71).

Hallin has served as a ratings reviewer for Freedom House.

Lakatos also writes, “A ‘ m o d e l is a set of initial conditions (possibly together with some of the observational theories) wh

knows is bound to be replaced during the further development of the [research] program.” Lakatos is thinking about a d

kind of model than ours, based in the natural sciences. But we share his view of science in the sense that we believe

conceptual framework has value as it is used in research, and does not acquire value only after it has been “verified.”

5 Hallin (1992, 2000, 2006) has written a series o f articles on the crisis of the American model o f journalistic professionalism

widely seen as the end-product of the natural evolution of media systems.


18/21

REFERENCES

berg, T., van Aelst, P., & Curran, J. (2010). Media systems and the political information environment: A cross-national comp

In tern ational Journal o f Pre ss/Pol itics , 15(3), 255-271.

mond, G., & Powell, P. (1966). Comparative politics: A developmen tal approach. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company.

tiansen, H. (2008). Media history and the study of media systems. M edia History , 14(1), 95-112.

son, R., & Hallin, D. C. (2007). How states, markets and globalization shape the news: The French and U.S. national press

1997. Euro pea n Journ al o f C om munication, 22(1), 27-48.

ldry, N. (2005). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics. Political Studies Review, 3(2), 308.

sbach, W., & Patterson, T (2004). Political news journalists: Partisanship, professionalism and political roles in five countrie

Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), Com paring politica l comm unication: Theories, cases an d challeng es (pp. 251-270). Cam

UK: Cambridge University Press.

ree, M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). Sha ping abortion discourse: Dem ocracy an d the pub licsp

Germany and the United States. N ew York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

rge, A. L., & McKeown, T (1985). Case studies and theories of organizational decision-making. Advances in In for

Processing in Organizations , 2, 21-58.

land, A. (2012). Africanizing three models of media and politics: The South African experience. In D. Hallin &P.Mancini (E

Comparing media systems beyond the Western world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

in, D. C. (1992). The passing o f the “high modernism” of American journalism. Journal o f C om munication, 42(3), 14-25.

in, D. C. (2000). Commercialism and professionalism in the American news media. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (Eds.)

media an d society (3rd edition, pp. 218-237). London: Arnold.

in, D. C. (2006). The passing o f the “high modernism” of American journalism revisited, Political Communication Report,

n.p.

in, D., & Mancini P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models o f media a nd politics . Cambridge, UK: Cam

University Press.

in, D., & Mancini, P. (2010). Preface. In B. Dobek-Ostrowska, M. Glowacki, K. Jakubowicz, & M. Sükosd (Eds.), Comp

media systems: Euro pean an d global perspec tives (pp. xi-xiv). Budapest: Central European University Press.

in, D., & Mancini P. (Eds.) (2012). Com paring media systems beyo nd the Western w orld . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Un

Press.

dy, J. (2008). Western media systems. London: Routledge.

mphreys, P. (2012). A political scientist’s contribution to the comparative study of media systems in Europe: A response to Hall

Mancini. In N. Just & M. Puppis (Eds.), Trends in comm unication po licy research: New theories, m ethods, sub jects (p

158). Bristol: Intelect.

es, P. K., & Pusey, M. (2010). Political communication and “media system”: The Australian canary. M ed ia , Culture & S32(3), 451-471.

zenstein, P. J. (1985). Small states in w orld markets: Industrial po licy in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

en, L. (2010). Savage deregulation in Thailand: Expanding Hallin and Mancini’s European model. M ed ia , Culture and S

32(2), 333-345.

idy, M. (2012). The rise of transnational media systems: Implications of pan-Arab media for comparative research. In D. Halli

Mancini (Eds.), Comparing media systems beyond the Western world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

atos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), C

an d the growth o f knowledge (pp. 91-196). London: Cambridge University Press.

ngstone, S. (2003). On the challenges of cross-national comparative research. Euro pe an Journal o f Com mun icat ion, 1


19/21

media systems beyond the Western world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

metko, H. A., Blumler, J. G., Gurevitch, M., & Weaver, D. H. (1991). The form ation o f campaign agendas. A comp

analysis o f party and media ro les in recent Am er ican and Br itish elec tions . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates.

ombàck, J., 0rsten, M., & Aalberg, T. (Eds.) (2008). Com municatingpolitics: Po litical communication in the Nordic cou

Gotenborg: Nordicom.

sbord, S. (2000). Watchdog journ alism in Latin America: News, accountability and d em ocra cy . New York, NY: Co

University Press.

o, Y. (2012). Understanding China’s media system in a world historical context. In D. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), Com

media systems beyond the Western world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


20/21

HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE

COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

Edited byFrank Esser

Thomas Hanitzsch

RRoutledgeTaylof & Francií GroupN EW YO RK AMD L ON DQKI


21/21

t published 2012

Routledge

Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

ultaneously published in the UK

Routledge

ark Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

tle dge is an im pr int o f the Ta ylor & Francis Group, an inform a bus ines s

012 Taylor & Francis

right of Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their

vidual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, o

ns, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, w

mission in writing from the publishers.

demark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification

anation without intent to infringe.

ra ry o f C ong ress Cataloging in Pub lica tion Data

dbook of comparative communication research / edited by Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch.

m.

udes bibliographical references.Communication, International. 2. Communication—Research. I. Esser, Frank, 1966- II. Hanitzsch, Thomas,

9-

.I5.H368 2012

.2— dc23

1034392

N: 978-0-415-80271-0 (hb)

N: 978-0-415-80275-8 (pb)

N: 978-0-203-14910-2 (eb)

nted and bound in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

Documents

HALLIN MANCINI Comparing Media Systems