Handouts without handshakes:Patronizing treatment of

human out-groups

Tomomi Tanaka (Arizona State University)Colin Camerer (Caltech)

Objective

Effectiveness of groups depends on norms of pro-social cooperation within groups, which are shared, and policed. These norms of in-group favoritism are also associated with out-group prejudice.

Questions of interest

1. Do we always observe in-group favoritism?

2. What explains in-group favoritism?

3 alternative hypotheses:Stereotypes

Economic Status (Relative Wealth)

Social Distance (Spouse, Parents, Neighbors)

This study investigate in-group favoritism among three ethnic groups (Vietnamese, Chinese, Khmer) in South Vietnam.

Vietnamese Chinese KhmerPopulation 92% 2% 6%Mean income (dong) in 2002

21.6 mil ($1,350)

40.5 mil($2,815)

15.1 mil($943)

Envy GameDictator GameThird Party Punishment Game

Trust Game Coalition Game

Number of subjectsV: 141K: 127C: 58Total: 326Color ID tags

Games

Don’t trust2020

1Trust

2

3030

Repay Don’t repay

1050

Envy GamePlayer 1: 12,000 DongPlayer 2: 0 – 60,000 Dong

Dictator GamePlayer 1: 10,000 - xPlayer 2: x

Third Party Punishment GamePlayer 1: 10,000 –x – 3,000 if punishedPlayer 2: xPlayer 3: 5,000 – 1,000 if punish

Plan 12 Plan 13 Plan 23

Player 1 15,000 15,000

Player 2 15,000 15,000

Player 3 15,000 15,000

Coalition Game

Stereotypes: Warmth, Competence, Status, Competition(Fiske et al. 2002)

Summary Results

1. Do we always observe in-group favoritism (Out-group prejudice)?

Ingroup favoritism: Between Vietnamese & ChineseVietnamese and Chinese are altruistic toward Khmer, but don’t trust / form coalition with them. Khmer show strong ingroup bias in all games.

2. What explains in-group favoritism?3 alternative hypotheses:

StereotypesAltruistic behavior (Envy Game): Warmth & Competitive threatSharing (Dictator Game): CompetenceTrust: StatusReciprocity: Warmth

Economic StatusWeak Effects

Social DistanceWeak Effects

Regression Results

EG DG TG1 TG2Khmer 0.314 -0.342 0.132 -0.816**Chinese 0.285 0.061 -0.375 -0.697**Age -0.001 -0.004 -0.015 -0.008Gender 0.053 0.398* 0.059 0.217Education 0.047 -0.013 -0.054 0.018Agriculture / Fishery -0.931*** -0.680*** 0.231 0.183Trade -0.442 -0.416 0.616 -0.019Business -0.614 -0.146 0.187 0.183Gov -0.192 -0.416 0.834 -0.544Private -0.638 -0.566 0.953* 0.265Casual 0.169 -0.104 0.691** 0.585Relative Income -0.037 0.102 0.343*** 0.097Mean Village Income -43.273** -47.842*** -2.647 -8.726

Outgroup -0.697*** -0.353*** -3.12* -0.611*Khmer Outgroup 0.460*** 0.277* -0.181 0.411

Constant -0.022 0.673Pseudo R2 0.028 0.022 0.050 0.063

Coalition Game

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

�V K C

Conclusion

We report rare evidence of high-status groups exhibiting out-group favoritism toward a lower-status outgroup, but not in business-like exchange.

Government policies and social practices parallel the experimental results.

Stereotyping images match experimental results.

Vietnamese Chinese KhmerPopulation 92% 2% 6%Mean income (dong) in 2002

21.6 mil ($1,350)

40.5 mil($2,815)

15.1 mil($943)