HARBINGERS FOR CHANGE OR ACTIVISTS IN

ISOLATION? STUDENT POLITICS AND THE

OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IN BOTSWANA.

JENS PREBEN MUNTHE

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

MSc Africa and International Development

2015

Word Count: 14953

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the relationship between student and national

politics in Botswana. The research sheds light on the causes and nature of

the party politicisation of student politics, and the importance of student

politics in national elections. The University of Botswana (UB) is

approached as a “state within a state,” and the contrasting political

playing fields between these two political spheres – the state and UB – is

seen as a defining factor in their relationship and the nature of student

politics. The effects, however, are contradictory. On the one hand, the

relative evenness of the political playing field within UB has been

embraced by the opposition party as a springboard from which to

challenge the hegemonic position of the Botswana Democratic Party, thus

breaking down the barriers surrounding this “state within a state.” On the

other, these very barriers are reinforced by the uneven playing field of

national politics – and the authoritarian nature of Ian Khama’s regime –

which has discouraged students from engaging with national politics. The

future of student politics in Botswana is thus highly unpredictable, as

they straddle a middle ground between isolated activists and central

actors in the national political contest.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... III

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

BOTSWANA’S UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD ............................................................................................ 3

METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................. 8

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................................. 9

CHAPTER 1: A HISTORY OF STUDENT POLITICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF

BOTSWANA ........................................................................................................................ 11

1970S: UB AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT ...........................................................................13

1980S: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION ................................................................17

1990S: CORRUPTION SCANDALS ...................................................................................................19

1995 MOCHUDI PROTESTS ............................................................................................................21

CHAPTER 2: STUDENT POLITICS AND THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT .......... 27

THE WORKINGS OF THE UB-SRC ..................................................................................................28

CONNECTION TO THE OPPOSITION PARTY ....................................................................................31

THE SRC AS A NATIONAL POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND ................................................................32

CHAPTER 3: STUDENT POLITICS AND THE STATE UNDER IAN KHAMA

(2008–) ................................................................................................................................ 37

CONCLUSION: HARBINGERS FOR CHANGE OR ACTIVISTS IN ISOLATION? ... 47

MEDIA .................................................................................................................................. 51

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 52

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge, first and foremost, Dr. Gerhard Anders for

acting as my supervisor and offering support and advice throughout the

dissertation process.

I would also like to thank Professor Ian Taylor, Professor Christian John

Makgala, Dr. Gladys Mokhawa, Dr. Boga Manatsha, Dr. Elisabetta Spano,

and Ms. Jenny Lawy for their invaluable help along the way.

Finally, this dissertation would not be possible without the contributions

of the members of UB-UDC, who have remained anonymous in this

dissertation.

1

INTRODUCTION

Relative to its African counterparts, Botswana’s diamond-fuelled economic

growth has been phenomenal, and the country has widely been hailed as

an “African success story” and “African miracle” in academia (Acemoglu et

al 2001; Samatar 1999), as well as in the media 1 and by European

governments. 2 The country’s economic growth has undeniably been

impressive. Having been one of the poorest countries in the world upon

gaining independence from Britain in 1966, it is now considered an upper-

middle-income country (Clover 2003: 1; Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001: 9). Its

economy has grown at over seven per cent per year since independence,

“making it the best global performer over that period” (Clover 2003: 1).

While the admirers of Botswana’s economic success are many, so too

are those who point out the many limitations of Botswana’s brand of

liberal democracy and the nature of its economic growth (Good 2010a;

2010b; 2005; 1994; 1993; Good and Taylor 2007; 2006; Taylor 2006; 2003;

Hillbom 2011; Gwatiwa 2015; 2011; Clover 2003; de Jager and Taylor

1 See e.g. ‘Botswana: Africa’s success story?’, BBC, 7 March 2005, available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4318777.stm [accessed 4 August 2015]; ‘Botswana:

An African Model for Progress and Prosperity” Huffington Post, 28 November 2012,

available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/botswana-economic-

growth_b_2069226.html [accessed 4 August 2015]. 2 ‘Botswana – an African success story’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 September 2007,

available at https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/development-

cooperation/slettemappe/hovedsamarbeid/Botswana--an-African-success-story/id476299/

[accessed 4 August 2015].

2

2015; de Jager and Meintjes 2013). Alongside indisputably impressive

GDP growth rates, gross inequality (Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001; Good 1993),

racial discrimination (Taylor 2003; Good 2005; 1993), corruption (Good

1994), a lack of economic diversity (Clover 2003: Iimi 2006), a lack of press

freedom (Taylor 2003), and a lack of academic freedom (Taylor 2006) have

all been observed. The absolute dominance of the Botswana Democratic

Party (BDP) – who have won every single election since independence –

has raised questions over the quality of democracy in the country (Holm

1987). De Jager and Meintjes (2013) and de Jager and Taylor (2015) call

upon Levitsky and Way’s (2010) definition of an “uneven playing field” to

explain the BDP’s dominance in Botswana. According to Levitsky and

Way (2010: 57) uneven playing fields are one of the most effective means

of autocratic survival in countries such as Botswana, where “democratic

competition is undermined less by electoral fraud or repression than by

unequal access to state institutions, resources, and the media.” They

define an uneven playing field as “one in which incumbent abuse of the

state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state

institutions that opposition parties’ ability to organise and compete for

national office is seriously impaired” (Ibid.).

Seemingly isolated from this uneven playing field is the University

of Botswana (UB), where opposition politics thrives. As one professor put

it, “UB is a sanctuary of freedom of political association.” The opposition

have embraced student politics as a potential catalyst for national

electoral success. Student politicians are not just future leaders, but are

using the relatively level playing field of student politics as a platform

from which to engage with the national political contest. In the words of a

member of the largest opposition movement at UB, “Right now, even in

our build up, even our SRC [Student Representative Council] elections,

ours is a mission to topple the government of the day come 2019.”

This dissertation aims to explore this relationship between national

politics and student politics in Botswana. In doing so, it seeks to shed light

on two particular themes: firstly, the causes and nature of the party-

3

politicisation of student politics in the country, and secondly the position

of student politics in national politics. In doing so, it approaches the

University of Botswana as a “state within a state” (Balsvik 1998: 318) that

has broken away from the traditional social structures of Botswana and

isolated itself from the uneven playing field of national politics. The

interaction between student politics and the state, it is argued, has a

defining, although contradicting, impact on the nature of student politics.

On the one hand, the relatively level political playing field within the

University has been embraced by the opposition as central to its future

political success, breaking down the barriers between student and

national politics. On the other hand, these very barriers have

simultaneously been strengthened by the uneven political playing field

outside the university – and especially the authoritarian nature of Ian

Khama’s regime – which has discouraged students from engaging with

national politics. These contradictions beg the question that this research

seeks to address: are student politicians harbingers for change, or have

they been successfully isolated from politics by the ruling elite?

Botswana’s uneven playing field

Within the opposition movement in Botswana, a lack of funding is widely

recognised as the greatest barrier to electoral victory. 3 Molomo and

Sebudubudu (2005: 149) argue that the BDP’s “electoral strength is,

among other things, a manifestation of deep-seated structural problems in

Botswana’s polity and electoral system. Key, among these factors, is the

uneven political playing field caused by disparities in financial resources.”

The BDP has been able to use its position in government to cement its

financial dominance. The current president, Ian Khama, is renown for

using state resources, such as Botswana Defence Force helicopters, the

3 Interview with Sedirwa Kgoroba, Member of Parliament (UDC) for Mogoditshane

constituency, 13 June 2015.

4

presidential jet and government owned 4x4s on the campaign trail.4 This

gives the BDP a huge advantage over the opposition who struggle to reach

out to the rural areas of Botswana, in which the BDP enjoys

overwhelming support. According to Masire himself (2006), the BDP’s

ability and commitment to reach even the remotest areas of the country

was vital in securing the BDP’s early electoral dominance. The use of BDF

helicopters is itself politically powerful and a source of prestige (Good

2010b: 90). As one student says of his exposure to politics as a child:

“obviously when the president visits […], when you see [the] helicopter,

you go to them.”

The opposition (as well as academics and political commentators)

have called for state funding of political parties, but the BDP has

(certainly in recent times) shown little interest in reform. Indeed, there

are few incentives for the government to do so: unlike the opposition, the

ruling party receives huge funds from big business, which is on the whole

unsurprising for a pro-capitalist incumbent government (Mfundisi 2005:

166; Good 2010b: 90). For example, in April 1999 the party received a P2.4

million donation from De Beers, who partner Botswana in the state’s

diamond extraction (Good 2010b: 90). Furthermore, as revealed by the

Sunday Standard, De Beers also provided personal financial aid to

President Ketumile Masire and his company, GM Five, over a period of 25

years. Through the use of a ghost company and a fictitious sale of shares,

De Beers is said to have transferred P3.7 million to GM Five, which was

used to settle the company’s debts. De Beers is furthermore alleged to

have helped secure a loan for GM Five from Barclays Bank, and helped

the company procure an expatriate farmer.5

The BDP also dominates important sectors of the media. While

private media outlets have been growing in number, these are largely

4 ‘BDP campaign gobbles up huge public funds’ Sunday Standard, 22 October 2014,

available at http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=21318&GroupID=4

[accessed 4 August 2015]. 5 ‘De Beers, Masire in shady deals’, Sunday Standard, 18 January 2010, available at

http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=6698&GroupID=1 [accessed 5

August 2015].

5

restricted to urban areas. In rural areas, the media landscape is

dominated by government-owned Radio Botswana, which “has long been

the mouthpiece of government and, by extension, ruling party machinery”

(Mfundisi 2005: 172). Indeed, “in a statement in late September 2009 the

Director of Broadcasting Services, Mogomotsi Kaboeamodimo, declared

that the state media take orders from President Khama and nobody else.

The president, he said, enjoyed constitutional privilege to use the media

whichever way he chose without being answerable to anyone” (Good

2010b: 89).

The independent media that exists, furthermore, is in large part

reliant on funding from advertising, which places limitations on its

independence. “The advertising ‘cake’ is very small in Botswana, and the

government remains the main advertiser, followed by parastatals, which

are viewed as an extension of the state, followed by big business –

arguably, a further state extension” (AMB 2011: 6). As reported by sources

within the Office of the President, a committee within the government

“monitors how all the media houses give coverage to all government

ministries and President Ian Khama. The idea is to starve those media

houses that are critical to the administration of adverts. The ministries

and the parastatals have been instructed to reduce their advertising

revenue in the negative media houses.”6

The government has, furthermore, increasingly cracked down on

the media and freedom of expression. Following a raid of the Botswana

Gazette and arrest of the newspaper’s lawyer in May 2015, 7 the

Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) stated that they

“now want media houses to allow [the DCEC] to look at their stories before

they can be published.” 8 The Directorate of Intelligence and Security

Services (DIS) is furthermore alleged to have attempted to stop a local

publisher from printing The Scandalous Murdering of Democracy, a book

6 ‘Inside Khama’s meda ’war room’’, Mmegi, 22 May 2015, available at

http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=51366 [accessed 4 August 2015]. 7 Botswana Gazette, 13-19 May 2015, p. 2. 8 Sunday Standard, 17-23 May 2015, p. 1.

6

critical of the Khama regime, threatening to take the press out of business

(see Chapter 3). 9 The country also introduced new visa laws limiting

access to the country for foreign journalists, academics and researchers

who had written negatively of the regime or shown “varying degrees of […]

interest in the Bushmen and the CKGR [Central Kalahari Game Reserve]”

(Good and Taylor 2007: 278). As argued in the African Media Barometer

(AMB 2011: 31), the government of Botswana acts in a way that “reduces

diversity in the media and promotes violence against the media […] the

state is increasingly closing the space for independent thought.”

Electoral laws are furthermore skewed to favour the BDP. A first

past the post electoral system disproportionately favours the ruling party

(Molomo 2005), and a system of appointed members of parliament (the

majority party in parliament is allowed to appoint four MPs) effectively

allows the BDP to reinstate MPs rejected by their constituents (de Jager

and Taylor 2015: 30-31). Furthermore, laws making civil servants (such as

teachers) ineligible to run for election severely reduces the pool of political

talent from which the opposition parties can recruit. While BDP-

supporters can step down from their respective positions and expect to be

reinstated should they lose their election, this is not the case for the

opposition. Indeed, at a political rally for the opposition in the Goodhope-

Mabule constituency in June 2015, identifying the many public sector

workers was strikingly simple: they would be the ones not dressed in

yellow, the party colours for the Umbrella for Democratic Change.

Furthermore, in 1997, Ketumile Masire introduced a set of constitutional

amendments allowing for “the automatic succession of the vice president

upon the retirement, death, or incapacitation of the president” (de Jager

and Taylor 2015: 30). Not only did this further personalise and centralise

power within the presidency – it effectively enabled the president to

determine his successor, bypassing parliament (Ibid.; Good 2010b: 85) – it

acted as a guarantee that the BDP would always stand for election with

an incumbent president. Current president Ian Khama, for example, was

9 Botswana Gazette, 3-9 June 2015, p. 3.

7

appointed vice president by Festus Mogae in 2004, became president when

Mogae stepped down in 2008, and was democratically elected to office for

the first time in 2009 (see Chapter 3).

Of course, an uneven playing field is only part of the reason for the

BDP’s electoral dominance. Stability within the BDP has been facilitated

by what Bayart (2009: chapter 6) calls a “fusion of elites” and what

Gulbrandsen (2012: chapter 3) refers to as a “grand coalition” between

cattle owners in Botswana in the early years following independence. This

elite unity maintained the historical elite autonomy in the state, which

“stemmed in good part from the enduring linkages between traditional

authority – chieftaincy – and its subjects, which the British protectorate

had done nothing to erode” (Good 2010b: 82). According to Taylor (2012:

470), Botswana’s elite have been able to consolidate their position through

the construction of a nascent historic bloc (see Forgacs 2000: 424;

Abrahamsen 1997: 148) aided by these favourable post-colonial conditions:

“During Seretse Khama’s tenure at least, the electorate of Botswana was

steeped in a traditionalist culture of respect for authority that hindered

any disputing of the post-colonial dispensation. This granted space for

Khama and his BDP to begin a task of establishing a hegemonic position.”

Furthermore, the low level of capitalist development early on “weakened

working-class formation and potential class conflict” thus giving the ruling

elite in the late 1960s and 1970s time to “establish their predominance”

(Good 2010b: 82). This was facilitated further by support for the BDP from

the British, who “were alarmed by the radical nationalism of the BPP

[Botswana People’s Party] on the grounds that it would seriously

antagonise South Africa” (Gulbrandsen 2012: 95) and therefore

“instructed the chiefs to deny the BPP permission to hold meetings and

rallies in their areas […] [T]his had the effect of denying the BPP the

opportunity of popularising its policies in those areas, with the result that

the party was not popular in the rural areas” (Nengwekhulu 1979: 63).

While the importance of the immediate post-colonial context that

allowed for the construction of a hegemonic position is not dismissed, this

8

dissertation will instead focus on the uneven playing field that allows for

the continued maintenance of elite hegemony in Botswana. As argued by

Abrahamsen (1997: 150), “hegemony […] is not won once and for all but

requires defending and reorganisation.” An uneven playing field has

allowed the BDP to do just that. This dissertation will argue that it is the

relatively level playing field of student politics within UB that has made it

such an attractive prospect for the opposition movement. It is seen as a

potential springboard from which the hegemony of the BDP can be

challenged.

Methodology

The sources used in this dissertation are primarily scholarly

literature, the print media, and interviews conducted by the researcher

whilst on fieldwork in Gaborone in May-June 2015. Print media is

extensively used throughout the dissertation. To establish a history of

student politics in Chapter 2, archival work was done in Mmegi, the

country’s largest independent newspaper, from the 1990s to uncover both

the activities of student politics during this decade, and, importantly, how

this was reported in the independent press. For subsequent chapters, the

Botswana Gazette, Sunday Standard, Patriot and WeekEnd Post are

extensively referenced. As will become evident, these papers play an

important role in uncovering government malpractice and are “at the front

of democratisation in the country” (Good 2009: ix).

Fieldwork was carried out over six weeks in May-June 2015 in

Gaborone, Botswana. Interviews were conducted with six members of UB-

UDC and three further members representing the party on the SRC.

Interviews were also conducted with two UDC members of parliament

(representing Gaborone Central and Mogoditshane constituencies), two

previous UB-SRC presidents, the deputy and acting directors of student

welfare at UB, and a former Vice Chancellor of the university. The

research was also aided by countless “off the record” conversations with

9

professors, students, party leaders, activists and supporters, many of

which took place at political rallies in Goodhope-Mabule and Gaborone.

The interviews were semi-structured and varied in length from 30

to 90 minutes. Most interviews were conducted once, but some were

followed up on multiple occasions. While a greater selection of SRC

councillors would have been beneficial, the aim of the research is not to

present a representative study of students, but rather to use their

experiences to “highlight or ‘shine into’ key dimensions or processes in a

complex social life […] to deepen understanding about a larger process,

relationship, or social scene” (Neuman 2013: 246-7). The larger

relationship this research project seeks to explore is that between national

and student politics, as experienced by members of the opposition. In

doing so, the researcher sought out representatives from the three

structures (or systems) that are crucial in this relationship, as identified

by Weinberg and Walker (1969): the political system (Members of

Parliament), the university (directors of student welfare and Vice

Chancellor) and the student political system (past and present student

politicians). The interviews touched on a variety of topics, but sought

primarily to explore one theme: the relationship between student politics

and national politics, from the perspectives of the national party, the

university, and the students themselves.

Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is split into three main chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 1 presents a history of student politics at the university. Starting

with the tripartite University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

(UBLS) that preceded UB in the 1970s, the chapter traces the actions of

student politicians in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. It shows how student

politics in Botswana has always been a reaction to actions of the state, and

argues that the party-politicisation of students manifested itself in the

1980s, as the students sought to engage with the state on student issues.

10

Chapter 2 explores the role of student politics within the opposition

movement today. It argues that the barriers surrounding this “state

within a state” have been blurred as the opposition movement has

embraced student politics as a platform for electoral victory. It is argued

that this is the result of the relative evenness of the student political

playing field compared to the uneven playing field of national politics.

Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between student politics and

the state under Ian Khama. It argues that the repressive nature of Ian

Khama’s regime have paralysed parts of the student movement, and made

engagement with national politics an unattractive proposition for student

activists. As a result, the uneven playing field has simultaneously

solidified the barriers between student and national politics, as many

students prefer to limit their engagement to feuds with the University

board.

The conclusion summarises the preceding chapters, and argues that

the contrasting playing fields of national and student politics have defined

their relationship. These contrasts have produced contradicting results,

making the future role of student politics highly unpredictable.

11

CHAPTER 1: A HISTORY OF STUDENT

POLITICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF

BOTSWANA

Research on student movements and their role in revolutionary

movements have been criticised for being both lacking and Eurocentric

(see e.g. Balsvik 1998: 302-3; Zeilig 2007: 1). In Botswana’s case, it has

been near absent. Books and articles that have attempted to deal with

student protests on a continent-wide basis have tended to draw on

evidence from other countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. For

example, Balsvik (1998) is based on the researcher’s fieldwork and

experiences in Ethiopia, Kenya, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia; Zeilig’s

Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa

(2007) deals with Senegal and Zimbabwe; Omari and Mihyo (1991) draws

its evidence from Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and Bratton

and van de Walle’s 1992 article, ‘Popular Protest and Political Reform in

Africa’ draws on evidence from an impressive range of countries on the

continent – but not Botswana. Others have covered the role of student

politics in national political developments in individual countries, such as

Ethiopia (Balsvik 1994; 1985) and Kenya (Amutabi 2002). In the case of

12

Botswana, analyses of student political engagement are few and far

between.

The lack of emphasis on student politics in Botswana in the wider

literature is perhaps no surprise. Botswana is, by many, seen as

exceptional on the African continent (Acemoglu et al 2001). It is a country

that has had a stable (de jure, if not de facto) multiparty democracy since

independence. The country has managed its diamond revenues with a

pragmatism that has attracted wide-ranging praise for its “exceptional”

and “miraculous” economic growth. It has gone from being one of the

poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country, and has had

the largest growth rate of any country in the world in the past 50 years.

Thus there is, perhaps, an underlying assumption that Botswana is

inherently different: it has not had any apartheid regimes, colonial

oppressors or military dictatorships since independence in 1966. It is the

only country in Southern Africa (apart from Mauritius) “that has never

experienced threats to governance such as attempted coups, nationwide

protests or fierce jostling for power” (Gwatiwa 2015: 2). Independence and

democracy came as the result of a negotiation between elites, and students

did not play an active role in the process (see Lipset 1966: 134). As such,

students in Botswana have ostensibly never had anyone to overthrow;

they have had no oppressive ruler or system to bring down.

Yet, student protest has in no way been absent in the country.

Indeed, as will be shown below, student protests in Botswana have clearly

followed regional patterns of protest, and reacted to both regional and

national political developments. An historical account of student protests

in Botswana, however, is lacking in the literature. While Mokopakgosi

(2008) analyses the role of the University of Botswana in the southern

African liberation movements in the 1970s, and Richard (2014) covers the

relationship between students and the state under Ian Khama (since

2008), a broader historical account of student politics in the country has

not been attempted. As a result, an analysis of longer-term breaks and

continuities in the nature of student politics is absent. What follows is a

13

contribution to filling this gap. This chapter will provide a brief overview

of the trends in student politics from the 1970s through to the end of the

1990s, based on existing literature, archival research in Mmegi and the

student newspaper UBScope, and personal interviews conducted during

the researcher’s fieldwork in Gaborone in May-June 2015.

1970s: UB and the liberation movement

Regional politics played an important role in Botswana’s early post-

independence years. A cartoon printed in Punch Magazine in 1966, and

reprinted on the very first page of Masire’s memoirs, captured the (both

real and perceived) state of the Batswana nation (then Bechuanaland) at

independence (see illustration 1.1). It depicts a British colonial officer

abandoning a young Motswana child in the middle of a field, surrounded

by lions, snakes and the hostile nations of Rhodesia and South Africa.

With the caption “You’ll be all right – you’ll be amongst friends,” it

illustrates the neglect of Britain’s hands-off approach to the colonisation

and decolonisation of the country. Botswana was left as one of the poorest

countries in the world, “surrounded by racist minority regimes in

Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa” (Masire 2006: ix). Looking further

afield, Botswana’s isolation becomes even starker; Mozambique and

Angola were at this point still under Portuguese colonial rule. As a weak

nation in this regional context, the threat of annexation by South Africa

was real.10 Seretse Khama’s government thus adopted an approach to

regional politics that was distinctly non-confrontational: Khama avoided

criticizing the surrounding racist regimes for the sake of national security.

Indeed, the BDP itself can in part be seen as a response to the perceived

dangers of the nationalism of an ANC-inspired Botswana People’s Party,

10 This threat was nothing new. British plans to transfer the protectorate to the British

South African Company in the late 19th/early 20th Century was a major source of conflict

between the colonial government and the dikgosi (regional chiefs). This was articulated

in the Native Advisory Council in 1933: “This meeting of Chiefs and Councillors present

on behalf of their respective Tribes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate records its protest

and objection to the incorporation of their Territory into the Union of South Africa”

(quoted in Gulbrandsen 2012: 72; see also p. 48).

14

which was established in 1960, one year prior to the creation of the BDP.

(Gulbrandsen 2012: 96).

This policy stance stood in stark contrast to the views of the student

population. The University

played host to several students and academics who had fled the brutal regimes of South

Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia, many of whom were to assume top

leadership positions in their countries in the years following liberation […] Those who fled

into Botswana included members of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan African

Congress (PAC), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), Zimbabwe African National

Union (ZANU) and Namibian liberation organisations, as well as children and ordinary

people in search of peace and educational opportunity. It was not surprising that the

students at the University felt part of these developments and wanted to partake in them

(Mokopakgosi 2008: 34).

Foreign students took leading roles on Student Representative Councils

(SRCs), and solidarity with liberation movements became central to

Illustration 1.1: "You'll be all right - you'll be amongst friends." (Masire 2006)

15

student politics. Tellingly, a permanent column in the student newspaper

at the time entitled “Political Desk” rarely discussed national politics.

Instead, as one such column stated in 1979: “The ‘P.D.’ (Political Desk) has

attempted, with a certain measure of success, to highlight the people’s

struggles in Southern Africa, Middle East and Asia, for purposes of

solidarity.”11

Student protests during the 1970s thus took place within the

framework of the regional liberation struggle. In January 1975, students

at the Roma Campus (Lesotho) of the University of Botswana, Lesotho

and Swaziland (UBLS) 12 boycotted classes and took part in peaceful

protests demanding a democratization of the institution. Crucially, they

demanded representation on the Appoints Committee, a demand that

“arose out of a perception that appointments, promotions and the

allocation of positions of responsibility, such as Headships of Department

and the Deanships of Faculty, were determined on racists lines”

(Mokopakgosi 2008: 37). Despite these events taking place in Lesotho,

they were, as Mokopakgosi (2008: 38) points out, to have a profound

influence on student politics in Botswana: “On 20 October 1975, Lesotho

withdrew from the UBLS and the Batswana students at Roma and some

lecturers relocated to Gaborone. Armed with the militancy of Roma, the

students and staff would later participate in the student political activities

in Gaborone, much to the discomfort of the Botswana government.”

In April 1978, students protested against the visit of Bishop Abel

Muzorewa, a man widely considered to be part of the white-minority

regime of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, to Gaborone (Ibid.: 38). The students

issued the following memorandum:

Muzorewa, as a member of the Executive Council is now directly involved in the directing

of terrorist forces which are now continuously committing atrocities against the people of

Zimbabwe and neighbouring states […] Welcoming Bishop Muzorewa to Botswana is

tantamount to recognizing the illegal regime in Salusbury (now Harare), which only a few

weeks ago ambushed and cold-bloodedly murdered members of our Defence Force (Ibid.).

11 UBScope, 26 June 1979, p. 3 12 UBLS was a triparte University that preceded the University of Botswana.

16

Indeed, the visit closely followed the Lesoma massacre, in which, as the

student newspaper reported, “15 fighters from the Botswana Defence

Force died the most cruel death in a cowardly ambush laid by the agents

of British imperialism who masquerade as the so-called Rhodesian

Security Forces.”13

In September 1978, students planned a demonstration against the

arrest of Sergeant Ompatile Tswaipe of the Botswana Defence Force, who

was charged with murder after killing three white men (two from South

Africa and one from Britain) who had attempted to flee his arrest

(Mokopakgosi 2008: 39). The perception amongst the students was that

Khama had ordered the arrest after being pressured by the British and

South African authorities, and thus the Khama government was

“popularly seen as selling out to racist regimes in the region and working

against the liberation movements” (Ibid.: 40). The government pre-empted

the demonstration. “During the early hours of 11 September 1978,

students of the UBS in Gaborone woke to find the entire campus

surrounded by the police, armed with batons, sticks and canisters of

teargas” (Ibid.: 39). Eight students, seven of whom were from the SRC,

were expelled, before being reinstated after four weeks. The student

newspaper described the events as the “expansion of South Africa-Britain

Imperialism in the arena of justice here at home.”14

As its members came from all over the Southern Africa region, the

student movement was not organized along party-political lines.15 Indeed,

an editorial from the student newspaper at the time clearly distances

student politics from the national party political struggle:

Student politics are being attacked for no apparent reason except that they are becoming

better representatives of Botswana public opinion […] The student’s issue is being used to

divert attention from the problems within the ruling party and the opposition. The

students are placed in the crossfire between the BDP-BNF power struggle.16

13 UBScope, 26 January 1979, p. 1. 14 Ibid. 15 Interview with Bojosi Otlhogile, former Vice Chancellor, University of Botswana, 17

June 2015. 16 UBScope, 1 March 1979, p. 2.

17

As a result, the government viewed student demonstrations as politically

imported activities putting the stability of the country at risk. It was a

political struggle that the government did not want in Botswana, and that

it dealt with accordingly. Foreign academics were deported for inciting

student protests and foreign students on the SRC were singled out for

excessive beatings from the police during riots (Mokopakgosi 2008: 41).

While the rationale has since changed, these interactions between police

and students were to set the tone for future relations. Students were, and

are, seen not only as unruly, but at times also as a threat to the stability

of the nation.

1980s: Economic growth and transformation

By the 1980s, the white minority regimes of Angola, Rhodesia and

Mozambique had fallen, and Botswana was in a period of rapid economic

growth and transformation. In 1974 the government reached a favourable

agreement with De Beers, entitling them to a substantial flow of revenues

from diamond mining in the country (Gulbrandsen 2012: 125). At the time

of this agreement, mining represented 8 per cent of Botswana’s GDP; by

the end of the 1980s it had increased to 53 per cent (Hillbom 2015: 84).

Over the course of a decade and a half, Botswana had rapidly transformed

from a cattle to a diamond economy.

As a result, student politics became increasingly focussed on finding

their position within this rapidly growing economy. The 1980s is thus

widely considered to be a period in which student politics became focussed

on “local student issues”, which largely took the form of material demands,

on issues such as personal allowances, books and accommodation. While

the researcher was not able to uncover many historical documents from

the period, what was found did confirm this periodization. In summarizing

the year for the SRC in 1984, the student president, in an interview with

the student newspaper, emphasized issues such as control of SRC

finances, the financial management of the SRC-owned Tuckshop, on-

18

campus entertainment, and student allowances.17 Of course, this is not to

say that there is a sharp cut-off point. International issues continued to be

important in student politics at UB throughout the 1980s and 1990s (and,

to a lesser extent, today), and “local” issues were also important to

students of the 1970s.18 For example, an interview given by the SRC

president in 1981 to the student newspaper focused solely on the

deportation of eight South African refugees.19 Nevertheless, there was a

clear shift in focus in the 1980s – from international issues to local student

issues.

This shift necessitated an increased engagement with national

politics. As argued by Weinberg and Walker (1969: 81), when the decision

making process on university policy is centralised within the government

(as is the case in Botswana), the creation of a strong, centralised

organisation of students at the national level usually follows. In other

words, the more centralised the decision making process on issues

affecting students becomes, the more centralised the students have to be

in order to engage with the process. Thus, for example, UB-SRC

memorandums requesting increases in student allowances are sent to the

Department of Tertiary Education Financing, rather than to the

University Vice Chancellor. 20 The University of Botswana is in an

interesting position in that, while it is not the only university in

Botswana, it is, by some margin, the biggest and most significant. Thus,

while Botswana does not have a prominent national student union (as

would be predicted by Weinberg and Walker), the University of Botswana

often takes this role, and speaks out on national student issues.

As a result of this increased engagement with the state on issues of

domestic policy, party politics came to the fore at UB in the 1980s.

According to one current member of UB-UDC, “Students back then, they

17 UBScope, December 1984, p. 10. 18 Mokopakgosi 2008; Interview with Otlhogile. 19 UBScope, 4 February 1981, p. 1 20 ‘Students Request for Allowance Increase’, The Voice, 21 October 2001, available at

http://www.thevoicebw.com/2011/10/21/students-request-for-allowance-increase/

[accessed 18 July 2015]

19

had the belief that [they would] have to align themselves with political

parties out there that better represented their interests.” According to one

source, in the 1988/89 academic year, “politically inclined movements such

as MELS, Mass (B.N.F.) [and] G.S. 26 (B.D.P.) began to take root on

campus. This was not surprising because the nation was preparing itself

for the 1989 general elections so the political tempo on campus was also

high.”21 This is corroborated by another source that puts the shift at some

point in the mid-late 1980s.22 It would, furthermore, come as no surprise if

the manifestation of party politics on campus came in the run up to an

election. Student politics at UB has always followed, and reacted to,

national electoral cycles – the years immediately preceding and following

national elections are usually the ones with significant political activity on

campus.23

1990s: Corruption scandals

The late 1980s and early 1990s in Botswana was dominated by reports of

corruption, gross government mismanagement and land acquisition

scandals, which were to have a significant effect on student politics (see

Good 1994). Like student movements throughout the continent during this

period, students at the University of Botswana began to draw connections

between local student issues they had campaigned for in the 1980s, and

broader “bad governance” (Balsvik 1998: 307). 24 The SRC of 1991/92

vowed to “take the university to the people”25 as the students became

increasingly “galvanised in an explicitly political direction” and their focus

shifted from particular student issues to broader issues of corruption and

government malpractice (Bratton and van de Walle 1992: 430). The

similarities with other African movements, however, while there, must not

be overstated. While the results of bad governance were the main causes

21 UBScope, April 1992. 22 Interview with Otlhogile. 23 Interview with Kabelo Lebotse, former UB-SRC President (BNF), 19 June 2015. 24 Ibid. 25 UBScope, April 1992, p. 7.

20

for protest, the student movements in Botswana never evolved to become

the democratisation movements seen elsewhere. While the UB-SRC had

on-going contact with, and offered support to, SRCs throughout Southern

Africa, the UB-SRC did not see their struggle as similar to those of their

neighbours: “In Botswana we were not fighting any authoritarian regime

or anything like that. It was more to improve our conditions.”26

Furthermore, while student movements elsewhere on the continent

are frequently considered to have played an important role in the

respective countries’ democratisation processes (see Ibid.), the impact of

student politics and protests in Botswana in the first half of the 1990s is

likely to have been minimal. Indeed, while the students staged several

protests against government corruption, not a single one was mentioned in

Mmegi, the country’s largest independent newspaper. Student politics and

protests were mentioned only seven times in the decade’s first four years

(see chart 1.1). While corruption scandals shaped the logic and rhetoric of

student movements in the 1990s, the student movements themselves did

not take on a leading role in the national anticorruption debate and

discourse. Indeed, student politics was not integrated into the party

machinery in the same way seen today (see chapter 2). Thus, while

corruption scandals galvanised students on issues of broader domestic

politics, and while the success of the BNF in the wake of the corruption

scandals (see Chart 1.2) created a buzz around BNF politics at the

university, students remained relatively isolated from the political process

compared to today. The political parties did not consider winning SRC

elections as important for their own electoral success.

26 Interview with Lebotse.

21

Chart 1.1: Annual mentions of university student politics, issues and protests, Mmegi

1988-1998

Chart 1.2: Parliamentary election results, Botswana National Front (Molomo 2005: 33)

1995 Mochudi protests

On the 6th of November 1994, the mutilated body of 14 year-old Segametsi

Mogomotsi was found in Mochudi, a village just outside the capital city of

Gaborone. Her murder was only one of many that had taken place in

Botswana in the decades preceding and following her death (Durham

2004: 599). Many of these murders were considered ritual murders;

3

11

2

4

10

4

10

5

21

11

0

5

10

15

20

25

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004

Popular vote (%)

Seats in parliament (%)

22

“female children with their genitalia missing, like Segametsi, are the

prototypical victims” (Ibid.).

Demonstrations broke out in January the following year, as

Segametsi’s fellow pupils protested against the perceived inability of police

to find the perpetrators, before later being joined by UB students. The

pupils clashed with police and set fire to the house of one of the suspects.27

Further unrest broke out in Mochudi in the following months.28 On the

23rd of February, students of the University of Botswana joined in,

storming parliament in protest.29 The University was subsequently closed

indefinitely30 and remained closed for three weeks.31

The riots represent a landmark in Botswana’s political history.

“Nothing of the kind had happened before, and the people themselves

were surprised – indeed, in a state of shock. The peaceful, harmonious

order of political life in Botswana, and idealization no doubt, seemed to

them to have been completely shattered” (Gulbrandsen 2002: 221). The

riots captured the media’s imagination, and put youth and student issues

front and centre of the political debate, providing impetus to an already

on-going discussion on the position of youth in Botswana. Students

became central in this development. Indeed, a three-year simple moving

average (SMA) shows a strong and sustained rise in average annual

mentions of student politics since the riots began in 1994 (see chart 1.3).

Even though court cases concluded in 1997, the debate continued: none of

the 11 mentions of university student politics in 1998 were reports of new

protests or court cases; they were all opinion pieces, editorials and readers’

letters discussing various issues relating to students. Such pieces were

completely absent in the aftermath of a court case between the SRC and

the government in the late 1980s. Topics discussed included the

27 Mmegi, vol. 12, no. 3, 27 January-2 February 1995, p. 1. 28 Mmegi, 17-23 February 1995, p. 4; Mmegi, 24 February-2 March 1995, p. 2. 29 Ibid., p. 5. 30 Mmegi, 10-16 March 1995, p. 5. 31 Mmegi, 17-23 March 1995, p. 1.

23

relationship between the state and UB32, the roots of student riots33, and

an on-going discussion on whether students should be seen as victims or

perpetrators.34

Chart 1.3: Annual mentions of university student politics, issues and protests, Mmegi, 3-

year simple moving average (SMA) 1990-1998

The SRC elections in 1996, furthermore, were the first (and only) to

be mentioned by Mmegi in the period analysed (SRC elections and

internal politics are today regularly discussed in Mmegi and other

newspapers). In an article entitled “BDP’s bid to control U.B?” the

newspaper reported on a letter alleged to have been sent from Nixon

Marumoloa, chairman of GS-26, to Daniel Kwelagobe, Secretary General

of the BDP. Bearing the heading “Re: Control Of The S.R.C. By GS 26,”

the letter said:

Following our discussion and resolutions at the recent seminar, I am pleased to report to

you that our plan to completely take control of the S.R.C. is about to be realized … We

hope that we will be able to implement our agenda soon … Brown Tlhaselo at information

and propaganda [he was standing in election for this position] will be able to work closely

with Hon. Kediklwe and master the media control tactics that he trained on at the

seminar. Above all we will be able to put all demonstrations to an end, especially those

32 Mmegi, 6-12 February 1998, p. 13. 33 Mmegi, 17-23 February 1995, p. 6; Mmegi 24-30 July 1998: 5. 34 Mmegi, 13-19 March 1998, p. 10; Mmegi, 9-15 October 1998, p. 13; Mmegi, 30 October-

5 November 1998, pp. 9, 13; Mmegi, 4-10 December 1998, p. 13; Mmegi, 11-17 December

1998, p. 13; Mmegi 23 December-7 January 1998, p. 13.

-

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

24

that tarnish the good image of our government. Our programme of action for the next

three years should enable us to help the B.D.P. grow by leaps and bounds within the

student community and Gaborone.35

The authenticity of the letter was denied by Marumoloa in a letter to the

newspaper the following week, where he claimed that he had

never entered into any discussions with Kwelagobe on SRC selections. There is no BDP

plan to take control of the SRC. The BDP does not interfere in student politics so there is

no way the Secretary General of the party could discuss SRC elections with me. No media

control tactics were discussed at the recent GS 26 seminar, nor anything linked to student

politics.36

The letter’s authenticity, or lack there-of, could not be verified.

Nevertheless, it is certainly an excellent foreshadowing of future relations

between students and national parties. Student politicians are now

completely candid about their connections to political parties, the political

training they receive from national parties, and the national political

importance of controlling the SRC (this will be expanded upon in Chapter

2).

***

Since the 1970s, student politics at the University of Botswana has

undergone significant changes. Multinational in the 1970s, the SRC’s

raison d’être was supporting the liberation struggles taking place in other

countries in southern Africa. In the 1980s, local student issues and

material demands gained increasing prevalence in student politics in the

country. As predicted by Weinberg and Walker (1969), this necessitated an

increased engagement in national domestic politics. Following this, party

politics came to the fore on campus in the second half of the 1980s, as

students sought to engage with political parties that better represented

their interests in national politics. Corruption scandals in the 1990s had

the effect of framing student issues within broader issues of

malgovernance. This reflected developments elsewhere on the continent in

the late 1980s/early 1990s, where activist movements in general became

increasingly politically galvanized and when “material demands [in the

35 Mmegi, 5-11 April 1996, p. 5. 36 Mmegi, 12-18 April 1996, p. 7.

25

1980s] were extended to affairs of national politics [in the 1990s]” (Bratton

and van de Walle 1992: 430; Balsvik 1998: 307).

The response of the Botswana state to student movements in

Botswana has also followed patterns from the continent. These were

characterized by

a chain of events consisting of student challenges and university/government responses

that combine to make a general formula. The first step is an announcement of a student

view/demand unpalatable to the political elite, expressed in a student paper or in the form

of a demonstration. Dramatic confrontations follow between students and armed security

forces. Student leaders are expelled from the university, often arrested, and their union

and paper banned. Students then strike in solidarity to reinstate arrested or expelled

student activists (Balsvik 1998: 305).

This pattern is followed in Botswana. Furthermore, the response of the

Botswana state has taken on the full spectrum of responses seen

elsewhere on the continent: the state has used everything from the courts

of law, suspensions, university closures and brutal responses from police.

Thus, despite being omitted from the wider literature on African student

movements, student politics in Botswana has continuously reacted to and

followed regional and continental student movements, and the reactions

from the state have followed similar regional patterns. Despite the post-

colonial experience of Botswana being seen as exceptional on the

continent, its student movements have, throughout their history, been

distinctly African.

Student movements, however, have also (and primarily) been

reactions to national circumstances. The nature of student movements in

Botswana has been affected by national politics and particularly actions of

the state and elites. In the 1970s, it was their position on apartheid

regimes surrounding Botswana; in the 1980s, it was their failure to

accommodate for student needs; and in the 1990s it was corruption.

It was shown how student politics became increasingly party-

political in the 1980s. The nature of this party-politicisation, however, was

quite different from what is seen today. Student politics was not central to

the national political contest. According to one source, political influence

from the outside was “minimal” at the time, compared to contemporary

26

SRCs.37 Indeed, according to one former SRC president representing the

opposition in 1993/94, his SRC campaign never received external support

(be it financial, political or otherwise), unlike today’s candidates.38 The

significant linkages between student and national politics seen today are a

modern phenomenon. Contemporary student politics in Botswana has

become increasingly party-political, and increasingly defined and shaped

by the authoritarian nature of Ian Khama’s presidentship. This will be

discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

37 Interview with Barbra Pansiri, Director of Student Welfare, University of Botswana,

22 June 2015. 38 Interview with Lebotse.

27

CHAPTER 2: STUDENT POLITICS AND

THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT

According to Balsvik (1998: 318), universities are feared by governments

across the African continent as “states within states.” They are seen as

social spheres that had broken away from the traditional hierarchical

structures of societies and escaped the government’s control. In developing

countries in particular, universities are not just breeding grounds for

future leaders; “university students do not just prepare themselves for

future roles in political life; they play a significant part in the political life

of their countries even during the student period” (Lipset 1966: 133). The

university thus represents a potential threat to regime stability.

As presented in the Introduction, the University of Botswana will

be approached as a “state within a state” or, said differently, a “sanctuary

of freedom of political expression and association,” isolated from many of

the factors contributing to the uneven playing field of national politics.

Such an analysis is aided by the composition of the SRC and the election

process, which closely mimics that of national parliament. This chapter

will explore these processes, before examining the role played by the main

opposition party – the Umbrella for Democratic Change – in SRC elections

and its connection to its UB cell, UB-UDC. Finally, it is argued, contrary

28

to the findings of Weinberg and Walker (1969), that the party

politicisation of student politics at the University of Botswana is the result

of differences in playing fields between the student politics and national

politics, rather than a centralised recruiting mechanism within the

political parties. The opposition have embraced student politics as an

important battle ground in their bid to win national elections.

The workings of the UB-SRC

The Student Representative Council of the University of Botswana (UB-

SRC)39 is an elected body of students whose mandate is to represent the

undergraduate students at the University of Botswana.40 As per article 3

(ii) of the SRC constitution, the SRC consists of 13 members: a President,

Vice President, Secretary General, Treasurer, Administrative Secretary,

Minister of Information and Publicity, Minister of Bar and Canteen,

Minister of Academic Affairs, Minister of Student Affairs, Minister of

Justice, Minister of Entertainment, Minister of Sports and Minister of the

Refectory. The positions have undergone some minor name changes since

the latest version of the constitution was written in 1985 (Minister of

Information and Propaganda is now Minister of Information and Publicity,

Minister of Entertainment and Culture is now Minister of

Entertainment), but the positions themselves have remained intact –

despite, for example, the fact that the SRC no longer has a bar and

canteen.

Elections take place towards the end of each academic year to elect

representatives for the following year. As per article 21.4 of the SRC

constitution, all full-time registered students are eligible to stand for

elections to the SRC provided that no candidate may stand for more than

one office. UB-SRC elections are fought along party political lines, and are

dominated by the two biggest parties in Botswana: UB-UDC representing

39 Any reference of “SRC” is a reference to the UB-SRC, unless stated otherwise. 40 An SRC for graduate students exists as well, but is smaller, less radical and far less

significant both on campus and in a national context.

29

the Umbrella for Democratic Change and GS-26 representing the

Botswana Democratic Party.41

Before the SRC elections, these groups hold primary elections in

which their proposed cabinet is selected. All members of the student party

are given a vote for each of the positions. Once a proposed cabinet is put

together, it is presented to the students, who vote for each candidate on an

individual basis. Many of the positions within the party seem to go

virtually uncontested. Indeed, a combination of political opportunism and

political cliquing – not uncommon in the world of national politics – is

prevalent. For many students, their engagement with the SRC came as

the result of “being invited” by members in the student-political hierarchy,

or “seeing an opportunity” within the party. The story of one member of

the SRC is typical:

I joined [UB-UDC] in 2013, and my activism was very low. Probably because of the pool of

leaders that was there at that point in time. And as I graduated to my third year, a chance

for me to contest prevailed itself. [In] January 2015, an opportunity came; the guys who

were doing the SRC approached me and saw me fit to represent the movement.

The experience of another student – who was already a member of the

national party – was similar: “I joined the movement because I was

approached by the brothers in the movement and they told me ‘brother, we

saw who you are, we say that you are a leader, and we saw that you can

make a lot of change. We need someone like you [on the SRC].’”

For many student politicians, the position on the council is of little

importance, as members of the SRC frequently engage in activities beyond

their portfolio (although this delegation does not cross party lines). Thus,

what is important is being elected to the SRC in the first place. One non-

executive member of the SRC, for example, claimed he had the choice of

several positions within UB-UDC, including the Vice Presidency. When

asked why he didn’t choose to be Vice President, which surely was a more

lucrative position, the following conversation took place:

41 Running as an independent, or as a non-political group, is of course allowed but widely

considered an impossible task. Without the political and economic backing of political

parties, these groups and individuals are unable to compete with the UB branches of

national parties.

30

STUDENT: It doesn’t really matter. I can do Vice President things when I want, and he

can do [my] things when he wants.

RESEARCHER: So would you say the position on the SRC doesn’t really matter, as long as

you end up on the Council?

STUDENT: Yes.

Of course, this could be a case of the student exaggerating his own

importance and standing within the party. Nevertheless, it was a feeling

one got throughout the SRC. One Minister, for example, said he decided to

run for the post because it was the one that was “closest to my heart.”

Another said, “when I looked into the SRC portfolios when I was asked to

contest (…) I took [this position].” Both of these comments imply that a

desire to contest in the SRC elections preceded any consideration

regarding the specific position to contest. More obvious, perhaps, is the

continued existence of a Minister of Bar and Canteen, despite the SRC

losing its bar and canteen several years ago. Exceptions, of course, exist.

One student that was interviewed was clearly driven primarily by a

passion for his portfolio, and he had no interest in any other position. His

story, however, seemed an exception. For most of the students

interviewed, the SRC was seen as the continuation of a lengthy career of

student leadership.

The UB-UDC presence on the SRC should thus be seen not as a

group of individual councillors (or ministers), but rather as a cohesive bloc:

they campaign together during elections, and work together once elected.

The majority party on the council is thus considered to control the SRC,

and this shapes the SRC’s interactions with the university. Their

communication with the university runs through a defined chain of

command that represents the university’s hierarchy, beginning with the

director of student welfare, through the deputy vice chancellor, and finally

to the vice chancellor.42 The department of student welfare sees itself as a

mother figure for the SRC,43 although, as was reiterated by the students

on many occasions, the SRC does not answer to the department – it is

accountable only to the students.

42 Interview with Pansiri. 43 Interview with Deputy Director of Student Welfare, University of Botswana, 15 June

2015.

31

The Vice Chancellor at the University of Botswana is appointed by

the government and is thus seen by the students of the opposition as an

agent of the BDP, and the university itself as a branch of government.

Representatives of the institution itself share this view. The Director of

Student Welfare, for example, argued that relations with students were

far better when GS-26 controlled the SRC, because it made very little

sense for GS-26 to argue with the university board: “you cannot criticise

yourself.”44 This relationship defines the SRC-University interactions, and

it is perhaps in this relation that student politics most mirrors national

politics. While the national UDC party is fighting the state in the national

level, students of the opposition battle the university.

Connection to the opposition party

The UB-UDC is tightly linked to its mother party, the Umbrella for

Democratic Change. For some students, the link is primarily considered

inspirational, couched in a shared ideology. According to one student, “we

take inspiration from the already formed political parties out there, and

that’s [why we] call ourselves […] UB-UDC.” In reality, the link between

the two organisations is far more institutionalised than this student lets

on. Indeed, most students interviewed rejected the distinction between

student and national politics entirely. The UB-UDC should be considered

as a cell within the UDC Youth League (UDCYL) alongside similar cells at

other universities. This link is made clear by the fact that the highest-

ranking UDC member on the UB-SRC (currently the Vice President), is

given a seat on the Youth League council. The UDCYL, in turn, is a

recognised cell within the UDC.

Youth Leagues in Botswana provide crucial political education to

the party’s future rank and file, and a link between university students

and the main party. Students often introduced high-ranking and senior

members of the Youth League to the researcher as their “mentors”; the

44 Interview with Pansiri.

32

Youth League officers in kind referred to the students as “my boys.” The

hierarchy also provides a clear career path for an aspiring politician. As

one current member of UB-UDC argues, “The expectation […] is that

when you graduate from student politics, you go straight into youth

activism and join the youth leagues of those parties.” Indeed, in the

upcoming Botswana National Front Youth League elections,45 two of the

presidential candidates are former UB-SRC presidents. This internal

system of recruitment extends to the highest level: the current leader of

the opposition was a previous UB-SRC president, as are several of the

parties’ members of parliament. The current Mayor of Gaborone

represents, perhaps, the perfect example of this internal recruitment

system: he was Chairman of GS-26 at the University of Botswana, become

leader of the BDP Youth League after graduating, was appointed Deputy

Mayor of Gaborone, and then finally was elected mayor after defecting

from the party.46

The SRC as a national political battleground

This form of centralised recruitment is not particular to Botswana,

Africa or developing nations, and is observed in many Western countries

(see e.g. Hooghe et al 2004). What is particular about contemporary

student politics in Botswana is its importance in national politics. Indeed,

the UDC has on-going contact with its UB cell, particularly with the

members of the executive branch of UB-UDC. The President, Vice

President and General Secretary of the UB cell of the party meet with the

main party several times a week, at various levels. The topics of

discussion include advice on campaign strategy for upcoming SRC

elections and checking in on how the cell was doing.

45 Note that through all levels, the UDC remains divided between the three parties that

are in coalition within it: the Botswana National Front (BNF), Botswana People’s Party

(BPP) and the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD). 46 ‘City Father on a Mission’, The Voice, 12 July 2013, available at

http://www.thevoicebw.com/2013/07/12/city-father-on-a-mission/ [accessed 21 July 2015].

33

This contrasts with student politics in the 1990s. Indeed, while

student politicians then had on-going contact with the party, they were

engaged as party members, not student politicians, and student politics

remained focussed on student issues.47 In contrast, the main goal of UB-

UDC today is to support the mother party in winning national elections.

This was confirmed, with little prompting, by the members of the cell.

According to one student, “Right now, even our build up, even our SRC

elections, ours is a mission to topple the government of the day come

2019.” When asked whether national politics ever influences his work on

the SRC, one UB-UDC member said, “Obviously, yes. Because, the UDC,

our main goal is to take over the government in 2019 […] They use the

SRC to the advantage of the party. We use the SRC to the advantage of

the party also.”

Winning SRC elections is crucial in this endeavour. It gives the

party the mandate to speak and act on behalf of the students within the

University structures, and allows the UB cell of the party to issue

memorandums, call press conferences and declare strikes. The comments

of one disgruntled staff member is quite telling: “We never have problems

when the BDP control the SRC. It’s only when it’s the opposition.”48 The

existence of an opposition movement itself is not enough to have a

discernable impact: winning elections is tantamount. Within the

constituency of Gaborone Central, SRC elections are seen as crucial for the

outcome of general elections, as students represent a crucial demographic

within the constituency. As the current MP for the area argues, “If you

have UB, you have the constituents. So they are very, very important […]

Winning the SRC elections is critical.”49

On a national level, controlling the SRC is of particular importance

to the newly formed Umbrella for Democratic Change. Successfully

bringing three parties together, running for and winning an SRC election,

47 Interview with Lebotse. 48 Interview with Deputy Director of Student Welfare. 49 Interview with Phenyo Butale, Member of Parliament (UDC) for Gaborone Central

constituency, 11 June 2015.

34

and finally successfully working together once elected, was considered

important to show the country that the Umbrella project was a realistic

proposal. According to one MP, “they are extremely important for our

image – they give us recognition as a serious party.”50 In a statement

following the UB-SRC elections in 2013, in which UB-UDC won every seat

by huge margins, the UDC issued a statement praising the student

community for “electing a student government which is premised on the

bringing together of Opposition parties in Botswana to unseat the

oppressive and neo-colonialist Botswana Democratic Party” and said that

the results would

serve as a warning to all those who have doubted the Umbrella project. Batswana have

spoken and are continuing to speak; they want opposition parties to work together under

the UDC banner. The UB community is a microcosm of the Botswana society and therefore

its decisions cannot be taken lightly.51

Because of the influence of the Council, winning SRC elections at

the University of Botswana has become an important aspect of the

political parties’ campaign strategy.52 As a result, as several informants

confirmed (students, politicians and university staff), both political parties

provide extensive campaign funding, strategic guidance and political

endorsements in the run up to SRC elections. According to one member of

UB-UDC:

We can meet and they give us advice on how to campaign and how to do strategic things

[…] Usually we station an office right here [on campus] during the campaigns. During that

period, we get one assistant from the party house, who will […] manoeuvre the publicity

part and the branding part of the campaign.

Senior politicians themselves visit campus in the run-up to the elections to

support the UB-UDC candidates:

During our campaigns, we had the leader of the opposition, Duma Boko, and also the Vice

President and the Secretary General of the party, they came here, they visited us, we

paraded around school… So we have a very good relationship with them.

We had the Member of Parliament [from Gaborone Central] greasing the campaign trail –

coming to campaign and help here, addressing rallies, hosting lunches.

This is not isolated to the run up to elections. One can sometimes see past

student leaders (now with other positions within the party) roaming the

50 Interview with Kgoroba. 51 ‘Umbrella on UB SRC ELECTIONS’, Botswana Gazette, 3 April 2013, available at

http://www.gazettebw.com/umbrella-on-ub-src-elections/ [accessed 7 August 2015] 52 Interview with Butale.

35

corridors of the Student Centre, meeting with current council members,

especially during crucial moments on the SRC (for example, following an

attempt by UB-UDC to suspend the GS-26 president from the council in

June 2015).

All members of the UB-UDC seem to have embraced this role

within the party, even those whose political aspirations are minimal.

Indeed, the aforementioned Minister on the UB-SRC, who was clearly

motivated by a passion for his post rather than political ambitions,

perhaps summed up the students’ position in the political landscape best:

“It is very difficult to try to extract the difference between UB politics and

national politics. After all, we are tomorrow’s leaders. [Today,] we are

more like foot soldiers in this institution. We are mobilizing.”

***

Student politics has thus been absorbed into national politics and become

a crucial battleground in the national political contest. This represents

quite an evolution from student politics in the 1970s, 80s and 90s (see

Chapter 1). Following Weinberg and Walker (1969), this development may

not be too surprising. They show how system linkages between the political

system, student politics and systems of higher education have an impact

on the nature of student politics in the United States, Britain, Latin

America and elsewhere. According to them, the creation of a strong,

centralised organisation of students at the national level, which the UB-

SRC de facto is, is a natural reaction to a centralization of authority over

the university within the government (Ibid.: 81). They further argue that,

Where political parties are highly organised and centralised at the national level, and are

thus able to sponsor mobility into professional political careers, they are likely to turn to

universities as sources of able, well-educated candidates. This in turn leads to the

development of student political clubs or branches of national political parties on

university campuses, where aspiring politicos may become socialised and prove their

mettle to party recruiting agents […] Student political clubs thus link student politics to

the political system through the medium of individual careers (Ibid.: 82).

When both of these conditions are present (the centralisation of leadership

recruitment, and the centralisation of university control within the

government), Weinberg and Walker (1969: 83) argue, “we might expect to

36

find the campaigns for office in national student unions conducted by the

student branches of national political parties.”

This explanation does not hold for Botswana, however. As has been

shown in this chapter, contemporary student politics within the opposition

movement is not driven primarily by individual career ambitions, but

rather a genuine effort to challenge BDP hegemony. A more likely cause

for the party-politicisation of student politics is thus the UDC’s recognition

of the SRC as a potent political force in the country. Faced with an uneven

playing field nationally, the relatively level playing field of student politics

– in which they have historically done well – is embraced as a springboard

to challenge the BDP in national elections. It is, in this way, that the

uneven playing field of Botswana politics has caused a blurring of the

boundaries between student and national politics.

37

CHAPTER 3: STUDENT POLITICS AND

THE STATE UNDER IAN KHAMA

(2008–)

The succession of Lieutenant-General Ian Khama to the presidency in

April 2008 is seen by students and scholars alike as a catalyst for “an

escalation in the militarisation and personalisation of power in Botswana”

(Good 2010a: 315; see also Gwatiwa 2011; Richard 2014). A former

military man, Khama’s political experience was limited to chieftaincy and

dynastic politics, and his rise to power swift and aided by family ties (Good

2010a: 319). He was appointed Brigadier in the new Botswana Defence

Force (BDF) by his father Seretse Khama (then president) in 1977, aged

24, “by-passing more experienced and better educated officers in the then

Police Mobile Unit” (Ibid.). In 1979 he was installed as kgosi53 of the

Bamangwato people, a position previously held by his great-grandfather,

Kgosi Khama III (r. 1872/1875-1923), and later, de facto though not de

53 The dikgosi (singl. kgosi) are the supreme royal authorities (kings or chiefs) of the

seven Tswana kingdoms (merafe, singl. morafe) in Botswana. It is a traditional title,

although still exists, and was incorporated into the bureacratic structures at

independence. See Gulbrandsen (2012), particularly chapters 1-4, and, for a first-hand

account from the point of view of the postcolonial government, Masire (2006).

38

jour, by his father upon his return from exile in 1956 (Gulbrandsen 2012:

90). Ian Khama’s father and great-grandfather are perhaps the two most

celebrated icons of Tswana leadership; as a result, his enthronement was

enthusiastically received by the people (Ibid.: 19, 90 footnote 34). His rise

within the BDP thereafter was remarkably swift: he resigned as

Commander of the BDF on the 31st of March, 1998; registered as a

member of the BDP and was appointed as Minister of Presidential Affairs

on the 1st of April; and was nominated Vice President the following day

(Good 2010a: 319). He became president ten years later to the day (1 April

2008), as Festus Mogae stepped down. Khama was elected president (in

the first democratic election of his political career) the following year

(2009) and again in 2014.

It must be noted that Ian Khama’s father, Seretse Khama, was

himself “never happy with constituency and parliamentary debate. In

October 1972, only six years after independence, the constitution was

changed to accommodate the indirect election of the president” (de Jager

and Taylor 2015: 29). This is seen by some scholars as “the first step on

the way to autocracy” (Parsons et al. quoted in Ibid.). Yet Ian Khama, to

many, represents a landmark in Botswana’s political history and a major

divergence from a positive democratic direction in the country. Upon

taking his role as president, he refused to give up his position as kgosi,

thus breaking laws and political practices that ensured that indigenous

authorities were “effectively barred by state legislation from engaging in

party politics” (Gulbrandsen 2012: 11). This arrangement was central to

the consolidation of democracy in Botswana. Indeed, according to

Gulbrandsen, “the post-colonial leadership in Botswana has succeeded

because indigenous authorities have not been linked up with the modern

state in relationships of ‘highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties’”

(Ibid.). Thus, while Botswana had been applauded for its meritocratic

recruitment policies, Ian Khama represented a return to the personalised

politics of pre-colonial and colonial chieftainship.

39

The greatest symbol of this personalisation and militarisation of

power under Ian Khama is the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence

and Security Services (DIS, sometimes abbreviated to DISS).54 Housed in

Office of the President, the DIS commenced operations on the exact same

day as Khama (1 April, 2010), and is thus widely associated with his

person. The role of the DIS in Botswana is (by design) unclear and thus

far-reaching. Its official roles include protecting “the security interests of

Botswana whether political, military or economic”; maintaining and

regulating the flow of state intelligence; providing personal protection to

the President, Vice President and their families; and, critically,

performing “such other duties and functions as may, from time to time, be

determined by the President to be in the national interest.”55 In the name

of “national security”, officers of the DIS “could make arrests without

warrant, and they could use their weapons when ‘necessary and

reasonably justifiable’” (Good and Taylor 2007: 277). While several of

Botswana’s parastatals face severe cash flow crises, and the country faces

increasing problems with electricity and water supply, the DIS received a

huge supplementary budget injection in December 2014, against the

advice of a section of the Parliamentary Budget Estimates Committee.56

The scandals surrounding the DIS are many: the agency has been

linked to extrajudicial killings;57 corruption scandals;58 accused of being

“the lynchpin of an elaborate crime network that helped raise funds for

54 The DIS, it should be noted, is only one of an astonishing amount of security agencies

in a country of two million people. These include Military Intelligence, Police Special

Branch, The National Intelligence Agency, Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the

Security Intelligence Service, Serious Crime Squad, the Diamonds and Narcotics Squad,

and the Directorate on Crime and Economic Corruption (DCEC) (Good and Taylor 2007:

277). 55 Volume IV, Intelligence and Security Service, Directorate of Intelligence and Security

(ss 4-24), chapter 23:02, available at http://www.elaws.gov.bw/rtf_pr_export?id=1383

[accessed 12 August 2015]. 56 Sunday Standard, 21-27 June 2015, p. 1. 57 ‘Security agents shoot another man’ Mmegi, 15 May 2009, available at

http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=1&dir=2009/May/Friday15 [accessed 25 July

2015] 58 Sunday Standard, 24-30 May 2015, pp. 1, 4.

40

the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)”; 59 alleged to have

“threatened, intimidated and spied on Directorate on Corruption and

Economic Crime (DCEC) officers who were investigating allegations of

corruption against [DIS director Isaac] Kgosi”; 60 openly admitted to

surveilling tourists; 61 restricted visas for academics, researchers and

journalists (Good and Taylor 2007: 278); and is described by one

newspaper as “the crown jewel of state repression [that] has been used to

criminalise an entire generation of political dissidents, journalists,

lawyers [and] publishers.” 62 Khama has appointed personal allies to

oversee the operation of the Directorate, including its Director, Isaac

Kgosi, who was a close associate of Khama during his years as BDF

Commander (Good 2010a: 316). A lack of effective independent oversight

mechanisms has thus opened the DIS up to political interference, blurring

the lines between national and regime security (Mogalakwe 2013: 13).

Sidney Pilane, spokesperson for the Botswana Movement for Democracy

(BMD), a breakaway party from the BDP, alleged that the DIS had been

used to investigate and spy on BMD members.63 More severely, the DIS

has been accused of murdering BMD leader Gomolemo Motswaledi in

2014 (see below).

This blurring of national and regime security is central to the

relationship between student politics and the state under Ian Khama.

Addressing the BDP national council for the first time as President,

Khama condemned student protest as a threat to the BDP’s “national

programme intended to benefit all Batswana” and warned that striking

students would be expelled from university and blacklisted from

employment in the public service. 64 Khama’s view of student protest,

59 Sunday Standard, 17-23 May 2015, p. 1 60 Sunday Standard, 24-30 May 2015, p. 1 61 Ibid., p. 2 62 Botswana Gazette, 3-9 June 2015, p. 3 63 ‘No blows barred as Pilane takes on Khama’ Sunday Standard, 29 April 2010, available

at http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=7491 [accessed 31 July 2015] 64 ‘Khama Derides UB Rioters, Delayes NDP10’, Mmegi, 30 March 2009, available at

http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=1&dir=2009/March/Monday30 [accessed 25

July 2015]

41

however, was already well known. Two months prior to this

announcement, then UB-SRC president, Kagiso Thutlwa, was reportedly

abducted, issued death threats, and dumped in the bush by what are

believed to be DIS agents.65 He was warned not to incite protests in the

future. Several similar events have since followed (Richard 2014: chapter

5).

Government repression (real or imagined), be it from state security

agencies or the University by proxy,66 plays a central role in the everyday

experience of student politics in Botswana. This was made clear when an

interview with a UDC member on the UB-SRC was interrupted by a

“comrade” who informed the interview subject that the Secretary General

of the SRC had been suspended from the University. He took this news

with remarkable calm. “This is the oppression that we face,” he explained,

“our boy will be back with us by next week.” These episodes define the

everyday life of members of the opposition on the UB-SRC, and serve as

constant reminders of the nature of student-state relations – and indeed

the state of democracy in the country. The episodes that dominate the

narrative of the state amongst students of the opposition, however, are

stories of kidnappings, murder, oppression and the blacklisting of student

politicians. What follows are three stories that were frequently brought up

by students in interviews and that clearly shaped their view of the

Botswana state. These are the suppression and blacklisting of former UB-

SRC President, Khumoekae Richard; the death of BMD leader Gomolemo

Motswaledi; and the sudden retreat from politics by UDC MP of

Goodhope-Mabule, James Mathokgwane. All three episodes happened

within a year prior to the researcher’s fieldwork and were thus still at the

forefront of the minds of the students.

65 ‘Has DIS started abductions?’, Mmegi, 29 January 2009, available at

http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=1&dir=2009/January/Thursday29 [accessed

25 July ] 66 The University management acting by proxy in the government’s interest is not

restricted to students. See, for example, the case of the deportation of Professor Kenneth

Good (Taylor 2006).

42

On the 30th of July, 2014, Gomolemo Motswaledi, leader of the

Botswana Movement for Democracy and Secretary General of the

Umbrella for Democratic Change, was involved in a fatal car accident near

Pitsane67 just ten weeks before what was “billed to be Botswana’s most

contested election.”68 His death sent shockwaves through the opposition in

Botswana. While the police said it was a road accident, members of the

opposition suspected foul play.69 Addressing a press conference following

the incident, UDC president Duma Boko said, “He was on UDC business

when he met his death […] I will be flying out this afternoon on UDC

duty. I do so aware of the threats that lie to thwart every effort we make

in the quest to re-energise our democracy and reclaim our country.”70 Boko

also announced that the UDC would launch a parallel investigation into

the death of Motswaledi. “We believe there is need for a second opinion to

allay suspicion. As UDC we are aware that political assassinations are

common towards elections. We must exhaust all avenues in our quest to

determine what could have caused the death of this valiant man.”71 The

case remains unresolved.72

In October 2014, three DIS agents approached a local publisher and

told them to stop printing The Scandalous Murdering of Democracy, a

book written by former UB-SRC President Khumoekae Richard,

threatening to take the publisher out of business if they refused to

cooperate.73 Similar threats were levied at bookstores in the country.74

67 ‘Gomolemo Motswaledi passes on’ Botswana Daily News, 30 July 2014, available at

http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=13332 [accessed 31 July 2015]. 68 ‘President Khama election rival killed in car accident’, Bulawayo24, 30 July 2014,

available at http://www.bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-africa-byo-51431.html

[accessed 31 July 2015]. 69 ’Death of opposition leader roils Botswana’, Daily Mail, 26 August 2014, available at

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2734875/Death-opposition-leader-roils-

Botswana.html [accessed 28 July 2015]. 70 Duma Boko, press conference in Gaborone, 31 July 2014. Available at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsQYBEZ7PUs [accessed 28 July 2015]. 71 ‘UDC suspects foul play in Motswaledi’s death’, Sunday Standard, 31 July 2014,

available at http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=20670&GroupID=1

[accessed 28 July 2015]. 72 Mmegi, 31 July 2015, p. 4. 73 Botswana Gazette, 3-9 June 2015, p. 3 74 Interview with Khumoekae Richard, former President (UDC), UB-SRC, 4 June 2015.

43

The book is a highly critical account of the government of Botswana,

covering Richard’s interactions with the state during his time as SRC-

President (in which he spent time in prison and was originally expelled

indefinitely before that ruling was overturned), the undermining of press

freedom, the militarisation of the state, and the increasingly authoritarian

nature of Ian Khama’s rule. After publishing the book, Richard was

relieved from his position as lecturer at the Francistown College of

Technical and Vocational Education “under dubious circumstances”75 and

now considers himself on the government’s blacklist.76

Finally, the sudden retreat from politics by UDC MP of Goodhope-

Mabule, James Mathokgwane, in June 2015 (at which point the

researcher was in Gaborone), was the talk of the students and politicos for

some time. While Mathokgwane himself claimed health reasons as the

cause for his abrupt resignation as MP, his immediate appointment as

Regional Director of the Selebi Phikwe Economic Diversification Unit

(SPEDU) raised suspicions that he had been bought by the BDP. As

reported by one newspaper,

WeekendPost has gathered that Mathokgwane was interviewed by the SPEDU Chief

Executive Officer, Dr. Mokubung Mokubung on Tuesday […] The following morning,

Mathokgwane was informed that he has passed his interview and his offer was ready for

signature. [That same morning] James Mathokgwane handed his resignation letter to the

Speaker of the National Assembly. He had not done the routine of consulting with his

voters to inform them of his intentions; evidently he had no time for consultation.77

It was reported elsewhere that “the BDP leadership knew about the

resignation of Goodhope-Mabule MP James Mathokgwane from politics

long before parliament made the announcement, and have indicated that

more will follow.”78 Reports that Mathokgwane was not qualified for the

job further fuelled speculation that it was a political move orchestrated by

the BDP.79 It was rumoured that Mathokgwane was pushed out of politics

by more coercive means as well. One informant claimed he had it on good

authority that the BDP had sent a girl to seduce Mathokgwane, and

75 Botswana Gazette, 3-9 June 2015, p. 3 76 Interview with Richard. 77 WeekendPost, 30 May-5 June 2015, p. 2. 78 The Patriot, 7 June 2015, p. 1. 79 Botswana Gazette 3-9 June 2015, p. 4.

44

threatened to publicise the affair if he did not resign. The cartoon below,

published in the Botswana Guardian and shared by students on social

media, illustrates the perceived power relation between Ian Khama (top)

and Mathokgwane (bottom).

The effect of these events on student activism varies on an

individual basis. For past and present student leaders with political

aspirations, it provides a further cause for their struggles. According to

one, the death of Motswaledi was cause for increased mobilisation within

the UB-UDC, due the “anger towards the BDP that they have killed our

precious leader.” Similarly, Khumoekae Richard dedicated his book to “the

heroic and legendary Gomolemo Motswaledi” (Richard 2014). Because

those with political ambitions are usually those in the executive of the

student party, the democratising rhetoric becomes synonymous with UB-

45

UDC. When visiting the Young Communist League in South Africa on

behalf of UB-UDC, for example, the president spoke out against Khama’s

regime, stating that democracy in Botswana was a “sham” and that

in the 2014 general elections for the first time there was emerging evidence of state

sponsored terrorism carried out by the notorious DIS whose major hallmark was the

political assassination of BMD President, Cde Gomolemo Motswaledi, one of our alliance

parties within Umbrella for Democratic Change. The Directorate on Intelligence and

Security continues to give threat to this democracy.80

The majority of the students of the opposition, however, do not publicly

share their enthusiasm. They regard their time at University as a chance

to freely and fully engage with politics, before entering the “outside world”

and being subject to the many constraints that exist outside of campus.

Few see themselves continuing their activism after graduating. The

experiences of Richard, Mathokgwane and, tragically, Motswaledi have

made life in politics an unattractive prospect. The response of one student

when asked if he would consider a career in politics is typical: “No, no.

Politics is a dirty business.”

For these students, a subtly different language of politics is utilised.

While the interconnection between student and national politics is

recognised, a degree of separation is clear in the way they understand

their position in politics. The UDC is consistently referred to as the party

“out there”, as opposed to politics going on “here” or “in school”. The

students are willing to discuss issues they may have with the University

board, but become visibly nervous and sometimes refuse to answer or

dodge tough questions about national politics, such as the state of

democracy in the country. This has the effect of strengthening the barriers

surrounding the “state within a state” that is UB, as many students prefer

to engage in politics internally.

In the words of one student, “we have politicians: people who love

politics and they believe that after they graduate they are going to do

something in line of politics. Those ones they engage in political issues

freely.” For the rest, the threat of blacklisting is too great. In a country

80 Owe Mmolawe, President, UB-UDC, speech given to Young Communist League rally in

Durban, South Africa, 21 June 2015.

46

with persistently high levels of youth unemployment (34% amongst those

aged 20-24, see Honde and Abraha 2015: 12) and where “the government

controls 70 percent of the Botswana economy and the remaining 30

percent is an extension of government” (AMB 2011: 31), the consequences

of being blacklisted are profound. “Many businesses depend solely on

government for survival. All businesses […] have to toe the line if they

want to survive […] as long as the government is the player, the referee

and the linesman in our economy, no one can do anything” (AMB 2009:

38). As a result, the students who are not looking for a career in politics

are considerably quieter on the SRC: “We just run for elections within the

university, with the hope that it can later on just die a quiet death within

the corridors of the University of Botswana. Once I graduate here, not all

the people will know who [I] was.”

47

CONCLUSION: HARBINGERS FOR

CHANGE OR ACTIVISTS IN ISOLATION?

Central to this dissertation has been an analysis of the relationship

between student politics and national politics in Botswana. It has done so

primarily to address two central themes: the causes and nature of the

party-politicisation of student politics in the country, and the impact of

student politics in the national political debate. Ultimately, this research

has asked: are student politicians harbingers for change, or activists that

have been successfully isolated from the national political process?

Much of the existing research and analysis on student movements

took place in the 1960s and early 1970s, often focussing on what might be

called the ‘microsociological’ and looked to develop a comprehensive

theoretical framework for understanding student movements (Altbach

1989: 97; Lipset and Altbach 1966: 320; Balsvik 1998: 302). They have

focused on individual factors such as religious preferences, political

beliefs, economic status and race (Astin 1968); ideology, personality,

socialization and experience (Thurber and Rogers 1973); and themes such

as generational conflict (Fendrich and Turner 1989; Goertzel 1972; Feuer

1969) and later on the influence of activist sub-cultures (van Dyke 1998).

This dissertation has taken a more institutional approach. In

analysing the relationship between student and national politics, it has

48

approached the University of Botswana as a “state within a state.” The

dialectical relationship between these two spheres – the state and UB –

has been central to the analysis. Chapter 1 traced the first three decades

of student politics in Botswana. It found that, while students were always

reacting to the actions of the state, it was not until the 1980s that political

parties started taking root on campus. As theorised by Weinberg and

Walker (1969), the students’ increased interest in domestic policy in the

1980s required a more organised, direct engagement with the political

system. However, their assumption that party politicisation is driven by

“the medium of individual careers” does not seem to hold for Botswana.

Instead, political parties were a medium through which students could

engage the national political system – a way of breaking down the barriers

of this “state within a state.” This engagement with the state gave space

for the students to engage with broader domestic political issues, such as

the nature of economic development and on-going corruption scandals.

As Chapter 1 showed, however, students were certainly not ever-

present in the national political debate. Despite staging several anti-

corruption protests in the early 1990s, not a single one was mentioned in

Mmegi, the country’s largest independent newspaper. Indeed, while there

was on-going contact between student politicians and political parties at

the time, the parties were, on the whole, relatively uninterested in SRC

elections.

This contrasts markedly from contemporary student politics. As

shown in Chapter 2, student politics has become integral to the political

project of the newly founded Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The

party now contributes financial and political support to the students in

their bid to win the UB-SRC elections. For the MP of Gaborone Central,

winning the SRC election is seen as “crucial” for his own electoral success

in the constituency. For the party as a whole, the success of UB-UDC has

been important in legitimating the Umbrella project, and students have

provided an important voice for the party nationally.

49

This dissertation has argued that the opposition has embraced

student politics because of its relatively even playing field. Indeed, student

politics is largely isolated from the three factors highlighted by Levitsky

and Way (2010). Access to media is relatively unimportant, as student

politicians largely engage with their electorate through political

campaigns and while performing their duties once in office. Furthermore,

the dominance of government-owned media outlets in rural areas has

little impact on student politics in Gaborone. Secondly, while GS-26 is

widely considered to have more resources than UB-UDC, this does not

seem to have had a significant effect on the outcomes of student elections.

Furthermore, given the significantly lower operational costs of student

politics compared to national politics, it is far easier for the opposition to

close the gap to the BDP. Finally, access to the state (defined here as the

University board) is limited to the BDP, but they have, historically, not

implemented policies that have hindered the opposition.

It is in this way that contrasts in playing fields have broken down

the barriers between student and national politics. As shown in Chapter 3,

however, these contrasts have simultaneously strengthened these very

barriers. Indeed, for many students, the relatively free and level playing

field of student politics has led to isolation as students prefer to engage

with politics within the confines of the university, and are reluctant to be

drawn into issues involving national politics. National politics is seen a

“dirty business” that few want to be engaged with after graduating.

These contradicting effects make the future of student politics in

Botswana highly unpredictable, and makes an answer to the question put

forth in the introduction – are student politicians harbingers for change or

activists successfully isolated by the state? – elusive. The influence of

students should not be under-estimated, however. They are widely

credited for the rise of the UDC and its success in the 2015 elections, in

which the BDP, for the first time in its history, failed to win 50 per cent of

50

the popular vote.81 The student movement has contributed to denting the

BDP’s hegemony; the 2019 general elections may prove to be the ultimate

measure of their influence.

81 Interview with Kgoroba; Interview with Butale.

51

MEDIA

Botswana Daily News (Gaborone)

The Botswana Gazette (Gaborone)

Bulawayo24 (Bulawayo)

Daily Mail (London)

Huffington Post (New York, NY)

Mmegi (Gaborone)

The Patriot (Gaborone)

Sunday Standard (Gaborone)

UBScope (Gaborone)

The Voice (Gaborone)

WeekendPost (Gaborone)

52

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