Harman_Prince of Networks. Bruno Latour and Metaphysics - Graham Harman Copy

7/30/2019 Harman_Prince of Networks. Bruno Latour and Metaphysics - Graham Harman Copy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/harmanprince-of-networks-bruno-latour-and-metaphysics-graham-harman-copy 1/260

Prince of Networks

Bruno Latour andMetaphysics

Graham Harman



Pinc o Ntwoks



Anamnesis Anamnesis mans mmbanc o miniscnc, th collction and -collctiono what has bn lost, ogottn, o acd. It is tho a matt o th vold, o what has mad s who w a. Bt anamnesis is also a wok that tansoms

its sbct, alwas podcing somthing nw. To collct th old, to podc thnw: that is th task o Anamnesis .

a re.press series



.pss Mlbon 2009

Gaham Haman

Pinc o Ntwoks:Bno Lato and Mtaphsics



re.press

PO Box 40, Pahan, 3181, Mlbon, Astalia

http://www.-pss.og

© .pss & Gaham Haman 2009

Th moal ights o th atho a atomaticall asstd and cog-nizd nd Astalian law (Copyright Amendment [Moral Rights] Act 2000 )

This wok is ‘Opn Accss’, pblishd nd a cativ commons licnswhich mans that o a to cop, distibt, displa, and pom th

wok as long as o clal attibt th wok to th athos, that o do nots this wok o an commcial gain in an om whatsov and that oin no wa alt, tansom o bild on th wok otsid o its s in nomal

acadmic scholaship withot xpss pmission o th atho (o thixctos) and th pblish o this volm. Fo an s o distibtion, omst mak cla to oths th licns tms o this wok. Fo mo inoma-

tion s th dtails o th cativ commons licnc at this wbsit:http://cativcommons.og/licnss/b-nc-nd/2.5/

Bitish Liba Cataloging-in-Pblication Data

A catalogue record or this book is available rom the British Library

Liba o Congss Cataloging-in-Pblication Data A catalogue record or this book is available rom the Library o Congress

National Liba o Astalia Cataloging-in-Pblication Data

Haman, Gaham, 1968-

Pinc o ntwoks : Bno Lato and mtaphsics / Gaham Haman.

ISBN: 978-0-9805440-6-0 (pbk.)ISBN: 978-0-9806665-2-6 (book)

Sis: Anamnsis.Nots: Inclds indx.

Bibliogaph.Sbcts: Lato, Bno. Mtaphsics. Ontolog.

110

Dsignd and Tpst b A&R

This book is podcd sstainabl sing plantation timb, and pintd inth dstination makt dcing wastag and xcss tanspot.



v

Contnts

Abbreviations page vii

INTrODuCTION

Th LSe evnt 3

Pac 5

PArT I: THe MeTAPHySICS OF LATOur

1. Idctions 11

2. Scinc in Action 33

3. W Hav Nv Bn Modn 57

4. Pandoa’s Hop 71

PArT II: OBjeCTS AND reLATIONS5. Contibtions 99

6. Qstions 119

7. Obct-Ointd Philosoph 151

Bibliography 233

Index 239





vii

Abbviations

Ar Aramis or the Love o Technology, tans. Cathin Pot,Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss, 1996.

FD La Fabrique du Droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d’Etat , Pais,

Décovt, 2002.LL Laboratory Lie. The Construction o Scientic Facts , with Stv

Woolga, Pincton, Pincton univsit Pss, 1986.

MB ‘Can W Gt O Matialism Back, Plas?’, Isis , no. 98, 2007,pp. 138-142.

MP ‘Fom ralpolitik to Dingpolitik, o How to Mak ThingsPblic,’ in Bno Lato and Pt Wibl (ds.), Making Things

Public: Atmospheres o Democracy, Cambidg, MIT Pss, 2005.NM We Have Never Been Modern, tans. Cathin Pot, Cambidg,

Havad univsit Pss, 1993.

Pe ‘On th Patial existnc o existing and Nonxisting Obcts,’in Loain Daston (d.), Biographies o Scientic Objects , Chicago,univsit o Chicago Pss, 2006.

PH Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality o Science Studies , Cambidg,

Havad univsit Pss, 1999.

PF The Pasteurization o France , tans. Alan Shidan and john Law,Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss, 1988.



Prince o Networks viii

PN Politics o Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy, tans.Cathin Pot, Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss, 2004.

rS Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,

Oxod, Oxod univsit Pss, 2005.

SA Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss, 1987.

VI Paris ville invisible , Pais, editions la Décovt, 1998. Availablin english at http://www.bno-lato./vital/indx.html#







introduction





3

Th LSe evnt

Th initial manscipt o this book was discssd at th London Schoolo economics on 5 Fba, 2008 at a dalong smposim ntitld ‘ThHaman rviw: Bno Lato’s empiical Mtaphsics’. Th host oth vnt was th Innovation Sstms and Inomation Gop in th LSe

Dpatmnt o Managmnt, and wam sppot was povidd b its Had,Posso Lsli Willcocks. Bno Lato was in attndanc to spond toth manscipt. Th panl discssion was chaid b edga Whitl, withadditional psntations b Lcas Intona, Noot Mas, and th athoo this book. Fancs Whit povidd citical hlp in oganizing th vnt.Th Smposim Oganising Committ mphasisd th th highl in-tnational avo o th vnt, ating Alksi Altonn, O engl, Ptedéli, and Wiak Hoi Gddana (all doctoal candidats) and D. MahaShaikh. In addition, som ot-v spciall invitd paticipants w inth adinc that da.

In th wods o edéli: ‘It was sch an nsal and nlikl vnt;vn in tospct it is diclt to bliv it actall had takn plac. Whata th chancs o hosting a mtaphsical dbat btwn a Hidggianphilosoph and a sociologist known o his dislik o Hidgg on thgonds o a managmnt school, oganisd b PhD stdnts o an ino-mation sstms dpatmnt?’1 Th chancs a gatl incasd whn anngtic and visiona gop lik ANTHeM is involvd. Th aconm

stands o ‘Acto-Ntwok Tho-Hidgg Mting’. Thanks to edéliand his inds in ANTHeM m intllctal li ov th last two as

1. Pt edéli, ‘rmmbing th Haman rviw’. Blog post at http://www.anthm-gop.nt/tag/th-haman-viw/



Prince o Networks 4

has bn gatl nichd, and this book was abl to bcom a pblic ac-to long bo pblication in its cnt, nal omat. Thogh I nomallavoid ‘acknowldgmnts’ sctions in books om a o making m ads

l bod o xcldd, edéli’s gop is not boing and xclds nobod.It is wothwhil to oin ANTHeM’s mailing list and bows thi wbsit:http://www.anthm-gop.nt/

Anoth non-boing, non-xclsiv pson is Lato himsl. At vai-os stags o witing this book I civd th wamst possibl tatmntom Bno and Chantal Lato—in Caio, Pais, and at th Lato ‘ht’in Châtlpon dans l’Alli. Lato has spondd gaciosl to m q-is om as al as 1999, whn I was st an obsc and npblishd shPh.D. stggling in Chicago. Bt th a contlss sch stois o Lato’s

opnnss to th ong and th nknown, and ads o this book ma onda discov this o thmslvs.



5

Pac

This book is th st to consid Bno Lato as a k g in mtaphs-ics—a titl h has soght bt al civd. Lato has long bn pomi-nnt in th lds o sociolog and anthopolog, t th philosophical ba-sis o his wok mains littl known. Whil his man admis a sldom

concnd with mtaphsical qstions, thos hmits and otcasts who stillps ‘st philosoph’ a gnall namilia with Lato. M aim is tobing ths two gops into contact b xpssing Latoian insights in tmsbaing on th basic stct o alit itsl. Whn th cnta o classi-cal mtaphsics is matd with th chtah o acto-ntwok tho, thi o-sping is not som hllish monstosit, bt a thooghbd colt abl to cas o hal a cnt and mo. Thogh Lato’s ca has noldd lag-l in th social scincs, his oigins li in a igoos taditional dcation inphilosoph makd b a stongl jsit avo. His choic o topics, his wit,and his lita stl a thos o a contmpoa, t his woks a a conti-btion to dispts ov mtaphsics tacabl to ancint Gc.

As otn happns with th most signicant thinks, Lato is attackdsimltanosl o opposit asons. Fo mainstam dnds o scinc,h is st anoth sot Fnch lativist who dnis th alit o th x-tnal wold. Bt o discipls o Bloo and Bodi, his commc withnon-hmans maks him a sllot to ossilizd classical alism. In Lato’sown woks, howv, this tisom sti btwn obctiv phsical mat-

t and sbctiv social oc givs wa to a mo ascinating thm: objects , which h gnall calls ‘actos’ o ‘actants’. unlik Hidgg and oth-s, Lato taks appls, vaccins, sbwa tains, and adio tows sioslas topics o philosoph. Sch actos a not m imags hoving both hman mind, not st cst agggats atop an obctiv statm o



Prince o Networks 6

al micopaticls, and not stil abstactions imposd on a p-individalx o bcoming. Instad, actos a atonomos ocs to ckon with, n-lashd in th wold lik lpchans and wolvs.

Th st pat o this book consids Lato’s mtaphsical position asdvlopd in o k woks: Irreductions (1984), Science in Action (1987), We Have Never Been Modern (1991), and Pandora’s Hope (1999). Bginning in 1987,Lato also wokd sctl on a mammoth altnat vsion o his sstm— which maks him sl th onl philosoph in histo to ndgo his a-l and lat phass simltanosl. Th ‘lat Lato’ is patl inspid bth ogottn Fnch think etinn Soia (1892-1979), and Lato otndscibs his hiddn sstm with Soia’s own catchphas: ‘th dintmods o xistnc’. Lato’s nw philosoph was patl nvild to pa-

ticipants in a jn 2007 colloqim in Cis-la-sall, Nomand. Bt thmanscipt discssd in Cis was ml a woking dat, and at psntth is no nalizd lat sstm o vn a singl lat book that might bdiscssd h withot p-mpting Lato’s own ights as an atho. Fothis ason, I conn msl to th Bno Lato who can b known omth k woks pblishd thogh 1999. As I s it, this is also th bst wa toppa onsl o whatv nw woks appa nd Lato’s nam in th as to com.

Th scond pat o th book consids th mits and dawbacks o Latoian mtaphsics, which I hold to b th most ndatd philoso-ph o o tim. Givn that Lato’s stictl philosophical position is notwidl known, I will psnt him as a lagl sui generis g, thogh this isonl a hal-tth. It wold ctainl b itl to consid Lato’s similai-tis and dincs with llow non-analtic/non-continntal (i.., basical-l non-Kantian) thinks sch as Ald Noth Whithad, Hni Bgson,William jams, Gills Dlz, Michl Ss, Gilbt Simondon, GabilTad, etinn Soia, and Lato’s own ind Isabll Stngs. Bt

whn this mging ‘School X’ is pomotd nd sch mislading titls as‘pocss philosoph’ o ‘philosoph o immannc’, th slt is a als snso batnik bothhood. Fo in act, th is a mao amil qal nd-wa on this list ov a highl classical poblm: th isolation and intbld-ing o individal things. On on sid a gs lik Bgson and Dlz,o whom a gnalizd bcoming pcds an cstallization into spcicntitis. On th oth sid w nd athos sch as Whithad and Lato,o whom ntitis a so highl dnit that th vanish instantl with thslightst chang in thi poptis. Fo th st gop, sbstanc is too d-tminat to b al; o th scond, it is too indtminat to b al. BtLato’s own standpoint dsvs spcial illmination bo it is lost amidstth tmoil o civil wa.







the metaphysics o latour





11

1

Idctions

Bno Lato was bon in 1947 in Ban, in th Bgnd gion o Fanc.Th town’s cobbld ampats and otdoo caés mak it a avoit o tavl-s, and its popla wins a nod vn b th ctional Shlock Holms.Fo gnations, th philosoph’s amil has podcd th amos Lois

Lato labl o wins; th amil stat at Alox-Coton is asil visibl onoganizd vinad tos hading noth om Ban. Lato is a indland appoachabl g, a tall man ond o good cigas and good oks. His maid with two adlt childn, and sids in a comotabl at on th Danton in th Latin Qat o Pais. At woking o man as atth Cnt d Sociologi d l’Innovation at th ecol ds Mins in Pais, hcntl movd to a snio administativ post at th Institt d’étds poli-tiqs d Pais (o Scincs-Po, as it is commonl known). His gatst in-tllctal impact has pobabl bn in th Anglophon wold, wh h is aqnt gst o o lit nivsitis.

Lato’s al schooling blndd igoos jsit classicism with a pivat ondnss o Nitzsch. Following std at th univsit o Dion, na-tional svic dtis took him to th Ivo Coast. His incasing intst inldwok whil in Aica st th stag o his long visit to rog Gillmin’snondocinolog lab na San Digo, wh Lato’s amos pogam o th ‘anthopolog o th scincs’ bgan. This piod clminatd in his stbook, co-athod with th Bitish sociologist Stv Woolga, pblishd in

1979 as Laboratory Lie . This al wok shows th innc o th so-calld‘Stong Pogam’ o th edinbgh School o th sociolog o scinc, withits inamos anti-alist tndncis. Nonthlss, vn Lato’s st bookscaps th stict om o social constctionism, sinc al inanimat obcts a sponsibl o constcting acts no lss than a pow-hng



The Metaphysics o Latour 12

hmans. In lat woks, Lato movd vn th om th constctivist vision o alit, and now occpis a stang middl gond misndstoodom all sids. On on ank, h is ith paisd b rot1 o condmnd b

Sokal and Bicmont

2

as th latst in a long paad o Fnch lativists whodn th obctiv alit o th wold. On th oth, h is banishd om thconstctivist old b Bloo3 as a tin man taintd b alism, a compomisdi witt actiona who plls p shot o xplaining scinc b social ac-tos. Lato’s middl gond btwn ths positions is not an clctic com-pomis mixing lmnts o both, bt maks a position o basicall gatphilosophical dpth. Th ollowing chapts aim to psnt Lato’s stand-point in accssibl and mmoabl om.

‘An agmnt abot m “philosoph,”’ Lato wits, ‘has to stat with

Irreductions , which is a totall ophan book’.4 Th ophan in qstion is allonl hal a book—a nint-pag appndix attachd to th mastl stdknown in english as The Pasteurization o France . Lato has nv wittnanthing as compact and sstmatic as this small tatis, no anthing sonstl ignod. H I will tak him at his wod, and tat Irreductions as thgatwa to th st o his philosoph, dspit his cavat that h is ‘not show mch [h] holds to ths aphoisms’.5 I Lato vntall abandonssom o th claims in this tatis, w shold st adopt thm in od tosha in thi lat abandonmnt. Wittn at a tim whn th phas ‘Fnchphilosoph’ was ml a collctiv nicknam in th Anglophon mind oMichl Focalt and jacqs Dida, Irreductions blongs to what I gad asa mo advancd stag o philosoph than ith o ths gs. Althoghth st pincipl o this al wok is that ‘nothing is, b itsl, ith dc-ibl o idcibl to anthing ls’ (PF, p. 158), th book is sl idciblto ith o th ival schools o analtic and continntal philosoph. Lato’stast o cla acadmic pos no mo qalis him o th st gop thanhis Fnch passpot admits him to th scond.

A. THe BIrTH OF A PHILOSOPHy

Lat in 1972, a makabl ong think was diving his Citoën van along th highwas o Bgnd. Onl twnt-v as old, alad maid, hwas taching at a villag lycée and ppaing o national svic in Aica. Inon spct th ong philosoph was an otsid, mging om mot

1. richad rot, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 , Cambidg, Cambidg

univsit Pss, 1998, p. 8.2. Alan Sokal and jan-Lc Bicmont, Fashionable Nonsense , Nw yok, Picado, 1998.3. David Bloo, ‘Anti-Lato’, Studies in the History o the Philosophy o Science , vol. 30, no. 1,

Mach 1999, pp. 81-112.4. Psonal Commnication, elctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 11 Novmb, 2005.5. Psonal Commnication, 11 Novmb, 2005.



Idctions 13

Dion ath than th lit instittions o Pais. yt this povincial otlihad also ankd st nationall in th Agrégation, a stnning sccss thatmst hav lt lik a licns to spclat as l as h wishd. Too littl

has bn wittn abot damatic ashs o insight in th histo o philoso-ph. W know o Dscats’s dams and his stov-hatd oom, rossawping nd a t, and Avicnna saing pas and giving mon to thpoo at ading Faabi’s commnta on Aistotl. Bt w a namil-ia with th bakthogh momnts o Hidgg, Kant, Libniz, o Plato,thogh w know ths momnts wll o v Zn monk woth his salt.In Irreductions , Lato oins th minoit b pblishing his own momnt o piphan: ‘I taght at Ga in th Fnch povincs o a a. At th ndo th wint o 1972, on th oad om Dion to Ga, I was ocd to stop,

boght to m snss at an ovdos o dctionism’ (PF, p. 162). Thollows a Homic catalog o vaios hmans who lik to dc th woldto som spcial alit that xplains all th oths: Chistians, Catholics, as-tonoms, mathmaticians, philosophs, Hglians, Kantians, ngins,administatos, intllctals, bogoisi, Wstns, wits, paints, s-mioticians, mals, militants, and alchmists. All ths dcs had nallmanagd to pl th ong Lato, who sat on th oadsid daming o anw pincipl o philosoph:

I knw nothing, thn, o what I am witing now bt simpl patd tomsl: ‘Nothing can b dcd to anthing ls, nothing can b d-dcd om anthing ls, vthing ma b allid to vthing ls’.This was lik an xocism that datd dmons on b on. It was a win-t sk, and a v bl. I no long ndd to pop it p with a cosmolo-g, pt it in a pict, nd it in witing, mas it in a mtoologicalaticl, o plac it on a Titan to pvnt it alling on m had […]. It andm, thm and s, w mtall dnd oslvs. And o th st tim inm li I saw things ndcd and st (PF, p. 163).

An nti philosoph is oshadowd in this ancdot. ev hman andnonhman obct now stands b itsl as a oc to ckon with. No acto,howv tivial, will b dismissd as m nois in compaison with its s-snc, its contxt, its phsical bod, o its conditions o possibilit. evthing will b absoltl conct; all obcts and all mods o daling with obctswill now b on th sam ooting. In Lato’s nw and ndcd cosmos,philosoph and phsics both com to gips with ocs in th wold, bt sodo gnals, sgons, nannis, wits, chs, biologists, aonatical ngi-ns, and sdcs (PF, pp. 154-6). And thogh all ths xampls o actosa hman, th a no dint in kind om th ocs that daw obcts toth cnt o th ath o pss dsis in th nconscios. Th wold isa sis o ngotiations btwn a motl amada o ocs, hmans among thm, and sch a wold cannot b dividd clanl btwn two p-xistntpols calld ‘nat’ and ‘socit’. As Lato pts it: ‘w do not know what




ocs th a, no thi balanc. W do not want to dc anthing toanthing ls […]. What happns whn nothing is dcd to anthing ls?What happns whn w sspnd o knowldg o what a oc is? What

happns whn w do not know how thi wa o lating to on anoth isov changing?’ (PF, pp. 156-7). What happns is th bith o an obct-ointd philosoph.

Lato alwas insists that w cannot philosophiz om aw st pin-cipls bt mst ollow obcts in action and dscib what w s. empiicalstdis a mo impotant o him than o almost an oth philosoph;lat in his ca, h will vn spak o an ‘xpimntal mtaphsics’ (PN,pp. 123, 241-2). Nonthlss, th a a small nmb o basic pincipls thatgid his vast mpiical labos. In Irreductions , Lato’s st philosophical

tatis, th sm to b o cntal idas om which th oths blossom.Fist, th wold is mad p o actors o actants (which I will also call ‘ob-

cts’). Atoms and molcls a actants, as a childn, aindops, bllttains, politicians, and nmals. All ntitis a on xactl th sam onto-logical ooting. An atom is no mo al than Dtsch Bank o th 1976Wint Olmpics, vn i on is likl to nd mch long than th oth-s. This pincipl nds th classical distinction btwn natal sbstancand aticial agggat poposd most candidl b Libniz. It also nds thta-king modn it btwn th thinking hman sbct and th n-knowabl otsid wold, sinc o Lato th isolatd Kantian hman is nomo and no lss an acto than a windmills, snows, popan tanks,and Thailand. Finall, it shows th dp ambivalnc o Lato’s lation-ship with Aistotl. Fo in on sns, Lato oins Aistotl in insisting thatwhat is al a onl conct ntitis. Th billions o cats in th wold aal individals, not a singl cat-om stampd in dspicabl clots o coptphsical matt. Bt in anoth sns, Lato taks conctnss in a moadical diction than Aistotl wold pmit. Fo Aistotl, individals a

sbstancs—and sbstancs a dp than thi accidnts and thi la-tions to oth things, and capabl o nding dspit changs in ths in-ssntial ats. Fo Lato, b contast, an actant is not a pivilgd in-n knl ncstd with piphal accidnts and lations. At all, thiswold mak a thing’s sac divativ o its dpth, thb spoiling thpincipl o idction. Th cannot b an ssntial Socats hiding b-hind th Socats who happns to b spaking and waing whit at this v momnt. Fo Lato, a thing is so ttl conct that non o its a-ts can b scapd awa lik cobwbs o moss. All ats blong to thacto itsl: a oc ttl dplod in th wold at an givn momnt, n-til chaactizd b its ll st o ats.

Scond, th is th pincipl o irreduction itsl. No obct is inhntldcibl o idcibl to an oth. In on sns w can nv xplain li-gion as th slt o social actos, Wold Wa I as th slt o ail timtabls,



Idctions 15

o th complx motion o bodis as p xampls o Nwtonian phsics. ytin anoth sns w can always attmpt sch xplanations, and somtimsth a ail convincing. It is alwas possibl to xplain anthing in tms

o anthing ls—as long as w do th wok o showing how on can btansomd into th oth, thogh a chain o qivalncs that alwas hasa pic and alwas isks ail.

Thid, th mans o linking on thing with anoth is translation. WhnStalin and Zhkov od th ncicling movmnt at Stalingad, this is nota p dictat tmptd thogh spac and tanspantl obd b thpaticipant actos. Instad, a massiv wok o mdiation occs. Sta o-cs daw p dtaild plans with lag-scal maps that a thn tanslatdinto individal platoon ods at th local lvl; ocs thn la th o-

ds, ach making s o his own htoical stl and psonal appot withth soldis; nall, ach individal soldi has to mov his ams and lgsindpndntl to giv nal tanslation to th ods om abov. Spising obstacls ais, and som ods nd to b impovisd—th nm mltsawa at nxpctd points bt pts p stbbon sistanc in qall sta-tling placs. Moving om wa to logic, w nd that vn logical ddctionsdo not mov at th spd o light. Ddctions too a tansomd on stpat a tim thogh dint las o concpts, adsting thmslvs to localconditions at ach stp, dciding at ach stp wh th oc o th ddc-tion lis and wh possibl vaiations can b addssd o ignod. No la- o th wold is a tanspant intmdia, sinc ach is a mdim: o inLato’s pd tm, a mediator . A mdiato is not som scophantic -nch anning its masts with palm-lavs, bt alwas dos nw wok o itsown to shap th tanslation o ocs om on point o alit to th nxt.H as lswh, Lato’s giding maxim is to gant dignit vn to thlast gain o alit. Nothing is m bbl to b sd p o tampld bmighti actos. Nothing is a m intmdia. Mdiatos spak, and oth-

mdiatos sist.Foth, actants a not stong o wak b vit o som inhntstngth o waknss habod all along in thi pivat ssnc. Instad,actants gain in stngth onl thogh thi alliances . As long as no on adsMndl’s paps, his bakthoghs in gntics main wak. An aiplancashs i a w hdalic lins malnction, bt th sistanc o ths linsis waknd in tn i th a discovd and xild to a gabag dmp.Fo Lato, an obct is nith a sbstanc no an ssnc, bt an acto t-ing to adst o inict its ocs, not nlik Nitzsch’s cosmic vision o thwill to pow.

Althogh Lato gnall opposs dcing mltiplicitis to simpl x-planato stcts, his o mtaphsical axioms all stm om a dppincipl: absolt conctnss. ev actant simpl is what it is. This n-tails that all actants a on th sam ooting: both lag and small, both




hman and nonhman. No actant is st odd o oths; ach nhancsand sists th oths in highl spcic was. Sinc v actant is ntilconct, w do not nd its alit in som lonl ssnc o chast sbstat,

bt alwas in an absoltl spcic plac in th wold, with compltl sp-cic alliancs at an givn momnt. evthing is immannt in th wold;nothing tanscnds actalit. In oth wods, Lato is podl gilt o what ro Bhaska and Manl DLanda both call ‘actalism’. Fo Latoth wold is a ld o obcts o actants lockd in tials o stngth—somgowing stong thogh incasd associations, oths bcoming wakand lonli as th a ct o om oths.

Lato’s dinc om psnt-da analtic and continntal thoghtshold now b cla. Whas Lato placs all hman, nonhman, nat-

al, and aticial obcts on th sam ooting, th analtics and continntalsboth still dith ov how to bidg, igno, dn, o xplain awa a singlgap btwn hmans and wold. Whil gadat stdnts a sall dilldin a stal dispt btwn cospondnc and cohnc thois o tth,Lato locats tth in nith o ths modls, bt in a sis o tanslationsbtwn actos. And whas mainstam philosoph wois abot whth- things xist indpndntl o s o a constctd b th mind, Latosas th a ‘sociall’ constctd not st b hman minds, bt also bbodis, atoms, cosmic as, bsinss lnchs, mos, phsical oc, popa-ganda, o God. Th is no pivilgd oc to which th oths can b -dcd, and ctainl no caslss intpla btwn p natal ocs andp social ocs, ach ntaintd b th oth. Nothing xists bt actants ,and all o thm a ttl conct.

B. ACTANTS, IrreDuCTION, TrANSLATION, ALLIANCe

Having abandond th Kantian landscap o th analtics and continntals,

Lato nts xotic tain. His philosoph nolds not amidst th shiting otns o a bland hman-wold colat, bt in th compan o all possi-bl actants: pin ts, dogs, spsonic ts, living and dad kings, stawb-is, gandmoths, popositions, and mathmatical thoms. Ths long lists o andom actos mst contin ntil thi plalit and atonom is nolong sppssd. W still know nothing abot ths obcts o what thntail. All that is cla is thi mtaphsical qalit. Th wold is a staglld with actos; philosoph is obct-ointd philosoph.

Bt as alad notd, this dos not lad Lato to a philosoph o sb-

stanc. Taditional sbstanc can b dnd b contast with its qalitis,accidnts, and lations. A sbstanc can asil b distingishd om itsown qalitis, sch as wamth o villain, sinc ths taits ma chang ovtim withot th thing bcoming a dint thing. In act, on o Aistotl’sbst dnitions o a sbstanc is that which sppots dint qalitis at



Idctions 17

dint tims. W can also distingish a thing om its accidnts, as whna pson was a paticla oscnt shit, sinc this gamnt can b -movd o placd withot th wa changing idntit. Finall, a sb-

stanc is distinct om its lations, sinc it mains th sam thing whth itis positiond th o t mts awa om m. In this wa taditional sb-stanc mains idntical bnath all its tivial sac ctations, and thisimmdiatl sggsts that th thing has an ssnc. Bt Lato mphaticallcts this it btwn an inn sbstanc and its tivial xtio. His ‘act-ant’ is a conct individal, bt not a ncls o alit sondd b shit-ing vapos o accidntal and lational poptis. Th is anoth obviosdinc btwn Lato and th sbstanc-thinks as wll. Aistotl andhis his gant th titl o ‘sbstanc’ onl to ctain pivilgd things in th

wold, sall thos that xist b nat. A cat, a t, o a sol wold bsbstancs, bt not th nation o egpt o vast machins with thosands o pats. Bt sinc Lato gants all actants an qal ight to xistnc, gad-lss o siz o complxit, all natal and aticial things mst cont as act-ants as long as th hav som sot o ct on oth things.

This bings s to a latd point. Fo Lato an actant is alwas anevent , and vnts a alwas compltl spcic: ‘vthing happns onlonc, and at onc plac’ (PF, p. 162). An actant dos not hdg its bts,ling bhind its cnt involvmnts in th mann o a sbstanc ld-ing its sac ctations. Instad, an actant is alwas compltl dplodin th wold, ll implicatd in th sm o its dalings at an givn mo-mnt. unlik a sbstanc, an actant is not distinct om its qalitis, sinco Lato this wold impl an indnsibl atlss lmp ling bnathits tangibl poptis. Also nlik a sbstanc, actants do not di omthi accidnts, sinc this wold cat a hiach in which som pats o th wold w m dtits oating on a dp sa, and Lato’s pinciplo dmocac btwn actants wold thb b violatd. And nlik a sb-

stanc, actants a not dint om thi lations. Indd, Lato’s cn-tal thsis is that an acto is its lations. All ats o an obct blong toit; vthing happns onl onc, at on tim, in on plac. Bt this mansthat Lato cts anoth wll-known at o taditional sbstanc: itsdabilit. W gnall spak o th sam dog xisting on dint dasov man as, bt o Lato this wold ltimatl b no mo than a g- o spch. It wold ntail that w abstact an nding dog-sbstanc odog-ssnc om an nti ntwok o lations o tials o stngth in whichth dog is involvd at ach momnt o its li. ultimatl th nid ‘dog’ isa sqnc o closl latd his, not an nding nit ncstd with shit-ing accidnts ov tim.

Sinc an actant cannot b split into dabl sbstanc and tansint ac-cidnt, it ollows that nothing can b dcd to anthing ls. each thing simpl is what it is, in tt conctnss. W cannot dc a thing to som




pivilgd inn co b stipping awa its inssntial ats. Bt at thsam tim, anything can b dcd to anthing ls, povidd th poplabo is don. This two-acd pincipl o idction is lss paadoxical

than it sms, sinc both acs stm om th sam basic insight. To dcon thing to anoth is to s it as an ct xplainabl in tms o a mondamntal la o alit. Can w dc th nz o agllant nns tosxal station? ys and no. On Latoian pincipls, this agllation isa conct vnt in th wold, st as al as an oth, and cannot b x-plaind awa as a hpocitical smptom masking th sol ndling alito th sx div. yt Lato is also not som postmodn champion o disointd simlaca, as i nothing cold v b divd om anthing ls.Th bhavio o th nns ctainl might hav an xplanation that dis

om thi own acconts o it. yt to stablish this connction involvs tho-tical labo: stding th nns, call obsving th xact nat andhthm o thi pnishmnt, its connction o lack tho with oth it-als o smptoms, and phaps intviws b taind pschiatic obsvs. Italso qis a willingnss to modi o appoach i alit sists it in anwa. Finall, a sccssl ading o th nns in tms o divs will pa apic vn whn sccssl: naml, it will sppss all additional ats o thi actions, lading invitabl to distotion and ovsimplication. In thissns, a thoist is no dint om an ngin digging a tnnl thoghth montains na Baclona. On stdis th ock, call assssing itswak and solid points, th cost o slcting on path ov anoth, th satconcns o woks, th availabilit o dill bits ndd o spcic tnnl-ing mthods, and oth sch actos. Th ngin is not a -oating mas-tmind o stockpil and calclation, as Hidgg imagins. Instad, thngin mst negotiate with th montain at ach stag o th poct, tst-ing to s wh th ock sists and wh it ilds, and is qit otn s-pisd b th bhavio o th ock. Th sam is t o a histoian stding

th nns, a lov dciding whn to show vlnabilit and whn nilding stngth, a ood tast dtcting th aint signals o poison, and an atilloc gaging th pop angl o a gn. All a ngagd in th sam x-cis, howv dint thi matials ma b.

Nothing is p calclation, nothing ollows dictl om anthing ls,nothing is a tanspant intmdia. evthing is a mdiato, dmand-ing its sha o alit as w pass thogh it towad o goal. ev mdimmst b ngotiatd, st as ai and wat stik back at th vhicls that ta- vs thm. Sinc v actant is onl itsl, and alwas a totall conctvnt, it is impossibl to div on thing instantl om anoth withotth ndd labo. In oth wods, th link btwn actos alwas qistranslation. In th cas o th nns, onl th most aogant citical dbnkwold smik whil nmasking th otic oots o thi nz in a matt o sconds. Not that Fd himsl nv dos this: his dam intptations



Idctions 19

involv painstaking tanslations om on imag o smbol to th nxt, otnqiing so man intmdiat stags that his opponnts mock thi nlik-l complxit. Fo this ason, tth o Lato is nv a simpl cospon-

dnc btwn th wold and statmnts that smbl it, sinc w can onllink a statmnt to th wold thogh th most diclt st o displacmnts.Bt nith is tth a kind o ‘nviling’, as in Hidgg’s modl, sinc thisstill implis that w appoach tth asmptoticall. Fo Lato, on thing nv smbls anoth in th last, and o this ason cospondnc andnviling a qall itlss modls o tth.

This bings s to th last o Lato’s o mao concpts: allianc. Sincactants a ttl conct, th do not hav an inn knl o ssnc n-cstd with tivial additional poptis. Actants a alwas compltl d-

plod in thi lations with th wold, and th mo th a ct o omths lations, th lss al th bcom. Past initiall stands alon in hisght with Libig ov th cas o mntation, o with Pocht ov spon-tanos gnation (PH, Chap. 4). Gadall, Past amasss a omidablam o allis. Bt notic that not all o ths allis a hman. Dspit thwod ‘Pinc’ in m titl, Lato is no Machiavllian dcing tth to h-man pow gams. Instad, Past’s motl allis incld might politi-cians who gant him nding, pics o glass o mtallic qipmnt, andvn bacilli thmslvs. Actos bcom mo al b making lag potionso th cosmos vibat in hamon with thi goals, o b taking dtos inthi goals to capitaliz on th oc o nab actants. Fo Lato, th wods‘winn’ and ‘los’ a not inscibd in advanc in th ssnc o a thing,sinc th is no ssnc in th st plac. An actant has a chanc to win olos, thogh som hav mo wapon at thi disposal. Winns and los-s a inhntl qal and mst b tatd smmticall. Th los is thon who aild to assmbl nogh hman, natal, aticial, logical, andinanimat allis to stak a claim to victo. Th mo connctd an actant

is, th mo al; th lss connctd, th lss al.On o th most vigoos schools o contmpoa philosoph is thsmall Slovnian cicl associatd with Slavo Žižk. Bt Žižk himsl spakswith mbaassmnt o his sitation: ‘Man o m inds think that i this a Slovnian Lacanian School and w pblish so mch aboad, thn whatmst happn in th cnt? Th answ is nothing, absoltl nothing […].It is almost as i w a caght with o pants down whn sombod comsto Lblana and thn w st hav to tll him that nothing is happning h’.6 Thogh Žižk ads this pdicamnt in tms o Lacan’s ‘void’ o‘lack’ at th cnt, a Latoian intptation o Lblana is mo convincing. Naml, Žižk’s gop is not a powl ssnc hosd in sommight otss o th Slovnian capital, bt ml a ntwok that mobilizs

6. Slavo Žižk and Gln Dal, Conversations with Žižek , Cambidg, Polit, 2003, p. 37.




discipls, pblishs, and oth allis thoghot th glob. Th spposdcnt is as ail and vlnabl as an oth point in th ntwok, st as Allid Spm Hadqats cold hav bn ind on D-Da b an x-

ploding wat pip o a sddn invasion o mic. In simila ashion, BnoLato as a think is ond in th bookstos that ca his woks, th ad-mis who commnd thm to oths, and th cas that a altd bcontact with his witings. I w mt Lato in th Latin Qat w willsl hav a good convsation, bt w ma lan st as mch om tak-ing on o his books to P and discssing it with a andom stang. Whnw ncont Lato in pson, tmpt blasts do not sond; tains o dv-ots do not ollow him shaking tamboins in th stt as w appoacha glitting intio compond at Scincs-Po, om which nw philosoph

wold manat lik adiation om Chnobl. Th is no cntal point inth ntwok wh w ncont th v hat o Lato and his philoso-ph. Th is no inn Lato-ssnc wappd in tansint wool o cha,bt onl a ntwok o allis mobilizd b his philosoph. Most o this nt-wok lis otsid Lato’s psonal contol, and mch o it vn mains n-known to him.

To pat, actants do not daw thi pow om som pistin innhath, bt onl thogh assmbling allis. This alwas ntails isks, sinc‘ocs a alwas bllios […] th conct in th pow station that cacks,th acllic bls that consm oth pigmnts, th lion that dos not ollowth pdictions o th oacl […]. Th momnt w tn o back, o closstinds noll thmslvs nd oth banns’ (PF, p. 198). Th oc o anactant mains in dobt, and hings on a dcision: ‘As it associats lmntstogth, v acto has a choic: to xtnd th, isking dissidnc anddissociation, o to inoc consistnc and dabilit, bt not go too a’(PF, p. 198). Fth xtnsion has onl on mthod at its disposal:

in od to spad a […] an actant nds aithl allis who accpt what

th a told, idnti itsl with its cas, ca ot all th nctions thata dnd o thm, and com to its aid withot hsitation whn tha smmond. Th sach o ths idal allis occpis th spac andtim o thos who wish to b stong than oths. As soon as an actohas ond a somewhat more aithul ally, it can oc anoth all to bcommore aithul in its tn (PF, p. 199)

It is nv th actant in nakd pit that posssss oc, bt onl th actantinvolvd in its amshackl associations with oths, which collaps i thsassociations a not lovingl o btall maintaind: ‘In od to xtnd it-sl, an actant mst pogam oth actants so that th a nabl to btait, dspit th act that th a bond to do so […]. We always misunderstand the strength o the strong . Thogh popl attibt it to th pit o an actant,it is invaiabl d to a tid aa o waknsss’ (PF, p. 201). Anticipating his lat ll-blown ction o modnism, Lato scos at th notion that



Idctions 21

th impialist Wst sccdd b piing obctiv tth om th naïvspstition o gllibl Indians. Th Spaniads timphd ov th Aztcsnot thogh th pow o nat libatd om tish, bt instad thogh a

mixd assmblag o pists, soldis, mchants, pincs, scintists, polic,slavs (PF, pp. 202-3). Call thm lgion, o th a man. Impialism isnot an almight cnt, bt a chain o aggd ocs in qal pats spii-tal, intllctal, and conomic. Th sam sot o motl-colod oc isnlashd b politicians, and hnc Lato is among th w psnt-daphilosophs who admis politicians ath than sning at thi vnalcompomiss: ‘It taks somthing lik coag to admit that w will never do better than a politician [… Oths] simpl hav somwh to hid whnth hav mad thi mistaks. Th can go back and t again. Onl th

politician is limitd to a singl shot and has to shoot in pblic’ (PF, p. 210). And again: ‘What w dspis as political “mdiocit” is simpl th collc-tion o compomiss that w oc politicians to mak on o bhal ’ (PF, p.210). Th politician ov balancs inomation, nding, thats, kind-nss, politnss, loalt, disloalt, and th pptal sach o was andmans. In this spct th politician is th modl o v sot o acto. Todcla onsl ntaintd b sti btwn conicting ocs is to dn thaton is an actant.

yt th a onl actants, ov lost in indships and dls. An at-tmpt to s actants as th dcibl pppts o dp stcts is doomdto ail. Th balanc o oc maks som actants stong than oths, btminiat tickst obcts tn th tid withot waning: a pbbl can d-sto an mpi i th empo choks at dinn. Focs a al, and altigs a stong than pap ons, bt vthing is ngotiabl (PF, p. 163).Th is no p-stablishd hamon among th actants in th wold, btonl a post -stablishd hamon (PF, p. 164). Th cnt od o things isth slt o a long histo o ngotiations and midnight aids o on actant

against th wak points o oths. It taks wok to sbodinat ss to thCza o qations to a tho. Th wold cold hav bn othwis. Btnith is th ml a andom pla o chanc, sinc th Tata hods donot vanish om th Middl east with a wav o th hand. Hamon is a -slt, not a giding pincipl.

evn power , that avoit occlt qalit o adical political citics, isa slt ath than a sbstanc (PF, p. 191). Th spposd ‘panopticon’ o modn socit stands at th mc o th tchnicians and bacats whomst install and maintain it, and who ma go on stik o do a slopp obbcas o bad moods. Th polic a otwittd b svn-a-olds in thslms. Th might CIA, with its bdgt o billions, loss tack o mujahideen iding donks and xchanging nots in milk bottls. A lovl Chins do-bl agnt coods th moal b o Scotland yad t blivs. Actantsmst constantl b kpt in lin; non a svil pppts who do o bidding,




whth hman o nonhman. Th wold sists o ots vn as it wl-coms thm. evn a sstm o mtaphsics is th lngth slt o ngotia-tions with th wold, not a timphant ddctiv ovlod who tampls th

dtails o th wold to dst. Th labo o tting on concpt to anoth ob-ssss a Kant o Hssl o dcads, and vn thn th polishd nal pod-ct will b iddld with os dtctibl b a novic. Th sam is t oo pisons, o gas and wat inastct, th sal o potato chips, int-national law, ncla tst bans, and nollmnt in nivsitis. Sstms aassmbld at gat pains, on actant at a tim, and loophols alwas main.W a not th pawns o slk pow-machins ginding s bnath thihls lik pathtic Nibelungen. W ma b agil, bt so a th powl.

Mo contovsiall, Lato holds that vn tth itsl is a slt, not

a stating point. ‘A sntnc dos not hold togth bcas it is t, bt be-cause it holds together w sa that it is “t.” What dos it hold onto? Manthings. Wh? Bcas it has tid its at to anthing at hand that is mosolid than itsl. As a slt, no on can shak it loos withot shaking v-thing ls’ (PF, pp. 185-6). W call ‘t’ whatv has attachd itsl tosomthing mo dabl, lss vlnabl to th sistanc o oth actants. As Lato pts it with his tpical ivnt wit, this is qall so o ‘a pob-lm in gomt, a gnalog, an ndgond ntwok, a ght btwnhsband and wi, o th vanish paintd on a cano’ (PF, p. 185). And -th, ‘this is wh “logic” is a banch o pblic woks. W can no mo div aca on th sbwa than w can dobt th laws o Nwton. The reasons are the same in each case : distant points hav bn linkd b paths that w naow atst and thn w boadnd and popl pavd’ (PF, p. 185). This ma o-nd had-co scintic alists, bt th shold mmb that th inabil-it to div a ca on th sbwa is also al. It can ctainl b don, bt onlat th high cost o ast o th xpnsiv tting o o ca. Nwton’s lawsalso can b dobtd: bt onl at th cost o ction b o possos and a

li sntnc as an obsc Swiss patnt oc i o qations contain -os o eddington’s obsvations bt o tho. W a now amsd tothink that th sd to b two kinds o phsics, on o th ath and ono th sk. Bt it is qall absd that w still cogniz two dint kindso alit: on o had scintic act and anoth o abita social pow.What xists is onl actants: cas, sbwas, cano-vanish, qaling spos-s, clstial bodis, and scintists, all on th sam mtaphsical ooting.

Dspit ctain qnt citicisms o Lato, this dos not tn th woldinto a matt o hman pspctiv. Fo th wold does sist hman abica-tion, st as hman innovation sists polio daths and th annal ooding o th Nil. ‘Anthing dos not go. Discoss and associations a not qiva-lnt, bcas allis and agmnts a nlistd pcisl so that on associa-tion will b stong than anoth. I all discos appas to b qivalnt,i th sm to b “langag gams” and nothing mo, thn somon has



Idctions 23

bn nconvincing. This is th wak point o th lativists […]. B pating “anthing gos,” th miss th wok that gnats inqivalnc and asm-mt’ (PF, pp. 168-9).7 yt in anoth sns vthing dos go, as long as

th pic is paid and th wok is sccssl. Phaps w can tavl to Plto ovn tavl thogh tim onc cntis o sach a xpndd on thspocts. Phaps w can s a tlphon in Caio to spak immdiatl witha ind in Honoll—indd, this is alad possibl, bt onl as a slt o th most polongd ngotiations btwn chmists, copp cabl, and lad-s o bsinss and stat. Phaps w can show that Lamack was ight andDawin was wong, bt th will b a high cost in thotical labo andinitial pblic idicl, and th ots ma ltimatl ail. ‘Nothing is b itsl ith logical o illogical, bt not vthing is qall convincing. Th is

onl on l: “anthing gos;” sa anthing as long as thos bing talkdto a convincd’ (PF, p. 182). Bt nv ogt that ‘thos bing talkd to’and ‘thos to b convincd’ incld inanimat obcts. A chalatan mightconvinc a ooml o dps that th can walk on hot coals withot bing hamd, bt th coals main nconvincd—lading th chalatan into law-sits o batings om his ang mob o victims. I o sccd in o dal-ings with hmans, qations, o ca ngins, thn ‘thos o soght to convinc hav acqiscd. Fo thm, th is no mo “anthing gos.” Thatwill hav to do, or you will never do any better […]. W can sa anthing wplas, and t w cannot. As soon as w hav spokn and allid wods, oth- alliancs bcom asi o mo diclt’ (PF, p. 182).

Th wold is not mad o stabl, ock-solid oms, bt onl o ont linsin a battl o lov sto btwn actants. Stabl stats a th slt o n-mos ocs (PF, p. 198), st as th appantl timlss shaps o dcks obttis actall ct a histo o ancstal stggls. ‘Th is no natu-ral end to [contovsis…] In th nd, intptations a alwas stabilizdb an aa o orces ’ (PF, p. 197). Th wold is not packd with so-calld nat-

al kinds, bt onl with mtant obcts that hav stck a had bagainwith alit to bcom and main as th a. ‘W nd p distingishing shaps that can b classid, at last in pactim. Bt ths classicationsnv last o long bo th a pillagd b oth actos who la things otqit dintl’ (PF, p. 195). Bt onc again, th xisting shaps and omsa nv bokn p in otlss ashion. Th a al, and a invadd otansomd onl b thos who pa clos attntion to thi al contos:‘dspit vthing, ntwoks inoc on anoth and sist dstction.Solid t agil, isolatd t intwovn, smooth t twistd togth, [th]om stang abics’ (PF, p. 199).

Lato’s ction o natal kinds, isolatd sbstancs, and ock-had bil-liad balls shold nv b consd with th timph o lativist langag

7. Pnctation modid slightl o as o ading.




gams. Fo h insists that things in thmslvs a al vn whn hmansdo not s thm: ‘i o missd th galloping dom o th zbas in th savannah this moning, thn so mch th wos o o; th zbas will not b

so that o w not th, and in an cas o wold hav tamd, killd,photogaphd, o stdid thm. Things in thmslvs lack nothing […]’ (PF,p. 193). Th sam cold b said not onl o zbas, bt o plastic and stas aswll. Things thmslvs a actants—not signids, phnomna, o tools ohman paxis. Lato maks th point with wickd mock: ‘Onc thingsa dcd to nothing, th bg o to b conscios o thm and ask o tocoloniz thm. Thi li hangs b nothing mo than a thad, th thado o attntion […]. Withot o “th wold,” as o pt it, wold b -dcd to nothing. yo a th Zoos, th Tazans, th Kants […]’ (PF, p.

193). ring obviosl to Hidgg, Lato tants alod: ‘Who told othat man was th shphd o bing? Man ocs wold lik to b shphdand gid th oths as th ock to thi olds to b shad and clippd.In an cas th is no shphd’ (PF, p. 194). H closs with a nal d-svd slap at th waisom ‘lingistic tn’ in philosoph: ‘rcntl thhas bn a tndnc to pivilg langag […]. Langag was so pivilgdthat its citiq bcam th onl woth task o a gnation o Kants andWittgnstins […]. What a ss! evthing that is said o th signi isight, bt it mst also b said o v oth kind o [actant]. Th is noth-ing spcial abot langag that allows it to b distingishd om th st oan lngth o tim’ (PF, pp. 184-5).

Dspit his ction o langag as th basis o all philosoph, Lato’socs on th conctnss o actants lads him to a spising Didan mo-mnt. Sinc actants a alwas ll dplod in th nivs, with no talit ling in sv, Lato dismisss an distinction btwn lital andmtaphoical manings o wods. As Lato himsl pts it, in a mannminiscnt o Dida’s ‘Whit Mtholog’: 8

Bcas th is no lital o gativ maning, no singl s o a mta-pho can dominat th oth ss. Withot popit th is no impo-pit. each wod is accat and dsignats xactl th ntwoks thatit tacs, digs, and tavls ov. Sinc no wod igns ov th oths, wa to s all mtaphos. W do not hav to a that on maning is ‘t’ and anoth ‘mtaphoical’. Th is dmocac, too, among wods (PF, p. 189).

Th agmnt h btwn Lato and Dida (a nomall nthink-abl allianc) stms om thi shad impatinc with Aistotl’s tho o sbstanc. Th cannot b som t alit o a ow o sn ling bnath

8. jacqs Dida, ‘Whit Mtholog’, in Margins o Philosophy, tans. Alan Bass,Chicago, univsit o Chicago Pss, 1985. I hav citicizd Dida’s agmnt inGuerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry o Things , Chicago, Opn Cot, 2005,pp. 110-6.



Idctions 25

thi intactions with oth lmnts o th wold. Hnc, an nam oanthing at all is dmocaticall connd to this la o intlations. Nonam can mo dictl than anoth to som non-xistnt ndwold

wh a vitabl sn-ssnc o t-ssnc wold b hosd. Whil this isadmiabl consistnt with Lato’s notion o actants, th a good asonsto maintain a sns o th pop alit o obcts apat om all thi alli-ancs. I lav this disagmnt to th lat potions o this book.

Lik th woks o Whithad, Nitzsch, o Libniz, Irreductions viwsobcts as individal pspctivs on th st. ‘ev actant maks a wholwold o itsl. Who a w? What can w know? What can w hop o?Th answs to ths pompos qstions dn and modi thi shapsand bondais’ (PF, p. 192). Ndlss to sa, o Lato ths qstions a

askd b coal and ta no lss than b nlightnd hmans. Statd mopoticall:

I don’t know how things stand. I know nith who I am no what I want,bt others sa th know on m bhal, oths, who dn m, link mp, mak m spak, intpt what I sa, and noll m. Whth I am astom, a at, a ock, a lak, a lion, a child, a wok, a gn, a slav, thnconscios, o a vis, th whisp to m, th sggst, th impos anintptation o what I am and what I cold b (PF, p. 192).

No Copnican philosoph, whth analtic o continntal, cold witsch a paagaph. This bi passag ns cont to all that is assmd bHssl, Hidgg, Dida, rssll, o Qin. Th absnc o ats, lions,and laks om mainstam philosophical dbat spaks not against BnoLato, bt against th bland dalt mtaphsics that dcs obcts to ohman accss to thm.

C. SOMe COrOLLArIeS

Th cntal thms o Lato’s al mastpic a now on th tabl. Wnd onl consid a w additional coollais. Fist, all lations in thwold a o onl on kind: tials o stngth. This is not a dction o al-it to pow plas and social constctions, sinc this wold impl that h-man social ocs a spio to thos o comts and atoms thmslvs. Bti all actos a on th sam ooting, thn all ocs com in onl on vai-t, howv nmos its sb-bands ma b. O habital nd to wallo obctiv natal ocs om contamination b abita hman ocsis th smptom o a modnist pication that Lato will attack in a lat

book. H is nith Machiavlli no Thasmachs, sinc o him tantsand dmagogs mst ngotiat with th sam animat and inanimat oc-s as do moalists and pists. To sa that all alit involvs tials o stngthis to sa that no actant clipss anoth a priori and withot th ot;all obcts mst ostl in th ana o th wold, and non v nos nal




victo. Th loss ma com back to hant th winns, as whn romgows both Chistian and babaizd, o whn bid idas ais sgntom thi gavs. ‘To oc I will add nothing ’, as th ong Lato bashl

pts it (PF, p. 213). ‘A oc stablishs a pathwa b making oth ocs pas-siv. It can thn mov to placs that do not blong to it and tat thm as i th w its own. I am willing to talk abot “logic,” bt onl i it sn as abanch o pblic woks o civil ngining’ (PF, p. 171). Logic is a logisticsin which som tanslations a btt spplid with ood and ammnitionthan oths, and thb pvail o a tim. Lato’s position has nothing to do with old-ashiond alism, sinc it placs phsical mass on th samlvl as pppt shows and cotoom haings. It has nothing to do with so-cial constctionism, o it is not limitd to hman socit, which is pondd

b th dmands o nonhman actants as i b wavs o th ocan. It is notdconstction, bcas vn thos who alsl sn at ‘thos who claimthat Dida dcs th wold to a txt’ mst still admit that inanimatobcts hav no plac in Dida. It is not phnomnolog, bcas an lc-tic dill o vin o silv a not appaancs o hman consciosnss, btactants that ndmin whatv hmans ncont o thm. It is not likHidgg, bcas th is not a nid mbl o bing that spiss swith a mltiplicit o somb moods and bokn hamms, bt onl a singlimmannt plan wh anxios Dasin is no btt o wos than winis,snaks, oil wlls, and moons. Copnican philosoph has no concpt o tialso stngth, bcas it sitats v tial on th hom t o hman bing,which is anointd as sol abit o v tial.

Fthmo, Lato dns alit as resistance . Whil th sam hadbn don in th al twntith cnt b Max Schl and josé Otga Gasst (and a cnt ali b Main d Bian in Fanc), th thsis has aspcial ol in Lato’s sstm. ev actant is ll dplod in th ntwokso th wold, with nothing hiddn bnath all th sac-plas o allianc.

It is ai nogh to call th wold a sit o immannc, as long as w ctan notion that immannc mans ‘insid o hman awanss’. Fo Lato,two atoms in collision a immannt vn i no hman v ss thm, sincboth xpnd thmslvs ll in th labo o cating ntwoks with othactants. ‘Sinc whatv sists is al, th can b no “smbolic” to addto th “al” […]. I am ppad to accpt that sh ma b gods, stas, oood, that sh ma mak m ill and pla dint ols in oigin mths […].Thos who wish to separate th “smbolic” sh om its “al” contpatshold thmslvs b spaatd and connd’ (PF, p. 188). What is shad incommon b main biologists, th shing indst, and tibal lds tlling mths abot icthian ditis is this: non o thm all knows what a sh is. All mst ngotiat with th sh’s alit, maining alt to its hidots, mi-gational pattns, and sacal o ntitional poptis.

W cannot bgin b dnoncing tibal lds as naïv dps who poct



Idctions 27

thi pimitiv spstitions onto an obctiv ndling biological sh-ani-mal. Th sh sists all ots to dc it to a known st o taits. ‘Th alis not on thing among oths, bt ath gadints o sistanc’ (PF, p. 151).

This lads Lato to a pai o mo dbios statmnts that h wold p-smabl no long maintain: ‘Th pincipl o alit is oth popl. Thintptation o th al cannot b distingishd om th al itsl b-cas th al a gadints o sistanc’ (PF, p. 166). Th ad will bogivn o viwing th st sntnc as sh social constctionism. Thatis ctainl what it sonds lik, and th a no cavats anwh in th vi-cinit to pvnt sch an intptation. Bt call that th pincipl o i-dction obids aising ‘popl’ to a loti pinnacl o alit than anthing ls, and hnc w can viw this sntnc as a htoical anomal, spokn in

th sam povocativ spiit as Lato’s phas ‘lik God, capitalism dos notxist’ (PF, p. 173), a statmnt not mant litall b this dvot Catholic. Aso th scond pat o th statmnt, ‘th intptation o th al cannot bdistingishd om th al itsl’, th appant social constctionism disap-pas i w consid th boad sns Lato givs to ‘intptation’. Fo thisis not th lonl act o a pivilgd hman ntit: ‘Fo a long tim it has bnagd that th lationship btwn on txt and anoth is alwas a mat-t o intptation. Wh not accpt that this is also t btwn so-calldtxts and so-calld obcts, and vn btwn so-calld obcts thmslvs?’(PF, p. 166). To sa that th al is no dint om its intptation is not tosa that obcts a sociall constctd, bt onl that th a constctdb all mann o ntwoks and alliancs, inclding inanimat ons.

This bings s to an vn mo povocativ statmnt: ‘W cannot dis-tingish btwn thos momnts whn w hav might and thos whn wa ight’ (PF, p. 183). Onc again, th sophists and tants might sm tob nting Lato’s hos thogh th sid doo. I might and ight cannotb distingishd, thn th mo powl scintists will csh th spio

xpimnts o nknown otsids thogh thi might political innc,thb ‘sociall constcting’ thi disciplin. rational agmnt will bdcd to oatoical gimmicks, to pow plas b thos holding th ston-gst positions. Bt th poblm with this citicism o Lato is that h nv- intpts ‘might’ as idntical with th sph o abita hman action.Gavit is also might; bid is might; qaks a might; a tsnami is might.Onc w accpt a wold mad o nothing bt actants, w can accpt that thwold is a tanslation o ocs withot cnicall clining on cochs, know-ing btt than all th gllibl, moalizd shp that th is all nothing in th wold bt pow. In act, to xplain anthing in tms o ‘pow’ is anact o intllctal lazinss. ‘Th philosophs and sociologists o pow at-t th masts th claim to citiciz. Th xplain th masts’ actions intms o pow, thogh this pow is cacios onl as a slt o complici-tis, connivancs, compomiss, and mixts’ (PF, p. 175). Onc an actant




sccds in lining p oth actants to do its bidding, thogh nmosoms o complicit and connivanc, w will lat sa that it did so b vito ‘pow’. yt this xplains nothing, and is all st anoth xampl o

th vis dormitiva that pspposs what it was spposd to xplain.Whil cting pow as an xplanato concpt, Lato also dismiss-s th latd notion o potnc o potntialit, so cntal to th histo o mtaphsics. Sinc Lato is committd to a modl o actants ll dplodin alliancs with nothing hld in sv, h cannot concd an slmbing potnc ling in th things that is cntl nxpssd. To viw a thing intms o potntial is to gant it somthing bond its cnt stats as a l-l spcic vnt. To dnd potnc is to claim that an ntit h and nowcontains oths in potentia : this acon ma not hav t-lik ats now, bt

th a alad ling th in gm. And Lato holds that ‘with potncinstic also bgins, bcas apat om a happ w—pincs, pincipls,oigins, banks, and dictos—oth [actants], that is, all th maind,bcom dtails, consqncs, applications, ollows, svants, agnts—inshot, th ank and l’ (PF, p. 174). Pt somwhat dintl, ‘talk o pos-sibilitis is th illsion o actos that mov whil ogtting th cost o tans-pot. Podcing possibilitis is as costl, local, and down to ath as mak-ing spcial stls o lass. Possibilitis a boght and sold lik anthing ls. Th a not dint b nat. Th a not, o xampl, “nal”’(PF, p. 174). Th claim to hav potntial is th claim to b mo than whaton cntl is, withot admitting that on mst haggl and boow tochang on’s cnt stat. As Lato xpsss it, with all d ion, ‘i anacto contains man oths in potntia, it is impssiv bcas, vn whnalon, it is a cowd. That is wh it is abl to noll oth actos and boowthi sppot mo asil’ (PF, p. 174). Bt this is ml a shll gam, and‘althogh it stats ot as a bl b claiming to own what has onl bn bo-owd, it bcoms al […]. Pow is nv possessed . W ith hav it in po-

tentia , bt thn w do not have it, o w hav it in actu, bt thn o allis ath ons that go into action’ (PF, pp. 174-5).9

In this spct, Lato’s position is miniscnt o th ancint Mgaians,who saw no oom o potntialit ling otsid th cnt stat o th wold.Th w vhmntl opposd b Aistotl, who in Metaphysics IX.3 is vxdin paticla b th ollowing consqnc o thi viws: ‘o instanc som-on who is not bilding a hos is not capabl o bilding a hos, bt onlth on who is bilding a hos, whn h is bilding [it], is capabl o it,and similal in oth cass. Th absd consqncs o this opinion anot diclt to s’.10 Aistotl wonds: i th hos-bild at st dos nothav th at o hos bilding, how dos h acqi th at whn it is tim

9. Pnctation modid slightl.10. Aistotl, Metaphysics , tans. jo Sachs, Santa F, Gn Lion Ps, 1999, p. 170.



Idctions 29

to tn to wok? Lato’s spons wold pobabl b that th idl hos-bild is capabl, not in potentia , bt onl thogh a sis o mdiations b-twn th bild and oth actos, which vanish whn th bild is at st.

Aistotl wold main nsatisd, sinc h has dp mtaphsical obc-tions to a wold withot potnc. Fo on thing, it wold ntail that nothing is hot o swt whn it is not bing tochd o tastd, which Aistotl calls‘th Potagoan claim’,11 thogh it is now btt known om Lock’s dis-tinction btwn pima and sconda qalitis. Bt Lato wold slndos th doctin o Potagoas and Lock that nothing is hot o swtwhn it is not pcivd. No wold h b swad b Aistotl’s obctionthat ‘ths asstions abolish both motion and bcoming. Fo [accoding tothm] what is standing will alwas b standing and what is sitting alwas

sitting […] sinc what dos not hav th potnc o standing p will b in-capabl o standing p’.12 Th position assaltd b Aistotl is dndd bLato’s ancstal all Whithad, who obcts to th notion o sbstanc asan nding ntit ndgoing advnts in spac and tim. Sinc Latohas alad statd that v actant is an vnt, and that v vnt hap-pns onl onc, in a singl tim and plac, h is committd to ntitis withonl a momnta xistnc.

As dscibd ali, Lato’s ction o potnc also lads him toabandon th modl o logical ddction as a tanspant channl that ato-maticall lads om on thoght to anoth. As h pts it, in on o his bold-st stabs at Kant:

Th has nv bn sch a thing as ddction. On sntnc ollows an-oth, and thn a thid ams that th scond was alad implicitl opotntiall alad in th st. Thos who talk o snthtic a pioi dg-mnts did th aithl who bath at Lods. Howv, it is no lss bi-za to claim that a conclsion lis in its pmiss than to bliv thatth is holinss in th wat (PF, p. 176).13

Agmnts a not linkd togth lik dominos o a hos o cads, achtoppling th nxt atomaticall: ‘Agmnts om a sstm o stct onli w ogt to tst thm. What? I I w to attack one lmnt, wold all thoths com cowding ond m withot a momnt’s hsitation? This is sonlikl! ev collction o actants inclds th laz, th cowadl, th do-bl agnts, th indint, and th dissidnts’ (PF, p. 177). Fo this ason itis wong to sk tth in th oundations o what lis bo s: ‘All sachon ondations and oigins is spcial, sinc it hops to idnti som [ac-tants] which potntiall contain th oths. This is impossibl […]. Thoswho look o ondations a dctionists b dnition and pod o it’ (PF,

11. Aistotl, Metaphysics , p. 170.12. Aistotl, Metaphysics , p. 170.13. Pnctation modid slightl.




p. 188). Thinks do not ddc, citiq, o bild alit ot o st pin-cipls o ondations. Instad, th simpl work , ngotiating with actants inth sam wa as btchs, ngins, tchnicians, capnts, and clowns.

Mo gnall, this lads s to a alit mad p o dint levels . I on statmnt dos not ollow with atomatic logical oc om anoth, i on actant nv contains anoth in potentia , thn it is impossibl to call onactant matt and anoth om, o on o thm pat and anoth th whol.‘Th a nith whols no pats. Nith is th hamon, composi-tion, intgation, o sstm. How somthing holds togth is dtmind onth ld o battl […]’ (PF, p. 164). ev actant can sv an o ths ols(matt o om, whol o pat) in dint sitations. using a Libnizianimag to ndct Libniz, Lato stats that ‘no matt how a w go,

th a alwas oms; within ach sh th a ponds ll o sh. Sombliv thmslvs to b th molds whil oths a th aw matial, bt thisis a om o litism. In od to noll a oc w mst conspi with it. It cannv b pnchd ot lik sht mtal o pod as in a cast’ (PF, p. 161).

This lads to anoth stiking at o Lato’s mtaphsics. W havsn that his nti cosmos is mad o nothing bt individal actos, vntsll dplod at ach instant, o potnc o oth hiddn dimnsions l-ing otsid thi sm o alliancs in an givn momnt. Fo this v asonth can b no indpndnt alit known as ‘tim’, as i actants w div-n owad b som tmpoal élan o durée , som x o bcoming distinctom thi total alit h and now. This lack o intst in x and owapat om spcic ntitis spaats Lato om sch gs as Bgsonand Dlz, who do gad bcoming as somthing dint om a siso conct stats o actos. Althogh Lato dos not stss th point, hbasicall dnds a cinmatic nivs o individal instants o pcisl thsot that Bgson abhos.14 Lato is, in act, th Anti-Bgson. jst as withpow, logic, and tth, Lato holds that tim is ml th slt o ngo-

tiations among ntitis, not what maks ths ngotiations possibl. As hpts it: ‘Tim is th distant consqncs o actos as th ach sk to c-at a ait accompli on thi own bhal that cannot b vsd. In this watim passs’ (PF, p. 165). O ath, ‘Tim dos not pass. Tims a what is atstak btwn ocs’ (PF, p. 165). Ctain ngotiations btwn actants ladto somthing asmmtical o ivsibl, and this is what w call tim: ‘Actas o wish, so long as this cannot b asil ndon. As a slt o th act-ants’ wok, ctain things do not tn to thi oiginal stat […]. Th awinns and loss, th a dictions, and som a mad stong than

14. elswh I hav agd that, dspit all appaancs to th conta, th philos-oph o Hidgg is also mo consistnt with a cinmatic modl o isolatd tmpoalinstants than with Bgson’s tmpoalit. H w nd on o th w hiddn points incommon btwn Lato and Hidgg. S also m book Tool-Being: Heidegger and the

Metaphysics o Objects , Chicago, Opn Cot, 2002, pp. 63-66.



Idctions 31

oths’ (PF, p. 160). And ‘to cat an asmmt, an actant nd onl lanon a oc slightl mo dabl than itsl ’ (PF, p. 160). Finall, ‘“tim” ais-s at th nd o this gam, a gam in which most los what th hav stakd’

(PF, p. 165). In Lato’s nivs no xtnal oc, not vn ‘tim’, xcdsth ll conct dplomnt o actants.Ths conclsions psh Lato to a gand nal in which nmos

bidgs and ships a st aam. Fo on thing, th is no spcial activitthat dsvs to b calld ‘thinking’, as i th w a sot o pivilgd tan-scndnt citiq that intllctals alon cold accomplish. ‘Whn w talko “thoght,” vn th most skptical los thi citical acltis. Lik vlgasocs, th lt “thoght” tavl at high spd ov gat distancs’ (PF,p. 218). Fo simila asons, Lato dnis that anthing lik ‘scinc’ xists.

Whil this might stik som obsvs as st anoth cas o tnd Fnchlativism, it ollows dictl om Lato’s modl o th wold as a ntwoko actants. ‘So o bliv that th application o mathmatics to th phsi-cal wold is a miacl? I so, thn I invit o to admi anoth miacl; Ican tavl aond th wold with m Amican expss cad’ (PF, p. 221). Aw pags ali, th was a mo mphatic vsion o th sam insight:

I th most obsc Poppian zalot talks o ‘alsication’, popl aad to s a poond mst. Bt i a window clan movs his hadto s whth th sma h wants to clan is on th insid o th otsid,no on mavls. I a ong copl mov a pic o nit in thi liv-ing oom and concld, littl b littl, that it dos not look ight and thatall th nit will hav to b movd o vthing to t again, whonds this woth o not? Bt i ‘thois’ ath than tabls a movd,thn popl talk xcitdl o a Khnian ‘paadigm shit’. I am vlga,bt this is ssntial in a domain wh instic is so poond. Thlagh at thos who bliv in lvitation bt claim, withot bing conta-dictd, that thois can ais th wold (PF, p. 217).

Th pow o scinc coms om a motl amada o th most vaios act-ants, t th slts o scinc a attibtd to a spcial om o tanscndntcitiq that is stangl dnid to baks and msicians.

I all o ths ntwoks a obscd b psnt-da philosoph, this willtn ot to b th slt o a modnist div to pi sbcts om obctsand nat om socit. W mst bing a halt to th attmptd clansing that pts naïv paxis on on sid and citical-intllctal tanscndnc onth oth. Fo Lato, modnit is th impossibl attmpt to cat a adi-cal split btwn obctiv natal act and abita hman pspctiv.

Moov, th modnist tis to pi obcts b assigning thm soll toon sid o th oth o this aticial divid, dning th xistnc o an-thing ling in th middl. Admis and citics o th modn wold a atlast nitd in agmnt that th modn wold exists . Bt in act w havnv bn modn, as Lato will dmonstat in his classic wok o th




sam titl. In t anoth slap at Hidgg, Lato wits that ‘th sa this“modn wold” is dierent om all th oths, absoltl and adicall di-nt […]. This poo wold is absoltl dvoid o sol, and th tawdist

hand-cavd clog has mo bing than a tin can’ (PF, p. 208). Lato canaptl b dscibd as th philosoph who gants a ll dos o bing vnto tin cans.

In this opning chapt, I hav tid to conv th pow and pci-sion o Irreductions , which has bn availabl to ads sinc 1984. In that a, Chnnko ld th Sovit union, ragan was onl hal-nishd inWashington, and tn nations o toda’s eopan union w ith singl-pat polic stats o did not t xist. 1984! Mo than two dcads, and nota singl nw obct-ointd philosoph.



33

2

Scinc in Action

Thogh Lato is btt known o his philosoph o scinc than o hismtaphsics, th 1987 book Science in Action povids plnt o both. WhilLato somtims taks a distanc om ctain aspcts o this wok, it -mains as sh toda as whn it was pblishd. In a hlpl pai o appn-

dics (SA, pp. 258-9), h conts th k idas o th book, dividd intosvn ls o mthod and six pincipls. H I will tak th libt o o-ganizing ths ls and pincipls into two basic concpts: (1) black boxs,and (2) action at a distanc. Both thms sonat in som om thoghotLato’s ca. rspctivl, th displa his novl appoach to two o thpivotal concpts in th histo o philosoph: (1) sbstanc, and (2) lation.H adopts a adical position on both o ths taditional thms, plac-ing dabl sbstancs with black boxs, and dict lations with indictlinks btwn spaat actants. To ad Science in Action in this wa inoc-s th viw o Lato as blonging to vnabl cnts in th histo o mtaphsics.

Whil th tm ‘black box’ is not o Lato’s own invntion, h dsvsmch o th cdit o impoting it into philosoph. A black box is an act-ant so ml stablishd that w a abl to tak its intio o gantd. Thintnal poptis o a black box do not cont as long as w a concndonl with its inpt and otpt. I am tping ths wods on a MacintoshPowBook G4 laptop compt. Th is a long histo bhind this patic-

la machin, and nmos tchnical and makting stggls w nddto stablish psonal compts as a amilia vda podct. Th int-nal ngining o this dvic wold b a complt mst to m i I wto ct on it, which happns onl al. yt it was st ight months agothat m pvios compt (a black on, incidntall) bgan to as m data




withot waning. In that cas th om black box bcam a mstios in-stmnt o panic, lik som vil dmon o mth, ining wks o monthso li as I slowl assssd which ls had not svivd th disast. In simi-

la ashion, w all know th bi hoo o nxpctd popping o bzzing sonds in an aiplan. In sch momnts, th black box o ai tavl baksopn and minds s that w a locatd 35,000 t abov th sac o thath, withot wings o o own, and with no mans o indpndnt bathat sch a hight. Fo Lato, th black box placs taditional sbstanc.Th wold is not mad o natal nits o intgs that nd thogh allsac ctation. Instad, ach actant is th slt o nmos pio oc-s that w lovingl o violntl assmbld. Whil taditional sbstancsa on, black boxs a man—w simpl treat thm as on, as long as th

main solid in o midst. Lik Hidgg’s tools, a black box allows s toogt th massiv ntwok o alliancs o which it is composd, as long as itnctions smoothl. Actants a bon amidst sti and contovs, t thvntall congal into a stabl congation. Bt simpl awakn th con-tovs, opn th black box, and o will s onc mo that th actanthas no slk nid ssnc. Call it lgion, o it is man.

Instad o a pivilgd la o pampd natal sbstancs, w nowhav a wold mad p o maniold las, non mo nid o natal thanan oth. ev actant can b viwd ith as a black box o as a mltit-dinos ntwok, dpnding on th sitation. Actants can b ith matt oom in dint spcts: matt o th lag assmblis that mak s o thm, om o th tini componnts th nit bnath thi mblla. Ism laptop compt matt o om? That dpnds on whth o ask mas I wit (‘matt’), o ask th nmos componnts om which it is bilt(‘om’). To sa that th wold is mad o black boxs is to sa that it con-sists o nmos dmocatic lvls—that th is no niql solid, dablsbstanc ling in th basmnt o th wold. evn a chaotic o mltiaios

actant can appa solid nd th ight cicmstancs; b th sam tokn,an spposd black box can b npackd, and its componnts aangdo challngd.

This lads s dictl to th scond mtaphsical concpt o Science in Action, action at a distanc. W hav sn that Lato insists on an absoltdmocac o obcts: a mosqito is st as al as Napolon, and plastic ina gabag dmp is no lss an actant than a ncla wahad. W cannotdc ths obcts to thi appaanc in consciosnss o to thi atti-bts as dnd b langag. Fthmo, no actant contains an oth ac-tants in gm, st as pants do not ‘implicitl’ contain thi childn. Thdmocac o obcts mans that all objects are mutually external . This is whatLato mans b action at a distanc. Sinc no obct contains anoth, allhav a ctain distanc om on anoth; vn a whol is distant om itsown pats. Bt action also mans nanss, sinc to act on somthing mans



Scinc in Action 35

to act, toch, o int with it in som wa. In oth wods, action at adistanc mans nothing lss than ‘nanss at a distanc’. And this is th cn-tal paadox not onl o Lato’s philosoph, bt o philosoph as a whol.

Th thm o action at a distanc has long bn a mao poblm o mtaphsics. Bginning in th Wstn tadition with Dscats, th pob-lm o communication cam to b o dcisiv impotanc. I mind and bod antil dint, thn thi mans o commnication bcoms a diclt,and God is ndd to mdiat btwn th two kinds o sbstancs. Thisband o philosoph, widl known as ‘occasionalism’, was as accptabl inth svntnth cnt as it is idicld toda. Bt th poblm nv al-l disappad—it simpl took on a nw and lss intsting om. WhasDscats saw a poblm in th commnication btwn sols and bodis,

and btwn sols and sols, his modl o th phsical nivs allowd himto igno th poblm o commnication between bodies . This dp qstionhad alad bn posd in th Islamic wold b sch ali gs as al- Ash‘ai and al-Ghazali, and was vivd b Nicolas Malbanch onc hand Géad d Codmo adoptd an atomic modl o th phsical woldin th post-Catsian contxt. Fo o pposs, all that matts is that thpoblm o commnication nv all disappad, and was simpl tans-omd into mo innocos om b Hm and Kant. Fom its high-watmak as a thil ling pplxit ling btwn all animat and inanimat nti-tis, th commnication poblm was dcd to a da povincial iddlpositiond soll btwn hmans and th wold. An lation not contain-ing a hman bing as on o its tms is now lagl sn as ling otsid thscop o philosoph altogth, t onl o th natal scincs st as ha issvd o donks.

On o Lato’s vits is his sal to ocs on a singl magical gapbtwn thinking, pactical, mood hmans on th on hand and stpdinanimat clods o matt on th oth. Th poblm o commnication is

aisd anw b Lato as soon as h gants ll dmocatic ights to all ac-tants in th cosmos, dning that an o thm contain th oths. His ac-tos a all mtall xtnal. His own answ as to how actants commni-cat is thogh translation. Things do not toch on anoth i lt st as wond thm. Th nd intacs in od to toch, and to bild an int-ac qis labo. ultimatl, this qis th appaanc o a nw n-tit thogh which th two commnicating tms a oind, howv bi-l. This poblm ntails th sam modl o hman thoght ncontd inth pvios chapt: naml, th is no sch thing as ‘thinking’ as a sp-cial citical tanscndnc that laps bond th wold and xivl ssthings ‘as’ th a. Instad, th lation btwn m mind and th oom ismtaphsicall no dint om th lation btwn th compt and thdsk within that oom. In both cass, th is a poblm o commnicationbtwn two actants vstd with ll atonomos ights.




A. BLACK BOXeS

Th titl Science in Action sggsts a spcic and limitd topic: scinc, as op-posd to histo, litat, cooking, o spots. Fo th sam ason, Lato

is otn calld a ‘philosoph o scinc’, as thogh his sbct matt wlimitd to a singl domain o hman activit. And t nogh, th bookcontains nmos xampls dawn om scintic pactic. Bt call thatLato has alad dnid th xistnc o a spcial tp o alit calld‘scinc’ that magicall tanscnds all oth sots o dalings with actants.In act, his book cold st as asil b calld Objects in Action, o Actants in Action. Lato might hav wittn compaabl woks abot sdcs, m-chanics, thivs, o chs—and has wittn on abot dgs (La abrique dudroit ). Lato is not so mch a ‘philosoph o scinc’ as a mtaphsicianwoking in a philosoph-o-scinc idiom. What actants do is act , as thwods thmslvs immdiatl sggst. In ngativ tms, this mans thatactants a not ad-mad ssncs that happn to stmbl into lationsv now and thn. An actant is alwas bon om cisis and contovs;onl whn it sccds in stablishing a oothold in th wold do w ogt thtiblations o its bith and vntall tat it as a samlss black box. Thason o ocsing on scinc in paticla is simpl that scinc gnatsits obcts thogh mo xplicit contovsis than most oth was o dal-

ing with actants. It is as to viw a pbbl on th bach as a black box tob collctd o thown, ntil a gologist tachs s th stss o volcanos osdimnts thogh which th pbbl was slowl assmbld. It is onl natalto tak th dclin o th roman empi as a dll nit mmbd omschoolhos das, ntil w ad Gibbon and a lost in vi ov dcadntpsona and th sadnss o what might hav bn. To spak o obcts in ac-tion is to convt obcts om black boxs into withing tials o stngth,-nacting th toid vnts that gav bith to th most obvios acts in thwold. Thank God w do not do this o all actants at v momnt; thankGod w a ignoant o th tblnt dtails and azo-thin magin o vic-to in th lov sto o o pants.

No bi smma can plac th walth o xampls givn in Lato’sbook, which shows in dtail how black boxs in scinc and indst aisom contovs. Som o his bst xampls incld disl ngins, vac-cins, and th chmical lmnt polonim. Bt lt’s consid his xampl o DNA, which sinc 1953 has bn dscibd as having th shap o a do-bl hlix. Opning an ncclopdia, w ad th ollowing sntnc: ‘DNA

has th stct o a dobl hlix’. No on qstions this anmo, xcpta w canks o ing dissidnts. It is now th cntal dogma o gntics.yo a to ght against it, as long as o a willing to b mockd bth nti possion o chmist and lag sgmnts o th dcatd pb-lic. Th dobl hlix has bcom a black box, sving as th nshakabl



Scinc in Action 37

basis o mo nctain thois, and has alad bn taght to svalgnations o childn. Bt i w wish to opn this paticla black box,w nd onl ad th classic accont b jams Watson1 o how it was bon.

Whn Cick and Watson bgan to collaboat at Cambidg in 1951, it wasnot vn cla whth DNA was th mdim o gntic activit at all, sincman still hld that potins w th vhicl o hdit. Bond this, thshap o th DNA molcl was ntil nknown; photogaphs takn bcstallogaphs w inconclsiv. Fo th two ong dak hoss to n-lock th DNA stct, th had to nd o nmos dicltis and as-smbl nmos allis. Whil acing Lins Paling o th piz, th hadto nd th tasing o ivals and th wanings o thi lab dicto. To as-smbl th nal modl, th had to bing nmos lmnts into hamo-

n, inclding Chaga’s laws and mtallic pics om th Cambidg ma-chin shop. evntall thi modl bcam stong nogh to sist dobts,and was appovd b thi most sios collags; thi landmak aticlwas pblishd in Nature , th most spctd onal in thi ld. Bt vnthis did not nd th contovs ov, sinc altnativ tipl-hlix mod-ls o DNA w still poposd b sios scintists o as to com. Hw hav a pogssion o statmnts that bcom incasingl mo solid:om ‘w bliv it’s a dobl hlix’, to ‘Cick and Watson claim it’s a doblhlix, bt ctain dobts ma b aisd’, to ‘Cick and Watson hav shownthat it’s a dobl hlix’, to th simpl nal stag o ‘DNA is a dobl hlix’.W hav a t black box whn a statmnt is simpl psntd as a aw actwithot an nc to its gnsis o vn its atho. As Lato asks, ‘whos to Lavoisi’s pap whn witing th omla H

2O o wat?’ (SA, p.

43) Tcks who s disl ngins hav nv had o th mbaassing al ails o ths ngins, which ld to contovs ov thi al invn-to and ltimatl to th sicid o Disl himsl.

In a sns, all hman activit aims to cat black boxs. Boing ngi-

ns labo to cat a nw modl o t, which will nv ach th makti its vaios pats bak down ding tst ights. In oming a indship,sttling a maiag, o composing a manscipt, o hop is to stablishsomthing dabl that dos not constantl a o bak down. A ob inwhich o ols a assignd ach wk, o with th constant dang o bing sackd b an motionall nstabl spio, is mo o a hadachthan anon can nd. eaning a doctoal dg wold not b woth thtobl i o tanscipt and thsis w sctinizd monthl b a panl o xpts o th st o o livs, o i long-tim possos had to tak thicomphnsiv xams v smm. In vda langag w now toctain cas and popl with th wondl phas ‘high-maintnanc’. Bdnition, a black box is low-maintenance . It is somthing w l on as a givn

1. jams Watson, The Double Helix , Nw yok, Noton, 1983.




in od to tak th stps, nv woing abot how it cam into bing.Th ason it can b ith so shing o so annoing to spak o on’swok with otsid amats is that th lack awanss o th black boxs

widl cognizd in o spctiv possions. Bginns in philosoph o-tn mak wild assalts on th positions o Plato and Kant, and this opns pnw vistas whn don sincl, st as it cass station whn it taks thom o contaian tanting b toblmaking insids.

Black boxs ac two pima and opposit dangs: too mch attn-tion om oth actants, o too littl. Whn a black box civs too littl at-tntion, it is simpl ignod. And this is th at o most o th obcts in thwold. W a sondd b tillions o actants at an givn momnt, andovlook th vast maoit o slss is, btls, and lctons that swam

amidst o mo tasd obcts. Most patnts a o invntions that nv- catch on in th makt, o a nv bilt at all. Most novls and scholalaticls go ntil nad: not criticized , bt simpl ovlookd. Black boxsgo nowh i th ail to bcom obligato points o passag o oth nti-tis. Th scond dang o black boxs is th opposit on—that o gaining too mch intst in th om o skpticism and sctin. Th wok o thadlnt Soth Koan clon docto was not ovlookd, and nith wasthat o utah’s aild cold sion sachs. Instad, thi black boxs wton opn and laid wast b sophisticatd dobts. W do not want o lovltts to aiv nnoticd, bt nith do w wish thm to b challngd ocitiqd, thi gamma makd with d ink.

In th cas o a scintic aticl, lt’s assm that it sccds in gain-ing th attntion o a ctain nmb o ads. As Lato obsvs (SA,p. 60), th a now th possibl sponss b th ad: giving p, go-ing along, o -nacting. In an amsing twist, h os ogh stimats o th pcntag o qnc o ach tp o spons. In phaps 90% o all cass, th ad o a scintic o scholal txt loss intst o is ov-

whlmd b tchnical langag, and simpl givs p ting to ollow ochallng whatv is wittn. Sch ads ma contibt to th pstigo th txt anwa, whth thogh bing vagl impssd, o b pass-ing th wod along that ‘th aticl lookd ptt good, bt it was too dpo m to ollow’. Bt sch ads a not th pima sppot o th ati-cl. This coms om th stimatd 9% [*laghing*-g.h.] who go along withth aticl, basicall convincd b th agmnts o Cick and Watson, oPast, o Hidgg, o Lato, o edwad Said, and s it as a black boxo additional claims o thi own. This lavs a m 1% o th pi o th-nactos, thos skptics o nthsiasts who pat an xpimnt o tacth xact stps o a philosophical agmnt—lading to vication, modi-cation, o otight ction. W a in dangos tain whn this daing 1% pts on th glovs and opns o black boxs, sinc th boxs ma nd



Scinc in Action 39

p dstod o dasticall altd.2

As an xtm cas o sch bhavio, Lato invnts a mavlos p-son calld ‘Th Dissnt’, a contaian cnic who challngs v last d-

tail h obsvs in a laboato. Lato imagins that th Dissnt adsth ollowing sntnc in a scintic aticl: ‘Fig. 1 shows a tpical pattn.Biological activit o ndophin was ond ssntiall in two zons with thactivit o zon 2 bing totall vsibl, o statisticall so, b naloxon’ (SA,p. 64) As on o th stimatd 1% o ads who activl dobt this claim,th Dissnt appas at th laboato to spak with th Posso in pson. Awa o th qstions sonding his aticl, th Posso sas ‘lt m show o’, and points to a dvic making an vn insciption o paks and vallson a oll o gaph pap. ‘OK’, th Posso contins, ‘this is th bas lin;

now, I am going to inct ndophin, what is going to happn? S?!’ Thpaks on th gaph pap immdiatl dcas in siz, vntall attning altogth. ‘Immdiatl th lin dops damaticall. And now watch nalox-on. S?! Back to bas lin lvls. It is ll vsibl’ (SA, p. 65).

This coding dvic is an instrument , which Lato dns as th nallink in a long chain o tansomations that allow s to s somthing ‘di-ctl’ o oslvs. Th instmnt nomall mains invisibl ntil it ischallngd: sall w accpt imags om camas and tlscops as n-qstionabl data, ntil som dissidnt bgins to pick apat aws in th dis-totion o thi lnss. Viwd in this wa, an obct can nction as aninstmnt nd th ight cicmstancs, woking to mdiat ocs li-abl as th pass om on location to anoth. Bt phaps o Dissnt isnot satisd with insciptions on gaph pap. Fo this ason, th possotaks him to s th actal xpimntal dvic, th phsiogaph, in which‘a massiv pic o lctonic hadwa cods, calibats, amplis andglats signals coming om anoth instmnt, an aa o glasswa’(SA, p. 65). W now s a bbbling glass chamb with somthing insid

that looks lik lastic. ‘It is indd lastic, th Posso intons. It is a pico gt, gina pig gt […]. This gt has th popt o contacting gla-l i maintaind aliv’ (SA, p. 65). This lastic mnant o a dad animal iswhat acts to chmical inctions and maks insciptions on th gaph pa-p. I w ml look at th twitching pic o gt, it is had to mak visalsns o what is going on; hnc th s o gaph pap, which givs lgiblom to a wildl thobbing mscl. At a tim th Posso gows dissatis-d with th xpimnt, ‘swaing at th gt, saing it is a “bad gt”’ (SA,p. 66). H blams th tchnician who dissctd th st gina pig, and now

2. Thn again, this 1% also inclds th Aistotls who modi th Platos and theinstins who modi th Nwtons, as opposd to th tst 9% who simpl stngthnth black box b sing it withot signicant impovmnt. Which kind o stdnt wold

o ath hav? Who did Hssl mo good in th long n: th Hsslians who mim-ickd him, o Hidgg who tansomd him?




ods th slaght o a scond doomd animal. Lato dscibs th scngiml: ‘A gina pig is placd on a tabl, nd sgical oodlights, thnanasthtizd, ccid, and slicd opn […]. Sddnl, w a mch -

th om th pap wold o th aticl. W a now in a pddl o bloodand visca, slightl nasatd b th xtaction o th ilm om this littl cat’ (SA, p. 66).

Whn ading th oiginal aticl it was possibl, thogh diclt, oth Dissnt to dobt what was wittn. Bt now it is vastl mo diclt.In od to dobt th Posso, h nds to nd som wa to ndminth gaph pap and th vaios coding dvics. evntall, h ma vnnd to mast th gsom tchniqs o disscting liv animals. As Latopts it, ‘“Showing” and “sing” a not simpl ashs o intition. Onc in

th lab w a not psntd otight with th al ndophin whos xis-tnc w dobtd. W a psntd with anoth wold in which it is ncs-sa to ppa, ocs, x and has th vision o th al ndophin. Wcam to th laboato in od to sttl o dobts abot th pap, bt whav bn ld into a labinth’ (SA, p. 67). Nowh in th Posso’s dm-onstation do w conont th thing itsl as angls pla haps and lightning ashs in th distanc. To s somthing ‘dictl’ mans to ollow a lngthchain o tansomations om on mdim into anoth and on into anoth-. Bhind th gaph pap with its gla pattns th lis a massiv s-is o obcts, ach tanslating its mssag into a dint lvl o th wold.Initiall, w might hav thoght w cold ag with th Posso simplb conslting th aticls in a liba. Bt now that w hav ‘sn ooslvs’, nd th Posso’s diction, th dissnt will inc painlcosts in tim, ng, and mon.

At this psnt point, in od to go on, w nd gina pigs, sgicallamps and tabls, phsiogaphs, lctonic hadwa, tchnicians andmophin, not to mntion th scac asks o pid ndophin; w

also nd th skills to s all ths lmnts and to tn thm into a p-tinnt obction to th Posso’s claim […]. Long and long dtoswill b ncssa to nd a laboato, b th qipmnt, hi th tch-nicians and bcom acqaintd with th ilm assa (SA, p. 67).

In oth wods, w cannot obct to th Posso’s aticl with an sot o dict appal to ‘nat’, bt mst intvn in a ll ang o intmdi-at las. ys, w could still mak obctions, bt th pic will b high inth om o isolation and ostacism. ys, th hav bn lon scintists andlon atists who hav stood ast amidst povt and idicl—bt sch h-os can nv st tmpt thi insights alod and blam th ignoancand coption o th poplac whn thi idas ail to catch on. To sc-cd, ths lons st nd to displac an nti ntwok o black boxs thata stackd against thm, som o thm spciall slk and hav. ‘“S o osl,” th scintist sas with a sbdd and mab ionic smil. “A o



Scinc in Action 41

convincd now?” Facd with th thing itsl that th tchnical pap was al-lding to, th dissnts now hav a choic btwn ith accpting th acto dobting thi own sanit—th latt is mch mo painl’ (SA, p. 70).

yt vn now o Dissnt mains nconvincd, and is cock noghnot to dobt his own sanit. Th Posso bhavs as i h w th ocialspoksman o th gaph pap and oth pics o tchnical appaats. Btphaps th Posso is not ltting th things thmslvs spak thogh thisxpimnt as tanspantl as h claims. It ma b that th gaph povsnothing: ‘It ma b that all sots o chmicals giv th sam shap in thispaticla assa. O mab th Posso so dal wishs his sbstanc to bmophin that h nwittingl consd two sings and inctd th sammophin twic, ths podcing two shaps that indd look idntical’ (SA,

p. 73) Whn th Dissnt contins to xpss dobt, th Posso calml o-s to lt him do th inctions himsl. Th Dissnt now chcks th lablson th two vials, and sing st mophin and thn ndophin, h nds thatth sam slt is obtaind in th sam amont o tim. Th Posso smsto b vindicatd onc mo; h ‘cannot b dissociatd om his claims’ (SA,p. 74). Th Posso is not isolatd, bt has all th black boxs in th xpi-mnt on his sid, whil th Dissnt is gadall stippd o possibl allis.

Bt imagin that o Dissnt is so skptical that h now bcoms opn-l d. How can w b so s that th vials labld ‘mophin’ and ‘n-dophin’ a not th sbct o a mix-p, o vn an act o dlibat ad?Th Posso mains calm, and shows th Dissnt th potocol booklld with nmbs, showing a colation btwn cod nmbs and sp-cic vials o chmicals. This is still not nogh to satis o anti-ho, thpompos skptic. ‘B now, w hav to imagin a dissnt booish noghto bhav lik a polic inspcto sspcting von and bliving no onand nall wanting to s th al ndophin with his own s’ (SA, p. 76).In this spiit o booishnss, th Dissnt opnl disblivs that th nm-

bs in th book actall colat with th vials o chmicals. Fo th sttim, th Posso bgins to show signs o ang. H lads th Dissnt intoa oom lld with glass colmns in which a liqid slowl pcolats thogha whit sbstanc. Th dsid chmical vntall lts down into a owo tin asks, sotd on th basis o how long it took to pass thogh th sb-stanc. ‘H it is, sas th gid, h is o ndophin’ (SA, p. 76). Whnth Dissnt contins to xpss skpticism, th Posso givs an an-nod tchnical xplanation o how th appaats woks, conclding h-il that th vial o ndophin sd b th Dissnt cam om this samack two das ali. evn now th Dissnt mains stbbon, challng-ing th pincipl that th dint chmicals will all lt thogh th ap-paats at dint ats, thb dning otight that th Posso can bs o which chmical is which in th st plac. ‘Th pss is mont-ing. evon in th lab is xpcting an otbst o ag, bt th Posso




politl lads th visito towads anoth pat o th laboato’ (SA, p. 76).H, th Posso xplains that th chmicals can also b idntid bthi optical spcta, thb dnitivl poving thi idntit. Whn this

dmonstation is mt with silnc om th Dissnt, Lato givs a ndispla o his a damatgical talnts, as th Posso lanchs an ov-whlming p-mptiv stik against an th wast o his tim:

Oh, I know! Mab o a nctain that I did th xpimnt with your vial o ndophin? Look h in th HPLC book. Sam cod, sam tim.Mab o claim that I askd this gntlman h to ak th books, andobtain this pak o m with anoth sbstanc? O mab o dobtth masmnt o optical spcta. Mab o think it is an obsoltpic o phsics. No sch lck, m da collag. Nwton dscibd this

phnomnon qit accatl—bt mab h’s not good nogh o o(SA, p. 77).

All o Lato’s books a pppd with dlicios imagind spchs o this kind. And lik all good comdians, h snds th adinc hom witha nal lagh vn at th climax has appantl passd. Th Posso’s voic is now qiving with ag, and th Dissnt has a dcision to mak.Is h all ppad to inslt von in th laboato b dobting thHPLC cod book o th action collcto into which th liqids pcolat?‘H could in pincipl, bt h cannot in pactic sinc tim is nning ot andh is snsitiv to th xaspation in von’s voic. And who is h an-wa to mont a dispt with Wat Associats, th compan who dvisdthis HPLC pototp? Is h ad to cast dobt on a slt [Nwton’s lawso optical spcta] that has bn accptd nqstioningl o 300 as,on that has bn mbddd in thosands o contmpoa instmnts?’(SA, p. 77). Th Dissnt tis on last ick o th wist, wonding alodwhth th p sbstanc ctd on th gaph is actall ndophin.Th Posso sponds with a withing analsis makd b gat tchni-

cal pcision. H thn asks whth his advsa can dm p an othpossibl dobts. ‘No, I mst admit, whisps th bliv, I am v im-pssd. This all looks lik gnin ndophin. Thank o so mch oth visit. Don’t tobl oslvs, I will nd m own wa ot… (xit thdissnt)…’ (SA, p. 77).

Althogh Lato nds th sto h, th atmath o th Dissntwold pobabl b mch wos than an mbaassd xit. Within a wmints o his dpat, th Posso’s ag tns to mith, as h chcklsalod ov th Dissnt’s bhavio. His assistants oin in ngticall, oll-ing thi s, som o thm cssing ov ‘that bastad’ and wonding ‘whathis poblm is’. At wok th tchnicians all mt o dinks, and as achnw ind dits into th pb, th Posso has a sh chanc to vnt hisidicl: ‘H Alx, o’ not going to believe what happnd in th lab to-da!’ B nightall, th sto has bn told in dozns o -mails to collags



Scinc in Action 43

aond th wold. Th Dissnt is now a scintic laghingstock. At -t connc psntations, smiks and knowing glancs a xchangdamong thos who both to attnd his paps at all. Som o th Dissnt’s

gant poposals now mstiosl ail, and his onc indl co-woks smto tn th oth wa down th hall as h appoachs. Mab h’s st bing paanoid? No, h’s not. Th Dissnt’s scintic isolation has pmanntlincasd. His om allis hav dstd him in dovs, and his ca willtak as to cov vn at an abct ltt o apolog to th Posso,who thlssl ciclats th ltt with his own sacastic maginal nots.

I hav told this scnaio in sch dtail patl o nttainmnt’s sak;th hav alwas bn too man boing philosophs, and w a ot-nat that Lato is not among thm. Bt it was also impotant to do som

stic to th mticlos dtail o Lato’s mpiical acconts o laboatoli, which mst othwis b xcldd om a mtaphsical book lik thison. What th sto shows is that th Dissnt can contin to dispt ad innitum, bt onl at th cost o gowing isolation and phaps vn mntalillnss (and h I do not st). Th Posso has contlss allis: th ginapig gt, th coding dvic, Si Isaac Nwton, amis o tchnicians, a -sach bdgt, and powl inds to whom th Dissnt can b idicldatwad. B contast, th Dissnt has no on and nothing to back p hisdobts. Th Posso is sondd b nmos black boxs that can bopnd, bt that in pactical tms a xtml diclt to opn. H stacksp so man black boxs that th Dissnt is ovwhlmd b thi com-bind oc, and has no ida how to scap (SA, p. 59). each black box thatalls on o sid, whth it b an xpimnt, a spctd athoit, a stong instittional position, o a complling ida, maks s stong and o op-ponnts wak (SA, p. 93). ev tim w link oslvs to a black box, oopponnts will hav a had tim spaating s om it.

This is th momnt whn Alan Sokal and oth scintic alists will

bgin to nod knowingl. Th hav caght Bno Lato in th act: h -dcs all o scinc to th sophist o hman pow politics. Accoding toLato, powl lab dictos stong-am thi wak sbodinats intoobdinc. Knowldg is pow, nothing ls. Bt I nd it had to s howthis ading o Lato cold vn occ to a ai-mindd ad. In th stplac, h nv maks an sot o clan split btwn nat on on sidand political pow on th oth. As w saw in Irreductions , all actants a onth sam ooting. In th pcding xampl, Lato nv vn tlls s thatth Posso is mo politicall powl than th Dissnt. W onl knowthat b th nd th Dissnt has mad a pblic ool o himsl. yt it cold st as asil b th cas that th Posso is a pool ndd mavick bi-ologist and th Dissnt an aggssiv captain o th Acadm o an ao-gant Nobl Laat. rwittn in this wa, th sto is no long abot th‘pow’ o distingishd possos to bll gnhon skptics, bt ath




abot th victo o bold xpimnt ov mdioc stablishmnt scinc.Fthmo, vn i th Posso all w a ‘mo powl’ g thanth Dissnt in pl social tms, his victo is not t gaantd. All w

know is that th Dissnt has st lt th lab in disgac, ttl dmoal-izd. Bt what i th Dissnt gos to wok mo diligntl than v b-o? Phaps h has a bainstom lading to a nw annus mirabilis o scinc,and two as lat has shockd th wold with an ingnios tation o Nwton’s optics. It is now th Dissnt who has th last lagh. Flash o-wad to th clos o his damatic Nobl Piz Addss in Stockholm: ‘Fitn as ago I was idicld in on amos laboato b a lading scintist o th da. His nam is now ogottn, and I will spa his sviving collagsan th mbaassmnt. Th impotant thing is that a nw ag in th

intptation o optical spcta has bgn. expimntal wok is onl nowaping th havsts that w sown at o dakst ho o idicl and iso-lation. Th lsson taght b th coag o Giodano Bno in th dngono th Inqisition is vid onc mo, and o all tim: lonl sk o thtth, nv a th scon o th powl! [ollowd b a standing ovation]’.Lato’s point is not that social pow tmps obctiv poo. Instad, thpoint is that whth th scintic piz gos to th swagging aistocats o th mao labs o alls instad to th stnning dak hoss, both mst ollowth sam path to glo: assmbling as man black boxs as possibl to ocon’s opponnts to giv wa.

What th laboato abl shows is that w nv s tth dictl inth sh. Th Dissnt ma b a loathsom pst, bt h dos hav a point:anthing can b challngd. Th is nv a d light ashing in o hadonc w hit th ight answ, no gni o magic ai to whisp in o athat w now hav th tth. (Cick and Watson lt st as s o thi m-baassing st soltion as o thi coct scond on.) Instad, w assm-bl th tth as painstakingl as a smphon o an lctical gid, and an

o ths things can collaps bnath th wight o nxpctd sistanc.Powl spios and igning paadigms a no mo and no lss blackboxs than anthing ls. Th bil lianc o The Double Helix lis in th wathat it placs had scinc, itation, gossip, and th lst o hono all on thsam ooting. All o ths a vnts; all involv actants. It is had to imag-in a mo Latoian book than Watson’s mastpic. Whatv ls oma wish to call Bno Lato, do not call him a lativist, a pow politi-cian, o a social constctionist. Th wold is constctd at ach momntot o man actants, and most o ths actants a not ‘social’ in th naowsns, sinc th can st as asil b mad o cmnt o gomtic solids aso hman conspiacis.

Bt i Lato’s actants a not st illsions gnatd b hman pow- plas, th a also not obctiv ock-had sbstancs. An obct is nota sbstanc, bt a perormance . ‘Som in ai tals dat th glist svn-



Scinc in Action 45

hadd dagons o against all odds th sav th king’s daght; oths in-sid laboatois sist pcipitation o th timph ov bismth’ (SA, p.89). H is ing h to th wok o Mai and Pi Ci in idntiing

th nw chmical lmnt calld polonim, which som dissnts initiallclaimd was st a wll-known lmnt in disgis:

What a ths amos things which a said to b bhind th tsts mado? Th a mad o a list o victois: [‘polonim’] datd animand thoim at th slphatd hdogn gam; it datd antimonand asnic at th ammonim slph gam; and thn it ocd ladand copp to thow in th [towl], onl bismth wnt all th wa to thsmi-nal, bt it too got batn down ding th nal gam o hat andcold! At th bginning o its dnition th thing is a score list o a sis

o tials (SA, p. 89).In this wa Lato holds to th notion o a thing as a list o attibts o d-nit poptis, making him no mo an anti-alist than Fg o rssll.Th dinc is that o Lato attibts a not int qalitis, bt po-mancs o activ victois ov thi ivals. On can ctainl ag againstthis viw b mans o vaios mtaphsical obctions—bt not b claiming that Lato is st anoth Fnch lativist pddling ashionabl nonsnsabot th nalit o th wold.

Instad o int sbstancs o ssncs that cicl in th void, ov stbing what th a, Lato givs s black boxs. Ths boxs a ocs tockon with, and th sist tials o stngth. evn so, th box dos not con-tin in th wold b intia alon: ‘in th most avoabl cass, vn whnit is a otin pic o qipmnt, th black box qis an activ cstom- and nds to b accompanid b oth popl i it is to b maintaind inxistnc’ (SA, p. 137). I black boxs a to nd, th mst alwas bcitadls o Thomist o Dawinian othodox bating down dviant h-tics. ev school nds its btal nocs as blwaks against chaos. yt

a black box is nv ll closd, and nv sa om all challng. Cacksvntall appa vn in smingl nshakabl black boxs: Nwtoniangavit, th roman empi. Th sam thing can happn with an intllc-tal othodox. Indd, on o th goals o th psnt book is to opn thblack box o th stal analtic/continntal dal monach, xposing its in-tio to th blows o snlight, agls, and dogs. A black box is low-maint-nanc, bt nv maintnanc-.

jst as h will lat sa o machins, Lato nots that a black box as-smbls vaios lmnts in a singl packag: ‘whn man lmnts amad to act as on, this is what I will now call a black box’ (SA, p. 131).Initiall an obct is an obct in action, idntid b its gat victois and itstials o stngth against oth actants. Bt ov tim, w ogt abot thisdama, and th black box tns into somthing lik a sbstanc: ‘Nw obcts bcom things : somostatin, polonim, anaobic micobs, tansnit




nmbs, dobl hlix, o Eagle compts, things isolatd om th laboa-to conditions that shapd thm, things with a nam that now sm ind-pndnt om th tials in which th povd thi mttl’ (SA, p. 91).3 Ths

things a toactivl ndowd with a comptnc o potntial, and in thiswa th a mistakn o a solid ssnc: ‘ach pomanc [sms to p-sppos] a competence which tospctivl xplains wh th ho withstoodall th odals. Th ho is no long a sco list o actions; h, sh o it is anssnc slowl nvild thogh ach o his, h o its manistations’ (SA,p. 89). Onl scholal spcialists mmb th contmpoa opponnts o Aistotl, Maxwll, Canto, o Boh, gs who now sm kissd b thgods om th momnt o thi bith, thogh it nv lt this wa to an o thm at th tim. Lato dos not pais this pocss, which alwas vs to-

wad so-calld ‘Whig histo’: th Allis datd th Nazis because th wbtt and stong; Past datd Pocht because h saw mo clal;th bnd th pap because it was ndowd with bning oc; th pillmaks s slp because it contains slping-oc. Th wod ‘nat’ sholdnv b sd to xplain somthing that oght to b xplaind instad b thconct dama o tanslations btwn spcic actos.

Bo moving on, w shold viw onc mo what is accomplishd bth notion o black boxs. First , nlik sbstancs, th xist at v possibllvl o th nivs, sinc Disnland is a black box no lss than ach o itscostmd chaacts, th cas that ciclat insid th pak, th ts on thcas, th bb om which th ts a mad, and th molcls and at-oms insid th bb. Th is no spcial plan o alit on which w ndsbstancs as opposd to m conglomats o pats. This pts Lato atodds with both th Aistotlian and matialist taditions.

Second , black boxs a dint om thi accidnts o lations onl ina lativ sns. W might b abl to distingish rssia as an acto om thdtails o its cnt political and cltal sitation. Bt in pactic this -

qis a labo o abstaction, sinc what now xists is onl rssia as a totalconct vnt, containing all its dtails. To abstact anthing om its n- vionmnt qis that it no long silntl nction as a black box, bt in-stad bcom noticd as sch a box, availabl o possibl opning.

Third , Lato’s black boxs do not atomaticall nd thogh tim,nlik most taditional vsions o sbstanc. Sinc th a vnts, th in-cld all o thi lations as pats o thmslvs. Bt sinc ths lationsshit om momnt to momnt, th black boxs do not nd o mo thanan instant, nlss w consid thm as ‘tactois’ cossing tim acoss asis o mint tansomations. Th mst also b constantl maintaind.This maks Lato an all o th doctin o continos cation, which isalso a qnt at o occasionalist philosoph. Th is no connction

3.Pnctation simplid.



Scinc in Action 47

btwn instants, sinc ach is an absoltl niq vnt, with nothing n-ding atomaticall om on momnt to th nxt. Bt occasionalism hasan vn mo powl implication alad mntiond abov: th inabilit

o an two actos to toch on anoth dictl. Bo ling on whthLato also adhs to this at o occasionalism, w shold consid hismodl o lation as a kind o action at a distanc.

B. ACTION AT A DISTANCe

Fo Lato th a no cptic ssncs ling bhind whatv lis inscibdin alit h and now. Th a onl actants o all possibl vaitis, andactants a ll xpssd in ach momnt with nothing hld in sv. It

is t that nw ats o obcts appa thogh th nolding o sccs-siv vnts, bt ths nw ats cannot b ascibd to ‘potntials’ o ‘ca-pacitis’, xcpt phaps in toactiv ashion. Actos a events , and vntsa alwas ll dplod. Th a th sm total o alit ath than anincidntal sac-ct o th movmnt o domant sbstata. In this -spct, th is onl on wold o Lato; all actants a h and nowhls. Bt notic that this dos not mak him a holist: vthing does not actvthing ls. A chaact in Lato’s book Aramis dmonstats this pointwith bt phsical oc: ‘th violnt blow h stck with his st on his dsk

had no visibl innc on th chapt o Aistotl’s Metaphysics that wasld nd th ltt A at th top o his bookshl. ‘yo s: not vthing coms togth, not vthing is connctd’ (Ar, p. 152). A philosoph o ntwoks dos not qi that th ntwok b dvoid o spaat pats. I vthing w alad linkd, tanslation wold not b sch a pssing is-s o Lato.

Th taditional notion o sbstanc is doppd in his philosoph alto-gth, placd b ndlss las o black boxs that sist vaios tials o

stngth. Lato’s tho o lations has t to b dtmind, bt it willnd to ct his conclsion that all obcts li on th sam plan o alit,vn i th a spaat zons not ntil commnsat with th oths.Obcts can b linkd togth, bt a mostl not yet linkd. Bt th shact that obcts hav an hop at all o bing linkd tlls s that vn i act-ants a spaat om ach oth, it mst b possibl to link thm thoghthi qualities . Two actos will b abl to link p onl in patial ashion: notwo things hav compltl idntical attibts, sinc vn two highl simi-la ntitis will occp dint ootholds in th cosmos and hnc will hav

dint lations to oth things. W cannot s Astia, Swdn, andPotgal into th sam nion withot ot, and it taks gat ng to mlta ca’s ngin into its windows in a homognos mass. Nonthlss, thsactants mst sha ctain ats in common i w a abl to link thm atall. Whnv on actant has som ct on anoth, this can b dscibd




as ‘action at a distanc’—all actants, b th m act o bing thmslvs,a distant om ach oth, split o om oths b nknown walls.

Antim w hav an allianc, w hav action at a distanc, and withot

this th wold b no alit o an kind: ‘alit has man hs […] andntil dpnds on th nmb o lmnts tid to [a] claim’ (SA, p. 105).Sch lmnts coss an spposd gap btwn hmans and nonhmans,so that th is no pistin obctiv scinc taintd now and thn b ‘so-cial actos’ sch as ‘wickd gnals, dvios mltinationals, ag consm-s, xploitd womn, hng kids and distotd idologis’ (SA, p. 175). Btalong with this moall impccabl ost o th gd and th victimizd,w mst not ogt abot ‘micobs, adioactiv sbstancs, ls clls anddgs’ (SA, p. 175). Whil ths ma lack th acadmic pathos o all th op-

pssos and oppssd, th a actants nonthlss.In v sitation th onl qstion to ask, whth o thois, amis,

policis, staants, o machins, is whth th a abl to link noghactants to oish. I not, thn o tho collapss, o platoon s nd, and o bsinss olds p within months. W will nd oslvs isolat-d, connd to an inn antas li whil all th actants pass thogh othpoints, laving s bhind as dst ghost towns. Fo scintic pposs, thislads Lato to th ollowing conclsion: ‘Th adctiv “scintic” is not at-tibtd to isolated txts that a abl to oppos th opinion o th mltitdb vit o som mstios aclt. A docmnt bcoms scintic whnits claims stop bing isolatd and whn th nmb o popl ngagd inpblishing it a man and xplicitl indicatd in th txt’ (SA, p. 33). Wcold asil chang Lato’s topic and wit as ollows: ‘Th nam “sta-ant” is not attibtd to isolated stoonts that daw mltitds b mans o som mstios aclt. A staant bcoms al whn it stops bing iso-latd and whn th nmb o popl ngagd in ating th a man andxplicitl ngagd in passing th wod along’. Both statmnts a qall

intsting, and qall vlnabl to th sam citiq. Was Mndl’s wokin gntics all lss scintic bo it cam to gnal notic, o was hnot ath an unknown great scientist ? Was China Hos all lss o a sta-ant whn it stggld o th wks than whn a blisting ad campaignmad it sddnl ashionabl, o was it not ath an ndiscovd gm?Was Cézann lss a paint, Höldlin lss a pot, o Lato lss a philoso-ph bo th w cognizd b oths to b so? This is on o th motobling consqncs o Lato’s hostilit to lonl, isolatd ssnc. Hsms to aliz this, sponding to a psonal q that ‘Science in Action is tibl biasd towad th winns and dos an instic to th loss […]th nddogs gt shot shit’.4 Bt in a sns th dinc btwn win-ns and loss is not th most poblmatic it, sinc Lato at last os

4. Psonal Commnication, elctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 14 jana, 2006.



Scinc in Action 49

a cition o distingishing thm: th winn has stong alliancs. Thmo intsting distinction is btwn th dsving and th ndsving among both winns and loss. Not all loss a qal, st as all winns

a not. This qstion is not st intsting o th pposs o histoicalwok, sinc it also bas on Lato’s ction o sbstanc. Fo sbstanc isth ltimat nddog: i it xists, it will alwas main obscd bhind thntwoks that dplo it. Bt w saw that sbstanc is xcldd om Lato’sphilosoph om th v otst o Irreductions . It mains dobtl whth- anon bt ‘th winns’ can pvail o vn exist in a mtaphsics thatgants sch pimac to conct vnts ov concald obcts o ssncs.

Laving this qstion asid o now, th goal o th vaios assmblisLato dscibs is to s nmos allis into an appant singl whol,

obidding thm an qalsom indpndnt action. A black box is a kindo machin, which ‘as its nam implis, is […] a machination, a statagm,a kind o cnning, wh boowd ocs kp on anoth in chck so thatnon can apat om th gop’ (SA, p. 129). Idall, a machin shold bso wll dsignd that th is almost no chanc o its pats blling againstth stamlind whol: a box pt togth so ctivl that it sms unthink-able to chang it (SA, p. 122). It is t that a nw black box mst mak somkind o innovation o impovmnt, o no on wold both to s it. ytwhn an innovation qis s to chang too man things, its at is no-mall not a happ on. Som xpimntal novls no gat sccss. Btimagin an ambitios avant-gad novl that tid to combin xpimntalcontnt (talking mshooms as th onl chaacts), and xpimntal om(pinting th novl on plaing cads to b shfd in andom od), and anxpimntal mssag (paching th tnts o Scintolog), and xpimn-tal distibtion (advtising on tlvision and inviting popl to sbscibto th cads), and xpimntal langag (clippd slang boowd om thSothn woking classs and oganizd into limicks), and an xpimn-

tal adinc (tailoing th mssag to cnt immigants). This gotsqxampl sggsts th gim consqncs o ting to opn too man blackboxs at onc. Mashall McLhan inoms s that a pblish told him thato a book to sccd, onl tn pcnt o its contnt shold b nw. Latohimsl daws th sam lsson om th ail o Aamis, th poposd a-tomatd mto sstm in Pais: ‘Don’t innovat in v spct at onc’(Ar, p. 298). O as w ad in Science in Action, ‘i o a too timid, o [sci-ntic] pap will b lost, as it will i o a too adacios’ (SA, p. 51).

Bt b a th gatst dang o a black box lis in simpl bing ig-nod. evn th most btal citicism o o labos is lss damaging thansh indinc; an pblishd atho knows it is btt to civ viciosviws than no viws at all. ‘This is th point that popl who nv comclos to th abication o scinc hav th gatst diclt in gasping.Th imagin that all scintic aticls a qal and aad in lins lik




soldis, to b call inspctd on b on. However, most papers are never read at all ’ (SA, p. 40, mphasis addd). Th obsvation lnds powl sppotto Lato’s mtaphsics o alliancs:

No matt what a pap did to th om litat, i no on ls dosanthing with it, thn it is as i it nv xistd at all. yo ma hav wit-tn a pap that sttls a c contovs onc and o all, bt i adsigno it, it cannot b tnd into a act; it simpl cannot . yo ma po-tst against th instic; o ma tas th ctitd o bing ight in o inn hat, bt it will nv go th than o inn hat; owill nv go th in ctitd withot th hlp o oths. Fact con-stction is so mch a collctiv pocss that an isolatd pson bildsonl dams, claims and lings, not acts (SA, pp. 40-41).

As is sall th cas with Lato, th statmnt mains qall powli w shit it awa om th hman alm. H cold st as asil hav wit-tn: ‘No matt what an obct is, i it acts no oth obcts, thn it is as i it nv xistd at all […]. ralit is so mch a collctiv pocss that an iso-latd obct is ml a dam, claim, o ling, not a act’.

To bild a nw black box, w nd to noll oth animat and inani-mat obcts. W mst contol thi bhavio as mch as possibl, o thma act as ‘high-maintnanc’ lmnts and tamp with th smooth wok-ings o o box. O goal is to mak th box so slk and oolpoo that noon vn thinks o opning it. In a long and ascinating passag, Lato -cts on dint possibl statgis o nolling th assistanc o oth ac-tants (SA, pp. 108-121). (1) W can cat to thi intsts b giving thmwhat th nd, as Pntagon contactos sall do. (2) W can psadthm that what th want is not asibl, and that th shold b intstdin somthing ls instad. (3) W can tll thm that th onl nd to maka shot dto thogh what we a doing to gt to wh they want to go.(4) In a mo complicatd statg, w can displac th goals o o allis,

invnt nw goals to inspi thm, invnt ntil nw gops that want thsam things w want, and vn t to hid th act that w a lading an-on along dtos in th st plac. (5) Finall, w can t to mak oslvsso indispnsabl that no on can do withot s, cating a monopol ova ctain tp o oc. I w sccd in this nal statg, w bcom an‘obligato passag point’, a mandato pot o nt wh von ls isocd to tad (SA, p. 132).

Along with assmbling allis o oslvs, it is a good ida to ct o op-ponnts o om thi own allis. As Lato pts it, ‘th most sddn vsalin th tial o stngth btwn athos and dissnts ma b obtaind sim-pl b ctting th links ting thm to thi sppots’ (SA, p. 85). In th p- vios xampl, th Dissnt tid to sv th links that tid th Possoto v pic o his qipmnt. In ach cas, th Dissnt aild. Bt con-sid what might hav happnd i th cod books had containd obvios



Scinc in Action 51

os, th w poblms with th wiing in th phsiogaph, th ndlw ond to b stck in a goov on th gaph pap, i th Posso hadmisndstood Nwton’s laws o optical spcta, o i otight ad had

bn dtctd. Th Posso wold hav bn givosl waknd, and thDissnt wold hav mgd timphant. Fo two cntis, ImmanlKant’s Copnican rvoltion has bn th obligato point o passag oan philosoph that dos not wish to look antiqatd. Anon coming othwith old-stl ationalist proos o th xistnc o God o th innit o thnivs will hav a had tim bing takn siosl b mainstam philos-oph, as will anon who claims th abilit to spak o th things-in-thm-slvs apat om hman xpinc. Ald Noth Whithad, clal noool, maks a bold attmpt to sv Kant om his cntal all: th notion that

th gap btwn hman and wold is mo philosophicall impotant thanth gaps btwn an oth sots o ntitis. Onc Whithad maks thissingl incision in Kant’s chain o allis, h is abl to mov with as amidstth spposd nkad o svntnth cnt philosoph, taking Libnizand Bkl as siosl as most possos now tak Davidson and Qin.Bt Whithad pas a hav pic o this gambl: h mains an isolatdho o a small minoit, nabl to stack nogh black boxs to mov thphilosophical mainstam back towad spclativ mtaphsics. Phaps aposthmos timph is coming, bt o most o th possion Whithad -mains at bst an ingnios oddball with a clv imagination and an obscpos stl. His list o allis mains a wak than Kant’s.

Sving an acto om its allis is asi than it sonds, sinc allis anv as sbmissiv to a black box as w think. As Lato pts it: ‘evn col-lags who had bn “naltabl” convincd b a laboato dmonsta-tion can chang thi minds a month lat. establishd acts a tnd intoatiacts, and pzzld popl ask, “How cold w hav blivd sch an ab-sdit?” establishd indstis that lookd as i th w to last ov

sddnl bcom obsolt and stat alling apat, displacd b nw ons’(SA, p. 121). This pocss can b acclatd i w activl oc o oppo-nnts’ allis to chang camp. Spisingl nogh, th asist wa to nd-min o opponnt’s ntwok o allis otn lis in attacking o opponnt’sstrengths, not waknsss. I Odsss stabs th oot o hand o th Cclops,h ml cass ag. Bt go staight o th had, o th singl ominos, and th Cclops has bn ntalizd.

In cnt politics, w hav th xampl o Kal rov, political advisoto th om Amican Psidnt Gog W. Bsh. Whth accatl onot, it is otn said that rov maks xpt s o this mthod o ontal at-tacks against th appant stong sit o an opponnt. I o opponnt isa csad o childn’s ights, spad th mo that h is a pdophil.5 I

5. I mak no claims as to th accac o ths chags against rov, and s thm onlas a wll-known popla xampl.




Snato K is a Vitnam Wa ho, thn attack this stngth b lining pmilita vtans who qstion his wa stois. Bt whatv on ma thinko rov, it nd not b lis and smas that w s to ct th links btwn

allis. Lt’s imagin that, in o ots to cont th dominanc o Kant’sCopnican rvoltion in philosoph, w hi Kal rov as a consltant.Sinc Kant has th ptation o a qit, asctic sk at tth, rovmight bgin b spading mos o Kant’s sct moal tpitd. To sim-pli th tal, lt’s imagin that th mos a actall true . In a spising discov, rov’s sach tam ncovs pviosl sppssd cospon-dnc btwn Kant and th aild Maqis d Sad, along with a shocking dia that cods midnight dowings and Badlaian hmns to tipl-gat Satan. Whn th discov is annoncd, th dnds o Kant’s lg-

ac a initiall skptical. Th spond b pointing to rov’s long histo o dit manovs and bmoan th invasion o philosoph b ‘th cass poli-tics o slaz’; som vn pickt rov’s hom dmanding a taction. Btlt’s assm that th athnticit o th Kantian docmnts is vid b n-impachabl onsic xpts. rov was tlling th tth, and in act was stas spisd as w a b nws o Kant’s dak dobl li. It is as to imag-in what wold happn in this cas. Th wold b a bi urore in th d-catd pss, ollowd b sval as o tdios pintd dbat ov whth- a bad pson can still b a gat think. (‘Althogh th nw vlationsshow that Kant was a om an admiabl hman bing, th act mainsthat…’) Bt vn with Kant nmaskd as a shocking hpocit, no on’sphilosophical positions will chang v mch. Th biogaph o th man isnwl distastl, t it somhow sms ilvant, and his Copnican phi-losoph will main th dominant paadigm. In shot, Kant’s ptation opsonal ctitd has tnd ot not to b on o his most impotant allis.rov snss that th battl is lost, and sms his invstigation into Kant’slita mains.

A w months lat, rov is dlightd to ncov somthing a mothatning than immoal diais. In a withd manscipt bid in acat o old paps, rov’s tam maks anoth stnning discov: Kantsms to hav wittn his nti philosoph as nothing bt a hoax! It tnsot that Kant nv blivd a wod o his own witings, making him a mosinist, sstmatic onn o Alan Sokal. Th k passag ns as ol-lows: ‘Fools! Fo th tak m at m wod… Sch is thi ignoanc that,with onl th slightst ndg, on convincs thm that black is whit, thatcold is hot, o that a “rvoltion” has tnd philosoph insid-ot lik anold sock’. Th ollows a diabolical sv o his mbittd motivs oth hoax, along with dsciptions o th dp plas h took in xct-ing ach stp o his sham agmnt. Th Kantian lgac is now in a mchmo mbaassing position than in th cas o m immoalit. Lt’s as-sm h onc mo that initial dobts abot rov’s tick giv wa to



Scinc in Action 53

itabl poo that th docmnt was composd b Kant himsl, pob-abl at som point ding th al 1790’s. Th nsing contovs woldb both noabl and consing. Th wold b months o as o mba-

assmnt o Kant scholas, with a handl vn claiming that th snsdth ion all along. Bt onc th dst had sttld, w wold pobabl ndthat nothing mch had changd in th philosophical wold. Th ollowso Whithad, Lato, Hm, and Aqinas might l nwl mboldnd bthis wakning o thi ival. Bt in th nd, most obsvs wold pobablconcld that it is not so impotant whth Kant meant what h said. Kant’sagmnts wold stil l b takn siosl insoa as th hav ‘gnin m-it indpndnt o Kant’s bal lvant sadonic intnt’. Back in sbbanViginia, Kal rov now nds himsl in a diclt position. evn his bomb-

shll vlations a ailing to dislodg Kant om th cntal stonghold o modn philosoph. Facing th gatst ail o his ca, h has now b-com obsssd with dating Immanl Kant.

Whil ading pss acconts o th contovs, rov lans o thst tim o th citicisms o Kant mad b a w isolatd dissnts. His intigd b thi claim that th lation btwn hman and wold is st a spcial cas o an lation whatsov, and that this maks it illgiti-mat to oot all philosophical qstions in th tanscndntal standpoint.Spnding long nights in th liba, rov bgins to discov additional s-l passags in Libniz and oth thinks. Within a w as, h ppashis st plasibl philosophical cas against Kantian philosoph, and labostilssl to cit oth k gs in th acadmic wold, showing thmhow it is possibl to wit thi philosophis o langag and mind vnmo ctivl sing p-Kantian thois o lation. At anoth twodcads o sach, th ldl rov is now a philosophical ggnat,haild in man qats as th most oiginal mtaphsician o th cnt-. rov has land an impotant lsson. Thogh h was abl to win som

tight Amican lctions b shiting a w gops o k swing vots withpsonal innndo, h cannot dthon Kant in this wa vn whn thgossip is gondd in ston-cold tth. Th philosophical wold tns otto b lativl nimpssd b th kind o psonal dit that ind GaHat and tanishd Bill Clinton. Kant’s cntal stngth lis not in his moalchaact no vn in his sincit, bt in th oc o th citical modl itsl.Fo rov o o anon ls, th is no wa to toppl this modl withot b-coming a ll-blown philosoph onsl, ghting th philosoph with phil-osophical wapons. To assmbl th black boxs ndd to dat th gatphilosoph Kant, Kal rov had to become a great philosopher himsel , o at lasta skilld spoksman o som nknown gat think who dos th wok btlangishs in obscit whil rov taks th cdit. In oth wods, rov’sattmpt to ‘sociall constct’ th ptation o Immanl Kant has aild.Instad, th idas o Kant hav constctd th nw li o Kal rov, st as




th dobl hlix constctd th livs o Cick and Watson. An actant is alwas a stngth, and a stngth is a cntal point that gath-

s oth actants aond it. Smming p his dtaild accont o a Fnch

navigational voag, Lato minds s that sch a voag dos not blong to an amilia catgo. W cannot all call it ‘knowldg’, sinc ‘bcom-ing amilia with distant vnts qis […] kings, ocs, sailos, timb,latn igs, spic tads’ (SA, p. 223). Bt it wold b st as idiclos to sathat th voag can b xplaind in tms o ‘pow’. At all, ‘th ckon-ing o lands, th lling-in o log books, th taing o th can, th igging o a mast, cannot withot absdit b pt nd th hading o this wod[“pow”]’ (SA, p. 223). Mo gnall:

w nd to gt id o all catgois lik thos o pow, knowldg, pot

o capital, bcas th divid p a cloth that w want samlss in o-d to std it as w choos […]. Th qstion is ath simpl: how toact at a distanc on namilia vnts, placs, and popl? Answ: bsomehow binging hom ths vnts, placs, and popl. How can this bachivd, sinc th a distant? B invnting [mthods] that (a) ndthm mobile so that th can b boght back; (b) kp thm stable so thatth can b movd back and oth withot additional distotion, cop-tion, o dca, and (c) a combinable so that whatv st th a mado, th can b cmlatd agggatd, o shfd lik a pack o cads.

I thos conditions a mt, thn a small povincial town, o an obsclaboato, o a pn littl compan in a gaag, that w at st aswak as an oth plac will bcom cnts dominating at a distancman oth placs (SA, p. 223).

Actants can b linkd to a cnt b bing ndd mobil, stabl, and com-binabl with oths. And h is a k momnt in Lato’s philosoph, sincb dnition his actants nomall do not hav mobilit, stabilit, o combin-abilit. Sinc v actant is ttl conct (and accoding to Irreductions

happns onl onc and in on tim and on plac) to mak an actant mobil,stabl, and combinabl dmands som sot o abstraction om that on timand on plac. yt Lato’s om o abstaction can b pomd b an obct, not st a tanscndnt knowing hman.

Abstaction dos not occ b ising abov th gllibl blis o a p-thotical acto, bt b nabling anoth actant’s ngis to b siphondawa at a distanc. In this sns, an lation is an abstaction. It is notonl Kant and einstin who bhav ‘abstactl’: an astolog abstacts blinking all thos bon with th moon in Liba thogh thi shad vanit

and sns o ai pla; an agl abstacts b diving at an abbit gadlsso its nknown spcic histo; an qation abstacts b linking all divstblnt ids that hav th sam rnolds acto; th ath abstacts bdawing all masss gadlss o thi colo; a windmill abstacts b spin-ning in an bz gadlss o its odo, and b niing all its woodn



Scinc in Action 55

pats gadlss o thi xact ganla pattn. Abstaction is not a niqhman aclt that magicall otstips th wold, bt th v st o -lation itsl. Sinc all actants a ttl conct, connd to a singl tim

and plac, in th stict sns th cannot commnicat with ach oth atall. Th intact onl b wa o abstacting om ach oth. Wood is mo-bilized b bing movd om a lmb ad to a constction sit. It is alsostabilized , b bing slctd onl o ats that main dabl btwnon plac and anoth. And th wood is mad combinable b slcting it oats compatibl with th oth ntitis to which it mst b linkd. ‘I b “abstaction” is mant th pocss b which ach stag xtacts l-mnts ot o th stag blow so as to gath in on plac as man soc-s as possibl, v wll, w hav stdid […] th pocss o abstaction,

xactl as w wold xamin a n in which aw oil is cackd intop and p oils’ (SA, p. 241). unotnatl, th sal viw o abstac-tion is ath dint: ‘th maning o th wod “abstaction” has shitdom th product […] to not onl th process bt also to th producer’s mind […].Lapéos will b said to opat mo abstactl than th Chins whnh handls latitds and longitds, and Mndlv to think mo abstact-l than th mpiical chmists whn h shfs his cads aond’ (SA, p.241). Fo Lato this is impossibl. Abstaction is not a at o th hmanmind, bt o an lation whatv, sinc two vnts a so ttl conctthat th mak contact at all onl at th pic o abstacting om on an-oth, daling with a small potion o ach oth ath than th totalit. Inoth wods, Lato givs s a mtaphsical concpt o abstaction aththan an pistmological on.

What w hav land in this chapt can b smmaizd as ollows.Instad o sbstancs, th a black boxs that a not pmannt, nat-al, o dabl, and a alwas at isk o bing opnd ding t con-tovsis. And instad o hamlss lations that act nothing, lations

a alwas violnt abstactions mad om actants that wold othwis btappd in a singl tim and plac. Black boxs and action at a distanc willpovid Lato’s answ to th cntal poblm o modn philosoph.





57

3

W Hav Nv Bn Modn

We Have Never Been Modern was st pblishd in Fnch in 1991. It is th bstintodction to Lato, and possibl his nst wok: i a mo oiginal pico philosoph has appad in th past twnt as, it is nknown to m.This book cts nw paths thogh th ad’s bain, and mains impossi-

bl to classi among th mo amilia ointations o contmpoa philos-oph. Indd, a sns o contind astonishmnt om ading it was thoiginal motivation o witing th psnt book. We Have Never Been Modern is witt, had-hitting, and balancd. It is also spisingl comphnsivo a book shot nogh that on o two sittings in a caé a nogh to con-sm its contnts.

Fo all th ichnss o this compact magnum opus , its mao thms asimpl. Fist, Lato advancs th most powl dnition o modnismo which I am awa. Modnit tis to puriy th wold b disscting it intotwo ttl opposd alms. On on sid w hav th hman sph, com-posd o tanspant dom and ld b abita and incommnsablpspctivs. On th oth sid w hav nat o th xtnal wold, madp o had matts o act and acting with obctiv, mchanical pcision. As Lato pts it lat in his Politics o Nature , a plalistic multiculturalism isalwas opposd to a homognos mononaturalism. W a told that natis on, bt that hmans hav nmos divs pspctivs on it. Not s-pisingl, Lato cts this modnist vision. Th a not two mtall

isolatd zons calld ‘wold’ and ‘hman’ that nd to b bidgd b somsot o magical lap. Instad, th a onl actants, and in most cass it isimpossibl to idnti th pcis sph (‘nat, o clt?’) to which angivn actant blongs. Th division o th wold into two zons is a pointlssction, sinc w hav nv managd to pi th wold. W hav nv




bn modn. W a nabl to spaat btwn th natal and cltalalms—not bcas th a hoplssl inttwind, bt bcas th d-alism o nat and clt is gondlss in th st plac. Th wold is not

mad o slavish mmbs o two ival atnitis, two monl disticts -smbling east and Wst Gman. Pication o on om anoth is im-possibl, sinc th w nv two opposd zons in th st plac. Instad,th is nothing bt a cosmic hailstom o individal actants, non o thminhntl natal o cltal. In act, pcisl because o its attmpts to p-i th two disticts o th wold om on anoth, th so-calld modnag has catd a gat nmb o hbid obcts than hav v bnknown bo.

A. MODerNITy

‘W pass om a limitd poblm […] to a boad and mo gnal pob-lm: what dos it man to b modn?’ (NM, p. 8). Lato is no modn,sinc h dns his own philosoph against an ot to pi two zons o th wold om ach oth. No is h among th anti-modns, sinc this sctoddl accpts modnism’s claim to hav tansomd vthing that cambo, and ml adds th mins sign o pssimism instad o basking inhappinss ov modn voltions. And h is also no postmodn, sinc this

gop svs itsl om th reality o actants to oat ptntiosl amidst col-lag and simlacm, laving no oom in philosoph o al atomic ncli,hicans, o xplosions, xcpt phaps as clv lita tops dawnom jabès and Mallamé. Instad, Lato is a nonmodern. Th has nv- bn a adical bak with what cam bo. Fo w oslvs, st likNandthals, spaows, mshooms, and dit, hav nv don anthing ls than act amidst th bstl o oth actants, compssing and sisting thm, o giving wa bnath thi blows.

Th modns ‘hav ct th Godian knot with a wll-hond swod. Thshat is bokn: on th lt, th hav pt knowldg o things; on th ight,pow and hman politics’ (NM, p. 3). Modnit is th attmpt to clansach hal o an sid o th oth, ing acts om an contamina-tion with psonal val dgmnts, whil libating vals and pspctivsom th tst o had alit. This amilia split now sms so obvios that wsldom mmb its inhnt stangnss. Wh cav alit into pcislthese two sctos? Wh not th old clstial and tstial sphs, as in an-cint phsics? Wh not call vthing ith mal o mal, as in th stc-

t o pimitiv gamma? Wh not distingish btwn things that bnand things that mlt? O btwn matt and antimatt? Th ason is thathman knowldg is now viwd as a niq sit wh on tp o ntitmagicall tanscnds th wold and oms mo o lss clod psnta-tions o it. Th gap btwn hman and montain is now sn as dint



W Hav Nv Bn Modn 59

in kind om that btwn lightning and montain. This bqst o spcialtanscndnt pows to hmans oms on sid o a gat divid, whil thoth sid is packd with stpid obotic obcts acting with clockwok m-

chanical topo. Th st sid is sn as snsitiv and potic, bt ssntiall vag and nalsiabl; th scond is viwd as sll xact, bt igid andmcilss in its cshing nit. yt both sids o th gat divid blong toth sam packag: ‘Modnit is otn dnd in tms o hmanism, ithas a wa o salting th bith o “man” o as a wa o annoncing his dath.Bt this habit itsl is modn, bcas it mains asmmtical. It ovlooksth simltanos bith o “nonhmanit”—things, o obcts, o basts— and th qall stang bing o a cossd-ot God, lgatd to th sid-lins’ (NM, p. 13). W a now lt with nothing bt

th mting point o th two xtms o Nat and Socit in whichsids th whol o alit. With this singl lin, alists and constctiv-ists will b abl to qal […] o cntis: th om will dcla thatno on has abicatd this al act; th latt that o hands alon ash-iond this social act […].

[yt] th gat masss o Nat and Socit can b compad to thcoold-down continnts o plat tctonics. I w want to ndstand thimovmnt, w hav to go down into thos saing its wh th magma

pts and on th basis o this ption a podcd […] th two conti-nntal plats on which o t a ml plantd (NM, p. 87).

I Kant’s Copnican rvoltion placd hmans at th cnt o philoso-ph whil dcing th st o th wold to an nknowabl st o obcts,what Lato commnds is a Cont-rvoltion. Nat and clt anot ‘inxticabl linkd’, bcas th a not two distinct zons at all. Hmockingl nots that ‘th modns hav imposd an ontological dincas adical as th sixtnth-cnt dintiation btwn th spalnawold that knw nith chang no nctaint [and th sblna woldo dca]. Th sam phsicists had a good lagh with Galilo at that onto-logical distinction—bt thn th shd to stablish it in od to po-tct th laws o phsics om social coption!’ (NM, p. 121, pnctationmodid). In this spct, Lato is th Galilo o mtaphsics, idicling th split btwn th spalna wold o had scintic act and th sbl-na wold o hman pow gams. Bt nlik th social constctionists, hdos not dstabiliz this split in od to cat a nw, invtd on whpow gams hold th pp hand. Th is no ‘pp hand’ in this sns o

Lato: th a onl actants, nothing ls, and th com in contlss va-itis ath than two. In dialog with his qasi-allis Stvn Shapin andSimon Scha, Lato givs a mavlos accont o th nat/clt divid thogh a long accont o th contovs ov an ai pmp btwnBol and Hobbs (NM, pp. 15-43). Whn ths histoians concld that




‘Hobbs was ight’ to gant victo to th pow o socit ov th alito nat, Lato conts blntl: ‘No, Hobbs was wong’ (NM, p. 26).Dmolishing in advanc th viw that his philosoph qals social constc-

tionism, Lato wits that[Shapin and Scha] o a mastl dconstction o th voltion,dision and poplaization o th ai pmp. Wh, thn, do th notdconstct th voltion, dision and poplaization o ‘pow’ o‘oc’? Is ‘oc’ lss poblmatic than th ai’s sping? I nat andpistmolog a not mad p o tanshistoic ntitis, thn nith ahisto and sociolog—nlss on adopts som athos’ asmmticalpost and ags to b simltanosl constctivist wh nat isconcnd and alist wh socit is concnd […]! Bt it is not v

pobabl that th ai’s sping has a mo political basis than english so-cit itsl […] (NM, p. 27).

This adical split btwn th mchanical lthag o obcts and th tan-scndnt dignit o hman sbcts is th tpical at o th Wst ding th modn piod. Bt in act, th is no adical bak btwn pmod-ns and modns—onl a dinc in scal.

It is not onl ot o aoganc that Wstns think th a adicalldint om oths, it is also ot o dspai, and b wa o sl-pn-ishmnt. Th lik to ightn thmslvs with thi own dstin. Thi voics qav whn th contast Babaians to Gks, o th Cnt toth Piph, o whn th clbat th Dath o God, o th Dath o Man, th eopan Krisis , impialism, anomi, o th nd o th civi-lizations that w know a motal. Wh do w gt so mch plas oto bing so dint not onl om oths bt om o own past? Whatpschologist will b sbtl nogh to xplain o moos dlight in bing in pptal cisis […]? Wh do w lik to tansom small dincs inscal among collctivs into hg damas? (NM, p. 114).

An spposd dinc btwn th ctting-dg Wst and achaic tadi-tional socitis mgs not om som adical tanscndnc that placsgllibl bli with citical dom, bt onl om th vast nmb o act-ants that a mobilizd b th vaios Wstn ntwoks. And ‘whn w sthm as ntwoks, Wstn innovations main cognizabl and impotant,bt th no long sc as th st o saga, a vast saga o adical pt,atal dstin, ivsibl good o bad otn’ (NM, p. 48). Onc w viwth wold as a st o shiting ntwoks involving tials o stngth btwnactants, ath than a adical sl-xiv bak with th naivté o pas-

ants and shamans, w bgin to s th Wst as no mo o lss biza thanan oth assmblag o actants: ‘is Bol’s ai pmp an lss stang thanth Aapsh spiit hoss […]?’ (NM, p. 115). This htoical qstion asksthat w stop dbnking o nmis b displaing thi ignoanc om olot citical tow. As th edinbgh School had alad insistd, w nd



W Hav Nv Bn Modn 61

to giv symmetrical xplanations that tat winns and loss with qal ai-nss: ‘i o want to accont o th bli in ing sacs, mak s oxplanations can b sd, smmticall, o black hols […]. I o claim to

dbnk paapscholog, can o s th sam actos o pscholog […]? I o analz Past’s sccsss, do th sam tms allow o to accont ohis ails […]?’ (NM, p. 93).

I th modns a bad, this is not to sa that th actiona antimod-ns o th ippant postmodns o anthing btt. All th gops anitd in accpting modnit’s claim o a adical schism btwn hmansand things. ‘excpt o th pls o mins signs, modns and antimodnssha all th sam convictions. Th postmodns, alwas pvs, accptth ida that th sitation is indd catastophic, bt th maintain that

it is to b acclaimd ath than bmoand!’ (NM, p. 123). Antimodns,hoid b th wastland o modnit, t to sav whatv can still bsavd: ‘sols, minds, motions, intpsonal lations, th smbolic dimn-sion, hman wamth, local spcicitis […]’ (NM, p. 123). As pal and li-lss as ths sids ma b, th a otn pabl to th comical poso th postmodns and thi xation on th magins, sbvsion, and allthat is oppssd. Sch athos og nti acadmic cas om ‘zzaas [sch as] madnss, childn, animals, popla clt and womn’sbodis’ (NM, p. 100), all d to thi ndlss concssion that modnit hasalad conqd vthing ls. Lato otn dscibs this concssionas ‘an intllctal Mnich’, ing to Nvill Chamblain’s sndo th Czch onti withot a stggl. As h bitingl pts it: ‘Th dnso maginalit pspposs th xistnc o a totalitaian cnt. Bt i thcnt and its totalit a illsions, acclaim o th magins is somwhat i-diclos’. Fo xampl, ‘it is admiabl to dmonstat that th stngth o th spiit tanscnds th laws o mchanical nat, bt this pogam is idi-otic i matt is not at all matial and machins a not at all mchanical’

(NM, p. 124). In a stiing appal, Lato asks his ads: ‘a o not dp with langag gams, and with th tnal skpticism o th dconstc-tion o maning?’ I not, thn o shold b, sinc ‘discos is not a woldnto itsl bt a poplation o actants that mix with things as wll as withsocitis, phold th om and th latt alik, and hold on to thm both’(NM, p. 90).

Th modn split actall maks th wold less intsting, caving pth cosmos into hman sbcts and mchanical obcts, dividd b a BlinWall mad poos onl b a handl o zz o ‘poblmatic’ chckpoints.In th s o th modns, th citical, tanscndnt Wstn is no longa nomal ntit, bt instad a kind o ‘Spock-lik mtant’ (NM, p. 115) dom th nomal lations btwn actos o v kind. Against this dismalcaicat o hman thoght, Lato nlashs a dsvd baag o ot-tn ggs and tomatos:




Havn’t w shd nogh tas ov th disnchantmnt o th wold?Havn’t w ightnd oslvs nogh with th poo eopan whois thst into a cold sollss cosmos, wanding on an int plant in awold dvoid o maning? Havn’t w shivd nogh bo th spcta-cl o th mchanizd poltaian who is sbct to th absolt domina-tion o a mchanizd capitalism and a Kakasq bacac, aban-dond smack in th middl o langag gams, lost in cmnt and o-mica? Havn’t w lt so nogh o th consm who lavs thdiv’s sat o his ca onl to mov to th soa in th TV oom wh his maniplatd b th pows o th mdia and th postindstializd so-cit?! (NM, p. 115).

And in an qall dvastating passag:

Tak som small bsinss-own hsitatingl going at a w maktshas, som conqo tmbling with v, som poo scintist tink-ing in his lab, a lowl ngin picing togth a w mo o lss avo-abl lationships o oc, som sttting and al politician; tnth citics loos on thm, and what do o gt? Capitalism, impialism,scinc, tchnolog, domination—all qall absolt, sstmatic, total-itaian. In th st scnaio th actos w tmbling; in th scond,th a not (NM, pp. 125-6).

Lato is th popht o tmbling actants, as wll as th satiist o all sp-

posd hgmonis and totalitaian codings. In this spct, h is th long-awaitd dsto o th acadmic sanctimon that mo o lss ind m oth. Th postmodn divas hav good ason to wo whn Lato n-ts th hos. Skipping ahad to a passag om Pandora’s Hope : ‘ys, whav lost th wold. ys, w a ov pisons o langag. No, w willnv gain ctaint. No, w will nv gt bond o biass. ys, w willov b stck within o own slsh standpoint. Bavo! enco!’ (PH, p.8). H w ncont th vigoos attitd o a gnin philosoph, as op-

posd to th tdios possional nocs o insights alad won.

B. QuASI-OBjeCTS

Th shak stats o th modn sttlmnt is sn most clal in th mlti-plication o what Lato calls hybrids , o (ollowing Michl Ss) quasi-objects . Whn ading a tpical nwspap aticl, it bcoms vitall impos-sibl to distingish spposd had acts om spposd social constctionso poctions o val. In Lato’s dail nwspap, ‘on pag lvn, th

a whals waing collas ttd with adio tacking dvics; also on paglvn, th is a slag hap in nothn Fanc, a smbol o th xploitationo woks, that has st bn classid as an cological psv bcas o th a oa it has bn osting! On pag twlv, th Pop, Fnch bish-ops, Monsanto, th Fallopian tbs, and Txas ndamntalists gath in a



W Hav Nv Bn Modn 63

stang cohot aond a singl contacptiv’ (NM, p. 2). Th ma b aw pags in Le Monde that dal with politics alon, along with ‘th litaspplmnt in which novlists dlight in th advnts o a w nacissistic

gos (“I lov o… o don’t”)’ (NM, p. 2). Bt th nmb o obvios h-bids is ovwhlming: ‘ozn mbos, xpt sstms, digital machins,snso-qippd obots, hbid con, data banks, pschotopic dgs, whalsotttd with ada sonding dvics, gn snthsizs, adinc analz-s […]’ (NM, pp. 49-50). Ths hbids a a nightma o an attmpt toslic th wold clanl into two pid disticts. Fo this ason, th mod-n position will dlibatl misad thm ‘as a mixt o two p oms’(NM, p. 78, pnctation modid). Bt sch a mixt is impossibl i thtwo p oms do not xist in th st plac. Lato’s hbids a not st

anoth st o zz g aas sitabl as campsits o thos who a ondo th tansgssiv bodlands. Fo o wold contains nothing but hbids,and vn th wod ‘hbid’ mislads s with its als ovtons o a mixto two pistin ingdints. I w call thm qasi-obcts, th wok donb th ‘qasi-’ is to mov an linging hint o solid natal obcts ap-poachd thogh a colol divsit o qall valid cltal standpoints.Th a onl actants: all actants a constctd thogh nmos tialso stngth with oths, and all hav an intimat intgit that patiall -sists an ot to disassmbl thm.

Whil th modns ct th Godian knot in hal, th goal o Lato andhis inds in scinc stdis is to ti th knot (NM, p. 3). H vn givsnams: Donald MacKnzi, Michl Callon, Thomas Hghs (NM, p. 3),and nmos oths ond in contlss passags o his books. This listing o allis b nam is not mant as a show o oc, as whn apps assm-bl hndds o acknowldgmnts on th ackt o a compact disc. Lato’shng o collaboation is th onl attitd consistnt with his vision o howactants opat. O all cnt philosophs, Lato is th most diclt to

imagin withot inds and associats. Whas Hidgg’s Black Fostht was th smbol o monastic commnion btwn on man and Bing it-sl, Lato’s own ht in cntal Fanc is simpl a plasant wok spac naa pond and a castl, sondd b villag nighbos, and opn in pinciplto talkativ gsts. Whas Hidgg snd at th mptinss o con-ncs, Lato sms most at hom in lag acadmic gathings. Thoghth wok o Lato and his allis, ‘scinc stdis hav ocd von tothink anw th ol o obcts in th constction o collctivs, ths chal-lnging philosoph’ (NM, p. 55). I philosoph has not takn p th chal-lng, this tlls s mo abot th cnt stat o o ld than abot thmits o Lato’s position.

W call th paadox o th modn wold that, vn whil claiming to pi th hman and natal zons om ach oth, vn whil holding thm in chast isolation, it has podcd a cod nmb o hbids. Indd,




th wok o pication sms to b th v pcondition o gnating th gatst possibl nmb o hbids, whas ‘b dvoting thmslvs toconciving o hbids, th oth [pmodn] clts hav xcldd thi

poliation’ (NM, p. 12). Althogh w cannot discss Lato’s cnt politi-cal witing h, on o its cntal points is that modn political oms antil bilt on th basis o an antisptic split btwn nat and socit. Against this split, h sggsts ‘that w a going to hav to slow down, -oint and glat th poliation o monsts b psnting thi xis-tnc ociall. Will a dint dmocac bcom ncssa? A dmocacxtndd to things?’ (NM, p. 12).1 Bt th ign o hbids o qasi-obcts isnavoidabl: ‘ndnath th opposition btwn obcts and sbcts, this th whilwind o th mdiatos’ (NM, p. 46).

Postmodn philosoph, with its antialist xcsss, can tll s nothing abot qasi-obcts. Whil scintic alists dop th ‘qasi-’ and wish tospak onl o obcts, th postmodns clbat th ‘qasi-‘ alon. Attndan lct b Bno Lato, and ask osl i his postmodn onnscold honstl sa anthing intsting abot th sam topics: Dida abotth pic o apicots in Pais, Focalt abot soil sampls in th Amazon, oLotad abot bak ails on a nw mto ca pototp.

Whn w a daling with scinc and tchnolog it is had to imag-

in o long that w a a txt that is witing itsl, a discos that isspaking all b itsl, a pla o signis withot signids. It is hadto dc th nti cosmos to a gand naativ, th phsics o sb-atomic paticls to a txt, sbwa sstms to htoical dvics, all so-cial stcts to discos. Th empi o Signs lastd no long than Alxand’s, and l ik Alxand’s it was cavd p and pacld ot toits gnals (NM, p. 64).

Hbids cannot b gaspd ith b scintic alists, th pow-gamso sociolog, o dconstctionists, bcas ‘as soon as w a on th tail

o som qasi-obct, it appas to s somtims as a thing, somtims asa naativ, somtims as a social bond, withot v bing dcd to am bing’ (NM, p. 89). Bt h as in th latd twoold split, th anot th distinct zons ntitld ‘thing’, ‘naativ’, and ‘socit’. At bst,ths a concpts oghl sl in pactical tms o caving p a vasttain o htognos actants. All that matts a actants and th nt-woks that link thm. To ollow a qasi-obct is to tac a ntwok (NM, p.89). Th is nothing ad abot this notion, sinc th bst pocd is‘to look at ntwoks o acts and laws ath as on looks at gas lins o sw-ag pips’ (NM, p. 117).

Lato now minds s o th point om his ali witings that nti-tis a events , inconcivabl in isolation om ntwoks (NM, p. 81). Th a

1. S also Lato’s Politics o Nature .



W Hav Nv Bn Modn 65

not isolatd points o ssnc that nd thogh spac and tim, bt molik trajectories (NM, p. 87). H w nd a tnsion btwn vnts and tac-tois that Lato’s mtaphsics nv ll solvs. An vnt happns in a

singl tim and plac and is ll conct, sinc it cannot b analzd intossntial and inssntial lmnts. This ntails that vn th tinist shit ina thing’s intactions, as alwas occs in v momnt, scs to tans-om an vnt into somthing altogth nw. Whth I mp, nbttonm shit, o los th last hai om m had, m xistnc in ach cas willbcom an ntil dint vnt, sinc Lato lavs no oom to spak o ‘accidntal’ vaiation in th sam nding thing. Fo this ason, vnts activl ozn into thi own absoltl spcic location and st o la-tionships, and cannot possibl nd otsid thm. B contast, th (diva-

tiv) notion o tactois tachs th opposit lsson. Whn considing atacto, w nv nd a thing in a singl tim and plac, bt gt to know itonl b ollowing its bcomings, watching th dtails o its curriculum vita . Wlan o th sccssiv tials om which it mgs ith victoios o stal-matd. And h is th paadox: in on sns, Lato’s obcts a ttlimpisond in a singl instant; in anoth sns, th bst all bondais o spac and tim and tak o on lins o ight towad v nw advnts.

Bt notic that in ith cas, th is no oom o an modl o essence .I w a spaking o instantanos vnts, thn th is no ssntial innco that lis bnath th shiting accidnts o th momnt. And i w aspaking o tactois o tansomations, thn th is still no cptic do-mstic ssnc on th intio o a thing that cold nd acoss tim— h a thing is still ond on th sac o th wold, bt it is now a sacnolding thogh a sccssion o vaios shaps ath than a cinmaticam o absolt spcicit. A ml appant ssnc will gadall con-dns om this gand dama o instantanos points and ing tacto-is; vn onc it cstallizs, th ssnc will hav onl a pagmatic val

in hlping s idnti ctain things as th sam. On th whol, this bil-liant assalt on ssnc and sbstanc is m last avoit aspct o Lato’smtaphsics, and will om th pima tagt o citicism in Pat Two. ytth is anoth sid to Lato’s concpt o ssnc that I am happ to sa-lt: naml, howv limitd th ol o ssnc in his philosoph, h at lastgants it to all ntitis. Instad o viwing inanimat obcts ith as invin-cibl machin-lik liqidatos o as mpt cptacls o hman catgois,Lato tns thm into activ mdiatos: ‘actos ndowd with th capacitto tanslat what th tanspot, to dn it, dplo it, and also to btait. Th ss hav bcom citizns onc mo’ (NM, p. 81). B contast,th Hidggs and Didas gow at on a s conom that lavs scincwith th dit wok o daling with all th bmbling ocks, diamonds, andts that ma b ot th somwh. Fo Lato’s pat, h wants noth-ing to do with sdom: ‘histo is no long simpl th histo o popl, it




bcoms th histo o natal things as wll’ (NM, p. 82). Pt dintl,‘what Sat said o hmans—that thi xistnc pcds thi ssnc— has to b said o all th actants: o th ai’s sping as wll as socit, o mat-

t as wll as consciosnss’ (NM, p. 86). What Lato mans is that th s-snc o a thing slts onl om its pblic pomanc in th wold, andin this spct h dos ag with ctain postmodnist cnts. yt oncan hadl imagin th jdith Btls acknowldging th ‘pomativit’o inanimate obcts as wll as o hman actos. In this wa, Lato stiks atacit blow against v vsion o spch-act tho: what h givs s is notspch-act tho, bt actor-act tho.

Contlss stal dalisms now all b th wasid. Fo instanc, in awold mad p o ntwoks o actants, dos anthing main o th distinc-

tion btwn global and local? ‘I w wand abot insid IBM, i w ollowth chains o command o th rd Am, i w nqi in th coidos o th Minist o edcation, i w std th pocss o slling and bing a bao soap, w nv lav th local lvl. W a alwas in intaction with oo v popl […] th dictos’ convsations sond st lik thos o thmplos…’ (NM, p. 121). Gon is th rd Am command who isssods awlssl applid b th lowl hman masss who sv his whims. Also gon is th classical distinction btwn simpl sbstanc and com-plx agggat: ‘th agggats a not mad om som sbstanc dintom what th a agggating’ (NM, p. 122). Libniz’s mock o a paio diamonds and his cotl spct o a singl diamond, his laght at thDtch east India Compan as a psdo-sbstanc combind with his gatassanc that th hman sol is a sbstanc, mlt awa in Lato’s handsinto an tt dmocac o lvls. Th is not som magic natal statmo th nivs wh all accidnts and combinations all asid to val pnatal nitis known as sbstancs. An black box can b opnd, and in-sid w will nd nothing bt mo black boxs. Fo th sam ason, th is

no paticla lvl wh hmans might stand so as to tanscnd th woldand citicall obsv it, stippd o all naïv bli: ‘b tavsing […] nt-woks, w do not com to st in anthing paticlal homognos. W -main, ath, within an inra-physics ’ (NM, p. 128, mphasis addd). Making s o Libnizian tminolog, Lato sas that ‘w stat om th vinculum [chain] itsl, om passags and lations, not accpting as a stating pointan bing that dos not mg om this lation that is at onc collctiv,al, and discsiv. W do not stat om hman bings, thos latcoms,no om langag, a mo cnt aival still’ (NM, p. 129). Instad, w x-plo th non-modn wold with all its ‘nncios, mdiatos, dlgats, -tishs, machins, gins, instmnts, psntativs, angls, litnants,spokspsons and chbim’ (NM, p. 129), a sntnc on wold nv ndin th collctd woks o Hidgg. W hav nothing bt o tblnt o wold o qasi-obcts, which also mans quasi-subjects (NM, p. 139).



W Hav Nv Bn Modn 67

Accoding to th modn viw, ‘w ma gloi th scincs, pla pow- gams o mak n o th bli in a alit, bt w mst not mix thsth castic acids’ (NM, p. 6). In a batil imag, Lato conts that

th ntwoks tacd b qasi-obcts a ‘ton apat lik th Kds b-twn th Ianians, th Iaqis and th Tks; onc night has alln, thslip acoss bods to gt maid, and th dam o a common homlandthat wold b cavd ot o th th contis which hav dividd thmp’ (NM, pp. 6-7). Abov all it is Kant who ind Kdistan, b cmnt-ing th nstid split btwn hmans and nat: ‘What was a m dis-tinction [btwn nat and hmans] is shapnd into a total spaation,a Copnican rvoltion. Things-in-thmslvs bcom inaccssibl whil,smmticall, th tanscndntal sbct bcoms innitl mot om

th wold’ (NM, p. 56). No matt what vaiations w pla on this thm,whth thogh absobing th spposd things-in-thmslvs back into thhman sbct, o dning that th qstion maks an sns in th stplac, th gap btwn hmans and wold alwas mains pivilgd ovth gaps btwn t and wind, o and cotton. ‘To b s, th SnKing aond which obcts volv will b ovtnd in avo o manoth ptnds—Socit, pistms, mntal stcts, cltal catgois,intsbctivit, langag; bt ths palac voltions will not alt th o-cal point, which I hav calld, o that ason, Sbct/Socit’ (NM, pp.56-7). Opposd to all oms o citical philosoph, Lato also shns anom o dbnking o nmasking. H ss to pack vthing into ththat o th hman sbct, as in rné Giad’s dnial o an al staksin hman conict (NM, p. 45), o th absoption o alit b socit in th‘Stong Pogam’ o th edinbgh school (NM, p. 55).

W alad know o Lato’s distast o th postmodns: ‘I hav notond wods gl nogh to dsignat this intllctal movmnt […] thisintllctal immobilit thogh which hmans and nonhmans a lt to

dit’ (NM, p. 61). Th postmodns ‘accpt th total [modn] division b-twn th matial and tchnological wold on th on hand and th lingis-tic pla o spaking sbcts on th oth’ (NM, p. 61). As th s it, ‘noth-ing has val; vthing is a ction, a simlacm, a oating sign […].Th mpt wold in which th postmodns volv is on th thmslvs,and th alon, hav mptid, bcas th hav takn th modns at thiwod’ (NM, p. 131). Lato xtnds his attack to a wighti tagt whn htaks aim at Hidgg, who is clal gilt o th sam sot o modn splitbtwn Dasin and wold, dspit claims to th conta b his loal man-svants. On shold nv ogt th ollowing litms tst: igno all hto-ic abot alism and idalism, and ask o an philosoph whth it plac-s inanimat lations on th sam ooting as th lations btwn hmanand wold. I not, thn w a still amidst th Copnicans, ll stop. B thiscition, Hidgg sl blongs in thi anks. Fo ‘h and his pigons




do not xpct to nd Bing xcpt along th Black Fost Holzwege . Bing cannot sid in odina bings. evwh, th is dst’ (NM, p. 65). Althogh in m viw (bt not Lato’s) Hidgg is th gatst philosoph

o th past cnt, th a ctainl momnts whn h dsvs to havhis ts slashd. Who dos not gow wa o his gav pomposit o ton,his insabl claim to th mantl o his Ttonizd p-Socatics? Latotats Hidgg with an appopiat dg o sati: ‘h too th gods apsnt: in a hdolctic plant on th banks o th rhin, in sbatomicpaticls, in Adidas shos as wll as in th old woodn clogs hollowd otb hand, in agibsinss as wll as in timwon landscaps, in shopkps’calclations as wll as in Höldlin’s hatnding vs’ (NM, p. 66, pnc-tation altd).

Modnit dgs its pogss accoding to a spcic tho o tim thatLato cts. ‘Th past was th consion o things and mn; th t iswhat will no long cons thm’ (NM, p. 71, mphasis addd). I w ctom th stat an hop o piing two nonxistnt alms, o tho o tim will also nd to chang. In a stl miniscnt o his tach MichlSs, Lato obsvs that ‘instad o a n lamina ow, w will mostotn gt a tblnt ow o whilpools and apids. Tim bcoms vs-ibl instad o ivsibl’ (NM, p. 73). This can asil b sn om a qickglanc at th psnt wold: ‘no on knows an long whth th intodc-tion o th ba in th Pns, kolkhozs, aosols, th Gn rvoltion,th anti-smallpox vaccin, Sta Was, th Mslim ligion, patidg hnt-ing, th Fnch rvoltion, svic indstis, labo nions, cold sion,Bolshvism, lativit, Slovak nationalism, commcial sailboats, and so on,a otmodd, p to dat, tistic, atmpoal, nonxistnt, o pmannt’(NM, p. 74). Tim is mad o spials and vsals, not a owad mach. Allcontis a ‘lands o contast’, mixing dint lmnts om dint p-iods o histo. Th sam is t vn o o own bodis and gntic cods:

‘I ma s an lctic dill, bt I also s a hamm. Th om is thit-v as old, th latt hndds o thosands […]. Som o m gns a500 million as old, oths 3 million, oths 100,000 as, and m hab-its ang in ag om a w das to sval thosand as. As Pég’s Cliosaid, and as Michl Ss pats, ‘w a xchangs and bws o tim’,[…]. It is this xchang that dns s, not th calnda that th modnshad constctd o s’ (NM, p. 75). Whn popl nwappd, th titl We Have Never Been Modern contains th whol o Lato’s philosoph. W havnv bn modn bcas w hav nv all mad a piing split b-twn hmans and wold. Fo this ason, w cannot sa that tim passs intms o ivsibl voltions, bt onl that it whils and ddis accoding to shits in th ntwoks o actants. An actant is an instantanos vnt, btalso a tacto that otstips an givn instant. On this paadoxical not,w can pocd to Pandora’s Hope , Lato’s otstanding book o 1999.







71

4

Pandoa’s Hop

Th chapts containd in Pandora’s Hope a patl nw matial, pat-l wokd aticls dating om as al as 1993. As i witing om LasVgas ath than Pais, Lato sings a bash mdl spanning his ntica, tacing th vaios stps thogh which h had passd b cn-

t’s nd. Th ad listns in: om th constction o scintic actsin th ngl, thogh th ballad o Past and th micobs, to th anti-Copnican hthms o his nonmodnist stl, on to th closing stains o a dmocatic politics o things. yt th book is a nid wok animatd ba powl cntal thm. It also shows Lato in ios combat with hisnmis, condctd with bsts o sadonic wit. Kant’s philosoph is nick-namd ‘th Königsbg boadcast’ (PH, p. 5) and his things-in-thmslvsa dismissd as saing no mo than ‘w a h, what o at is not dst’(PH, p. 6). evn whil spaking o ‘a slow dscnt om Kant to hll’ (PH,p. 21). Lato os backhandd pais, sinc ‘o Kant th was [at last]still somthing that volvd aond this cippld dspot [th hman sbct], a gn plant aond this pathtic sn’ (PH, p. 6). Th postmodnsa mch wos, attd with th acidic ‘Bavo! enco!’ and dscibdas ‘gloating pisons’ (PH, p. 8). Thi vb ‘dconstct’ is dnd as ‘todsto in slow motion’ (PH, p. 8).

Th book is bst ndstood b simpl ction on its titl and sbtitl.Th titl mplos Pandoa’s abld box as a smbol o th ‘black box’ o th

scincs, which Lato has now opnd:[Th box] was tightl sald as long as it maind in th two-clt no-man’s-land […] blissll ignod b th hmanists ting to avoid all thdangs o obctication and b th pistmologists ting to nd o th nl mob. Now that it has bn opnd, with plags and css,




sins and ills whiling aond, th is onl on thing to do, and that isto go vn dp, all th wa down into th almost-mpt box, in odto tiv what, accoding to th vnabl lgnd, has bn lt at thbottom—s, hope (PH, p. 23).

eqall instctiv is th sbtitl o th book, ‘essas on th ralit o Scinc Stdis’. Th wod ‘alit’ h is a ank call o realism in phi-losoph. And thin lis th spis, sinc Lato is otn hld to blivthat alit is constctd b hman socit. H is awa o this ptation,as shown b th sacastic titl o his opning chapt: ‘Do yo Bliv inralit?’ rcting ointl on th titl and sbtitl, Lato aims at a nwalism o intlockd black boxs. Bt his om o alism dis om thamilia kind in at last th was, non o thm spising at o sv

o his ali books.Point 1: Taditional alism sall accpts som ltimat sbstanc,whth it b othwodl xmplas (Plato), conct individal things(Aistotl), God (Agstin, Spinoza), mio-lik monads (Libniz), in-dstctibl phsical matt (Dmocits, Max), o som vaiant o ths. Bt ths sbstancs a ml tatd as th tminal blackbox—a nal statm o alit that can nv b opnd and xamind.Lato’s alism dnis an ltimat statm on which vthing ls isbilt. Th a no black boxs that cannot b opnd, no nal la o sbstanc om which all ls is divd.

Point 2: Along with sbstanc, taditional alism otn dnds th pa-alll notion o ssnc, sinc a sbstanc oght to hav ssntial pop-tis opposd to its accidntal taits o its lations. B contast, Latocognizs no inn sanctm o th thing in which th ssnc cold pos-sibl sid. His actants a alwas pblic, not hmtic.

Point 3: Taditional alism also pts gat stock in th dinc b-twn things and how th a pcivd. Fo Lato, this split ml

lads to a Copnican it btwn things-in-thmslvs and phnom-na. His scap ot is to insist that w a alwas in contact with al-it, vn thogh it sists s in som mann. ralit dos not pla hid-and-sk bhind a vil. Things lat to on anoth, tanslat into onanoth, and a nv ot o mtal contact.

Th mtaphsics o Pandoa’s box givs s a dmocatic nivs o actos.Whth an acto is phsical o pl dlsional, it ngags in tials o stngth with th oths. ev acto can b opnd to val its compo-

nnts, as long as w pom th ncssa labo. Th is no nal ina-stct o alit that dcs th st to m idological spstct. An acto has no ssntial inn co spaatd b a colossal gap om its tiv-ial ncstations, o om its lations with oth things. This list o pinci-pls will alad b nogh o som obsvs to dn Lato’s claim to b



Pandoa’s Hop 73

a alist. Fo m own pat I am inclind to gant him th titl, with a singlsvation that will bcom impotant ding th scond hal o this book.

A. CIrCuLATING reFereNCeLato’s phas ‘ciclating nc’ capts th whol o his mtaphsi-cal position, which placs th tagic gap o sbct and obct with a singlplan o contlss dling actos. W hav sn th absolt qalit o thsactos, which cannot b sggatd into gnin solid atoms on on sid andm gmnts o hman bings on th oth. Lato povids a n xam-pl in his lngth cas histo o Fédéic joliot, son-in-law o th Cis,and in his da on o th wold’s lading athoitis on adioactiv chmis-

t (PH, pp. 80-92). joliot and his collags gappl with anim ssionin thi laboato, ting to calclat th avag nmb o ntons -lasd whn anim is bombadd. Bt anim is not thi onl concn.Thi stdis lad thm towad so-calld ‘hav wat’, which is podcdin scint qantitis onl b th m Nosk Hdo eltisk; whn its ac-to lat alls nd Nazi occpation, w will nd that ‘somon who want-d nothing bt a Nobl Piz [sts] abot oganizing a commando opationin Nowa’ (PH, p. 89). At th sam tim, th joliot tam nts tick n-gotiations with a mining compan in th Blgian Congo, which will sppl

th anim o thi xpimnts. Simltanosl, th a gd b thphsicist Lo Szilad to sppss thi ndings o a that Nazi o Sovitscintists ma b among thi ads. joliot mst sk th nancial sppoto cabint minist raol Dat, and mst also do withot his oign as-sistants Halban and Kowaski, who as alins a bi xcldd om thlab as potntial spis.

Taditional histo o scinc, lik taditional alism in gnal, woldsplit this sto clanl in two: ‘pl political o conomic actos wold

b addd to pl scintic ons’ (PH, p. 90). Bt joliot’s sto is on, nottwo. It is t that anim is a al acto otsid joliot’s contol: it will not ild its scts withot xactl th ight point o attack, and vn thn itwill statl him with ndlss spiss. yt th sam is t o th Blgianand Nowgian indstial ms, Lo Szilad, th Fnch minist, and thGman sntis gading th hav wat plant. Th is not som ‘pa-alllogam o ocs’ in which p stats o aais in nat a thn l-td o shapd b social actos (PH, p. 133). Th is not som ‘gttablintmixing o two p gists’ (PH, p. 90). Sinc ntons, dtim,

and paan a no mo o lss al than minists and spis, th st stpshold b to reuse to distingish btwn ths things. Lato’s position ‘- cts […] th nti sach pogam that wold t to divid th sto o joliot into two pats […]’ (PH, p. 84).

Lato viws his position as an nichd vsion o alism. Bt




taditional alists wold call it an npntant om o social constction-ism. Th asons o this dispait a intsting. Fo Lato, w cannotbgin with a natalistic standpoint that assms th wold is bilt o tin

phsical paticls with all ls dcing ltimatl to matial intaction. Atth otst, th philosoph has no ida what is al and what is nal. Tomov this pplxit b spaating a pivilgd cast o al matial nti-tis om a hod o hman-mad gmnts amonts, o Lato, to a om o idalism. It placs th pzzling nat o an acto, so call nlockdthogh divs tials o stngth, with an a priori dogma abot th nato th al. This is wh a gnal mtaphsics o actos looks to Lato likth onl gnin om o alism. A tho that dos not tat Fédéic joliotand Nosk Hdo eltisk in th sam wa as paan might b materialism,

bt it cannot possibl b realism. Thogh matialism is sall viwd as thalist philosoph pa xcllnc, it is in act a covt idalism that placsth mst o actos with th dogmatic idea o an xtndd phsical st l-ing at th oot o vthing.

Bt Lato stiks a a lag tagt than matialism. evn Libniz,who was no matialist, maks a simila distinction btwn natal monadsand aticial agggats. In th Libnizian sstm joliot and Dat woldb gantd monads lik all oth hmans, bt th sam wold not b to anim atoms (m ‘chains’ o monads), lt alon actois and a-nim mins (m ‘agggats’). rits o this kind xist in nmos phil-osophical alists bsids Libniz. Thi main cition o alit alwassms to b th natal as opposd to th aticial. Bt th waknss o thisstandad is clal displad in th cas o pltonim: althogh aticial-l catd b hmans and nv ond in nat, it is a chmical lmntv bit as al as lad o gold. Th act that somthing is catd b h-man atic dos not dpiv it o alit, as Docto Fanknstin qicklland. On this point Lato’s agmnt is complling, and dos not sc

to an him th labl o an ‘antialist’. Good alism actall qis thatw not dc th nmb o actos b mans o som dogmatic plimi-na standad. Fo this ason w shold not hsitat in ndosing Lato’sw omlation that ‘Goldn Montains, phlogiston, nicons, bald kingso Fanc, chimas, spontanos gnation, black hols, cats on mats, andoth black swans and whit avns will all occp th sam spac-tim asHamlt, Pop, and ramss II’ (PH, p. 161).

yt th is anoth point on which th nas o taditional alistsstiks clos to th hat o Lato’s sstm. Fo sch alists, alit is not st takn to b natal o phsical, bt is also takn to xist ‘whth wlik it o not’. ralit is indpndnt o hman pcption, not catd b it,and will sviv th xtmination o all hmans and all oth animals. Andin pincipl, thogh taditional alists nv sm to ca mch abot thispoint, alit shold b indpndnt vn o its ct on oth sonding



Pandoa’s Hop 75

inanimat things. This is th only point wh Lato might sm to had o in an antialist diction, sinc what h os is a alism o lations, noto non-lational obcts ling bnath thi intactions with th nvion-

mnt. Against th taditional gst o isolating th al om all its distot-ing associations, Lato holds that a thing bcoms incasingl al the more associations it has. H is ctainl not a ll-blown antialist, sinc h al-lows obcts to do mo wok than phnomnologists o philosophs o lan-gag pmit. In m viw h is vn mo o a alist than th scintic nat-alists a, sinc h dos not bgin b dning all alitis ot o xistncoth than clods o phsical matt. H is clal no social constctionist,sinc anim and paan constct joliot’s xistnc v bit as mch asFnch socit molds and shaps thm in tn. Bt Lato is dnitl a re-

lationist , and sinc lational philosophis otn hold that hman lingistico social stcts do all th wok o lation, it is ndstandabl wh hisposition is consd with ths oths. rlationism, th viw that a thing isdnd soll b its cts and alliancs ath than b a lonl inn knlo ssnc, is th paadoxical hat o Lato’s position, sponsibl o allhis bakthoghs and possibl xcsss.

Th is a wothwhil philosophical dbat to b had ov this point. Itma b that lationism is nstid. It ma b (as I msl hold) that mta-phsics demands a distinction btwn th inn alit o a thing and its -lations with oth ntitis. yt it is not possibl to sid h with Lato’s op-ponnts, who commit th obvios blnd o assigning alit and lationto two spcic kinds o ntitis: th natal obct and th hman sbct,spctivl. In oth wods, taditional alism thinks that nat is pllacd with obctiv alit, and th obsving hman bing imposs alslational poctions onto this alit, which th nlightnd pson mstpocd to dbnk and dnonc. Nat dos all th wok o alit, andclt dos all th wok o distotion. Bt vn i somon wishs to op-

pos Lato’s lationism with a it btwn th inn hat o a thing andits manistations to oth things (as I do), this chasm still cannot b a sn-onm o a cosmic gap ling btwn wold and hmans alon. It cannot bonl hmans who podc this dalism, o w hav lapsd into th mostdismal at o modnit. B ting to appotion alit and lationsalong th hman/wold divid, taditional alists gant too mch pow tohman bings b giving thm th niq soc’s pow o distoting thwold. Lato abolishs this mistak onc and o all, b giving all actos anqal kind o pow: th pow to lat and assmbl. Lt thos who attackLato attack him o lationism, and not on als chags o antialismand social constctionism.

W hav sn that th pivilgd it btwn wold and hmans is, oLato, th most gttabl at o modnit. As h otn dclas, ‘thphilosoph o langag maks it sm as i th xist two disointd sphs




spaatd b a niq and adical gap that mst b dcd to th sach ocospondnc […] btwn wods and th wold’ (PH, p. 69). Mch likWhithad, Lato agmnts this gap to innit, placing it vwh in

th wold. evwh, th nivs is iddld with gaps. Bt th a b nomans nbidgabl, sinc th a cossd constantl b th wok o tans-lation. In Chapt Two o Pandora’s Hope , Lato givs s a tpicall wond-l cas std: a tip to th Amazon to obsv a dispt ov whth a sc-tion o th ngl is cding om th savannah o advancing towad it (PH,pp. 24-79). H w nd a pct cas o ‘scinc in action’. At no point inth sto is th tth o th ngl visibl incanat at a glanc. O knowl-dg o it mgs onl thogh a long chain o mdiating actos, whthintllctal o pl manal. Fist, th a th satllit maps that tans-

lat aw Amazon landscap into a sis o accssibl colod shaps. Thmap tnds to oll p i not pssd down ml b papwights o hands,which thb bcom scintic instmnts. Th ts in th ngl mstb labld with nmbs. Th soil mst b compad with colos on po-tabl chats and vn moldd with th hands and sbctivl dgd: is it‘sand cla’ o ‘cla sand’? (PH, p. 63). Finall, th soil and plant samplsmst b phsicall movd om thi natal contxt and takn to th nivsit o th tsts. I th a gaps in th agmnt o th scintists,thi aticl ma nv appa in pint. Bt th sam will b t i th pcashs on th homwad div and spills th sampls, i a milita coplands th sachs in pison, o i a calss inslt lads to bokn ind-ships among th co-athos. Th chain o mdiatos can b intptd atan point: intllctal, phsical, political, o moal. Whv th bak oc-cs, it will ct th nbokn lctic cicit that th sach qis.

using th sam tm mplod b Hidgg to spak o pots, Latosas that th tth o whth th ngl is advancing o cding is insti-tuted ( gestitet , in Hidgg’s Gman) b this lngth chain o actos. Th

is nv an immdiat visibilit o th act, bt onl a sis o mdiations,ach o thm tanslating a mo complicatd alit into somthing whosocs can mo asil b passd down th lin. Thogh a skptic mightclaim that ths mdiatos a m tnsils that can b tossd asid atth nd, th is no sch thing as tanspot withot tansomation. Tthis nothing but a chain o tanslation withot smblanc om on acto toth nxt. To ocs onl on th nd-points is to distot th maning o tth.Philosophs hav takn sbct and obct, th two xtmitis o th chain,‘o th nti chain, as i th had tid to ndstand how a lamp and aswitch cold ‘cospond’ to ach oth at ctting th wi […]’ (PH, p.73). This is th maning o ‘ciclating nc’. As Lato pts it, ‘whnw sa that Past spaks tthll abot a al stat o aais, w no lon-g ask him to mp om wods to wold. [Instad,] w sa somthing mchlik ‘downtown xpsswa moving smoothl this moning’ […]’ (PH, p.



Pandoa’s Hop 77

149). W do not gain accss to alit b sbtacting th las o distot-ing pcption addd to th wold, bt onl b increasing th nmb o m-diatos: ‘as i the more lters there were the clearer the gaze was […]’ (PH, p. 137).

Tth is bst dscibd not b th optical o pictoial mtapho o coping at stat o aais in o mind, bt b an ‘indstial’ mtapho. Fo ‘whn[…] a stdnt o indst insists that th hav bn a mltitd o tans-omations and mdiations btwn th oil tappd dp in th gologicalsams o Sadi Aabia and th gas I pt into th tank o m ca om th oldpmp in th littl villag o jalign in Fanc, th claim to alit o th gasis in no wa dcasd’ (PH, p. 137). Fo modn philosoph, all th pob-lms o tanslation occ at th singl citical point wh hman mtswold. Bt o Lato, tanslation is biqitos: an lation is a mdiation,

nv som pistin tansmission o data acoss a noislss vacm. WhilDscats ttd ov th gap btwn mind and bod, Lato is closto Malbanch and his Aab ancstos, who ndd God to nabl vnth collision o gains o dst—sinc h too th was a gap, thogh noton btwn minds and bodis. Instad o calling on divin intvntion,Lato nds his mdiatos locall. Fo it was Joliot who connctd ntonswith politics: ‘it is onl bcas o joliot’s wok that this connction has bnmad’ (PH, p. 92). Two actos a alwas mdiatd b a thid; this is thltimat lsson o th ciclation o nc. This ‘local occasionalism’ inLato maks an impotant bakthogh in mtaphsics, and will b dis-cssd in mo dtail in Pat Two.

Lato’s concpt o th ciclation o nc ntails his dmocaticmtaphsics o actos, ach spaatd om th oth b a gap as wid as thatbtwn hman and wold, ach sving as a mdiato o tanslato thatlavs no mssag ntansomd. His pima nm is Kant’s Copnicanrvoltion, with its salto mortale o dadl lap om insid to otsid, citi-cizd so ocll b William jams (PH, pp 73-4). Lato holds instad that

th pilos lap occs not onc, bt constantl, and that it is not alwas sopilos. This also changs o concption o th taditional matt/omdistinction. Instad o assigning matt to on kind o ntit (nat) andom to anoth kind (hmans), Lato globalizs th distinction. ev ac-to now lls both ols at onc:

w load th pcios cadboad boxs containing th athwoms p-svd in omaldhd, and th natl taggd littl bags o ath, intoth p […]. Fom th staant-laboato w st ot o anoth labo-ato a thosand kilomts awa, in Manas, and om th to jssiunivsit in Pais, anoth six thosand kilomts awa […]. As I havsaid, ach stag is matt o what ollows and om o what pcds it,ach spaatd om th oth b a gap as wid as th distanc btwnthat which conts as wods and that which conts as things (PH, p. 74).

Among thos philosophis that Lato accss o inocing th bad niq




gap btwn hman and wold is phnomnolog, a school o which h haslittl smpath. Fo ‘phnomnolog dals onl with th wold-o-a-hman-consciosnss’. And thogh it ‘will [claim to] tach s a lot abot how w

nv distanc oslvs om what w s, how w nv gaz at a distantspctacl, how w a alwas immsd in th wold’s ich and livd txt[…] w will nv b abl to scap om th naow ocs o hman intn-tionalit’. And this ‘lavs s with th most damatic split in this whol sadsto: a wold o scinc lt ntil to itsl, ntil cold, absoltl inh-man; and a ich livd wold o intntional stancs ntil limitd to h-mans, absoltl divocd om what things a in and o thmslvs’ (PH,p. 9). Lato’s obction to phnomnolog, naml, is its appant dcito realism. H maks a simila complaint, and with vn mo stic, abot

th scintic natalism that opposs Dscats’ mind/wold dalism witha singl al wold o phsical ocs:

Wh not choos th opposit soltion and ogt th mind-in-a-vat alto-gth? Wh not lt th ‘otsid wold’ invad th scn, baking thglasswa, spill th bbbling liqid, and tn th mind into a bain,into a nonal machin sitting insid a Dawinian animal stggling o its li? […]. No, bcas th ingdints that mak p this ‘na-t’, this hgmonic and all-ncompassing nat, which wold nowincld th hman spcis [as wll], a th very same ones that hav con-stittd th spctacl o a wold viwd om insid th bain-in-a-vat.Inhman, dctionist, casal, law-lik, ctain, obctiv, cold, nani-mos, absolt—all ths xpssions do not ptain to nat as such ,bt [onl] to nat as viwd thogh th doming pism o th glass vssl (PH, pp. 9-10).

Th ason phnomnolog is not alist nogh o Lato is that it back-ts th wold and ocss on a dsciption o what appas to hman con-sciosnss, ltting scinc dal with th nonhman alm b mans o a

casal tho on which no th light is shd. Natalism is also not al-ist nogh, bcas it ml dnis sch backting and sbmits poignanthman motions to th sam matialist tatmnt as ntons and paa-n. Fll-blown idalism is obviosl not alist nogh, sinc it ml ipsnatalism psid-down and impisons phsical alit in th sph o h-man pcption. As dint as ths th positions might sm, all shath sam basic mistak. Naml, all wok within th amwok o th mod-nist pication, in which th a xactl two possibl kinds o bing: hman consciosnss and mchanical clockwok casation. Th di

onl b vaiosl aming this split and handing ot on slic o alit toach tp o bing, o b attmpting to dc hmans ntil to natalcass, o natal cass ntil to appaancs in hman consciosnss.This is th sam pacling ot o Alxand’s empi, th sam violation o a nitd Kdistan, that w ncontd in We Have Never Been Modern. Non



Pandoa’s Hop 79

o ths positions a alist nogh, bcas non o thm gant individ-al obcts an alit. Lato stl taks pid in th altnativ position o ‘scinc stdis’, th nam h ss in Pandora’s Hope o his own mtaphs-

ics. In Lato’s philosoph ‘alism now tns in oc’, and th chaptso his book ‘shold look lik milstons along th ot to a mo “alisticalism”’ (PH, p. 15). Pt dintl, ‘alism coms back lik blood thoghth man vssls now attachd b th clv hands o th sgons […].No on [shold] vn think o asking th biza qstion “Do o blivin alit?”—at last not o asking us !’ (PH, p. 17). And nall, ‘it shold b-com cla how v nalistic most o th philosophical discssions abotalism hav bn’ (PH, p. 24). Th tim has com to look a bit mo clos-l at what Lato dscibs as his mo alistic alism. Fo in a spising

stp, Lato coms to idnti alit with relations .

B. A reALISM OF reLATIONS

Th tanslation modl o tth nds th cospondnc tho impos-sibl. Accoding to th cospondnc vsion, knowldg in th hmanmind copis a alit otsid it, with th sal poviso that this coping canonl b ‘asmptotic’ and nv aiv ntil at its goal. Pogss in knowl-dg wold man making incasingl accat copis o th wold, st as

impovd camas giv v mo alistic imags o what th dpict. Bti v lation is a tanslation ath than a cop, thn th optical modlails. Th dsciption o a win dos not ‘smbl’ that win, bt amassswods and mtaphos o vaios individal histois in od to vok som-thing lik th style o th win. Fancis Pakman’s histo o Qbc dosnot ‘smbl’ th al vnts an mo than lss intsting histois o thsam topic do. Th gas in jalign dos not ‘smbl’ th oil tappd dp in Aabian sss; it has ml taind somthing o that oil, a kind o nectar

o th oil xpssd in tms comphnsibl to th intnal combstion n-gin. Now, it is otn blivd that abandoning th cospondnc thoo tth ntails th abandonmnt o alism as wll. To ttison th modl o tth as a cop, ptting in its plac a modl o tanslations, appantl lavsno oom to dg on tanslation as spio to anoth. I th is no co-spondnc btwn knowldg and wold, it might sm that ‘anthing gos’. Bt this conclsion dos not ollow. Th can still b btt o wostanslations, st as th can b limitlss Fnch vsions o Shakspa o vaing angs o qalit. Bt h th mtapho sms to bak down: at

all, th all is an oiginal txt o Shakspa (thogh philologists hava had tim stablishing it) and b analog w might hold that th is alsoan oiginal wold that is th sbct o all tanslation b actos. Bt sch anotion maks a poo t with Lato’s lationism. Th analog with Latowold appantl wok onl i Shakspa’s txt xistd onl at th momnt




o bing tanslatd and w in act dnd b that v tanslation. Sincthis hadl sms lik a alist tho o mind-indpndnt alit, it is asto ndstand wh obctions to Lato might still ais om mainstam

alists. I lav this iss o an oiginal, ntanslatd alit to th scondhal o th book.Lato’s lationism is cla nogh. unlik o taditional alism,

things a not al b bing lss connctd with oths, bt bcom mo alth mo th a linkd with allis. Whil spaking o Past’s micobs,Lato maks ionicall that ‘w imagin micobs mst hav a sbstancthat is a littl bit more than th sis o its histoical manistations. W mab ad to gant that th st o [its] pomancs alwas mains insid thntwoks […] bt w cannot sppss th ling that th sbstanc tavls

with w constaints than th pomancs’ (PH, p. 167). This ling o sbstanc as ‘somthing a littl bit mo’ is pcisl what Lato opposs.echoing Whithad, Lato sas that his position ‘dos not docmnt thtavl through tim o an alad xisting substance ’ (PH, p. 162). A thing is notspaat om its lations, and in act ‘ach lmnt is to b dnd b itsassociations and is an vnt catd at the occasion o ach o thos associa-tions’ (PH, p. 165, mphasis addd). Th ollows a list o somtims shock-ing xampls: ‘this is t o th lactic acid mnt, as wll as o th cito ron, th empo, th laboato on th d’ulm, God, and Pastand Pocht’s own standing, pscholog, and psppositions’ (PH, p. 165).God is not incldd on th list accidntall, o in a passing ippant momnt.Lato’s Catholicism dos not compl him to think o God as an nding sbstanc an mo than th oth actos, no dos h spct ‘th modns’pathtic notion o a God-o-bond’ (PH, p. 267). Lato givs s not st amtaphsics o actos, bt o actos that com to bith onl on the occasion o thi associations. Insoa as ths associations shit constantl in both tinand voltiona was, w hav actos that pptall pish ath than

nd. Th sam notion ld Whithad to qat his ‘actal ntitis’ with‘actal occasions ’, a tm mant to mphasiz thi tt tansinc, thi t-t xhastion b a spcic st o lations to th wold that dos not ndo long than a ash. All o this clal links both Whithad and Latowith th gat and ndatd tadition o occasionalist philosoph sttch-ing om mdival Iaq to Bkl. Bt whil occasionalism viwd God asa niq pilla o ganit, an nilding sbstanc amidst th constant dis-intgation o oth ntitis, th dvot Lato dos not xmpt vn GodHimsl om th iv o alliancs.

An acto is not a sbstanc, bt a kind o xplo tsting what canand cannot b withstood. ‘An ntit is sch an xploation, sch a siso vnts, sch an xpimnt […]. I Pocht accpts th xpimnts o his advsa bt loss th Acadm and gains th popla anti-stablish-mnt pss, his ntit, spontanos gnation, will b a dierent ntit. It is



Pandoa’s Hop 81

not a singl sbstanc spanning th nintnth cnt nchangd’ (PH, p.162-3). Spaking qall o himsl, Lato sas that ‘Past is a good pag-matist: o him ssnc is xistnc and xistnc is action’ (PH, p. 123). As

w ad on pag ali: ‘in his laboato in Lill Past is designing anactor [… H] dsigns tials o th acto to show its mttl. Wh is an actodnd thogh tials? Bcas th is no oth wa to dn an acto btthogh its action, and th is no oth wa to dn an action bt b ask-ing what oth actos a modied, transormed, perturbed, or created b th cha-act that is th ocs o attntion’ (PH, p. 122, mphasis addd). And again,‘th accac o [a] statmnt is not latd to a stat o aais ot th, btto a tacabilit o a sis o tansomations’ (PH, p. 123). And nall:

Th wod ‘sbstanc’ dos not dsignat ‘what mains bnath’, imp-

vios to histo, bt what gaths togth a mltiplicit o agnts intoa stabl and cohnt whol. A sbstanc is mo lik th thad thatholds th pals o a ncklac togth than th ock bd that mainsth sam no matt what is bilt on it […]. Sbstanc is a nam that ds-ignats th stability o an assmblag (PH, p. 151).

Allding to a mo taditional tminolog, Lato dismisss thos who‘want to hav a sbstanc in addition to attibts’ (PH, p. 151). H h im-plicitl sids with th tadition o Bitish mpiicism and its notion that ‘sb-

stanc’ is nothing bt a bndl o qalitis, and against th phnomnologi-cal viw that stats with nid obcts and ss attibts as divativ.Indpndnc is not th stating point o isolatd individal things, bt thnd slt o a long sis o tansomations: ‘th mo Pasteur woks, thmo independent is th sbstanc on which h woks […]. W do not simplwant to sa that th mnt is [both] constctd and al as all atiactsa, bt that it is more al ater bing tansomd, as i, ncannil, thw mo oil in Sadi Aabia bcas th is mo gas in th tank o mca’ (PH, p. 138).

Dspit sch maks, it shold b cla wh Lato is not a social con-stctionist holding that th wold is mallabl cla sbctd to th whimso a might hman socit. At all, ntons and govnmnts both sist joliot, st as mnts and nwspaps sist Past. Hmans both shape and a shaped by oth actos, no mo o lss than th shap on anoth.I th is a point wh Lato dviats om th sal alist spiit, it lisnith in his spposd pnc o hman socit ov th ‘obctiv -alit’ o stons, no in his actal ction o th sbct/obct dalism, btonl in his viw that a thing is dnd ntil b its lations. This lation-ist tho cts against th gain o common sns, which ams a wold o nchanging phsical solids occasionall shovd aond b tansint hmanwhim. Bt mtaphsics is not th handmaid o common sns. And th-mo, common sns itsl is nothing bt th sdimntation o a dbios andmdioc mtaphsics. Th ondation o this wat alism is th notion




o obctiv ‘stats o aais’, in which al dabl things sit aond in thnivs whth w lik it o not, and sit aond in th sam wa whthth a obsvd b Past, Libig, o no on at all. This is th sam con-

cpt that Hidgg citicizd nd th nam o Vorhandenheit , o psnc-at-hand. Lat in this book, I will sggst that this ida o obctiv phsicalstats o aais is satatd with an vn mo ntnabl om o lationismthan th on Lato advocats. This maks Lato’s lationism an ‘obliga-to passag point’ o psnt-da mtaphsics (PH, p. 191). Fo th aonl two options h: w can ith accpt Lato’s lational dnitions o actos, o ps a vivd tho o sbstanc apat om all its lations.Bt vn i w choos th latt option, it will tn ot that commonsnsmatialism is not o scint qalit to do th ob.

Boowing an apt i cololss pic o tminolog om Whithad,Lato now spaks o ‘popositions’. Nomall popositions blong to thphilosoph o langag, as statmnts b a hman sbct abot an otsidwold. Bt o Lato, ‘popositions a not statmnts, o things, o an soto intmdia btwn th two. Th a, st o all, actants. Past, thlactic acid mnt, th laboato a all popositions’ (PH, p. 141). Whiloccasionalism mad God th sol mdiato btwn v last intactionin th nivs, Lato distibts this divin pow to Fédéic joliot andv oth acto in th cosmos. W hav sn that Lato is pobabl thst think in histo to invnt a local option o occasional cas—on notpassing thogh God (as in al-Ash‘ai, Malbanch, and vn Whithad)o th hman mind (as whn Hm and Kant tn hman habit o catgo-is into th sat o all lations). In m viw, this is Lato’s singl gat-st bakthogh in mtaphsics, on that will b associatd with his namo cntis to com. As h pts it, ‘[popositions] a not positions, things,sbstancs, o ssncs ptaining to a nat mad p o mt obcts ac-ing a talkativ mind, bt occasions givn to dint ntitis to nt into con-

tact’ (PH, p. 141). In this nw occasionalism it is joliot ath than God whobings ntons and politics into nion, and oth local mdiatos that bing an two ntitis into contact.

Occasions ‘allow th ntitis to modi thi dnitions ov th coso an vnt’ (PH, p. 141) and this is what Lato mans b a poposition.ev acto is a poposition: a spising maiag o componnts that nvxpctd to nd thmslvs togth, o which w at last spisd b thxact nat o thi nion. And ‘th lation stablishd btwn poposi-tions is not that o a cospondnc acoss a awning gap, bt what I willcall articulation’ (PH, p. 142). Sinc aticlation dos not occ acoss a gap,bt is ml th impovd aticlation o a contact alad in plac, whav an intsting sitation in which things mst alad b in lation b-o that lation is btt aticlatd. ev aticlation aiss om a p- vios aticlation, not ex nihilo. Past and Pocht aticlat something in



Pandoa’s Hop 83

thi thois: not an ndling sbstanc, bt an ali poposition thatwas not as wll aticlatd as th on th will soon cat. Ndlss to sa,it is not onl hmans who do this. It is diclt to nd an social constc-

tionism in th ollowing passag b Lato: ‘instad o bing th pivilgo a hman mind sondd b mt things, aticlation bcoms a vcommon popt o popositions, in which man kinds o ntitis can pa-ticipat’ (PH, p. 142). H w can sal plac ‘man ntitis’ with ‘all n-titis’, sinc Lato sl dos not st wish to add intllignt whals andmonks to th list whil xclding clmps o mtallic o. Th aticla-tion o popositions is clal mant as a gnal mtaphsics o lations.‘Popositions do not hav th xd bondais o obcts. Th a spis-ing vnts in th histo o oth ntitis. Th mo aticlation th is, th

btt’ (PH, p. 143). Actos o Lato a both hman and nonhman, last-ing onl as long as thi allianc nds, mo al th mo alliancs thhav, and linkd onl thogh anoth acto capabl o tanslating on intotms o th oth.

W hav sn that Lato’s poond commitmnt to lations as thst o th wold ns cont to common sns and mainstam scincalik. It taks a adacit to call onsl a alist whil still tting stat-mnts o th ollowing kind: ‘“Did mnts xist bo Past discovdthm?” Th is no avoiding th answ: “No, th did not xist boh cam along”—an answ that is obvios, natal, and vn, as I willshow commonsnsical!’ (PH, p. 145). Whatv th htoical val o thispassag, vn a sppot o Lato’s lationism wold hav to con-cd that th is nothing ‘obvios’, ‘natal’, o ‘commonsnsical’ abotth doctin. Indd, its ntil nobvios and nnatal chaact givsit mch o its shocking appal to thos who phold it. Bt Lato’s motivh is obviosl not a wish to allow th hman mind to cat alit omscatch. Instad, it is his commitmnt to lations that maks him sa that

th mnt is a poposition ath than a sbstanc, and that a poposi-tion qis mltipl actos. Th on bafing point is that Lato has al-ad amd that popositions blong not st to Past and his llowhmans, bt to ‘man’ kinds o actos, b which h sl mans ‘all’ actos.I Past and th st o hmankind w xtminatd, nmos actoswold still main on th scn; psmabl, vaios matials wold con-tin to mnt in o absnc. Bt th al point o Lato is that thsincidnts wold b dint popositions, sinc Past and o pastizdmodn socit wold no long b involvd in thm. Th might b ‘pop-ositions’ linking chmicals with oth chmicals and with woodn bals,long at th gat ncla holocast dstos all hmans. yt vn sch ac-tos wold not b obctiv stats o aais, sinc th wold b ll dt-mind b thi associations with ach oth.

Ths viws lad Lato to a toactiv tho o tim that is anthing




bt obvios and natal. H holds that th t alit o an momnt intim is not somthing that slmbs bnath its sac aticlations; ath,th momnt is incanatd in thos v aticlations. To think th past o

Lato mans to podc an altnat vsion o th past retroactively, a timthat nv all xistd at th momnt in qstion:

It is now possibl o Past to ndstand tospctivl what am-ing and indst hav bn doing all along with knowing it […]. Sowing gms in a clt mdim is th aticlation b Past o what oth-s bo him, not ndstanding what it was, namd disas, invasion,o mishap […]. Past reinterpreted th past pactics o mntation asmbling aond in th dak with ntitis against which on cold nowpotct onsl (PH, p. 169).

This pshs Lato into a spising sis o maks abot histoical tim,maks that will onl conm (ndstandabl, thogh wongl) th viwthat h is a social constctionist. ‘What Past did was to podc in 1864a nw vsion o th as 1863, 1862, 1861, which now incldd a nw l-mnt: “micobs oght nwittingl b alt and haphazad pactics”’(PH, p. 169). jst as eopans thoght th histo o Gman clt ol-lowing Aschwitz, Past ‘retrotted th past with his own micobiolog: th a 1864 that was bilt ater 1864 did not hav th sam componnts, tx-

ts, and associations as th a 1864 podcd during 1864’ (PH, p. 170).Bt to pat, an obctions to ths viws shold b aimd at thioot: Lato’s mtaphsics o lations. His point is not that ‘histo is what-v w mak o it b pocting o own slsh vals onto it’. His point isthat 1864, lik an oth a, is a ll aticlatd vnt withot an cp-tic svoi o indpndnt alit that had pviosl lain nxpssd. At all, Lato’s lationist mtaphsics ls ot sch an option om thstat. Hnc, i a nw 1864 is nathd b Past’s discovis, this can-not b bcas it was alwas alad psnt at th tim and is now ml

nvild bo th mind. Instad, th nw 1864 can onl b a nw proposi-tion, in which Past’s micobs intact with a past a b ading it inmicobial tms. Th poblm h is that Lato ocss on a human acto,Past. I w xtnd popositions to all actos, as Lato himsl lswhintnds, this mans that th w oth aticlations o 1864 during 1864 it-sel o which humans w simpl not awa at th tim. Micobs ma havxistd in th a 1800, intlockd in popositions with win and both,and vn with hman bodis, thogh not with th hman mdical knowl-dg o th tim. Fo hmans to bcom aware o th micobs dos qia nw poposition, on that links Past with thos past inanimat vnts. And Past will invaiabl modi o tanspot thos vnts in th coso th poposition, sinc that is what all actos mst do.

Thogh Lato claims that his viws on tim a both obvios and com-monsnsical, his shocking conclsions mass v mo havil as th chapt



Pandoa’s Hop 85

pocds. His mtaphsics o lations ocs him into a twoold tho o tim, now split into ‘lina’ and ‘sdimnta’ kinds. In his own wods, ‘a a shold b dnd along two axs, not st on. Th st axis gists

th lina dimnsion o tim […] in that sns 1864 happns beore 1865. Btthis is not all th is to sa abot th a 1864 […]. Th is also a potiono what happnd in 1864 that is podcd ater 1864 and mad tospc-tivl a pat […] o what happnd in 1864’ (PH, p. 172). And th, ‘i wskip owad 130 as, th is still a a 1864 “o 1998” […] mab [in-clding] a complt vision o th dispt in which, vntall, Pocht isth winn bcas h anticipatd som slts o pbiotics’ (PH, p. 172). I o l osl sisting this stang conclsion, Lato sas that o -sistanc is th slt o ‘a v simpl consion’ (PH, p. 172) btwn lina

and sdimnta tim. At th sam tim, h dnis that his tho amontsto ‘an absd om o idalism, sinc most o th sdimnta sgmnts o th a 1864 do incld aibon gms. It is ths possibl to sa, withotcontadiction, both ‘Aibon gms w mad p in 1864’, and ‘Th wth all along’ […]’ (PH, pp. 172-3). O to xpss it in a singl sntnc:‘ Ater 1864 aibon gms w th all along’ (PH, p. 173). ending in thsam xaspatd spiit in which h bgan, Lato assts that ‘th answto ths appant pzzls is so staightowad’, and mockingl adds that‘th qstion is no long whth to tak sch “mstis” siosl, bt whpopl tak thm as dp philosophical pzzls that wold condmn scincstdis [i.., Lato’s philosoph] to absdit’ (PH, p. 173). Bt otight ab-sdit is not Lato’s dang h, at last not om ai-mindd ads. At all, his tho o tim dos ollow with pct igo om his viw thatactos a ll aticlatd vnts with nothing hld in sv. I will con-tnd blow that th a complling asons to p this vision o actosto th mdioc alism wildd b Lato’s dtactos. Bt this dos not -qi that w accpt th ntit o his acto mtaphsics. Th a good

asons to viv a non-lational om o alism—bt a mch weirder al-ism than th kind ndosd b Alan Sokal and his scinc waios.

C. ON BeHALF OF THe MOB

Bo laving th mavlos pags o Pandora’s Hope , w shold consid- Lato’s spising citicism o Socats, which occpis two ll chap-ts o th book. Thanks to Nitzsch w hav long bn accstomd todiatibs against Socats as a li-dning and dcadnt ciminal tp; at

th sam tim, mo cnt athos hav discovd nw mit in th long- vilid Sophists. evn so, Lato’s anti-Socatic viws main spising.Gomts do not dnonc eclid, no do Chistian monks hap sconon St. Pal. Hnc it is woth o not i Lato, a philosoph indd, hasnothing good to sa abot th onding ho o o disciplin—a man who




is sall psntd to stdnts in a spiit o pios aw. Lato is awa, hal-apologticall, o th intnsit o his attacks. yt h can hadl avoid schattacks, sinc his ngativ viws o Socats ollow om his lational mta-

phsics as dictl as his astonishing tho o tim.Plato’s dialog Gorgias psnts a discssion btwn Socats and thSophists o vaing qalit: Gogias, Pols, and Callicls. Althogh Latois wll awa o th annoing sns o Callicls, his assalt on Socats ismch mo lntlss. Not sinc Nitzsch has a philosoph chagd oancstal ol modl with sch a ang o misdds. Socats, ‘having dis-coagd discssion’ (PH, p. 219), condcts himsl in a spiit o ‘tanqilaoganc’ (PH, p. 220). H is ‘on v thin ic’ (PH, p. 231), ‘shold havlost’ (PH, p. 229) th agmnt with th Sophists, and was savd onl b

thi inpt concssions. Gtd sacasticall as ‘Posso Socats’ (PH,p. 244), his ail in Athnian politics is mt with th phas ‘togh lck’(PH, p. 238). evn his closing timph in th ndwold is mockd with anacid ‘clap clap clap’ (PH, p. 257). Gilt o a ‘mind-boggling cim’ (PH, p.253), Socats oins th Sophists in ‘odios sl-annihilation’ (PH, p. 245).Nitzsch was ight that Socats is an anti-Midas who ‘tns gold intomd’ (PH, p. 240) and also ight to pt Socats on his ‘hit list o “mn o ressentiment ”’ (PH, p. 253). Wos t, th xction o Socats b Athnswas ml a ‘political mistak’ that ‘mad a mat ot o a mad scintist’(PH, p. 257). Plato civs qall ogh tatmnt o his own ‘pv-sit’ (PH, p. 253) in ‘holding all th pppt stings’ and cating ‘a stawCallicls’ (PH, p. 221). Plato’s staging o th dialog is dscibd b Latoas i b a nast that citic: ‘A batil ct on th stag, to b s,with nakd shadows pacing a papi-mâché inno and aticial msand og linging in th ai’ (PH, p. 227). Plato is also a hpocit and aspoild bat, sinc his Gorgias was wittn ‘not b a babaic invad, bt bth most sophisticatd, nlightnd, litat o all wits, who all his li

gogd himsl on th bat and walth that h so oolishl dstos odms ilvant o podcing political ason and ction. This sot o “dconstction,” not th slow iconoclasm o psnt-da sophists, is wotho indignation […]’ (PH, p. 245).

Bt Lato’s vitiolic attack dsvs to b takn siosl, o two n-latd asons. Fist, thos ads who hav not visitd th Gorgias -cntl ma b spisd b Socats’ ton in th dialog. This is not thlovabl ndling ionist ond in o mmois o Socats, bt a mo ag-gssiv and bitt intlocto: h bhavs, as w sa in english, lik a jerk .His tatmnt o Pols is spciall appalling, with its slss twists o gam-ma and a dad-nd sacasm that al advancs th dbat as it dos inoth dialogs. Thogh I am mo smpathtic to Platonism than Latohimsl, on a pl motional lvl I nd msl ching o Callicls inthis dialog, dspit th shallownss o his sns. Bt scond, and mo



Pandoa’s Hop 87

impotantl, Lato’s annoanc at Socats coms in dns o an nd-standabl cas. Socats dnds positions that a anathma to Lato’smtaphsics. Moov, it is not onl th long-dad Socats who dos this,

bt also his mlatos in th 1990’s scinc was. Lato cits Nobl LaatStvn Winbg om th New York Times : ‘O civilization has bn po-ondl actd b th discov that nat is stictl govnd b imp-sonal laws […]. W will nd to conm and stngthn th vision o a atio-nall ndstandabl wold i w a to potct oslvs om th iationaltndncis that still bst hmanit’ (PH, p. 216).1 It is had to imagin a lssLatoian passag than this. Winbg ndoss two opposd sphs: animpsonal nat govnd b laws, and an abita alm o iationalhman bli. Th latt mst b condmnd o its naïv pdic so that

hmans can b mad mo ational. yt on can asil imagin a postmod-nist invsion o Winbg on th sam pag o th Times : ‘O civiliza-tion has bn poondl actd b th discov that “nat” has bn viwd dintl b dint socitis, ach spaking with a dint voic[…]. W will nd to conm and stngthn th vision o a wold constct-d b cltal psppositions i w a to potct oslvs om th impi-alist tndncis that still bst hmanit’. Onl th choic o option is di-nt. Th shallow opposition btwn two and only two sphs mains thsam o Winbg and postmodnists alik. And not onl dos Lato - ct both options—his own position is glal conused with both! It is littlwond i this sitation povoks ang, and o this ason it is as to o-giv his vhmnt otbst against th Socats/Winbg axis.

Lato’s basic insight into th dialog is itabl. At st, th Gorgias sms to b a pdictabl moalit pla o might vss ight. Pow is allthat conts o th Sophists, whil Socats sacics all pow to th sl-lss sach o tth. As h podl pts it, ‘last a I was on th Concil[…] and [whn] I had to pt an iss to th vot, I mad a ool o msl b

not knowing th pocd o this […]. I can’t vn bgin to addss po-pl in lag gops’ (PH, p. 238).2 Th Sophists a concnd with gtting thi wa thogh psasiv spch, bt Socats is concnd onl withaching th tth no matt what th cost in hman tms. In a sns,this tpical viw is coct. Bt Lato is qall coct that Socats andCallicls bhav lik Siams twins, and that both hav th sam nm: th Athnian mob. Althogh Socats sms to psnt ‘ight’, and Callicls‘might’, both wish at bottom to silnc th cowd om a position o spi-oit. ‘Socats and Callicls hav a common nm: th popl o Athns,th cowd assmbld in th agoa, talking ndlssl, making th laws atthi whim, bhaving lik childn, lik sick popl, lik animals, shiting

1. Winbg citd b Lato om th Agst 8, 1996 dition o th New York Times , p. 15.2. Lato’s addd italics to th passag om th Gorgias hav bn movd.




opinions whnv th wind changs diction’ (PH, p. 219). Th main pob-lm with th popl is that ‘th a simpl too many o thm’ (PH, p. 220).Fo Socats, th popl a dominatd b att, doxa , cstom, otin,

which a inio to th dmonstativ tths discovd b gomt. FoCallicls, th mob is ml a gop o slavs and oth ools, and thimassd phsical stngth mst b sbodinatd to th gat mit o sp-io individals. In both cass, th plalit o actos (‘th mob’) is dspisdin accodanc with a tho o what th al tth is. Fo Socats, who hanticipats Hidgg’s ontological/ontic distinction, th is tth in g-omt bt not in cooking. Fo Callicls, th onl alit is pow: th abil-it to do with impnit whatv on wishs. Th tl spio man mstotank th mscla oc o th mob with htoic. In oth wods, both

Socats and Callicls dnd an ontolog (and a politics) that is basicall n-dmocatic. This pts both o thm at th opposit pol om Lato, whosmtaphsics, w hav sn, holds that ‘Goldn Montains, phlogiston, ni-cons, bald kings o Fanc, chimas, spontanos gnation, black hols,cats on mats, and oth black swans and whit avns […] all occp thsam spac-tim as Hamlt, Pop, and ramss II’ (PH, p. 161). Whthw sa with Socats that all ths actos blong to a sph o appaancand doxa , o sa instad with Callicls that th xist onl to b ovpowdb th htoician, in ith cas w dn sch actos ot o xistnc. Wappal to som xpt theory o th t nat o things, and s this th-o to annihilat whol amis o swans, avns, nicons, phaaohs, andDanish pincs. This is pcisl what Lato dos not do.

In th Gorgias , might and ight tn ot not to b opposits at all. Bothattmpt to plac th dmocac o actos with a monolithic ontolog thatdcs its opponnts to dst: ith w silnc th iational babbl o thcowd with impsonal laws (Socats, Winbg) o w psad th cklmob o o own abitail chosn pspctiv (Callicls, th postmodn-

ists). Fo Lato, th tth lis not in som combination o ths two awdpositions, bt in a middl tm that shas nothing in common with ith:th ‘Thid estat’ o ‘xcldd middl’ o th bstling mob o actos, all o thm qall al. ‘Instad o a damatic opposition btwn oc and a-son, w will hav to consid three dint kinds o ocs […] th oc o Socats, th oc o Callicls, and th oc o th popl’ (PH, p. 235). Ina sl imag, Lato asks s to imagin a tg o wa not btwn Socatsand Callicls, bt btwn both o thm on on sid o th op and th mobon th oth.

Lato’s commitmnt to dmocac is not a om o panding to thspiit o o ag, bt is an intimat pat o his mtaphsical position. Thnivs is nothing bt contlss actos, who gain in alit thogh com-plx ngotiations and associations with on anoth: not as on against acowd, bt as on in th shape o a cowd o allis. W cannot appal to som



Pandoa’s Hop 89

athoit (gomt, pow) ling otsid th shiting alliancs o ntwoks. And o this ason, th tmoil o dmocac cannot b silncd b th x-ptis that Socats wants to s o this ppos. ‘Th assmbld Bod

Politic, in od to mak dcisions, cannot l on xpt knowldg alon,givn th constaints o nmb, totalit, gnc, and pioit that politicsimposs’ (PH, p. 228). A politics that dos not l on xpts citing imp-sonal law ‘qis a dissminatd knowldg as mltiaios as th mlti-td itsl. Th knowledge o the whole needs the whole, not the ew . Bt that woldb a scandal o Callicls and o Socats, a scandal whos nam has bnth sam at all piods: dmocac’ (PH, p. 229). B contast with dmoca-c, ‘th disagmnt o [Socats and Callicls] is sconda to thi ag-mnt: th contst is abot how to sht th moths o th popl ast and

tight’ (PH, p. 229). Whn Socats boasts that h wold ath psadon pson than a cowd, Lato sponds that ‘canvassing o on vot iswos than a cim, it is a political mistak’ (PH, p. 229).

B ‘political mistak’ Lato dos not man a tactical blnd in a -gttabl copt wold wh th think mst hstl th tth past sl-in-tstd ools. rcall that o Lato, political compomis is on xactl thsam ooting as Winbg’s ‘impsonal’ collisions btwn billiad balls.Talland and Sakoz a actos no lss than paan and ntons. A‘political’ mistak is alad an ontological mistak, bcas it mans thatan assmblag has bn badl constctd. Lato is displasd that ‘con-tmpt o politicians is still toda what cats th widst consnss in aca-dmic cicls’ (PH, p. 245). Ths acadmic cicls a still mad p o thwaing discipls o Socats and Callicls; all o thm miss th xclddmiddl, and hnc miss politics altogth. Fo Lato all alit is political,not bcas hman pow inxoabl shaps th tth, bt bcas tthand alit a assmbld thogh chains o actos in th sam wa thatbills go thogh Congss: slightl tansomd and tanslatd at ach stp,

and ailing as otn as th sccd. All alit is political, bt not all poli-tics is hman. ring to th ‘cosmopolitics’ o his ind Isabll Stngs,Lato spaks o a dnd political od that ‘bings togth stas, pi-ons, cows, havns, and popl, th task bing to tn this collctiv into a“cosmos” ath than an “nl shambls”’ (PH, p. 261). It is no accidntthat Lato’s book Politics o Nature is tanslatd into Gman as Das Parlament der Dinge : ‘Th Paliamnt o Things’. W mst libat politics om thnaowl hman alm and allow pions and th ozon hol to spak as wll.Whth babbl is dcd b ason (Socats) o b pow (Callicls), in i-th cas political mediators a liminatd. Lato’s position is not st mopoliticall attactiv than this, bt mo mtaphsicall act.

And t, philosophs will wond i th is nothing mo to Socatsthan this. Dos his sol signicanc in th histo o philosoph amont tosilncing th cowd o actos in th aogant nam o ason? Th answ,




o cos, is no. Th is mo to Socats than this, and it amonts to thmost pivotal discov o Socatic-Platonic philosoph. Lato ovlooksthis additional lmnt, not thogh ill will towad Socats as a pson,

bt bcas o his own mtaphsics o lations. Th a k passags o th Gorgias that pla no ol in Lato’s accont, and th smbl cont-lss oth passags in th Meno, th Euthyphro, th Republic , and almost vPlatonic dialog. Ths not to Socats’ contmpt o th mob, bt tohis contmpt o power . Sinc this lmnt is mo visibl in his dispt withPols than in th collision with Callicls, I will spak h o Pols.

evthing Lato sas abot Socats and Callicls is t. Th actainl nitd in thi contmpt o th mob, and it is as to imaginthm tamd p in a tg o wa against th nl shambls o th po-

pl. yt th is mo to Socats than mts th , and not mo to thSophists than mts th . rcall that Socats is not ml th tanqilliqidato o th mob that w mt in th Gorgias , bt also th lgndaposso o ignoanc. Socats’ amos statmnt that h ‘onl knows thath knows nothing’ is not a m ptns contadictd b his high-handdtatmnt o vaios intloctos. Fo vn i Socats in th Gorgias imag-ins silncing th mob with dmonstations, th is no passag in an o thPlatonic dialogs wh h actall claims to hav sch dmonstations athis disposal. Mo impotant than his opposition btwn xpt knowldgand th att and cooking o th popl is his opposition btwn wis-dom and pow. This latt distinction is th ‘inn tth and gatnss’ o Platonic philosoph.

Socats’ statg is a amilia on o gla ads o Platonic dia-logs. It bgins hamlssl nogh. In his dispt with Pols, Socats d-noncs htoic as a m knack o otin that podcs gatication andplas. Whn Pols asks i sch plas dos not mak htoic a nthing, Socats tots: ‘What, Pols? Hav o alad land om m

what I consid htoic to b, that o pocd to ask i I do not considit a n thing?’.3 Th ton is sadonic and impatint, bt th point lis atth v hat o Wstn philosoph. Th amos Socatic qst o dni-tions is qall amos o nv poviding an. Th poblm is not st thatPols ndd to lt Socats nish, as i w cold patintl wait anoth twoo th pags o Socats to dn at last what htoic is. Socats willnv aiv at that dstination: not thogh psonal ailings, bt bcasno dnition o anthing will v stik th tagt. Pit is nv dnd inth Euthyphro, no stic in th Republic , no th Sophist in th dialog o th sam nam; vn vit civs onl th o o vagl appoximatdnitions in th Meno. Whas Lato holds that a sbstanc is constct-d toactivl om its qalitis, Socats taks th opposit appoach. Fo

3. Plato, ‘Gogias’, tans. W.D. Woodhad, in The Collected Dialogues o Plato, edith Hamiltonand Hntington Cains (ds.), Pincton, Pincton univsit Pss, 1961, p. 245.



Pandoa’s Hop 91

Socats, w do hav an appoximat sns o what pit, stic, vit,indship, lov, and Sophists all a—bt all attmpts to giv xact d-initions o ths things bcom ntangld in contadiction. Socats is not

stiking a pos whn h tlls s in th Meno that h is nlik th stingasinc h nmbs himsl as mch as h nmbs oths. In act, Socats dosnot actall win an o th discssions in th dialogs—what wins a thnv ll gaspabl oms o things, bo which all dnitions all shot.

In on sns, this vn maks Socats th all o Latoian mtaphs-ics. Lato’s stating point is actos whos nat cannot b dnd in advanc. In simila ashion, what Socats and Plato dnd a alitis thata vagl known withot bing xplicitl known. Thi agmnt withLato is onl patial, o cos, sinc Lato gants ll alit to vthing

that Plato wold dnonc as shadows on th cav wall: political spchs,Hamlt, sbwa tains. Bt nowh do Socats/Plato claim to gasp whatlis otsid th cav, sinc onl a god cold do this. Fo all his blling oc-it in th Gorgias , Socats dos not oppos th mob with a knowldg that isactall possssd b an living hman xpt. At all, w mmb thathis nti ca bgins with a two-a piod o sstmaticall dbnking all sch xpts, aching th ltimat conclsion that th sm to b noxpts in an ld. Not that Socats al sks andom mmbs o th Athnian mob in Plato’s dialogs, bt maks a point o challnging th sp-posd xpts in thi v lds o xptis: h asks statsmn abot poli-tics, Mno abot vit, and Phads abot lov. Th xptis that Latowois will b sd to csh dmocac is an xptis that Socats nds inno living cat, inclding himsl. In this sns, Lato and Socats aoddl nitd in thi rejection o pivilgd xpts. Thi main dinc isthat Plato’s mtaphsics sks alit at a la dp than all aticlationb qalitis, whil Lato thinks th is no alit otsid sch aticla-tions. Hnc, th cold nv b a Latoian mth o th cav.

In this spct it is as to imagin Lato and Socats oind on thsam sid o th op in a dint tg o wa: plling had against StvnWinbg, postmodnists, th Chchlands, and vaios p-Socatics whothink vthing is mad o wat o ai. Fo what Lato and Socats havin common is an initial gst o ignoanc, vn thogh th dpat omthis gst in ath dint was. Platonic philosoph abandons igno-anc thogh its dobl wold o alit and appaanc, which Lato op-poss with his dmocac o obcts: an Adidas sho is not st a shadow on acav wall, bt an acto v bit as al as stic itsl. Th Latoian mta-phsics abandons ignoanc thogh a pagmatist dnition o actos, whosalit is dnd b th impact th hav on oth actos. Socats woldoppos this dnition o th sam ason that h cts all dnitions: ittns things into a st o qalitis, withot gasping th things to which thsqalitis blong. Lato is th ltimat dmocat in philosoph, allowing




vn widl dspisd consm obcts to nt th paliamnt o things. ytth a allowd to nt onl b vit o thi ct on oth things, sincLato holds that th is nv anthing mo to thm than this.

W now tn to a latd point that also cs thoghot th Platonicdialogs. In th Gorgias , Pols givs nspising pais o tants, whichSocats st as pdictabl condmns. In spons, Pols wonds sacasti-call i Socats ‘[is not] alos whn [h ss] a man killing o impison-ing o dpiving o popt as sms good to him!’.4 A bit lat, Pols wishsthat h w ‘at libt to do what I plas in th stat—to kill, to xil, andto ollow m own plas in v act’.5 As an xampl o his idal sccsssto, Pols os th cas o Achlas o Macdonia, a woth ival to ano Machiavlli’s anti-hos. Achlas was bon th son o a slav woman,

and wold alwas hav maind a slav i h had actd stl. His is topow qid that h st intoxicat and md his ivals, thn down hissvn-a-old hal-both in a wll whil ling to th bo’s moth that itwas an accidnt. Pols has no dobt that Achlas is happ.6

Th Socatic spons to this sto had com a w pags in advanc,whn Socats told an astonishd Pols that htoicians a actall pow-lss. Fo ‘how can htoicians o tants possss gat pow in o cit-is, nlss Pols povs against [m] that th do what th will? […] I dnthat th do what th will’.7 C th gat old Platonic msic, amilia omcontlss dialogs… Fo Socats, hmans do not will whatv it is thatth happn to b doing at th momnt, bt onl that or the sake o which tha doing it. This is cla and mo complling than it sonds. W knowom th Republic that th tant who tis to hlp his inds and ht his n-mis is al s o who thos inds and nmis a. Otn th tant’scoption backs, as h xcts appant nmis who a all lo-al conslos, and pamps appant inds who sctl conspi againsthim. Hnc th onl al vit, o Socats, is wisdom. All oth vits—

intllignc, bat, phsical stngth—can b missd to th dtimnt o oths and onsl. Onl wisdom govns ths vits in sch a wa thatth alwas ach that o th sak o which th act; and in th nd onla god is wis, not hman xpts. As Socats sas in th Gorgias : ‘So toowith thos who sail th sa and ngag in mon-making in gnal—thdo not will what th do on ach occasion. Fo who dsis to sail and s- dangs and tobls? Bt th will, in m opinion, that o th sak o which th sail, naml walth, o it is o walth’s sak that th sail’.8 Andth, ‘i a man, whth tant o htoician, kills anoth o banishs

4. Plato, ‘Gogias’, p. 251.5. Plato, ‘Gogias’, p. 253.6. Plato, ‘Gogias’, pp. 253-4.7. Plato, ‘Gogias’, p. 249.8. Plato, ‘Gogias’, pp. 249-50.



Pandoa’s Hop 93

him o conscats his popt, bcas h thinks it is to his advantag, andit povs to b to his ham, th man sl dos what sms good to him,dos h not?’.9 Whn Pols ags, Socats conclds: ‘thn I was ight in

saing that it is possibl that a man who dos what sms good to him in thstat has no gat pow and dos not do what h wills’.10 Ths, th tantis not to b nvid.

jst as Spinoza is th most ashionabl gat philosoph in o tim,Plato mst ank na th bottom o th list. Most contmpoais a nit-d in stablishing thi cdntials against Platonism; all compt to invtPlatonism mo adicall than th nxt. And t nogh, th Socatic d-ns o wisdom against pow can otn sond sacchain and insinc. Btth is a sns in which this distinction is th onding gst o Wstn

philosoph. A thing is not a bndl o qalitis, st as a tant is not a mbndl o dsis, bcas Socats dmonstats that no qalitis v do stic to that which th sk to dn. Vit and lov a al, i vaglgaspd; w dn thm in tntativ ashion b wa o attibts, bt thstaits nv qit gt at th thing itsl. Th pow o a tant o htoi-cian is inscint, bcas ths a ml spcial ots at th mco a alit that onl wisdom can pob, not pow. Th giding insight o Socats is th notion that alit is mo than its cnt stats, its cntimpact in th wold h and now, its attibts, its lations, its alliancswith oth things. And h w nd a mo gnin point o opposition b-twn Socats and Lato. I conontd with Past and his micobs, it ismost nlikl that Socats wold ncoag Past to s his xptis tosilnc th babbling Fnch mob. Instad, h wold sl haass Past oa denition o micobs, and w can alad gss that Past’s ots woldnv satis him. Lato wold ag with Socats that w cannot p-ctl dn micobs, sinc th will alwas b a ‘slight spis’ in thiaction. What Lato dnis is simpl that this spis coms om an addi-

tional hiddn alit, a ‘somthing mo’ ling bond thi basicall pag-matist dnition in tms o ‘what oth actos a modid, tansomd,ptbd, o catd b th chaact that is th ocs o attntion’ (PH, p.122). Bt Socats is no pagmatist. I w had a Platonic dialog calld thLatour , it might contain an nai scn along th ollowing lins:

Socrates : At th v bginning o o discssion, I paisd o o bing in m opinion wll taind in ths matts. So tll m, i o will, whatis a micob?

Latour : Ctainl, Socats. What I sa is that w do not know a micobin itsl, bt onl what oth actos a modid, tansomd, o p-tbd b it.

9. Plato, ‘Gogias’, p. 251.10. Plato, ‘Gogias’, p. 251.




Socrates : B th dog, m ind! yo dnitions a as gnos as owinis! Fo is it not t that Bno, son o Lois, is also knowldgablo wins, th podction o wins, and th nmos mthods o ship-ping th casks in which win is stod?

Latour : ys, Socats. What o sa is t. M whol amil has knowl-dg o ths things, as o sa.

Socrates : Now thn, i I askd o to tll m what win is, and o plid thatwin coms in man sots, is podcd thogh man stps, and is shippdin boats, ailcas, aiplans, and oth vhicls, wold this man that win isman things, o on thing podcd and movd in man dint was?

Latour : It wold sm to b onl on thing, Socats. Fo how cold it b

othwis?Socrates : Wll thn, gat blovd o Dionss th Libato, b now thavoit o Asclpis th Hal as wll!

Latour : How do o man, Socats?

Socrates : Whn I askd o what micobs a, o said that th modi,tansom, and ptb oth things.

Latour : I hav said it, s.

Socrates : And do micobs modi, tansom, and ptb on man, oman? Fo sl o know o th plag ding th tim o Picls, andoth pidmics among th Psians and Scthians? And that th hasbn not st on otbak o disas, bt man pidmics in man di-nt lands, and man mn who hav did om thm?

Latour : O cos, Socats. evon has had o ths things.

Socrates : And dos th micob main on whn it acts on man mn inman lands, o is it a dint sot o micob in ach cas? Plas, do

not b ang, and answ m qstion.Latour : I sa that it is a dint micob in ach cas. Fo in ach cas itis allid with dint popl, and with oth actos too.

Socrates : B Zs! yo a lik th naiad in th mth who hantd thcovs o Dlos, o Lmnos i Pinda is to b blivd. Fo hav o nothad that th Gks o old wold plac a singl coin in h hand, and itwold b tnd as hndds o vn thosands o coins?

Latour : I hav ogottn th dtails, Socats, bt I did ha o th mth.Socrates : Bt instad o coins, o spising man, I pt on micob in o hand, and it coms ot as thosands! I’m aaid I am a poo hto-ician, bt othwis I shold s t to chag o in th law cots as amnac to th halth o th cit!



Pandoa’s Hop 95

Th ton is insabl, bt th dispt is valing. In this ctional ‘dis-cssion’, Socats aims not to silnc th cowd with a knowldg alad inhis possssion, bt onl sks to ndmin Lato’s claim to know that an

acto is idntical with its ptbations o oth actos. Socats/Plato dnthat an acto can b dnd in this wa, o an oth wa o that matt.To mak this dnial, th pa th immns pic o dcing actos as wknow thm to icking shadows on a cav wall. Instad o holding that tht alit is wat, atoms, o th bondlss apeiron, Plato contnds that it isth eidei o pct oms. This is th gnin co o th Gorgias , as o nalv oth Platonic dialog. Bt Lato is not intstd in a nid al-it ling bnath its vaios appaitions; in his own mtaphsics, th is noplac wh h cold possibl pt an eidos .

Nonthlss, th similaitis btwn Lato and Socats a mchgat than thos btwn Lato and th Sophists. Lato’s dns o d-mocac cold b ad as dnding th sam band o land ignoancthat Socats mbodis, dspit Plato’s cla anti-dmocatic lanings. Btto dnd th Sophists wold hav pcisl th opposit slt. Th slightspis o action ond in v acto mans that Lato can nv dndth notion that appant pow is th sam as al pow, o that an appa-nt acto is th acto itsl. Th qstion is onl whth w gant scintalit to obcts whn w sa that a thing is not st known b what it ‘mod-is, tansoms, ptbs, o cats’, bt that it actall is nothing mothan ths cts. I th pagmatism o knowldg bcoms a pagmatismo ontolog, th v alit o things will b dnd as thi bndl o -cts on oth things. Bt in this wa, th ignoanc o Socats is lost along with his aoganc.





objects and relations





99

5

Contibtions

Th st pat o this book psntd Bno Lato as a mtaphsician—atitl dnid him b libaians and pblishing catalogs alik. Acadmic phi-losoph dpatmnts hav littl to do with Lato vn as his idas ciclatwidl in sch lds as anthopolog, gogaph, sociolog, and th histo

o scinc. Indd, his nam is somtims ntil nknown to possoso philosoph othwis wll vsd in cnt Fnch thoght. Bookstosshlv his titls in a vait o sctions, bt almost nv assmbl thm n-d th ‘Philosoph’ hading, at last otsid th Nthlands. evn Lato’sadmis al com to his wok pimail thogh an intst in mtaphs-ics. Nonthlss, this scond pat o th book dvlops th claim that Latogivs s not onl a mtaphsics, bt an obligato passag point in th nat o th ld. Chapt On viws th contibtions o Lato’s mta-phsical standpoint. Chapt Two idntis a ang o shadow isss nv- ll solvd b Lato himsl. Finall, Chapt Th contnds thatLato opns th gats on a nw, obct-ointd philosoph, bt also claimsthat his ction o non-lational ntitis is an notnat cb on thspiit o sch a philosoph.

Lt’s bgin with a bi considation o how Lato dis om othcnt gs o spclativ philosoph. Sinc h has nv had his momnton th stag o mtaphsics, I hav psntd him lagl as a sl-containdg, and mad littl attmpt to tac th nmos inncs and tacit

ivalis dtctabl in his thinking. Sch ots a bst lt to a dintsot o std. Bt it will b sl to giv a bi gogaphical sv, distin-gishing th most notabl Latoian landmaks om thos o oth pomi-nnt contmpoa schools. M ppos h is not to giv a dtaild histoo cnt philosoph, bt onl to sktch th landscap inhabitd b vaios



Objects and Relations 100

tibs o Ioqois, Hons, Miamis, Choks, and Cks. Th possiblzz bodlands btwn ths gops a o lss intst than th gla-ing dincs btwn thm. Spaking in jsalm in 1954, th ominos

Lo Stass mad passing nc to ‘th o gatst philosophs o thlast ot as—Bgson, Whithad, Hssl, and Hidgg’.1 ThoghStass himsl lacks th imagination and intllctal wamth tpical o gat philosophs, his valation o thinks o that ank is alwas shwd,and otn wll woth noting. In th psnt cas, it is as (o m, at last)to ndos his conclsion that Bgson, Whithad, Hssl, and Hidgga th lasting nams o philosoph om th piod in qstion. So, wmight bgin b asking what Lato adds to ths ‘o gatst philosophs’o 1914-1954, and to oth tnds o th past cnt that hav commandd

th most acclaim.On this shot list w nd Hssl and Hidgg, tach and stdnt.

Th can sal b combind nd th labl ‘phnomnolog’, thogh thdincs btwn thm hav long bn widl known. Thogh ths twogs ank among m dast intllctal hos, th a not Lato’s,and his lack o intst in this tadition is ndstandabl. Hssl limitshimsl to a dsciption o phnomna psnt to hman consciosnss, andhnc mains an idalist dspit his call o a tn to th things thm-slvs. Lato ndoss this sal citicism o Hssl, which is lagl ac-cat. As o Hidgg, thogh h nv dcs ntitis to thi ps-nc in consciosnss, h still blittls spcic obcts as ml ‘ontic’ anddaws th conclsion that ontolog is commandd to dal with bing it-sl and not spcic ntitis. It shold b obvios nogh wh Lato is noHidggian. Fo Lato, philosoph plas ot amidst micobs, tap -cods, windmills, appls, and an al o nal actos that on mightimagin. Moov, Lato has no intst in th pathos o dpth: thoghhis actos can alwas spis s, ths spiss alwas mg at th s-

ac o th wold, not om som vild ndwold ld b th shads o eckhadt and Höldlin. Now, m own viw is that phnomnolog ha-bos socs that lad it to convg with Lato’s insights, howv di-nt thi stating points ma b. rad call, Hssl and Hidgg v om th pvios sot o idalism thanks to thi ocs on objects , andthis tnd is caid th in th woks o lat phnomnologists sch asMla-Pont, Lvinas, and Lingis.2 Nonthlss, th sal sot o insid’spais o phnomnolog is dictd mo towads its vics than its vi-ts, and Lato is stid in condmning this ital. Hssl’s backting o th wold, Hidgg’s contmpt o all plastic and lctical things, andLvinas’s ‘pathtic’ notion o a God o th bond a in no wa compatibl

1. Lo Stass, What is Political Philosophy? , Chicago, univsit o Chicago Pss, 1988, p. 17.2. Haman, Gaham, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry o Things ,

Chicago, Opn Cot, 2005.



Contibtions 101

with th stl o philosoph that w ow to Lato. Phnomnolog does -main lagl impisond in Kant’s Copnican rvoltion.

Otsid th Hssl/Hidgg iv vall, w nd jacqs Lacan and

his billiant admis Alain Badio and Slavo Žižk. Howv ths gsma di, it is sa to sa that all th lt th hman sbct ba th llload o philosoph and lav nothing to non-hman ntitis. A Lacanianphsics is nthinkabl. Žižk opnl poclaims that alit otsid th sbct is a naïv spposition, whil Badio holds that actos a nits onl whnth a counted as nits—and th is no vidnc that h allows anon bthmans to do th conting. A Žižkian chmist and a Badioian zoologa qall nthinkabl. B contast, Lato lts non-hman actos do asmch ontological wok as popl do, vn i th inanimat alm civs too

littl attntion in his books compad with hman scintic pactic.W tn to Bgson and his gat sccsso Dlz. Th dinc b-

twn Lato and ths gs shold b cla nogh, and dspit possiblconnctions nith Bgson no Dlz is his ancsto in an ccial -spct. What spaats both gs om Lato is thi disbli that con-ct actal ntitis a pima in th wold. Bgson is widl and acc-atl dscibd as a champion o p-individal dnamism, an élan o durée that ma hadn into individal ntitis, bt whos hadning is alwas d-ivativ and gnall lamntabl. Indd, Lato might vn b dscibdas th anti-Bgson, givn his implicit opposition to an philosoph in whichdismbodid bcoming tmps individal actos. Dlz’s notion o ‘th vital’ is dsignd pcisl to mov philosoph awa om actal ighttains and apicots; it is had to imagin Dlz taking Lato’s ‘actos’ s-iosl. rcall that th is no sch thing o Lato as a ‘bcoming’ thatwold xcd individal actos. No is th an ‘vitalit’ that xcdsthm, st as potntialit dos not xcd thm. Th mch-discssd di-nc btwn potntial and vital, so otn wildd lik a bill clb in o

tim b Dlzian hooligans, is ilvant h—both tms ail Lato’sstandad o conctnss in xactl th sam wa.W a now lt with Whithad, who is sl Lato’s closst philosoph-

ical ancsto. Th similaitis btwn thm a as obvios as th a pivot-al. Whithad’s ‘ontological pincipl’ holds that th asons o anthing atall mst alwas b soght in th constittion o som dnit actal ntit, apincipl that nith Bgson no Dlz cold possibl ndos. This s-cs to dmonstat th sloppinss o ting to gop all o ths gs to-gth nd an singl bic, sch as ‘pocss philosoph’. Whithad andLato also sha a gat ondnss o lations, which Whithad calls ‘p-hnsions’. Th attmpt to spak o a thing apat om its lations givs sonl what Whithad calls ‘vacos actalit’, th sam tm h ss to dis-miss matialism and oth thois o sbstanc. B now it shold b clathat Lato os th sam basic citicism o sch thois.




It is also t that Whithad’s philosoph displas a spclativ cos-mological spiit o which th is no qivalnt in Lato. Thogh it woldb mislading to call Lato a ‘philosoph o scinc’, it is valing that

no on v calls him a ‘philosoph o nat’—a tm that might asilb applid to Whithad. Nonthlss, I still p Lato’s mtaphsics toWhithad’s o on pivotal ason: th gat sclaism o Lato’s tho- o lations. In Whithad’s modl o phnsions btwn actal ntitis,w a ld down th cl-d-sac o ‘tnal obcts’, o nivsal qalitis lo-catd in God himsl. This is ml a vaiant o taditional occasionalism,and shas all th alts o that school. Lato taks th mo daing stp o ignoing tnal obcts and kping intactions on a local lvl: it is joliotwho links ntons and politics, not God. In act, o Lato very actor is a

Joliot , a mdim o tanslation abl to link th most a-ng obcts andqall capabl o ailing in this ot. Th ason o ping th sclamodl o lations is not bcas w mst pand to th smg athism o to-da’s avant garde , bt bcas whn th poblm o lations btwn actos ismagicall tansd to God it is solvd ml b at. To pt all lationsin th hands o a dit is no btt (thogh also no wos) than th Hm/Kant appoach o locating all lations in th habits o catgois o hmanbings. In both cass inanimat actos a stippd o atonom, smothdin thi inanc. B contast, Lato givs s th st philosoph v knownin which th lations btwn obcts a both a pzzling diclt and anot monopolizd b som pivilgd tant ntit, whth hman o divin.This last point povids th mao thm o th maind o th book.

A. THe CONCreTeNeSS OF ACTOrS

As w hav sn, th most tpical at o Lato’s philosoph is th dig-nit it gants to all sizs and tps o actos. Ntons a actos and black

hols a actos, bt so a bildings, citis, hmans, dogs, ocks, ctionalchaacts, sct potions, and voodoo dolls. Som ads ma ti (o p-tnd to ti) o ths qnt lists, dismissing thm as an ‘incantation’ o ‘po-tics’ o obcts. Bt most ads will not soon gow tid, sinc th htoi-cal pow o ths osts o bings stms om thi dict opposition to thaws o cnt mainstam philosoph. W cannot imagin Kant o Hglinvoking sch a oll call o conct ntitis, which shit th wight o phi-losoph towad spcic actos thmslvs and awa om all stcts thatmight wish to sbsm thm. W nd a tacit monism in philosophis o h-

man accss with thi global apathid wh all bds o obcts a noth-ing mo than qall non-hman. Th bst stlistic antidot to this gimdadlock is a patd soc’s chant o th mltitd o things that sistan nid mpi. Sch lists a ond not onl in th psnt book, andnot st in Lato himsl, bt in nmos athos who t to shit o ocs



Contibtions 103

om an onold oc to th mfd plalitis that ais om its ashs.Witing o th dstction o Hioshima, richad rhods lanchs a moxtavagant pot o obcts than Lato o I hav v attmptd:

Dstod, that is, w not onl mn, womn and thosands o childnbt also staants and inns, landis, that gops, spots clbs,swing clbs, bos’ clbs, gils’ clbs, lov aais, ts and gadns,gass, gats, gavstons, tmpls and shins, amil hilooms, adi-os, classmats, books, cots o law, cloths, pts, gocis and ma-kts, tlphons, psonal ltts, atomobils, biccls, hoss—120wa-hoss—msical instmnts, mdicins and mdical qipmnt,li savings, glasss, cit cods, sidwalks, amil scapbooks, mon-mnts, ngagmnts, maiags, mplos, clocks and watchs, pblic

tanspotation, stt signs, pants, woks o at.3

Having bn dpl distbd b a psonal visit to Hioshima andNagasaki, I man no disspct to th victims and ind obcts o japan i I sa that th sam list o obcts is dstod in a dint wa b th vaiosphilosophis o hman accss. Hman-cntd philosoph is a Hioshimao mtaphsics, on that annihilats th obcts invokd b rhods along with all oths. Bt Lato dos not sha in this cim against hmans andnon-hmans. Instad o dismissing gass, gats, gavstons, adios, class-mats, and cots o law as m ontic dtails, h allows thm to b topics o philosoph again. Withot bing ippant, w shold add that Lato alsowlcoms Hamlt, Pop, phlogiston, sbwa tains, th Dtch east IndiaCompan, th east Bnn, and th Hol Spiit into a philosophical almom which th matialists wold cll banish thm.

Whil Whithad’s ontological pincipl stats that vthing that hap-pns is a consqnc o th alit o spcic ntitis, Lato’s convsthom is qall itl: all ntitis hav consqncs. To plac all obcts on qal ooting ass th vaios two-wold gaps ond in th his-

to o philosoph, as wll as th nmos ax ‘adical’ ots to gl thtwo wolds togth om th stat. Th gass o Hioshima is spaatd not st om som nknowabl gass-in-itsl, bt also om th gavstons andmsical instmnts that inhabit th sam plan o alit as th gass. Noa th blads o gass m psnt-at-hand ntitis otstippd b a nidmbling bing. Gass can do things in th wold, st as atoms and Popcan do things.

Th ncssa conctnss o actos also sspnds an p-individalalit that tis to claim a dp stats than spcic ntitis. To tak a bid

siosl mans to lt th whol o alit po into th actal bid, not to viw it as th tansint incanation o som p-avian ‘diagam’ o ‘lin o ight’. Mammals a al, and th is no good ason to hold that mammals

3. richad rhods, The Making o the Atomic Bomb, Nw yok, Tochston, 1986, p. 733.




inhabit a topolog that stcts a spac o possibl vtbats, as th won-dl Manl DLanda4 wongl ags. To shit th scn o philosophawa om spcic things is a spos gst, on that maks sns onl

i w los aith in th conctnss o actos. Lato’s gambl, o cos, lisin his notion that actos a dnd ntil b thi lations and alliancs.His modl o lta-conct actos qis that th b ll lational inchaact, with no distinction btwn obct and accidnt, obct and -lation, o obct and qalit. This sam modl qis that actos not bpmittd to nd an shit in thi alliancs, sinc to chang on’s la-tions is to chang on’s alit. entitis o Lato must b a pptal p-ishing, sinc th cannot sviv vn th tinist chang in thi poptis.Whithad patl scaps this consqnc b contasting ‘socitis’ (which

can nd) with actal ntitis o occasions (which cannot). This distinc-tion is lss dvlopd in Lato, bt in m mind this conts to Lato’s cd-it as a mak o bold consistnc. As w hav sn, Lato dos somtimspaks o actos as ‘tactois’ that ct acoss nmos momnts, and im-plis that an acto acqis a ‘histo’ whn its allis shit ath than that itpishs otight. Fo xampl, w might claim that Obama’s Whit Hosin 2009 is th sam as eisnhow’s in 1959, sinc th changs on its piph- do not all act th tacto o vnts that tl compis th WhitHos. Bt call that th v dcision abot what is impotant in a thing qis a wok o tanslation, sinc it cannot li in th hat o an acto liksom taditional knl o ssnc. Lato accpts no ‘sbstantial om’ o th Whit Hos that cold nd thogh th dcads dspit shiting in-habitants and changing coats o paint, bcas th is no atomatic wa inhis philosoph to spaat th inn alit o th bilding om its tansintctations thogh th wok o bids and vandals. Som xtnal joliot willalwas b ndd to establish that th Whit Hos is th sam thing at twodint momnts t as apat.

Individal actos a ct o in thmslvs, ll dnd b thi xactlations with oths at this v instant, nabl to chang thos lations inth last withot pishing. It ma sond paadoxical to stss this island-lik chaact o actos givn Lato’s obvios ondnss o lations, bt thxact ats o this paadox will b xplod soon nogh. Thogh an ac-to is dnd b its lations with oths, this dos not man o Lato thatit can bal owad into a dierent st o lations thanks to som magicalélan, whil still somhow maining th sam thing. I on acto w to con-tain its own t stats in gm, o i it ndd as an ssntial co ovtim and withstood th ainstom o shiting intactions, this wold con-tadict th basic pincipl o Latoian mtaphsics that nothing containsanthing ls. evthing is xtnal to vthing ls, and it taks diclt

4. S Manl DLanda, A New Philosophy o Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity,London, Continm, 2006.



Contibtions 105

wok to link an two things. Lato gants no initial pincipl o ndancov tim, st as h accpts no oc o tmpoal x ov and abov spcicactos thmslvs. Lato is no philosoph o bcoming, no ‘pocss philos-

oph’ xcpt in th tivial sns that h tis to accont o changs in thwold, as v think mst. As w hav sn, Lato gos so a as to claimthat tim is produced b th labo o actos, and that onl sch actos catan asmmt o bo and at. Fo xactl th sam ason, th links b-twn on instant and anoth mst also b podcd thogh th labo o actants, o th a not p-givn in som sot o intnal div o conatus inth hat o things that wold thm om th pison o singl instants. At all, th tt conctnss o actants actall qis that th b in-cacatd in an instant. Mo occasionalist than Bgsonian, Lato’s ac-

tos hav no choic bt to occp pnctiom cinmatic ams. Othwisth wold nd, and ndanc wold impl an inn nding knlncstd with shiting accidnts—a most n-Latoian thm.

Lato’s giding pincipl is that an acto is dnd b its alliancs; i alliancs shit, thn by denition th acto has changd, and th two WhitHoss a linkd as ‘th sam’ Whit Hos onl i som oth acto isabl to link thm b showing an qivalnc. It is sh nonsns to claimthat an Latoian acto ‘points’ towad anoth, o posssss som intnaldiv towad som t stat o itsl. That wold b Libniz, not Lato.Fo Lato an obct ‘points’ onl i som joliot makes it point b oging awll-constctd link btwn that acto and anoth. I w want to claimthat th Whit Hos ‘points’ to its own t stats, w might as wll claimthat ntons alad ‘point’ to Blgian mining companis and commandoopations, in dict contadiction o Lato’s maks on th pivotal ol o joliot. Th iss is so cla o anon who ads Irreductions call thatI hav otn pzzld ov th widspad sistanc to ading Lato as aphilosoph o isolatd instants. What I sspct is that th sistanc stms

ml om th spiit o o ag, which not onl assms (lik Lato) thatphilosoph’s nm is ock-had nding sbstancs, bt also assms (n-lik Lato) that th onl antidots to sch a poison wold b pocss, x,and ow. Sinc o Zeitgeist tnds to assm that all intllctal shnsslis on th sid o bcoming as opposd to static bing, it th assmsthat anon dning sch lta-x in Lato mst b accsing him o st-pidit. Th mistak h lis in th mao pmis: o th al novlt inphilosoph no long blongs to th tid old limick o shiting xionsand bcomings, bt to ttl conct and ttl disconnctd ntitis thatc alod o mdiatos to bidg thm. Lato’s obsssion with tanslationwold mak no sns i actos w alwas alad linkd o alad pointdbond thmslvs.

Ths, Lato’s lational modl o actos tilts him paadoxicall towadan occasionalist tho o isolatd instants. yt it also shilds him om th




possibl complaint that b admitting Pop and nicons to th sam al-ist clb as ocks and atoms h has mltiplid ntitis to th point o abs-dit. This is bcas Lato’s lationism givs him an obvios cition o

claing th slm o spos actos: naml, a thing is al o Latoonl i it acts o ptbs oth things. Following a wll-known pagma-tist axiom, h holds that an acto that maks no dinc is not a al ac-to. Th possibl ntit assmbld om Mas, th Mississippi riv, andChals Badlai is not a nid acto nlss this pvs condationsomhow manags to ptb oth actos. Th is alwas th aint chancthat somon might sccd in linking thm (‘Tu es beau, mon euve, / comme la planète rouge…’) thogh this wold psmabl b mo diclt than making th phsical pats o a tlvision achiv a gnin total ct.

Finall, w hav sn that Lato’s lationism allows him to placth sal twoold it o philosoph with a plalit o lvls. Not onl is thmonl hman/wold gap abolishd, bt th sam happns with th sp-posd chasm btwn matt and om. Th is no nal statm o btmatial om which imsi, mo ostntatios ntitis wold thn b mold-d. Th Aistotl-Libniz distinction btwn sbstanc and agggat isabolishd, sinc ‘nat’ is a poo wa to distingish atoms on th on handom machins and amis on th oth. Fo Lato an acto is al notthogh nat-sans-atic, bt thogh its cts on oth ntitis. This no sbstanc, onl black boxs, and lik Pandoa’s box th can b opndat will to xamin th dlicat intnal ngotiations that mad thm possi-bl. Taditional alism’s hobgoblin o th ‘m agggat’ o ‘m thing o ason’ is no long a wo, sinc in th nd vthing is an agggat,assmbld call o calssl om nmos componnts. Gaps mlti-pl to innit and a constantl cossd b th wok o tanslation, not bth impossibl pilos lap so dsvdl idicld b jams. In shot, this no nal la o alit om which all lations will hav bn clansd.

Th stnning mtaphsical implication h, which Lato nv discsssopnl, is an innite regress o actors . I th a onl black boxs and nv anal sbstanc, thn w will nv com to a nal stag in an analsis. Btnotic that this innit gss is not st a podct o o own hman anal-sis: Lato’s black boxs blong to th wold itsl, not to o spchs abotth wold. Th point is not st that w can kp opning black boxs as ar as we wish , with som abita cto point at th limits o hman atig.Mo than this, his mtaphsics ntails that black boxs do in act xtndinto innit dpths. Lato will shd no tas that this conclsion opnlots Kant’s Scond Antinom.

Thesis : evthing in th wold is constittd ot o th simpl.

Antithesis : Th is nothing simpl, bt vthing is composit.5

5. Immanl Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , tans. Pal Cas and visd b



Contibtions 107

Thogh Kant obids s to choos btwn th two, Lato’s position im-plis th antithsis qit baznl. jst as sping is annoncd b th songs o tning bids, th tn o mtaphsics will b known thogh th ap-

paanc o bids divn soth b th Antinomis. Lato’s positions on thmaining th antinomis (nitd/innit o spac and tim, dom/mchanism, ncssa bing/no ncssa bing) a as to gss as wll.Bt th a lss cntal to his thinking than th ndlss chain o compositblack boxs sttching down to Hll and bond.

B. AGAINST MATerIALISM

A mo spising histoic paalll now mgs btwn Lato and

edmnd Hssl: a g o whom h has littl smpath. As w hav sn,thogh Lato ma b wong to show sch contmpt o phnomnolog,th asons o his disdain a commndabl. B backting th actal woldand ocsing on phnomna in consciosnss, Hssl atis th most dis-mal aspct o Copnican philosoph. B contast, Lato cts idalismand maintains that th is no xd gap btwn hmans and oth actos. All o this is t, and on mst admit that Lato gos th than Hsslin abolishing th popl-cntd cdo o continntal philosoph.

yt th is a stiking similait o mthod btwn th two thinks:

naml, both obsv a l o absolt plalism that maks no swping distinction btwn al and nal obcts. jst as Lato initiall placscatoon chaacts on th sam lvl as ocks and atoms, Hssl asks thatvn th most ldicos gmnts b dscibd xactl as th appa to sand not qickl dismissd. This is th positiv sid o th idalist mthod o backting, sinc it allows Hssl to potct th nl mob o phnomnaom apid dcimation b citical dbnks. Fo this v ason Hssland Lato otn sha th sam ang opponnts: hadco dctionists

who bcom nagd whnv cntas and nicons a allowd to gazl in thi ld o ntons. Bt th is an ion h. Sinc Lato o-bids an schism btwn phnomna and th natal wold, h is slmo o a alist than Hssl, who mains obstinatl within th phnom-nal alm. yt this v act maks Lato mo obnoxios to matial-ists than Hssl cold v b. At all, sinc Hssl claims to do noth-ing mo than dscib th contnts o consciosnss, this lavs a ll hal o alit in which th natalists can omp abot and dominat. Th willnot l thatnd b whatv Hssl dos in his hommad hman cas-

tl, and can alwas siz it i th wish in th nam o cognitiv scinc. BtLato’s claim to spak o th whole o alit, and his paalll claim thatmatialism is not a good dsciption o that alit, sggsts a d invasiono scintic hnting gonds. As long as philosophs main on th hman

jams W. ellington, Indianapolis, Hacktt, 1977, p. 74..




sid o an aticial hman/wold divid th pos no dang to matial-ism, and a gnall lt in pacl contmpt. Bt as soon as th invadth matialist kingdom itsl, th a assaltd b ang scintic mili-

tias—as happnd to Lato in th Sokal-divn ‘Scinc Was’, bt woldpobabl not hav happnd to Hssl i h had bn aliv in 1996.Natalism gants pivilg to a wold o al cass acting all phsi-

cal things qall, and thb sks to liminat th Catsian mind/wolddalism and its vaios his. Natalism vn gants phsical casation thight to invad th hman alm, so that conscios phnomna no long b-long to a spcial zon immn om phsical xplanation. Th mind bcomsa m bain, not an nchantd spiit that pncts th abic o casationand iss abov th wold. In m viw this attitd is both spio and in-

io to th wa old dalism. In on sns it is spio, sinc it liminatsth gondlss dal monach o Hman and Wold, which is ltimatl nobtt than th p-Galilan dobl phsics o havn and ath. Cognitiondos dsv to b tatd b th phsical scincs, and o thos who atid o Copnican dogma th wok o sch gs as th Chchlands isalwas stangl shing. Bt in anoth sns natalism is inio, sincit ml invts th basic dctionist gst o absolt idalism. Whasth idalists dc inanimat collisions to thi appaanc in conscios-nss, th natalists simpl dc in th opposit diction. Instad o tn-ing into a m phnomnon o , th tn this phnomnon into am piphnomnon o ’s t micophsical alit. In both cass thtwo-wold tho is takn as an aticl o aith, with on tm lvatd to ththon and th oth dcd to slav. Th sitation smbls th tnchso Flands ding th Gat Wa, with nith sid gaining mo than a winchs o v million bllts d. To nlist with ith sid in a tim o tnch waa is oolish: movmnt is a and lispans a low. Whnvw nd that two sids o an intllctal dispt a ml th invtd oms

o on anoth, w hav a stalmat. What is alwas ndd to scap stal-mat is som nw statg, som amod vhicl o shock toop tactic ablto pic and otank both tnchs. In th psnt cas, Lato’s mthod o placing all ‘phsical’ and ‘mntal’ actos on th sam ooting is th bst wato nd th tnch wa btwn natalism and idalism.

Matialism can sal b dscibd as th dalt commonsns philos-oph o o tim, dspit Winbg’s a o ‘linging iational tndncis’.Toda’s dcatd casts silntl assm, whth happil o sadl, that thnivs is basicall mad o had phsical matt. Natalists opnl cl-bat this viw, whil dalists bta an qal aith in phsical micopa-ticls thogh thi al tat to th hman castl—a spcial sanctawh th hop th blows o atoms will not appl. Th ‘intllctal Mnich’o th dalists lis in thi sal to condct onsiv opations in th almo inanimat matt, wh th lt th natal scincs dominat vn whil



Contibtions 109

consoling thmslvs with a bl spioit in th agil zon o hmanmaning. Th boost thi moal b pating Hidgg’s inamos anddpssing claim that scinc dos not think. Philosoph in o tim is ith

matialist o it is intimidatd b matialism—on o th two. Th sitationis intolabl. W can lov and spct th scincs withot accpting that phi-losoph is thi handmaid. Scinc dos think, bt this dos not man it d-svs th monopol on thinking that th vaios intllctal Chamblainshav givn it. What philosoph mst do is addss th inanimat wold again,bt in tms dint om thos o matialism, sinc th latt has spis-ingl littl to commnd it. Th modl o th wold as a had la o impn-tabl matt tlls s onl that matt can shov oth matt ot o th wao smack it ocll, with th addd swtn that cognitiv scinc will no

long allow th hman mind to b xmpt om this pocss. Bt this mltaks inanimat casation as an obvios givn whil doing nothing to xplainhow it occs. It is a mtaphsics t o a two-a-old: ‘da wd ball psht dagwn ball… an da gwn ball ll on da woo’.

O Aistotl’s amos o cass, onl th cint and matial casa taind, whil th omal and nal cass a dismissd as ith ill-so (nal) o divativ (omal). Mo gnall, lation is nv tatd asa problem b matialists, as it is b Lato. B showing that th lation b-twn actos is alwas a om o tanslation, Lato bgins to philoso-ph om its a o inanimat nat. H invits s to lav o dat h-man castl, om which all non-hman obcts a banishd nd pnalto bing dcd to imags. Not that th idalist contmpt o matialismamonts to nothing mo than ignoing it, with th claim that philosophhas nothing to do with what happns bond th iv in th inanimat wil-dnss. In tn, matialism simpl conts that it owns both banks o th iv, sinc hman alit is st as govnd b phsico-chmical lawsas an sollss matt. Lato’s contmpt o matialism is mo compl-

ling than ith option: th is not on iv, bt millions o thm, and n-bidgd gaps btwn an two ntitis that xist. Scinc constantl cosssths gaps with gat itlnss (as do gadning, ggling, and cook)bt it nv tlls s how th a cossd. This is th task o an obct-oint-d philosoph. An mtaphsics woth o th nam mst b a mtaphsicso obcts and lations.

Lato is ight to call matialism a om o idalism. H dos this mostlcidl in a 2007 aticl with th plaintiv titl ‘Can W Gt O MatialismBack, Plas?’ Th aticl dclas that w nd a ‘nw dsciptiv stl thatcicmvnts th limits o th matialist (in ct idalist) dnition o ma-tial xistnc’ (MB, p. 138). Th poblm is that ‘matialism, in th shotpiod in which it cold b sd as a discssion-closing top, implid whatnow appas in tospct as a ath idalist dnition o matt and itsagncis’ (MB, p. 138). Th oigins o this idalist matialism li in th




distinction btwn pima and sconda qalitis divd om Dscatsand Lock. As Lato pts it: ‘This is wh th matialism o th cnt pastnow looks so idalistic: it taks th ida o what things in thmslvs shold

b—that is, pima qalitis—and thn nv stops gawking at th mi-acl that maks thm “smbl” thi gomtical podction in daw-ings’ (MB, p. 139). To claim that alit is dcibl to matial actos isto mak a dogmatic dcision abot what th pima qalitis o actos -all a, placing th pmannt mst o actos with a dogmatic modlo actos as xtndd solid things. In oth wods, a on-dimnsional idea o actos placs thi alit, which is alwas patl spising and opaq.Matialism tns ot to b not a hadhadd alist doctin, bt on o thmost blatant oms o idalism th wold has v known. It tns Socats

into a scintic xpt, st as Lato ad. Bt sinc no on all knowswhat an acto is, to dn it in tms o had phsical matt is a dpl n-philosophical stp, on adoptd mostl bcas it allows s to lagh at all thnaïv tibal dps who still bliv in ghosts and omns. Bt as a l, antho that xists ml to nmask anoth as naïv is pobabl a bad on.

Whn Lato dnis th matialist pincipl and pts all actos on thsam ooting, w ma notic an inn ling o sistanc—as thogh somtick w bing plad and somthing w bing lost. Naml, what smsto b lost is th citical wapon that allows nlightnmnt to dismiss ia-tional phantoms and bing s to a t alit that xists ‘whth w lik ito not’. I Hamlt, Pop, and bald kings o Fanc a st as al as pa-an, thn w sm to b in th land o ‘anthing gos’. B now it sholdb cla how this distots Lato’s position. Lato holds that all obcts aqall al, not that all a qall strong . H wold ag with matialiststhat a tpical montain has more alit than Pop, o at last a mo t-nacios kind. Thi point o disagmnt concns th cition o alit.Th iconoclastic mthod o citical dbnking liks to mas alit ac-

coding to th adical hman/wold split. It mistaknl idntis th ‘wold’sid o th dalism with ‘alit whth w lik it o not’, and givs to th‘hman’ sid th sol sponsibilit o distoting this alit—phaps n-doing th distotion lat in th nam o cospondnc and nlightnmnt. Accoding to this standpoint things a al i th com om th ‘wold’sid and nal i addd b th ‘hman’ sid. enlightnmnt pocds b de-nouncing , and xlts as it pncts von’s tisss o naivté. In this wa,iconoclasm solidis both th niq hman/wold gap and th cospon-dnc tho o tth. Lato’s soltion is ntil dint. What maks anatom mo al than a ghost is not that th om xists as a al stat o a-ais and th latt onl in o minds. Instad, what maks th atom moal is that it has mo allis, inclding allis sttching wll bond th h-man alm. expimnts tsti to th atom’s xistnc; instmnts stabi-liz it and mak it indictl visibl; th scintic possion is tansomd



Contibtions 111

b it; gnations o childn lan abot atoms and pass th wod along;Bownian motion shows that paticls o wat a movd b atoms, as a-gd b non oth than einstin himsl. B contast, th ghost has onl a

palt nmb o allis baing witnss to its alit, sch as hstical chil-dn and a w old lgnds. Bt it might also happn that th atom’s allisdst it on da too.

This Latoian appoach to alit is both convincing and nconvinc-ing, mch lik th sbct/obct dalism itsl. Lato is ight that hmanand wold cannot sv as a dal tibnal o alit, with wold gtting allth alit and hmans gtting all o th nalit (at last ntil th gowp and lan to cospond with th wold). Whn sbct and obct aidntid with hman and wold, w hav a disast on o hands, sinc

tth and alsit a now appotiond among two distinct kinds o bings.Th sam thing happns with th distinction btwn pima and scond-a qalitis, also ctd b Lato. Accoding to this distinction th pi-ma qalitis o a thing (sch as th phsical stct o cloth o sga)blong to it ‘whth w lik it o not’, whil th sconda qalitis (schas th colo o a shit o th tast o sga) xist onl o pcption. H,somthing that oght to b a global ontological distinction is cavd p b-twn two domains that Hidgg wold call ‘ontic’: inanimat things havall th pima qalitis, whil hmans and mab a w smat animals addall th sconda ons.

Bt as alad sggstd, th is somthing ls going on in ths d-alisms that is not as contmptibl as Lato thinks. Th patd shotsagainst Lato that alit xists ‘whth w lik it o not’ can immdi-atl b dismissd whn th a mant to ndos th hman/wold splitthat his dmocac o actos dstos. Bt th is a mo dnsibl sid to‘alit whth w lik it o not’—naml, th alit o a thing apat omits relations whth w lik it o not. Sinc Lato is an absolt lationist

in his tho o actos, h cannot look ondl pon this point. Bt th gaino tth in th phsicist’s scam is that an acto mst alad xist i othactos a to ngotiat with it in th st plac. Fo xampl, th is ithsomthing lik a micob at wok in th p-Pastian a 1700, o th isnot. Th toactiv podction o th micob, in th mann that Latocommnds, givs too mch wight to th human awanss o it, and ig-nos th ct o th micob on oth non-hman ntitis in 1700 ‘whthw lik it o not’. Lato wold sl b appalld b this obction, bt hI think th old-tim alists hav a point. Howv, th qickl in thipoint b sing Lato’s stid abolition o th hman/wold divid andb dning all wok o tanslation in th inanimat alm, which th -gad as nothing bt an obctiv and asil mioabl stat o obctiv a-ais. What ths scinc waios ovlook is that not onl hmans tanslato distot th alit o th micob. I th want to sa that th micob is




th whth we lik it o not, th shold add that it is th whth dogs,milk, and win lik it o not. entitis sch as hoss and chs conont thismicob no lss than w do, and th too will giv it ‘sconda qalitis’

that do not ntil ovlap with th micob itsl. As w hav sn, th sal appoach o scintic alists is to assign pi-ma qalitis to things and sconda qalitis to th hman distotions o things. Lato’s conta statg is to dn an dinc at all btwn pi-ma and sconda qalitis, sinc h ss all qalitis as constittd b -lations, and ths all qalitis a sconda—as Bkl also holds, thoghwith a mo idalist twist. Bt th is still a thid possibilit. Naml, w canaccpt th distinction btwn pima and sconda (lik th scinc wa-ios) whil sing to cav it p btwn th hman and th inhman -

spctivl (as Lato himsl ss). Fo it is had to s wh onl hmansand animals wold b abl to gnat sconda qalitis in th things thncont. I th smll and colo o cotton (o hmans) a sconda qali-tis, thn th ammabilit o cotton (o ) is sconda as wll. An obct isgazd onl lightl b anoth, not daind to th dgs. B placing scond-a qalitis soll in th hman mind, hmans a givn th niq powto distot a t alit that is wongl idntid with inhman nat. Thisalsl movs all poblms o tanslation om th inanimat alm.

In shot, Lato does los somthing whn h sas that a micob is noth-ing mo than th chain o actos ptbd b th micob’s xistnc. Foth lational tho o actos bods on a kind o ‘vicationism’ in whichth alit o a thing is dnd b th was in which it is gistd b othntitis, with th impotant cavat that Lato allows inanimat actos towok on ach oth as wll as on s. His viw that an acto is al b vito ptbing oth actos dos v awa om on o th k pincipls o alism: naml, that a thing is al bond th conditions o its accssibilit.Lato’s gat achivmnt is to dn th modn oscillation btwn h-

man and wold as th wllsping o all nlightnmnt. Bt h pas th ol-lowing pic: whil th gaps btwn ntitis a ightl mltiplid to inn-it, h lavs no gap at all btwn a thing’s inhnt alit and its cts onoth things. Bt this is a a small pic than that paid b taditional al-ism, with its stict sggation btwn hmans and things, and its modl o ‘alit’ as a dll indpndnt stat o aais that th mind is ocd to coplik a haassd stdnt at som da povincial at school.

C. LOCAL OCCASIONALISMW now tn to what I hav calld th doctin o local occasionalism.This is pobabl Lato’s gatst achivmnt in philosoph, and povids(as a as I can s) an npcdntd thm in th long histo o mta-phsics. Whil mainstam alism is sall sn as th gat champion o



Contibtions 113

casalit, it ml assts th xistnc o casation against dobts whilshdding no light on how it woks. Th casal pow o nat is wildd asa swod against both xtm thists who dn it and skptics who dobt it.

Islamic occasionalism was opposd b Avos, and Hm was opposdb an nmb o alist citics. Bt whnv natal casation is savd inthis ad hoc wa om its adical citics, an impotant insight is lost. Fo this a t ash o gnis shad b th occasionalists and th skptics, andit coms om thi willingnss to ct things o in an inn li, sing tolt thm bld into ach oth withot th xplanation. In both th oc-casionalist and skptical taditions, lations a xtnal to th things thatlat. Th sol nlck point is that occasionalists and skptics do not pshthi insight to its maximm limit, sinc both sstms a basd on a cown-

ing hpocis. As occasionalists s it, i cannot bn cotton thn Godcan still do it. Bt sinc it is nv claid how God can bn cotton i cannot, onl th shod o ocial pit can bolst this billiant bt hal-hatd doctin. And whil skptics also claim to dobt th link btwn and cotton, th hav alwas alad linkd ths ntitis in th am-shackl om o cstom o habit. At all, Hm nv dnis that I link ,cotton, and bning in m mind; h ml dispts that th ncssailhav atonomos pow otsid m xpinc o thm.

Th stngth and waknss o ths dnials o casation shold now bcla. Thi stngth lis in th dsvd atonom th gant to alitis aspl xtnal to on anoth—whth ll-blown sbstancs o th occa-sionalists o dismbodid qalitis o th skptics. Nothing ‘points’ towadanthing ls o blds into anthing ls. evthing withdaws into itsl;all bidgs a ownd and opatd ith b God o th hman mind. Thwaknss o both thois is th sam: th allow a singl pampd ntit tobak th ban on lations that is cll nocd on all oths. Both tho-is att th dal tann o a singl acto allowd to dominat th st.

No is th dispt btwn ths mio-imag philosophis st a dst his-toical sidshow, sinc it contins to gid s toda. Fo th dl btwnoccasionalists and skptics can b wittn as that btwn th so-calld a-tionalists and mpiicists, who Kant claims to hav nid in his own phi-losoph. Svntnth cnt continntal thoght, om Dscats thoghLibniz, poclaims th indpndnc o sbstancs mdiatd onl b God (oidntical with God, as in Spinoza’s cas). Manwhil, th mpiicists placnid sbstancs with qalitis that a abitail linkd and bndld bth habits o hman obsvs. Th tann o God and sbstanc plagsth st gop, whil th tann o mind and qalitis nslavs th scond.Both gops nit to sppss th pivat local acto, who is now dcd i-th to a pppt o th Dit o to a m appaanc in consciosnss. Onth oth sid o th nc, thogh th Aistotlian aith in dict casation isctainl admiabl, it lacks th insight o ths xtmists thogh its ail




to adopt th mtal xtnalit o things, which th xtmists am witha lcid xtmism. Kantian ml blnds th wost o both options: ltting things link togth in th mind as long as th claim no xta-phnomnal

stats, and allowing o al things-in-thmslvs whil giving thm no p-mission to intact. In this spct th Copnican standpoint givs s occa-sionalism and skpticism olld into on, sondd b nmis that choosonl sid o th oth: Gman Idalism ml tmpts th hman sido th dalism; natalism taks th inhman sid, bt nv acs p to thoccasionalist poblm xcpt to mock it onc in awhil ding intodctocoss. Non o ths gops sm abl to do two things at onc; non o thm know how to allow o local casation and pa spct to th absoltmtal xtioit o things.

To pat, occasionalists and skptics ag in dning individal thingsth atonomos pow to nt lations. This sms to mak thm th op-posit o Lato, sinc h is sch an adnt champion o lations. yt this no contadiction at all in isolating things om on anoth and mak-ing thm lational, as sn vn bo Lato in th cass o Libniz andWhithad. Th Libnizian monads a mios o oth things, t tha insla mios in dict contact onl with God. Fo Whithad, actalntitis mtall phnd on anoth and a vn mad p ntil o -lations, sinc othwis th wold b m ‘vacos actalitis’. yt thdo not phnd ach oth dictl; this occs b wa o th ‘tnal obcts’ that a ond onl in God. Fo Whithad as o Lato, lations aa diclt result , not an as stating point. Hin lis th clos link o bothathos with th occasionalist tadition. Fo Lato an acto is dnd bits cnt alliancs—bt this dos not man that it has no poblm nt-ing nw ons! Th clast poo o this act can alwas b ond in Lato’sobsssion with tanslation, along with his vhmnt dnial that actos con-tain t stats in potentia . Whithad’s appal to God and tnal obcts

placs him too ml in th taditional occasionalist camp, with its cntalhpocis o a singl ntit mdiating all lations. Lato avoids this pit-all, ganting th om dtis o God to joliot and all oth actos. In ad-dition, Lato also scaps th dadlock o Kant and th mpiicists b d-ning th claim o th hman mind to hav monopol ights ov lations.Hman and non-hman actos lat acoss contlss gaps, and this bidg-ing occs constantl. Th wok o bidging alwas mains poblmatic,thogh it mst b solvd locall ath than b som god o hman mind.Fo Lato, actos a linkd onl whn som oth acto makes thm link.Th tm I hav otn sd o this is ‘vicaios casation’, as opposd to th‘occasional casation’ that too asil sggsts a wathbatn tholog.6 Lato is on o th w to ais th poblm o th v nature o casation,

6. S Gaham Haman, ‘On Vicaios Casation’, Collapse , vol. II, Oxod, 2007.



Contibtions 115

which natalists ml tak o gantd. Moov, h plas th pat o Galilo b dning that th a two kinds o casation, on o nat andanoth o th hman alm. Th impact o acid on sashlls is no long

dint in kind om Casa’s ct on Cato o Hawaiian stl gitas onMississippi Dlta bls. Th point o a tho o casation is not to dchmans to th atomic o molcla, bt to giv an accont o casation thatis boad nogh to mbac vthing om ntons to amis o ocs omModo.

Th occasionalist tadition st aos in al Islam, o thological a-sons. Ctain passags o th Qur’an sggst God’s dict innc on vnth mintst vnts, and som o th aithl dw boad conclsions. Inthi s, to gant an casal agnc to catd things wold amont to

making thm miniat catos—a blasphmos slt. Hnc, God mstb dictl sponsibl o vthing that happns, and mst b capablvn o th illogical and th malicios: sch as making two pls two qalv, o snding a st man to Hll o no ason whatsov. In th Ash‘aitmtaphsics o atoms and accidnts, God intvns to povid things withthi accidnts, and sinc ndanc itsl was viwd as st anoth soto accidnt, ntitis wold vanish with v passing momnt i not ss-taind o catd b Allah. With Dscats ths thms mak thi b-latd appaanc in th Wst and dominat th svntnth cnt in va-ios oms that a sbtl distingishd whil th wid point is missd.Dscats’s poblm, having split catd sbstancs into two distinct kinds,is how th thoghts o th mind cold v act th motions o th bod.God alon sms capabl o bidging th gap. Onc th Catsian res extensa is agmntd into atoms b Codmo and oths, Malbanch is ocdto xtnd God’s hand into th lations btwn bodis thmslvs. Thlimitd mind-bod poblm tns into a bod-bod poblm. Occasionalcas bcoms global onc mo, as it alad was o th Ash‘ait Mslims.

Fo Bno Lato th poblm is global as wll, sinc th link btwn onatom and anoth is no dint in kind om that btwn th rd Amand th Pop. W hav sn that Lato solvs th poblm withot gant-ing niq lational pivilgs to ith God o th hman mind. In thiswa, Bno Lato is th st secular occasionalist : th ond o what I havcalld vicaios casation. An ntit is abl to om th link btwn oth-s that pviosl had no intactions at all. Lato also concds that lo-cal cass might ail in thi ots: an intsting tagic sid o casationthat was alwas dnid, o obvios asons, to God. joliot might sccd inlinking politics with ntons, o lik Pocht h might nd his das as a dis-cditd op. Links a not as to cat, vn thogh th happn v-wh all th tim.

W tn onc mo to th skptical and mpiicist taditions. It is wllknown that Hm was an admi o Malbanch and gatl appciatd




his dobts abot dict casal links. Bt o Hm th is still a link b-twn things. Thogh not a al link mad b God btwn sbstancs,it is an appant on mad b hman habit btwn distinct impssions

o qalitis. Th hman mind links bad with noishmnt o withpain dspit no ncssa connction btwn ths alitis. Hman habitis vn sponsibl o shaping qalitis into ‘bndls’, b habitall psm-ing that th colo, txt, shap, and avo o an appl all blong to onand th sam nid thing (a stp that Hssl vss, with his claim thatsch qalitis manat om a pio nid appl). Dspit all his skpticalclaims, Hm nv dnis that habit cats sch links— o course it dos. Hml dnis that w hav poo o atonomos ntitis ling otsid opcptions, with an inhnt abilit to om links in thi own ight whn

hman habit is not watching. Cstom is to Hm what God is to th oc-casionalists: th onl gnin link btwn spaat alitis, vn thoghths alitis o him a qalitis ath than sbstancs. Lato’s point o agmnt with Hm is cla nogh, sinc both ag that things a notdint om thi attibts. What savs Lato om skpticism is his d-nial that hmans hav th sol pow to cat links. An acto is abl to linkoths. Fo Lato it is not human habit that links nmos machin-patsinto a singl woking machin, o man atoms into a singl ston. Instad,habit ls sistd b th machin and ston.

I hav sd ‘joliot’ as a nicknam o actos in gnal, sinc all actosmst do what joliot did. Obcts connct things that nd not hav bnconnctd, and somtims th ail to do so. Lato’s pincipl o idc-tion taght s that nothing is inhntl ith dcibl o idcibl toanthing ls: wok mst b don to mak a connction btwn thm, andthis is alwas isk. In this wa Lato gants th spaation o actos andtis to show how th gaps btwn thm a bidgd b th wok o tans-lation. This maks him th ond o a novl occasionalist tho in which

gaps a bidgd locall. Lik th occasionalists h ss actos as ct o omon anoth, bt unlike th occasionalists h thinks that local lations apossibl. Lato simpl cannot b ndstood i this jans-hadd pinciplis ovlookd. Actos a dnd b thi lations, bt precisely or this reason th a ct o in thi own lational micocosms, which nd o onlan instant bo th acto is placd b a simila acto. Th wok o mdia-tion mst b don at v momnt to sto o maintain th links btwnactos. Whil abndant paadoxs ais om this dobl otlook, th ath v paadoxs that dsv to b th topic o philosoph toda. Lt thLatoian school o mtaphsics commnc.







119

6

Qstions

An old maxim stats that th a two kinds o citics: thos who want s tosccd, and thos who want s to ail. Dbat is alwas tdios whn con-dctd with psons o th latt kind. Whv w tn, th a popping balloons and spilling oil on th oo; w nd oslvs conontd not onl

with agmnts, bt with nmistakabl aggssions o voic and phsicalpost. yt sch gsts o spmac ild no tass vn o th vic-tos, and somhow alwas sm to solidi th status quo. It is analogos to‘citiqing’ long-distanc bss b pncting thi ts, assing that noon lavs town and nothing is iskd. Bt ai pla dmands that w lt thbss lav. I w mak no concssions and pla along with nothing, thno ‘citical’ claims ml ndos on o th pabicatd positions o thda, whichv on it ma b. Toda’s citics stand not onl o citiq, btsall o a wa hman/wold dalism that is ith amd o lsalsl ovcom b gling two pics togth that shold nv hav x-istd in th st plac. I som andom cank w to asst that vthing in th wold is mad o ith wood o mtal, w wold oppos him not bpholding a pimal ‘wood-mtal’ that pvnts ths two matials omv xisting in isolation, bt simpl b obsving that woodn vs. mtallicis not a ndamntal it. Th sam alization shold occ with th dismalopposition and qall dismal conciliation o hman and wold. BnoLato shows this mo vividl than an atho w hav known. B stat-

ing with contlss actos ath than a p-givn dalit o two types o ac-tos, h shits philosoph om its stalmatd tnch wa towad th ichnsso things thmslvs. Nmos bakthoghs ollow om this dcision, asth pcding pags hav tid to show.

Th a good asons not to nd this book with a ‘citiq’ o Lato’s




philosoph, givn that I wish him to sccd ath than ail. It is child’s plato nd mistaks and discpancis in gs o th od o Plato, Agstin,o Hgl. ev gat philosoph has bn td contlss tims b citics

long ogottn, t w contin to ad ths thinks whil ogtting mosto thi citics. Aistotl nots that sbstanc is onl sbstanc whn it cansppot opposit qalitis at dint tims. Likwis, a philosoph ma bmost sbstantial whn it sggsts th most possibl contadicto adings.W cannot dc a philosoph to a list o distinct agmnts, bcas this no philosoph (o at last no good on) who dos not tt statmnts thata appantl at odds with on anoth. A philosoph is mo lik a sb-stanc o a pson than a list o consistnt statmnts, and o this ason itnds to b psntd in th mann o biogaph, ath than as a chain o

t and als ttancs.Lato otn nots that citiq maks things lss al whn th goal -

all oght to b to mak thm mo al. Th dama o hman nlightn-mnt is otn potad as an limination o gllibl bli and an incasin citical distanc towad th wold. Bt nv hav hmans blivd in -mot and lss accssibl ntitis than toda. In oldn tims th ma havbn mo angls, omns, and saints than now, bt in thi plac w havvn wid psona as o nighbos: qasas, black hols, ntons, di-nosas, continntal dit, Nandthals, th Oot Clod, nconscios oc-s. rcnt philosoph has not matchd this ast o scintic ntitis, andoddl imagins that it bcoms mo lik scinc th mo it tas downv claim and xplods v ntit in th nam o ‘pasimon’. rad agood popla wok on scinc, thn ad an aticl b Bno Lato andanoth b a mainstam analtic philosoph, and o will nd that it isLato who minds o mo o th scintists.

Instad o tipping and bating a philosoph o its spposd alts onlto nd p with th sam ang o mdioc biass with which w bgan,

w oght to nd a mo vigoos mans o ngagmnt with philosophs.Th mthod I popos is to plac th piosl ovvald ‘citical thinking’with a sldom-sd hyperbolic thinking. Fo m at last, it is onl books o thmost stnning waknss that daw attntion to non sequiturs and oth logi-cal allacis. Th books that sti s most a not thos containing th w-st os, bt thos that thow most light on nknown potions o th map.In th cas o an atho who intsts s, w shold not ask ‘wh a thmistaks h?’, as i w hopd o nothing mo than to avoid bing oold.W shold ask instad: ‘what i this book, this think, w th most impo-tant o th cnt? How wold things nd to chang? And in what waswold w l both libatd and impisond?’ Sch qstions sto thpop scal o valation o intllctal wok: dmoting th psh ca-ist sandbagg who mains within th bonds o th cntl plasibl andpdnt, and pomoting th gambl who ncovs nw wolds. Nitzsch



Qstions 121

maks a mo ‘mistaks’ than an avag p-viwd onal aticl,bt this dos not stop intllignt adlts om ading him all night long,whil tossing th aticl asid o a da that nv coms.

Th is an obvios wa to pt th hpbolic mthod into pactic.Naml, w shold bgin b placing an givn atho in a position o maxi-mm stngth. This is bst don b mans o th imagination. Lt’s imag-in that Lato’s mtaphsics somda achivs absolt victo. Thoghnow positiond at th ings o mainstam philosoph, h is vntallblssd with a stnning vsal o otn. Thogh a vait o timphsand lck accidnts Lato attains complt hgmon in th philosophicalwold. Th analtic and continntal schools ad om mmo, as gna-tions o ong thinks wholhatdl adopt th mtaphsics o Lato. In

th a 2050, stdnts woldwid a dilld in th maxims o Irreductions ,whil dissnts a maginalizd and qickl ad om viw. In Pais,Oxod, Boston, and Toko, compils dispt th xact maning o thMast, as most o th om pzzls o philosoph now sm to hav bnsolvd. W still nd waing schools o Latoians and a w otlaw h-sis, bt th is no on who qstions th basic pincipls o his wok. Tosom xtnt w can imagin what this wold wold look lik. A nw mpii-cal spiit pvads philosoph: von doing mtaphsics is now doing ‘x-pimntal mtaphsics’, dvloping thi catgois thogh dict std o actal volcanos, apicots, o tains. Th old modn split btwn hmanand wold is now a ossil idicld as svl as p-Galilan phsics, anddcads o Kant-inspid analtic and continntal pblications sm lik atagic wast o pap. eldl social constctionists and whit-haid mat-ialists a d om thi podims and haassd into timnt, csing th nam o Bno Lato as th dpat. evn th scinc was hav nddwith a smashing victo o Lato—th nw bd o phsicist salts himas a ho. Black boxs a now a stapl o v philosophical dictiona,

and sbstanc is a add mmo o sta. Th nti histo o modnphilosoph is wittn with Lato’s mgnc in mind. Fo m at last, itis a plasant dadam—a a c om th Didan tannis o m st-dnt as. Bt th is no edn in o wold. I Latoian mtaphsics wnocd with all th violnc o dogma, it is likl that vn his gatst ad-mis wold l misgivings. Whn thinking o a a 2050 in which Latohas bcom a g o igid othodox, I t to imagin th vaios was inwhich I wold l both happ and nhapp. What wold b missing omthis intllctal wold? I I w to bl against somthing in sch a lativpaadis, what wold it b?

Fo m, th a phaps v things that wold b missing om scha wold, points I wold b willing to contst vn at th cost o banishmntom th Latoian citadl. Fist, th a poblms aising om th -lational modl o ntitis. Scond, th idntit o a thing with its qalitis




might b sspctd o additional poblms. Thid, althogh matialism isgavl wondd, it still has a nal hiding plac. Foth, th a n-solvd isss concning th tanslation btwn actos. And th, man

isss o cosmolog hav bn lt to th sid, ndvlopd. This chaptwill bi consid ach o ths qstions, sktchd olonl as i in 2050,amidst th cshing dominanc o th Latoian School.

A. reLATIONISM AND COrreLATIONISM

eal in 2006, Qntin Millassox pblishd his otstanding book Après la Finitude .1 Thogh th atho ss ‘mtaphsics’ as a ngativ tm, his spc-lativ philosoph is still a good xampl o mtaphsics as dndd in th

psnt book. Instad o ml winging his hands ov obstctd path-was o hman accss to th wold, Millassox achs nmos distinctconclsions thogh ason alon: th indpndnt alit o th wold, thdistinction btwn pima and sconda qalitis, th ncssa ttho th law o non-contadiction, and th ncssa contingnc o th lawso nat. At th long, cold wint o hman-cntd philosoph, thblbid sings again! Bt th ason I cit Millassox’s book h is o hiscntal polmic, whos dsving tagt is a widspad doctin h tms‘colationism’. Th colationist holds that w cannot think o hmans

withot wold, no wold withot hmans, bt onl o a pimal colationo appot btwn th two. Fo th colationist, it is impossibl to spako a wold that p-xistd hmans in itsel , bt onl o a wold p-xisting hmans or humans . Th Big Bang is not an ancstal alit pcding h-man bings, bt onl happnd in itsl or us , a phas opnl ndosd bMla-Pont and phld b man oths. A lag potion o cnt phi-losoph vads alism with this colationist dodg, which bgins to dis-solv bo o s as soon as it has a nam.

In man spcts, Millassox’s book is a highl n-Latoian pod-ct. His discssions o scinc mak no appal to mdiatos and pa noattntion to actal scintic pactic, which Lato taks as th hallmako his mthod. Th distinction btwn pima and sconda qalitisis on that Lato cold nv accpt, spciall sinc Millassox holdsthat pima qalitis a thos that can b mathmatizd. Bt th in-tsting qstion is whth Lato cold b dscibd as a colation-ist. In Fba 2007, Lato gnosl hostd a salon in Pais to discssMillassox’s book. Gatl cios abot this vnt, I took th libt o

contacting th cntal gs, who gav nioml wam acconts o thvning. espciall intiging was Millassox’s pot o a sl-dpcating

1. Qntin Millassox, Après la nitude , Pais, editions d Sil, 2006. Th book has -cntl bcom availabl in english as Ater Finitude , bt ncs in this chapt a to thoiginal Fnch vsion, and ndd into english b th psnt atho.



Qstions 123

ok plad b his host. On th shmnts tabl, Lato had st a placadading: ‘Wlcom to this colationist hos!’.2 Howv nsiosl th ok was mant, th qstion mains as to whth Lato all is a co-

lationist. In lag pat I hav dndd his claim to th mantl o alism.Bt Millassox’s book dnis that th colationist can b a alist, sinc apmannt hman-wold colat is not condciv to an alit that woldscap sch a appot.

Lt’s bgin b viwing Lato’s appantl most colationist mo-mnt. In addssing th poblm o whth micobs xistd bo Past,Lato’s conclsion was this: ‘ Ater 1864 aibon gms w th all along’(PH, p. 173). In oth wods, micobs did not p-xist Past in th stictsns, bt p-xistd Past onl or Pasteur and o thos who inhabit his

tadition. Past vnts a podcd toactivl withot having bn thall along in thi own ight. Now, this is pcisl th sot o statmnt thatMillassox’s st chapt assalts. H imagins th colationist both-hood saing that ‘vnt x happns man as bo hmans— or humans […]’.3 Th wold nd it absd that th cold b ‘givnnss o a bing pio to its givnnss’,4 and wold concld that ‘[a] bing is not pio togivnnss, bt is given as pio to givnnss’.5 Fo colationists, thn, anpast momnt is a toactiv podct ath than an indpndntl p-xisting stat o aais. Millassox obsvs th that this attitd d-stos th lital maning o scintic statmnts. Indd, h closs with aqstion that Lato might asil ha om Sokal o Winbg instad: ‘itis nogh to pos th ollowing qstion to th colationist: but what hap- pened 4.56 million years ago? Did th omation o th ath tak plac: so no?’6 Fo Millassox th answ mst b ith s o no, not Lato’sqalid s/no hbid. Th onl answ that avoids colationism woldb ‘s, th ath was omd 4.56 million as ago… whth w lik ito not’. At this point, Lato’s at on th Danton looks v mch lik

a colationist hos.yt th is anoth sid to th sto that mst not b ogottn.Colationism is nith matialism no absolt idalism, sinc it glshman and wold togth om th stat, giving pnc to nith. Btw hav otn sn that gl is not Lato’s pd matial o nding th hman/wold divid. Naml, h dos not sa that hman and woldcannot b spaatd bcas th a ‘inxticabl linkd’, bt sas instadthat w shold not spak o two sch zons at all. Most actos a mad o

2. Millassox. Psonal Commnication, lctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 21Fba, 2007. tans. Gaham Haman.

3. Millassox, Après la nitude , p. 30.4. Millassox, Après la nitude , p. 32, mphasis movd.5. Millassox, Après la nitude , p. 32.6. Millassox, Après la nitude , p. 34.




so man hman and nonhman componnts that it wold b idiclos toassign thm to on o ths kingdoms o th oth. In oth wods, Lato’s rst step in philosoph is to dismiss th v two tms that th colationist

wants to combin. Lato no mo dnds a hman/wold colat thana solid/liqid colat o a pimal appot o basts and bids. Whil thcolationist holds that hman and wold a alwas linkd, and also holdsthat nothing xists in itsl apat om sch a link, ths a two spaat ac-csations (Millassox dos not spaat th two claims, bt in m viw hshold hav don so). As o th st chag, Lato’s dnial that hman andwold a two pivilgd zons o th wold savs him om th ‘colation-ist’ labl that h hal-okingl applid to himsl. Soon I will sggst that hiscolationist ading o th a 1864 is simpl a bidg too a, not a co

lmnt o his thinking. As o th scond chag, Lato does dn indpn-dnt stats o aais that li otsid all links btwn actos. Bt mmbthat h nv sas that hmans nd to b witnsss to th link, and is som-tims xplicit that th do not. Hnc th chag shold b downgaddom ‘colationism’ to ‘lationism’, a lss ons that som wold p- to dciminaliz altogth (thogh I msl main a hadlin dg).To pat, Lato’s pimal colation btwn an acto and its allis is notth sam thing as a colation btwn hman and wold. A mo accatsign on Lato’s dining tabl wold ad: ‘Wlcom to this relationist hos!’

Lt’s consid th iss th. Fo th colationist, not onl a thno indpndnt stats o aais apat om th pimal appot, bt a h-man obsv mst also b on o th two ingdints o this appot. Btth cas o Hidgg shows that on can bliv that hman and wolda alwas linkd withot bliving that th wold is ll nvild in thislationship. And th cas o Whithad shows how on can b a lation-ist withot bing a colationist. Fo Whithad, that pod bl againstKant’s Copnican tn, hmans hav no pivilg at all; w can spak in

th sam wa o th lation btwn hmans and what th s and thatbtwn hailstons and ta. In Irreductions , Lato said that tanslations alsoocc btwn nonhman things, and did not add th poviso that hmansmst b th to obsv it. Fo this ason a Latoian phsics is conciv-abl, nlik o most contmpoa thinks; his global ocs on actos al-lows o a possibl tatmnt o inanimat bodis b th sam st o lsthat a sd to dscib hman tanslations. It is t that Lato’s booksocs ovwhlmingl on scintic pactic, and povid onl th most ick-ing hints o ntwoks dvoid o hman involvmnt. Bt this lack o m-phasis on th inanimat alm is not nogh to mak somon a hman/wold colationist, spciall whn that pson bgan his ca with thollowing wods: ‘Fo a long tim it has bn agd that th lationship b-twn on txt and anoth is alwas a matt o intptation. Wh notaccpt that this is also t btwn so-calld txts and so-calld obcts, and



Qstions 125

even between so-called objects themselves ?’ (PF, p. 166, mphasis addd). This m-tal tanslation btwn all bands o obcts is oign to v om o co-lationist philosoph.

Dspit not living in a colationist hos, Lato dos hav cola-tionist momnts. Th xampl o micobs in 1864 sms to qi that h-mans had to lan abot micobs bo th cold toactivl bgin toxist in th past. This claim wold nag an alist, sinc it sms to dna wold apat om hman pcption o that wold. Bt as alad sggst-d, this shold b viwd ml as a bidg too a, not as a cntal ato Lato’s position. Th ason is that h not onl could hav avoidd sch atho o tim, bt vn should hav avoidd it givn his gnal viws on ac-tos. Lato’s main point is that alit is mad o propositions , in Whithad’s

sns o th tm—dnd not as vbal statmnts b conscios hmans,bt mtal lations in which two things aticlat ach oth v mo l-l. Past bings micobs into ocs om th dbios g matt and va-ios smptoms thogh which th a annoncd; in tn, micobs bing Past into ocs as a gnis and national ho. Past and th micobsnd on anoth. Thogh Lato limits himsl to th statmnt ‘at 1864micobs w th all along’, h wold sl b willing to add th alt-nat vsion that ‘at 1864 Past was thi discov all along’. This lat-t phnomnon is amilia to ads o th al chapts o biogaphis,whn w obsv th childhoods o Past, Hgl, Cathin th Gat, oMaxwll with thi lat achivmnts alad in mind. Th was nothing clal lctomagntic abot th two-a-old Maxwll, and nothing vi-dntl philosophical abot th nwbon Hgl, t thi al livs and vnthi ancstos tnd to tak on a toactiv halo o t bakthogh. Foth sam ason, it sms to ollow that th was nothing micobial abotmicobs in th a 1492, sinc all th alliancs thogh which th latbcam known a missing.

Th poblm is that th two sids o th poposition a tatd asm-mticall. Fist w hav ‘at 1864 micobs w th all along’, and sc-ond ‘at 1864 Past was thi discov all along’. Not that th scondstatmnt is no that to alism, sinc all it dos is mildl condmn th wll-known hman tndnc to toct lat biogaphical vnts back into thpast. All that th statmnt dnis is that Past caid som latnt gnisthat p-xistd his dalings with micobs. Thogh I wold psonall dis-ag vn h, th point is not hotl contovsial, and Lato’s lilong bod o wok dos a gat dal to bolst it. Actos co-podc on anoth;Past and th micobs nd ach oth. Fai nogh. Th al contov-s coms om th st statmnt, which sms to impl that Past catdobcts ex nihilo b discoving thm. Lato nv dnis that Pasteur was al-ad aliv in 1850, bt dos sm to dn that micobs w psnt at thatdat. H nv sas ‘at 1864 Pasteur xistd in 1850’, bt dos sa that ‘at




1864 microbes xistd in 1850’. Th asmmt is obvios. And h is th bidg too a. It will widl b gantd that Past and

micobs mtall aticlat on anoth, althogh som hav opposd this

ida o ims asons. Man will also gant (as I do not) that th is noth-ing mo to ths ntitis than thi whol st o lations with oth things.What must not b gantd is that Past has mo ight to xist bo 1864than micobs do. To avoid possibl consion, lt’s spak o ‘Past’ and‘micobs’ onl as thos actos that bgan to xist in 1864. W can thn sth nam ‘p-Past’ to point to th man bo his discov, and ‘p-micob’ to dsignat th ntit h appantl discovd. W know that‘p-Past’ was aliv thoghot th 1850’s; it wold b madnss to claimothwis. Bt what abot ‘p-micobs’? Did th xist bo 1864: s o

no? Th answ mst b s. Somthing was poming mltipl actions:spoiling win, mnting milk, killing shp and childn. Baing somdastic vision o cnt biolog, th p-micob was that thing. Givnthat Lato’s tho o actos dos allow o th wok o tanslation to oc-c vn btwn non-hman obcts sch as micobs, milk, and win, itis notnat that h dos not dscib thi lations apat om th ps-nc o Past.

Bt indd, Lato’s own Whithadian s o ‘poposition’ actall re-quires that th actos xist bo th a linkd; othwis th wold bnothing o ith o thm to aticlat. H shold hav mphasizd not onlPast’s aticlation o th micob and its cipocal aticlation o him,bt also th mtal appot o micobs with milk and th hman bod,which long pdats thi appot with mdical knowldg. Th ail todo this lads dictl to colationism, which qis hmans to b on in-gdint in vthing that xists. Bt i this is a ail, thn it is a tacticalxcss ath than a statgic aw at th hat o Lato’s wok. At all,his philosoph dmands that th two ingdints o allianc a not hman

and wold, bt an two actos whatv. M sspicion is that Lato cossdthis dangos bidg bcas o his viw that an acto is no dint omits sm total o qalitis and cts. Sinc no on had oml nitd th vag g-colod matt with th dath o pigs and th cdling o milk,Past bcoms th joliot who links thm, and o this ason h mightsm mo th invnto than th discov o micobs. Bt this cannot bt. Th micobs thmslvs w alad mini-joliots, linking thi vai-os ‘allis’ wll bo hmans knw o thm. Past ml linkd th mi-cob with a nw st o allis: lab dictos, hginic pactics, mdical o-nals, Fanc, and vaios honos and awads. Thogh inction and mnthad not t bn linkd b hman knowldg, th w alad linkdthogh th micobs thmslvs.

Fo this ason, it was nncssa o Lato to sa that th p-mi-cob ndd Past to xist an mo than Past ndd th micob to



Qstions 127

contin li as nomal, nhaldd p-Past. Bt b contast, it is a cen-tral Latoian thm that th micob (o p-micob) cannot xist i it a-cts nothing at all. I th micob casd no changs in win o milk, th

sonding ai, th bodis o animals, th md o a ck, o anthing ls,thn Lato wold dn its xistnc altogth. This is what I hav calldLato’s relationism: Past and th micob a dnd b thi sm totalo cts, not b an atonomos hiddn ssnc. Th ath dint cor-relationist viw, ond o instanc in Hidgg, is that th micob did notxist ntil hman Dasin nvild it, sinc no alit maks an sns i h-man bing is sbtactd om th pict. I w imagin all hman catswipd om th cosmos, w cannot imagin Hidgg’s philosoph dscib-ing this sitation. yt on cold sl dvlop a Latoian accont o stl-

la clods and black hols intacting with thi nighbos both bo andat th misabl bi lispan o th hman ac. Lato is intinsicalla lationist bt a colationist onl now and thn. M ppos h is notto dnd Lato om som t Millassoxian citic, bt onl to nsthat h civs pop cdit o xploding th hman-wold appot o thcolationist. To scap th colationist gip, it is not nogh to ddcthat somthing mst p-xist th colat. W mst also dscib how thpats o this ‘somthing’ intact. Lato’s dmocac o actos is th bstmans I know o to dpiv hman bings o thi illgal monopol on la-tions, which is st as naow as th ali stanglhold gantd to God oth hman mind. Th is a poblm posd b th lation btwn any twoactos, not st hman and wold.

Having dalt with th colationist poblm, th iss is now lation-ism itsl. Th is no qstion that Lato dns actos in tms o thilations. An obct is no mo than what it modis, tansoms, ptbs,o cats, as w ad in Pandora’s Hope . Th is not a ‘somthing mo’ oLato, a latnt sbstanc hiddn om pblic viw bnath an acto’s ovt

pomanc. An acto is compltl actalizd in an momnt, inscibdwithot sv in its cnt schm o alliancs. Th tm somtims sdo this doctin is ‘actalism’, and som athos nd it pllant. Th spc-t o actalism divs ro Bhaska7 om ntitis to th laws th mst ob-sv, and divs Manl DLanda8 om ntitis to a topological spac inwhich th nold. B contast, Lato shows a maximm commitmnt toactalism. Whithad’s ontological pincipl dnis that w can pass b- ond conct ntitis whn xplaining anthing, and this lmnt o thWhithadian pogam is on om which Lato nv vs.

W hav sn that th actalist viw o actos is miniscnt o th an-cint Mgaians, citicizd b Aistotl with sch and loqnc. Th

7. S ro Bhaska, A Realist Theory o Science , London, Continm, 2006.8. S Manl DLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London, Continm, 2002.




Mgaians hold that a thing onl is what it is, with no sct inn chambshiddn in sv. As Aistotl nots, this wold ntail that things hav nopotntial, and wold also ntail that a thing is not hot o swt nlss it is

tochd o tastd. Lato wold b happ to accpt ths implications; hgladl dnis th potntialit o actos as wll as thi possssion o pimaqalitis divocd om lations to oth things. Lato wold also dismiss Aistotl’s complaint that accoding to th Mgaian doctin a sitting p-son will nv b abl to stand d to his lack o potnc. Fo Lato a psondos not stand p b dawing on an inn svoi o potnc, bt thogha sis o mdiations—nvos xcitations acting on mscls, which thnshit th bod’s wight onto a had, nilding oo. Nmos allis aboght into pla vn in th simplst movmnts o o bodis.

Bt h again th a two spaat isss in pla. Potntialit is onthing, and th distinction btwn pima and sconda qalitis is an-oth. Lt’s bgin with potntial. Lato’s ction o potnc gos back toth pincipl o idction itsl. To spak o somthing xisting in poten-tia implis that it is alad th bt simpl covd o sppssd. This iswhat Lato dnis. Fo him a thing is onl h onc it is h, not soon.To mak somthing bcom actal is not to nold a cptic sd ling hid-dn in th gond, bt to assmbl a wid ang o actos that bgin in sp-aation. Fo instanc, it wold mak no sns to call joliot ‘th potntial a-th o th atomic bomb’, xcpt in a pl lita wa. What joliot woldhav ndd to do, and what Oppnhim did do, is hlp pic togthan assmblag o ntons, hav wat, anim, cannon assmblis, pl-tonim, implosion dvics, distillation cascads, al sits, mtallgists,scit gads, loalt oaths, govnmnt nds, phsics aticls, politicalallis, milita allis, wondd gos, and tagt lists. Th atomic bomb didnot li slmbing in an o ths lmnts—not vn in Oppnhim him-sl, who bcam dicto o th Manhattan Poct lagl b accidnt, and

to th gat spis o man who dobtd his managmnt skills. In thisspct Lato’s actalism shold b appladd. B dnding potntialit, Aistotl King o ralists vs stangl om atonomos alit towadan vn mo lation-dpndnt tho than Lato’s own. Fo in whatsns is an oak t ‘alad in’ th acon? Onl in th sns that th aconcontains actual ats that gt th st st o tanslations ndwa on thlong and winding oad to th oak. To sa that somthing has potntial is todn it in tms o th oth things that it might somda act. Latodos not mind dning an acto b what it acts, bt h dos not allow anacto to boow its cts in advanc. Pamnt in al tim is dmandd atv stag o th tanslation. In this sns, Lato nv dpats om thal b snaking ahad to th nd o th sto, lik a dvios bo ading thnal o a Ha Pott tal bo his boths. Fo Aistotl, a thing is al-was mo than what it is ight now; o Lato, nv. A thing changs b



Qstions 129

nolling oth actos, not b nviling a p-xistnt intio. Th costo potntialit is a dodg that lavs actalit ndtmind and nall n-intsting; it dcs what is cntl actal to th tansint costm o an

mgnt pocss acoss tim, and maks th al wok happn otsid ac-talit itsl. Th sam holds t i w plac ‘th potntial’ with ‘th vi-tal’, notwithstanding thi dincs. In both cass, conct actos thm-slvs a dmd inscint o th labo o th wold and a indntdto hiddn ovlods: whth th b potntial, vital, vild, topological,xional, o an adctiv that tis to scap om what is actall hight now. On this point I can onl salt Lato, th ancint Mgaians,and oth dnds o actalism.

yt m agmnt is sspndd whn th dn th dinc btwn

pima and sconda qalitis. H w hav th ccial point: th vstonghold o lationism. I hav alad agd with Lato that pimaand sconda shold not b idntid with wold and hman—as i thwold w mad ml o obctiv stats o aais, and hmans m-l taintd thm with distotion o copid thm with cospondnc. Fotwo actos to nt into lation (‘poposition’), thos actos mst xist inod to lat. And i th actos xist th mst also hav qalitis, oothwis th wold b atlss lmps no dint om on anoth.Lato might concd this point, bt h wold still hav a powl wap-on in hand. Naml, whil admitting that Past th man mst hav c-tain qalitis bo discoving micobs, h wold add that ths qalitisa thmslvs th slt o alliancs with a pvios st o actos. And tnogh, Past ding th 1850’s was not oating in som othwoldl vacm o ssnc, bt was alad in lag with contlss allis dintom his lat and mo amos ons. At an momnt o li, Past smsto b dnd b th allis h nolls. This haks back to Mla-Pont’sstatmnt that ‘th hos itsl is not th hos sn om nowh, bt th

hos sn om everywhere ’.9

Th is no Past-in-himsl, bt onl Pastin lation with vthing that h modis, tansoms, ptbs, and c-ats. In this wa, all o his qalitis might b calld sconda qalitis stas Bkl dmands. Pima qalitis hav nowh to xist, sinc Pastand vthing ls is stippd o an dak intio.

Th a xactl two poblms with this lationist modl o th cos-mos, and in m viw th a sv nogh that th modl mst b aban-dond. Fist, lationism dos instic to th uture o an acto, b notxplaining how it can chang. Scond, lationism dos instic to th

present o an acto, b not allowing it to b al otsid th alliancs thataticlat it. Both poblms w alad snsd b Aistotl, howv in-adqat his soltions.

9. Maic Mla-Pont, Phenomenology o Perception, tans. Chistoph Smith, London,rotldg, 2002, p. 79, mphasis addd.




1. As notd, Aistotl accsd th Mgaians o not allowing a sitting man to b abl to stand p. Fo i th sitting man has no potnc, th is nowa to chang an aspct o his cnt stat. Th man will b pl act-

al, pl dnd b his cnt lations with th wold, and hnc cannotbak o his sitation and nt a nw on. Lato wold vn dn thatth man is an nding sbstanc who ndgos advnts in man di-nt posts, bt that is a spaat iss. Th qstion o s h is whatallows th sitting man to b placd b a standing man. A good asono siding with Lato in this dispt was that th actal cannot b p-in-scibd with potntial, which ml boows its potnc om th oth ac-tos it might on da actall act. Th soc o all chang mst b ondin the actual , o it is a phantom. Th is nothing on ath bt th actal i w

psh Whithad’s pincipl a bit th than Whithad did (b dmping th ‘tnal obcts’), and I gladl oin Lato in doing so. Th is nothing wong with ‘actalism’.

Bt i Aistotl is wong in what h ams, h is ight in what h d-nis: Lato and th Mgaians still cannot xplain chang. Th poblmis not that th dnd th actal ov th potntial, bt that they identiy the actual with the relational . Onl a non-lational vsion o actalit (and notpotntialit, which is lational thogh and thogh) can xplain chango movmnt. W do not mpow th sitting man b sowing him with hid-dn sds o movmnt, bt onl b somhow disngaging his actalit omhis cnt sitation. This cannot b don i w sa that th man is th smtotal o his alliancs, bcas his cnt allis incld th sitting postand th sot cshions o th coch. I th sitting man is inhntl ‘sitting-man’ thogh and thogh, thn th is admittdl no wa to tn him into‘standing-man’. What w a sking instad is simpl th ‘man’ who canith stand o sit.

What happns, in Latoian tms, i I cas to b a posso in egpt

and bcom a capnt in m hom stat o Iowa? Lt s gant that m as as a Caio acadmic hav changd m chaact in som wa; thatis bond dispt. Th qstion is this: what a th componnts o th new poposition whn m li is changd? Th nw poposition inclds Iowa,capnt’s tools, and me mysel —not m-th-egptian-posso, sinc thispoposition no long xists, vn i som histoical tacs o it ma b lt inth nw m. Analogosl, it is Latour who intacts with Scincs-Po to oma nw poposition, not Lato-at-ecol-ds-Mins, an acto who no longxists. Whil it ma b t that Lato did not mg nscathd and n-altd om his dcads at th eNSMP,10 h is still abl to disngag omthat all and oin with anoth. Th as in his om oc sl ltman tacs, bt th is also plnt o ‘inomation loss’: man ats o

10. eNSMP is th Fnch abbviation o Lato’s long-tim om mplo: ecolNational Spéi ds Mins d Pais.



Qstions 131

th pvios Lato-eNSMP allianc a gon ov. Thos that continin th nw poposition Lato-Scincs-Po nd onl i th a somhowtchd into th acto Lato, not into a now-vanishd om poposition

that no long walks th ath.In shot, things mst b patiall spaatd om thi mtal aticla-tions. I this w not th cas, th wold nv b abl to nt nw pop-ositions. This dos not qi that w accpt th notion o ‘potntialit’;it ml mphasizs that th actal is not th sam as th lational. Thpoposition ‘Past-micob’ dos not ll s p ith Past o th mi-cob, thogh it pobabl tansoms thm, and sl cats a nw nti-t dint om both. To sa othwis wold amont to th claim that apoposition impots its componnts compltl withot loss o gain o n-

g—a v n-Latoian maxim. Th lation ‘Past-micob’ dos notll sond th dpths o ith Past o micob, bt ml dplos a tinsgmnt o both.

Whn Lato dnis that a thing is dint om its lations, h mab thinking o a latd bt spaat iss. His philosoph sggsts vividlthat th ‘I’ who tns om egpt to Iowa is not a simpl monadic sol,bt a black box containing all mann o swaming actos. This ‘I’ is sla vast allianc composd o nmos lmnts: th inds and schools o m past, th books that hav shapd m, th intnal ogans that kp maliv, th gain and bans I consm. Bt m lianc on intnal compo-nnts dos not ntail lianc on m ot lations. I cannot xist withotm componnts, bt can v wll xist withot m allis. Ths allis mashap m in tn: bt what th a shaping is me , not m pvios st o alliancs, most o which a not psvd in m cnt sl at all. I noto this basic asmmt btwn an acto’s componnts and its alliancs,w wold hav a pl holistic cosmos. evthing wold b dnd to anqal dg b th actos abov it as blow it, and th wold b no plac

in alit not dnd ttl b its contxt. Bt this is b no mans what hap-pns. What happns instad is that componnts somtims nit to om anw acto, an ‘mgnt’ alit idcibl to its pics. It can sviv c-tain changs among its constitnts, and vn mo asil svivs th otlations into which it is thown. An acto is a wall, pvnting all tinshits in its componnts om acting it, and also pvnting its nvion-mnt om nting th black box too asil. An obct nds its componntsto som xtnt, bt nv nds its allis. Onl th allianc as a whol -qis th allis, bt th allianc as a whol is a dint ntit om acho its componnts. Statd bi: Past is not th sam thing as Past-discov-o-micobs.

2. W hav alad tochd on th scond poblm: vn an acto’s pres-ent is not adqatl dnd b its lations. Whn Mla-Pont spaks o ‘th hos sn om vwh’, what h mans is th hos sn om all




cnt points o viw. Bt a simpl thoght xpimnt allows s to con-sid oth points o viw on th hos. Imagin hndds o nw ntitis incontact with th hos om pviosl ntid angls, distancs, o moods.

This wold ctainl cat nw lations, bt it wold not cat a nwhos. Now imagin (vn thogh Canto sms to obid it) that th hosis viwd b all possible actos om all possible angls nd v conciv-abl condition. evn nd this biza scnaio, it is still not ths viw-points that a doing th wok o th hos. Ths innitl man obsvsa not th ons who block th winds and kp th inhabitants d: onl thhos itsl dos this. This implis that th hos contains nknown ali-tis nv tochd b an o all o its lations. rlations do not xhast athing—instad, th rely on th thing.

W hav now appoachd th nw modl o obcts that I popos todvlop. jst as Lato tachs, th a contlss actos o dint siz-s and tps, constantl dling and ngotiating with ach oth. Bt obcts a not dnd b thi lations: instad th a what nt into -lations in th st plac, and thi allis can nv ll min thi os. InHidggian tms, obcts nt lations bt withdaw om thm as wll;obcts a bilt o componnts, bt xcd thos componnts. Things xistnot in lation, bt in a stang sot o vacm om which th onl patlmg into lation. Obcts a pl actal, not potntial. yt this act-alit is not dnd b a st o lations with oth things. This modl o obcts, a alism o atonomos things withot matt, is admittdl athwid. Bt this stangnss can b tnd into a battl c b sing ‘widalism’ as a snonm o obct-ointd philosoph, in th mann o H.P.Lovcat’s ‘wid ction’.

Sinc lations a so impotant o Lato, h might sm nwilling toconcd an alit otsid aticlations b wa o alliancs. yt th ating momnts whn h tns his gaz in this diction with his s o th

tm ‘plasma’, to which m attntion was tnd b Pt edéli. This a bi bt intiging discssion o this concpt in at last two placs: th1998 wok Paris: Invisible City (Paris ville invisible ), athod ointl b Latoand emili Hmant,11 and a somwhat mo sggstiv s o th tm inReassembling the Social ,12 Lato’s livl 2005 intodction to acto-ntwoktho. eal in th 2005 wok, th nw concpt o plasma is haldd bspising ootnots: ‘w will ncont th stang g o th “plasma,”which taks th bottom ot o an bottom lin whn acconting o action’(rS, p. 50 n. 48); ‘w will dal [lat] with th notion o “plasma.” emptinss

11. It was edwin Sas who dw m attntion to th ss o th tm ‘plasma’ in thiswok, wh Lato links it xplicitl with th now popla concpt o ‘th vital’.

12. edéli was th st to call m attntion to th impotanc o th tm ‘plasma’ inthis wok, in a post mad on Agst 15, 2007 to th ANTHeM mailing list, which is soitll dvotd to th Lato/Hidgg connction.



Qstions 133

is th k in ollowing th rare condits in which th social ciclats’ (rS, p.132 n. 187). Th latt statmnt is spciall intiging whn coming omLato. H alwas ss th titl ‘social’ in sch a wa as to to non-h-

man actos too, not st hman ons. ‘Socit’ o Lato is so biqitosthat to ha him call it ‘a’ is spising indd.Th main discssion o plasma coms at th nd o th book. As Lato

pts it, ‘no ndstanding o th social can b povidd i o don’t tn o attntion to anoth ang o nomattd phnomna […]. I call thisbackgond plasma , naml that which is not t omattd, not t ma-sd, not t socializd, not t ngagd in mtological chains, and not t covd, svd, mobilizd, o sbctid’ (rS, pp. 243-4). H vnstimats th siz o this backgond plasma, st as astonoms indict-

l siz p th amont o dak matt: Lato sas that i th social wold o ntwoks w th siz o th London undgond, plasma wold ll thmaining spac o London. A tl vast spac o nsocializd matial!Th plasma is ‘in between and not mad o social st. It is not hiddn, sim-pl unknown [… lik] a vast hintland […, lik] th contsid o an bandwll […, lik] th missing masss o a cosmologist ting to balanc otth wight o th nivs’ (rS, p. 244).

In ths statling pags, Lato amplis th alism o Irreductions witha batil imag: ‘Hmntics is not a pivilg o hmans bt, so tospak, a popt o th wold itsl. Th wold is not a solid continnt o acts spinkld b a w laks o nctaintis, bt a vast ocan o nctain-tis spckld b a w islands o calibatd and stabilizd oms’ (rS, p. 245).Lato’s plasma is not a m annoing maind o acadmic bookkp-ing, bt is hld sponsibl o all th chang and movmnt w know. Abovall, th is a stnning passag that on wold nv nd in Hidgg:

Wh do c amis disappa in a wk? Wh do whol mpis likth Sovit on vanish in a w months? Wh do companis who cov

th whol wold go bankpt at thi nxt qatl pot? Wh doth sam companis, in lss than two smsts, mp om bing dp inth d to showing a massiv pot? Wh is it that qit citizns tn intovoltiona cowds o that gim mass allis bak down into a o-os cowd o citizns? Wh is it that som dll individal is sddn-l movd into action b an obsc pic o nws? Wh is it that sch astal acadmic msician is sddnl sizd b th most daing hthms?Gnals, ditoialists, manags, obsvs, moalists otn sa thatthos sddn changs hav a sot, impalpabl liqid qalit abot thm.

That’s xactl th tmolog o plasma (rS, p. 245).Ths things happn bcas th aticlatd social wold o lations

lavs so mch naticlatd: monsts and angls sp om th plasma,lik ats and pigons into th undgond. In his conclding smma o plasma, Lato vn ss a tm onc bannd om his psonal lxicon: ‘To




v action I hav dscibd so a, o hav to add an immns ptoio missing masss [… And th] xists a reserve , a reserve army, an immnstito […] o v omattd, localizd, continos, accontabl action

to b caid ot in’ (rS, p. 245, mphasis modid). H Lato sms tondstand that th is a poblm with xplaining how compltl omat-td actos cold v chang thi omat. As his nw thoghts indicat, thonl possibl soltion is that actos a not ll omattd b alliancs atall. Som sv o svoi mst xplain th sddn changs mntiond,and mo gadal changs as wll. To scap lationism mans to stablisha mtaphsics o th plasma o missing mass to which Lato s. Onlon not o cation is ndd: th is no good ason to ag with Latothat th plasma has no omat, sinc this wold impl that all omat mst

com om lations. Th plasma might still b omattd b oth mansthan thos o allianc, thogh h nv consids th possibilit. Fomatting and ntwoks a viwd as qivalnt, and at bst Lato vgs on ac-knowldging a singl plasma-in-itsl, not a plalit o distinct ntitis with-dawn om all lation.

B. ACTOrS ONeFOLD AND FOurFOLD

A it has now opnd within obcts thmslvs. Lato has alad mlti-

plid gaps between ntitis lik no on bo him, and is patint nogh notto link thm thogh th instant Ave Maria o th occasionalist God. Bt oth most pat, Lato nvisions ach acto as on: th t is not split b ass om its own qalitis, and is also not dividd om som hiddn t-in-itsl. Th t can mov and ptb oth actos, and lik an black boxit can alwas b opnd to val its swaming componnts. Bt th t -mains a singl acto ttl dnd b its stanc towad oth things, not acptic ncls hiddn om viw bnath shiting accidnts. yt th sita-

tion changs onc w sa that th obct is not th sam as its alliancs. Foasons dscibd in th pvios sction, Past-o-th-micob and th-micob-o-Past cannot b th sam as Past and th micob thm-slvs. Having distingishd an acto om its lations, w a now spak-ing o ‘al’ actos o obcts as opposd to thos ncontd in an allianc,th latt o which a nothing bt patl aticlatd stand-ins o th obctsth aticlat. H w a no long on stictl Latoian gond, thoghhis basic vision mains intact: a dmocatic cosmos o actos ngagd inntwoks, spaatd om ach oth b gaps that a bidgd onl b vai-

os joliot-lik mdiatos.rlations do not xhast th things that lat, and hnc nothing can

b dnd as a sm total o alliancs o vn o possibl alliancs. Bing innw spctatos to watch Mla-Pont’s hos om v nw angls, andwhat o will gt a contlss nw popositions that incld th hos as a



Qstions 135

componnt, not a nw house ach tim. Th hos itsl is sbct to all manno lations withot bing gnatd b thm. It is ctainl composd o thlations on its intio, bt ths hav a dint stats om th lations on

th otsid. (I am not spaking h o so-calld ‘intnal lations’, which aml xtnal lations gatd into a thing’s own hat.) Th most xtminstanc o this wold b Libniz, who holds that an monad alad haboslations to distant sns and plants and all t tims. H I ag withthos who accpt nothing bt xtnal lations. Nothing is allowd to con-tain anthing ls; all obcts a mtall xtnal to oth obcts. Bt bspaking o lations on th intio o a thing, I man somthing qit di-nt: th assmbl o actos on th insid o an black box that nabl it to x-ist. Fo lack o a btt tm, w might call ths ‘domstic’ lations to avoid

consion with th intnal lations that dsv to b xplld om viw. Ihold that th is an absolt distinction btwn th domstic lations thata thing nds to som xtnt in od to xist, and th xtnal alliancs thatit dos not nd. Bt th acto itsl cannot b idntid with ith. An obct cannot b xhastd b a st o alliancs. Bt nith is it xhastd ba smma o its pics, sinc an gnin obct will b an mgnt alitov and abov its componnts, ovsimpliing thos componnts and ablto withstand a ctain dg o tblnt chang in thm.

It is not Lato’s mann to spak o th hiddn and th atonomos.No is it Whithad’s. Somwhat spisingl, th cnt tadition most sm-pathtic to things apat om thi lations is that o Matin Hidgg.Th nxt sction will viw his tool-analsis, which I hav otn discssdlswh. Against th sal ading o Hidgg, his tools a in no walational, bt withdaw ntil om lations whil maining al non-thlss. Hidgg is th nxpctd champion o indpndnt obcts as op-posd to thos allid in ntwoks; this ns cont to Lato’s own viws,baing som nosn tn to a ll-blown tho o plasma in his t

woks. yt Lato’s points o spioit to Hidgg hav alad bn d-scibd. His dmand o tanslation is on that Hidgg nv mts, sinco Hidgg th obct is ml vild, mad gadall manist thoghth old ‘asmptotic’ modl o tth. Bt Lato dnis that w nvil som-thing alad cpticall psnt, and asks instad that w dscib th in-stmnts o mdiatos that allow that thing to mg. It is actall a mospising and sophisticatd modl o tth than Hidgg’s own, and d-ivs om Lato’s mtaphsics o actos ct o in thmslvs and ttldplod in thi cnt actalit. Fthmo, Hidgg’s opposition b-twn al and appant obcts, o zuhanden and vorhanden, dos littl to clai- th nat o withdawn bings, and nothing at all to show what links thtwo alms. I w ask Lato to sbtact a thing om its allis, w mst alsoask Hidgg to xplain th lation btwn th al t and th t thatis psnt to o viw.




Bt th is a scond it that mst b considd. I Lato dos not dis-tingish an acto om its lations, h also dos not distingish it om itsqalitis, a simila bt not idntical thm. Fo vn i w s to dscnd

into th Hidggian ndwold o vild hamms, vn i w main in awold wh things a all allid on a nid plan o mtal accssibilit, itcan still b qstiond whth a thing is a packag mad o all its qalitis.expinc shows that w can cicl an obct om dint angls, thbchanging its spcic visibl pols withot changing th thing. Bt vn i w w connd to a singl instant withot bing abl to cicl th thing,it wold still b th cas that w look at things , not bndls o disct qali-tis. In act w pass ight thogh ths qalitis to look dictl at th ni-d obct, ignoing th v-psnt distotions podcd b a tiltd had

o atic lighting. No on v all saw ‘d’. W saw appl-d, ink-do blood-d, insd with th stl o th obcts to which th blong. Tospak o th sam qalit cing in nmos obcts qis a lngthwok o abstaction, as Lato wold sl ag. Fo this ason it is som-what spising that h allows qalitis to amass as individal things, givnhis mch gat ai o conct obcts than th Bitish empiicists s-all show. This dinc btwn nid obcts o pcption and thinmos qalitis is th gat discov o Hssl, whos pivotal concpt isth ‘intntional obct’. Dspit his idalism. Hssl is still a philosoph o obcts—obcts ond onl in consciosnss, bt still obcts dp than allthi qalitis and sac ptbations. I w ocs onl on Hssl’s basicidalist gst, w ogt his statling it btwn obcts o xpinc andthi qalitis, which is ond nowh in pvios idalisms. In what ol-lows I will otn to ‘intntional obcts’ with th nconvntional nam‘snsal obcts’. On motiv o doing so is to plac th stil, tchnicalavo o ‘intntional’ with somthing a bit mo chaming. yt a scondand mo impotant motiv is that Hssl ss ‘intntional’ to onl

to th nid obcts o consciosnss, whil xclding th shiting sacqalitis o things om th intntional domain. So-calld ‘sns data’ anot intntional o Hssl, pcisl bcas th a not obct-ointd.Fo this ason, a nw nid tm is ndd that covs both th nding obcts o consciosnss and th ovl spcic acads thogh which tha alwas manist.

In an cas, th obct is now dividd om itsl in a scond sns. Wsaw that it is dint om its lations, withdawing into mstios dpths.Bt now it is also dint om its qalitis, and hnc opns p a dama onth v sac o th wold. Lato’s magnicnt cics o gaps btwnactos is now acd with th dmand o th mdiation within objects them-selves . As w hav sn, this mdiation occs in two dictions. Th t it-sl mst hav qalitis, nd pnalt o bing a atlss lmp no di-nt om all oths. yt it mst also b distinct om ths qalitis, sinc



Qstions 137

ths can b altd to som xtnt withot changing th t. Th t asncontd b allis also has qalitis, t h as wll it sms dintom an paticla st o thos qalitis, which can va withot changing

it. Hnc th two basic its in an obct ais om its dinc om its -lations, and its dinc om its qalitis. Th obct bcoms oold: alck clov whos lavs a linkd b a plasma still nknown. In pviosbooks I hav dscibd Hidgg’s idicld Geviert (oold) as on o thgat bakthoghs in th past cnt o philosoph. I hav claimd -th that th two axs o this oold ais om th two dint concpts o obcts ond in Hidgg and Hssl, which a thn oind b Hidgghimsl. Th is no nd to cont th stct o Hidgg’s ooldh. Sc it to sa that ath and gods mak p th concald dimnsion

that ml hints, whil motals and sk to th wold in its psnc tos. each pai thn has a th intnal split, sinc ath and motals to th nit o xistnc, and gods and sk to th plalit o qalitis ondith in withdawal o in psnc.

Hidgg nv ollows this path to th nd. H badl nds BnoLato to hlp him dvlop his modl o obcts. Som joliot nds to in-todc ths two thinks, and th psnt book sks to pla this ol. Btin a sns, ths athos can asil b linkd thanks to Hidgg’s own d-cts. Fo th a two spciall glaing poblms with Hidgg’s o-old: (1) h dnis th oold to indstiall podcd goods whil allowing it to pasant handicat and ind tmpls; (2) h givs no accont o howth o pols intlat, spaking vagl instad o mios, dancs, wd-dings, and songs. Lato is btt qippd than anon to solv both pob-lms, bcas o (1) his dmocac o obcts and (2) his tho o tanslationbtwn ntitis.

Thogh Lato’s scattd maks on Hidgg a al mad in aspiit o pais, h sms to sns that th a nighbos on vaios thms.

This is phaps most cla in Lato’s opning ssa om Making Things Public , th catalog o an at xhibit hld in Kalsh, Gman. Latowits: ‘as v ad o Hidgg knows […] th old wod “Thing” o“Ding” dsignatd oiginall a ctain tp o achaic assmbl’ (MP, p.22). in th sns o a paliamnt. H cits th Nodic paliamnta tmsthat main so clos to this tmolog vn now: Storting (Nowa), Althing (Icland), Ting (Isl o Man) (MP, p. 23). Hmans assmbl togth withthings, which a no long xplld om a pid hman political alm.edéli, with his agl o all things Hidgg/Lato, nots that anindividal thing is alad a paliamnt in its own ight i cossd b itsand sss that mak it a o.13 Lato snss this too, invoking an altd

13. In Pt edéli, ‘ANT, th Foold, and th Thing in Common: A Mlti-CasStd o Oganising, Statgising and ICTs in-Tailing SMes in th uK’, npblishdthsis poposal, Dpatmnt o Managmnt, London School o economics, 2007.




vsion o Hidgg’s oold to sa that ‘ gatherings is th tanslation thatHidgg sd, to talk abot thos Things, thos sits abl to assmblmotals and gods, hmans and non-hmans’ (MP, p. 23). H is ight that

‘th is mo than a littl ion in xtnding this maning [o “thing”] towhat Hidgg and his ollows lovd to hat, naml scinc, tchnolog,commc, indst and popla clt’ (MP, p. 23). And minding s o Hidgg’s contast btwn ‘obct’ (bad) and ‘thing’ (good), Lato com-mnts that ‘th obct, th Gegenstand , ma main otsid o all assmblisbt not th Ding . Hnc th qstion w wish to ais: What a th vaiosshaps o th assemblies that can mak sns o all thos assemblages ?’ (MP, p.24). H w nd Lato’s stid complaint abot Hidgg’s contmpto ‘ontic’ bings. Lt nmntiond, howv, is th act that Hidgg’s

‘thing’ cannot possibl b th sam as Lato’s amos ‘matts o concn’.Somthing can onl b o concn to stakholds who a actd b it insom wa. B contast, Hidgg’s g is pcisl what does not assmblwith oth things, and sids in itsl, at last in pat. evn so, Lato’s phi-losoph o tanslation is o bst hop o xplaining how th o pats o anobct blong togth.

Whatv h might sa abot Hidgg, Lato’s own poximit to thoold obct is mo visibl lswh. I to his book Politics o Nature ,st pblishd in Fnch in th sam tistic-sonding a that Pandora’s Hope was bon in english: 1999. In Politics o Nature , Lato is at wa with thmodn split btwn act and val, so clal linkd with his old o thwold/hman it. ‘Facts’ a nshakabl stats o aais ntaintd b h-mans, whil ‘vals’ a th poction o hman dsis withot an tis tocitia in th obctiv wold. This givs s th sam old misabl bicam-al modl that Lato’s nti ca has aimd to sbvt. His sal manso attacking this split is to oppos th twoold wold with a vast plalit o actos, a gst that nv disappas om his woks. Bt th cios thing

abot Politics o Nature is that Lato opposs th bicamal wold not with a vag plalit, bt with a spcicall qadicamal wold (thogh h callsit a nw bicamalism instad). That is to sa, Lato salvags th act/valsplit b doubling it. Th old distinction btwn act and val is cossd ba nw on btwn ‘taking into accont’ and ‘ptting in od’ (PN, Chaps.3-4). Fo all th dint ndling assmptions o Lato and Hidgg,thi oold mchanisms a spisingl simila. ‘Taking into accont’cononts a wold that is alad th and mst b addssd. In this sns itsmbls th old ‘act’ sid o things, as do Hidgg’s ‘thownnss’, ‘past’,o ‘concalmnt’. B contast, ‘ptting in od’ mst aang what it nds,which clal smbls th old ‘val’ pol, as do Hidgg’s ‘poction’,‘t’, o ‘nviling’.

Th is also a scond it o Lato, st as o Hidgg. Bt this onis asi to gasp, sinc Lato opnl dclas which tms a th his



Qstions 139

o act and which o val. Th pow to tak into accont is split into p-plxit (act) and consltation (val). Th pow to aang in ank odis cavd into instittion (act) and hiachization (val). In shot, th is

a act/val split on th ‘act’ sid, and anoth act/val split on th ‘val-’ sid. Hidgg’s mthod is th sam, giving s a bing/bings split onth bing sid (ath/gods) and anoth bing/bings split on th bingssid (motals/sk). Th nmb o oold stcts in th histo o phi-losoph is so stagging that w shold hadl b spisd whn thinksgnat nw ons. Monisms a too pios and sga in thi holism, d-alisms too static in thi tnch waa, and tiads too smg in thi hap-p ndings. Bt oold stcts allow o tnsion no lss than plalit,and hnc w nd empdocls, Plato, Aistotl, Scots eigna, Fancis

Bacon, Vico, Kant, Gimas, McLhan, and oths chopping th wold ino. It is impotant that th two pincipls o ssion b chosn wisl, andthat som xplanation b givn o how th o zons intact. Assming ths cavats, th is mch to b said o viwing th cosmos as a cipocalpai o dobld mios. Th main dinc btwn o two thinks his that Hidgg’s o is ond on th insid o spcic gs and bidgs,whil Lato’s o is a pblic cat, a matt o concn btwn ml-tipl things. Bt ths appoachs ma not b as dint as th sm— at all, i Lato opns an g o bidg, h will alwas nd anoth pa-liamnt o things.

C. THe BrOTHerHOOD OF MATTer AND reLATIONS

It is said that in Pto rico, d and gn tac lights displa a ciosvsal o ols. Divs hav otd d lights to sch a dg that thpactic is now contagios, so that cas appoaching a gn light mst stopom a o thos ignoing th d. Sinc m tavls hav nv takn m to

Pto rico, I cannot vi ths pots. Bt I will tak th libt o coin-ing th phas ‘Th Pto rico ect’ to dscib a simila phnomnonin adings o past philosophis. Sinc v gat think is appoachdthogh an initial aa o widspad clichés, th citical schola is alwasin a mood to vs thm. Good asons shold b givn whnv this isdon, sinc w mst alwas spct th ights o th obvios. Bt o costh is nothing atomaticall als abot sch vsals.

As sggstd ali, it is tpical o th gatst thinks that th sp-pot opposit intptations, st as Aistotlian sbstanc can b both hot

and cold o happ and sad at dint tims o in dint spcts. Now, itsms to m that convntional wisdom is alsl vsd whn Nitzsch isad as a dmocatic thoist, Spinoza as a think o plalit, Libniz asa think o monism, Aistotl as dcing sbstanc to th hman logos , oHssl as a alist, t I hav had actal xampls o all o ths vsals.




Bt th cass a wll woth haing. What is intsting is that no on at-tmpts sch contintitiv invsions with thinks o minor stat—stas w vs o ndstanding o Hamlt mo asil than o ading o

Batman. This sggsts a good dnition o a mino atho, mino chaac-t, mino concpt, mino invntion, o mino agmnt: on that is dc-ibl to content . Th mo a pson, obct, o ida can b smmaizd in a listo nivocal asstions, th lss sbstantial th a, sinc sbstanc alwaswas dint costms whn sn om vaios angls. This has impotantstlistic implications o philosoph. Against th pogam o philosophwittn in ‘good plain english’, I hold that it shold b wittn in good vivid english. Plain spch contains cla statmnts that a ogottn as soon asthi spoksman closs his moth, sinc th hav alad said all that th

a capabl o saing. Bt vivid spch ogs nw concpts that tak on ali thi own, lik good ctional chaacts. It nss that Libniz’s monadand Kant’s Ding an sich will hant th dams o th t dspit ndlss‘tations’ o both. H w nd th sol bt towing advantag o conti-nntal philosoph ov its analtic ival—th awanss that a philosoph ismo than a list o t and als agmnts. yt th continntals wast thisadvantag b honoing gat thinks with shins and pa whls aththan xploing th ost om which th cam.

W now tn to th Pto rico ect. In m st book, Tool-Being,14 I ond it ncssa to n a d light o m own. Hidgg maks a a-mos distinction btwn ntitis psnt-at-hand (vorhanden ) and ad-to-hand (zuhanden ). It might sm that psnc-at-hand s to obctiv phs-ical sbstanc whil adinss-to-hand consists o tools sd b hmans. FoHidgg o pima wa o nconting obcts is in thi adinss-to-hand; an sh psnc o things is divativ, and gnall occsthogh a malnction o bakdown o tools. Sinc th ad-to-hand is d-scibd as a sstm o lations in which hamms daw thi maning om

nails, nails om hoss, and hoss om hmans who s thm, Hidggsms to dnd a lational viw o th wold ov a modl o atonomosthings. To som dg this was vn his conscios intntion. Bt a closlook soon qis s to invok th Pto rico ect: against all appa-ancs, Hidgg’s tool-analsis actall lads to th victo o atonomosobcts ov thi lational sion in a sstm.

Hidgg alwas ss th tm ‘psnc-at-hand’ ngativl, as som-thing that philosoph oght to ovcom. It is sldom notd that h ssit o sval dint tps o sitations. Somtims th psnt-at-handis a bokn tool, takn o gantd in its momnt o s bt now ling ob-tsivl bo s. Somtims it is an obct pcivd in consciosnss,lik Hssl’s phnomna, which Hidgg assails b pointing to a hiddn

14. Gaham Haman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics o Objects , Chicago, OpnCot, 2002.



Qstions 141

dpth in th things. Finall, th psnt-at-hand is somtims th nam oindpndnt phsical matt considd apat om th sstm o hmanpaxis. This tipl s o th tm is no inconsistnc on Hidgg’s pat,

sinc all th momnts sha th sam at. Fo all a relational , dc-ibl to thi lation with hman Dasin. This is immdiatl cla in thst two cass: phnomna and bokn tools. Both a psnt-at-hand b-cas both a sn onl om th otsid. A bokn hamm, o a ham-m as lcidl dscibd b edmnd Hssl, do no stic to th hammin its sbtanan action. In sch cass th hamm is viwd ml asa st o visibl qalitis, not in its ndgond Vollzug o ‘xction’. FoHidgg, th hamm withdaws om an o its congations in thmind. Th bokn o phnomnal hamm do not liv p to this alit, bt

xist onl in lation to s.Th cas ma sm had to mak whn psnc-at-hand s to

phsical sbstanc, sinc th phsical alm sms to b niql indpn-dnt o hmans. yt Lato’s claim that matialism is a kind o idalismshds nw light on th poblm with phsical mass. To dn a thing asmatial st that occpis spac is to dc it to a sstm o coodinatsand masabl poptis. Thogh it ma sm that matt is atono-mos, it is onl atonomos insoa as hmans dn it accoding to c-tain poptis, not in its own ight. Fo Hidgg, th onl wa to scappsnc-at-hand is to scap an om o psntation at all—whth itb that o th spisd capnt whos hamm alls apat, th phnom-nologist who sticts th hamm to its manistation to consciosnss,o th phsicist who dns it in tms o obctiv phsical poptis. Inshot, psnc-at-hand is alwas lational to th co, and is in no waindpndnt o Dasin.

Fo convs asons, th ad-to-hand mst b dnd as atonomosand pl non-lational. Th hamm withdaws om viw. It sl can-

not b dscibd as an appaanc in consciosnss, sinc it dos not appato m at all ntil it ails. It is qall cla that a hamm is not th sm o what scinc tlls s o its molcls, om, o dnamic poptis, sinc oHidgg it is a dpth xcding all sch taits. It might still b claimdthat th hamm sd in nconscios paxis is th al on, and givn thatHidgg tlls s that qipmnt blongs to a sstm, th hamm itsl might asil b takn o somthing lational. Bt this is th cntal als-hood o mainstam Hidgg stdis. It is t that whn I gaz at thhamm mch o its alit scaps m. yt it is qall t that th sc-cssl capnt o mason do not xhast th alit o th hamm whnsilntl sing it. Whth I am consciosl awa o a thing o nconscioslxploit it, in ith cas th thing itsl habos sct svs that m dal-ings with it nv toch. I I shit ols om phnomnologist to manal la-bo, I do not sddnl gain th magical pow o xhasting a hamm




to its dpths. Fo this ason, any sot o hman contact with a hammchangs it into a kind o psnc-at-hand; th adinss-to-hand o qip-mnt alwas lis dp than th s w mak o it, no lss than th thois

w mak abot it. Hidgg himsl is not so cla abot th iss in Being and Time , bt it bcoms qit vivid in his 1949 discssion o th thing,15 wh th g is divocd om all hman accss and lt to stand in itsl whth hmans s it o not.

Bt w mst go a stp th than Hidgg v did, and sa that notonl human lations with a thing dc it to psnc-at-hand, bt any rela-tions at all . W hav sn that Hssl dos not xhast th hamm b look-ing at it, th scintist b modling it, th nlck capnt b spis at itsail, o th lck capnt b liabl sing it. Bt nith do ants and

spaows xhast th hamm b toching it; no do boads and nails do sob civing its blows. Th will alwas b mo to th hamm than anpossibl contact with its bing. Thogh Hidgg’s tool analsis is sallglossd as ‘nconscios pactic vs. conscios sing’, this hollow intpta-tion mst b placd b a dl o ‘thing vs. lations’. This is on d lightthat simpl mst b n, sinc th matt is gnt.

All o this svs as a backgond o th discssion o matt. Latodos a btt ob than Hidgg o showing wh phsical sbstanc is notth podct o hadhadd alism bt is a pl idalist gmnt. W sim-pl do not know what actos a, as both Hidgg and Lato wold ag.W cannot assm that th hamm is mad o molcls an mo thano hamm-spiits. An sch tho is an attmpt to omat o omlatth hamm. This mst not b consd with th hamm’s own alit, towhich no omat v dos stic. And that is wh Lato opposs matial-ism, thogh h cts th withdawn dpths o th hamm in avo o itsalliancs with oth things. Man ads, inclding a w matialists, alikl to s th oc o this agmnt. Bt common sns will still bl.

evn i Lato convincs s that matialism is wong, o inn aith willlag bhind o intllctal agmnt. It is diclt to abandon o cstom-a bli that th wold is mad o had, nilding st, sinc th sol al-tnativ sms to b that all things a aiis dancing bo th mind.

Lato’s qation o matialism with idalism is mdos in intnt;h wants matialism to di. Bt it svivs his attack, thogh st bal, b-cas it still has a plac to hid. Th al, o Lato, is lational. Abstactphsical matt is a ail o Lato bcas it allows pima qalitis toxist apat om all lations. Bt o thos with a nagging sns that al-it must b indpndnt o lations, it will b tmpting to assm a lao obctiv stats o aais ling bnath th social ntwok o things. ‘LtLato hav his ntwoks o lations’, th will sa. ‘Had matial bodis

15. S Matin Hidgg, ‘einblick in das was ist’, in Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge ,Fankt, Vittoio Klostmann, 1994.



Qstions 143

still li ndnath thm’. Th onl wa to oppos sch claims is to nt thlion’s dn o th spposd obctiv phsical alitis and show that th can-not b matial ith. Matial bodis cannot possibl do stic to th -

alit o things thmslvs. Matt can onl b lational, and hnc it lacksth atonom that al things dmand.Lato’s citiq o matt smbls Hidgg’s assalt on phnom-

nolog. Both attack thi ivals o dcing things to o concptions o thm, and claim that mch is thb lost. Th st instinct o both Latoand Hidgg is to plac this modl o solid obcts with a sstm o thingsin cipocal connction: th ntwok, th tool-sstm. As alad shown,Hidgg can and mst b pshd in th opposit diction: th hammis no mo xhastd b its contxt than b hman vision o handling, and

ths th hamm in its bing mst b o all lations. Psnc-at-handis gnatd not onl b th abstacting hman mind, o b th hmanpaxis that bshs onl a small potion o hamms, bt b an lations atall. Fi dos not xhast th alit o cotton b bning it, no dos ains p th glass that it moistns. An obct might b masd o gistdb its lations, bt can nv b ll dnd b thm. Pagmatism has val- as a mthod, bt ails as a mtaphsical doctin.

That is wh matialism is still bathing, vn at Hidgg’s tool-analsis and Lato’s impotant blow against matt. Fo both citiqs stp an opposition in which th atonomos is alwas th ml idal andth al is alwas th lational. This allows th matialist a wa to snakot o th tap. Naml, th matialist is to concd that w ov-ab-stact whnv w think o matt, whil still holding that th is an n- ilding phsical st that is th t alit, dp than an lational ss-tm. Th is a had phsical alit occping som position in spac, aal stat o aais whth w lik it o not. Th poblm is that vthing said abot matt, vn i imagind in indpndnc om o minds, is stil l

modlld in pl lational tms. I phsical things a dscibd as mand had, this is clal th cas onl o whatv tis to mov thm. Thmatialist might answ that pio to an xpinc o hadnss o m-nss th is phsical matt occping a position in spac. yt to occp apoint in spac is nothing i not lational. To s this, w nd not vn taksids with Libniz in his dbat with Saml Clak.16 In this amos x-chang, Libniz holds that tim and spac a not mpt contains bt aonl th podct o lations btwn monads. Fo Clak (witing on bhal o Isaac Nwton) tim and spac a contains indd, and th things o th wold mst b positiond somwh in absolt spac. Whil Libnizdns spac as a lation btwn things, notic that Clak also dns itas a lation: bt a lation btwn a thing and space . To occp a position

16. G. W. Libniz and Saml Clak, Correspondence , Indianapolis, Hacktt, 2000.




mans to b a ctain distanc om oth spacs, to ll p a vacant cavi-t, and oth things o this sot. Bt ths a all poptis in lation withsomthing ls and cannot xhast th inn alit o th thing. Th thing

ma manist itsl in a spatial position, bt this is no mo idntical with itsalit than a its colo o smll. To s a somwhat ldicos mtapho,th thing in itsl and th thing as dnd b lations a lik th knl o con bo and at bing poppd. Th wold is not lld with cipocalntwoks o obcts dnd b thi intchang and bndld togth oto disct qalitis, bt nith is it th g o solid phsical pncta aditin mpt spac. This lavs s with no option bsids th stang modl thatwill b dvlopd in th nal chapt o this book.

To smmaiz, th poblm with phnomna, bokn tools, and matt

is not st that th a abstactions in o hads bst contd b a alitotsid o hads in which things dnamicall intact. Instad, th pob-lm is that th abstactions in o hads xist onl in relation to s, thbplacing thi alit with simlaca. Bt not onl th hman had has thpow to do this: m nconscios s o a hamm alad tns th ham-m into a caicat. Phsical collision btwn two balls dcs ach ballto a shadow o its ll plnitd, tning thm into nothing bt spatial ob-stacls whil ignoing thi colos and odos. And nall, th sam holdst o matt stationd in spac and toching nothing; vn nd thisminimalist scnaio o phsics, th spposd poptis o matt all tnot to b lational (intia, solidit). In act th is no sch thing as mat-t, bt onl a dscnding chain o what sd to b calld sbstantial oms.Ths oms a not st al, bt also pl non-lational. It is t thatmatt has no pima qalitis bt onl sconda ons, sinc it is alwasin lation with oth things. yt pima qalitis do xist otsid matt:in th hat o sbstanc itsl.

D. TrANSLATOrS

Lato givs s a wold o actos that a not st lational, bt also sel-contained . rsistanc to this ading o Lato is likl to contin, o n-dstandabl i misgidd asons. Sinc h dns actos in tms o thialliancs, it ma sm ttl impossibl that th cold b ct o in thm-slvs. Bt th k point is that st bcas a thing is dnd b its alliancsdos not man that it can slid into nw ons withot xplanation. evn i I am totall dnd b m allis at this momnt, this dos not absolv m

o th nd to pass thogh a sis o mdiations in od to mt m nwallis o a a, a wk, o a scond om now. Lato’s notion o tim is n-til occasionalist in spiit; i it w not, thn tanslation wold not loom asth mao thm o his philosoph. Fo Lato th is no stam o ‘bcom-ing’ compad to which momnta stats a a m abstaction: bcoming



Qstions 145

is produced b actos, not pspposd b thm. No do I contain m tstats in potentia in th mann o Libniz, sinc m psnt xistnc dosnot contain o ‘point towad’ anthing otsid itsl. That wold b chat-

ing, sinc in Lato’s philosoph nothing is allowd to contain anthing ls.This basic pincipl o Irreductions is nv abandond in his lat ca—anacto is an instant, sinc th is no tim otsid actos o Lato.

Bt th a sval pzzls connctd with tanslation, all o thm p-taining to th mdim in which it occs. W hav sn patdl that n-tons and politics do not ‘point’ to ach oth bt nd joliot to link thm.Th cosmos is an am o hman and non-hman joliots, all o thm link-ing ntitis that wold othwis not b linkd. Th st poblm that aissis simpl: i joliot is th bidg btwn politics and ntons, thn what is

th bidg btwn joliot and ach o ths things? I politics cannot tochntons dictl, thn how can joliot toch thm dictl? Th Latoianansw, o cos, is that h cannot. Ntons bcom visibl onl b a long chain o mdiatos, clminating in th scintic instmnts thogh whichthi psnc is annoncd. Bt how can joliot vn toch thos nal in-stmnts dictl? Phaps thogh his s, his nvos sstm, his d-cational backgond, o oth mans that allow him to mak sns o whath ss. yt th sam qstion can alwas b patd, howv a w -tat. It smbls th classic citiq o intmdiat points: th ac stagdb Zno btwn Achills and th totois. To ach on mdiato w ndanoth btwn thm, bt mst st ach an additional mdiato midwabtwn thos, and so oth. Th sam poblm has otn bn aisd con-cning th tho o tim as constctd ot o instants, a doctin I havascibd to Lato as wll. Sch points a wll takn. Bt th a mlpoblms to b solvd, not otight tations o th occasionalist stanc.Not that th altnativ tho o a pimal whol o obcts and pimalx o tim is plagd with dicltis no lss sv, sinc it cannot xplain

clal how ths whols a sgmntd into distinct zons. Th qantizdwold o occasionalism dos hav diclt xplaining laps, bt th contin-m modl o holistic x o plsations o intnsit has poblms xplaining wh th wold is not a singl moltn whol, dvoid o gions. It sms liklthat th winning soltion will b a modl o th cosmos allowing o both as-pcts withot wating down ith o thm.

This obction o innit mdiatos btwn an two actos is not somsmat-alck tick dsignd ml to win an agmnt. Instad, it toch-s on th cntal poblm o occasional casation. Naml, th cannot b

only indict links, sinc this wold dc to th absdit o innit mdia-tos btwn an two points.17 In th nd, something mst b capabl o dict

17. Th ad might wond wh this sitation is hld to b so haml, givn thatI hav alad ndosd an innit gss o v-tini black boxs. Bt that gssis ml stang; it dos not contadict an known acts. yt th imposition o innit




action. It is t that w a alwas to igno th poblm and pocdon a ml pactical basis. joliot’s s and nvos sstm do not smhighl lvant to an link btwn scinc and politics in 1930’s Fanc, as

long as blindnss o insanit do not hamp his scintic abilitis. Hnc,w can igno thm in most cass. Bt whil this mthod is scint o thsociolog o scinc, it is impmissibl o mtaphsics. I w a ting todiscov how obcts intact, th phas ‘o all pactical pposs’ cannotb pat o th soltion. W cannot main agnostic abot th xact pointwh obcts nall toch. Th mst b som mdim in which joliotnall tochs something ; at som point, mdiation mst giv wa to imm-diac. As alad sn, Lato avoids th chap soltions o making God oth hman mind th sat o all dict contact; his modl qis casation

to b scla, local, and plal. This qis that w idnti th local sitwh things nall mak contact. In th nal chapt o this book, I willpopos th soltion that two actos can onl toch on th insid o a thid.Ntons and politics mt onl in joliot’s th, wh h tochs both di-ctl bcas th hav alad bn tanslatd into joliot-langag. Thisis what I hav calld th poblm o ‘vicaios casation’, sinc th two ac-tos a linkd vicaiosl thogh a thid.

Th scond poblm slts dictl om th st. Sinc ntons andpolitics mst alad b shapd b joliot bo th intact, w nd acla notion o wh thi intaction was v dlad in th st plac. At all, politics and ntons w both a pat o joliot’s li o man as bo h linkd thm, and both will main pat o his li whthh sccds o ails in making th link. Wok mst b don to mak thmcompatibl, bt sinc both a alad accssibl to him, th hav aladachivd a ogh sot o compatibilit in advanc ml b both bing apat o joliot’s li. What dos it man to do wok on two actos so that tha no long spaat zons sid b sid in m li, bt linkd togth in

thi own ight? Fo xampl, on o th aims o th psnt book is to oinLato with Hidgg. This is not th asist task: Lato dos not likHidgg, Hidgg wold not hav likd Lato, and thi adshipovlaps in a m handl o popl. Both w avoit thinks o mino man as bo thi point o intac bcam cla nogh to bstatd in witing. What happns i th psnt book is gatl sccssl, andLato and Hidgg chang om bing ml two avod athos sid-b-sid in a w andom minds into gs whos link is stablishd bondall pblic dobt? A good mdiato will tnd to disappa, allowing th tmsit links to ow mo o lss dictl into ach oth. Hnc, a sccssl linko Lato and Hidgg wold nd th agnt o linkag incasingl i-lvant, st as ngins and contactos ad in impotanc whn a bidg

mdiatos btwn an two points dos contadict a known act—at all, ntitis do in-nc on anoth ath than vapoizing into a mist o innit intmdiat points.



Qstions 147

is nall compltd. I joliot sccds in linking ntons with politics, thcts ma b lagl otsid his contol; h ma also ail, in which cas thtwo actos will main sid b sid in his mind, nabl to oin p. Sinc this

implis that actos a alad contigos in a mdim bo making modict contact, w can call this th poblm o ‘bd casation’. Thingsa psnt togth in th sam mdim bo th a oind, pvnting all casal lations om occing in a ash, and nsing that th wold isiddld with missd oppotnitis. In act, ‘th sit o missd oppotnitis’is th bst dnition o spac that I can imagin.

Th thid and nal poblm stms om Lato’s viw that allianc issmmtical: Past aticlats micobs and micobs aticlat Pastin tn. Th motiv o this smmt was th commndabl wish to -

ac th hman/wold divid b ltting both actos coss th gap qall.Bt whil this smmt dos somtims occ, it dos not always sm to oc-c. Th ma b cass wh activ and passiv a ivsibl—not stin th obvios sns that th sn acts s gatl and w act it v littl,bt in th mo absolt sns that on thing might act anoth withotbing actd cipocall in th last. Pim nmbs ma obsss a psonwho has no skill to act thm in th mann o Gass o rimann. Dadthinks act s all, and thogh w ma b abl to act how thi booksa intptd now, w cannot act th dad. This kind o asmmt isimpossibl o Lato: i on thing is allid to anoth, thn th scond is ipso acto allid to th st, and th allianc changs thm both. yt asmmtma b th l ath than th xcption. I two things act ach oth -cipocall, this ma tn ot to b a cas o two dint bt simltanoscasal lations. This poblm can b tmd ‘asmmtical casation’.

Th th poblms mt whn w ct on th mdim o lations,which I contnd is th intio o som oth obct—som gat blackbox. Two actos link vicariously in th hat o a thid. Sinc th mst mt

in that plac o a shot o long piod bo thi intac is bilt, th abuered om on anoth. And nall, it sms likl that th do not mt onqal ooting in this mdim, bt that a al obct mts onl th shadowo anoth, thb allowing cts to pocd asymmetrically in on dictionalon. To smmaiz: mdiating obcts a alwas ndd btwn an twoobcts, bt a mdiato wold b ndd to toch th mdiato as wll, andon to innit. Hnc, th wold mst also b lld with a non-obctiv gaso plasma in which dict contact is possibl. That plasma is ond on thintio o obcts thmslvs.

e. COSMOLOGy

rcall that this chapt is wittn in th spiit o an imagind a 2050,with Lato’s sta at its znith. It is a happ landscap woth xploing in th




mind o hos, and vn woth binging into pactic. yt th is no schthing as paadis: vn th bachs o Ipanma and th palm-lind cov o Palolm in Goa will dakn on da with th ling that somthing is miss-

ing. This chapt has covd sval points wh Lato’s his in 2050might wish to psh things a bit th. Fist, th was th nd to dscibits in th acto itsl. A thing is not st a dl with oth actos, bt alsoa sti btwn its own o dimnsions; an obct is split om its lationsand om its qalitis as wll. Nxt, th was th sns that matialism wasnot t bid b Lato’s citiq, sinc th al poblm with matialismis not idalism, bt its covt lationism. Finall, th was th qstion o th mdim in which tanslation occs—o how obcts can mt withotmting, in th inn co o a thid.

Bt also missing a ctain points o cosmolog that Lato dos notaddss, thogh h is a om alon in this silnc. As w hav sn, We Have Never Been Modern achivs a powl dismantling o th Kantian gapbtwn wold and hmans. Now, on o th amos slts o this gap wasKant’s limination o all taditional qstions o mtaphsics. Is th liat dath? Is vthing pl dtminat, o a th spaks o chancin th cosmic machin? Is th a ncssa bing, o a all bings contin-gnt? B dc o Kant’s Copnican rvoltion sch qstions a nowabandond ith to phsics o to pivat pa and conssion. Philosophshinks back om ths qstions and hols p in th hman castl whildispting whth it has th ight to lav, with a w hothads claiming that th is nothing bond th castl in th st plac. Pick p an andombook o cnt philosoph and o a likl to nd d, hsitant dscip-tions o th limits o hman accss to th wold. Bt pick p a andom booko cnt phsics, and o will nd dazzling spclation on all mann o things: th cation and dstction o th nivs, th xistnc o paal-ll wolds, chanc and ncssit, hiddn spatial dimnsions, tim tavl, and

two-dimnsional hologams that dld s into bliving in th. Pick p aandom book o histo, and o will nd contlss actos xchanging s-piss: gnals, ss, minals, gain, animals, and gms. evn th Nw Ag movmnt, dspisd b most intllctals, spclats on thms o int-st to an hman: li at dath, incanation, th maning o dams, thspiit niting hmans and animals, omns invading o livs to signal tht, and shad achtps at wok in mltipl individals. In Lato’sown possional cicl, wh th qstions a alwas too conct o thCopnican gap to nction smoothl, w nd stdis o v possibl obct. yt so-calld “st philosoph” mains paalzd, and th soc o itspaalsis is cla: th obsssion with th singl hman/wold gap. W havvn achd th point wh I, a passionat ad o philosoph, p ansction in bookstos except philosoph. Fa btt to ad o th poptis o salt, o th lov sto o a bccan and an Indian pincss, than th latst



Qstions 149

masmnts o th walls o o hman pison. Th lphant in th liv-ing oom is this: philosoph has bcom boring . It is littl wond that BnoLato cam to s om th otsid; h cold nv hav mgd om th

wind-swpt dst o o disciplin. Scinc does think, and so do mathmat-ics, histo, anthopolog, litat, politics, ligion, and th occlt. Thqstion is whth philosoph wishs to oin thm.

Lt’s tn bi to Qntin Millassox. Anoth shing momntin his book lis na th nd, whn h dnds qstions sch as ‘Who aw?’ and ‘Wh do w com om?’.18 In o da ths qstions a tol-atd om th novic as chaming tokns o sincit, bt no taind philos-oph wold b caght dad posing thm. Th a dmd a sign o na-ivté o poo o haphazad taining. Man philosophs still wond abot

sch qstions pivatl, in chch o oga gops, whil ading books o popla phsics, o in thos lonl hos o th night whn sch qstionspss pon von. yt onl al do th appa in woks o sios phi-losoph, a disciplin long signd to th ‘intllctal Mnich’ o 1781. BtMillassox’s admiabl viw is that sch qstions a al. Thogh hisown tho o adical contingnc ntails that th hav no answ, this it-sl is an answ ath than th all-knowing smik with which sch qs-tions a sall gtd.

Lato placd th hman-wold gap with a dmocac o actos,thb toppling th cntal pilla o th Copnican tn. Th nxt stpwold b to sto th spclativ qstions that smd nanswabl oas long as th Kantian gap was in oc. W hav alad sn Lato dis-ob th Antinomis b impling that th a no simpls, onl composits.Wh not pss th and t to tak a stand on Kant’s oth illgal topics?Wh not ps a campaign to claim all th taditional qstions o mta-phsics? I w can tak a stand on th innit gss o obcts, w mightalso wlcom contpoos sggsting that obcts com to a halt at all.

I th qstion povs ndcidabl, thn this oght to b o asons ntildint om thos o Kant’s hman-wold it. Th initial goal shold bto claim all o th maining Antinomis: dom o ncssit, innit onitd o tim and spac, and th xistnc o non-xistnc o a ncssabing (on th latt qstion Millassox wighs in with a ‘no’). ev sinc1781, an agnostic attitd to ths qstions has bn sn as th pim phil-osophical vit. Bt th spiit o a nw a oght to tat agnosticism as a vic. Mtaphsics can b bilt th wa Nw Olans cold hav bn, withbtt ngining and mo p-to-dat matials.

18. Millassox, Après la nitude , p. 151.





151

7

Obct-Ointd Philosoph

This book has dscibd Lato as a pion o obct-ointd philosoph.In this nal chapt o th book I will t to clai what this mans, sinc‘obct’ signis man things to man popl. Th most tpical viw o thtm is that th obct is whatv opposs th hman sbct—in this sns,

th obct wold b a ‘alist’ concpt pointing to a gnin alit ind-pndnt o hman accss to it. Bt this is too stictiv to cov all snsso ‘obct’, as can b sn om th cas o edmnd Hssl. Fo Hssl isb no mans a alist, sinc h backts th al wold ot o considationin his philosoph. Nonthlss, h mains an obct-ointd philosoph,sinc vn th most cso ading o Hssl’s mao woks shows obctsto b among his most pivotal concpts. Th obct o Hssl is a nit ovagainst its shiting sis o ot accidental manistations, sinc a hos isth sam hos om no matt what diction o distanc w viw it. Andin a scond sns th hos is an idal nit ov against its essential qali-tis, sinc w also cannot aiv at th hos vn b smming p all its non-accidntal qalitis. In Hssl, thn, w nd th stang cas o an obct-ointd idalism.

Whil it is t that obcts cannot civ thi ll d om an non-alist philosoph, th mains th ionic act that Hssl has mad gat- contibtions to th philosoph o obcts than most alists. It is not hadto s wh. ralists a pimail concnd with assting th xistnc o

a wold otsid th hman mind. And onc th l that this agmnt iswon and thi point is stablishd, th a too otn satisd to lt obctssit otsid hman knowldg as obvios and inaticlat phsical lmps,with thi philosophical mission alad accomplishd b thi m nd-ctting o idalism. Bt givn that idalists conn thmslvs within th




naow compass o hman accss to th wold, th a otn ocd to wokhad within this hman alm b idntiing nw ats and nw its.

A. rADICAL, CONSerVATIVe, AND POLArIZeD APPrOACHeSTO OBjeCTS

Whatv sns o th wod ‘obct’ w might consid, it alwas s tosomthing with a ctain nit and atonom. An obct mst b on, andit mst also hav a sot o indpndnc om whatv it is not. An obctstands apat—not st om its manistation to hmans, bt possibl vnom its own accidnts, lations, qalitis, momnts, o pics. Fthmo,insoa as an obct is mo than its lations it mst stand apat om an

spposd monism o th wold-as-a-whol, sinc a homognos nivso this kind ml givs s th most adical om o lationism—with v-thing dissolving into vthing ls in a vast holistic stw. Now, an dis-tinction btwn obcts and th oth tms mntiond abov can also bctd, povidd good asons a givn. Indd, most ctting-dg phi-losophis a distingishd pcisl b thi denial o on o mo o th di-ncs st mntiond. Lt’s s th phas ‘adical philosoph’ to dsciban claim that th obct is nothing ov and abov on o mo o th tmsto which it might b opposd. This immdiatl voks a landscap o pos-

sibl adical philosophis:radical dnial o th distinction btwn obct and sbct. Althogh1.Bkl alad dcd esse to percipi , a mo pstigios dnial o th sbct/obct distinction is ond in Ficht and Hgl. Fo thmKant’s thing-in-itsl is spos, sinc it is positd as ling out-side thoght onl by thoght. A simila gst can b ond toda inŽižk, o whom th ral is not somthing stationd bond hmanaccss, bt is instad positd b th hman sbct itsl as its own

constittiv lack.radical dnial o th split btwn obcts and lations. W nd2.this xtm position in Whithad (and lat in Lato), o whom itmaks no sns to spak o actal ntitis as nding nits that n-dgo advnts in spac and tim. An ntit ‘phnds’ o lats toman oth ntitis, and it is ll dnd b ths phnsions. I wclaim that th is somthing mo to th thing than all ths la-tions, Whithad calls this ppotd sbstatm a vacos actalit,

and h ll intnds ‘vacos’ to b an inslt.radical dnial o spaat atonomos ntitis in th al wold in3.avo o a pimal whol. This is ml an xtm vaiant o thscond adical position that dcs a thing to its lations. Th mothings a lationizd, th lss indpndnc th hav, and hnc



Obct-Ointd Philosoph 153

th mo w appoach th limit cas o a singl homognos block,with th nivs as an ominos mbling nit. B impling thatall things hav som sot o nit at a lvl dp than th act-

al, th gnin poblm o commnication btwn things is blithlliminatd. Th alist xampls o sch a position can b ond insom o th p-Socatic thinks: whth in Pamnids (spaatindividals a nal gmnts o th snss as vald b ason), Anaximand (th cnt dincs btwn spcic things a atansint instic that will vntall pass awa into a nid apeiron ),Pthagoas (th oiginal alit was an ndintiatd apeiron ntil itinhald th Void and bok into agmnts), o Anaxagoas (th oigi-nal apeiron bok into pics whn otatd apidl b nous o Mind). A

mo cnt xampl can b ond in th Cause, Principle, and Unity o Giodano Bno, o whom vthing swlls p om a nid pi-mal matt. Spinoza’s Ethics invits th sam accsation, sinc his at-tibts and mods blong to a singl divin sbstanc (althogh thislation is vsd b mo chic psnt-da ads o Spinoza, thscn o his philosoph is still shitd awa om individal things). Wvn nd xampls in twntith cnt Fnch thoght. In Existence and Existents , emmanl Lvinas haks back to Anaxagoas b imag-ining a mbling pimal il y a (‘th is’), hpostatizd into spcicchnks onl b hman consciosnss. evn mo cntl, jan-LcNanc1 has attmptd a spising tho o th wold as a omlss‘whatv’ aticlatd onl b th intactions among its pats.

radical dnial o an distinction btwn an obct and its shiting 4.accidnts. At last o pominnt thinks bsids Lato com tomind who tak a adical position on this point. On is David Hm,who amosl dnis that an obct xists as anthing mo than abndl o qalitis habitall linkd togth b th mind. Anoth is Alain Badio, who ss th wold as mad p o ‘consistnt mltiplic-itis’ that a nits onl bcas th a counted as on, not thoghan inhnt intgit o thi own. yt anoth xampl is ond inth lat ‘ist’ position o Hssl’s tach Fanz Bntano, spcial-l in th collction The Theory o Categories , wh a thing is said to con-tain th sm total o all its ats, not st a limitd inn sanctmo ssntial ons. Fo Bntano’s ism th is no nding Socats-ncls dp than th cnt Socats who happns to b sitting,

waing a whit ob, and dinking win. Anoth amos xamplis Libniz, who adicall compsss v incidnt o th t intoo monads om th dawn o tim: Casa cossing th rbicon was

1. jan-Lc Nanc, ‘Cops’, tans. Cladtt Satiliot, in The Birth to Presence , tans. B.Holms & Oths, Stanod, Stanod univsit Pss, 1993.




not an accidnt, and nith is th act that I am tping ths wods at3:14 in th atnoon ath than 3:17, o that I hav tavld to t-six contis ath than a m t.

radical dnial that an obct is dint om its qalitis. This is5.simila to Point 4 abot accidnts, bt s to th lvl o alit it-sl ath than that o qalitis xpincd b th mind. Btandrssll2 is on g who somtims taks a adical position h,dning that th is anthing calld ‘sbstanc’ ov and abov thqalitis that tpi it.

radical dnial that an intntional obct is dint om its Hsslian6.eidos —om th sum total o ssntial qalitis that it qis in od

to b intndd as what it is. A ngad an o Hssl might pholdthis adical point on th gonds that th is no ppos in positing an obct ov and abov its ssntial taits.

radical dnial that an obct is dint om its pics. This is clas-7.sic scintic dctionism. Fo adicals o this stip, high-lvl obcts a not mgnt alitis ov and abov th tin matial com-ponnts o which th a omd. Man go so a as to sa that vnconsciosnss is dcibl to th phsical micopaticls o which itis bilt. evn among thos who dn that consciosnss is dcibl,th a man (sch as David Chalms and Galn Stawson) whostill hold that all physical things can b dcd to micopaticls—sothat a tabl wold b nothing ov and abov th qaks and lctonso which it is mad, vn i consciosnss cannot ths b dcd.

Ths appoachs can all b calld ‘adical’ o asons o tmolog. Whilnot all a adical in th sns o bing nw and nosn, all a ting to idnti th singl radix, th oot o alit as a whol. B taking on sid

o an opposition as pima and th oth as divativ, th solv an ap-pant paadox b collapsing vthing into on o two opposd tms.

Th svn adical philosophis st citd all banish nid and atono-mos obcts as a spposd gmnt o th actiona mind, placing obcts ith with bndls o qalitis, poctions o hman dsi, nction-al/nvionmntal cts, sbatomic paticls, o a pimal nid womb o bcoming. B contast with sch adical gsts lt’s s th phas ‘consvativ philosoph’ to to thos doctins that lav initial oppositions in

plac ath than adicall dcing thm to on tm, bt with th maodawback o not giving adqat xplanation o how th two tms int-lat. exampls o a consvativ appoach wold b th yin/yang polait,th mind/bod dalism, th sbstanc/agggat distinction, th act/val

2. Btand rssll, The Analysis o Matter , London, Kgan Pal, 1927.




opposition, th animat/inanimat it, th phnomnal/nomnal split, oth Platonic gap btwn pct oms and cav shadows. Whil all o thsthois w ‘adical’ in thi tim in th sns o bing innovativ, non

t to dc th cosmos to a singl radix . Instad, ach os som sot o nspassabl dalit, and hnc can b calld ‘consvativ’ in th snsdnd h. Fo all o ths thois t to consv two sids o th sto,i at th cost o ailing to link thm ctivl.

Most tatmnts o most philosophical poblms adopt ith a adi-cal o a consvativ statg (and most thinks a adical on som pointsand consvativ on oths). Hnc, i w ct an adical appoach thatdissolvs nita obcts into som oth xplanato tm, it might smthat w atomaticall laps into som sot o consvativ mtaphsics that

atis timwon actiona splits in th cosmos. At all, to dnd obcts mans to s th adical assalts b Hgl on nomna, Hm onsbstanc, Whithad on vacos actalit, Chchland on ghostl minds,rssll on sbstanc, o Bno on sbstantial oms. It might thb smthat w a taking th sid o boing common sns i w insist that all thpolaizations sonding obcts mst b takn siosl. Bt w a not,sinc w also aim to show clal how th two tms o an polaization aabl to intact. Whas th adical gst is alwas to sa ‘th is noth-ing mo to S than P’, o conta gst is to insist that ‘th is always mo to S than P’. Obct-ointd philosoph is a pod dns o th‘somthing mo’. And whas th consvativ gst is to sa that ‘thwold is mad o opposd S-tms and P-tms’, w shold nv ogt thpoblm o how on tm is inscibd in th oth. Statd dintl, adicalphilosoph holds that th is no poblm o commnication btwn op-posits in th nivs, bcas vthing is ltimatl o th sam nat.(exampl: Hm’s skpticism, sinc vthing that poplats his philoso-ph stms om impssions.) Manwhil, consvativ philosoph holds that

th a absolt gaps o dalitis that mst b spctd, and which agnall onl dscibd o ls solvd b at. (exampl: occasionalism, inwhich all ntitis and all instants o tim a ct o om on anoth ntilGod intvns magicall to link thm.)

Althogh Kant is widl clbatd o caving p his pdcssos into‘ationalists’ and ‘mpiicists’, ths a ml tms o two was o knowing th wold (thogh ason o thogh xpinc) ath than two doctinsabot th stct o th wold itsl. A dp distinction is th on that lisbtwn occasionalism (‘consvativ’) and skepticism (‘adical’), th most p-id oms o th compting Continntal and Anglo-Saxon schools o thsvntnth cnt. This visd tminolog nabls s to s that Kant’sspposd snthsis o th two pcding camps o philosoph is no snth-sis at all, bt ll ndoss th skptical sid ov th occasionalist sid. InKant’s philosoph vthing knowabl is adicall dcd to th stats o




phnomna govnd b catgois. Th onl conserved dalit o Kant isth on that lis btwn hman and wold. Whil th occasionalists boldlinsist on psving th gap btwn cotton and o aindops and wood,

Kant lavs sch non-hman lations otsid o philosoph altogth. Hmaintains onl a sickl, minimal occasionalist gap btwn hmans on thon hand and everything else on th oth. No wond Ficht viwd this mpmnant o occasionalism in Kant as a withd vstigial ogan, woth o amptation. Ths, th things-in-thmslvs w bootd om philosophas naiv. And in this wa toda’s ‘continntal philosoph’ actall abandons th vigoos Continntal option o th svntnth cnt and oins ana-ltic thoght in a littl-noticd skptical/adical consnss in which th di-nc btwn Hm and Kant is not so gat. evthing is dcd to a

qstion o hman accss to th wold, and non-hman lations a aban-dond to th natal scincs.

B contast, th mthod o obct-ointd philosoph is nith adi-call skptical no consvativl occasionalist, bt polarized . Obcts xistas atonomos nits, bt th also xist in connction with thi qali-tis, accidnts, lations, and momnts withot bing dcibl to ths. Toshow how ths tms can convt into on anoth is th alchmical mis-sion o th obct-ointd think. Th wold is mad p o a basic st o polaitis—o o thm, it tns ot. Th cannot b divd om a singladical oot, bt nith do th xist as incoptibl lmnts ntans-mtabl into on anoth in th mann o th empdoclan ai, ath,, and wat.

So a th has nv bn a pct ho o obct-ointd philoso-ph. Som o th polaizations o th obct (vss th hman sbct, -lations, th block-nivs, accidnts, qalitis, eidei , and pics) hav bnpsvd b vaios thinks, bt onl at th cost o dning th oths.Bno Lato is th closst g I can think o to th idal obct-ointd

ho. Fo in addition to th mavlos plalit o conct obcts ondin his books, h is abl to think two things at onc in th mann that thpolaizd appoach dmands. Fo on th on hand, his actants a ct o om on anoth in thi ttl conct stats and nd mdiatos tobidg th gaps btwn thm (‘consvativ’). Bt on th oth hand, ac-tants a dnd ntil b thi lations to oth things (‘adical’). Msol obction is that Lato’s adical sid is too adical, and his consva-tiv sid too consvativ. B tating actants as ntil lational and notallowing an ssntial ncla co in thm to withdaw bhind lations, hdos not acknowldg th spaation o things om thi own taits. Andb spaating all things via mdiatos ad innitum (joliot and politics, joliotand ntons) h maks thi commnication impossibl, sinc th mdia-tos a lt in th sam boat as th two oiginal actants that w not al-lowd to toch (politics and ntons).




B. eSCAPING THe WHIrLPOOL OF reLATIONS

W now ac sval tasks. Sinc obcts can b distingishd om at lastsvn conta tms, w nd to oganiz ths opponnts in clan ash-

ion. Nxt, w nd to pinpoint which sid Lato taks in ach o ths con-tovsis in od to know in what sns h is an obct-ointd philosophand in what sns not (no on has v bn obct-ointd on v point).Finall, w shold also xplain wh an obct-ointd o polaizd appoachis spio to its adical and consvativ altnativs on ach cont.

Th st stp is to notic that th o th dincs mntiond (obct vs. accidnt, momnt, qalit) to an intnal split in th obct itsl,not in its lation to anthing ls. I w spak o a t as dint om thaccidntal pol that w xpinc o it, om th ssntial momnts (ei-dos ) o th t as xpincd, o o th qalitis that th t has vn whnnobod nconts it, ths a all its within th al o intntional t.Non o ths distinctions a o intst to Lato, and hnc th can bsal ignod o th momnt. At all, Lato’s pincipl o th absoltconctnss o ntitis dos not allow o an distinction to b dawn b-twn th thing as a nit and th vaios ats o which it is compisd.In this sns h is clos to th mpiicist ‘bndl o qalitis’ tho thanto Hssl’s modl o a thing in tnsion with its own taits. Onl in th nxt

chapt will I tn to ths th its within obcts thmslvs. unlikths, th maining o dincs (obct vs. wold-block, th hman sbct, lations, and pics) not to th aticlation within a singl obct,bt to th lation o that obct with somthing ls. And on ths pointsLato’s viws a mixd:

Lato clal has no concpt o a singl block-wold om which in-1.dividals a m divativ chips (with th possibl xcption o hismging tho o plasma, givn that h sms to viw it as an no-

mattd whol). In act, his spcic actos a compltl ct o omon anoth. This is pcisl wh an two obcts nd a mdiatoi th a v to mak contact—a claim that on wold nv haom Pamnids.

Clal, Lato also mans to distingish btwn obcts and thi2.pics. No on wold mistak him o a scintic dctionist givnthat h allows Pop and aild mto tains th sam philosophi-cal ights as qaks and lctons. An obct o Lato is a black box

concaling a vast intnal dama, bt it is nv tatd as a msac-ct o tin nopnabl micoboxs ling at th bottom o all boxs. Indd, I ind ali that Lato’s tho o black box-s qis an innit gss in which no box is v nal and n-opnabl, no matt how tin. Nonthlss, i w ask what maks




complicatd maco-ntitis gnin mgnt alitis o him, ittns ot to b nothing inhnt in thi hats, bt has to do withthi ptbations o oth ntitis. In oth wods, th ason a sb-

wa tain is not st a divativ clst o tin atoms is because it haslag sbwa-cts on oth ntitis that cannot b xplaind intms o th tain’s componnt atoms. In shot, Lato vs towad a unctional concpt o mgnc: a thing mgs as a al thing whnit has nw cts on th otsid wold, not bcas o an intgalmgnt alit in th thing itsl. This lads to a ctain tnsion inhis tho o black boxs.

Lato’s position is somwhat ambigos whn it coms to th sb-3.

ct/obct dalism. ralist citics o Lato might tak his claim thatth micob xistd onl whn Past discovd it, that it pxist-d Pat only or Pasteur , as gonds o ining that h absobs allalit into th hman sbct. Ths sam citics might also b ss-picios o th act that th witings o Lato sall involv on omo hmans in whatv ntwok is nd considation. In Lato(nlik in Whithad) w nd littl discssion o lations btwn in-animat ntitis whn popl a nowh on th scn. Fo this a-son th notion o a Latoian phsics might sm impossibl to som

citics. Against ths citics, two points cold b aisd to claim thatLato dos allow o a alit indpndnt o hman accss. Fist,th is th insistnc in Irreductions (his k philosophical wok) thatintptation occs not st btwn hmans and obcts, bt alsobtwn obcts and obcts. Scond, th is th act that actos oLato a not dcibl to o cnt hman accss to thm: actosresist, at all. Th do not alwas do what w ask o thm, and thisimplis that th hav som dg o atonom om s.

Bt on th qstion o lations with oth things Lato is a scam-4.ing adical, opposd to an attmpt to distingish btwn obctsand lations. As w hav sn, a thing o Lato is nothing mothan its sm total o ptbations o oth ntitis. Th is no ms-tios sid in th things hiding bhind thi lations with oththings.

Point 4 is wh Lato most clal dviats om th obct-ointd ap-poach. Point 3 is mo dbatabl, thogh I will pat th po-Lato cas

momntail. Bt Points 1 and 2 a nogh to stablish Lato as on o thgat obct-ointd philosophs o all tim. What maks Lato a gatthoist o obcts a th two ollowing points:

H dos not t to dc vaios sizs o actos to som pimal lvl A.o phsical matt. H is not a matialist givn that lctons, tabls,




Pop, and amis a qall obcts. In tms o Point 2 abov, his not a adical who liminats blk maco-actos in avo o thitin littl mico-pics.

At th sam tim, Lato ss ths actos as ct o om on an-B.oth. Th can onl b linkd b som thid tm as thi mdiato,as whn joliot links politics and ntons, nith o thm inhntllinkabl o nlinkabl pio to joliot’s act o tanslation. In tms o Point 1 abov, Lato dos not t to hav his cak and at it too bpositing som npoblmatic pimal whol wh commnication isas, bt a whol that is also cavd into ‘p-individal singlaitis’o som oth qall vag phas. Th a nothing bt actal ob-

cts. Th com in all shaps and sizs, and all a qall sqs-td b wa o gaps that som thid tm mst alwas bidg. Latonv chats b invoking an nalsiabl global dit to do this wok.Instad h nds to call pon a local om o casation, and hncmst cont as what I call th st ‘scla occasionalist’. And insoaas h nds ths casal links to b poblmatic, and not st odd oan abitail invokd God o th gaps, h avoids th consvativ ap-poach to obcts st as skillll as most o th adical ons. Th cn-tal poblm o mtaphsics is th intpla o obcts and lations,

and Lato shds mo light on both poblms than phaps an oth- contmpoa think. It is odd that no on so a has smd toaliz this—bad lck o Lato, bt onc-in-a-litim good otno m, as th atho o th st book on his mtaphsics.

Althogh w hav covd o spaat points so a, all a concnd witha singl qstion: a obcts atonomos om thi lations? M own viwis that all o thss a dint gadations o a singl ndling thsis,so that all mst b ith amd o dnid. Whas Lato’s position lis

somwh in th middl o th ollowing continm, I hold that all o o th ollowing positions mst b amd.

Objects are Not Derivative o a Primal Whole

Th mo w dn a thing b its lations, th mo w stip it o atono-mos alit. This can b don to gat o lss xtms. Th most x-tm vsion o a lational philosoph wold b th p monism o asingl lmp nivs, a wold dvoid o an spcic alitis at all. Sch a

position claims not st that a ston o dolphin a both dnd compltlin tms o thi lations to oth obcts, bt vn dnis that stons anddolphins xist as two spaat lational constllations. Instad, all is on.Sch philosophis a most abndant in th p-Socatic a. W might sathat an ndintiatd wold-lmp, omlss bing, o bondlss apeiron




ith xistd in th past bo it was shattd into pics (Pthagoas, Anaxagoas), that it xists ight now thogh o snss dciv s into think-ing othwis (Pamnids), o that it will xist in th distant t onc s-

tic dstos all opposit tms (Anaximand). As alad mntiond, wnd analogos thois in th mo cnt positions o Lvinas and Nanc. Assming that on pholds sch a tho, th is ith som sot o -

lation btwn th ndintiatd wold-lmp and th spcic bings wappantl ncont, o th is not. Bt in th om cas it is had to show a homognos lmp cold b cavd p lat into distinct pics, givnth positd homognit o all potions o th lmp. And in th latt cas,that o no lation at all btwn th global lmp and th spcic bings, thnid wold-mass is all st an ilvant maind plaing no ol o

s, and w a lt to conont th dtails o xpinc om a position indis-tingishabl om that o idalism. I Bkl had claimd that bhind allth pcptions th was a gigantic blob o obctiv indtminat matt,this wold hav changd littl abot his philosoph.

rcntl w hav ncontd a wak bt mo sophisticatd vsiono this position in th vaios philosophis o th vital that hav bgn topoliat in and aond th woks o Dlz. Ths positions t to noth bst o both wolds, dning a nid alm bnath xpinc thatis not completely nid. Instad o a total lmp-wold, it is on animatdin advanc b dint ‘p-individal’ zons that pvnt th wold ombing pl homognos. This position has th ollowing spposd bn-ts: it pvnts things om bing ovdtmind b thi cnt actal-it (an admiabl obct-ointd gst), whil also sll bidging th gapbtwn things withot doing th qid wok (a ml ‘adical’ movin th sns that mst b ctd). Fo instanc, DLanda wishs to stab-lish th possibilit o a ‘continos, t htognos spac’.3 Th sam ist o Gilbt Simondon, that posthmos ising sta. As Albto Toscano

dscibs Simondon’s position, ‘whilst [pindividal bing] is t to b in-dividatd, [it] can alad b gadd as actd b lationalit. Thispindividal lationalit, which taks plac btwn htognos di-mnsions, ocs o ngtic tndncis, is nvthlss also a sot o non-lation […]. Bing is ths said to b more-than-one to th xtnt that all o itspotntials cannot b actalizd at onc’.4 Simondon lik DLanda wants thwold to b both htognos and not yet paclld ot into individals. Inthis wa, spcic alitis lad a sot o halhatd xistnc somwh b-twn on and man.

This is ctainl not Lato’s own position, sinc his actos a ll in-dividal om th stat; his philosoph contains no sch concpt as ‘p-

3. Manl DLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London, Continm, 2002, p. 27.4. Albto Toscano, The Theatre o Production, London, Palgav, 2006, p. 138.




individal’. His actos a not blndd togth in a ‘continos t ht-ognos’ whol, bt a basicall ct o om on anoth. Th is nocontinm o Lato dspit his lationism, and this thankll ntails

that his lationism is less adical than it is o philosophis o th vital(not that Lato’s a itations with monism sm to coincid with hisqall a itations with th tm ‘vital’). Individal candls and api-cots do xist o Lato. This mans that th cannot ully dissolv into aglobal sstm o lations, not vn o th ‘continos t htognos’kind advocatd b DLanda, who is othwis a mo hadco alist thanLato himsl. In Lato’s mtaphsics, vn i a candl is nothing bt itsst o lations with oth things it is still a spcic individual st o lationsdint om thos that assmbl to giv s an apicot. Fo Lato th a

no p-individal o vital apicots—onl actal apicots, dnd ntilb thi lations with oth actants.

Objects are Irreducible to Their Components

I tt monism is th most xtm om o lationism, th halwa hoso vital philosoph is onl bal lss xtm. What wold b th nxt in-cmntal stp awa om th ll-blown adicalism o th shaplss apeiron?It wold b a position that Lato still cts: matialism. This wod can

b dnd in a nmb o dint was, so lt’s dn it h as a philoso-ph claiming that all maco-sizd ntitis can ltimatl b dcd to a -nal la o tin pampd phsical lmnts that a mo al than v-thing ls. I monism holds that th a no individal things at all, and vitalism holds that alit consists at bst o pre -individals, thn matial-ism maks onl a small additional concssion: th a individals indd,bt onl at th lvl o ltimat micopaticls. All lag ntitis can b x-plaind awa as lational composits. An apatmnt bilding is all sta big assmbl o atoms, sinc th bilding xists qua bilding onl in its -lations with th popl who s it. Onl ltimat paticls, whth th bqaks and lctons o nknown small pics o th wold, xist in and o thmslvs and nd no lations with oth things to an thi alit.

H w still nd Lato sisting lationism as too xtm. raththan saing that all maco-sizd actos a dcibl to tin matial atoms,Lato allows o v possibl siz o obct—nw ntitis emerge at di-nt scals o th wold. On good list o citia o mgnt ntitis canb ond in DLanda’s A New Philosophy o Society (a list dawn in pat om

ro Bhaska, an atho DLanda admis as mch as I do). On obviosat o mgnt ntitis is that th mst hav ‘mgnt poptis’:5 o instanc, th Pais Mto has ats not discnibl in an o its cas,

5. Manl DLanda, A New Philosophy o Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity,London, Continm, 2006, p. 48.




tacks, tnstils, o cstoms takn alon. Anoth at is ‘dndantcasalit’:6 th whls o th Mto tains can b placd with dplicats ovn with compltl dint tps o whls withot ncssail changing

th Mto as a whol. Still anoth at is that mgnt whols a abl toact toctivl on thi pats:7 whls in th Mto a phaps sbctd tomo niom ictional hat than th wold in oth possibl contxts, andth global makt o whls, baings, and tacks ma bcom mo stan-dadizd i th Pais Mto bcoms thi biggst cstom. A nal atmntiond b DLanda is that man pats o th mgnt whol do not p-xist that whol bt a actall gnatd b it:8 on can now hav a spcialca as a Mto msician, ow vndo, o gati atist; on can bcoman acadmic schola o th Pais Mto, o a Mto at spnding a litim

in its tnnls. Non o ths w ncssa initial pats o th Mto to bwhat it was, bt all a now inspaabl om its ich mgnt li.

It shold b cla nogh that Lato’s actos mt all o ths citiao mgnc. This is t vn o dndant casation, which might notsond v Latoian at st: i an ntit contains all o its ats and not st th spposdl ‘ssntial’ ons, woldn’t a dint whl man a com-pltl nw Mto? Not at all. Whn Lato sas that a thing is dnd bits lations, h is talking abot its otwad lational cts on oth things,not its al intnal composition. I th Mto had on tp o whl aththan anoth, it wold not ncssail b a dint acto nlss this changmad it gist dint otwad cts on other actos. At an momnt wcan choos to opn p a black box and xamin th componnts that gavis to it. Bt th black box dos not st scn its inn pics om h-man viw, o it also has a ctain abilit to nd intnal changs (as inth cas o th Mto whl st mntiond). Most intnal aangmntso an acto’s pics a scnd o om th xtnal actos that th Mtoacts, tansoms, ptbs, o cats. Hnc th black box is not st a

tmpoa stopping point o hmans who hav not t opnd it, bt alsoa gnin scn that blocks o nimpotant changs om accssibilit ball oth obcts.

Howv, I hav alad mntiond that th is a slight slippag to-wad lationism h. Wh? Bcas Lato sms to viw mgnc as a unctional matt. Naml, i a thing is al onl bcas it tansoms o p-tbs som oth ntit, this mans that it mgs onl i it has an ct onsomthing ls. And this wold impl that th Pais Mto dos not xist i nothing is tansomd b it. W cannot sa that th Pais Mto xists ‘po-tntiall’ bo it is bilt, bcas th is no oom o potntial in Lato’sphilosoph; instad, th Mto will bgin to xist onl at th momnt whn

6. DLanda, A New Philosophy o Society, p. 37.7. DLanda, A New Philosophy o Society, p. 34.8. DLanda, A New Philosophy o Society, p. 37.




it is acting oth things. Bt this cannot sccd as a concpt o m-gnc, bcas it passs th hot potato o alit om th Mto itsl to othntitis—nothing in th Mto maks it somthing al ov and abov

its constitnt qaks and lctons. ral mgnc cannot b ml nc-tional/lational, bt mst amont to th gnation o nw atonomosthings with nw atonomos qalitis whether it relates to anything else or not. Othwis, w wold hav a nal la o atomic micopaticls. All lagphsical ntitis wold b dcd to lational cts—as sn in th phi-losoph o David Chalms, who thinks a tabl is al onl in th nctionalsns o having tabl-cts, bt is othwis dcibl to tin pics o mi-co-matt. Bt Lato’s philosoph dos not vn allow o th xistnc o micopaticls d to th innit gss implid b his pincipl that black

boxs can alwas b opnd. Hnc, it is all th mo impotant o Latothat h allow gnin non-lational alit to mg at ach lvl o thwold. And thogh h nv passs th bck o alit downward to an ati-cial stopping point in th ppotd nal kingdom o qaks, h dos passit upward to th otwad cts an actant has on its nighbos. Bt th bckmst nv b passd in ith diction. Th alit o an obct blongs tothat obct—not to its tin intnal constitnts, and also not to th lagcollctivs in which it is immsd.

Objects Exceed Our Access to Them

Alad, Lato has avoidd th most xtm oms o lationism. H op-poss th lmp nivs, th smi-lmp nivs o p-individal ‘htog-nos contina’, and vn th matialist poo hos wh tin littl pa-ticls a th wold’s onl pmittd ntitis. Against ths xtm attmptsto lationiz th wold, Lato maintains a ail stalwat obct-ointdstanc—allowing o nmos ntitis o dint sizs, and gaant-ing thi atonom b ctting thm o om on anoth. Bt w now n-t a cold, g ntal zon wh Lato bgins to it with th lationalmodl o ntitis, and soon nogh will ach th wak om o lationismthat h opnl dnds. Following th th tps o lationism that havalad bn dscibd, th nxt mo watd-down vsion wold b this:‘th wold is not st mad o on kind o ntit, sch as atoms. Instad, tha two al ntitis: hman and wold. Bt th xist onl in pmanntappot with on anoth. Th cannot b al things-in-thmslvs lodgdotsid th hman mind, bcas i w a thinking abot thm thn w a

thinking abot thm, and hnc th a no long indpndnt o thoght’.Th ad will immdiatl cogniz this position as th ‘colationism’billiantl idntid b nam in th wok o Millassox.

W hav alad sn that th a ashes o colationism in th wit-ings o Lato: micobs did not p-xist Pat’s discov o thm, and




ramss II cold not hav did o tbclosis sinc it was not t discov-d in ancint egpt.9 Bt on th oth hand th is also th Lato o Irreductions , who maks it cla that obcts intpt ach oth as mch

as w intpt thm. I hav alad sggstd that th latt is clos toLato’s t position, and that his intmittnt colationist momntsa a piphal, dispnsibl lmnt o his wok. This viw is scondd bMillassox, who agd in an -mail that ‘lik o, I bliv that Latois not a colationist’.10 Millassox actall holds Lato to b qit thopposit: a lationist mtaphsician who smbls Whithad (and p-smabl Haman!) in hpostatizing th hman lation with th wold andspading it thoghot th cosmos.11 Althogh Millassox viws this stpngativl and I viw it positivl, w both ag that Lato is not tappd

in a hman/wold colat. It is ionic that w both ag on this pointvn thogh Lato mockd himsel as a colationist.

Now, th most notwoth at o Millassox’s own philosophi-cal position was somwhat ncla to m on m st two adings o hisbook, blindd as I was b m own stong distast o colationism.12 FoMillassox is th onl mmb o th ‘Spclativ ralist’ cicl who is ac-tall sympathetic to th colationist position. rath than viwing it as asad dgnation om a obstl alist attitd, Millassox ss it as thonl path to a igoos, ationalist philosoph. In oth wods, h holds thatcolationism mst b adicalizd om within, not dismissd om th ot-sid. In this spct h has mo in common with gs sch as Lacan,Badio, and Žižk than with taditional alists. Now, in th Anglophonwold w sall ha Lato dnoncd as th latst Fnch lativist whosbctivizs th wold and ins scinc. Fo this ason it coms as a bit o a shock to ha Millassox’s opposit complaint (mo common in Fanc):naml, that Lato is so addictd to hadhadd, old-ashiond alism that h nv dvlops th logic o th hman-wold colat with scint

9. Fo th cas o ramss II and tbclosis, s Lato, ‘On th Patial existnc o existing and Nonxisting Obcts’ (Pe).

10. Millassox, Psonal Commnication, 16 Sptmb, 2007. tans. Gaham Haman.11. Millassox, Psonal Commnication, 16 Sptmb, 2007.12. S o instanc m al viw o Millassox’s book, ‘Qntin Millassox: A

Nw Fnch Philosoph’, Philosophy Today, vol. 51, no. 1, Sping 2007, pp. 104-117. Th Isggstd that Millassox maind somwhat caght p in colationism himsl, notll alizing that this was pcisl th point. In Millassox’s viw, colationism canonly b ovcom om within. Ths th al sctions o his book on ‘ancstalit’ andth ‘ach-ossil’ ml dscib a paadox o th colationist position, not a tationo it. This st bcam cla to m whn haing Millassox lct in Maasticht on 4Octob, 2007. Th cod shows that h had alad mad th point with qal claitin his 27 Apil, 2007 lct at Goldsmiths Collg in London, bt on that occasion svphsical illnss dpivd m o ll concntation dspit having givn m own lct im-mdiatl bo his.




igo. In Millassox’s psntation at th Apil 2007 Spclativ ralistwokshop in London, h s to th anti-colationist agmnt as

a htoic o th itl conctnss o things, th vng o dscip-

tions and stl on ptitiv qibbls. Lato, somtims, svs all linkswith colationism in sch a wa, and dos so with mch talnt and h-mo [….] Bt in th cas o [his] ‘rich elswh’ htoic, it is clathat it is not an agmnt, bt a disqalication o h who ags: thsickl and boing colationist.13

H th dsciption o th colationist as ‘sickl and boing’ is mant sa-casticall. Althogh Millassox ocll attacks th colationist stand-point in his own witings, h still contnds that it has a dvastating point tomak. It is cla om th maind o Millasox’s lct that h has no

smpath o attmpts to vad th colationist dadlock om th stat, asin Lato’s cas (and b implication m own).

Millassox dnds th colationist insight as ollows. H spaks o th dominanc o th hman/wold colat in philosoph bcas h‘[wants] to xhibit th ssntial agmnt o ths “philosophis o accss”, asHaman calls thm; and—I insist on this point—th ssntial strength o this[colationist] agmntation, appantl and dspatl implacabl’.14 On this point h stands bavl alon against his Spclativ ralist col-

lags, sinc ra Bassi, Iain Hamilton Gant, and I concd no stngthin th colationist standpoint at all. Millassox accpts th Fichtan pin-cipl o ‘no X withot givnnss o X, and no tho o X withot a positing o X. I o spak abot somthing, o spak abot somthing that is givnto o, and positd b o. Consqntl, th sntnc: “X is”, mans “X isth colat o thinking” in a [boad] Catsian sns [o thinking, nam-l…] X is th colat o an action, o a pcption, a concption, o o an sot o sbctiv act’.15 Fo Millassox as o Ficht, to posit X as non-positd is an obvios pagmatic contadiction,16 and no alism is woth o

th nam nlss it somhow avoids this pitall.17 Among thos hld gilt o alling into this tap is Fançois Lall

(whos scap om th colationist cicl towad a p-philosophical ralis ndosd b Bassi). In Millassox’s own wods: ‘i, lik Lall, oposit somthing otsid th cicl o obctivit—in his cas th ral otsid“Philosoph”—this ral will still b, accoding to m, [insid] th cicl o colationism’.18 Lall has abndant compan, sinc Millassox holds

13. Bassi, ra, Iain Gant, Haman Gaham, and Qntin Millassox, ‘Spclativ

ralism’, Collapse , vol. III , Falmoth, ubanomic, 2007, p. 423.14. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 409.15. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 409.16. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 412.17. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 413.18. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 418.




that nmos contmpoa thinks a gilt o too mch ral and notnogh alism.19 H also accss standad alists o avoiding ational d-bat with th colationist in avo o two illgitimat manovs: (1) ps-

chologizing th motivs o th colationist; (2) abandoning logical dbatwith th colationist thogh appal to a ‘rich elswh’.Whil Bassi paiss Lall o pholding ‘th adical atonom

o th ral towads thoght […] th ssntial asmmt o th ral andthoght’,20 Millassox viws this gst as a m ‘scssion’ om ationalagmnt. It is inscint whn Lall tis to disam th colationistb predicting that th colationist (Millassox’s tm, not Lall’s) willsist th notion o a non-positd ral. Fo pdicting that somon will -sist a statmnt dos not t pov that th a wong. Lall is still not

o th hook: to think X is still to think X, and can nv gt s anthing mo than th X that is thoght. Millassox nds that this colationistagmnt is an argument , and dsvs to b tatd as sch,21 and also ndsthat man alists o nothing bt a disappointing coup de orce xit omth colational cicl.

No is Lall alon in casting dobt on th pscholog o colation-ists and idalists ath than aging with thm. Th sam is vn moobviosl t o sch gs as Max, Fd, and Nitzsch: ‘Th alistghts v om o idalism b discoving th hiddn asons bhind thsdiscoss—asons that do not concn th contnt o philosophis, btth shaml motivations o thi sppots: class-intst, libido, etc ’. Thsam holds t o ‘th Nitzschan sspicion o th sickl Kantians o thnivsit’.22 Howv, ‘o don’t s a mathmatical dmonstation b-cas th mathmaticians a spposd to b sickl o ll o statd libi-do, o st s what o t!’.23

Along with th laz pschologizing o on’s opponnts, Millassox isnimpssd b attmpts to scd om th colational cicl in avo

o a nglctd ‘rich elswh’. H Lato is paid with Schopnha,phaps th onl tim ths two nams hav bn linkd. Millassox sm-maizs th attitd o this nxpctd copl as ollows: ‘solipsism is a phi-losoph nobod can t, bt also on that nobod can bliv. So lt’slav th otss as it is, and lt’s xplo th wold in all its vastnss!’ In thishtoic o th rich elswh, ‘th alist disqalis th colationist a-gmnt as nintsting, podcing aid idalitis, boing acadmics, andpathological intllctals’. rath than dging colationism b its motivsin th mann o Lall, Nitzsch, Max, and Fd, th rich elswh

19. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 435.20. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 425.21. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 426.22. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 424.23. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 426.




thinks dspis colationism bcas o its boing slts. Millassox ad-mits that th hav ‘an attactiv and powl htoic [and] not in a po-ativ sns’24 […]. Th a ov annod b ‘th sam [colationist]

obction, tdios and iitating: i o posit X , thn o posit X’.

25

Bt oMillassox, tdim is not a philosophical agmnt. Fo ‘alism, in m viw, mst main a ationalism’,26 not st an ang scssion om what-v w dislik.

In spons to Millassox’s spch on bhal o th colationist, Iwill t to do th things, thogh with gat bvit than all ths pointsdsv. Fist, I want to sggst a mo nancd pict o hman ason-ing than Millassox psnts with his split btwn ational agmnt onon sid and pschologizing htoic on th oth. Scond, I will claim that

th ‘htoic o th rich elswh’ is mo philosophically powl thanMillassox allows, and not st a matt o impssiv stlistic psasion.Thid, I will sa that colationism is actall not a powl agmnt atall, dspit its contining ashionabilit in continntal philosoph cicls.Bt with Millassox as with Lato, I nd msl in th stang position o not wanting to convinc him that h is wong. Fo in th st plac, non o s can v b s that w hav ond th pop stating point o philoso-ph; vn a sccssl annihilation o opposing positions ml stips div-sit om th gn pool, which shold onl b don i w a absoltl sthat th a alt gns. And in th scond plac, m disagmnt withMillassox’s po-colationist otlook dos not lssn m admiation oall th xotic its and bids that sping om it. In what ollows, I aim onlto psad ads o this book that colationism is not an advisabl on-dation o philosoph. As o Millassox himsl, it will b btt i h con-tins to do what h is alad doing, as will sl happn anwa.

On poblm is that Millassox’s lct at Goldsmiths os a pictin which ational, ddctiv agmnt on th colationist sid opposs

sh innndo and oid htoic on th non-colationist sid. A similamodl o thinking is poclaimd b analtic philosoph, with its assmp-tion that taing down th alt logic o nsond agmnts is th pima- task o philosoph. Fo th analtics th gat nmis o hman thoghta zzinss, non sqits, lack o clait, potic sl-indlgnc, and in-scintl pcis tminolog. I disag with this that assssmnt. Inm viw ths a all lativl mino poblms in compaison with shal-lownss, als dichotomis, lack o imagination, obotic chains o asoning,and th aggssiv sl-assanc that tpis analtic philosophs at thiwost. Whn a dsolat tax law lik Qin passs o a mast o englishpos simpl bcas h alwas sas xactl what h mans, o whn mico-

24. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 423.25. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 421.26. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 426.




dbats ov tchnical sb-isss at p dozns o cas, thn I think wnd to qstion th assmptions o this nti school. Whn dcads o ana-ltic dominanc bild p a spls o igoos agmnt a xcding glob-

al svs o sobans and ha, t so w o th pominnt analtic think-s a obvios kps o th cntis to com, thn on has to wondwhth th constant ocs on ‘agmnt’ is all gtting s anwh. Tosa that a philosoph is bilt o agmnts is lik saing that achitct isa matt o aanging stl gids. It is ctainl t that no bilding canstand with alt ngining, bt th a alwas man was to aangstl bams and mak thm stand. Shiting to an analog that hits clos tohom: to sa that a philosoph is bilt o xplicit agmnts is lik saing that an appl is bilt o qalitis, o that a pson is bilt o all th things that

can b known abot thm. W a not spaking h abot asthtic p-ncs o dst o ngl landscaps. Instad, w hav a gnin philosophical dispt abot whth o not an obct o a tth is adqatl ndd bspcic statmnts o agmnts abot it.

Now, th is nothing vn motl stil abot th witings o Millassox, whos pags contain on magnicnt spis at anoth.His philosophical imagination is a soc o constant ascination o m andoths. His lcid psit o asond ddction, on a continntal landscapthat too otn shns sch clait, is a lag pat o what maks his appoachso appaling. Bt thogh Millassox claims an itabl st pincipl ashis stating point (‘no scap om th colational cicl’), this statg isopposd b no lss a g than Ald Noth Whithad. eal in Process and Reality w ad ths stiing wods: ‘It has bn makd that a ss-tm o philosoph is never reuted; it is only abandoned ’.27 This is not st inspi-ing histoical htoic, bt stms om pl philosophical considationso dp impotanc to Whithad. H contins: ‘logical contadictions […]a th most gatitos o os; and sall th a tivial. Ths, at

citicism, sstms do not xhibit m illogicalitis. Th s om inad-qac and incohnc’.28 An cock, wll-taind analtic philosoph canmak logical mincmat o Plato’s Phaedo o Spinoza’s Ethics in tn mintso lss, t von knows that th latt two athos a still th mo im-pssiv gs—and not ml d to thi ‘gat histoical impotanc’.Somhow, w all sns that gtting th agmnts ight is not qit noghto bild a philosoph.

Contining th: ‘th accat xpssion o th nal gnalitis isth goal o discssion and not its origin. Philosoph has bn misld b th x-ampl o mathmatics; and vn in mathmatics th statmnt o th lti-

27. Ald Noth Whithad, Process and Reality, Nw yok, F Pss, 1978, p. 6,mphasis addd.

28. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 6.




mat logical pincipls is bst with dicltis, as t inspabl’.29 And‘th vication o a ationalistic schm is to b soght in its gnal sc-css, and not in th pclia clait, o initial clait, o its st pincipls’.30

And vn mo mmoabl: ‘i w consid an schm o philosophic cat-gois as on complx asstion, and appl to it th logician’s altnativ,t o als, the answer must be that the scheme is alse ’.31 And nall, ‘th pi-ma mthod o mathmatics is ddction; th pima mthod o philoso-ph [b contast] is dsciptiv gnalization. und th innc o math-matics, deduction has been oisted upon philosophy as its standard method , instad o taking its t plac as an ssntial axilia mod o vication whbto tst th scop o gnalitis’.32 I cit ths wods om Whithad, a cl-batd mathmatician and on o th gat philosophs o th last cnt,

to ais initial concns abot Millassox’s absolt split btwn lcid a-tionalit on on sid and htoical shadow on th oth. This tns ot tob mo than a dispt ov mthod, o it stms om a dp mtaphsicaldisagmnt. Fo Whithad, as o m, an statmnt o a philosophicalagmnt is alwas an ovsimplication not st o th wold as a whol, btvn o what th statmnt itsl discsss. rhtoic is not th dvios at o non-ational psasion, bt th bst tool w hav o xposing th nstatdassmptions that li bhind an sac poposition. Th analtic contmpto htoic and mtapho mst not b mlatd—not st bcas this atti-td lads to boing slts, bt bcas it is philosophicall als.

rcall Millassox’s complaint that th cas against colationism isotn basd on a statd appal to a ‘rich elswh’ o an attack onth hiddn motivs o th colationist ath than a gnin agmnt.Following Whithad, m st obction is that this ovsimplis th wok-ings o hman ason. Consid th ollowing possibl statmnts that mightb mad against matialism:

‘Matialists, lik all citical minds, a motionall statd po- A.

pl. Thi ang nd to toppl all taditional vals in th nam o anal sbstat o phsical atoms is a kind o nd potst at th woldo ltting thm down. Indd, a lag nmb o matialists smto com om bokn homs, o to hav oth nsolvd isss withthi pants and siblings. Notic how aggssiv th alwas a, stlik th angist childn on th plagond’.

‘Th poblm with matialism is that it dcs vthing to p-B.l relational poptis sch as hadnss, sistanc, and xact spatio-

tmpoal coodinats. This mans that matialism is not as alist

29. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 8, mphasis addd.30. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 8.31. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 8, mphasis addd.32. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 10, mphasis addd.




as it claims to b. It onl givs s lations, whil tlling s noth-ing abot what lats. Fthmo, matialism is pl abitawhn it dnis alit to intmdiat maco-sizd obcts sch as

molcls, ocks, and animals and instad gants alit onl to thmthical ltimat paticls o sb-atomic phsics—which vn phs-ics can nv idnti onc and o all’.

Statmnt A is a good xampl o th sot o innndo that Millassoxwold ndstandabl ct. Statmnt B, b contast, is what Millassoxwold call an ‘agmnt’. Matialists wold still call it a bad on, bt it isclal an agmnt omlatd in th pop Millassoxian spiit o atio-nal disagmnt. Th dinc btwn ths two statmnts is obviosnogh. Most popl wold ag that A is bond th pal o accptablphilosophical discssion, bt that B is a spctabl agmnt vn i it ails.Bt now consid an intmdiat cas o th ollowing kind:

‘Too man matialists sm motivatd b a pdictabl, psdo-icon-C.oclastic commitmnt to athism and political ltism. Woking omth als assmption that scinc maks pogss thogh stp-b-stpcitical dbnking o gllibl vda bli, th t to annihilatall intmdiat lvls o maning and accpt onl a nal, phsicalsbstatm as a mans o nmasking naiv pit and bogois social

stcts. In oth wods, th a motivatd mo b o-th-shl ationalist pdic and thi own inabilit to nvisag mo int-sting altnativs than b an solid sppot om scinc itsl’.

H w hav a mo poblmatic cas. rgadlss o whth o nd itconvincing, is this a valid agmnt against matialism o m pscholo-gizing innndo? Th answ in m viw is that Statmnt C is neither ag-mnt no innndo. Althogh Statmnt C sl ails to mt Millassox’sthshold o conting as an agmnt, it still poms gnin cognitiv

labo. In th hos bo somon has Statmnt C o th st tim,th ma hav a signd sns that matialists hold th intllctal pphand against thi opponnts, who a nothing bt a gang o anti-scintic,dogmatic, pios actionais. ‘Sinc I nv want to b on o ths ho-ibl actiona popl’, somon might silntl assm, ‘m onl choicis to sid with th matialists’. Bt Statmnt C hints at a dint pos-sibilit. Statmnt C ma not b an agmnt in th stict sns, bt vnMillassox might admit its ctivnss as ‘powl htoic’ o a ctainadinc. And to pat an ali point, htoic dos not man ‘iationalappal to th motions at th xpns o ason, otn b a dviosl cha-ismatic spak o wit who avos stl ov sbstanc’. As Whithadobsvs, an xplicit agmnt is alwas a vast ovsimplication o what-v iss is at hand. On o th biass o which h citicizs analtic phi-losoph most svl is ‘th tst in langag as an adqat xpssion o




popositions’.33 Whil agmnt ml plas with xplicit dialctical g-s, htoic pas attntion to th nstatd backgond assmptions o anlingistic poposition. Bt sch assmptions a pat o o cognitive lation

to th wold, not st o asthtic o motional on.Lt’s tn to Statmnt C, which appantl lis halwa btwn a-gmnt and ill-mannd inslt. No on wold claim that it givs a dvas-tating tation o matialism. yt it still dos impotant cognitiv wok— not b dstoing th matialist position, bt b sggsting both th need o nw options and th possibility o nw options. Pviosl th matialistmight hav smd lik th onl possibl standad ba o nlightndason against th hods o obscantist oppssos. Bt Statmnt C nowsbtl wans s that th matialist ma b gilt o: (a) ovhast zalot,

(b) a dstctiv sh to liminat all intmdiat las o th wold in a- vo o som dogmatic sbstat in a mann mo dctiv than th sci-ncs thmslvs, and (c) a xiv, nal obotic distast o ligion andcnt political oms. As Whithad wold sl ag, matialism (likan philosoph) is nv st an agmnt, bt also coms ll qippdwith a htoical backgond and vn an associatd listl. Accoding toits implicit gand naativ, matialists hav scod patd timphs ovalchmists, astologs, and spiital obscantists in th kingdom o nat,whil onl iational actiona sistanc has blockd th sam pogssin political and intllctal matts. Bt Statmnt C os a dint pic-t, on in which matialism is zalos and hothadd, motivatd mob what it wishs to dsto than what it is abl to cat. evn th opn in-slt ond in Statmnt A is not entirely lacking in cognitiv val, sinc vphilosophical school tnds to cit and ncoag ctain hman chaac-t tps. Most o s avoid on o mo intllctal gops simpl bcasw nd thm lld with gnall pllnt psonalitis (som o m indshat Hidgg o no btt ason than this). Bt along with bing d

and ncivilizd, Statmnt A also has th atal aw o bing vsibl: -dc matialism to th nsolvd childhood ang o its adhnts, andtn matialists will spond with qall vicios spclations on o ownsodid motivs o bliving in Catholicism, libal dmocac, élan vital , -incanation, Lamackism, o whatv doctin o might p to this.

Lt’s consid an analogos sot o htoical claim that I otn makmsl. In past witings I hav mad statmnts nning appoximatlas ollows:

D. ‘Colationists alwas conn philosoph to a hman-cntd ghtto,hoping in this wa to bild a pivilgd citadl immn to th blows o th natal scincs. Instad o this, w mst tak th ght to th sci-ntists and bild o own philosophical tho o inanimat lations’.

33. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. xiii.




Is Statmnt D an ‘agmnt’ in Millassox’s sns o th tm? Not qit.Bt nith is it m pschological innndo. In oth wods, Statmnt Dcannot b glossd as saing:

D1. ‘Colationists a cowads who don’t ndstand scinc, and that’swh th lad philosoph into a naowl hman ana wh thhop that scintists cannot nt. Th a aaid to ac alit. Mano thm a pobabl not v skil ld at mathmatics, and this is whth d into th hmanitis’.

ys, som cognitiv scintists might accpt Statmnt D1 as th litaltth. Bt this is obviosl nv th maning o Statmnt D whn ondin m own witings. Instad, th contxt alwas maks cla that I manas ollows:

D2. ‘Givn th gat pstig and sccss o th natal scincs, popla qick to assm that scinc alad dos philosophical stic toth non-hman wold. That is wh philosoph sinc Kant clings tooclosl to th human wold, nd th als assmption that no philo-sophical wok mains to b don on th inanimat sid. Bt i co-lationists alizd how poblmatic inanimat casal lations tla, th might b lss satisd with maining tappd in th co-lational cicl. And this is pcisl what I aim to show’.

In Millassox’s sns D2 is not t an ‘agmnt’, bt wold cont atbst as a ‘powl htoic’. yt qua htoic it dos ampl cognitiv wok bxposing a k colationist backgond assmption: naml, ‘givn thatscinc is alad wiping th tabl clan in th inanimat alm, th missiono philosophs is to wok soll within th sph o hman accss’. And Ihav ond that ml raising th opposit possibilit otn has a poondphilosophical ct on listns, opning contlss nw doos and windows.Th stal assmption that scinc monopolizs th inhman sph and

hnc philosoph mst t to dominat th hman-wold colat is amo nivsall cippling than an ‘bad agmnt’ o which I am awa.In this spct, htoic is at last as potnt a philosophical tool as x-

plicit dialctic—th om naths hiddn psppositions vn as th lat-t tis to balanc acconts on th lvl o xplicit statmnt. Millassoxhimsl otn sots to a simila ‘good’ htoic, as an ctiv thinkmst. Whn th taditional alist opposs th colationist b ting toposit a non-positd X, Millassox htoicall compas him to CaptainHaddock in th Tintin comics,34 who angil shits a bandag om on n-

g to th oth, statd that th bandag nv lavs—st as th co-lationist pdicamnt spposdl nv lavs s no matt how had wt to scap it. At ading this point abot Captain Haddock, somonmight shot at Millassox: ‘Haha! Hpocis! Now o’ saing that th

34. Bassi, t. al., ‘Spclativ ralism’, p. 421.




tpical alist acts basd on station and annoanc! yo’ pscholo-gizing him! And that’s st what o accsd Lall, Nitzsch, Max,and Fd o doing! Haha! yo hpocit!’ Bt this spons wold miss

th point. Millassox’s nc to Captain Haddock’s bandag was nvmant as an ‘agmnt’. Instad, it was mant as a powl htoical ap-pal along th ollowing lins:

‘Th colationist agmnt is that v X is a positd X—that i e.w t to think an obct otsid o thinking, w a still thinking it asotsid o thinking. Th is no scap om this cicl… This is apowl point that w mst accpt… What did o sa, M. Lato?Plas spak p… ys, I aliz that m point sonds so stating and tdios, spciall sinc it otn woks to dail th most billiant

and ascinating philosophical agmnts. Nonthlss, it is a ationalagmnt, and w hav no choic bt to accpt it. I ndstand andag with o station, bt plas don’t giv in too qickl and awa om ason. Ba with m h… W mst wok againstcolationism b adicalizing it rom within, into a om o absoltknowing. And i o ollow m in ting this mthod, not onl canw main mo ational than most alists a, bt th slts will bmch mo intsting and oiginal than o xpct. I hav statd

to wok this ot in m book Ater Finitude . Hav a look and s what o think. It’s st a small sampl o what I think is possibl to dowhn w wok patintl om within th colationist assmption. And I think o’ll nd that it’s an intsting book, not stating otdios at all’.

Whil Millassox’s ‘agmnt’ is clal visibl in this passag, it containsmch mo than an agmnt. It is all an intsting attmpt to addssth ndling assmptions and wold-pict o his taditional alist op-ponnts. Millassox achs ot in indl acknowldgmnt, concding that colationism might sond lik a tdios dad nd. Bt h also insistswith his sal mixt o psonal wamth and stl solv that this no wa aond th colationist agmnt. In closing h pomiss aom o compnsation o o loss: w can vntall still aiv at a soto alism even though w accpt th igoos and dvastating obction o th colationist. jst as Statmnt C accsd th matialist o a ai lo imagination, Millassox maks th sam accsation against th richelswh ralist.

And this is wh I ct th sggstion o Millassox and man an-altic thinks that philosoph plas ot pimail at th lvl o xplic-it, ddctiv agmnt om cla st pincipls. With Whithad I holdthat ‘logical contadictions […] a th most gatitos o os; and s-all th a tivial. [And that] at citicism, sstms do not xhibit m




illogicalitis. Th s om inadqac and incohnc’.35 Fo th samason Millassox is wong to s so littl o val in th ‘rich elswh’obction. In act, I think it is powl vidnc against a philosoph i it

cannot do stic to th vidnt ichnss o th wold. Whn Pamnidssas ‘bing is, and non-bing is not’, this is td lss b agmnt thanb a glaing sns o its inadqac to o xpinc o alit. In shot,Pamnids is abandond ath than td. And h again I qotWhithad, who sas that ‘[th] idal o spclativ philosoph has its atio-nal sid and its mpiical sid. Th ational sid is xpssd b th tms“cohnt” and “logical.” Th mpiical sid is xpssd b th tms “ap-plicabl” and “adqat”’.36

Nith Millassox no anon ls in philosoph simpl ollows a

moslss chain o ddctions withot stpping back om tim to timand looking at whth ths ddctions dscib th wold accatl.Mathmatics ma pocd in this wa, bt I ag with Whithad thatphilosoph cannot. And as o th natal scincs, not onl do th notpocd thogh sh logical ddction—th do not vn acknowldgcontadiction as thi mao pincipl o discov. Althogh on alsiing instanc is nogh to dcimat a mathmatical poo, th sam is not t(conta Popp) o th scincs. As Thomas Khn has obsvd, no scintictho v manags to ovcom all alsiing vidnc. Nwton’s thoo gavit was taind o a long tim dspit th anomalis in Mc’sobit. rlativit and qantm tho a still mtall incompatibl in th a 2009, t no on is ppad to gt id o ith—in this wa th aalad td bt not alad abandond. In o tim sting tho -mains instittionall dominant in paticl phsics dspit its total lack o xpimntal vidnc, soll bcas o its oth vits: mathmatical l-ganc, th abilit to ni gavit with qantm phnomna, and (so saits citics) th act that popl hav invstd so man as in stings that

th a aaid to admit that th modl is ailing. rad th litat on con-tmpoa phsics, and along with nmos xplicit agmnts and picso mpiical vidnc, o will nd nmos statmnts that a pctlscintic dspit amonting to nothing mo than a hnch: ‘somthing stdosn’t l qit ight abot th intllctal clt o th sting commni-t’; ‘I hav a vag ling that w will vntall nd to dop th einstin-Minkowski modl o o-dimnsional spac-tim’, and so oth. Considth amos scintic ‘paadigms’ stdid b Thomas Khn. Khn is otnad as saing that ths paadigms tak pow thogh mass social p-dic and plac on anoth at a lvl impmabl to ason. Bt this isincoct. What paadigms all a is objects— scintic obcts that gid

35. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 6.36. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 3.




sach o a tim, not onl despite th act that w can nv pin down thixact qalitis, bt pcisl because o this. rhtoic has as mch pow asagmnt in stablishing nw paadigms in both scinc and philosoph.

This is not bcas ‘popl a not alwas ational and o somtims havto appal to thi motions to mak thm s th light’. Instad, it is d toWhithad’s point abot th inabilit o agmnts, popositions, xplicitvidnc, o tangibl qalitis to do ll stic to th wold. As MashallMcLhan might sa, to claim that a philosoph is bilt soll o agmntsis lik saing that a adio show is nothing mo than th wods that a said,with th backgond mdim making no dinc to th contnt.37 To sathat a philosoph is mad o agmnts is lik saing that an appl is noth-ing bt a bndl o qalitis—that th is nothing mo to th appl than

th sm o its xplicit taits. Against this ‘bndl o qalitis’ tho, I hav said that w mst p-

hold objects . And against th ida o philosophis as ‘agmnts’, w mst d-nd a modl o philosoph as obct-ointd. Analtic philosoph has giv-n s mo ‘knockdown agmnts’ than th hman ac has v known, t it is not cla that w hav achivd a Goldn Ag o philosoph in -tn. It is o this v ason that I phold hpbolic adings o philoso-phs against citical ons, sinc citiq assms that th mao poblmwith an pic o witing a th logical os it contains. B contast, tohpbolicall imagin th complt victo o an philosoph is to sim-lat a social nvionmnt in which it is widl hld to b ree o logical bln-ds, and hnc this mthod allows s to ocs on what Whithad calls th‘cohnc and adqac’ o that philosoph. All o ths points a closllinkd. All l on th act that th is somthing mo to th wold ovand abov what can b xplicitl statd abot it. This dos not qi a‘non-cognitive’ accss to th wold, as Millassox and Bassi38 ndstand-abl a,39 bt simpl a non-qualitative accss to th wold. Th is nothing

spciall mstical abot sch a viw, sinc it can alad b ond in SalKipk’s (1996) tho o nams—which h viws as ‘igid dsignatos’ thatpoint to alitis withot bing abl to spll thm ot adqatl in tms o dnit dsciptions.40

37. S an o McLhan’s books o impotant insights into th lativ povt o di-alctical gs and agmnts in compaison with thi tacit gond o mdim. Thmost thoticall psasiv ma b Mashall McLhan and eic, Laws o Media: The New Science , Toonto, univsit o Toonto Pss, 1988.

38. ra Bassi, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, London Palgav, 2007, p. 28.

39. Bassi wois abot th attmpt b Hidggians ‘to dplo th gativ di-mnsion o langag in od to sond sb-xpintial dpths’. Fo Bassi th popaltnativ to sch pot is to b ond in ‘invstigating th sb-smbolic alit o ph-nomnal consciosnss [b] sing th omal and mathmatical socs availabl to ththid-pson pspctiv’ s ra Bassi, Nihil Unbound , p. 29.

40. Th amos dispt ov whth rth Bakan Macs dvlopd th tho st




In shot, th rich elswh is a itl htoical appal, and I holdmch mo stongl than Millassox himsl that a ‘good htoic’ is thk to philosoph. Fo htoic dals with vild backgond assmptions

ath than xplicit dialctical gs—and i philosoph dos not xposbackgond assmptions and pla contpoint against thm, thn I do notknow what philosoph is o. Plato, Spinoza, and Libniz do not mak wlogical blnds than th avag nivsit posso, bt a simpl mch vast in adqac, cohnc, oiginalit, lvanc, and insight. This an-sws j Fodo’s pzzld qstion as to wh la ads hav mo int-st in ‘Kikgaad […] Hidgg […] Kant, Hgl, and th p-Socat-ics’ than in mainstam analtic philosoph, vn i w gant his point that‘anhow, o agmnts a btt’ (Fodo 2004). Bt I will not vn pla-

ll gant Fodo’s biza additional claim that ‘most o s wit btt thanmost o thm’, a idiclos statmnt dvotd to th allac that good wit-ing mans making as man xplicit, nivocal statmnts as possibl whilhinting at nothing mo. In act th a stnningl ew good wits among th analtics, dspit innmabl cla ons. Clait is not t vividnss. An xact wax dplicat o Gandhi cannot India o th empi.

It is powl vidnc against colationism that it abitail tatsth hman/wold lation as philosophicall mo impotant than an obct/obct lation. This ma not b a ‘knockdown agmnt’, bt it is c-tainl a stong waning sign. Millassox sms wll awa that tdim isnot a philosophical vit, sinc h avoids it so skillll in his own books. Hdos not ndlssl pat that ‘X is alwas posited as X’, bt movs on to moabndant ichs than I v thoght possibl o anon opating om hisstating point. Spaking onl o msl, I am dawn to Millassox’s wit-ings not so mch thogh th ddctiv onslaght o his asoning (which Ind impssiv bt not dcisiv). Instad, his shingl stang results awhat captivat m: his claims abot th ncssa contingnc o th laws o

nat, his shocking inncs abot God, his magnicnt spclations asto th nat o dath o an thics o gt. Millassox is not ‘mo logi-cal’ than Qin o Davidson, h is simpl mch mo intsting. Indd,th ichs o Millassox’s witings a so makabl that on might sspcthim o his own htoical commitmnt: a ction o th rich elswh inavo o a convs doctin o th rich Homland: ‘Do not t to scap.Ot th is ml g matt sbct to cold calclation. Bt st think o

is litt l mo than a domstic contovs among analtic philosophs, sinc Hssl andvn Aistotl alad saw that nams point to things dp than thi palpabl atti-bts. What maks Kipk sch a makabl g is that h was abl to intodc thisdoctin in an intllctal clt—analtic philosoph o langag—that was so hav-il dvotd to th mpiicist/positivist pdic that things a dcibl to bndls o at-tibts. And it was Kipk, not Macs, who had this shocking cltal ct among thanaltics.




all th lscios oms o logic and histo that Hgl was abl to spin ot o th hman-wold colat’. Millassox’s own tast o ichnss is sch thath might wll abandon th cicl o colation i it had not bn gtting him

anwh. In an cas, I hop h wold ag that htoical appal to ich-nss dos not blong in th sam baskt o ‘iational agmnts’ with wildclaims abot o opponnt’s statd libido.

This dto into htoic has bn long, bt it ds dictl into mown ction o th colationist standpoint. yt w still nd to answth ‘agmnt’ pat o Millassox’s position, lst it sm that w hav noth-ing to o bt potic appals to ichnss. Phaps th biggst poblm withMillassox’s Goldsmiths lct lis in its tacit asstion that no on hasvn tried to o a ational tation o th colationist/idalist posi-

tion—as i Ficht’s ‘X is positd as non-positd’ had bn mt o th pasttwo cntis onl with mass innndo and iational appals to th gattilit o oth thois. Millassox nv maks this accsation opnl,and sl h knows btt. Bt nowh dos his aticl mntion an o thalist cont-agmnts to th hman/wold colat. No a sch ag-mnts a had to nd. A simpl Googl sach o ‘tation idalism’ povids dozns o lads: Moo, Kant, Pic, Candakiiti, and Wittgnstinappa on th st sach pag alon. Bt Millassox pocds in hisGoldsmiths talk as thogh colationism clal occpid th high gond,so that th bdn is on its opponnts to chag p th hill and tak volls o aows in tn. Now, it is t that th hman-wold colat is dominantin th Fanco-Gman continntal tadition wh Millassox and I bothdo bsinss. Bt this is mch lss th cas among analtic philosophs. Inact, man analtic thinks ollow th lat Astalian David Stov (1991) incalling th colationist agmnt ‘th wost agmnt in th wold’ (Stovoganizd an actal competition bo giving it st piz). This sggsts thatcolationists a in no position to pla dns, lik a basktball tam icing

a lat ot-point lad. It still mains to show th allac at th hat o thcolationist agmnt. rath than psing th obctions mad b ana-ltic thinks, I will oppos colationism sing th v think who n-wittingl boght m to th alist pat: Matin Hidgg.

Th bst wa to show wh I do not nd th colationist agmntcomplling is to spak o Hssl and Hidgg, and o Millassox’s tat-mnt o ths two gs. Hssl and Hidgg might sm lik a stangpai o thinks to hlp s scap om th colational cicl—at all,Millassox is coct to sa that both a colationists. Fo Hssl thisis obvios nogh, sinc h ‘backts’ an notion o an xtaphnomnalwold, insisting that w ocs onl on what appas to hman conscios-nss. Althogh Hssl patdl dnis that h is spaking o a ml im-mannt alit, this is onl bcas h wants to distanc himsl om phil-osophical pscholog in th stl o Bntano. Th idal alm o maning




o Hssl is not somthing containd insid a hman mind as opposd to awold otsid that mind, bt is qal to th whole o alit. Hssl patd-l calls o a tn to th things thmslvs, bt ths a in no wa Kant’s

nomnal things-in-thmslvs ling bond all possibl hman accss—anonsnsical notion o Hssl. Th cit o Blin psnt in consciosnss isth sam as th cit o Blin itsl. In pincipl w can hav an intition o th ssnc o an obct; th do not li in som tanscndnt alm bondconsciosnss, bt a mbddd within it.

O st qstion is whth th sam is t o Hidgg. Millassox’scas that Hidgg is a colationist ns as ollows:

o Hidgg, it is ctainl a cas o pinpointing th occlsion o bing o psnc inhnt in v mtaphsical concption o psntation

and th pivilging o th psnt-at-hand ntit considd as obct.Yet on the other hand , to think sch an occlsion at th hat o th ncon-calmnt o th ntit qis, o Hidgg, that on tak into accontth co-popiation o man and bing, which h calls eignis [… which]mans that nith bing no man can b positd as sbsisting ‘in-thm-slvs’ [… sinc] both tms o th appopiation a oiginail consti-ttd thogh thi cipocal lation.41

In this wa, Hidgg appantl mains aithl to th colationist in- nction that ns om Kant to Hssl. Bt in th passag abov I havmphasizd th phas ‘t on th oth hand’ bcas it signals a pointwh Millassox shits gas. In th st pat o th passag h concdsthat Hidgg is a philosoph o occlsion, viling, hiddnnss, and with-dawal om all psnc to hmans (which wold b a diclt thing to saabot Hssl). Bt in th scond pat o th passag Millassox implisthat this viling is thn swallowd p b Hidgg’s Sin/Dasin co-lat anwa. Bt this is nt. Th poblm is that Millassox’s wondltm ‘colationism’ (which dsvs to b a pmannt pat o o philo-

sophical lxicon) maks a sbtl twoold claim. In its mao sns colation-ism mans that nith hman no wold can xist withot th oth. Thisis dnitl t o Hidgg, o whom Sein (bing) and Dasein (hman b-ing) alwas com as a pai. Indd, it is t to sch an xtnt that Hidggamosl claims that Nwton’s laws wold b nith t no nt i h-mans did not xist.

Nonthlss, it is qit a dint claim i w sa that th two tms b-ing and Dasin a mutually exhausted b thi intlation. Consid th caso two lovs so attachd to ach oth that th a nv ond apat andwold litall di i spaatd. This obviosl dos not ntail that th lov-s a ll constittd b thi mtal intactions. Au contraire . Fo thslovs can nv ll gasp ach oth to th ltimat dpths, vn i th

41. Qntin Millassox, Ater Finitude , tans. ra Bassi, London, Continm, 2008,p. 8, mphasis modid.




a nv apat o on scond ding th st o thi livs. In Hidgg’shands, bing and hman bing a a lov sto o this kind. Attmpts aotn mad to sa that o Hidgg bing is nothing mo than its sis

o manistations to Dasin with nothing hiding bhind th sis. Bing wold thn bcom an ‘mgnt pocss’ cicmscibd within th h-man/wold colat instad o somthing altogth dp than th co-lat. yt Hidgg’s own witings o littl sppot o sch an int-ptation, which ml stms om th pvasiv colationist ashion inth continntal philosoph o o tim. It is simpl assumed that an bli innon-phnomnal alit is so glaingl naïv that a think as ingnios asHidgg cold not hav hld sch a stpid viw.

In shot, i w call Hidgg a colationist in th sam sns that

Hssl is a colationist, th impotant dinc btwn thm is lost.Th is a good ason that Hidgg talks so mch abot occlsion, vil-ing, and withdawing thogh ths tms pla no ol whatsov in schgs as Ficht, Hgl, and Hssl. Th is also a good ason whHidgg thinks that both Hgl and Hssl a qall gilt o dc-ing bing to its psnc-at-hand congations, and wh h tns o at-tntion to th viling o bing instad. Millassox tis to accont o thispassion b bi adding ‘th cloistd otsid’42 to a list o viws sppos-dl shad b all colationists. Bt it is diclt to nd an niom no-tion o a cloistd otsid that can b applid simltanosl to Hidgg,Hssl, Hgl, Ficht, and Kant. In act th cloistd otsid plas vastldint ols in all ths gs: dnid altogth b Ficht, Hgl, andHssl, pobabl accptd b Kant (nomna) and absoltl accptd bHidgg (withdawn bing, shlting ath, and gods that hint withotappaing). To mp om Hidgg’s obvios accptanc o a pmannthman/wold colat to his spposd bt nonxistnt viw that th isnothing mstios to bing otsid its manistation to hmans is to ps-

nt a Hglizd vsion o Hidgg, o to mlt Hidgg and Hssl to-gth into on.43 W shold not ogt that Hidgg patdl claims to b doing som-

thing mo innovativ than Hssl. Fo Millassox to sa that both a co-lationists in th sam wa cais th implication that Hidgg is wong to think himsl adical, and that h mains instad within th sam h-man-wold colat as Hssl dspit his attmpt to do othwis. This isa poblmatic consqnc o Millassox’s ading o Hidgg. In act,Hidgg blongs to a spcis o think that h sms to gad as impos-sibl: a correlationist realist . With this phas I do not man Millassox’s own

42. Millassox, Ater Finitude , p. 8.43. A simila poblm can b ond in th idalist ading o Hidgg b L Bav

in his otstanding ncclopdic wok A Thing o This World: A History o Continental Anti-Realism, evanston, Nothwstn univsit Pss, 2007.




poct o stablishing alism by way o colationism, bt an actal siml-tanos bli in colationism and alism. That is to sa, Hidgg holdsthat hman and wold mst alwas com as a packag, bt h also holds

that bing is not ll manist to hmans. And thogh I cannot ndos thismonstos hbid doctin, th is no dobt that Hidgg pholds it.In od to s th gnin dinc btwn Hssl and Hidgg,

w tn to th amos xampl o a hamm. Fo Hssl th hamm is aso-calld ‘intntional obct’. It dos not xist in som indpndnt woldov hiddn om hman viw; th is no nomnal hamm-in-itsl.Instad, th hamm xists onl as a colat o consciosnss—which oHssl can man th consciosnss o hmans, animals, o xtatsti-al cats. W nv s all acs o th hamm at onc, bt alwas s it

om a ctain angl and distanc, in a ctain colo and intnsit o light,and alwas in a spcic mood. In this sns th hamm onl appas inth om o spcic pols o admbations ( Abschattungen in Gman). FoHssl th obct ‘hamm’ is not mad p o th ll sis o appaancso th hamm, bt is an idal unity ov and abov ths appaancs andvn abov all possible appaancs. In pincipl this nit o ssnc o thhamm can b gaspd thogh idtic intition in a ll vidnt wa, vnthogh w onl appoach this idal b dgs and nv qit ach it.

Now, Hssl is otn said to bliv that hmans can onl pciv ad-mbations, so that th hamm itsl nv appas. Althogh this viwis qit ndstandabl (I thoght so msl ntil th all o 2004), it is -onos. Fo it dos not matt that w can nv s th whol sis o hamm-admbations— this series is not the hammer . Fo Hssl, th ham-m is th idal nit that maks ach pol a pol o th same hamm;th hamm is not a sis o appaancs o an sot. Hnc, o inabil-it to n thogh th innit sis o possibl hamm-appaancs d-pivs s o nothing as concns th obct. Nothing is ‘hiddn’ bhind th

admbations o Hssl; th hamm itsl lis within ach admbation,as an idos ncstd with accidnts. In oth wods, o Hssl th idoso an intntional obct is alad with s om th v momnt w intndit, and is not hiddn o vild in th mann o Hidgg’s tools. To think,wish, o imagin that w hav a chai bo s mans that th idos o thchai is alad psnt to s. W do not gt this idos b nning qicklthogh a pmanntl absnt innit st o chai-pols, bt b claing awa th inssntial dbis that alwas accompanis o intntion o thchai. It is a kind o subtractive pocss, sinc th ssntial chai is ncstdat v momnt with inssntial sac ctations that idtic analsismst t to stip awa.

Clal, Hidgg viws th sitation dintl. Th whol o Hidgg’s philosoph is dsignd as a citiq o ‘psnc-at-hand’. Among oth things, this mans that th bing o an obct is alwas dp than




how that obct appas to s. In th s o Hidgg, Hssl’s phnom-na a ml psnt-at-hand in consciosnss, xhastd b thi appa-anc to s. yt Hidgg holds that th hamm cannot b dcd to a st

o visibl ats—not vn ssntial ons—bcas ths ats a notwhat do th wok o hamming in th wold. Th hamm as a Hsslianintntional obct is alwas alad psnt as soon as w acknowldg it,and is ml ncstd with non-ssntial ats. B contast, th ham-m o Hidgg is a al ntit that invisibl dos its wok in th cosmos.It is withdawn o vild om viw and tnds to b noticd onl whn itbaks. To s Millassoxian tminolog, Hssl wold ag that thhamm is alwas a ‘positd’ hamm o hamm thoght b s, sinc it hasbing onl as a colat o thinking. Bt o Hidgg this is not th cas,

sinc th ‘positd’ hamm that I think abot is onl th hamm sspnd-d and chlooomd, dcd to psnc-at-hand, which is not th sam asth hamm at wok in its sbtanan tool-bing.

In Millassox’s s it mst look as thogh Hidgg is ml nacting th Lallian band o coup de orce b impossibl ting to posit th hammas non-positd. Convsl, Hidgg wold accs Millassox o ogt-ting th qstion o bing. At all, b insisting that whatv w talk o thinkabot is atomaticall a thing talkd abot o thoght abot, Millassoxholds that w cannot scap om what Hidgg calls Vorhandeheit , o ps-nc-at-hand. This sitation is ssntiall th sam as in Hidgg’s int-mittnt dispt with Hgl. And ths a v mch th two taditions inpla h, sinc Hgl is ltimatl Millassox’s philosophical ho st asHidgg is m own. Thos who a convincd b Hgl’s appoach willtnd to b smpathtic to Millassox; thos who bliv that Hidggstck a dath-blow against Hgl’s vsion o bing a likl to giv a sm-pathtic haing to th obct-ointd position o this book.

Now, Millassox’s Fichtan point at Goldsmiths can also b statd

in Hidggian tms. Hidgg wants to spak o th tool’s adinss-to-hand compltl apat om its psnc to hman Dasin. Bt pcisl b-cas w spak o it, th tool is all nothing bt psnt-at-hand: to say thatth tool withdaws om all accss mans that th tool is said to withdawom all accss. Tho an attmpt to stablish a hiddn Zuhandenheit mst alwas vt into a psnt Vorhandenheit . Viling is impossibl, bcaswhn w spak o somthing vild o spaking alad nvils it. Thisamonts to a tacit ction o Hidgg’s nti philosophical ntpis,and is also a vaiant o what David Stov calls th ‘wost agmnt in thwold’ (widl known in analtic cicls as ‘Stov’s Gm’).

Lt’s accpt Millassox’s boad s o th tm ‘thinking’ in thDscats/Hssl sns to to all oms o mntal act, to incld sing,wishing, hating, xpcting, and so oth. This having bn don, th co-




lationist citiq o Hidgg will thn n oghl as ollows:44

I cannot think o th hamm’s bing withot thinking it. In oth1.wods, thinking o th hamm is a ncssa condition o thinking it.

This is sh tatolog, o cos, and no on will dn it. Th poblmcoms with th nxt stp.

Tho, th hamm is no mo than th bing-thoght o th2.hamm.

Bt this scond stp is mch mo than a tatolog, and qis an addi-tional nspokn pmis: naml, that th is no hamm withot its bing thoght. As Bassi smmaizs th Gm: ‘om th act that [th hamm’sbing thoght] is a ncssa condition o m lation to [it,] I spiosl in-

that it is a ncssa condition o [th hamm] tout court ’.45

In act this agmnt was alad td in Pat On whn cting Lato’s ting colationist claim abot Past and th micobs inPandora’s Hope . As th ad will call, Lato conclds that ‘at 1864’micobs had xistd all along; th w givn a toactiv alit onl bPast’s discov o thm. Th main poblm with this agmnt, I sg-gstd, coms om its asmmt. Lato’s initial point is that Past andth micobs co-aticlat ach oth: Past wold not hav bn amos

withot th micobs, whil th micobs might b sn dintl i anoth- discov o a non-Fnch mdical tadition had chosn to mphasizdint aspcts o thm. This is both intsting and somwhat dbatabl(thogh I ll accpt it), bt it is lagl hamlss in its mtaphsical sp-positions. yt om this smmtical stating point, Lato daws a stangasmmtical conclsion. Fo on Past’s sid o th lation, Lato holdsthat Past was ml modid, ptbd, and tansomd b his n-cont with micobs. Bt on th micob’s sid o th lation, h holdsthat th micobs w st created in 1864, as i ex nihilo. Th is a slight ad-

ditional complication to th pict, o cos, sinc Lato’s stict lation-ism dos not all allow that Past in 1845 and Past in 1864 a qitth sam pson. Bt h at last allows that th was somon in 1845 whowas ail simila to th 1864 Past, whil h maks no allowanc at allo a micob-lik obct in 1845 that mntd and inctd vaios ntitiswithot hmans knowing abot it. W bgin with a two-wa colat andnd with a on-wa tann. W w pomisd that Past and th mi-cob co-dn ach oth, and nd p ascibing godlik pows to Past

and m nllit to th micobs.44. I am indbtd to ra Bassi o stating th poblm in this paticla ashion,

and o calling m attntion to th ots b Stov and oth analtic philosophs to ad-dss it.

45. ra Bassi, Psonal Commniction, lctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 12 Agst, 2008.




Bt th is an vn mo vivid wa to shd light on th poblms withthis agmnt. Naml, w can reverse th nal asmmt and s whathappns. Imagin that Bno Lato has a povbial ‘vil twin’. Th ob-

sc Posso Bnno Lato—o so w shall call him—maind in Dionas his both achivd am and otn in Pais, and in his sthing -sntmnt Bnno dvotd himsl to an spciall pvs phaval o hisboth Bno’s wok. In spons to Bno’s chapt on Past and th mi-cob, Bnno Lato maintains pcisl th opposit doctin. Fo Bnnoit is th inanimat phsical nivs that mst alwas hav pioit, sincvthing ls aiss om it. Naml, o Bnno th can b no qstionthat micobs hav alwas xistd, o at last hav xistd sinc thi m-gnc on o hot plant billions o as ago. B contast, hmans a ag-

il, phmal, and not o spcial impotanc. Micobs hav xistd allalong—bt onl whn Past discovd thm did he bgin to xist. Onlat 1864 did Pasteur xist all along! Bt not th micobs, whos xistncall along is bond all dispt.

A simila vsal can b sd to plag th Fichtan agmnt abot‘positing X as non-positd’. Fo w can imagin anoth vil twin namd‘Anton Millassox’, Bnno Lato’s sta stdnt in Dion. In th sam man-n as st dscibd, Anton holds that his mo amos both Qntin hasit backwads. H accpts th hman-wold colat bt vss th basicasmmt. Instad o saing that a hamm xists onl whn it is posited asa hamm, h holds that hamms alwas xist, whil th hman who viwsit is posited as a hman o th st tim onl b his thinking o th hamm. Almost von will dnonc th viws o Bnno and Anton as absd, tth ddctiv oc o thi agmnts is v bit as stong as thos o thiboths. W call ths invtd agmnts pvs onl bcas it sms soimpossibl contintitiv that Past and a hamming capnt coldb smmond ex nihilo b th inanimat ntitis th conont. B contast,

o cntis o Wstn idalism hav taind s to s th vs doc-tin as not so v stang—naml, that micobs and hamms xist onlas colats o us .

Th poblm is th sam in both cass. W bgin with a basic smm-t btwn hman and wold. Fom this smmt, in which th hammand th hman xist onl as pat o a hman-wold colat, w stanglddc an asymmetry in which on hal o th colat is allowd to domi-nat th oth. This bcoms cla onl whn w s how biza th vsdomination wold b. And notic that th ason w nd ths invsionsabsd is not bcas thi logical agmntation is wos than th oiginals,bt onl bcas w hav an vda intitiv sns o oslvs as individals nding thogh tim, whil w lack sch immdiat accss to thcas o micobs and hamms.

Bt I hav ond that vn thos who accpt this agmnt against




colationism otn tat to a wak vsion o th doctin. Thoghth will no long claim that it maks no sense to spak o things-in-thm-slvs apat om hman accss, th will still sa that we have nothing to say

abot things insoa as th xcd o accss thm. H is anoth xam-pl o th ‘rich Homland’ htoic that so man s against alism: ‘Goahad and spak abstactl abot nomnal things-in-thmslvs. Bt obo m, bcas it is impossibl to sa anthing abot thm’. evn i things-in-thmslvs xist, th a compltl nintsting. This is a a lss int-sting and igoos attitd than Millassox’s adical stanc, and not-natl it is a mo common. Wost o all, it is hoplssl als. An xamplo wh it is als coms om phsics, which os nmos thois abotth wildl popla obct known as a black hol. No ntit in th phsical

nivs maks a btt analog with Hidgg’s inaccssibl tool-bingsthan th black hol. Its gavit is so stong that no inomation can scap;hnc, w nv s th black hol o hav dict accss to anthing abotit. Dos this mak th black hol ‘boing’ to phsicists, o ‘not woth talking abot’? Hadl! Th act that w cannot ncont th black hol dictldos not man that w cannot spak abot it.

Nmos poptis o black hols can b ind, dspit o inabilitto civ dict inomation om thm. I o ask an astophsicist abotths obcts, o will not civ a bod shg and a spons o: ‘Whocas? W can’t know anthing abot thm, so th’s no point aising thsbct. Astonom shold conn itsl to thos obcts to which w havdict accss’. Instad, o will b inomd that a black hol has vaios -cts on sonding matt, that qantm tho has ctain poblms ac-conting o black hols, and that th appantl lak a ctain amont o ng ov tim in th so-calld ‘Hawking adiation’. Nmos oth d-dctions and spclations hav bn mad abot ths ‘nintsting’ blackhols, which ma actall b th most intsting obcts in th nti ni-

vs. Thi sac aa sms to b mo lvant than thi volm, lad-ing som thoists to sggst that th a hologams ath than solid obcts. Ctain ddctions can vn b mad abot what will happn to anobct that alls into a black hol. L Smolin has thoizd, and not withotasons, that ach black hol might contain a nivs o its own.

Gantd, somon might obct that th black hol is known onl thoghits cts on sonding ntitis, and that it can onl b intsting bcasths cts a visibl to s. To this I hav two sponss: (1) Withdawnobcts in mtaphsics, sch as Hidgg’s tool-bings, also hav cts onoth obcts. Hnc, i this is nogh to mak vild obcts intsting to o, thn o hav alad concdd m point that a philosoph o obcts isnot boing. (2) evn i th cts o th black hol o th obct ma b whatalts s to thi xistnc, ths obcts a not identical with thi sm to-tal o cts. Fo w can discov nw ats o th black hol at an tim,




and this dos not man that th black hol is no long a black hol. Opict o astophsics wold b hoplssl incomplt i th w a piosWittgnstinian ban qiing s to ‘pass ov in silnc’ th inaccssibl in-

tio o black hols. In simila ashion, mtaphsics achs a inos stati it obids all discssion o alit sbtactd om all lations.Bt to tn in closing to th main point, it is Hidgg’s tool-analsis

that convincs m that th colationist standpoint is wong. I I sa thatth hamm in its tool-bing is that which xists in concald sbtananom withot bing dcibl to its psnc to s, th colationist will -spond that I am now talking about this sbtanan tool-bing and thbconvting it into a om o psnc. Bt this is to cons wods o thoghtsabot tool-bings with thos bings thmslvs. Th act that w can alld

to concald hamms b wa o langag o thoght dos not ntail thatth hamms a xhastd b sch allsion. Ths th colationist stand-point ails o th sam asons as th lationist standpoint, bt vn moqickl, sinc it is a basicall wak position than lationism.

Anoth wa o dscibing th colationist standpoint is to call it a‘adical’ philosoph that claims an ntit is nothing mo than its dtmi-nat mann o givnnss to thoght. Bt this is als o both Hsslianand Hidgg asons. Fo on th on hand Hssl’s hamm is alwas less than what it sms—a minimalistic co o idtic ats that can sppotall possibl vaitis o sac vaiation. And on th oth hand Hidgg’shamm is alwas more than what it sms—a mbling ndgond al-it that can nv bcom psnt withot distotion. I w hint at th con-cald hamm, th hinting is ctainl somthing psnt to thoght, btth concald hamm at which w hint is not. evon knows th oldChins povb abot th ng pointing at th moon and th ool looking at th ng. Bt colationism is vn wos, sinc it claims that th moonis mad o ngs. This is not st oll, bt a om o madnss.

Objects are Irreducible to their Eects on Other Objects

W hav sn that Lato cts th lmp nivs, th vital nivs o p-individals, and th dcd nivs mad soll o matial paticls.Th nxt wak vsion o lationism is correlationism, in which hman andwold a th sol alitis and a mtall dtmind b thi pma-nnt appot. Millassox ags with m that Lato is not a colation-ist, thogh w disag as to whth this avoidanc o th colat conts

as a vic o a vit. Bt th is still a nal stag o lational philosophthat Lato contins to phold, and it can b givn th gnic nam ‘la-tionism’. Fo Lato an acto is nv anthing mo than what it ‘modis,tansoms, ptbs, o cats’. And it is cla that w mst oppos vnthis wakst om o lationism.




Th non-colationist Lato is shing in man o th sam wasas Whithad, sinc both xplod th basic dogma o Kant’s Copnicanrvoltion. Kant hld that bhind th phnomnal appaancs a th n-

knowabl things-in-thmslvs. Too mch attntion has bn paid to thissid o Kant, with ndlss agmnts ov whth it maks sns to positsch nomna, and whth Kant himsl actall blivd in thm. Btths a ml sid isss. Th gat dct o th Copnican philoso-ph is that vn i w accpt th xistnc o things-in-thmslvs, still dosnot giv s mch o a alism. Fo th onl nction o things-in-thmslvsin Kant’s philosoph is to hant hman knowldg as a sot o gholish si-d. Th mao dct is that no discssion is possibl abot how things-in-thmslvs lat to each other . Th t-in-itsl, i it w vn gantd to x-

ist, wold b lt with no oth nction than to di om th phnomnalt, st as shadows hav no alit apat om thi mo tangibl dobls.Nothing is said abot th lation btwn t-in-itsl and -in-itsl,sinc o Kant this is somthing w can nv talk abot. I a bns at, chmists and osts can talk abot how this happns, not philoso-phs. Bt notic that th scincs can onl do this o natal phsical obcts. It took Whithad and Lato to pt th lations btwn all tpsand sizs o obcts on th sam ooting, so that th lation o ctional cha-acts sch as Bilbo and Smag mst b tatd in th sam wa as thos o and cotton o hman and wold. Whas th colationist is obsssdwith th singl hman-wold colat, lationism givs s tillions o di-nt colats btwn all th things that xist: ts, ams, dogs, chw-ing gm, violins, nicons, diamonds, nmbs, incns, and moons. Thisalad maks a shing bak with Kant’s Copnican rvoltion andits vaios colationist his.

Nonthlss, lationism still ss om th sam basic poblm as co-lationism. It vastl boadns th scop o colationist philosoph b al-

lowing an two ntitis to lat withot a hman witnss. yt it nv sactos om every witnss; indd, it allows obcts to xist onl insoa as thhav an ct on oth obcts. eali I sggstd that th a two basicpoblms with th lationist thsis that a thing is nothing mo than its -cts: naml, it dos an instic to th psnt and t o th obct inqstion. Tak th xampl o a gat philosophical wok—sa, Hidgg’s Being and Time . Th lationist wold sa that this book is no mo than whatit ‘modis, tansoms, ptbs, o cats’. At this v momnt, Being and Time is modiing, tansoming, ptbing, and cating a ctain nmbo obcts, mostl hman ons. Bt is this all th whol o its alit? Wcan asil pom th thoght-xpimnt o imagining oth intptscoming onto th scn. What th wold b intpting in this cas is Being and Time itsl, not th sm total o oth intptations. In oth wods,an acto is not idntical with whatv it modis, tansoms, ptbs, o




cats, bt alwas mains underdetermined b thos cts. Th cts can-not occ withot th obct, bt th obct might wll xist withot thoscts, and phaps vn withot any cts.

Scond, w hav viwd and accptd Aistotl’s citiq o thMgaians: i a thing is ntil lational, thn th wold b no asono it to chang. Th thing wold b ll dplod o xhastd in its al-it h and now, and th sam wold b t o all o th things with whichit lats. Wh, thn, wold th nivs v chang? Bt whil Aistotlss this agmnt to stablish th nd o potntialit along with actalit,I ad it instad as stablishing a alit bond all lationalit. A thing canb actal withot bing gistd b oth things, o at last withot bing gistd ll b thm. Lato and Aistotl stangl ag in placing ac-

tal and lational togth on on sid, and potntial and non-lational onth oth, with th sol disagmnt that Lato gants no xistnc at allto th scond pai. Bt th paiing is als om th otst. Th potntial canonl man a potntial or uture relations , and th actal can onl man whatis in and o itsl actal apart rom any relations . unlss th thing holds som-thing in sv bhind its cnt lations, nothing wold v chang.This sct svoi cannot b th ‘potntial’, bcas th potntial ndsto b inscibd somwh actal ight now, and i th actal is ntil d-tmind b its lations thn this gts s nowh. And th sv also can-not b calld th ‘vital’, sinc this tm ml plas th dobl gam o saing that t alit in th nivs is both connctd and spaat, bothcontinos and htognos. Th onl thing that will t th bill is a non-relational actuality: obcts that xist qit apat om thi lation to othobcts, and vn apat om thi lation to thi own pics.

Conclusion

In this sction I hav tid to sav obcts om o o th ‘adical’ attmptsto dn thi xistnc. Fist, obcts a dint om an spposd pi-modial wold-lmp, and hnc th a not divativ o a pimal whol.Scond, obcts a idcibl to thi pics and hav a gnin mgntalit, which ntails that matialist dction will not wok o mtaphs-ics, and that it is o limitd s vn in th scincs. Thid, obcts a i-dcibl to thi appaanc in hman consciosnss, st as Hidgg’stool-analsis shows. Lato wold sl ag on th st two conts, andwold pobabl ag on th thid. Th onl cas wh h wold not ag

is nmb o: obcts a idcibl to thi lations with oth things,and alwas hold somthing in sv om ths lations. All o thss a all st dint dgs o th sam thsis: an at-

tmpt to claim that a thing’s alit is dpndnt on its lations with oththings. This is somtims calld a ‘tho o intnal lations’. Against sch




thois, w shold insist on th old maxim that lations a xtnal tothi tms, that things a ct o in thmslvs and th lations btwnthm a somthing qit oth than thos things. Th thsis (howv it

might b wodd) is associatd at vaios tims with Dlz, rssll, oBitish empiicism. Bt an vn old nc wold b to th Aab andFnch occasionalist taditions, o which a thing dos not lat to oththings at all nlss it passs thogh th mdiation o God. (empiicism, whav sn, ml placs God with th hman mind.)

Bt w mst sta attntiv to two spaat points h. On th on handan obct is spaatd b walls om whatv it modis, tansoms,ptbs, o cats. It is compltl indpndnt o ths, sinc it can shitinto an nw nvionmnt and still main th sam thing. On th oth-

hand, an obct is also spaatd b walls om its own pics, sincth thing mgs as somthing ov and abov thos pics, and sinc ‘-dndant casation’ mans that ths pics can b shitd o placd tosom xtnt withot changing th thing. Bt th is a slight asmmtin th two considations, bcas whas a thing is compltl indpn-dnt o its lations, it is not compltl indpndnt o its own pics. To -mov Whithad om Havad and pt him at Stanod wold onl dstoWhithad o thos (sch as Whithad himsl) who accpt th stangdoctin that a thing is ntil dnd b its lations. Fa mo dasticthan ocing Whithad to lav Havad wold b to mov all o hisbod pats, o to shatt his sol in th bowls o th ndwold. In thslatt cass th ct wold b tl dstctiv. Nonthlss, all th cllsin Whithad’s bod can b placd b simila ons withot dstoing Whithad, and in this sns an obct is patl indpndnt o its own pic-s st as it is ll indpndnt o its lations with oth things.

In this sns, an obct is a sot o invisibl ailwa nction btwn itsown pics and its ot cts. An obct is weird —it is nv placabl b

an sm total o qalitis o cts. It is a al thing apat om all oignlations with th wold, and apat om all domstic lations with its ownpics. Statd in mo taditional tms, both th oign and domstic la-tions o an obct a xtnal lations ath than intnal ons. Nith o thm maks dict contact with th obct, thogh both a capabl o d-stoing it in dint was.

C. IMMANeNT OBjeCTIVITy

W know that on o Lato’s signat movs is his limination o th mod-nist hman/wold gap, as sn most clal in We Have Never Been Modern.Instad o an obctiv nat lld with gnin alitis and a sbctivcltal sph lld with abicatd ctions, th is a singl plan o actosthat ncompasss ntinos, stas, palm ts, ivs, cats, amis, nations,




sphos, nicons, and sqa cicls. All obcts a tatd in th samwa. Lato stis this with his boad concption o an acto as anthing that has an ct on oth things. In this sns, h is ight to lt Pop in-

habit th sam gion o th cosmos as copp and non. Whn scintic -alists spond with otag to this mixt o act and ction, Lato addsthat i all ntitis a qall al, all a not qall strong . Fictional chaac-ts and mths hav wak lgions o allis tstiing to thi xistnc thando lmps o coal. Hnc, w can dmocatiz th wold o actos and stillavoid th -o-all o social constction.

Bt th is still a poblm. Bassi, who is mo smpathtic than Iam to scintic matialism, somtims asks in convsation wh th toothai shold b st as al as qaks. Allow m to spond to Bassi’s v

asonabl qstion with a dint xampl. Whil witing this sction Iam hosting Falaki and Taa, two cats who blong to a tavling collag.Ths animals obviosl qali as actos in th Latoian sns, sinc thtansom, modi, ptb, and cat an nmb o things in m apat-mnt ach da. Bt I now tn awa om th cats and pos in imagina-tion. At a w momnts o laxation I abicat a nw ctional ntit—a‘Monst X’ possssing a tl abhont aa o qalitis. In od to p-sv th absolt isolation o this cat in m own mind, I s to d-scib an o its qalitis h, bt can ass th ad that thi combi-nation is npcdntd in th annals o ction. Now, Monst X is alsoan acto in th Latoian sns: it patiall distbs m mood, nts intoth cnt book as an xampl vagl acting th mood o t ad-s vn at I am dad, and lads m to ct on th paallls btwnMonst X and th cats o H.P. Lovcat. Sinc th cats and th mon-st a qall capabl o nting into ntwoks and tansoming othntitis, Lato wold ct an assignmnt o th cats to ‘nat’ and thmonst to ‘clt’. Ths two domains do not xist o him. W cannot ap-

potion th wold in sch a wa that nat is paisd o all th alit andhmans a blamd o all th distotion.Th tth o this can b sn most asil i w tak a thid xampl:

th Spclativ ralism movmnt, which I msl hlpd to ‘sociallconstct’ in th a 2006. Dspit th hmanl abicatd chaact o Spclativ ralism, it is obviosl al in a wa that Monst X is not. Inact, it is al in th sam wa that th cats a al. Not o instanc thatthis philosophical movmnt has a ctain indpndnc om thos whocatd it. Within ctain limits, on o mo mmbs can slp, sign,o di withot xtminating this intllctal tnd. Indd, it might onda b hiackd and tansomd b hostil nwcoms, which is pcislwhat happnd to phnomnolog in Hssl’s s. In shot, th act thathmans cat somthing dos not mak it lss al than ntitis spinging om th bosom o inanimat nat. I socitis a al (and th a), thn




th obcts o sociolog a v bit as al as th obcts o phsics. Andh Lato is coct.

Bt this dploabl hman/wold divid is sbtl dint om a simi-

la gap that Lato mixs with it, thogh in m viw th a two spaatthings. I to th dinc btwn al and intntional obcts, whichtaks vaios oms in th Bntano School o Astian philosoph omwhich Hssl mgd. Consid th xampl o th cats and th monst.unlik th clbatd cats o Lovcat, Monst X was catd in mmind lss than tn mints ago, and I solmnl swa that non o its taitswill v b divlgd vn to m dast inds. This mans that i I all to-night into a damlss slp, th monst will cas to xist. Monst X isntil dpndnt on m thinking o it. Th sam is b no mans t o

th cats, sinc I will sl awakn tomoow to nd vaios psonal itmsmissing o displacd d to thi noctnal actions. Now, notic that th catsa not only al. Th also lad a ctain xistnc in m own mind, thipoptis obctid and caicatd b som in som spcic mann. Qua obcts in m mind, th cats will vanish along with Monst X as soon as Iall aslp. Bt nlik th monst, th cats will main atonomos ocsnlashd in m apatmnt dspit m lack o awanss o thi activitis.

This xampl sggsts that w cannot ll accpt Lato’s dmocaco actos, which ntails that all obcts a o th xact sam bd. Whilaging with Lato that th split btwn nat and clt is ntnabl,w nd to intodc a split btwn al obcts and snsal ons. Thatthis nw dinc is not th sam as th old on can b sn om th p-cding xampls. Th modnist sstm dplod b Lato wold assignth cats to ‘nat’ and Spclativ ralism to ‘clt’. Bt althogh catsbd withot hman pmission whil philosophical movmnts mst bcatd b hmans, this is ilvant o th pposs o ontolog. Th catsa obviosl real obcts, bt th also xist o m as sensual obcts that

vanish whn I pa thm no hd; slp tmpoail kills o th snsal catswhil laving th al ons ntochd. Spclativ ralism ma sm to bonl a sensual obct insoa as it was catd, dvlopd, and psvd bhmans. yt it is also a real obct indpndnt o its catos and consm-s—o non o s can contol it, gaant its sccss, o nvision how andwh it will nd. Indd, at this point no hman bing can vn giv a satis-acto dnition o Spclativ ralism. This mans that th al/snsaldistinction is not a m woking o th dismal old nat/clt gap. ytit dos povid an obvios wa to assag th as o scintic alists abotallowing a dmocac o obcts. W can still distingish btwn mlsnsal obcts and atonomos al ons vn at abandoning th nat/clt divid. Th onl small concssion Bassi nds to mak is thatth tooth ai has a ‘al’ dimnsion qa acto in stois and mths, vni not as a gnin wingd ai ing thogh gnin ai. Bt vn mo




impotantl, to allow both al and snsal obcts opns additional sssin th hat o obcts that non o th vaios ‘adical’ philosophis a ablto cogniz. W a spaking h o a nw polarization o obcts, not a nw

adix to which all ls mst b dcd.Th locus classicus o intntionalit in philosoph is Fanz Bntano’sstill ndatd Psychology rom an Empirical Standpoint , st pblishd in 1874.Thoghot th book, Bntano shows an nnving git o pshing classi-cal thms in sh dictions:

ev mntal phnomnon is chaactizd b what th Scholastics o th Middl Ags calld th intntional (o mntal) inxistnc o an obct […] o immannt obctivit. ev mntal phnomnon incldssomthing as obct within itsl, althogh th do not all do so in th

sam wa. In psntation somthing is psntd, in dgmnt som-thing is amd o dnid, in lov lovd, in hat hatd, in dsi d-sid and so on.

This intntional in-xistnc is chaactistic xclsivl o mntal ph-nomna. No phsical phnomnon xhibits anthing lik it. W can,tho, dn mntal phnomna b saing that th a thos ph-nomna which contain an obct intntionall within thmslvs.46

Bntano was not onl on o th sminal thinks in th philosoph o -

cnt cntis, bt pobabl on o th most chaismatic tachs o all tim.His concpt o ‘immannt obctivit’ spakd a long-nning dbat, som-tims acimonios, btwn Bntano and his most gitd discipls: spcial-l Anton Mat, Kazimiz Twadowski, Alxis Minong, and Hssl.

Twadowski (1866-1938) is littl known to th avag Anglophon ad-. Bt h is a giant in Polish philosoph, and dsvdl so. His Vinna ha-bilitation thsis o 1894 is ntitld On the Content and Object o Presentations ,47 andphaps plad as gat a ol as Bntano himsl in stimlating Hsslianphnomnolog. In on sns Twadowski viws Bntano as a ho, and

tmpts his basic insight as i it w a commonplac: ‘It is on o th bstknown positions o pscholog, hadl contstd b anon, that v mn-tal phnomnon intnds an immannt obct’.48 Bt whn Bntano spakso immannt obctivit in th mind, Twadowski nots sval dicltis. Among thm is on alad notd b Bntano’s stdnt Alois Hö, qot-d b Twadowski as ollows:

Th wods ‘thing’ and ‘obct’ a sd [b Bntano] in two snss:on th on hand o that independently xisting ntit […] at which o

46. Fanz Bntano, Psychology rom an Empirical Standpoint , tans. A. rancllo, D.Tll, and L. McAlist, Nw yok, rotldg, 1995, pp. 88-9.

47. Kasimi Twadowski, On the Content and Object o Presentations , tans. b rinhadGossmann, Th Hag, Matins Niho, 1977.

48. Twadowski, On the Content and Object o Presentations , p. 1.




psntation and dgmnt aim, as it w; on th oth hand, o thmntal, mo o lss appoximat ‘pict’ o that al ntit which ex-ists ‘in’ us […].

In distinction to th thing o obct, which is assmd to b indpndnto thinking, on also calls th contnt o a psntation and dgmnt(similal: o a ling and willing) th ‘immanent or intentional obct’ o ths mntal phnomna.49

B accpting this distinction, Twadowski sts p a simpl opposition b-twn two tms. On th on hand w hav th obct in th al wold,which h calls simpl ‘obct’. On th oth hand w hav th intntional obct, th pict that xists in th mind, which h himsl calls ‘contnt’. Thtitl o Twadowski’s book cold ths b wittn as On Intentional and Real Objects . Lik his btt-known llow stdnt Minong, Twadowski nvisionsa global tho o obcts that wold otank th scincs, which ocs toonaowl on on spcic kind o obct. In Twadowski’s stiing wods:

mtaphsics mst b dnabl as th scinc o obcts in gnal, tak-ing this wod in th sns h poposd [….] Th natal scincs, inth widst sns o th wod, o xampl, a concnd with th pc-liaitis o thos obcts which on calls inoganic and oganic bodis;pscholog invstigats th poptis and laws chaactistic o mntal

phnomna, o mntal obcts. [B contast,] mtaphsics is a scincwhich consids all obcts, phsical—oganic and inoganic—as wllas mntal, al as wll as nonal, xisting obcts as wll as nonxist-ing obcts; invstigats thos laws which obcts in gnal ob, not sta ctain gop o obcts […]. evthing which is in th widst sns‘somthing’ is calld ‘obct’, st o all in gad to a sbct, bt thnalso gadlss o this lationship.50

Ba Smith’s n book on th Astian philosophical tadition latsa statmnt o th lat Polish phnomnologist roman Ingadn that

Twadowski’s book psnts ‘so a as I know, th st consistntl con-stctd tho o obcts manisting a ctain thotical nit sinc thtims o scholasticism and o th ‘ontolog’ o [th clbatd Libnizian]Chistian Wol’.51

49. Twadowski, On the Content and Object o Presentations , p. 1, citd om Alois Hö and Alxis Minong, Logic , Vinna, 1890.

50. Twadowski, On the Content and Object o Presentations , p. 36-7.51. Ba Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy o Franz Brentano, Chicago, Opn Cot,

1994, p. 159. Smith tanslats th citation om pag 99 o T. Schnll, Ludwik Fleck—Lebenund Denken, Fibg i.B., Hochschlvlag, 1982. In tn, Schnll s to pag 258 o roman Ingadn’s Polish aticl, ‘Dzialalnosc nakowa Twadowskigo’, ond in th col-lction Kazimierz Twardowski: Nauczyciel—Uczony—Obywatel (Lvov, 1938), making this thmost convoltd nc o m ca, all as a slt o m (and psmabl Smith’s) in-abilit to ad Polish.




Th action o Hssl to Twadowski shows th sot o ambivalnctpical onl o o most impotant hman lationships. Hssl’s lttsto his Polish collag a indl and spctl, and his patd -

ncs to Twadowski’s book thoghot his ca a a too nmos tosggst anthing bt poond spct. yt w somtims also nd hash odismissiv maks abot Twadowski, whos obct/contnt distinction issomtims dismissd as ntnabl o vn consd. Thoghot th 1890’sHssl stggld to wit his ssa ‘Intntional Obcts’, in which man o his lat thms appa in gminal om.52 It is Twadowski vn mo thanBntano who svs as his ival and catalst in ths al as. Hssl’sgnal attitd towad intntional obcts is as to ndstand. As h ssit, ‘th masss’ (inclding Twadowski) alsl think that o mind is lld

with mntal imags o obcts that point towad al ons, althogh thmasss concd that in cass o o ths imags ail to point to anthing al.53 Bt o Hssl, th obct is not dobld p btwn al and m-l intntional vsions; instad, th al and intntional obct a on andth sam. As h wittil pts it, ‘th sam Blin which I psnt also xists,and th sam wold no long xist i dgmnt ll pon it as pon Sodomand Gomoah’.54

Howv, o Hssl is lss a matt o cting Twadowski’s distinc-tion than o displacing it. Hssl and Twadowski both ag that th is adistinction btwn obct and contnt. Bt Hssl’s gat innovation is totansplant this tnsion into th phnomnal alm itsl, with Twadowski’sal wold disappaing om th pict. Fo Hssl w do not point atsom obct ot th somwh on th basis o intnal mntal contnt.Instad, experience itsel is split in hal btwn nid obcts and th divscontnts thogh which th bcom manist. Imagin o instanc thatw pciv a t. Fo Twadowski th ‘obct’ is th al t ling otsido s, whil th ‘contnt’ o (‘immannt obct’) is whatv w hav in con-

sciosnss as an imag o th t. Fo Hssl it is dint. Th t as obct dos not li in som mot obctiv wold, bt inhabits v pcp-tion o th t—v t-contnt that w v xpinc. At th samtim, Hssl dnis that th t-obct and t-contnt a impisond inth immannc o th hman mind. W a not tappd in th mind, sincb intnding th t w a aching ot towad an obct. This t-obct is not a pschological phantasm, bt a tl valid idal nit. Whthh admits it o not, this stp dos conn Hssl within an idalist philoso-ph, sinc h ss to lt s spak o anthing in itsl bond th bondso possibl xpinc.

52. edmnd Hssl, ‘Intntional Obcts’, in Early Writings in the Philosophy o Logic and Mathematics , tans. Dallas Willad, Dodcht, Klw, 1993.

53. Hssl, ‘Intntional Obcts’, p. 345.54. Hssl, ‘Intntional Obcts’, pp. 347-8.




yt this v idalist gst is what allows him to dscib an npc-dntd split within th idal alm, pcisl b impoting Twadowski’s obct/contnt distinction into th phnomnal sph. In act, this nw it

within phnomna shold b sn as Hssl’s most til contibtion to phi-losoph. Fo i w pciv a t o chai, what w pciv is not ml con-tnt, sinc no contnt is v qit adqat. Whth I look at a bilding o aind, th xplicit ‘contnt’ sms to b onl th ont sid that I now obsv.Bt no on thinks th a looking at a m sac, vn thogh th sacis all that w dictl s. As Hssl pts it lat in th Logical Investigations :

Th obct is not actall givn, it is not givn wholl and ntil as thatwhich it itsl is. It is onl givn ‘om th ont’, onl ‘pspctivall o-shotnd and poctd’ tc […]. Th lmnts o th invisibl a sid,

th intio tc., a no dobt sbsidiail intndd in mo o lss d-nit ashion […]. On this hinges the possibility o indenitely many percepts o the same object, all diering in content .55

Imagin cicling a t om dint angls and distancs at dint timso da in v-shiting moods. Fo Twadowski v tinist chang in thcontent o pcption mans a nw immannt obct; what mains idnti-cal thogh all ths changs is th real t ling otsid xpinc. FoHssl it is dint: no ‘al’ t xists otsid o possibl xpinc

o it, which is wh Hssl is an idalist and Twadowski is not. Bt in an-oth sns this dinc is mino. Both ag that th contnt shits con-stantl vn as th obct mains th sam. Th mao dinc btwnthm is that Twadowski, lik Bntano, assms that o experience is alwaso dnit contnt, so that th nding obct mst li somwh otsid.Bt Hssl, o pobabl th st tim in th histo o philosoph, holdsthat th alm o appaanc is dobld in its own ight btwn nd-ing nita obcts and shiting accidntal pols. This bakthogh hasgnall bn lost amidst all th polmics and cont-polmics sond-

ing Hssl’s idalism. Bt h both his inds and his os miss th point:Hssl’s oiginal insights a not to b ond in th alism/idalism dis-pt (wh h is all st anoth colationist) bt in his acting o thphnomnal alm itsl. And this has dcisiv consqncs o s toda.

In th pvios sction I claimd that obcts cannot b dnd in tmso thi lations with anthing ls in th wold. ral obcts withdawom o accss to thm, in ll Hidggian ashion. Th mtaphos o concalmnt, viling, shlting, haboing, and potcting a all lvanth. Th al cats contin to do thi wok vn as I slp. Ths cats anot qivalnt to m concption o thm, and not vn qivalnt to thiown sel -concptions; no a th xhastd b thi vaios modications

55. edmnd Hssl, Logical Investigations , 2 Vols., tans. j.N. Findla, London, rotldgand Kgan Pal, 1970, pp. 712-3, mphasis addd.




and ptbations o th obcts th handl o damag ding th night.Th cats thmslvs xist at a lvl dp than thi cts on anthing.ral obcts a non-lational. This was th lsson o th ali sction.

Bt now w hav intntional o snsal obcts as wll. Monst X o thcats-o-m (as opposd to th cats thmslvs) clal cannot b sbtact-d om all lation, sinc th xist onl insoa as I pa attntion to thm.Whn I clos m s and all aslp, th intntional cats vanish om x-istnc no lss than Monst X dos. This distinction btwn al and in-tntional obcts might sond lik th old-ashiond dinc btwn pi-ma and sconda qalitis, bt it is not. Fo on thing, pima qalitisa sall dscibd in tms o ndling physical poptis (sch as mass,shap, position) nactd b hman pcption. Bt I hav claimd that

sch qalitis a pl lational, and hnc not dp nogh to qalio th stats o ‘pima’. Manwhil, sconda qalitis a alwas sp-posd to b mad p o m qualities , sch as ‘swt’, ‘d’, and so oth. Bto Hssl xpinc is not mad p o -oating qalitis, bt o obcts:th doo slamming, th sailboat cising down th lak. Th mpiicist mod-l, accoding to which w xpinc disct colo-patchs and abitailwav thm togth into lag nits thogh habit, is ctd b Hssland all lat phnomnologists as sh idolog. Fo Hssl th phnom-nal alm is not st xcldd om th al on, bt is also dividd in itsl.

Real Objects are Not Bundles o Relations

O woking modl now ns as ollows. W hav al obcts, which with-daw om all hman viw and vn om all lations with ach oth. Thiswas th conclsion o th pvios sction, which ctd all ‘adical’ at-tmpts to collaps obcts into a monistic wold-lmp, a vital alm o p-individals, a dctionist cosmos o ock-had atoms nting lag‘nctional’ nits, a colational cicl o hman and wold, o a global -lational ntwok à la Whithad and Lato. ral obcts blong to a p--lational dimnsion in which th cannot mak dict contact o an sot. Btth phnomnal lvl o th cosmos now sms to b split in two, with a stibtwn intntional obcts and thi accidntal contnt at an givn mo-mnt: th mailbox mains th sam mailbox no matt what tansint a-çad it happns to psnt in an instant. I al obcts a hiddn and nv- psnt nogh, intntional obcts a alwas alad psnt. Th aml ncstd with inssntial accidnts that nd to b stippd awa b

th phnomnologist in th mthod Hssl dscibs as ‘idtic dction’.ral obcts xist ‘whth w lik it o not’, bt intntional obcts can b vapoizd b a simpl act o shiting o mind lswh. (Hssl woldnot ag with this point, sinc h holds that th mailbox is an ‘idal’ ni-t that mains th sam vn i no on is looking, bt w nd not ollow




him h.) Finall, sinc al obcts withdaw om all lations, th can-not mak an contact with ach oth. B contast, intntional obcts aalwas intndd o tochd b m, sinc th a a gnin pat o m li

at this instant. And sinc th a alwas mltipl intntional obcts in mmind at an momnt, th a contigos with on anoth in m xpi-nc, not totall ct o om ach oth lik al obcts a. In th pvi-os sction I considd th dinc btwn al obcts and thi mlational pols, and citicizd sval ‘adical’ attmpts to collaps thisdinc, which in m stimation mst b psvd o vn dpnd atall costs. H I will consid sval oth its within obcts that nd tob maintaind. unlik th ‘obcts vs. lations’ dinc, ths additionalits a ons that Lato dos not vn both dning. Fo onl th ph-

nomnological tadition givs s th ndd sti within obcts that stab-lishs ths additional polaitis, and th phnomnological tadition hashad littl innc on Lato.

Sensual Objects are Not Bundles o Accidental Qualities

It is gnall th cas that Lato, lik Whithad, is satisd with th m-piicist doctin that a thing is not dint om its qalitis. In an casth wold b no wa o Lato to mak sch a distinction, sinc it wold

qi him to locat an nding knl in obcts dint om its pal-pabl qalitis, and this wold b a ath n-Latoian task. What I havcalld a ‘adical’ philosophical position (not th sam thing as an ‘oiginal’on) amonts to saing somthing along ths lins: ‘philosophs om-l distingishd btwn X and y. Bt y is ml a gmnt o taditionalpdic, and w can now s that it dcs compltl to X’. radical phi-losophis a dctiv in spiit, and hnc Lato’s Irreductions maks himan anti-adical in spiit, as dos his ot-patd maxim that th mission o th intllct is to mak things mo al ath than lss al—th v op-posit mthod o th ovatd ‘citical thinking’.

Th pvios sction covd vaios adical attmpts to dc nti-tis to thi relations with oth ntitis, thogh dint possibl dgs o zalot in this poct bcam visibl. Bt along with saing that an ntitis nothing mo than its lations, th is a dint sot o adicalism thatholds obcts to b nothing mo than bndls o spcic qalitis. On thispoint Whithad cits David Hm, th most amos mascot o sch doc-tins: ‘Bt m snss conv to m onl the impressions o colored points , dis-

posd in a ctain mann. I th is snsibl o an thing th, I d-si it ma b pointd ot to m’.56 And lswh: ‘I wold ain ask thosphilosophs, who [bas] so mch o thi asonings on th distinction o

56. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 117, mphasis addd. Citd om David Hm, ATreatise o Human Nature , Oxod, Oxod univsit Pss, 1978, Book 1, Pat II, Sction III.




sbstanc and accidnt, and imagin w hav cla idas o ach, whthth ida o substance b divd om th impssions o snsation o omction?’.57 Fo Hm, o visal xpinc is mad p o tin colod

points wovn abitail into lag-scal things thogh th oc o habit.Bt this is pcisl th modl o pcption that Hssl ightl cts.Fo who on ath v xpincd a visal ld mad p o ‘impssionso colod points, disposd in a ctain mann’? On can wll imagin ascinc ction tal in which th naato’s visal xpinc dcomposshoicall into atonomos dots, as in th pointillist paintings o GogsSat. Bt nith I, no th ad, no David Hm himsl v xpi-ncd sch a nightmaish wold. Th v sggstion is anthing bt m-piical: it is basd on a snsationalist idolog not atid b th xpinc

o an living cat. As Hssl batill pts it, ‘h is m ind Hansand I call him “Hans.” H is no dobt individall dtmind, h is alwasat a paticla point in spac and tim. I ths dtminations w, how-v, concntl mant, th nam “Hans” wold chang its maning withv stp m ind taks, on v occasion that I addss him b nam’.58 Bt in act ach o s contins to call him Hans vn as h changs po-sition, acial xpssion, clothing, and xact spatial distanc om s. It ispl abita to discont o viw that it is th sam Hans in all thscass in avo o a m Hman dogma that th xact qalitativ cong-ation mst b idntical o th pson to b th sam pson. In act, thissimpl amonts to anoth ‘adical’ attmpt to blittl whatv on’s ini-tial idolog dos not admit. jst as matialists dlight in taing all laso alit down to thi spposd atomic sbstatm, snsationalists wishto liminat vthing bt a ppotd spstatm o spcic colo-pix-ls. O as Hssl obcts: ‘nthinkingl on cdits to contents vthing that acts plac in th object , in thi staightowad nc; its attibts,colos, oms tc., a othwith calld “contnts” and actall intptd

as contnts in th pschological sns, .g. as snsations’.59

And th, ‘thconct phnomnal thing is tatd as a complx o contnts, i.. o at-tibts gown togth in a singl imag’.60 Bt i that w th cas, howcold w v xpinc things sch as ‘th-dimnsional solids?’.61 Ththid dimnsion can nv b givn as a mntal content , sinc contnts comonl in th om o two-dimnsional at sacs, with th thid dimnsionnv civing dict visal xpssion.

Simpl pt: w xpinc objects , not masss o sns data. In ach

57. Whithad, Process and Reality, p. 118, mphasis addd. Citd om Hm, A Treatise o Human Nature , Book 1, Pat 1, Sction VI.58. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 380.59. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 382, tanslation modid slightl o asons o clait.60. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 382.61. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 382.




momnt w contnd with books, cats, moons, and Si Lankan ta planta-tions, not tin cks o colo. Whn I cicl an obct o whn it otats lbo m, I do not s a disct sis o closl latd contnts and thn

mak an abita dcision that th all blong togth as a st o closllinkd spcic pols. Instad, what I xpinc is alwas one obct nd-going accidntal, tansint changs that do not alt th thing itsl. Whnm ind Hans walks, I do in act s m nid ind Hans ndgoing advnts in tim and spac whil maining th sam Hans. I do not s achain o slightl dint ntitis calld Hans1, Hans2, Hans3, Hans4, tc.,nitd b som sot o ‘amil smblanc’ (in accodanc with on ov-l admid ‘adical’ mov). Instad, w simpl xpinc a nid Hanswalking along thogh ml accidntal changs o position. Th qs-

tion might now b askd: what a th citia o whn Hans has changdnogh that h is no long Hans? And th answ is simpl: it does not mat-ter, or we ourselves are the judges . At all, w a not spaking h o alobcts—a alm wh mistakn inncs a possibl. W a spaking soll o intntional obcts, a sph wh ach o s is absolt mast. I I dcid that Hans is still Hans dspit cnt dastic chang in his pop-tis, thn h is still Hans—nd o sto. Th act that it ma b jügn oKat who is mistakn o Hans is ilvant ntil w bgin to spak o real obcts. As long as I tacitl accpt that th nw st o appaancs a stillHans-appaancs, thn th simpl a. No o is possibl at this lvl,sinc intntional obcts consist soll in thi lation with m.

Hssl’s citiq is dictd not onl against Bitish empiicism, btalso against his own tach Bntano—and implicitl against Twadowski,who still ollowd his tach on this point. Bntano and Twadowski, no lssthan Lock, Bkl, Hm, Kant, and almost von ls, assm thatth alm o mntal phnomna is alwas mad p o spcic content . In op-position to this, Hssl sas that ‘I do not s colo-snsations bt colod

things, I do not ha ton-snsations bt th sing’s song tc. tc’.62

WhasBntano thinks all consciosnss is gondd in presentation, Hssl modi-s this pincipl to sa that all consciosnss is gondd in objectiying acts .63 B now th dinc shold b cla nogh. I w hold with Bntano thatm consciosnss o a t is a psntation, this mans that I hav t-contnt in m mind, and all o it is qall t-contnt. Hssl’s positionis slightl bt dcisivl dint. Fo him, not all aspcts o m intntion o th t a th sam. On th on hand th is an nding idtic nclsthat th t-pcption mst hav in od to b what it is; this is th tas a nid intntional obct. On th oth hand th is th contnt o thxpinc, which can shit massivl om momnt to momnt. I w look

62. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 559.63. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 648.




at th t ctd in a pool, psid-down, thogh oang lnss, at mid-night, o blanktd with ashing stob-lights—all o ths cass alt th presentation dasticall, bt non chang th obct-giving act as long as I still

bliv that th t is th sam old t as bo.In shot, it is impossibl to dc an intntional obct to a bndl o qalitis. Hm’s amos adicalism on this point alwas lnds a ctaincitical cockinss to his admis. Th lov to dismiss nid things as old-ashiond pit in compaison with th togh-mindd, xpinc-cntdtho o tin colo-patchs. Th ado th dction o nding ntitisto a sis o closl latd imags nitd at th act b m amil -smblanc. It is n to b a sl-poclaimd adical, bsting th bbbls o gllibl dps; indd, th a thos who hold that th tdios spctacl

o disabsing naïv popl o thi oll is th v pitom o mntal li.unotnatl, no colo-dots a givn in xpinc, and to poclaim thDot Tho to b mpiical is a tavst o what dlit to xpinc oghtto man. No do w s a sis o disct Hans-lik shaps and thn dcidthat th a scintl simila that it mst b th sam pson. Non o this is mpiical, sinc it ml svs a dogmatic dctionism that psto liminat whatv it cannot handl.

Ths, along with th dinc btwn a al obct and its lations,w mst now cogniz a scond polait: th dinc btwn an intn-tional obct and its accidnts. In both cass w hav an nding co obctnactd b tansint changs, not liant on th was in which it is an-noncd. Th dinc is that whas a al obct is alwas more than thspcic qalitis that w ascib to it, an intntional obct is alwas less . Aal t withdaws into th dsk o its bing, and is nv ll xpssd ban o its distinct ats. B contast, an intntional t is alwas bo sas soon as w s a t, o think w s a t. It is ml oodd ov o n-cstd with xcssiv dtail: too mch ilvant snlight ov that nd-

ing t-nit, too mch psonal mood not ptinnt to th t, too mchspcicit o angl and distanc. W now hav two idcibl tnsions thatcannot b xplaind awa b als adicalism: al obcts and intntionalobcts a both dint om thi spcic psntations.

Sensual Objects are Not Bundles o Essential Qualities

What al and snsal obcts hav in common is that both a nding n-cli that withstand nmos changs in thi pcis psntations. In oth

wods, al and snsal obcts do ndgo advnts o changing qali-cations. Bt althogh th t can b sn in contlss dint pcptalcongations, it dos not sm to hav advnts with spct to its owneidos , which mst alwas main th sam o as long as th thing mainsth sam. (W a spaking h o Hssl’s idos, not Plato’s.) Th t can




b sn om tn o t mts, at snis o at dsk, bt in all sch cassth idos mst b th sam o th t to main th sam snsal obct.Hssl contnds that an o o spcic intntions o snsal obcts can b

sbctd to this sot o idtic dction, ‘which lads om th pschologi-cal phnomnon to th p “ssnc,” o […. ] om actal (“mpiical”) to“ssntial” nivsalit […]’.64 W stip awa th inssntial nois and con-tti ncstd on th ncls o th thing and thb t to gain an idt-ic intition o whatv t, mailbox, o blackbid w xpinc. I I sd-dnl aliz that an appant t is actall an gl light-pol disgisd asa palm, as happnd na m hom sval hos ago, thn I now intnd anw obct with a dint eidos . Th pvios palm-obct ndwnt advnts o accidntal chang onl as long as I took it o a palm. Onc I

saw that it was a sttlight in disgis, th pvios palm-obct was simplliminatd. Sinc obcts cannot nd th loss o thi idos, it might as-il sm as i th intntional/snsal obct and its idtic ats a idn-tical. yt this tns ot not to b th cas, and w a conontd with a nw,thid om o non-adical tnsion: th sti btwn a snsal obct and itsssntial qalitis.

W can bgin b asking abot th nat o an snsal obct that wncont, whth it b a t, mailbox, dog, o sklton. A snsal obctdos main nid dspit its vaios swiling pols. Bt it is not stan mpt contain o nit, sinc this wold ntail that all snsal obctsa th sam onc w sbtact thi accidnts. A snak and a iv woldb idntical i not o thi accidntal sac pols, which is clal ab-sd. Th poblm is amilia to classical philosoph, as in Libniz’s point in Monadaolog y §8 that ‘monads mst hav qalitis, othwis th wold notvn b bings’.65 Bt Hssl dals with this dalit o nit and paticlai-t at th snsal lvl ath than Libniz’s lvl o real monads. Hssl sas,o instanc, that th obct is snatchd p in ‘a singl “a o maning”’. 66

Hnc th a is both ‘singl’ (it is nid) and also a a ‘o maning’ (ithas a paticla chaact to it). Whn th snsal palm t stas th samom v angl and distanc, it mains th sam in palm-ashion aththan in dog-ashion. Th snsal obct slts om ‘th ndamntal op-ation o nominalization, th tansomation o man-ad snthsis intoa singl-ad snthsis’. Th dinc btwn ths two is that ‘singl-ad acts a not aticlat, th man-ad acts a aticlat’.67 In oth

64. edmnd Hssl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tans. W.r.B.

Gibson, London, Alln & unwin, 1931, p. 44.65. G. W. Libniz, ‘Monadolog’, in Philosophical Essays , tans. rog Aiw and Danil

Gab, Indianapolis, Hacktt, 1989, p. 214.66. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 622.67. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 640, mphasis movd om th ist o th

two passags.




wods, th snsal obct is a nit o dnit chaact bt not opnl a-ticlatd accoding to its idtic ats. Th palm t is th bo s,howv mch o littl attntion w might b paing it. This snsal t is

not an intllctal contnt, bcas it mains th bo s vn i w d-scnd into th most dploabl stpo. Nith is it a pcptiv contnt, ow hav sn that this can chang wildl om momnt to momnt withoto pciving a dint t. Finall, it is not an motional contnt, sincth nid t can nd ctations o mood p to and inclding ot-ight pschosis. Nonthlss, th wondl Otga (on o th intllctalhos o m stdnt as) is onto somthing impotant whn h s tosch snsal obcts as ‘lings’:

Kping this nam [‘ling’] o stats o plas and displas, o

and soow, is an nomos o that pscholog has onl cntl ac-knowldgd. ev obctiv imag, on nting o laving o con-sciosnss, podcs a sbctiv action, st as a bid that lights on olavs a banch stats it tmbling, o tning on and o an lctic c-nt instantl podcs a nw cnt.68

To smmaiz, th ling-thing o snsal obct is both on and patic-la. It is a spcic t naticlatd nit—a sot o smooth idtic past, btwith vastl dint avos o past in th cass o t, dog, and sta.

Now, th v act that th nid thing is inaticlat shows wh thsnsal obct is not th sam as its idos. It is t that th snsal obct iscovd with nois, bt stipping awa this nois onl givs s th snsalobct, not th idos. This idos qis a high lvl o aticlation, whichqis that w go bond th inaticlat snsal obct itsl. Anothtm o th idos o an obct is its meaning , in a mch boad sns thanth lingistic on; w a spaking h o o dalings with nid obcts,and this obviosl qis nith spch no witing. Bt a w o Hssl’sxampls dawn om langag a hlpl. In som cass, sch as ‘London’

in english and ‘Londs’ in Fnch, w nd both th sam maning and thsam obct.69 Bt oth xampls mak cla how dint th two polsa. Fo instanc, th sam obct can b namd b two dint manings:‘th victo at jna’ and ‘th vanqishd at Watloo’ both to Napolon;th sam tiangl can b calld both ‘that qilatal tiangl’ and ‘thatqiangla tiangl’70 (Am I th onl ad who nds th tiangl xam-pl astondingl nn? Hssl’s wit is ndatd.) Convsl, th aman cass whn th same maning s to two dierent obcts—as whn‘hos’ s qall wll to Bcphals (th mont o Alxand th Gat)

68. josé Otga Gasst, ‘An essa in esthtics B Wa o a Pac’, in Phenomenologyand Art , tans. Philip Silv, Nw yok, W.W. Noton, 1975, pp. 144-5.

69. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 287.70. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 287.




and to an avag cat hos.71 Nomall o snsal acts a ocsd on thobct, not on its maning, its aticlatd idos. In Hssl’s own wods: ‘I w pom [an intntional] act and liv in it, as it w, w natall

to its obct and not to its maning. I, .g., w mak a statmnt, w dgabot th thing it concns, and not abot th statmnt’s maning, abotth dgmnt in th logical sns. This latt st bcoms obctiv to s ina x act o thoght […]’.72

W can s, thn, that th nid snsal obct is a singl a o ‘l-ing’ (in Otga’s boad sns) that is not aticlatd into its constitnt i-dtic momnts. Bt what is makabl is that sch aticlation cannot oc-c b mans o snsal intition at all. evn thogh Hssl holds that athing can bcom psnt in a llling intition, this lllmnt has noth-

ing to do with nomal snsal intition. Fo th is no pop angl o dis-tanc om which to viw th idos o a palm t, Napolon, o Bcphals.Som vantag points on obcts ma b mo optimal than oths, bt vnths viwpoints can onl giv s accidntal sac pols o an obct,nv its idos. In shot, a snsal intition is always accidntal. Hsslnots that ‘Bismack’ is a nid maning gadlss o ‘whth I imaginth gat man in a lt hat o coat, o in a ciassi’s niom, o whatvpictoial psntation I ma adopt’.73 I I stat ot lod that a blackbid ising in th gadn:

a listn ma ndstand m wods, and m sntnc as a whol, with-ot looking into th gadn: condnt in m vacit, h ma bing othth sam dgmnt withot th pcpt [o th ing blackbid]. Possibltoo h is hlpd b an imaginativ -nactmnt, bt phaps this too isabsnt, o occs in so mtilatd, so inadqat a om, as to b no tcontpat o what appas pcptall, at last not in spct o thats ‘xpssd’ in m statmnt.74

In vn cla tms, ‘w mst […] locat no pat o th maning in th p-

cpt itsl’.75 Th idos o th mailbox dos not appa as soon as w sta di-ctl at th it. Th idos o maning is tacitl psnt inasmch as th mail-box is somthing that occpis o attntion. Bt it is not aticlatd.

W alad knw om th pvios sction that th snsal obct is anit ov against th swiling accidnts that accompan it. Th cnt sc-tion has addd th ollowing additional points: (1) Th idos is not th sam

71. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 288.72. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 332

73. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 328.74. Hssl, Logical Investigations , pp. 680-1. At th isk o bating to dath th point

abot Hssl’s wit, is th not somthing staggingl comical abot th ida o ‘a m-tilatd o inadqat imaginativ -nactmnt o a blackbid’? Psonall, I nd thnotion hilaios.

75. Hssl, Logical Investigations , p. 685.




as th snsal obct, sinc dint aspcts o th idos can b aticlat-d b dint statmnts, whas th obct itsl is alwas nid in thmann o a igidl dsignating pop nam. (2) Most spisingl, th idos

o a snsal obct is withdrawn om viw, st as al obcts a withdawnom viw. To aticlat th idos o an obct is to hint at somthing really blonging to it and really withdawn om accss, not to call o attntion tosom adqat visal incanation o th ssnc. An lllmnt that occswill b pl intllctal, and nv complt.

Hssl dos not cogniz this scond point sinc h holds that ad-qat, vidnt intition o things is possibl. Fo him th is no hiddnalm o al obcts, dp than intntional obcts. Bt h it is ncssato dpat om Hssl’s own viws. I w spak o th idos o a snsal ob-

ct as having moments , ths momnts a dictl accssibl nith thoghth snss no vn thogh th mind. W a abl to hint at th momnts o th idos thogh vaios lingistic o non-lingistic mans, bt can nvqit ach thm. No aticlation o th idos o a mailbox v gts it quite ight. And h w hav on o thos paadoxical invsions that a otna smptom o tth. Th sal assmption b thos who bliv in al obcts is that w hav accss to a thing’s qualities bt not to th thing itsl. Inth cas o snsal obcts, pcisl th vs tns ot to b th cas: whav immdiat accss to th snsal object om th v momnt w intndit, sinc that is all it taks o a snsal obct to xist. yt w hav no dictaccss to th gnin moments o a snsal obct, vn thogh w constantlbath in its accidents . And this is th thid non-adical polait o obct-oi-ntd philosoph: th snsal obct vs. its idtic momnts.

A nw pic o tminolog sms in od o this ath spising d- vlopmnt (which occd to m onl in th smm o 2008). W said thatth accidntal sac pols o a mailbox a encrusted on th mailbox as anid snsal thing. Bt in th cas o an obct’s gnin idtic momnts

it tns ot not to b a matt o ncstation, sinc ths momnts a b nomans accssibl on th sac. Instad, w cold sa that th momnts o a snsal obct a submerged om viw. Althogh nw tms in philosophalwas isk sonding pcios, ocd, o ldicos, th dinc btwnncstation and sbmgnc is a k distinction btwn two was oqalitis to xist. Now, it ma sm odd that a ml snsal obct coldsbmg a real idos, bt th vidnc lads s to concld that this mst bso: lik an imagina t ptting down al oots, o a ghost ship cting al cago into th sa. Bt it shold hav smd qall odd that a al obct cold manat snsal qalitis o a pciv, thogh this scnaio isa mo amilia on. Ths two diagonal lins, ctting om snsal to aland om al to snsal, mst b a cl as to how things a abl to com-mnicat dspit th withdawal o obcts om ach oth. Th hint at asoltion to th poblm o vicaios casation.




Real Objects are Not Bundles o Essential Qualities

Bt w now com to a oth non-adical polait in obcts. Fo st as asnsal obct dis om its al qalitis (intntional obct vs. its idos),

th sam holds t o al obcts that xist apat om o accss to thm.This iss is o no concn to Hssl, sinc h dos not vn cognizwhat I hav calld a ‘al obct’ ling otsid th intntional alm; it wasHidgg’s tool-analsis that boght ths al obcts into phnomnol-og o th st tim. I a al obct withdaws om an accss, sch a no-tion is clal anathma to Hssl, sinc h thinks that nothing can with-daw bond th possibilit in principle o bing adqatl known, howvdiclt this ma b in pactic. Fo this ason I tn bi to th SpanishBasq philosoph Xavi Zbíi (1898-1983), discipl o Hidgg andOtga and a omidabl think in his own ight. M own insistnc on thsbtanan alit o obcts apat om an pcption o thm ows agood dal to his mastwok On Essence .76 Sinc I hav discssd Zbíi x-tnsivl in Tool-Being ,77 a bi smma will sc h.

Fom th otst o On Essence , Zbíi staks ot a dp tain thanth snsal alm—a land that can b sal dscibd as blonging to so-calld ‘alism’. Whn w ask abot ssnc, Zbíi sas, ‘w a asking, inth st plac, o th ssnc considd, not as the term o our way o conront-

ing real things , bt ath as a momnt o thos things thmslvs’.78 In othwods, w a not daling with Hsslian phnomna o intntional obcts. Instad, Zbíi bgins to tac a path thogh th ssnc o what Ihav calld real obcts. ‘In a wid sns, th “what” o anthing compissall its nots, poptis, chaactistics (it matts littl which tm w m-plo). Ths nots a not -oating o dtachd, bt constitt a nit[…]’.79 This nit is ccial, o ‘i th lackd this nit and i ach onstood b itsl, w wold not hav “on” thing bt a nmb o things. I thnit w ml additiv o xtnal, w wold hav a conglomat o things, bt not, in an stict sns, “on thing”’80.

Bt to spak o all o a thing’s nots, poptis, chaactistics has a v dint maning dpnding on what is incldd in th ‘all’. And hZbíi taks s thogh th incasingl dp concpts o th whol o a thing’s chaactistics, two o thm alad ond in Hssl. Fo in thst and widst sns, ‘th “what” mans all thos things which th thing in

76. Xavi Zbíi, On Essence , tans. A. robt Caponigi, Washington, Catholic

univsit o Amica Pss, 1980.77. Gaham Haman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics o Objects , Chicago, Opn

Cot, 2002, §22-§23.78. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 47, mphasis addd.79. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 51.80. Zbíi, On Essence , pp. 51-2




qstion, as a matt o act, is, with th totalit o nots which it posssss hic et nunc , inclding this v hic and this v nunc ’.81 H w a in th almo things dtmind in tt spcicit, as with Lato and Whithad. It is

not st th snow, bt ath th snow viwd in o o’clock shad-ow om tn mts in dpst sadnss, and so oth. Sch ovl dtmi-nat xpinc has a dnit qiddit that can b dscibd in as mch d-tail as w wish. Bt this is not what Zbíi is looking o.

This lads him to a scond vsion o th whol o a thing’s taits, whichis clos to what Hssl did with th tm ‘ssnc’. H, th obct ‘ps-nts nots which apidl tak on a nction which is chaactistic o distinc-tiv o it, dintl om oth nots which it posssss, so to sa, indistinctlin a al, thogh indint, mann’. Mo pcisl, ‘it is an apphnsion

o th thing as being “the same,” dspit th act that ths indint notsma va’.82 In this scond vsion o ssnc th angl and distanc o thsnow, o th mood in which it is viwd, a sbtactd om th pict.Instad, w hav th snow as an nding snsal obct that ndgosadvnts o changing dtminations. Althogh this is clos nogh towhat Hssl dsis, it mains qit a om what Zbíi hops to attain.

Th thid sns o ssnc, which Zbíi himsl ndoss, has to dowith th thing itsl ath than th thing as concivd b s. H it is nolong a qstion o stting hman citia b which to dmacat ntitisom on anoth, bt a qstion o th ssnc o al things thmslvs.Zbíi sks th nots ‘which, takn in and b thmslvs, not onl chaac-tiz a thing mo o lss so that it ma not b consd with oth things,bt ath, that th can in no sns ail o that th can in no sns b ab-snt om a al thing withot this latt, in a stict sns, casing to b whatit is’.83 To tn to o pvios mlancholic xampl, w spak o som-thing dp than both th ovl dtmind snow and th snowas an nding nit o hman xpinc. Instad, w a spaking o th

real ow and thos taits it mst hav in od to kp on bing what it is. And h w nall ach what Zbíi is sking: ‘th nita connctiono all ths nots is what in th stict sns I shall call ssnc’. 84 As h ptsit in a wondl th passag that I hav nv bn abl to ogt: ‘it is anit sch that, with spct to it, the notes are nothing but moments in which, soto phas it, th nit in qstion exhaustively deploys itsel ’.85

W alad hav bo s th basic ats o Zbíi’s modl o ssnc,potad in sch massiv dtail in his hndds o th pags. H sksth ssnc o al obcts, not st o things that appa to s (intntional

81. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 5282. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 52, mphasis addd.83. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 53.84. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 53.85. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 53, mphasis addd.




obcts). This ssnc is a nit, and moov it is a nit that ‘xhastivldplos itsl’ in nots that cont as its ‘momnts’. jst as Hssl’s snsalobct is a nit ov against its accidnts, Zbíi’s al obct is a nit ov

against its momnts. Th intpla h btwn th nit and plalit o th thing is calld ‘ssnc’. And th ssnc is incanatd in th v al-it o th individal thing; it is not a nivsal pct om ling otsid ththing and shad b man individals: ‘th ssnc dos not pos on itsl;it poss on th al thing accoding to that mod o posing on it whichis “to b it.” Consqntl, it ollows that th ssnc is in itsl somthing compltl mad activ. There are no essences which are real and physically immu-table and absolute ’.86 In oth wods, dsto th al obct and o hav d-stod th ssnc at th sam tim, which is not what happns o Plato.

In Zbíi’s cas, th obct in its own ight is xhastivl dplod in its s-snc, withot maind. In this ssntial nit, ‘ach not is tnd to thoths “om itsl” […] it is “this” not in “this” givn sstm which is in-tinsicall tnd to th oths’.87 Simpl pt, th momnts a not abstactqalitis abl to oat aond otsid thi spcic incanations (as withWhithad’s ath Platonic ‘tnal obcts’, happil absnt om Lato).Instad, th a mo lik what analtic philosoph calls ‘tops’: individ-alizd qalitis that cannot b stippd om th ntit to which th blong and shad lswh. And t o Zbíi th a mltipl nots to an ni-d ntit: a ‘ichnss’ in th thing to go along with its ‘solidit’, o a spci-ic ‘talitativ’ chaact that accompanis its ‘tanscndntal’ nit. Bt thisonnss is not a mere nit, as i v al thing shad th sam tanscn-dntal dimnsion o onnss. Instad, as th nal sntnc o Zbíi’s bookpts it, ‘th ssnc is stctal pincipl o th [individal] sbstantivit’.88 In shot, having sn that th snsal obct had al momnts, w now svn mo asil (bcas lss paadoxicall) that th al obct has almomnts as wll.

W hav now shitd standpoint om Lato’s ttl conct onoldacto to a compltl polaizd modl o oold obcts. Instad o having all obcts on th sam plan o alit, w hav two kinds o obct: al andsnsal. And instad o a thing bing th sam as its qalitis, w now hava dl that plas ot in both kinds o obcts: th nid sstmatic thing and its plalit o ats. This ncssail givs s a qadpl modl o th wold. Statd dintl, th a two kinds o obcts and two kinds o taits. W hav th al snow (assming it xists) and th snsal tansla-tion o it that appas to hmans o oth ntitis. W hav th al momntsthat th snow nds in od to b what it is, and th accidntal spcicqalitis thogh which th snsal snow is incanatd in th xpinc

86. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 65, mphasis addd.87. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 274.88. Zbíi, On Essence , p. 457.




o pcivs. W hav also bshd p against th dint sots o lationsthat can occ btwn ths pols, bt will mostl lav ths ntil lat.

elswh I hav dscibd th similait btwn this modl and

Hidgg’s clbatd t nglctd Geviert o ‘oold’. In Tool-Being Iwot as ollows: ‘Zbíi’s qadpl stct [th on st otlind] andHidgg’s hav pcisl th sam stct. Th a idntical’.89 Bt thisstatmnt was inscintl pcis. Along with whatv violnc th dis-cipls o Hidgg and Zbíi might claim I am doing to thi hos (andI am alwas dlightd to ght thm), th is a mo obvios iss h— naml, Hidgg’s oold modl is dint in 1949 (whn it bcoms x-plicit) om in 1919 (whn it was tod with vagl in a sktch al om).Th on that most smbls th oold aising om m Hssl/Zbíi

hbid modl is not th amos 1949 oold, bt th ali on om 1919.Fo it was onl th that th ong Hidgg was spaking o th tnsionwithin individual ntitis, whth in th mod o vald (‘occnc’) ohiddn (‘vnt’). B contast, th 1949 oold pas no hd to th tnsionwithin individal bings (as Hssl and Zbíi do), bt onl to that b-twn th wold as a whole and individal things. ‘eath’ and ‘motals’ donot psnt individal things o th lat Hidgg, bt th totalit o all.‘Gods’ and ‘sk’ a th onl qadants o th oold wh w nd individal paticlait. Othwis th modls a stctall simila, thoghHidgg’s 1949 modl is damagd b his als appal to a global nit atboth th vild and nvild lvls.

The Interior o Objects

It might now sm that th is a tnsion btwn two aspcts o this book.In th st plac I attackd colationism and dmandd that th lationsbtwn an two obcts b placd on th sam ooting as that btwn h-man and wold. Bt now I hav insistd that th is not a total dmocaco obcts o ‘at ontolog’ o th tp dndd b Lato, bt ath two tps o obcts—(a) al and (b) intntional o snsal. To spak o intn-tional obcts maks it sm as i this book w invoking a pivilgd almo hman phnomnolog, inapplicabl to sch cass as cotton’s intactionwith o th collision o hailstons with wood. Bt spisingl nogh,this tns ot to b a m pdic. Bntano was ight to spak o intn-tional obcts as having ‘intntional inxistnc’, an xistnc on th intioo somthing ls. H was simpl wong to sa that this inn spac is th

insid o th hman mind.In on sns th intntional lation is on, bt in anoth sns it istwo. Fo in a st sns, whn staing at a mailbox I main pctl dis-tinct om it—intntionalit is two. B no mans do th mailbox o I s

89. Haman, Tool-Being , p. 266.




togth into a singl continm o hap o moltn slag. I am on thing andth mailbox is anoth, which is pcisl wh I am abl to intnd it. This also a ascinating asmmt in this sitation. Fo th mailbox is ml

a snsal o intntional obct, on that will vapoiz as soon as I cas pa-ing attntion to it; at bst, it is a tanslation o distotion o som al obctthat withdaws om an snsal ndition. Bt b contast, th ‘I msl’that nconts this mailbox is a pctl real obct. It is I msl who x-pnd ng taking th mailbox siosl as an obct o attntion, not somimag o m. And h w hav an impotant pincipl that assists in dvl-oping th thm o vicaios casation. All dict contact is btwn obctso dierent tps—st as tilit qis both mal and mal, and stas magnts mak contact onl whn opposit pols mt. W can call this

th Principle o Asymmetry. Lato’s at ontolog o actos lavs no oom oasmmt, and this is wh joliot will ail to toch politics o ntons vbit as mch as th ail to toch on anoth, lading to th poblm o in-nit mdiatos. What joliot is abl to bidg a th snsal caicats o politics and ntons.

To tak a bi dto, w now hav a modl o th mdiation btwnobcts that cais at last th spaat implications (as wll as a pai o coollais to th scond o thm):

Fo as w hav sn, two1. real obcts withdaw om on anoth intoscldd dpths, and o that v ason th cannot mak contactwith on anoth. Manwhil, th vaios sensual obcts that co-x-ist in a singl intntional act (intntional ts, montains, lopads)ml sit aond in a contigos stat, toching on anoth onlin th sns that th pciv pcivs thm both simltanosl. At all, snsal obcts consist onl in bing ncontd, not innconting. I I xpnd m ng in taking thm siosl, ththmslvs hav no sch ng to xpnd; th a pl passiv

gmnts o an ncont o m own. Hnc th a incapabl o dict intaction o an sot, and blong to th sam pcptal mo-mnt onl thogh th mdiation o m th pciv. ral obctscan toch onl thogh th mdim o an intntional obct, and in-tntional obcts can toch onl thogh th mdim o a al on.This is th Pincipl o Asmmt. On ascinating bt slightl p- vs consqnc o this pincipl is that th cannot b anthing lik a mind/bod poblm: two mntal imags can nv toch, and

two al obcts can nv toch, bt contact btwn opposit omso obcts always can.

It ollows om Asmmt that an cas o dict contact mst con-2.sist o two tms, no mo. Fo givn that an pmtation o th omo obcts mst contain at last two o th sam tp (whth al




o snsal) all dict contact btwn mo than two tms bcomsimpossibl. It ollows that whn contact seems to b mad o mo thantwo, somthing ls mst b happning. Phaps th initial obct is

bilt om a pai, lik Lnnon and McCatn as th p-xistntco o th Batls. O phaps an alad xisting obct daws ml-tipl nw obcts into its obit simltanosl and spaatl (as whnsval nations oin th eopan union on th sam da). Th gn-al dmand that an contact has onl two tms can b calld th Binary Contact Principle , with th abiding poviso that sch tminol-og is disposabl and can asil b placd o abandond i it sondsabsd in pactic.

As a coolla, it will alwas b th cas that on obct will ba. th dominant ‘al’ obct and th oth a ml snsal imag.Howv, in man cass it will happn that ach tm o th paihas an activ lation to th passiv caicat o th oth—liktwo mtall inocing obcts giving th appaanc o on,with th al t nconting an imag o m as wll. In act,reinorced object ma b a good tchnical tm to s o sch cass.(Phaps Lnnon/McCatn is a classic xampl o a inocdobct, sinc nith o ths gs cold asil b calld a m

pppt o simlacm dplod b th oth.)

As an addd coolla, w mst ct th popla viw that thb.is no singl cas o an vnt bt ath a mltitd o nvion-mntal actos. This viw is dndd b john Stat Mill andlcidl phld b th nttaining W. Td rockwll.90 Whilaging that nvionmntal actos a alwas psnt and l-vant, I dn that th dsv th nam o ‘cas’. O th vaioscontxtal actos that sond m ight now, not all a having

an ct on m. O thos that a, th hav an ct onl inso-a as th a pat o an obct that acts m. Th is no ‘con-txt’ xcpt as inscibd in individal obcts (as also sppotd bWhithad’s ‘ontological pincipl’ that vthing that happnshas its asons in th constittion o som actal ntit). Fo thisason, tigging incidnts cannot b viwd as intchangablks that might asil hav bn placd with som oth ini-tiato; instad, th ss th nti casal vnt with thi p-

sonal stl. Bismack’s dismissiv (and coct) pdiction that thnxt wa wold com om ‘som damn ool thing in th Balkans’is amsing, bt dos no stic to Gavilo Pincip’s act o plling

90. W. Td rockwll, Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-BrainIdentity Theory, Cambidg, MIT Pss, 2005, ch. 4.




th tigg. W mst sto dignit to individal cass and -sist th sdctiv dogma o total contxt. H I will sist thas pn on Pincip’s nam and spak instad o Gavrilo’s Corollary.

Mill’s viw gads individal cass as ml ‘damn ool thingsin th Balkans’, bt this cannot b ndosd.

Bt not onl is it th cas that snsal obcts lad a ml contig-3.os xistnc withot making dict contact: mo than this, th donot vn mak sch contact with thi own snsal qalitis. Fo bothth nding intntional obct ‘t’ and its highl spcic sac-pols lad a ml snsal xistnc. Th vanish instantl i I di,slp, o tn m attntion lswh. H again, both a pl pas-

siv tagts o awanss, withot xpinc in thi own ight. Thnd th al pciv to mdiat and bind thm st as two snsalobcts qi this svic. Th act that on is an obct and anothis a qalit is inscint asmmt o contact to occ. Two snsalalitis cannot mak dict contact, bcas both consist ntil inthi alit o som al ntit. Fo lack o a btt nam, lt’s call thisth Foreign Glue Principle , sinc th bond btwn a snsal obct andits qalitis mst b otsocd om th snsal alm. Bt this tmis somwhat idiclos, and is mant onl as a plachold o som

mo phonios phas that I o anoth might invnt.W hav sn that snsal alitis cannot mak dict contact bt qi aal mdiato, whth w spak o two snsal obcts o o snsal obctsand snsal qalitis. Bt this aiss th spct o somthing vn mo bi-za at th lvl o real obcts. Fo it sms to ollow that al obcts woldhav qal diclt making contact with thi own al qalitis, givn thatboth a al. At all, al ntitis a ndamntall incapabl o dict,ntanslatd contact with on anoth. Bt d to th pincipl o asmm-

t, a al obct wold nd a sensual obct to mdiat btwn th al obct and its own qalitis—as thogh onl som external thing nabld a thing to link with its own qalitis, st as th pciv poms this svic osnsal obcts. Mch ls ollows onc asmmt is accptd as a pincipl. An nti book o philosoph cold b constctd om sch ddctions.

Bt w mst now tn to th dalit o intntionalit as both on andtwo. In ‘On Vicaios Casation’91 I showd how th lation btwn thal m and th intntional t can b tatd as a nid al obct inso-a as it has an intgal alit that no intptation v xhasts. This ist, bt ilvant to th main point, and hnc th aticl is mislading onthis qstion. I wold no long sa that th intntional lation btwn mand th snsal t is what contains th two pats, and it is stang that I

91. Gaham Haman, ‘On Vicaios Casation’, Collapse , vol. II, Oxod, 2007, pp.181-6.




v said so in th st plac. Fo m intaction with th t is a dict con-tact , not a vicaios relation, and can nv bcom th latt. Th lation atiss is that btwn th al m and th real t. At all, m pcption

o a t is not an obct in its own ight, bt onl bcoms on thogh t-ospctiv analsis in a pschological o phnomnological act. And ths itis not m intentional lationship with th t that contains th two pics o th lation (which is contact, not lation). Instad, this hono gos to thlation btwn th al m and th al t, howv this ma occ. Dto Asmmt sch lation can nv b dict, bt onl b mans o somsnsal mdiato.

Bt what is tl o intst is that any relation orms a new object . Assming that th al t and I a abl to nt into som sot o gnin lation,

w om a nw intgal alit that is somthing ov and abov both o s,and also somthing dp than an xtnal viw that might b takn onthat alit. And that is what ‘obct’ all mans, dspit th sal p-dic that obcts mst b phsical ntitis o at last lativl dabl.Instad o saing that th snsal t has ‘intntional inxistnc’ in h-man consciosnss, w shold sa that both th snsal t and th al m‘inxist’ on th intio o th obct composd o th al m and th alt.92 In this wa, th contact btwn al and snsal obcts alwas taksplac on th intio o a mo comphnsiv al obct. And i Dant andth t combin to om a nw obct with a nw intio, notic too thatboth Dant and th t a thmslvs obcts omd o componnt-obctso thi own. Ths, w hav a chain o obcts dscnding withot limit,ach o thm with a moltn intnal spac wh nw nconts can ais.

Panpsychism

It will b noticd that th modl st sktchd dos not qi a hman b-ing o vn an animal to b th al obct cononting snsal caicatson th intio o a lag al obct. Th modl allows an al ntit, omsand to bactia to th exxon Copoation, to hav sch an intntional li.I an obct nconts anthing thn this cannot b anoth al obct,d to th mtal withdawal o obcts that w hav dscibd. It can onlb som sot o snsal alit. I also hold that th split btwn snsal obcts and thi swiling accidntal qalitis can b ond vn at th inani-mat lvl. Fo th maining option is that this split wold b th spcialpodction o hman o animal intllignc. yt this is not th cas, bcas

92. In th cas nd discssion this involvs a al m and a snsal t, bt thmight b a paalll lation and hnc paalll obct in which th al t cononts asnsalizd vsion o m. Th ma also b cass wh th things ncont m withotm nconting thm at all: in Nitzschan tms, an abss that stas back at m with-ot m v staing into it. Fo asons o spac I omit this additional iss h, thogh itis bi discssd in Haman, ‘On Vicaios Casation’.




th split within th phnomnal alm is somthing alad ond th,not somthing podcd b s o anthing ls. jst as nmos gadalchangs can occ in th hman pcption o a t withot th t itsl

sming to alt, inanimat obcts mst also conont a wold qantizdinto chnks capabl o accidntal vaiation that can b snsd withot bing impotant. Thogh it ma tak a highl dvlopd nvos sstm to gainan xplicit sns o th dinc, and thoght it ma tak edmnd Hsslto tn it into a wll-dnd philosoph, this dos not ntail that th di-nc is not psnt vn in th most pimitiv csss o th wold.

This stp immdiatl aiss th dadd spct o ‘panpschism’, thdoctin that vthing thinks. Bo addssing this concn, lt m stdn th citicism that m modl is gilt o anthopomophizing th wold

b tocting pl hman mntal taits into th non-hman wold. Thillgitimac o this citiq is as to show. Whn w consid thos ps-chic taits that ma b niql hman o phaps animal, w might listthinking, langag, mmo, motion, visal xpinc, planning o tht, o th abilit to dam. In no cas hav I ascibd sch capacitisto inanimat obcts. What I hav don, instad, is to dc hman cogni-tion to its bast ontological at—th tanslation o distotion o a with-dawn alit that it addsss. And it shold b as to s that vn inani-mat casal impact show xactl th sam at. Hnc w can spak o a spas, bdock om o lationalit that holds good o all al ntitisin th cosmos, and om which all th spcial plant, animal, and hmanmntal ats mst dvlop as i om som pimal knl. To m gstsI o black co, withot th milk and sacchain o hman onamntalats. rath than anthopomophizing th inanimat alm, I am mo-phing th hman alm into a vaiant o th inanimat.

As o th tm ‘panpschism’ itsl, I hav cntl bn waming toit. In Guerrilla Metaphysics 93 I was ngativ towad th tm. M concn

matchd that o most citics—that panpschists a qick to toct sp-cicall hman cognitiv taits into th pimal om o lation that lis inth most pimitiv psch. Whil accpting this citical wo, I ml d-nid that it applid to m own modl, bt ad that most ot-o-th-clos-t panpschists w gilt o it. Bt now I hav lost most o this wo aswll. Fo that dang now stiks m as gatl otwighd b th tl p-ilos isk o psving th dominanc o th hman-wold it. As a slt,m tactical smpathis hav shitd towad th panpschist insight that h-man cognition is st a mo complicatd vaiant o lations alad ondamidst atoms and stons. Th ath dint concn that som panps-chists might b too slopp in xpoting spcial hman ats to a mopimitiv lvl than th dsv now stiks m as a tchnical wo, asil

93. Gaham Haman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry o Things ,Chicago, Opn Cot, 2005, pp. 83-4.




policd on a cas-b-cas basis. Moov, it has alwas bn th cas that Il gat temperamental smpath o panpschists than o thi opponnts. As long as w insist on a highl pimitiv om o lationalit as th basis o

panpschism, I am mo than willing to pa ds to th movmnt. Fo so-calld inanimat obcts do not ncont dismbodid qalitis alon, btncont oth obcts. And it dos not ncont thm in thi nakd p-it an mo than hmans do. Instad, it nconts a nid obct swil-ing with accidnts, which can chang within ctain limits withot chang-ing th ovall obct. This will occ dintl o v sot o ntit, andit ma b possibl to shd mo light on ach o ths cosmic las o pschthan is sall blivd. I wold vn popos a nw philosophical disciplincalld ‘spclativ pscholog’ ddicatd to ting ot th spcic pschic

alit o athwoms, dst, amis, chalk, and ston.Bt th is on impotant stiction to m allianc with th panps-

chists. It s to th px ‘pan-’ (maning ‘all’, in Gk), which sms togo too a. Fo in th st plac, not all ntitis can hav pschic li, bt onlreal objects . Fo instanc, it wold sm pointlss to claim that qualities havmntal li, whth w man a nivsal gn o a paticla instanc o this h. No a intentional obcts capabl o mntal li o an sot, sincth xist onl as passiv gmnts ncontd b somthing al. Ths, thspposd ‘pan’ o panpschism is alad stictd to on o th o basicntitis acknowldgd b th obct-ointd modl. Bt th stiction gosvn th than this, sinc vn real obcts nd not hav psch. B thisI do not man that th is som abita cto point btwn th vgta-bl and minal alms wh psch cass to xist. No—all al obctsa capable o psch, insoa as all a capabl o lation; o al obctshav psch not insoa as th exist , bt onl insoa as th lat. Andwhat I dn is that all ntitis a alwas in som sot o lation. It is onl inLato’s modl that an acto is not al i it dos not tansom, modi, p-

tb, o cat somthing ls. In th modl psntd in this book, an obctis al b vit o its atonomos alit, o its possssion o gnin qali-tis. It ctainl nds to hav componnt pics that lat in od o thisto occ, bt i it is a al obct thn it will not b idntical with sch pic-s. It will b somthing ‘ov and abov’ thos componnts. And it is qitpossibl that th a nmos obcts that do ni componnt-obctsin sch a wa that th hav alit, bt a simpl nv activatd b -th lations to achiv an otwad ct. W wold hav to look callat spcic cass to s whth ctain obcts dsv this dsignation— ‘ntappd makts’, ‘nknown mastpics’, ‘th McCain 2008 victo co-alition’. It ma b had to pinpoint individal cass that clal mt th ci-tia o non-lating obcts, bt th is no ason oth than pdic tosppos that no sch thing xists.

What w a spaking abot a ntitis with nmos componnt




lations blow bt non abov. Sval analogis will hlp mak this mo vivid. Th st analog is that all living oganisms hav a long nboknchain o ancstos, thogh not all o thm hav osping. Th obvios aw

in this analog is that cats ith podc o not, whas obcts candit back and oth btwn bing in lation o not bing in lation at di-nt tims. A btt analog is to compa non-lating obcts to dopso wat at th tblnt sac o th ocan, with contlss oth dops o wat bnath bt onl mpt sk abov. Bt th bst mtapho o ntitisthat a al dspit nting into no ot lations is phaps ‘slping’ o‘domant’ ntitis. To slp is to withdaw to som xtnt om all otwadassociations. Althogh hmans sl nv achiv a pct stat o slp,w can s that th act o hman slp has a mtaphsical signicanc b-

ond its cla phsiological on.In passing, w mst also ct thos hast taditional analogis that -

to dath as a long and pacl slp. Fo in mtaphsical tms, dathand slp cold hadl b mo dint. I w pt asid an considationso atli (which is a ml phsical dath anwa) and idnti dath withcssation o xistnc, thn dath mans that a spcic niq obct no lon-g xists in th wold. Dath shatts th bond btwn a cat’s compo-nnt obcts to sch an xtm that its ssnc is shattd, as opposd to in-tnal svivabl changs sch as th dath o componnt clls. B contast,slp psvs th cat pctl intact—bt o now o lation,ad o anoth da. Th highl shing chaact o good slp has thmtaphsical signicanc o ing s om th vaios tivial ncstationso lation in which w bcom nmshd. It stos s o a tim to th in-n sanctm o o ssnc, sbtacting all sac onamnt. rvsing thsal association o high oganisms with gat waklnss, it might bth cas that high ntitis a high pcisl thogh thi gat capac-it to slp: ascnding om inscts thogh dolphins, hmans, sags, angls,

o God. I somon took th gambl o an obct-ointd tholog, th om-niscint God o monothism might b abandond in avo o somthing -smbling Cthlh, th slping monstosit o H.P. Lovcat:94

Ph’nglui mglw’nah Cthulhu R’lyeh wgah’nagl htagn.

In his hos at r’lh dad Cthlh waits daming.

Bt this wold qi that w tak th wod ‘dad’ as a mtapho o slp.To slp is not to b dad, as w hav sn.

D. TIMe, SPACe, eSSeNCe, AND eIDOS

Th modl o th wold poposd h tains Lato’s at ontolog in onsns whil cting it in anoth. All natal and aticial obcts a

94. H.P. Lovcat, Tales , Nw yok, Liba o Amica, 2005, pp. 179, 181.




qall obcts, and in this spct th Dtch east India Compan cannotb liminatd in avo o qaks and lctons o mlti-dimnsional stings. An obct is al not b vit o bing tin and ndamntal, bt b vit

o having an intinsic alit that is not dcibl to its sbcomponnts o x-hastd b its nctional cts on oth things. yt th is anoth sns inwhich ctain obcts (sch as th aomntiond ‘Monst X’) a not al,bt pl snsal. Sch intntional obcts hav no intio o thi own,bt xist pl on the interior o som oth obct. This holds not onl owild ctional monsts, bt vn o th snsal vsions o things w woldb mo inclind to call ‘al’—o instanc, an oak t o cabon atom in-soa as th a ncontd. All o ths obcts a sch hoplss caica-ts o thi gnin nts that th disappa i w all aslp, stop pa-

ing attntion, o di. This givs s a kind o dalism dspit th lvling o all natal and aticial things: obcts ith hav an intio (al obcts)o xist on th intio o somthing ls (snsal), bt not both.

yt this is not a ‘two-wold tho’ o th sal kind, in which a sp-posd al wold inhabits on plan o alit and hman imags anoth-. I w spak o th al hamm that withdaws om all lation, thishamm is still th lational podct o pics that a still mo dplwithdawn; ths hamm-pics in tn a lational componds o othwithdawn al obcts, and ths psmabl to innit. Th wold is com-posd o contlss las o withdawn al things, ach with a moltn cowh on o its al pics cononts th snsal imag o anoth pic,thb oming a bidg btwn on la o alit and th nxt. It woldb ncssa to povid a ll-blown ‘ncla mtaphsics’ dtailing th m-chanics o what nolds in th moltn co o obcts, bt th ambition o ths closing pags lis lswh. Fo now th impotant thing is to mm-b that w mst avoid both th natalist and idalist philosophis, acho thm psnting on xtm o th modnism citicizd b Lato.

evthing is ith liminatd in avo o tin componnts, o this tin littlmico-alm is abolishd in avo o an immannt sph o accssibilit tohmans o to actos in gnal. What shold b dndd instad is a pola-izd ontolog mad p soll o obcts and thi intios.

Th modl is o a qadpl chaact, lik an o th histoical ontolo-gis stctd aond two basic oppositions. In th psnt cas, th stopposition is th distinction btwn al and snsal obcts, dawn om aspcic ading o Hidgg. Th scond opposition can b ond in a -th sti, whth btwn al obcts and thi qalitis (.g., in Libnizo Zbíi) o snsal obcts and thi qalitis (.g., in Hssl). Whn itcoms to th ‘vtical’ lation btwn al obcts and thi accssibilit tooths, th al obct is alwas somthing more than th tanslatd distotionthogh which it is ncontd. That is wh th al obct is said to with-daw om all accss, in a mann to which Hidgg alts s btt than




anon ls. Bt th sitation is dint with th ‘hoizontal’ lations b-twn th two kinds o obct and thi spctiv qalitis. H, th obctis alwas less than th ats thogh which it is known. Fo on th snsal

lvl th t has a co o idos that cas nothing o th spcic angl odg o shadow thogh which it is gaspd at an momnt. And on thal lvl, th obct is not ll gn o smooth o bittl, bt nits thstaits in a spcic and limitd ashion, so that an qalit is an xagga-tion o sots vn with spct to al obcts. In act, w might sa that bothth al and snsal obcts a compltl nid, with all o thi qalitiscompssd togth in blk: ‘thistnss’, o instanc. This nid qalitbcoms plalizd onl b laking o lswh into a dint qadant o alit. This can asil b sn om th intntional alm, wh a t is a

vagl gaspd nit that bcoms plal onl thogh its spcic appa-anc (accidnts) o thogh an intllctal gasp o its most ccial ats(idos). Othwis, a snsal t o wol per se main inaticlat blocks o vag ling-things o th on who nconts thm.

As dscibd ali, th o pols o th nivs a al obcts, alqalitis, snsal obcts, and snsal qalitis. This tns ot to b ailclos to what Hidgg mant b his ‘oold’—thogh in its ogottn 1919 vsion ath than th xplicit 1949 vsion, which movs th qadplstct om individal things and modls thm as an intpla btwnthing and world at ach lvl. And t, th is somthing in Hidgg’sGeviert vn mo intsting than th o pols: naml, th lins that con-nct ach o th qadants, which Hidgg viws as a sot o ‘mioing’lation. I p to think o ths lins as tensions btwn an two qad-ants, ath than mio-lik ctions. Now, an st o o tms nomal-l lads to six pmtations: th a six was to match p o havwightghts, o o dogs whn th a onl two lashs o a walk in th pak,o o o anthing ls. Bt tension in this modl has a v spcic man-

ing, and s to th ambigos intpla o obcts and qalitis, sinc obcts a both attachd and not attachd to thi qalitis. Fo this asonth o pols in th modl a mo lik two mn and two womn in ths o th villag matchmak. (And in act, Hidgg somtims ss thtm ‘wdding’ as a snonm o ‘mioing’.) H th a onl our pos-sibl maiags, at last in taditional socitis. Th a as ollows: snsalobct/snsal qalit, al obct/snsal qalit, al obct/al qalit,snsal obct/al qalit.

And h w hav a ascinating modl to pla with, lik th piodic ta-bl o lmnts, o th Boh modl o th atom, o th o ocs o nat:stong, wak, gavit, lctomagntism. In obct-ointd philosoph whav a dint st o o ndamntal ocs, and to dscib thi m-chanics in dtail will nd a lngthi tatis. Among oth things, this ‘n-cla mtaphsics’ wold nd to dtmin whth every tnsion btwn




two o th tms is mdiatd b on o th oth two tms. W hav snthat this happns in th cas o a al obct (th pciv) mdiating b-twn snsal obcts and snsal qalitis. I also smisd, withot poving,

that an intntional obct ma sv in tn to mdiat btwn a al obctand its al qalitis. Th latt qstion is nw to m, and mains ncla.Bt vn mo ncla is whth th oth two tnsions qi a mdiato:thos btwn al obcts and snsal qalitis, and snsal obcts and alqalitis. Sch qstions mst b lt to a dint book. M goal o th mo-mnt is mo limitd, thogh st as intsting. Naml, I want to show thatthis oold modl is not st a ash gimmick lvant onl to pivat ms-ings on th post-Hidggian landscap. Instad, it shds immdiat pos-sibl light on on paticla st o impotant cosmic stcts.

Most popl o a philosophical bnt pobabl call pivat philosoph-ical topics o al childhood. Among th most popla thms o alction a tim and spac, whos poond and paadoxical atsa had to ogt at an ag. This most otn taks th om o wonding whth w can tavl in tim, whth tim itsl might vs and owbackwads, whth spac might hav additional hiddn dimnsions, and sooth. In lat as, on also lans that th can b tatd mathmaticallas a combind o-dimnsional spac-tim, as poposd (with gat sccss)b Hmann Minkowski. M own childhood qstion was dint. What Ialwas wondd was wh st ths two tms—tim and spac—w al-was tatd as peerless stcts o th cosmos. It nv smd obvios tom that nothing ls dsvd to b mntiond in th sam bath as thsdal monachs. Fo i both tim and spac cold b divd om a mopimitiv oot, thn th slt might b a slightl xpandd p gop o basic dimnsions o alit. In cnt as, m gatst intllctal xcit-mnt cam om alizing that th oold obct-ointd modl allows sto do pcisl this. Fo it tns ot that tim and spac can b dscibd as

two oms o th tnsions btwn obct and qalit. Btt t, this dictlntails that tim and spac a oind b two nxpctd collags at thoot o th wold.

W hav sn that in th snsal alm, nid intntional obcts n-d vn whn viwd om contlss dint angls and distancs andin v-shiting moods. Th intntional/snsal obct is not th mthical‘bndl o qalitis’, bt a nit abl to sstain an innit nmb o spci-ic ‘admbations’, to s Hssl’s tm. Lt’s call this Tension Number 1, b-twn a snsal obct and its qall snsal qalitis. Now notic that thisis xactl what w man b th xpinc o time . Tnsion Nmb 1 is tim.Th wold b no sns o tim i w cold not xpinc stts o plas-tic bottls nd sbtl shiting conditions om on instant to th nxt. Thling that tim is owing along is in act a sns o th swiling pla o acci-dnts on th sac o slightl dp intntional obcts. W can postpon




an considation o how this lats to oth possibl concpts o tim ondin histo, th natal scincs, o lswh. To ngag in sch dbat itwill st b sl to stablish a oothold in this obct-ointd modl o

tim as th tnsion btwn an intntional obct and its shiting, accidntalmanistations. Philosoph is not th handmaid o th natal scincs, andshold not l obligd to pot to th Had o Laboatois o pmissionto spclat bond th bonds o psnt-da scintic othodox. On thconta, th two gatst scintists o th last cnt (einstin and Boh)took spcial inspiation om mtaphsics, and wold not advis s to limpalong scaping p cmbs om thi dscndants. W shold look o inspi-ation and points o intac om th scincs, bt it is not th cas that i-th th o w mst dominat th convsation.

W hav also sn that al obcts withdaw bhind whatv sns-al qalitis th manist to viw. T as w might, w cannot adqatltanslat th sbtanan xction o things into an discsiv list o tan-gibl poptis; sch attmpts alwas all somwhat shot o th thing it-sl. M avoit passag in Plato coms on th st pag o th Meno, whnSocats sas: ‘I I do not know what somthing is, how cold I know whatqalitis it posssss?’.95 This sntnc contains th nti paadox o phi-losoph: thogh things can obviosl b known onl b wa o listing thiqalitis, Socats is ight that th thing itsl mst b known qit apatom thos qalitis. W can call this Tension Number 2, btwn a al obct and th snsal qalitis thogh which it is accssibl. Pt dintl, itis th tnsion btwn a al obct and its relations , sinc lating to a thing onl givs s a spcic ang o tangibl qalitis ath than th thing itsl.Now notic that this is xactl what w man b th concpt o space . Libnizis amos o claiming that spac is not an absolt mpt contain, btonl a sit o lations btwn things. Bt althogh Libniz mains m a- voit philosoph thoghot th ags, his sggstion can b no mo than

a hal-tth. Spac is not th sit o lation, bt o both lation and non--lation. W hav a stong p-philosophical gasp o this taching: spac is amdim in which I can to Bangkok o Dbai, bt also on in which I amnot cntl in thos placs. Spac is both nanss and distanc. Thingsmak contact along spcic sacs bt a not xhastd b this contact,and cd patiall into pivat dpths. Tnsion Nmb 2 is spac.

Lt’s tn now to th concald ndwold o al obcts, o gnintool-bings. Th al obct is a nid thing, bt not an mpt nit. It pos-ssss a mltitd o qalitis that it nis in a highl spcic wa, as indi-catd in th viws o Libniz and Zbíi citd ali. W can giv this th la-bl o Tension Number 3, btwn al obcts and thi qall al qalitis.Th classical nam o this dalit is essence . Tnsion Nmb 3 is ssnc.

95. Plato, ‘Mno’, tans. G.M.A. Gb an visd b john M. Coop, Indianapolis,Hacktt, 2002, p. 60.




Notic that this is th onl on o th o that nolds ntil at th al lv-l withot a snsal componnt. B analog, w cold call it a kind o timxpincd b no on.

Th mains a oth and nal cas, an appantl odd scnaio inwhich th snsal obct xists in a dl with al qalitis. Accoding toth now amilia pattn, w mst call it Tension Number 4. Onc tim, spac,and ssnc cam togth in this modl, it took som months vn to alizthat sch a oth sitation is possibl vn thogh Hssl’s phnomnologalad points dictl towad it. Fo i on th on hand a snsal t is annding nit apat om its shiting cst o accidnts, it is also a nit qitapat om th ost o its ssntial ats nlockd b th phnomnol-ogist. Th t has an eidos : Tnsion Nmb 4 is idos, in Hssl’s sns

ath than Plato’s. Whatv th idtic ats o th t ma b, thhav no snsal componnt whatsov. This givs s th nsal sitationo a snsal obct having al qalitis, st as lationalit gav s snsalqalitis o a al obct: th shad paadox o th two diagonal lins o o qadpl stct.

B viwing tim and spac as th bpodcts o a tnsion btwn obcts and qalitis, w gnatd a schma with two missing tms. As is sootn th cas in intllctal histo, this indicatd additional placs wothsaching o nw inomation. It cam abot that tim, spac, ssnc andidos all blong on th sam ooting, ath than th st two standing alonas a pampd king and qn, in th sal mann. Lt th modl soak in o mind o a w wks, and o ma nd as I do that it bings a nwmtaphsical wight to vda xpinc. Whil common sns contin-s to viw tim and spac as al ntal contina in which vnts nold,to think thm as podcts o th inadqat lations obcts hav withthi own poptis cais powl intitiv consqncs o vdali. Tim no long sms to oll owad nioml with incidnts tanspi-

ing on an mpt th-dimnsional gid. Instad, w l scldd in a hon-comb o obcts lockd in a pmannt o stat adioactiv dca—losing and absobing qalitis om th otsid lik ntons.

Bt von knows that tnsions can b paadoxicall stabl. Th mact that th is tnsion btwn obcts and thi qalitis ma mak vai-os changs possibl, bt is not t scint to tigg thm. I a bachballo chnk o ganit a in tnsion with thi own qalitis, th is no a-son wh this tnsion shold not psist indnitl, withot sismic changso an sot. Instad o tnsion, what w nd is a pt in th bond b-twn th thing and its qalitis so that ths qalitis can b xchangdom on obct to th nxt, lik photons in th Boh atom. Whil this no-tion might giv th impssion o scinc ction, it is in act a highl classi-




cal moti. Witnss o instanc its k ol in th Disputationes Metaphysicae 96 o Fancisco Sáz, th v icon o igoos Aistotlo-Scholastic philoso-ph. Fo Sáz sbstantial oms do not intact dictl, bt onl b mans

o accidents , which bcom dtachd om thi hom sbstancs and tavllswh in th wold to wak havoc. On xampl wold b hat laving th sbstanc o and stting p shop in ion o wat o a tim. In oth- cass a mch high pow taks contol, as whn th accidnts o wina tansd to th absnt blood o Chist ding th echaist, o smnis dtachd om th sbstantial om o th ath and wildd dictl bGod to gnat a nw sol ex nihilo in th moth’s womb. Th qstion oa lat dat is whth ach o th o tnsions in th modl ach hav thiown wa o baking down nd pss and thb tigging chang.

It is notnat that th is not mo tim to discss Sáz, on o th gat masts o mtaphsics, wongl didd as an aid lat-gowthScholastic. Bt I wold sa in passing that his tho matchs p nicl withth o basic ats o casation in obct-ointd philosoph. Fist, sb-stantial oms (o obcts) do not mak dict contact with ach oth. Thcan onl b linkd indictl, o to s m nw avoit english wod— vi-cariously, b wa o som vica o dpt. Casation can onl b vicarious . Fohim, th vica is alwas an accident o som sbstanc. Scond, Sáz insiststhat casalit stms not om th accidnts o th patint, bt om thos o th agnt,97 which implis that casation coms not whn accidnt mts ac-cidnt, bt onl whn accidnt mts sbstantial om. Casation mst basymmetrical . Thid, althogh this asmmt is psnt at all tims, this isinscint to mak anthing happn. Fi is alwas making som sot o contact with th accidnts o nighboing ntitis, t this cass somthing to happn onl whn it ss thos accidnts to nd som wa to act th obct ndnath. This happns lativl al, and mch contact lads no-wh. In shot, casation dos not instantl occ as soon as two obcts a

in poximit. On is shildd om th oth b accidnts that obstct ohind. Bt this mans that casation is buered . And oth, w mst gn-aliz th actal split btwn a sbstantial om and its accidnts that Sázconns to stictd cass. H thinks this happns onl whn accidntstavl phsicall a om thi soc, as with hat om th sn; o whnth shit to a oign mdim, sch as hat migating om its homland in into xil in wat o ion; o whn dtachd om thi sbstanc andcontolld b God, as with Sacamntal win. In cass wh this dos nothappn things will alwas main in contol o thi own accidnts, achqalit staing ov in its own obit. Fo this to happn, accidnts mstb tansd om on sbstanc to anoth whil still taining th tac

96. Fancisco Sáz, On Efcient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19 , tans. Ald j. Fddoso, Nw Havn, yal univsit Pss, 1994.

97. Fancisco Sáz, On Efcient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19 , p. 66.




o thi pvios sbstanc. This is th vnt that I hav otn calld all.Casation is alluring .

All o this can b statd withot nc to a histoical g, o

thos who might nd th nc distacting. Casation is vicarious insoaas two al o two snsal obcts cannot toch. Asymmetry ml addss-s th oth sid o that sto b pointing to a plac wh obcts do in acttoch—a plac wh al obcts mt snsal ons. Casation is buered insoa as w mt an obct that is not t split om its own qalitis, andalluring insoa as that split dos vntall occ. I lt ntndd ths -patd qadpl stcts might stat to pil p lik som Nw Ag dbisld. Bt handld skil lll, th cast patd nw light on novl vaios as-pcts o th qatt o basic stcts at th co o th wold.

e. MOre MeTAPHySICS

Th wods ‘ontolog’ and ‘mtaphsics’ hav no xd maning, bt a -dnd b v a (and somtims v atho) as conditions dictat. Inth Hidggian tadition in which I was aisd, mtaphsics svs as a p- oativ tm o philosophis that dc alit to its xplicit psnc andigno th bing that withdaws bhind all psnt-at-hand congations.B contast, I hav chosn to mbac th wod ‘mtaphsics’. This dcision

implis a passag bond th pison o th hman-wold o Dasin-Sin co-lat in avo o a ction pon alit itsl. Bt this sms to violat thsticts o Kant’s Copnican rvoltion, which clbats this pison asth v condition o intllctal igo. It also sggsts a vival o spcla-tion on som o th mtaphsical thms that Kant hld to b pmanntlsspndd. This topic is o gat lvanc to a book on Lato. Fo dspitLato’s vhmnt ction o Kant (mch stong than m own mixd at-titd) w still nd lss cosmological spclation in Lato than in his gat

ancsto Whithad. Lt’s s ‘ontolog’ to to a gnal tho o thpincipls govning all obcts and thi intactions. And lt’s s ‘mta-phsics’ o a philosophical tho giving positiv inomation abot distinctobcts o spcial concn—sch as th spcic ats o hman con-sciosnss as opposd to lation mo gnall, th nitd o innit o th nivs, th xistnc o non-xistnc o a sol and a ncssa bing,and oth sch topics. With ths dnitions in mind, acto-ntwok thowold hav to b calld ontolog ath than mtaphsics—o its sccsslattning o ntitis onto a singl plan is lagl o an gambl’s spc-

lation on th mtaphsical qstions st nmatd.Lato is not alon in this agnostic cation, which dominats th post-

Kantian landscap. evn th oold modl o intactions btwn obcts dndd in this book has not vntd a into tl mtaphsical t-ain. Bt i w want to vs th impact o th Copnican athqak, w




mst also attmpt to tiv at last som o th lost spclations that wvictd om philosoph in 1781 as hoplssl dogmatic. Moov, dspitm admiation o Whithad’s boldnss in simpl tning back th clock to

th svntnth cnt, w shold not do this in th nam o a philosophthat wold b p-Kantian. At all, it is t that dogmatic mtaphsics wasdalt a motal blow b Kant’s pochal philosoph. yt it is mistakn to in- that alism per se is dogmatic whil th tanscndntal standpoint is not.Dogmatism is a matt o holding that hman knowldg can adqatlmodel alit-in-itsl, not that there is sch a alit. Fail to obsv thisdistinction lads to a widspad conation o onto-tholog with simpl -alism among Didans and man oths. Indd, w might vn sa thatth citiq o ontotholog qis alism, sinc othwis whatv is

psnt will b a pctl adqat psntativ o alit, and w mlhav a dogma bilt o sac-cts and plas o signication.

Immanl Kant is stl cognizd as on o th gatst philosophsv to hav livd. I askd b tlphon sv to ank th giants o ocat, I wold pobabl pt him in thid plac, tailing onl Aistotl/Platoo Plato/Aistotl accoding to m mood at th tim. Kant’s clait and s-iosnss, along with his makabl badth o intsts, hav sldom bnpaallld vn among thinks o th highst ank. Althogh I hav op-posd Kant o placing th hman-wold lation on a pdstal abov alloths, m dns o th withdawal o obcts bond all accss clal hassomthing in common with his things-in-thmslvs. Indd, I hav bnaccsd o bing both too Kantian and too anti-Kantian, at dint timsand in dint spcts. And as mntiond ali in th cas o th doblassalt on Lato (‘social constctionist!’—‘actiona alist!’) sch am-bivalnt attacks a otn a sign that citics a on th wong tack altogth-. Thogh I nomall pota Kant as somon to b ovcom, this hasbn a pl tactical choic; m aim was to ocs on th vils o hman-

cntd ‘philosophis o accss’ (o which Millassox’s ‘colationism’can sv as a mo phonios sbstitt). Bt I cold st as asil havchosn to dnd Kant as th champion o th Ding an sich against ctionso an alit xtnal to thoght. A dint histo o philosoph is pos-sibl in which Kant might hav bn th ancsto o obct-ointd philoso-ph. Fo whas Ficht and his his ocsd on th amptation o things-in-thmslvs as slss vstigial stmps, post-Kantian thinks in a paalllnivs might citiciz Kant instad o not globalizing th tanscndnco things bond th ml hman sph. That is to sa, th might wllhav inctd a phnomnal/nomnal distinction into inanimat lationsthmslvs, st as I popos to do. This stp wold alad b scint to ild an obct-ointd philosoph. All it wold hav takn was an alhi with a mo Libnizian inclination than Ficht himsl.

Bt i th is anoth aspct o Kant that I tl gt, it is his




sspnsion o taditional mtaphsics in th ‘Tanscndntal Dialctic’ o th Critique o Pure Reason. Th th tms paralogism, antinomy, and ideal mak th impossibilit o hman knowldg abot classical mtaphsical

poblms, vn i Kant ightl nots that hmans cannot stop asking thsqstions whos answs a ov withhld. Thogh th pilla o Kant’sCopnican rvoltion is th pimac o th hman/wold lation abovall oths, th sspnsion o taditional mtaphsical qstions as ‘dogmatic’is on o its chi consqncs. Bt this givs cas o sspicion. evn mothan oth lds o knowldg, philosoph sms to b piodic in chaac-t. I ctain doctins a ov abandond as pimitiv atiacts (schas th now qaint notion that ach o th planta sphs is a no-Pla-tonic manation) it also happns that abandond doctins tn om th

dad. An nw tho is likl to sll its pdcssos shot, and o this a-son w shold alwas pa spcial attntion to whatv philosophical doc-tins are not cntl in ashion, o vn thos that now sm nthinkabl,sinc ths ma b th philosoph’s gatst chamb o ogottn tass.ralism is gatl ot o ashion in continntal cicls in o tim, and othis v ason it can b xpctd to hav man sh lssons to tach s.Th sam is t o spclation on wight mtaphsical isss. Kant ap-pantl dcimats ths thms in his Tanscndntal Dialctic. Bt it dosnot sm likl to m that, a millnnim om now, histoians o philosophwill b saing th ollowing: ‘At Kant, no sios philosophical attntionwas v paid again to whth tim and spac a nit o innit. Kantsttld th iss pmanntl’. Fo his sspnsion o taditional mtaphsi-cal qstions divs om his placing th hman-wold colat at th cn-t o philosoph, and it is impobabl that this spisingl bl doctinwill maintain its socating dominanc in th cntis to com. Fa molikl is that Kant pt an nd to a ctain manner o daling with mtaphsi-cal poblms, whil th poblms thmslvs main, ppaing vn now to

thow a contpnch.Th dinc btwn Kant and th obct-ointd modl can al-ad b sn in th ollowing passags om th Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics : ‘Fo th spcic nat o o ndstanding consists in thinking vthing discsivl, i.., b concpts, and so b m pdicats […]’.98 And thmo, givn that ‘all illsion consists in holding th sbctivgond o o dgmnts to b obctiv […,]’ w mst avoid ‘th abationsinto which ason alls whn it mistaks its dstination, and tanscndntls to th obct in itsl that which onl concns ason’s own sbctand its gidanc in all immannt s’.99 On ths points h is th hi o Hm, in two distinct snss that this book has alad opposd. Fo in th

98. Immanl Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , tans. Pal Cas and visdb jams W. ellington, Indianapolis, Hacktt, 1977, p. 70.

99. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , p. 65.




latt passag, Kant sticts s to spaking abot th immanent alm o thndstanding. And in th om, h holds that th ndstanding ncon-ts nothing bt bndls o predicates . Kant’s tm ‘discsiv’ poms both

labos at onc, laving s standd in a kingdom o palpabl qalitis owhich ndling obcts a xplld om considation. Ths a gn-all viwd as scplosl minimalist claims, tthd admiabl to thvidnc o xpinc. B contast, I hold that th a nstiabl ‘adi-cal’ claims abot th nat o alit, dcing th wold to th singl radix o hman accss. Philosoph can go bond distinct pdicats and bondimmannc. In this book I hav mplod Hssl to ct th bndl o pdicats and Hidgg to ct th qaantin amidst immannc. I magmnts on thos points is psasiv, thn Kant’s sspnsion o tadition-

al mtaphsical poblms immdiatl ails. Fo it is not th cas that ‘thobct is onl an ida invntd o th ppos o binging th cognition o th ndstanding as na as possibl to th compltnss indicatd b thatida’.100 H I will not pat a dtaild dns o th ol o obcts in phi-losoph, bt will onl sa bi wh I think Kant’s stictions a invalid.

Th idal, o thological ida, is bst lt o anoth occasion. Thpaalogism, o pschological ida, aims to show that th pmannc o sbstanc is nknowabl vn in th cas o on’s inn sl. Bt th t-l intsting qstion is not so mch pmannc as th sh endurance o a sbstanc thogh vaios shiting accidnts, thogh Kant cts vnthis. O vn mo colol intst a th o antinomis, o cosmologi-cal idas. Lato’s tho o black boxs alad ld s to sspct that thScond Antinom was wong.

Th ason o Kant’s ction o dogmatic mtaphsics can b snmost clal in his ason o sing taditional sbstanc. ‘Popl havlong sinc obsvd that in all sbstancs th sbct pop, that which -mains at all th accidnts (as pdicats) a abstactd, hnc th sb-

stantial itsl, mains nknown, and vaios complaints hav bn madconcning ths limits to o insight’.101 Kant dos not oin thi lamnt, o cos, bt ss ths limits as an insmontabl at o alit: sincw can onl think ‘discsivl’, w cannot mak an sns o a sbct thatwold xist in itsl withot pdicats. H contins:

P ason qis s to sk o v pdicat o a thing its own sbct,and o this sbct, which is itsl ncssail nothing bt a pdicat, itssbct, and so on indnitl (o as a as w can ach). Bt hnc it ollowsthat w mst not hold anthing at which w can aiv to b an ltimat sbct, and that sbstanc itsl can nv b thoght b o ndstanding,howv dp w ma pntat, vn i all nat w nvild to s.102

100. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , p. 68.101. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , p. 69.102. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , pp. 69-70.




Bt notic that Kant mixs two distinct claims h. Fist, h stats that sb-stanc wold hav to b somthing dint om th pdicats w ascibto it, and this h gads as impossibl. Scond, h assts that sbstanc

wold hav to b somthing ultimate . And this h also cts as impossibl:insoa as an la o things that w ach can onl b dscibd via pdi-cats, w nv ach a tl sbstantial la.

Both claims a sd b th obct-ointd modl. In th st cas,phnomnolog xposs as als th viw that obcts o sns a st abndl o distinct pdicats. To obsv a t is not to pic togth a sto indpndnt -oating ats; ath, sch ats adiat om tht as a whol. Th gn and lanss o th t a impgnatd withth stl o th t, which th wold los i ncontd lswh. On this

paticla point it is Hssl who is oiginal, whil Kant ml ollows thdictats o Hm—whos tho o abitail bndld qalia cospondsto no xpinc at all. In this sns Hssl was mo o an mpiicist thanHm v was. And in th scond cas, th is no ason to stict sb-stancs to ultimates in th sns dmandd b Kant and man philosophso a natalist bnt. Th act that hamms and vn ntons a not lti-mat paticls o phsics dos not ntail that th a not obcts. Hidggshows that th hamm has a alit indpndnt om cnt ss o p-cptions o it, and this is nogh to mak it an obct. Th act that hamms(lik ntons) nd to b mad o pics, and hnc a not ltimat, dosnot stip thos pics o thi mgnt atonom. This can b sn om th vaios citia o mgnc citd ali om DLanda. Among othconsidations, th hamm has hamm-qalitis not ond in its pics.Moov, ths hamm-qalitis a not st nctional cts on th n- vionmnt, sinc th hamm has oth ntappd hamm-qalitis thanthos cntl gistd b nighboing things. In addition, within ctainlimits, th hamm can withstand nmos changs in its pics withot

losing its individal hammnss.Sbstancs nd onl b atonomos, not ltimat. And thogh Kantdnis that w can think anthing in isolation om pdicats, this is asmptom o his colationist dogma, which is v bit as dogmatic as thdogmatic mtaphsics h cts. Whn th hamm spiss s with itsbakdown, th xact chaact o this spis can admittdl b dscibdb vaios pdicats. Bt not that ‘spis’ is onl th phnomnal result o th pviosl concald hamm. Th vild, ndgond hamm can-not b idntid with th spiss it gnats, sinc ths ml alldto its xistnc. (Allsion and all a lgitimat oms o knowldg, btidcibl to spcic pdicats.) I w now ocs xplicitl on th boknhamm ath than on o pvios poct o bilding a hos, w do notthb capt th obct that disptd o pvios labos. Onl th dog-ma that all knowldg is discsiv knowldg via pdicats cold sppot




th bli that sbtanan things a dcibl to th tangibl disptionsth cas in th phnomnal wold. Fo it is pctl as to ddc thxistnc o al obcts om th inadqac o th cnt xpssion o

things. And as o sensual obcts, thi xistnc nd not vn b ddcd.Ths can b xpincd dictl and immdiatl, povidd on is willing to ttison Hm’s thooghl nmpiical dogma o bndls o qalitis.

Bt not onl do obcts not need to b ltimats —th cannot b ltimats,as mntiond ding th discssion o Lato’s black boxs. This lads sinto dict conict with Kant’s Scond Antinom: ‘Thsis: evthing inth wold is constctd ot o th simpl. Antithsis: Th is nothing sim-pl, bt vthing is composit’.103 Givn Kant’s pdic that th is noknowldg oth than th discsiv kind in which things a xhastd b

thi accssibl pdicats, it dos indd ollow that pats and whols ‘am psntations; and th pats xist ml in thi psntation, con-sqntl in th division […] and th division achs onl so a as sch x-pinc achs’.104 A thing has pats o ails to hav thm onl in xpi-nc, and ths to asst ith sid o th antinom is to mak a claim abotthings-in-thmslvs sing vidnc that blongs onl to appaanc. Btthis ails o th sam ason that Kant’s ction o sbstanc aild. Fowhat it all mans o somthing to hav pats is that its componnts anot xhastd b thi lations; th pats hav som sot o atonomos li.Whn I s a hamm, this is a lation mad p o m and th hamm. Bdcing th hamm to its discsiv appaanc thogh pdicats, Kantdnis it atonomos li otsid its lation to m. Ionicall, this mansthat h taks sids in an Antinom that was mant as vidnc o his ntal-it on sch qstions. Naml, Kant ctivl claims that xpinc hasno pats. Th xpinc o th hamm is said to b pl immannt, andhnc nothing can b said abot th vaios componnts that xist otsidth lation. This is th ontological maning o both skpticism and mpii-

cism, which o o pposs a bal distingishabl. Whas o occa-sionalism th wold is poplatd with atonomos sbstancs that cannotintact withot God’s assistanc, o mpiicism th wold is lld with in-tactions that cannot stablish th atonom o thi pics. I hav aladmakd that this is a dp division than Kant’s mo amos pistmo-logical it btwn ationalism and mpiicism. rath than mdiating b-twn two taditions as h claims, Kant taks continntal philosoph on adlibat swv into th skptical lan, wh it mains vn now.

To b mo spcic, th ion is this: Kant does claim th xistnc o anltimat, thogh it is hman xpinc ath than a phsical micopa-ticl that svs as his ltimat la. It is psid-down dctionism, o

103. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , p. 74.104. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , p. 77.




natalism in vs; all alit taks its mas om th conditions o hman xpinc. It is littl s claiming that Kant o Hm concdsthat th might b somthing otsid th hman-wold colat, sinc thi

skpticism amonts to a dogmatic claim that dict accss is th st o allth alit w ncont. To sa that ‘th might b somthing otsid thcolat; I nv dnid it’ is no mo philosophicall ctiv than i I sath might b nicons o ot xta spatial dimnsions. unlss things-in-thmslvs pla som gnin ol in a philosoph, th ma as wll not bth. Fo th sam ason, th viw calld ‘agnosticism’ is all no di-nt om athism, and ml taks a cnical distanc om its own claims.I a sociologist ocss onl on hman socitis, this coms as littl spis.Bt i a philosoph mains adit in masmnts o hman accss to th

wold, it tns this accss into th oot o th nivs vn whn concssionsa mad that somthing ma li bond it.

Bt obcts cannot b simpl (Scond Antinom) o th sam asonthat w shold not xpct thm to b ltimat (Paalogism). Instad tha black boxs, and black boxs can alwas b opnd. Lt’s concd Kant’sitabl point that to ncont somthing alwas mans to ncont it;w cannot ncont th nncontd. Bt m tatmnt o Hidgg’stool-analsis showd that to ncont a black box mans to lat to it, andthat lation is alwas a kind o distotion o caicat o its obct. Thislation has two tms: th black box and m. W shold both b viwd aspics o th lation, nith o s xhastd b this ncont with th oth-. Hnc an black box w ncont can b opnd by denition, sinc whav aticiall closd it ml b daling with it. Whatv val ‘pointpaticls’ ma hav o mathmatical phsics, th a o no s to mta-phsics. Fo vn a point paticl has vaios poptis, and th ‘bndl o poptis’ is st as incohnt a modl o al obcts as ‘bndl o pdi-cats’ is o snsal ons. Bhind an gistation o cts on th nvion-

mnt, th thing and its nvionmnt xist in atonom om on anoth, aspics o th total lation. Th dscnt o black boxs into th dpths mstb innit.

In shot, th citiq o psnc-at-hand is nogh to st s omth Scond Antinom. Hman xpinc is th dogmatic simpl and lti-mat o Kant’s ontolog, and onc xpinc is ndct b th obcts thatcd om its gasp, th possibilit o an lational whol withot patsimmdiatl disappas. This is implicit, bt only implicit, in both Latoand Hidgg. Fo Lato tnds to tat it simpl as a maxim o mthod:black boxs can b opnd as ar as we wish . H nv assts that th po-css is actall innit, thogh I insist that it mst b. Hidgg b contastdos mak withdawal into an absolt pincipl o philosoph, t nlikLato h mains ttd to a two-sto modl o th wold, with bing on th gond oo and Dasin’s awanss on th top oo. Ths, innit




dscnt into tini boxs can hav no plac in his tho. Whas Kant s-sntiall claims th xistnc o a patlss hman xpinc, this is n-dd impossibl b Hidgg’s hamm. In this wa th Scond Antinom

is otankd as soon as th colationist dogma is otankd. I will lavth oth th Antinomis o a dint occasion.Th sbtitl o this book is Bruno Latour and Metaphysics . Ths two top-

ics hav nv bn pblicl linkd to th xtnt attmptd h. Lt’s closthis book with a qick mind o what Lato achivs o mtaphsics—abisk shot o spsso at th nd o a mlti-cos mal. Fist, Lato plac-s taditional sbstanc with actors . This has th advantag o dmping thspstition that sbstancs mst b both natal and pmannt. Lato’sactos incld aticial pltonim no lss than natal agon, and tansint

stivals no lss than immotal sols. This tho also has th disadvantag(in m opinion) o lationizing obcts in a mann that lavs thm withnothing apat om thi cts on oths. Scond, dspit tning actosinto bndls o lations, Lato is admiabl awa o how diclt it is othos lations to occ at all. Lik th occasionalists bo him, Latoss ntitis as basicall ct o in thi cnt lations, nabl to nt nwons withot a thid acto mdiating on thi bhal. Instad o appaling on high to an almight God whos wokings li bond philosophical sc-tin, Lato givs s th st secular occasionalism v known. Thogh I havmad sval citicisms o his position in th latt hal o this book, th amad soll o th ppos o modication o dbgging: in th nam o Scla Occasionalism 2.0. Thanks to Lato, an obct-ointd philoso-ph has bcom possibl.







bibliography





233

Bibliogaph

WOrKS By BruNO LATOur

For a complete list o abbreviations used in this text see page vii.

Aramis or the Love o Technolog y, tans. Cathin Pot, Cambidg, Havadunivsit Pss, 1996.

La Fabrique du Droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d’Etat , Pais, Décovt,2002.

Laboratory Lie. The Construction o Scientic Facts , with Stv Woolga, Pincton,Pincton univsit Pss, 1986.

‘Can W Gt O Matialism Back, Plas?’, Isis , no. 98, 2007, pp. 138-142.‘Fom ralpolitik to Dingpolitik, o How to Mak Things Pblic’, in Bno

Lato and Pt Wibl (ds.), Making Things Public: Atmospheres o

Democracy, Cambidg, MIT Pss, 2005.We Have Never Been Modern, tans. Cathin Pot, Cambidg, Havadunivsit Pss, 1993.

Psonal Commnication, elctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 11Novmb, 2005.

Psonal Commnication, elctonic mail to Gaham Haman o 14 jana, 2006.

‘On th Patial existnc o existing and Nonxisting Obcts’, in LoainDaston (d.), Biographies o Scientic Objects , Chicago, univsit o Chicago Pss, 2006.

Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality o Science Studies , Cambidg, Havadunivsit Pss, 1999.

The Pasteurization o France , tans. Alan Shidan and john Law, Cambidg,Havad univsit Pss, 1988.



Prince o Networks 234

Politics o Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy, tans. CathinPot, Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss, 2004.

Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxod, Oxod

univsit Pss, 2005.Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, Cambidg,Havad univsit Pss, 1987.

Paris ville invisible , Pais, editions la Décovt, 1998. Availabl in englishat http://www.bno-lato./vital/indx.html#

OTHer WOrKS

Aistotl, Metaphysics , tans. jo Sachs, Santa F, Gn Lion Ps, 1999.

Badio, Alain, Being and Event , tans. Oliv Fltham, London, Continm,2006.Bhaska, ro, A Realist Theory o Science , London, Continm, 2006.Bloo, David, ‘Anti-Lato’, Studies in the History o the Philosophy o Science , vol.

30, no. 1, Mach 1999, pp. 81-112.Bassi, ra, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, London Palgav,

2007.Bassi, ra, Psonal Commniction, lctonic mail to Gaham Haman

o 12 Agst, 2008.

Bassi, ra, Iain Gant, Gaham Haman, and Qntin Millassox,‘Spclativ ralism’, Collapse , vol. III , Falmoth, ubanomic, 2007.

Bav, L, A Thing o This World: A History o Continental Anti-Realism,evanston, Nothwstn univsit Pss, 2007.

Bntano, Fanz, Psycholog y rom an Empirical Standpoint , tans. A. rancllo,D. Tll, and L. McAlist, Nw yok, rotldg, 1995.

Bntano, Fanz, Theory o Categories , tans. rodick M. Chisholm andNobt Gtman, Th Hag, Matins Niho, 1981.

Bno, Giodano, Cause, Principle, and Unity and Essays on Magic , tans. robtd Lcca, Cambidg, Cambidg univsit Pss, 1998.Chalms, David, The Conscious Mind , Oxod, Oxod univsit Pss,

1996.DLanda, Manl, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London, Continm,

2002.DLanda, Manl, A New Philosophy o Society: Assemblage Theory and Social

Complexity, London, Continm, 2006.Dida, jacqs, ‘Whit Mtholog’, in Margins o Philosophy, tans. Alan

Bass, Chicago, univsit o Chicago Pss, 1985.edéli, Pt, ‘rmmbing th Haman rviw’, blog post at http://

www.anthm-gop.nt/tag/th-haman-viw/edéli, Pt, ‘ANT, th Foold, and th Thing in Common: A Mlti-

Cas Std o Oganising, Statgising and ICTs in-Tailing SMes in



Bibliogaph 235

th uK’, npblishd thsis poposal, Dpatmnt o Managmnt,London School o economics.

Fodo, j ‘Wat’s Wat evwh’, London Review o Books , 21 Octob,

2004.Haman, Gaham, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics o Objects , Chicago,Opn Cot, 2002.

Haman, Gaham, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry o Things , Chicago, Opn Cot, 2005.

Haman, Gaham, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing , Chicago,Opn Cot, 2007.

Haman, Gaham, ‘On Vicaios Casation’, Collapse , vol. II, Oxod,2007.

Haman, Gaham, ‘Qntin Millassox: A Nw Fnch Philosoph’,Philosophy Today, vol. 51, no.1, Sping 2007, pp. 104-117.

Hidgg, Matin, Being and Time , tans. john Macqai and edwadrobinson, Nw yok, Hap and row, 1962.

Hidgg, Matin, ‘einblick in das was ist’, in Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge ,Fankt, Vittoio Klostmann, 1994.

Hö, Alois and Alxis Minong, Logic , Vinna, 1890.Hm, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Indianapolis,

Hacktt, 1993.Hm, David, A Treatise o Human Nature , Oxod, Oxod univsit Pss,

1978.Hssl, edmnd, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tans.

W.r.B. Gibson, London, Alln and unwin, 1931.Hssl, edmnd, ‘Intntional Obcts’, in Early Writings in the Philosophy o

Logic and Mathematics , tans. Dallas Willad, Dodcht, Klw, 1993.Hssl, edmnd, Logical Investigations , 2 Vols., tans. j.N. Findla, London,

rotldg and Kgan Pal, 1970.

Ingadn, roman, ‘Dzialalnosc nakowa Twadowskigo’, in Kazimierz Twardowski: Nauczyciel—Uczony—Obywatel , Lvov, 1938.Kant, Immanl, Critique o Pure Reason, tans. Noman Kmp Smith,

London, Palgav Macmillan, 2003.Kant, Immanl, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , tans. Pal Cas and

visd b jams W. ellington, Indianapolis, Hacktt, 1977.Kipk, Sal, Naming and Necessity, Cambidg, Havad univsit Pss,

1996.Khn, Thomas, The Structure o Scientic Revolutions , Chicago, univsit o

Chicago Pss, 1970.Libniz, G. W., ‘Monadolog’, in Philosophical Essays , tans. rog Aiw

and Danil Gab, Indianapolis, Hacktt, 1989.Libniz, G. W. and Saml Clak, Correspondence , Indianapolis, Hacktt,

2000.




Lvinas, emmanl, Existence and Existents , tans. Alphonso Lingis, ThHag, Matins Niho, 1988.

Lovcat, H.P., Tales , Nw yok, Liba o Amica, 2005.

McLhan, Mashall and eic, Laws o Media: The New Science , Toonto,univsit o Toonto Pss, 1988.Millassox, Qntin, Après la nitude , Pais, editions d Sil, 2006.Millassox, Qntin, Ater Finitude , tans. ra Bassi, London, Continm,

2008.Millassox, Qntin, Psonal Commnication, lctonic mail to Gaham

Haman o 21 Fba, 2007. tans. Gaham Haman.Millassox, Qntin, Psonal Commnication, lctonic mail to Gaham

Haman 16 Sptmb, 2007. tans. Gaham Haman.

Mla-Pont, Maic, Phenomenology o Perception, tans. ChistophSmith, London, rotldg, 2002.

Nanc, jan-Lc, ‘Cops’, tans. Cladtt Satiliot, in The Birth to Presence ,tans. B. Holms t. al., Stanod, Stanod univsit Pss, 1993.

Otga Gasst, josé, ‘An essa in esthtics B Wa o a Pac’, inPhenomenology and Art , tans. Philip Silv, Nw yok, W. W. Noton,1975.

Plato, ‘Gogias’, tans. W. D. Woodhad, in The Collected Dialogues o Plato,edith Hamilton and Hntington Cains (ds.), Pincton, Pinctonunivsit Pss, 1961.

Plato, ‘Mno’, tans. G. M. A. Gb and visd b john M. Coop,Indianapolis, Hacktt, 2002.

rhods, richad, The Making o the Atomic Bomb, Nw yok, Tochston,1986.

rockwll, W. Td, Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind- Brain Identity Theory, Cambidg, MIT Pss, 2005.

rot, richad, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, Cambidg,

Cambidg univsit Pss, 1998.rssll, Btand, The Analysis o Matter , London, Kgan Pal, 1927.Schnll, T., Ludwik Fleck—Leben und Denken, Fibg i.B., Hochschlvlag,

1982.Smith, Ba, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy o Franz Brentano, Chicago, Opn

Cot, 1994.Sokal, Alan and jan-Lc Bicmont, Fashionable Nonsense , Nw yok, Picado,

1998.Spinoza, Bach, Ethics , tans. Saml Shil, Indianapolis, Hacktt,

1992.Stngs, Isabll, Cosmopolitics , 2 vols., Pais, editions La Décovt,

1997.Stov, David, The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies , Oxod, Blackwll,

1991.



Bibliogaph 237

Stass, Lo, What is Political Philosophy? , Chicago, univsit o ChicagoPss, 1988.

Stawson, Galn ‘ralistic Monism’, Journal o Consciousness Studies , vol. 13,

nos. 10-11, 2006, pp. 3-31.Sáz, Fancisco, On Efcient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19,tans. Ald j. Fddoso, Nw Havn, yal univsit Pss, 1994.

Toscano, Albto, The Theatre o Production, London, Palgav, 2006.Twadowski, Kasimi, On the Content and Object o Presentations , tans. b

rinhad Gossmann, Th Hag, Matins Niho, 1977.Watson, jams, The Double Helix , Nw yok, Noton, 1983.Whithad, Ald Noth, Process and Reality, Nw yok, F Pss, 1978.Žižk, Slavo and Gln Dal, Conversations with Žižek , Cambidg, Polit,

2003.Zbíi, Xavi, On Essence , tans. A. robt Caponigi, Washington, Catholic

univsit o Amica Pss, 1980.





239

accidntsas opposed to substance, 16, 66, 72, 105,

152, 153-154, 157, 180, 198, 199,200, 202, 203, 206, 211, 213,

216, 218, 220action at a distanc, 33, 34-35, 47-55acto-ntwok tho (ANT), 3, 5actos/actants, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19,

20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27-28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 44, 47, 55,57, 58, 62, 68, 72, 73, 74, 80,82, 101, 102, 112, 122, 128, 134,135, 136, 145, 159, 162, 228

actal, 131, 132, 187actalism, 16, 127, 129, 130 Alxand th Gat, 201allianc, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 48, 49,

50, 51, 75, 83, 104, 105, 111,129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137,144, 147

alling casation, 221, 225allsion, 225

analtic philosoph, 16, 45, 120-121,140, 155, 156, 167-168, 169,170-171, 173, 175, 176, 182,182n44, 206

Anaxagoas, 153, 160

Anaximand, 153, 160 ANTHeM (Acto-Ntwok Tho-

Hidgg Mting), 3-4,132n12

anti-alism, 64, 74, 75apion, 95, 153, 159-160, 161 eatureless world-lump, 136, 160, 187 homogeneous block, 152-153

Aqinas, St. Thomas, 45, 53 Achlas o Macdonia, 92agmnt, ovatd impotanc o

philosoph o, 168, 173, 175,177

Aistotl, 13, 14, 16-17, 24, 28-29,39n2, 46, 47, 72, 106, 109, 114,120, 127-128, 129, 130, 139, 187,220, 222

our causes, 109saw rigid designator beore Kripke,

175n40aticlation, 82, 84, 91, 126, 131, 132,

133, 202, 203

Al-Ash‘ai, Ab al-Hasan Ali ibnIsma’il, 35, 80, 82, 115assmblag, 21, 138asmmtical casation, 147, 210,

220, 221

Indx




Asmmt, Pincipl o, 208, 211St. Agstin, 72, 120 Avos (Ibn rshd), 113 Avicnna (Ibn Sina), 13Bacon, Fancis, 139Badio, Alain, 101, 153, 164Badlai, Chals, 52, 106bcoming, 101, 105Bgson, Hni, 6, 30, 100, 101, 105

Latour as anti-Bergson, 30Bkl, Gog, 51, 80, 112, 129,

152, 160, 198Bhaska, ro, 16, 127, 161Bina Contact, Pincipl o, 209Bismack, Otto von, 202

causation as ‘some damn ool thing in the Balkans,’ 209-210

black boxs, 33-34, 36-47, 55, 71, 72,106, 107, 121, 131, 145n17, 147,157, 158, 226, 227

black hols, 184Bloo, David, 5, 12Boh, Nils, 216, 218, 219Bodi, Pi, 5Bol, robt, 59, 60Bassi, ra, 165, 166, 175, 175n39,

182n44, 189, 190-191Bav, L, 179n43Bntano, Fanz, 153-154, 177, 190,

191-194, 198, 207reism o, 153-154

Bicmont, jan-Lc, 12Bitish empiicism, 81, 136, 188, 198Bno, Giodano, 44, 153, 155Bcphals, 201-202bd casation, 146-147, 220, 221Bsh, Psidnt Gog W., 51Btl, jdith, 66Casa, jlis, 115, 153-154Callon, Michl, 63Candakiiti, 177Canto, Gog, 132Captain Haddock, 172-173Cathin th Gat, 125Cato th yong, 115

Cis-la-sall (2007 colloqim), 6Cézann, Pal, 48Chalms, David, 154, 163Chamblain, Nvill, 61, 109Chaga, ewin, 37Chnnko, Konstantin, 32Chnobl, 20Chchland, Paticia and Pal, 91,

108, 155ciclating nc, 73-79Clak, Saml, 143Clinton, Psidnt Bill, 53cognitiv scinc, 107, 109, 172combination, 54, 55commnication poblm, in mta-

phsics, 35, 55, 156, 159conats, 105‘consvativ philosoph,’ 154-155,

156, 157contxt, 209contigit, btwn snsal obcts

on intio o al on, 208continntal philosoph, 16, 45, 107,

121, 140, 155, 156, 167, 168, 177,179, 223, 226

Copnican (post-Kantian) philoso-ph, 25, 26, 51, 52, 59, 67, 71,77, 101, 107, 108, 114, 124, 148,149, 186, 221, 223

Codmo, Géad d, 35, 115colationism, 122-134, 163-185, 207,

221, 223as upside-down reductionism, 226-227

cosmolog, as lativl nglctd bLato, 122, 158, 221

cosmopolitics, 89Cick, Fancis, 37, 38, 44, 54citiq, ovatd as intllctal

mthod, 110, 119, 120, 196Cthlh, 214Ci, Mai and Pi, 45, 73Dawin, Chals, 45, 78Dat, raol, 73, 74Davidson, Donald, 51, 176dath, as nlik slp, 214



Indx 241

dconstction, 26, 71, 86DLanda, Manl, 16, 104, 127, 160,

161-162, 225Dlz, Gills, 6, 30, 101, 160, 188dmocac, 88, 91, 95, 111, 134, 189,

207Dmocits, 72Dida, jacqs, 12, 24, 25, 26, 64,

65, 121, 222Dscats, rné, 13, 35, 77, 78, 110,

115, 165, 181Disl, rdol, 37discsiv thinking, accoding to

pdicats, 223, 224, 225, 226‘Th Dissnt,’ ctional chaact o

Lato, 39-44durée , 30, 101eckhadt, Mist von Hochhim,

100eddington, Ath Stanl, 22eidos , 95, 154, 180, 185, 195, 198, 199-

200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 216,219

as product o tension between object and quality, 214-221

einstin, Albt, 22, 39n2, 54, 111,218

relativity, 174eisnhow, Psidnt Dwight D.,

104élan vital , 30, 101, 171mgnc, 131, 158, 162, 187empdocls, 139, 156mpiicism, 114, 155, 157, 173, 195,

196, 199, 225, 226ncstation, o accidnts on intn-

tional obct, 180, 200, 203nlightnmnt, 110, 120edéli, Pt, 3-4, 132, 137eigna, johanns Scots, 139ssnc, 14, 16, 20, 25, 36, 46, 49, 65,

72, 75, 104, 129, 156, 181, 200,203, 205, 218, 219

‘exhaustively deployed’ in the thing, inZubíri, 204

as product o tension between object and quality, 214-221

quiddity, 205 as unity, in Zubíri, 206

eclid, 85vnt, 17, 18, 29, 47, 49, 64xpimntal mtaphsics, 14, 121al-Faabi, 13Ficht, j.G., 152, 156, 165, 177, 179,

180, 183, 222wall, 131, 188at ontolog, 207, 214-215Fodo, j, 176Foign Gl Pincipl, 210om and matt, 30, 34oold (Geviert ), 134-139, 206-207,

215, 216, 217, 221Focalt, Michl, 12, 64Fanknstin, 74Fg, Gottlob, 45Fd, Sigmnd, 18-19, 166, 173Galilo Galili, 59, 108, 115, 121Gass, Cal Fidich, 147Gavilo’s Coolla, 210al-Ghazali, Ab Hamid Mhammad

ibn Mhammad, 35, 80Gibbon, edwad, 36Giad, rné, 67Gant, Iain Hamilton, 165Gimas, Algidas jlin, 139Gillmin, rog, 11habit, 116Halban, Hans von, 73Haman, Gaham, 164, 165

Guerrilla Metaphysics, 212Tool-Being, 140, 207 ‘On Vicarious Causation,’ 210, 211n92

hamon, post-stablishd, 21, 30Hat, Ga, 53Hgl, G.W.F., 102, 120, 125, 152, 155,

176, 177, 179, 181Hidgg, Matin, 3, 5, 13, 18, 19,

24, 25, 26, 32, 38, 39n2, 63,65, 67-68, 76, 88, 100, 101,109, 127, 132, 137, 138, 139,




143, 146, 171, 176, 177, 178-182,184, 185, 186, 194, 204, 207,215, 216, 221, 224, 227

1919 Freiburg lecture course, 207 1949 Bremen lectures, 142, 207 anti-Bergsonian theory o time o, 30n14Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit in, 82,

135, 140, 142, 179, 180-181hmntics, 133

things interpret each other, 27, 164Hioshima, 103Hobbs, Thomas, 59-60Hö, Alois, 191-192Höldlin, Fidich, 48, 68, 100holism, 47, 131Holms, Shlock, 11Hghs, Thomas, 63hman accss, philosoph o, 25, 102,

103, 112, 156, 227Hm, David, 35, 53, 82, 102, 113,

115-116, 153, 155, 156, 196-197,198, 199, 223, 225, 226, 227

Hssl, edmnd, 22, 25, 39n2, 100,101, 107, 108, 116, 136, 137, 139,141, 142, 151, 154, 177-178, 179,181, 189, 190, 191, 197, 198,199-200, 203, 204, 207, 212,215, 217, 219, 224, 225

accidental adumbrations o objects, 151,180, 217

essential qualities o objects, 151 ullling intuition, 202intentional objects in tension with their

own qualities, 157, 180, 185, 197 Logical Investigations, 194objectiying acts rather than presentations,

198 reaction to Twardowski o, 193saw rigid designator beore Kripke,

175n40sense o humor o, 193, 201, 202n74

hbids, 58, 62, 63, 64hpbolic thinking, 120idalism, 74, 78, 107, 108, 109, 112,

123, 142, 151-152, 193, 215

German Idealism, 114Husserl’s idealism, 194

innit gss o actos, 106, 145n17,149, 157, 211, 215, 227

‘inomation loss,’ 130ina-phsics, 66Ingadn, roman, 192intntionalit (intntional inxis-

tnc), 191, 202, 204, 207, 211intmdia, 18idction, 14-15, 17-18, 27, 116, 128Islam, occasionalist philosoph in,

35, 77, 80, 82, 115, 188 jabès, edmond, 58 jams, William, 6, 77, 106 joliot-Ci, Fédéic (‘joliot’), 73, 74,

75, 77, 81, 82, 102, 104, 105,114, 115, 116, 126, 128, 137, 145,146, 156, 159

Kant, Immanl, 13, 14, 16, 22, 24,35, 38, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 67,71, 77, 82, 101, 102, 106-107,114, 121, 124, 139, 140, 148,152, 155-156, 166, 176, 177, 179,186, 198, 222, 224, 225

Antinomies, 106, 149, 226, 227, 228 things-in-themselves, 24, 67, 71, 100,

140, 152, 163, 178, 184, 186, 222transcendental dialectic, 223

K, Snato john, 52Kikgaad, Søn, 176Kowaski, Lw, 73Kipk, Sal, 175, 175n40Khn, Thomas, 31, 174 paradigms o, misinterpreted, 174-175

Kdistan, 78as metaphor or alsely divided realms o

reality, 67 Lacan, jacqs, 19, 101, 164Lamack, jan-Baptist, 23, 171Lall, Fançois, 165, 166, 173, 181‘Lato, Bnno,’ imagina twin o

Bno, 183Lato, Bno, 3, 4 Aramis, 47, 49



Indx 243

at Ecole des Mines, 11, 130, 131at Sciences-Po, 11, 20, 130, 131attack on Socrates/Plato by, 85-95 biographical notes on, 11-13as Catholic, 27, 80La abrique du droit, 36 ounder o new occasionalist theory, 116 ourold structure in, 138-139Heidegger disliked by, 3, 24, 32, 137, 146 host o salon or Meillassoux, 122-123‘hut’ in Châtelperron o, 4, 63hyperbolic reading o, 121-122imagined as character in Platonic dia-

logue, 93-95 Irreductions, 12-32, 43, 121, 124, 145,

158, 164later system o, 6 Making Thing Public, 137 metaphysical contributions o, 5, 33, 36,

99-116, 228 modernism rejected by, 20, 31, 57-68,

190not a social constructionist, 11-12, 26, 27,

44, 53, 59-60, 74, 81, 121opponent o nature/culture split, 48, 64Pandora’s Hope, 62, 71-95, 138 The Pasteurization o France, 12-32 philosophers’ neglect o, 5, 121-122 politicians admired by, 21Politics o Nature, 57, 138 realism o, 12Science in Action, 33-55 sense o humor o, 11, 12, 22, 71, 74We Have Never Been Modern, 57-68, 78

Lavoisi, Antoin, 37Libniz, G.W., 13, 25, 30, 51, 53, 66,

72, 74, 105, 106, 114, 139, 143,145, 153, 167, 192, 215, 218, 222

monads, 74, 114, 140, 200vinculum (chain), 66

Lnnon, john, 209lvls (incl. ‘las’), 30, 46, 66, 62,

171, 215, 225, 226, 227-228Lvinas, emmanl, 100, 153, 160Libig, jsts von, 19, 82

Lingis, Alphonso, 100lingistic tn, 24, 75Lock, john, 29, 110, 198Logical ddction

as orm o translation, 15, 22, 26, 29London School o economics wok-

shop, 3-4Lovcat, H.P., 132, 189, 190, 214Lotad, jan-Fançois, 64Machiavlli, Niccolò, 19, 25, 92MacKnzi, Donald, 63Main d Bian, Pi-Fançois-

Gonthi, 26Malbanch, Nicolas, 35, 77, 82, 115Mallamé, Stéphan, 58Macs, rth Bakan, 175n40Mat, Anton, 191Max, Kal, 72, 166, 173matialism, 46, 74, 82, 107, 108, 109,

110, 121, 122, 123, 138-144, 148,158-159, 161, 169-170, 171, 185,189

‘matts o concn,’ 138Maxwll, jams Clk, 125McCatn, Pal, 209McLhan, Mashall, 49, 139, 175maning, lital and mtaphoical,

24mdiatos, 15, 18, 29, 65, 75, 77, 105,

128, 134, 135, 145, 147, 157, 159,208, 210, 211, 217

Th Mgaians, 28-29, 127-129, 130,187

‘Millassox, Anton,’ imagina twino Qntin, 183

Millassox, Qntin, 122-124, 127,149, 163-186, 222

Minong, Alxis, 191Mndl, Ggo, 15, 48Mla-Pont, Maic, 100, 122,

129, 131, 134Mill, john Stat, 209-210Minkowski, Hmann, 217mobilization, 54, 55modnit, 75, 78, 215




as attempted purication o nature romculture, 57-68, 190

never existed, 57-58 theory o time in, 68

‘modi, tansom, ptb, o c-at,’ Latoian catchphas,81, 158, 213

momntsas opposed to substance, 152, 157, 203,

206 monism, 102, 139, 152, 161mononatalism, 57‘Monst X,’ 189, 190, 195, 215Moo, G.e., 177mlticltalism, 57Mnich

‘an intellectual Munich,’ Latouriancatchphrase, 61, 108, 149

Nagasaki, 103Nanc, jan-Lc, 153, 160Napolon, 34, 202natalism, 78, 215, 227natal kinds, 23ngotiation, 18, 25, 26, 30no-Platonism, 223ntwok, 20, 23, 26, 27, 40, 64, 68,

124, 144Nwton, Isaac, 22, 39n2, 42, 43, 44,

45, 51, 143, 174, 178Nitzsch, Fidich, 11, 15, 25, 85,

86, 139, 166, 173, 211n92nonmodns, 58‘ncla mtaphsics,’ 215, 216Obama, Psidnt Baack, 104obct-ointd philosoph, 16, 32,

99, 109, 151-228obcts, 16, 113, 125, 132, 135, 138,

144, 151, 157, 174-175, 188-214,215

dened, 14, 153-154horizontal and vertical relations within,

215-216 immanent objectivity, 191, 192, 193, 194inanimate objects, 11, 23, 66, 211, 212,

213

intentional objects, 136, 157, 180, 181,190, 192, 195-196, 198, 199, 200,204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 215,216, 217

molten core o, 215 mutual externality o, or Latour, 34, 47,

104non-relationality o, 99, 187, 196 polarization within, 136, 156, 191, 199,

200, 215 real objects, 190, 191, 195-196, 198,

199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217,218, 219, 226

reinorced object, 209sensual objects, 136, 190, 191, 200, 201,

202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210,211, 215, 216, 217, 219, 226

obligato passag point, 50, 82, 99occasionalism, 35, 46, 47, 105, 113,

114, 116, 134, 144, 145, 155,156, 188

continuous creation in, 46 inability o entities to make direct contact

in, 47 local occasionalism, 77, 112-116 secular occasionalism, Latour’s great

discovery, 102, 115, 159, 228 Odsss, 51ontolog, dinc om mtaphs-

ics o, 221onto-tholog, 222Oppnhim, j. robt, 128Otga Gasst, josé, 26, 201, 202panpschism, 212-214Pakman, Fancis, 79Pamnids, 153, 157, 160, 174Past, Lois, 19, 38, 61, 71, 76, 80,

81, 82, 83, 84, 93, 111, 123, 125-127, 129, 131, 134, 147, 158, 163,182, 183

St. Pal, 85Paling, Lins, 37Pég, Chals, 68Pic, Chals Sands, 177



Indx 245

pomanc, 44pomativit, 66phnomnolog, 26, 75, 78, 81, 100,

101, 107, 141, 143, 189, 196,204, 207, 219

picsas opposed to substance, 152, 188

plasma, 132-134, 132n11, 135, 137, 147,157

Plato, 13, 38, 39n2, 72, 85-95, 120,139, 155, 176, 199, 206, 219,222

Euthyphro, 90Gorgias, 85-95 Latour (parody dialogue), 93-95 Meno, 89-90, 218 Phaedo, 168 Phaedrus, 91Republic, 90, 92Sophist, 90-91

polaizd philosoph, 156, 157Popp, Kal, 31, 174postmodns, 61, 64, 67, 87, 88, 91potntialit, 28, 29, 30, 46, 114, 128,

129, 130, 131, 132, 187Pocht, Félix-Achimèd, 19, 80, 82,

85, 115pow, 21, 27, 43-44, 54, 89

as vis dormitiva, 28 pagmatist, 81, 91, 93, 95, 106, 143p-individal alm, 159-161, 163,

185, 195p-Socatics, 68, 91, 153, 159, 176Pincip, Gavilo, 209-210‘Th Posso,’ ctional chaact o

Lato, 39-44poposition, in Whithad’s sns,

82, 83, 84, 125, 126, 129, 130,131, 170-171

Potagoas, 29‘Th Pto rico ect,’ 139-140Pthagoas, 153, 160qalitis, 91, 129, 136, 137, 206, 210,

213, 216, 218as opposed to substance, 16, 120, 148,

152, 157, 197, 199, 203‘bundles o qualities,’ 116, 157, 168, 175,

196, 197-198, 199, 217, 225, 226,227

distinction between primary and second-ary, 110, 111, 112, 122, 128, 129,195

notes, in Zubíri, 204, 205 radiation o, 225 real, 216, 217, 219sensual, 216, 217, 218, 219tropes, in analytic philosophy, 206

qantm tho, 174qasi-obcts, 62, 63, 64qasi-sbcts, 66Qin, Willad van Oman, 25, 51,

167, 176‘adical philosoph,’ 152-156, 157, 158,

185, 195, 196, 198, 199, 204,224

reduces reality to a single radix, 154ationalism, 113, 155, 167, 174ragan, ronald, 32alism, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,

85, 112, 113, 122, 125, 128, 139,142, 151, 161, 167, 169-170, 184,204, 222, 223

correlationist realism (in Heidegger),179-180

litmus test or, 67 mainstream realism, 112old-ashioned realism, 26, 111realism o relations, 75 Rich Elsewhere Realism, 173scientic realism, 22, 43, 64, 112traditional realism, 72, 74, 106, 112,

164, 173weird realism, 85, 132, 188

dctionism, 13-14, 17-18, 25, 29,107, 108, 154, 171, 185, 196,199, 226

dndant casation, 162lationism, 75, 82, 84, 86, 106, 109,

111, 114, 122-134, 126, 129, 134,142, 144, 148, 152, 156, 157-




188, 227lations, 33, 36, 46, 55, 72, 75, 77, 79,

81, 83, 101, 104, 105, 121, 130,131, 133, 132, 134, 136, 137, 138-144, 148, 158, 159, 162, 163,169-170, 195, 212, 213, 214, 228

as abstractions rom reality o the relata, 54

as denition o actors, or Latour, 17 domestic, 135 orm new objects, 211, 215 internal and external, 135, 187-188 non-human relations abandoned to natu-

ral science, 156 as opposed to substance, 16, 152

lativism, 23, 31, 44, 45sv, 134, 187sistanc, 44, 45

as characteristic o reality, or Latour, 22,26, 27

toaction, 46, 83-85htoic, ndatd impotanc o

philosoph o, 169-175, 176,177

rhods, richad, 103‘rich elswh,’ Millassoxian

citical tm, 166, 167, 169,174, 176

‘rich Homland,’ as ip sid o richelswh, 176-177, 184

rimann, Bnhad, 147rockwll, W. Td, 209rot, richad, 12rossa, jan-jacqs, 13rov, Kal

considered as anti-Kantian operative, 51-54

rssll, Btand, 25, 45, 154, 155,188

Sad, Donatin Alphon Fançois,Maqis d, 52

Said, edwad, 38Sakoz, Nicolas, 89Sas, edwin, 132n11Scha, Simon, 59-60

Schl, Max, 26Scholasticism, 191, 220‘School X,’ 6Schopnha, Ath, 166sns data, 136Ss, Michl, 6, 62, 68Sat, Gogs, 197Shakspa, William, 79Shapin, Stvn, 59-60Simondon, Gilbt, 6, 160skpticism, 113, 114, 116, 155, 156, 226Smith, Ba, 192Smolin, L, 184Socats, 14, 85-95, 110, 153, 218Sokal, Alan, 12, 43, 52, 85, 108, 123

science warriors, 111, 121Sophists, 85-95Soia, etinn, 6spac

as partly non-relational, 143-144as product o tension between object and

quality, 214-221spclativ mtaphsics, 51, 99, 102‘spclativ pscholog,’ 213Spclativ ralism, philosophical

movmnt, 164-167, 189, 190spch-act tho, 66

contrasted with ‘actor-act theory,’ 66 Spinoza, Bach, 72, 93, 114, 139,

153, 168, 176stabilization, 54, 55Stalin, josph, 15Stngs, Isabll, 6, 89Stov, David, 177, 181Stass, Lo, 100Stawson, Galn, 154sting tho, 174, 215Stong Pogam (Th edinbgh

School), 11, 60, 67Sáz, Fancisco, 220-221sbmgnc, o ssntial qalitis

bnath intntional obcts,203

sbstanc, 16, 17, 23, 24, 33, 34, 44,45, 46, 49, 55, 65, 66, 72, 80,



Indx 247

81, 82, 83, 101, 106, 113, 121,141, 142, 144, 154, 197, 220,221, 225, 228

as opposed to content, 140, 191, 194, 195,197, 198

as substantivity, in Zubíri, 206 supports opposite qualities at dierent

times, 120, 139sbstantial oms, 144, 220sbtactiv mthod, 180smbolic vs. al

distinction critiqued by Latour, 26 Szilad, Lo, 73Talland-Péigod, Chals

Maic d, 89Tad, Gabil, 6tnsions, btwn obcts and qali-

tis, 216, 220Tension Number 1 (time), 217 Tension Number 2 (space), 218 Tension Number 3 (essence), 218 Tension Number 4 (eidos), 218

things, 136, 138, 140, 142Thasmachs, 25tim, 30, 68, 83-85, 86, 104, 145

as partly non-relational, 143-144as product o tension between object and

quality, 214-221Toscano, Albto, 160tacto, 46, 65, 104tanslation, 15, 16, 18, 26, 27, 76, 77,

79, 89, 102, 111, 122, 125, 135,206, 210, 215

‘no tanspot withot tansoma-tion,’ Latoian catchphas,76, 89

tnch waa in philosoph, 108,119

tials o stngth, 16, 25, 26tth, 16, 19, 22, 79, 129

industrial model o truth in Latour, 77 Twadowski, Kazimiz, 191-194, 198 vicationism, 112 vicaios casation, 114, 146, 147,

203, 210, 220, 221

Vico, Giambattista, 139 vitalit, 101, 129, 132n11, 161, 185,

187, 195Watson, jams, 37, 38, 44, 54Winbg, Stvn, 87, 88, 91, 108, 123Whithad, Ald Noth, 6, 25, 29,

51, 53, 76, 80, 82, 100, 101-102,114, 124, 125, 126, 135, 158,164, 171, 186, 188, 195, 196,205, 221, 222

actual entities, 102, 104, 114actual occasions, 104eternal objects, 102, 206 logical mistakes are gratuitous errors,

173-174mathematical deduction inappropriate or

philosophy, 169ontological principle, 103, 127, 209 philosophies are abandoned not reuted,

168, 174 prehension, 102, 114, 152vacuous actuality, 101, 114, 152, 155 verbal statements as inadequate expres-

sion o propositions, 170-171, 175 withdawal, 132, 135, 136, 141, 181,

184, 199, 203, 215, 221, 222,227

Wittgnstin, Ldwig, 24, 177, 185Wol, Chistian, 192Woolga, Stv, 11Zno o ela, 145Zhkov, Gog, 15Zizk, Slavo, 19-20, 101, 152, 164Zbíi, Xavi, 204-207, 215, 218





Prince of Networks is the frst treatment o Bruno Latour specifcally as a

philosopher. Part One covers our key works that display Latour’s underrated

contributions to metaphysics: Irreductions, Science in Action, We Have Never

Been Modern, and Pandora’s Hope. Harman contends that Latour is one o

the central fgures o contemporary philosophy with a highly original ontology

philosophy

Documents

Harman_Prince of Networks. Bruno Latour and Metaphysics - Graham Harman Copy