Hartmut Esser

Segregation and Ethnic Stratification.Institutional Completeness and the Ethnic Mobility Trap

University of MannheimFaculty of Social SciencesMannheim Center for European Social Research

Hartmut Esser

Segregation and ethnische Schichtung.Institutionelle Vollständigkeit und die ethnische Mobilitätsfalle

Universität MannheimFakultät für SozialwissenschaftenMannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung Research

1. The Problem2. Breton & Wiley3. A General Model4. Four Special Cases5. Empirical Evidence?6. Conclusions

Outline

1. The Problem

Background

Ethnic stratification as a possible alternative outcome to„structural assimilation“ (segmented assimilation)

Labor market performance as a necessary prerequisite ofany social integration into functionally differentiatedmarket societies

Function(s) of ethnic segregation?

Segregation Ethnic Stratification???

? really true?

? if yes: why?

? if not: why not?

Two propositions ...

Segregation as an obstacle

Segregation as support

Mechanisms: missing opportunities, discrimination, stress ...

Mechanisms: solidarity, self-esteem, own institutions ...

... and a third one:

Segregation as support serving (unintendedly) as an obstacle

Two (classic) references:

Raymond Breton (AJS 1964): Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities

Norbert F. Wiley (SF 1967): The Ethnic Mobility Trap

Topic:

• Elaborating and combining the arguments• Modelling the mechanism(s)• Application to some special constellations

2. Breton & Wiley

Raymond Breton: Institutional Completeness

Guiding idea

Institutionally complete ethnic communities allowand motivate the (exclusive) preservation of ingroup relations.

Main propositions:

„ ... that the direction of the immigrants´ integration will to a large extent result from the forces of attraction (positive or negative) stemming from the various communities.“

and

„These forces are generated by the social organization of thecommunities.“

„Institutional completeness would be at its extremewhenever the ethnic community could perform all theservices required by its members.“

What is „Institutional Completeness“?

Emergence of IC:

• (cultural and/or social) „distances“• the „level of resources among the members of the ethnic group“• activities of „social entrepreneurs“• the „number of immigrants“• migration as an „individual or a group phenomenon“

In sum:

demand: migrants with problems of easy integration in rc

supply: ethnic entrepreneurs (actors with special abilities: business experience, bilingual abilities, social

capital)

Institutional completeness creates ingroup opportunities with chances for economic success, prestige and mobility within the boundaries of the ethnic group.

Consequence(s) of IC:

„Members would never have to make use of native institutionsfor the satisfaction of their needs, such as education, work,food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance.“

Segregation

**ethnic entrepreneurs/organizational investments

resources distances embeddedness group size

Summary Breton (+):

Organization Inst. Completeness

chain-migration/cumulative causation

Norbert F. Wiley: The Ethnic Mobility Trap

Guiding Idea

Ethnic opportunities for social mobility have in most casesa relatively low ceiling, but are more attractive, because theprobability of success is higher.

„Briefly, a mobility trap is an opportunity for mobilitywhich offers a good deal less than it seems to, and, oncepursued, permits release only at the cost of somedownward mobility.“

What is an „Ethnic Mobility Trap“?

The EMT-Mechanism:

• Mobility is a consequence of investment decisions.

• Choice between two alternative routes of investment:

The „trap“:

- safe and comfortable, but with a low ceiling- unsafe and uncomfortable, but with a high ceiling

If there are ingroup opportunities, they will be preferred, justbecause the probability of success is very much higher.

Once off to a „wrong“ start, the decision is almostirreversible.

Other examples:

age-grade-trap: cultivation of age-specific behavior

overspecialization trap: concentration on only one sociological paradigm/ field

localité trap: investment in local prestige

minority group trap: „... not only ethnic and racial roups, but, under some conditions, religious, female, radical political and other ...groups which offer advancement within their ghettos.“

Consequence(s) of EMT:

• Underinvestment in efficient and generalized capital• Low chances of placement on central positions• Status differentials between ethnic group and natives• Emergence of ethnic stratification ...

... by „voluntary“ decisions

Summary Wiley:

**migrants/mobility investments

IngroupOpportunities

Ethnic Stratification

EMT

Combination of Breton &Wiley:

... which offers (internal) safe, but limited opportunities for vertical mobility for other members of the ethnic group...

... and the structural result of this mobility trap is an ethnic stratification.

Ethnic segregations can motivate ethnic entrepreneurs to create ethnic organizations up to institutional completeness ...

Inst.Compl.Int. Opport.

**

EthnicStratification

migrants/mobility investments

Segregation

**

Organization

entrepreneurs/organizational investments

resources distances embeddedness group size chain-migration/

cumulative causation

3. A General Model

Three Steps:

1. The general (micro-)mechanism: investments2. Structural (and other) conditions: demand and supply3. Aggregations and processes : explaining the links

Step 1: Investment Strategies

Two types of actors/activities:

Question: how to explain differences in investment behavior?

1. entrepreneurs: (eg-)organizational investments2. migrants : (rc-)mobility investments

Alternatives:

• no investment (ni)• investment (in)

Components:

U(sq) value status quo without investmentU(in) value investment returnp probability of successC investment costs

following standard-investment-theory we derivefor the decision to invest (EU(in) > EU(ni)):

Investment Motive Investment Risk>

U(in) – U(sq) > C/p

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

ni

Investment Strategies: Basic Model

in

2

1

1

4

3

C/p

increase ofincentives

increase ofopportunities

C´

increaseof costs

investment

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

ni

Investment Strategies: Basic Model

in

2

1

1

4

3

C´/p

increase ofincentives

increase ofopportunities

C´

increaseof costs

noinvestment

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

ni

Investment Strategies: Basic Model

in

2

1

1

4

3

C/p

increase ofincentives

increase ofopportunities

C´

decreaseof costs

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

ni

Investment Strategies: Basic Model

in

2

1

1

4

3

C/p

increase ofincentives

increase ofopportunities

C´

investment

Step 2: Structural Conditions

Application of the general model to the two typesof investments:

1. (eg-)organizational investment (ethnic business)2. (rc-)mobility investments (language, education)

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

no

(eg-)ethnic organization & IC

or

1

1

4

C/p

groupsize

organizational skills

C´

ethnicsocial capital

IC

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

eg

(rc-)mobility investments, IC & EMTrc

1

1

4

C/p

rc-ressources

C´

decreasingdistance

ethnicmobilty trap

rc-labormarket

institutionalcompleteness

3

structuralassimilation

p-

U(in)-U(ni)=U

C

U+

U-

pp+

eg

(rc-)mobility investments: Segregation&Stressrc

1

C/p

stress

C´

decreasingdistance

preventedinvestment

2 4

possibleinvestment

Step 3: Aggregations and processes

so far: structured decisions of individual actors

now: interdependencies and collective consequences

Variables: EU-weights for eg- versus rc-investments

varying with:

group size ressources/distances ethnic organization

EU(rc)

EU(eg)

group size

The Basic Model

ethnic organizationwith „critical mass“

high resourceslow distances

EU (rc)EU (eg)

low resourceshigh distances

„individualistic“aggregation

4. Four Special Cases

1. „Normal“ migrants2. Intergenerational Integration3. IC and EMT4. Segmented Assimilation

group size

Model 1: „normal“ migrants

EU(rc)EU(eg)

high resourceslow distances

no embeddenessno organization

(straight) assimilation

group size

Model 2a: Intergenerational Integration

EU(rc)EU(eg)

follow-up generations:exposure&acceptance

ethnic organization

competition/distances

(chain)immigration

Contact Conflict Accommodation Assimilation

(RRC)

group size

Model 2b: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)

EU(rc)EU(eg)

dissolutionof ethniccommunity

group size

Model 2c: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)

EU(rc)EU(eg)

group size

Model 2d: Intergenerational Integration (absorption)

EU(rc)EU(eg)

„leaving the colony“

(structural)assimilation

absorption

group size

Model 3: Institutional Completeness&Ethnic Mobility Trap

EUrc)EUeg)

increase of eg-opportunities

EMTIC

follow-up generations

„individualistic“ segregation

(net-)replenishment

ethnicorganization

furtherincrease of eg-opportunities

group size

EUin)EUni) rc-core culture

exposure/values

Model 4: Segmented Assimilation

subculturalstatus system

rc-subcultureexposure/values

segmentedassimilation

rc-subculture

: rc-Subculture Mobility Trap

5. Empirical Evidence?

Is there really such an effect of institutional completeness on the emergence of an ethnic stratification?

Three References:

1. Breton 19642. Fong and Ooka 20013. Portes and Rumbaut 2001

Breton (1964: 197): IC and ingroup relations

degree of institutional completeness

proportion low medium highof mainlyingroup .21 .54 .89relations* (62) (28) (83)

•*„The relationship held under all ... controls“ (group size, residential concentration, proportion of professionals). Exception: language; reduction „by as much as one-third“.

Fong & Ooka (2002: 140): Ethnic economy and outgroup relations

Odds

education 2.10language 2.23length of stay 1.03 (ns)single migrant 4.34family migration 2.62perception of own group 3.61

* „The result indicatesthat, controlling for other factors, workingin the Chinese ethniceconomy significantlyreduces the level ofparticipation in thewider society“

participation inethnic economy 0.55*

„ ... Cuban-American students are also affected by an unexpectedconsequence of the successful economic performance of theearlier exile generation. By creating such opportunities, the Cubanethnic economy paradoxically facilitated school attrition, especially among children whose families confronted a moredifficult situation“ (266/7)

Portes & Rumbaut (2001: 266f.): School achievement of late- coming Cuban-Americans

6. Conclusions

• There are relations between IC and ES by EMT, but they are conditional.

• The interplay of the various factors and processes is not uncomplicated, therefore explicit theoretical modelling is necessary.

• Other factors, like discrimination, legal restrictions or stress, are still possible and could easily be included (via bridge hypotheses on the U-, p- or C-terms for investment).

• Main aspect: solving the „problem of incompleteness“ of integration-theory