Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak Ma Thesis

7/28/2019 Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak Ma Thesis

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Tel-Aviv University

The Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of Security Studies M.A Program

The Ceaseless Conflict in Anatolia : The Kurds of Turkey and the Ethnic Turkish State

This paper was submitted as the thesis for the M.A

By: Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak

This study was carried out under the supervision of

Prof. Ofra Bengio

November 2009


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INDEX

Acknowledgements.3 List of Acronyms.4 Introduction.8 Theoretical Background....10 The Roots of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire..20 Kurdish Re-Awakening in the Modern Turkish Republic40 The Birth of Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)..44 PKK and Other Actors......58

I. Syria.59

II. Iran...62

III. Iraq..64

IV. Other Countries67

Turkish Media The State and the Kurds.69 Legal Political Kurdish Movement...76 Conclusion.88 Bibliography..98 Abstract in Hebrew - ...108


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project would not have been possible without the support of many

people. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Ofra Bengio, who was

abundantly helpful and offered invaluable assistance, support and guidance. Deepest

gratitude to Liran Ofek without whose support and assistance this study would not have been

successful. I am grateful to Sara Heide Krulewich for her contribution in the editing of the

paper. Special thanks also to my friend, Uri Stossel, for his invaluable assistance during the

Security Studies M.A Program in the Tel-Aviv University. I would also like to convey thanks

to Israels Ministry of Absorption for providing the financial means. I wish to express my

love and gratitude to my wife Roslyn, to my brother Soni, his wife Lisya, and finally to my

beloved parents Sara and David for their understanding, support an endless love throughout

the duration of my studies. I dedicate this M.A. Thesis to them.


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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKP Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

BDP Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)

CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party)

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CUP Commitee of Union and Progress (ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

DDKO Dou Devrimci Kltr Ocaklar (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centers)

DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic Peoples Party)

DEP Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)

DTP Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)

ERNK Eniya Rzgariya Netewa Kurdistan (National Liberation Front of

Kurdistan)

GAP Gneydou Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project)

GKK Geici Ky Koruculuu (Temporary Village Guards)

HADEP Halkn Demokrasi Partisi (Peoples Democracy Party)

HEP Halkn Emek Partisi (Peoples Labor Party)

IDF Israel Defense Forces

KCK Koma Civaken Kurdistan (Ruling Commitee of Kurdistan Society)

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party

MHP Milliyeti Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)

MT Milli stihbarat Tekilat (National Intelligence Agency)

NGO Non Governmental Organizations

PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)


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PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

SHP Sosyal Demokrat Halk Parti (Social Democrat Peoples Party)

TGNA Turkish Grant National Assembly (Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi-TBMM)

TSAD Trk Sanayici ve adamlar Dernei (Turkish Industrialists and

Businessmens Association)

UN United Nations

USA United States of America


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INTRODUCTION

Since the Turkish victory over the Byzantine Empire in the Battle of Manzikert of

1071, the Turks and the Kurds have been living together side by side in the same geographical

region of Anatolia. In 1299, the Turks founded the Ottoman Empire. In time the Ottomans

expanded their borders. Many different ethnic groups and nations became the subjects of the

Ottoman Empire. In order to rule easily the Ottomans introduced the Millet Systemin 1453,

which based the concept of citizenship upon the basis of religion. As a consequence of the

Ottoman Millet System each recognized religious community enjoyed a high degree of

internal autonomy and preservation of their ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities.1

According to the Millet System society was divided into Greek Orthodox Christians,

Armenian Christians, Jews and Muslims. As a result, all the Muslim subjects of the Empire

including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, etc. were bound to the Ottoman Sultan regardless

of their ethnic origin. Consequently, religion became the glue of the Ottoman Empire.

The ideas of nationalism as associated with the 1789 French Revolution became

very popular in all of Europe, especially in the empires which were composed of many

nations, such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. In order to save the empire

from secessionist policies, the Ottoman Empire adopted Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism

respectively. However, neither Pan-Ottomanism nor Pan-Islamism could find a solution to

the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek, Serbian and Albanian secessions from the

Ottoman Empire under the formation of a nation-state of their own influenced the Turks in the

Ottoman Empire.

The Young Turks, also known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),

became the sovereign power in the Ottoman Empire from 1908-1918 as Pan-Ottomanism and

1 Nesim eker, Identity Formation and the Political Power in the late Ottoman Empire and Early TurkishRepublic,HAOL, No:8 Autumn 2005, p.59


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Pan- Islamism had failed to keep the enpire together. The Young Turks were the first Turkish

nation-state nationalists. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, the founder of Modern Turkey, was a

member of this organization.

The Ottoman Empire was among the defeated belligerents of World War I. Just as the

Versailles Treaty was signed with Germany, the last Ottoman government of Sultan Vahdettin

reluctantly signed the Sevres Treaty (10th August 1920) with the victorious powers of World

War I. Articles 62, 63, and 64 of the Sevres Treaty paved the way towards a local

autonomy for the Kurds, possibly leading to full independence, which would be worked out

by a commission composed of British, French and Italian delegates.2 The treaty envisaged

that the future Turkish state would be reduced to a rump that would include only Istanbul and

central and northern Anatolia, and with access to very few resources and practically no

freedom of action in the economic sphere.3 With the Treaty of Sevres; Turkeys Armenians,

Greeks and Kurds had their own territories. This treaty is the root of paranoia among the

Turks that can be summarized by the term of The Sevres Syndrome which will be addressed

in the next chapters of this paper.

The concept of citizenship changed with the new born secular Turkish Republic. The

core emphasis on citizenship was transformed from religion to ethnicity. Mustafa Kemal

Atatrks anti-sultanic, secular, Turkish nationalism became the sovereign power in Turkey.

Even the name Turkey, derived from the Turkish ethnicity, it symbolized the new glue of

citizenship.

Even before the establishment of modern Turkey there had been Kurdish unrest that

had resulted in a violent revolt. In 1880, the Kurds rebelled against the Ottomans under the

leadership of Sheikh Ubeydullah. After the Ubeydullah Uprising was suppressed, and with the

proclamation of a secular republic, Kurds found themselves more alienated than ever before.

2 The Treaty of Sevres Articles 62,63,64http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260, 9th July, 2009

3 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 p.45


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They found no bond to the new secular Turkish republic which based its principles on ethnic

origin.

As a result of this alienation Kurdish rebellions erupted, such Kogiri (1920), Sheikh

Said (1925), Ar/Ararat (1927), Dersim (1937); these revolts will be examined in the

following chapters. All of these rebellions were supressed by the Turkish army, and as a

result, the Kurdish question and their rights became a taboo subject in Turkey.

From the Dersim Revolt of 1937 until the year 1961, the Kurdish national

consciousness fell silent. A more libertarian constitution was adopted in Turkey in 1961.

This new constitution granted rights and liberties that the Turks had never enjoyed, and

allowed the Kurds of Turkey to enter into a period of re-awakening. In the aforementioned

period, the Kurdish youth began to discover their Kurdishness. In this new wave of the

Kurdish consciousness, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers Party)

was born. The PKK was founded in 1973 by Abdullah calan as a Marxist Leninist Kurdish

Movement whose main purpose was to establish an independent Kurdistan in eastern Turkey.

The division of the Turkish people to right and left created a chaotic situation which

led to violence and triggered the 12th September 1980 coup detat that abrogated the 1961

Constitution. The 1961 Constitution was replaced by the current constitution written in 1982,

which took severe measures against the wide rights and liberties enjoyed by the Kurds. The

1982 Constituiton granted extra ordinary jurisdictional powers to the military, and more

importantly, constrained the rights and liberties of the people.

From 1984 until today, the PKK has been carring out its activities against Turkey.

The PKKs activities can be categorized as guerilla warfare and at the same time as terrorism.

The reality is that despite its violent actions, the PKK contributed to Turkish politics in terms

of breaking the untouchable taboo, like the Kurdish Question, which led the way to political

representation of the Kurds in the Turkish parliament.


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In order to analyze the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, a theoretical background is needed to

address the basic terms and their importance to each party. This paper will follow a

chronological order in order to analyze the roots of the conflict and its development making it

easier to analyze and reach a concrete conclusion.

I chose this topic for several reasons. The first element that attracted my attention is

that the Kurds are the largest stateless nationality in the world. Secondly, the geographic arena

and the culture of the conflict are very familiar to me since I was born in Istanbul, Turkey and

am a native Turkish speaker. The last reason why I chose the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict is to

better understand the parties stance through an objective manner.

The thesis question of this paper is: Did the Turkish governments try to hinder the

Kurdishness to appear n the public sphere, and if yes, what were the Kurdish responses to the

mentioned policy? The thesis assumption of this paper is that the Turkish governments did

try to hinder the Kurdishness to appear in the public sphere.


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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

As was stated in the introduction part of this paper, this conflict has two parties: the

Turks and the Kurds. The Kurds are a largely Sunni Muslim people with their own language

and culture. The Kurdish people mostly inhabit a geographical region called Kurdistan which

includes adjacent parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.4 They have their own language with

different dialects. The two main dialects are Kurmani and Sorani. According to the

American Central Intelligence Agencys (CIA) factbook, 20% of Turkeys population is of

Kurdish origin.5 This means the Kurds constitute a large minority group, while the Turks are

the majority in their own republic.

As of 1994, approximately 22 million Kurds were living in Kurdistan. 6 Even though

Kurdistan is the homeland of the Kurdish people, due to wars and economic reasons Kurds

began to emigrate to other countries and have created a Kurdish diaspora. Beginning in the

1960s, large Kurdish communities migrated from Turkey due to labor needs and settled in

Lebanon, Germany, Western Europe, Libya, Russia, the United States and Australia.7

Although the Kurds of Turkey see themselves as a different ethnic political entity in

the Modern Turkish Republic, the Turkish state discourse rejects their claim. The Lausanne

Treaty, which founded the Modern Turkish Republic, was signed between the Ankara Turkish

Grand National Assemblys representatives and British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek,

Romanian, Bulgarian, Portuguese, Belgian, Russian and Yugoslav representatives on 24th

July, 1923. The Treatys articles 37-42 define the minorities and their rights and obligations.

Only the non-Muslim Turkish citizens were defined as minorities. According to Turkish

political discourse Kurds are first class citizens who shall not seek minority rights. In a BBC

4 Who are the Kurds The Washington Post, August1999.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm 9th August, 20095 CIA Factbookhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#People 19th April, 20096 Amir Hassanpour, The Kurdish Experience, Middle East Report, July-August 1994, p.37 Martin Van Bruinessen, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question, Florence, Robert Schumann forAdvanced Studies, 2000, p.4


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interview on 24th March, 1992, Minister of Interior smet Sezgin invoked the Treaty of

Lausanne to assert that the Kurds were not a minority but actually first class citizens of the

Turkish state.8 In addition to that, in May 1995 President Sleyman Demirel opposed the

granting of more rights to the Kurdish citizens of Turkey claiming that if the Kurds were

given additional rights this would be equivalent to privileges which would cause other

Turkish citizens to become second class citizens.9 Furthermore, Demirel claimed there was

a Western conspiracy against Turkey in which Western appeals for Turkey to grant minority

rights and open up dialogue with the Kurds could lead to a situation worse than that envisaged

by the much despised Treaty of Sevres.10

Since the Kurds in Turkey could not identify themselves with the new definition of

citizenship on the base of the ethno-nationalism, they have entered a period of alienation. This

phenomenon can readily be seen also in other conflict theaters such as the Basque-Spanish

conflict. The conflict derives from the fact that the players define each other in different

terms which contribute to the conflict's essence. Therefore it is vital to understand how each

party defines itself.

Today, one of the vital disagreements between the politically conscious Kurds and

Turkey is the political status of the Kurdish citizens. This conflict can be explained in

minority-majority terms.

A report by the United Nations (UN) sub-commission on the Prevention of

Discrimination and the Protection of the Minorities released in 1985, attempted to define the

concept of minority. The report defines minority as a group of citizens of a state

constituting a numerical minority which differs from those of the majority population in terms

8 Robert Olson, Mark Muller (eds.), Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Kentucky, KentuckyUniversity Press, 1996, p.1759 Kemal Kirii and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, Abingdon Oxon, Routledge-Curzon,2004, p. 21210Ibid, p. 209


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of ethnicity, religion or language, whose ultimate goal is to survive and achieve equality with

the majority in fact and in law.11

The Kurdish minoritys essence in Turkey is nationalistic and ethno-cultural. The

Kurds want to acquire wider civil rights on the basis of ethnic constitutional definitions which

will be examined in the following chapters. First we will examine what are the concepts of

ethnicity and nationalism.

The term ethnos was first used in Ancient Greece. Therefore the Greeks differentiate

the others by the term ethnos. Moreover, the English term ethnic derived from the Greek

ethnikos which in turn was a translation of the Hebrew goy, meaning non-

Israelite/Gentile/non-Jewish/Pagan. Consequently, we see that the term ethnic was a

religious code of difference.12

Today the term ethnicity refers to the cultural practices and outlooks of a given

community of people that set them apart from the others. Members of ethnic groups see

themselves as culturally distinct from other groups in a society and are seen by those other

groups to be so in return. The most common characteristics of the ethnic groups are language,

history, ancestry, religion and style of dress.13

In his bookMajority-Minority Relations, John E. Farley defines the ethnic group as a

group of people who are generally recognized by themselves and/or by others as a distinct

group with such recognition based on social or cultural characteristics. Most of these

characteristics are nationality, language and religion. Hence, ethnicity is a social characteristic

that passes from generation to generation.14 Anthony Smith lists characteristics of an ethnie,

11 Kemal Kirii and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.3312 Chris Lorenz, Stefan Berger (eds.), The Contested Nation, Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in NationalHistories, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.3613 Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 4th Edition Polity, 2001, p.24614 John E. Farley, Majority-Minority Relations, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2000, p. 8


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these are: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared

culture, an association with specific territory, and lastly, a sense of solidarity.15

Walker Conner (1993) uses the term Staatsvolk to illustrate the process by which the

dominant ethnic group comes to determine the national essence of the nation-state.

Staatsvolkdescribes a people who are culturally and politically preeminent in a state, even

though other groups may well be presented in significant numbers. Connor suggests that by

their preeminence, the dominant groups culture and language come to be represented as the

core or national culture and language. Minority groups, their cultures and languages,

consequently tend to be excluded from national recognition. At the same time, minority

groups are also variously encouraged and/or coerced by the dominant ethnie to assimilate to

national norms.16

Thomas Hammerberg, the European Councils Human Rights High Commissioner,

published a report after visiting Turkey on 28th June 3rd July 2009, which revealed the

domination of the Turkish ethnicity in Turkey. According to the report, Turkey glorifies the

Turkish ethnicity in the schools by promoting Atatrks famous motto:Happyis the man who

says he/she is a Turk. This report states that the motto leads to ethnic discrimination.

Hammerberg also added that the minority definition in Turkey must be re-addressed

according to todays needs.17

Despite Turkeys insistence that being Turkish is not reflecting an ethnical identity but

rather a citizens bond to the state, today in Turkey we can clearly see a staatsvolk Turkish

ethnic model. While the Turks are seeing the Kurds as an indispensable element of the

Turkish nation, the Kurds see themselves from a different origin.

15 Quoted in T.K Oomen (ed.), Citizenship and National Idetity, New Delhi, 2000, p.1916 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language, New York,

Routledge, 2008, p.8117 Zeynep Lle, Ne Mutlu Trkm Etnik AyrmclkHrriyet, 1st October 2009


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Anthony Smith (1983) notes that even in Europe where, arguably, the ideal of the

nation-state is strongest, at the time of his writing there were 73 nations and only 24 states.18

Today, not every nation can enjoy sovereignty in its own territories. The Kurds are one of

these unlucky nations.

The word nation comes from Latin and, when first coined, clearly conveyed the idea

of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the verb nasci meaning to

be born.19 Anthony D. Smith, in his bookNational Identity, defines nation as a named

human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass

public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.20

Shared language, religion, culture and a common descent can also be added to Smiths

definition of nationalism.

Nationalism has three models: the first one is the PrimordialistNon-Modern; the

others are the Modern and the Ethno-Symbolic approaches. According to the Primordialist

approach the nations did exist even before nationalism. In the Primordialist approach the

importance was given to the kinship instead of the state-citizen relation. German nationalism

is an example of this approach. The Primordialist approach has six vital characteristics, these

are common assumed blood ties, common race, common language, common region, common

religion and common custom.21 Accordingly, if a person does not match all of these criteria

than he/she would not be considered as part of a primordial thought nation.

On the other hand, contrary to the Primordialist, modern nationalism emphasizes the

bond between the citizen and the state regardless of the religious and linguistic differences.

French nationalism and the Turkish model are a good example of the Modern approach.

18 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language, p.7519 Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p.9420 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1991 p.1421 Clifford Geertz, Primordial and Civic Ties, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism,

New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32-33


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The Ethno-Symbolic approach regards both approaches as insufficient. It states that

ethnic origins are as important as the state-citizen relationship. Smith supports the Ethno-

Symbolic approach.

Joseph Stalin, in his article The Nation, argues that nation is a community of

people which is not racial or tribal. He strengthens his point of view by giving examples such

as the modern Italian nations formation which was based on the joining of the Romans,

Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs and so forth. Thus Stalin came to the conclusion that a

nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of

common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a

common culture.22

Ziya Gkalp, a Kurd, whose nation definition is similar to that of Stalins and who

had a great influence on Atatrk, is regarded as the Father of Turkish nationalisms core

theories. Gkalp, in his book Trkln Esaslar (The Priciples of Turkism/Turkishness)

first published in 1920, showed the Kemalists the way how to assimilate the minorities with

the Turkish identity. According to Gkalp, the concept of race can not be related to the

concept of nation. Gkalp emphasized that the components of nationality such as societal and

cultural unity can be transferred to the next generations through education. Moreover, Gkalp

further defines nation as: nation is not a group of people who came from the same racial

roots, geography, or political view, but nation is a group of people who have the same

language, religion, shortly, who receives same sort of education. Likewise, he emphasizes the

importance of Trkiyecilik, which means Turkish nationalism within the boundaries of

Turkey, instead ofTuranclk/Kzl Elma (Red Apple), the unity of the whole Turkic world.23

Today, the core concepts for the humankind -- nationalism, religion, ethnicity,

minority rights and other concepts -- are used as a tool in order to carry out terrorist activities.

22 Joseph Stalin, The Nation, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism, New York,Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32-3323 Ziya Gkalp, Trkln Esaslar, Ankara, Elips, 2006, pp.15-27


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Terrorism is one of the most important instruments of weak players against their powerful

opponents in the international arena. In order to understand what terrorism is we should

examine its origins. The term "terrorism" was first used in reference to the Reign of Terror

during the French Revolution which began 5th September 1793, and ended 28th July 1794.

The Terror (French: La Terreur) was a period of violence that led the mass executions of

enemies of the revolution.

Today, there is still no consensus regarding the definition of terrorism in the world

arena. For one state an entity might be a terrorist organization while for the other the same

entity might be seen as a freedom fighter.

According to the Former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence (1955-1959),

Yehoshafat Harkabi, terrorism is threatening and using violence against innocent people to

achieve political goals.24 With the rise of terrorism any small group might become more and

more influential by challenging nation-states through the use of terrorism. Walter Laqueur, in

his article Post Modern Terrorism, defines terrorism similar to Harkabi: a substate

application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society in order to

weaken or even overthrow the incumbents and to bring about political change.25

In November 2004, a United Nations Security Council report described terrorism as

any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with

the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international

organization to do or abstain from doing any act. Terrorisms goals are to create violence,

inflict psychological impact and fear, with an emphasis on a political goal, deliberately

targeting civilians and unlawfulness.

Another vital instrument of the weak player against its opponent is guerilla warfare.

The term guerilla came after Napoleons defeat against the Spanish army. Literally,

24 Yehoshafat Harkabi, (Milhama ve Estrategya War and Strategy ), Tel-Aviv, HadekelPublications, 1990, p.20425 Walter Laqueur, Post Modern Terrorism,Foreign Affairs, Vol.75 No.5, 1996, p.24


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guerilla means small war. Spanish people organized belligerent, asymmetrical groups

which are known today as guerillas. Clausewitz defines this style assmall and popular war

of the occupied people against the occupiers.26

According to Gil Merom, guerilla strategy offers the underdog a cheap, efficient and

often the only way to remain militarily active in spite of logistical, numerical and material

inferiority. It provides the insurgent with a chance for a prolonged struggle by relying on the

support of the indigenous population. Conquerors and oppressors who refuse to compromise

with the political demands of their weak rivals can nevertheless deal with insurgencies in

several ways. They can annihilate the popular base of insurgency, isolate the population from

the insurgents or selectively eradicate the insurgents and their leaders.27

Hseyin Pazarc, in his book Uluslararas Hukuk (International Law), states the

classical aspects of the guerilla as their struggle for independence, peoples contribution,

guerillas targetting on military forces, guerillas involvement in political and societal

spheres and more importantly Guerillas Long time war.28

Mao Ze Dongs famous theory of Water and Fish emphasizes the importance of the

support of the people in the guerilla war. Ze Dong states:If you withdraw the water, that is to

say, the population, fish, guerilla can no longer live; its simple, I know, but in war only the

simple things can be achieved.29

Today, the Kurds are trying to reach their interests through two different ways: the

first is the violent PKK which exercises terrorism and guerilla warfare at the same time, the

second sphere is the non-violent political. The DTP (Democratic Society Party Demoktarik

Toplum Partisi) the Kurdish political party, is advocating Kurdish rights in the Turkish

Parliament and trying to find a solution to the ongoing conflict.

26 Yehoshafat Harkabi, (Milhama ve Estrategya War and Strategy ), p.19427 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, New York Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.4628 Hseyin Pazarc, Uluslararas Hukuk, Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 2004, pp. 574-57529 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, p.38


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In order to analyze the Turkish-PKK/Kurdish conflict, I prefer to use the Conflict

Theory, and as a research method, I chose the Content Analysis method. In short, Content

Analysis Method is based on recognized historical sources such as letters, diplomats, official

documents, and so on. The content to be researched can be found in speeches, academic

articles and newspaper articles. The ultimate goal in this method is to reach general

conclusions about the events.

Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr define conflict in their bookUsing Conflict Theory:

conflict can originate either in goal incompatibility or in hostility (or in both) and that it

involves a unique type of behavior, conflict behavior. Thus conflict is defined as a situation in

which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to

express their hostility.30

Bruce Bonta defines the conflict as incompatable needs, differing demands,

contradictory wishes, opposing beliefs or diverging interests which produce interpersonal

antagonism and at times, hostile encounters.31 I would define the concept of the conflict as a

state of unharmony caused by clashing interests, needs and principles.

There must be at least two parties for a conflict to exist. In this case, Turkey and the

Kurdish rebel organization, PKK, are the two parties. As will be addressed in the coming

sections of the paper, Turkeys roots are relying on ethnic, secular Turkish nationalism. On

the other hand, the PKK bases its policies on the recognition and the emphasis of the Kurdish

identity in Turkey. Hence these two conflicting interests resulted in a conflict.

According to Anatol Rapaport, the conflict has more than one level: dog fight, chess

and a debate. To quickly summarize his theory, when the conflicting parties are in the state of

dog fight both sides try to annihilate the other completely; while in the chess level, the two

sides try to defeat each other. At this level, the parties are not trying to put an end to each

30 Otomar J.Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.1331 Christopher Beaudoin and Esther Thorson, Media and Conflict, Spiral of Violence? in Eytan Gilboa (ed.),Conflict and Conflict Resolution in International News, Transnational Publishers, 2002 p. 47


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others existence. In the last level, debate, the sides try to persuade each other that their cause

is true and noble and the others is false.32 In a conflict, side A might be at a different level

than the side B. For instance, in the Turkish-Kurdish/PKK conflict, Turkey is at the chess

level while the Kurds/PKK are at the debate level. In November 1991, Turkish journalist

Ismet Imset interviewed the PKK leader calan at his headquarters in Lebanon. In the

historic interview, calan declared that the PKK is no longer seeking secession from Turkey

but rather to gain Kurdish political and constitutional rights and to change Turkeys

composition from unitary to the federative system while continuing to live under Turkish

sovereignty. The PKK leader insisted that his group is not a terrorist organization and

emphasized that the current conflict was not created by them, but rather by the Turkish denial

policies. Turkey, however, was not interested in any form of compromise of the PKK.33

32 Anatol Rapoport, The Origins of Violence, London, Transaction Publishers, 1995, pp.510-51133 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), p.376


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THE ROOTS OF TURKISH AND KURDISH NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

In order to understand the roots of the current Turkish-Kurdish conflict we have to

observe and dig into the early roots of the history of these two people, before their interaction.

The word Kurdistan was first used in the 12th century by Seljuk Turks as a geographical

term.34 Moreover according to Paul White, Seljuk Sultan Sandjar created the Kurdistan

province and made the city of Bahar its capital.35

There are no officially recognized borders in Kurdistan because the Kurds have never

had a state. However, Kurdistan is strategically located in the Middle East:36in southeast and

eastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, western Iran, and smaller parts located in

Syria, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Kurds constitute one of the largest stateless nations in the

world.37 Approximately 22 million Kurds are living in Kurdistan.

With the victory of Seljuks against the Byzantines in the war of Manzikert 1071, the

Kurdish principalities became the dominant autonomous actors of southeast and eastern

Anatolia. Later, however, with the Seljuk influence the Turkomans became more dominant.

In time Kurds regained their autonomy. Later, the East Roman and Seljuk Empires were

replaced by the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires who were in rivalry.

In 1299, the Turks founded the Ottoman Empire. Through the years, the Ottomans

expanded their borders, hence the many different ethnic groups and nations, including the

Kurds, became subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish principalities were jammed

between the Iranian Safavid Empire, which tended to expand its area of influence towardseastern Anatolia, while the Ottoman Empire tended to expand its territories to the east. In

34 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi (A Modern History of the Kurds), Ankara, Doruk, 2004, p. 2835 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? London, Zed Books, 2000, p.1536 A.Manafy, The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Maryland, University Press of America,2005, p.137 Amir Hassanpour, The Kurdish Experience,Middle East Report, July-August 1994, p.3


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1514, the aldran (Chaldiran) War, which was a milestone in Kurdish history, took place at

Chaldiran between the Safavid Shah Ismail and the Ottoman Yavuz Sultan Selim, where the

Ottomans defeated their adversary. The resulting boundary established between the two was

formalized by the Treaty of Zuhab (Kasr- irin) in 1639, and has persisted into modern

times.38 As a result of the war the Kurds were divided between the Ottomans and Safavids.

Following the Ottoman victory, Yavuz Sultan Selim sent Kurdish notable dris Bitlisi

(Idris of Bitlis), a highborn Kurdish scholar and diplomat who had helped broker important

agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish Emirates, to Kurdistan. Idris Bitlisi

was authorized by the Sultan to grant the former ruling Kurdish families prominent positions

in the newly conquered territories of Kurdistan and establish their administrative framework

under nominal Ottoman suzerainty.39 In return, the Kurds recognized Yavuz Sultan Selims

overlordship, except for one of the principalities. The Kurdish princes retained de facto

control of their lands and some even continued to mint their own coins.40

As Western and Kurdish historians have stated, the Kurds enjoyed limited autonomy

in the region. However, according to the Turkish historians product, Turkish high school text

books describe another story which is not similar to the Kurdish-Western one. According to

the school text book discourse, Yavuz Sultan Selim conquered the entire region from the

Safavids which then became under absolute Ottoman rule. In this case, the words Kurd,

and autonomy are never mentioned. One can suggest therefore that the principalities of the

nineteenth century, with their autonomous existence, constituted and defined a political-social

space whereKurdishness was constituted.41

In 1876, Sultan Abdulhamit II came to power. The Sultan decided to form the

Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments as a precaution against the Russians. This policy,

38 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, 2004, p. 3239 bid, p. 2740 Christopher Houston, Kurdistan Crafting of National Selves, Indiana, Indiana University Pres, 2008, p. 1041Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity,Middle Eastern Studies32:2 , 1996, pp. 216 - 229


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however, planted the seeds of Kurdishness. The real reason for Hamidiyes establishment

was the disorder in southeast and eastern Anatolia which was being caused by Armenians and

some Kurds. Hamidiye was composed of loyal local Sunni Kurdish tribal members.

Generally, the regiment was composed from a homogenous tribe, therefore the loyalty to the

regiment was secured. Tribal leaders and other members of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry

Regiments were sent to Istanbul Military Academies.42 Soon a struggle between the

Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments tribal members and other tribes started.

The name of Hamidiye soon became synonymous with corruption. The state-

sponsored Hamidiye was also used against the local Armenians. Consequently, the

Armenians formed their own militaristic units, such as Armenikan and Hinchak. The

Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments was a complete failure for Istanbul. Kurds became more

united with their tribal consciousness and less loyal to Istanbul.43 The Hamidiye was

eventually dissolved by Istanbul.

In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire faced serious inter-connected problems.

The conventional administrative, political and economic structure of the empire were being

eroded due to the desire of the Ottoman state to become a modern Western state. A prime

consequence of these processes was the gradual erosion in national and non-central aspects of

Ottoman politics. The Ottomans started a centralization process. As a result of this process

the Kurdish principalities were abolished. This new conjuncture meant the termination of the

confederative unity of the Kurdish tribes and the rise of sheikhs as the new political leaders.44

Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri is known as the Father of the Kurdish nationalism, or

Kurdishness (Krtlk). In order to understand why Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri is

considered the Father of the Kurdish nationalism, we must first examine the idea of Kurdish

nationalism.

42 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, pp.97-10343 bid, pp.94-10344 Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, pp. 218-219


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Hakan zolu, in his bookKurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, based Kurdish

nationalism or Kurdishness, on two pillars: Kurdish nationalism refers to an intellectual

and political movement that is based on two pillars the belief in a consistent Kurdish

identity, which is rooted in an ancient history; and the conviction of an unalienable right for

self determination in a historic Kurdish homeland or territory.45

The main reason for the Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion was the Treaty of Berlin,

signed on 13th July 1878. According to the treaty the Ottoman Empire made promises to the

Armenians. Sheikh Ubeydullah, in order to show his dissatisfaction with the treaty, warned

Tosun Pasha (Governor of Subdivision of Bakale): What is this I hear, that the Armenians

are going to have an independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the

British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to

arm the women.46

Here I would like to emphasize the Kurdishness of Ubeydullahs revolt by quoting a

letter of his to Mr.Cochran, an American missionary in Hakkari, which was written in 1880:

The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their

religion is different, and their laws and customs are distinct We are also a nation apart. We

want our affairs to be in our hands. 47Although the Ubeydullah rebellion came to an end with

Ottoman and Iranian oppression, its impact on Kurdish history is indisputable.

As was stated above, for the first time Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri mentioned the idea

of a separate Kurdish nation. The Ottomans, however, were using the Millet System, which

worked in an efficient way up until the rise of European nationalism, at which point it ceased

to be effective.

45 Hakan zolu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York, State University of New York Press,2004, p. 1046 bid, p.7447 Ibid, p.75; Ubeydullah to Dr.Cochran, 5th October 1880, Parliamentary Papers (Turkey 1881), 5:47-48


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As stated above, the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire--Turks, Kurds etc--

was defined as Muslim or Ottoman. Until the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) rise

to power, Turks and Kurds were not conscious of their national identity. Their sense of

identity was based on the glue: Islam.

With the French revolution, however, the ideas of nationalism became influential

among the Turks just as it was influential for other millets in the Ottoman Empire. The Greek

and Serbian rebellions and their independence from the Ottomans led the Ottomans to adopt a

new unifying ideology called Ottomanism. Ottomanism was a collective, territorial, non-

religious, non-ethnic based nationalism. Ottomanism emerged in order to confront the

problems that nationalism was causing in the empire. This new notion was formally

announced with a Nationality Law in 1869.48

Ethnic nationalism was strongly felt among the Young Turks. The Young Turks, or

CUP, became the sovereign power in the Ottoman Empire after a successful rebellion against

Sultan Abdulhamit II which took place in 1908. CUP members were keen on establishing a

state on the basis of Turkish nationalism due to the act that Ottomanism could not unite all the

subjects nor could it stop the disintegration of the empire as it has it had been designed to do.

The founder of Modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, was a member of this organization.49

Ethnic nationalism was also influential among the Kurds who were more passive than

the Turks, since ummah (Nation of Islam) and the Ottoman identity were much more vital

for them. During the First World War, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed secretly by the

Allied Forces against the Ottomans in May 1916. The Sykes-Picot Agreement defined the

Allied Forces spheres of influence and control in western Asia after the expected downfall of

the Ottoman Empire. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks made this secret agreement public.50

48 Paul White, Citizenship Under the Ottomans and Kemalists: How the Kurds were Excluded, CitizenshipStudies, Vol. 3, No.1, 1999, p.7949 Ibid, p.7950 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, p.167


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On 30th October 1918, with the Mudros Armistice Agreement that put an end to

World War I, and following the Wilson Principles, General Sherif Pasha, a Kurd, along with

other Kurds, decided to form a national organization to advocate the Kurdish peoples right to

establish its own nation-state in Kurdistan. The organization was formally established on

17th December 1918, and was named The Rise of Kurdistan Society (Krdistan Teali

Cemiyeti). Sherif Pasha was declared a traitor in stanbul.51 His agreement with the

Armenian representative, Boghos Nubar, was not well acknowledged among all Kurdish

subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Kurds had always identified themselves with their religion

instead of their ethnic identity. With the rise of CUP, the Turkish national identity was

strengthened.

Ottoman submission to the Allies was a huge disappointment to the Turks. Mustafa

Kemal (Atatrk) who would become the founder of the Modern Turkish Republic, decided to

flee Istanbul for Samsun in order to form an independence movement. The Turkish War of

Independence had begun on 19th May 1919.

Mustafa Kemal was aware of Kurdish nationalist acts throughout the empire. On 23rd

May 1919, four days after his arrival in Samsun as inspector of the 9 th Army, Mustafa Kemal

(Atatrk) requested a situation report from Ahmet Cevdet, deputy commander of the 13 th

corps in Diyarbekir (today:Diyarbakr). In his reply dated 27th May 1919, Cevdet detailed the

activity of the tribes and of the British in his area and said that the Kurdish Club (The Rise of

Kurdistan Society) in Diyarbekir was working for Kurdish independence. On 29th May 1919,

Mustafa Kemal asked the General Staff in Istanbul to notify him where exactly the British

were promoting the cause of an independent Kurdistan. As an outcome, Mustafa Kemal sent

a telegram on 11th June 1919, to a Diyarbekir Kurdish notable, Kasm Cemilpaazade, as a

message to all Kurds. In his telegram Kemal stated: the plan to create an independent

51 smail Glda, Krdistan Teali Cemiyet, stanbul, Doz Yaynlar, 1991, pp.12-13


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Kurdistan had been hatched by the British for the benefit of Armenians. However Kurds and

Turks are true brothers and may not be separated. Our existence requires that Kurds, Turks,

and all Muslim elements should work together to defend our independence and prevent the

partition of the fatherland. Mustafa Kemal went on:I am in favor of granting all manner of

rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment (to the state) and the prosperity and

progress of our Kurdish brothers, on condition that the Ottoman state is not split up.52

During the war, Mustafa Kemal placed a strong emphasis on Islamic unity and their

brotherhood bods against the Christian alliance. Although he was against the Caliphate, he

never spoke against it in order to preserve the unity of the resistance.

The Mudros Armistice Agreement was signed on 30th October 1918. This armistice

agreement was different from previous armistice agreements which had been signed after

World War I. This is because that even though it divided Turkey into pieces between the

Allied states, Article 24 also gave jurisdiction to the Allied Forces to occupy eastern Anatolia

in case of a chaotic situation.

As a result of the Mudros Armistice Agreement, in the spring of 1919, Greece had

landed its army in western Anatolia. The Greeks living in the district of Trabzon were hoping

for support from the Greek government in order to set up a Greek dominated Pontus state.

Furthermore, in eastern Anatolia where the aim was to establish Greater Armenia, the

Armenians began to occupy areas vacated by the Ottoman armies. Due to these

circumstances, organizations for local Turkish defence and the preservation of national rights

were formed. The landing of Greek troops at Izmir accelarated the efforts of these

organizations.53

In order to unite all of these national resistance movements against the Mudros

Armistice Agreements conditions and against the occupation forces, Mustafa Kemal presided

52 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds,Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4, 1999, pp.5-753 Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.76


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over two important Congresses, Erzurum and Sivas. At the Erzurum Congress participants

drew up the National Pact (Misak- Milli), which basically established modern Turkeys

existing borders. The National Pact showed that Turkey would not accept an independent

Kurdistan in southeastern Anatolia.54

The proclamation of the Congress states that the Black

Sea and the eastern Anatolian provinces (including the main Kurdish provinces of Diyarbekir,

Mamretlaziz, Van and Bitlis) were an inseparable part of the Ottoman community and that

all the Islamic elements living in this area are true brothers,55 while at the same time it

stressed the loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.56

In 1920, the National Pact was ratified by the Ottoman Parliament. The ratification

granted legitimacy to the borders that the Turkish Independence Movement sought to defend.

It is important to note that the only legitimate government for the victorious powers of World

War I, was the Ottoman government. The Turkish Independence Movement, led by Mustafa

Kemal, acknowledged this pact as a milestone for the unity of Turkey, while Winston

Churchill believed that an independent Kurdistan would form a buffer zone between Turkey

and the British-controlled northern Iraqi territories.57

On 10th August 1920, the Sevres Treaty was signed. Sevres authenticated the division

of the empire and the final settlement of the Eastern Question.58 According to the treaty,

western Turkey was to be occupied by Greek forces, southern Turkey was to be occupied first

by the Italians, then by the French who would replaced them. Armenian gangs were

operating in the east, while the British surrouded the area of Istanbul, even though this

territory was declared an international zone. Kirkuk and Mosul were also placed under

British occupation. Only central Anatolia was left as Turkish territory (See Map 1).

54 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.14355 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds, p. 856 Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.7657 bid, pp.69-7158 bid, pp.67-68


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The Treaty of Sevres created a syndrome in Turkey, Sevres Syndrome. The Sevres

Syndrome describes the suspicion that the Western powers were bent on dismantling Turkey

territorially, just as they had tried to do in the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1920.59 Hasan

Cemal, a prominent Turkish journalist in his bookKrtler (Kurds), describes the Sevres

Syndrome: As an empire in 1913 we controlled a shore in the Adriatic sea, while in 1919

Istanbul, the empires capital was under occupation. This created a trauma. The fear of

Sevres passed from generation to generation.60 The Sevres Syndrome is the reason why the

new born Turkish state rejected plurality and the expression of the other ethnic identities in

the state and emphasized only Turkism.

Map 1: Map of Turkey according to Sevres Treaty61

Article 62 of the Sevres Treaty states that a commission would prepare a new plan for

Kurdish autonomy in the Kurdish populated areas. Article 63 states that the Turkish

59 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p. 22560 Hasan Cemal, Krtler, p.33761 Map of Turkey according to Treaty of Sevres,

http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/vmap7.gif 6th September 2009


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government would accept the commissions decisions. Lastly, Article 64 emphasized that the

autonomous Kurds may ask for the right of independence from the League of Nations, and if

the Council of the League of Nations would concur, Turkey must abandon her claims to the

region.62

The minorities of Turkey became a third party after the Mudros and Sevres Treaties.

The legal basis for the minorities political rights was derived from the Wilson Principles of

8th January 1918. According to United States of Americas (USA) President Woodrow

Wilson, the 12th principle states that the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire

should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under

Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested

opportunity for autonomous development. Wilson added that the Dardanelles should be

permanently opened as a free passage to ships and commerce of all nations under

international guarantees.63 Kurdish nationalists base their demands on the Sevres Peace

Treaty and Wilson Principles.

As was mentioned before, under the Mudros Armistice Agreement, Article 24 granted

opportunities for Allied Forces to occupy the east. In order to put an end to the chaotic

situation which had been created by Mustafa Kemal, the stanbul government decided to

send British Army Major Noel to the east. Noels intention was to defy the Turkish policy of

Pan-Islamic propaganda and to put a stop to the Turkish policy of turning the Kurds against

the Allied Forces. J.B. Hohler, a former British political advisor, once said thatI am afraid

that he will be a Kurdish Colonel Lawrence. 64

Noel sent a telegram to stanbul about his mission in the east. Due to his telegram, the

Kurdish state issue was seriously debated in the peace conference where the Armenians

62 The Treaty of Sevres Articles 62,63,64http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260, 9th July 2009

63 Wilson Pinciples, 12th Principlehttp://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points 18th August 200964 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi p184


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were represented by Boghos Nubar and the Kurds by General Sherif Pasha.65 n the telegram,

Major Noel noted that Ali Galip, Governor of Elaz Province, produced a decree from the

Sultan ordering him to raise a force of Kurdish cavalry against Mustafa Kemal in Sivas. A

day later, Major Noel commented that Ali Galip had to disperse the Kurdish tribal gathering

as the idea of marching to Sivas was too risky. Later, Noel and his colleagues who had

helped him, had to leave Turkey. Mustafa Kemal made maximum use of the Ali Galip plot to

discredit the stanbul Government, even though the plot failed to reach its goals.66

Seyit Abdulkadir, president of the Rise of Kurdistan Society, sent Baytar Nuri to the

region in order to organize the infrastructure of the Kogiri Revolt which took place in 1920.

Kogiri rebels asked the Ankara government to put the Sevres Treaty in force in order to

establish a Kurdish state on Diyarbekir, Van, Bitlis and Dersim provinces. In a memorandum

sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), the rebels asked for the autonomy of

Kurdistan and the replacement of the Turkish governors by Kurdish ones. Their

memorandum was not accepted. In the above mentioned provinces, TGNA declared martial

law and crushed the revolt.67

Despite the Kogiri revolt Mustafa Kemal was still considering granting autonomy to

the Kurds in the framework of local government throughout the country. Mustafa Kemal was

against drawing new borders for Kurds. He said,If we wished to draw a border in the name

of Kurdishness it would be necessary to destroy Turkishness and Turkey .68 On 1st March

1922, in the TGNA, Mustafa Kemal said, The people of Turkey is a social entity united in a

race, religion and a culture, imbued with mutual respect and a sense of sacrifice and sharing

65 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi pp.184-18666 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds p.1067 smet Bozda, Krt syanlar, stanbul, Truva Yaynlar, 2004, pp.19-2168 Dou Perinek, Kurtulu Savanda Krt Politikas, stanbul, Kaynak Yaynlar, 1999, p.357


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the same destiny and interests. Nevertheless, the expression People of Turkey, rather than

Turkish people is significant (See Figure 1, page 35).69

After the decisive Turkish victory over the Greeks, the Lausanne Peace Treaty was

signed by the former occupiers and Turkey. The treaty had set the borders of the Turkish

national state, while all the promises to Kurds made by the Allies were neglected in this

agreement due to the Turkish victory in the War of Independence.

The Lausanne Agreement defines the minorities in Turkey as simply non-Muslim

citizens of the republic. Therefore, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians and other non-mentioned

Muslim citizens of the Turkish republic are not considered minorities. In the Minority Rights

Section of the Lausanne Treaty, Article 39 is indirectly related to the Kurds. It states that

every citizen of Turkey in every sphere is allowed to use any language, while emphasizing

that Turkish is the sole official language.70 This article specifically de-legitimizes the former

law which had banned the Kurdish language.

The Treaty of Lausanne failed to recognize ethnically based minorities. As Lord

Curzon noted: The Turkish delegation insisted that these minorities (Kurds, Circassians and

Arabs) required no protection and were quite satisfied with their lot under Turkish rule.71 In

one stroke, the Kurdish people lost their right to exist as a recognizable and distinct people

and were incorporated into the Turkish nation by virtue of their Muslim heritage.72

In October 1923, a republic was formally declared, with Mustafa Kemal Atatrk as its

president and smet nn as its prime minister. The caliphate separated from the Sultanate

since November 1922 - was abolished on 3rd March 1924, and Abdul Mejid, the last caliph,

was sent into exile. These changes were embodied in a new constitution enacted on 20th

April 1924. In 1926, Turkey abondoned the old Islamic based civil and penal codes in favor

69 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds, p. 1270 Lausanne Treaty, Articles 37-42 http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne 12th July 200971 Robert Olson, Mark Muller (eds.) Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Kentucky, KentuckyUniversity Pres, 1996, p.17572 bid, p.175


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of secular codes based on the ones of Switzerland and Italy. The compulsory change from the

Arabic letters to the Latin script, and the withdrawal of the declaration of Islam as the religion

of the state73 shook the relationship between the Turks and the Kurds. As was already

mentioned, Kurds were bound in unity with Turks merely because of the glue that held

them together: Islam.

The new state policies being implemented were intolereable for the Kurds.74 The

Turkish language as the sole official language, the Turkish states ignorance of the Kurdish

language, and the abolishment of the sultanic rule and the caliphate are just a few examples of

such policies. The use of other languages in public was banned and a campaign was

inaugurated under the motto Citizen, speak Turkish (Vatanda Trke Konu). The chief

target of this policy were the Jews who spoke Ladino instead of Turkish in their daily lives.

In addition to the Jews, the non-Turkish Muslims such as Kurds, Arabs and Circassians felt

the impact of the campaign.75

Kemalists (the secular and Turkish nationalistic political trend members) thought to

unify all elements under the umbrella of secular, nationalist Turkism. With the 1921

Constituition, the definition of citizenship transformed from religion to ethnicity.

Mustafa Kemal Atatrks anti-sultanic, secular, Turkish nationalist view became the

dominant view in the name of the Republic of Turkey. The name of the new republic,

Turkey, which came from the word Turk, symbolized the new glue of citizenship. As

was indicated in the theoretical part of this paper, Ziya Gkalp, the Father of Turkish

nationalisms core theories, was very influencial. Gkalp, in his bookTrkln Esaslar

(The Principles of Turkism), published in 1920, showed Kemalists how to assimilate the

minorities with the Turkish identity.

73 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp.56-5774 Kemal Kirii, Garreth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp.91-10375 Nesim eker, Identity Formation and Politcal Power in Ottoman Empire and in Early Turkish Republic,p.66


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Today, there are many different ethnicities living within Turkeys borders as Turkish

citizens, the most prominent groups are Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazs, Albanians, Jews,

Greeks, and Armenians. Despite the fact that all of these ethnicities compose the Republic of

Turkey, etymologically the name Turkey is derived from the Turkish ethnicity. This fact

automatically determines the citizens of Turkish ethnic origin as the dominant and primary

staatvolkethnie of Turkey.

Kemalism had three different definitions of the Turkish nation. The first of these was

territorial. This was embodied in the Turkish constitution of 1924, which registered all

inhabitants of Turkey as Turks. It promised to accommodate the Kurds, the Armenians and

all others as equal citizens of the republic. The second definition, less inclusive than the first,

was religious. Due to the legacy of the Millet system, the Kemalists saw all Muslims in

Turkey as Turks. The third and least inclusive definition was ethno-religious, the ethnic-

Turks (See Figure 1).76

Figure 1: Zones of Turkishness77

76 Soner aaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s,Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.8,No.2 Summer 2002, pp.75-7677 bid, p.76


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From the earliest days of the Turkish Republic, Atatrks conception of ethnic-

nationalist, secular citizenship of unitary state -Kemalism has made Turkishness

synonymous with the Turkish nation-state. The idea was propagated by the Kemalist

magazine, Kadro, that there was only one race in Turkey, the Turks, and one language,

Turkish. This process popularized slogans, such as One party, one nation and one leader

(Bir parti, bir ulus, tek lider), The only friends of Turks are Turks (Trkn Trkten baka

dostu yoktur) and as a last example One Turk is worth all the world (Bir Trk dnyaya

bedeldir).78 It was not until March 1992, that the former President Demirel openly announced

that he recognized the reality of a Kurdish ethnic presence in Turkey.79 Previously, the Kurds

were not acknowledged by the Turkish administrations as a different ethnic group nor a

minority. Kurds were seen as Mountain Turks who had forgotten their native language.80

Article 2 of Turkeys current 1982 Constitution states that: the Republic of Turkey is a

democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law, bearing in mind the

concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice respecting human rights, loyal to the

nationalism of Atatrk (Atatrk Milliyetilii) and based on the fundamental tenets set forth

in the preamble.81 According to Necmi Yzbaolu and Blent Tanr, the term Nationalism

of Atatrk is a synonym for Turkish nationalism. Yzbaolu and Tanr state in their book

that, the nationalism of Atatrk is based on several principles: Turkishness openness to

Atatrks reforms and principles, the states inseparableness, and the interpretation of the term

Turk on the basis of citizenship and not on ethnicity, policy of seeking peace, citizens

bound to the state, secularism and sovereignty. 82 Hence Turkish nationalism / nationalism of

78 Paul White, Citizenship under the Ottomans and Kemalists: How the Kurds were Excluded, CitizenshipStudies, Vol. 3 No.1, 1999, p.8279 Kemal Kirii, Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.11380 John Bulloch, Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains, New York, Oxford University Press,1992,

p.16881 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi Yaynlar, 2005,Article 282 Blent Tanr, Necmi Yzbaolu, 1982 Anayasasna Gre Trk Anayasa Hukuku, stanbul, Beta, 2004, p.66


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Atatrk was based on the Modernist Approach of nationalism in which the common

denominator is not race, religion, language and ethnicity but the will of living together.83

According to Article 66 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution, everyone who is bound to

the Turkish Republic in terms of citizenship is defined as a Turk.84

This definition includes

Muslims, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Circassians, Lazs, Albanians, and of course, the Kurds.

Furthermore, on 20th July 1971, the Turkish Constitutional Courts decision 1971/3, 1971/1,

and from 8th May 1980, decision numbers 1979/1, 1980/1, set precedential decrees on

Atatrks nationalism, stating that Turkish nationalism can not be based on racial ideologies,

different ethnic origins, religions and languages, and that these can not be considered as

separative factors for the states unity.85

However, in the case of Turkey, the most prominent difference of the Kurds is the fact

that they have a different language. The Republic of Turkey prefers to regard the Kurds on

equal footing as fellow citizens of the republic who are not separate from the Republic. The

Kurds regard themselves as a political, stateless nation and ask for further democratic rights,

if not independence.

Modern Turkey was ready to absorb and assimilate all other ethnic groups into one big

Turkish group. As Mustafa Kemal Atatrk said,Happyis the man who says he/she is a Turk

(Ne mutlu Trkm diyene). Turkishness/Turkism became the only identity for all citizens of

the republic regardless of religion and ethnic origin. After the Ubeydullah uprising was

suppressed, and with the proclamation of the secular republic, Kurds found themselves more

alienated than ever before.

The extension of the central governments external authority into Kurdish lands,

accompanied by the new and unfamiliar economic and technological processes of modern

civilization, roused Kurdish resistance and increased the vehemence of Kurdish nationalism.

83 Blent Tanr, Necmi Yzbaolu, 1982 Anayasasna Gre Trk Anayasa Hukuku, stanbul, Beta, 2004, p.6784 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Article 6685 Trial Records Abdullah calan 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya , Turkey


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The aggressiveness of nascent Turkish, Persian and Arab nationalism gave rise to new

grievances and apprehensions, for besides wounding Kurdish national pride, they threatened

the Kurdish national identity with extinction.86

In the post-victory period there were no Kurdish separatists left in stanbul. However

we do see that in 1923 a new organization in the name of Azadi formed in Erzurum. Azadi

members were composed of the former officers of the Turkish Army and the Hamidiye

Regiments. In 1924, Azadi organized its first meeting in which Sheikh Said was also present.

Due to Sheikh Saids pressure, two important decisions were taken. The first decision was

that a revolt would be organized against the Ankara govenment for the sake of Kurdishness

and Islam, and the second decision was that the revolt had to be supported by external powers

such as France and Britain.87 Sheikh Said used Turkeys secular process reforms and its

emphasis on the Turkishness as an excuse to start his rebellion in 1925.88

The explicit goal of the revolt was to establish an independent Kurdistan which would

be based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the secular Turkey that had just abolished the

caliphate. Unfortunately for the Kurds, Sheikh Said could rally only the Zaza speaking

Kurds. Alevi Kurds fought on the side of the Turkish government due to their belief that they

would be better off in a secular Turkey than in a Sunni Kurdistan led by a Naqshibandi

sheikh.89

The rebellion started in the village of Piran when the Turkish gendarmerie tried to

arrest five outlaws who were under the protection of the Sheikh, leading to the death of the

gendarmeries. This was the largest and most important Kurdish rebellion, until the emergence

of the PKK. The Turkish army crushed the rebellion, imprisoning many. As punishment,

86 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, Syracuse, Syracuse UniversityPress, 2006, pp.292-29387 Yaar Kalafat, Bir Ayaklanmann Anatomisi eyh Sait, Ankara, Avrasya Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi(ASAM)Yaynlar, 2003, pp.107-11188 Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, 1996, p.22189 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.179


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Sheikh Said and other leaders of the rebellion were hanged by the Independence Courts of the

Turkish State.90

Even after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Kurds continued their disobediance against the

Turks. In 1927, a new Kurdish nationalist organization, Khoybun, was established in

Lebanon. Just as Azadi played a crucial role in the Sheikh Said rebellion, Khoybun played a

crucial role in the Mount Ararat (Ar Da) Revolt. Khoybun sought to establish a strong

Kurdish national liberation front with a trained fighting force that would not depend on the

traditional tribal leaders.91

In order to organize a trained force that would not rely on the traditional tribal leaders,

Khoybun appointed hsan Nuri Bey, a former staff major in the Turkish army. By 1928, a

miniature Kurdish state had been created at Ar Da. Turkish authorities surprisingly

adopted a conciliation policy. The governor of Beyazt began to negotiate with the rebels.

Ihsan Nuri turned down every offer down due to his belief that the Turkish delegation had

completely ignored Kurdish national aspirations. As an outcome of the failed negotiations the

Turkish army launched an attack which crushed the revolt.92

As a means of oppressing these transgressions, the Turkish parliament legislated law

number 1850. According to this law, there will be no investigations concerning the violence

against the Kurdish civil population which may have been carried out by the security forces

during the clashes.93

In those days, assimilation of the Kurds was seen as an absolute solution for the

ongoing Kurdish revolts. A new 2510 numbered re-settlement law passed on 13th June 1934.

The first article of this law stated that the Ministry of Interior is assigned the power to correct

90 Robert Olson, The Emmergence of the Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion 1880- 1925,University of Texas Press, 1989, pp. 107-12891 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.9992 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, pp.211-21593 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi,p.285


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the distribution and locating of the population in Turkey in accordance with membership of

the Turkish culture. 94

According to the law, Turkey was divided into three regions. The first region was

Turkish-cultured peoples populated areas, the second region was for the people who do not

belong to the Turkish culture but who were seen as a potential for assimilation, and lastly the

third region was the Kurdish majority region that had to be evacuated totally for sanitary,

material, cultural, political and strategic reasons. Places like Ar, Sason, Tunceli (Dersim),

Zeylan (Van), Kars, Diyarbekir (Diyarbakr), Bitlis, Bingl, Mu were among the cities to be

evacuated.95

This law made possible to annihilate the Kurdish tribal system. Every village and

town whose mother tongue was not Turkish was to be evacuated.96 Assimilation policies such

as the Resettlement Law, forced the resettlement of the dangerous Kurdish

tribes/leaders/people to the western part of the country in order to disconnect them from the

region, resulted in further Kurdish self-consciousness. Turkeys assimilation policies were

becoming more evident for the Kurds.

The city of Dersim was an important center of Kurdish insubordination. The Kurds

were greatly affected by the 1937 Resettlement Law that the Turkish government initiated.

Kurds of Dersim decided to send a delegation with a letter of protest to the Turkish Military

Governor Abdullah Alpdoan in order to express the peoples opposition to the law.

According to Kurdish sources, the Turkish governor arrested the emissaries bearing the letter

of protest and executed them. In retalliation, the Kurds attacked a convoy of police cars and

kidknapped the policemen. This act marked the beginning of the Dersim Revolt.97

94 Soner aaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s, p.7295 smail Beiki, Krtlerin Mecburi skan, Ankara, Yurt Kitap, 1991, p.11196 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, pp.286-28797 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, p.215


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General Alpdoan declared martial law in Dersim. There was an extremely tight

military censorship, Dersim became a restricted area where travel was prohibited and the flow

of news was strictly controlled. In this confrontation the Turkish army used modern

armaments including air crafts. Sayyid Riza, together with a number of leaders and their

families surrendered to the Turkish army after two years of ceaseless fighting. Sayyid Riza

and the rest of the leaders were tried and hanged. The Kurds have charged that the Turks

resorted to the most inhuman methods to punish the rebels both during and after the rebellion

which was completely suppressed in 1938.98

After the suppression of the Dersim rebellion, Celal Bayar, Turkish Minister of

Interior of the time, was reported to have declared in the TGNA that the Kurdish problem no

longer existed...99 It is also noteworthy that Dersims name was Turkified and changed to

Tunceli. The Dersim rebellion was the last tribal rebellion against the Turkish Republic.

98 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, p.21699 bid, p.216


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KURDISH REAWAKENING IN THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC

The affects of the Dersim oppression were felt by the Kurds until the 1960s. The year

1961 marked a new constitution in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution granted rights and liberties

that the Turks today do not even enjoy under the current 1982 Constitution. In this period,

Kurdish youth began to discover Kurdishness. It was during this new wave of Kurdish

Consciousness that the PKK began to sprout.

Kurdish Radio broadcasts had begun in Cairo and Yerevan at this time. Kurdish

intellectual Musa Anter, began to publish leri Yurt in 1959, the first Kurdish publication

since the Dersim Rebellion. The Menderes government eventually banned leri Yurt and

jailed 50 Kurdish intellectuals to be executed. They were accused of being communists. Due

to the fact that one of the intellectuals was killed during his custody, the case was named as

the 49ers. Forty-nine prisoners were set free during the military coup detat in 1960.

Despite the fact that the coup detat set free the 49ers, the aghas (Kurdish tribal leaders) were

arrested and sent to the camps in Sivas. This event would come to be known as the Exile of

the Aghas.100

In the introduction to Sherif Firats bookEastern Provinces and the history of Varto,

coup detat President Grsel advocated for the non-existence of the Kurdish nationality.

Grsel claimed that the Kurds are the racial brothers of the Turks and good citizens of the

Turkish Republic.

A new era for the Kurds began when the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centers

(Dou Devrimci Kltr Ocaklar (DDKO)) were founded in 1969. The DDKOs were

organized by urban Kurds in response to provocative anti-Kurdish articles that inflamed the

100 A.Osman lmez, Trkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, Doruk Publications Ankara, 1995, pp.38-45


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Kurdish public opinion.101 The word East (Dou) in DDKOs name symbolized

Kurdistan.102 The DDKOs were the first legal Kurdish organization in Turkey. The DDKO

centers created a network within all the Kurdish towns as a place for evolution in

understanding the Kurdish problem. It was no longer an issue of regional under-development,

but rather a national (later a colonial) problem.103

In tken, the journal of the extreme right wing Nationalist Movement Party

(Milliyeti Hareket Partisi MHP), an anonymous article was published. The article stated

that the Kurds were a backward people, devoid of history and culture, who wanted to cut

Turkey into pieces. The author suggested that the Kurds must get out of Turkey since Turkey

was only for the Turks. As an outcome, the Kurds organized a furious protest. Kurds

demanded that the Ankara government punish the author and ban the magazine, since Section

12 of the Turkish constituiton proclaimed the equality of all citizens irrespective of any

distinction, but the government did nothing. Instead of condemning the article, Turkish

President Cevdet Sunay stated: Those who are not Turks may go away from Turkey, 104 which

came as a complete shock to the Kurds. Consequently, many protests took place in cities.

In the DDKOs monthly bulletin, the main issues were about the economic problems

of eastern Turkey, the oppression of the Kurdish villagers by (Kurdish) landlords and tribal

leaders, and the brutal and violent behavior of the Turkish army units in Kurdish villages. 105

When Abdullah calan, the founder of the PKK, was in stanbul in 1970, he took part in

DDKO activities and established connections with other students. The DDKO blended

Marxism and Kurdish nationalism to mobilize the youth in the name of social justice and

101 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in TurkeyLondon, Zed Books, 2000, p.129102 Martin Van Bruinessen, The Kurds in Turkey,Merip Reports, February 1984, p.8103 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey

p.134104 bid, pp.132-133105 Martin Van Bruinessen, The Kurds in Turkey, p.8


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identity.106 The DDKOs were later destroyed when all their leaders were arrested during the

1971 military coup.

For the first time in the Turkish history, the Constitution of 1961 made possible the

establishment of a socialist party. With time, the Turkish Labor Party became the legal basis

for the Kurds.107 However, in 1970, Turkish Labor Party members, sitting in their fourth

congress, made a public statement that put an end to the partys being. The partys statement

caused an earthquake in the Turkish political arena. The Labor Party emphasized that there

are Kurdish people in eastern Turkey who are confronting the fascist policies of assimilation,

suppression and violence in their daily lives.108 DDKO members were very active in the

Turkish Labor Party. They openly advocated for the Kurdish thesis. More importantly, the

division between the Turkish left and the Kurdish left occured only after the DDKOs

emergence.

In April 1978, a violent event occured in Malatya and in Mara, where the ultra

nationalist, Sunni, rightist Turkish Bozkurt group launched an attack against the Kurdish,

Alevi, leftists. As a result, 109 people were killed, 176 people were severly wounded, and 500

shops were destroyed. A State of emergency was declared in the Kurdistan provinces.

Unfortunately the violence did not end, which led to the 12th September 1980 military coup

detat.

Events such as the rise of Communism, the division of the Turkish people as right and

left, and the chaotic situation of violence all resulted in 12th September 1980 coup detat

which abrogated the 1961 Constitution. It was replaced by the current 1982 Constitution

which took severe measures against all Turkish citizens by constraining the rights and

106 M.Hakan Yavuz, Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, Nationalism andEthnic Politics, Vol.7 No:3, Autmn 2001, p.10107 Chris Kutschera, Mad Dreams of Independence, The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK,Middle East Report

No:189, The Kurdish Experience, Jul-Aug, 1994, p.13108 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, p.542


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liberties. In addition to that, 1982 Constitution granted extra ordinary jurisdiction to the

military.

Another crucial factor in the newly reawakened nationalist Kurdish culture is the

Newroz holiday. The Newroz holiday, was first celebrated by Persians between eighth-tenth

centuries before their conversion to Islam. It is believed that Newroz is the day that the God

created humanbeings and the universe. Moreover, as it is written in Sherefname, written by

Sherefhan of Bitlis, Newroz is the day that the Kurdish nation was born.109

Newroz was first adopted by the Iraqi Kurds in the 1950s. At the same time, Kurdish

student unions in Europe began organizing Newroz parties. The Kurdish youth in Europe

became more aware of their Kurdish national identity. During the 1980s, the Newroz parties

also began to be celebrated among Turkeys Kurds. In time Newroz became politicized. The

organized Newroz parties by the PKK distinguished themselves especially in the first years by

calling its supporters to a violent struggle for liberation against the Oppressive Turkish

State.110

With the rise of the PKK and the Kurdish identity in Turkey, the Kurds of Turkey

adopted Newroz as their national holiday. Furthermore, as a holiday it signifies the unity to

all the Kurds around the world.

109Hrriyet, 21st March 1998110 Martin Van Bruinessen, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question,Robert Schuman Center for

Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence 2000


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THE BIRTH OF PARTIYA KARKEREN KURDISTAN PKK

In 1973, Abdullah calan along with a group of his friends, decided to form Partiya

Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) (Kurdistan Workers Party) in ubuk, Ankara. The organizations

main ideology was Marxist-Leninist and sought the independence of the Kurdish people. In

the criminal charges brought against Abdullah calan in mral Island, it is implied that the

PKKs aim was to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan on the parts of the

Turkish terrirtories where the Kurdish population is the majority. According to the PKK, this

part of Turkey is under Turkish colonial rule.111

In its charter, the PKK defines its purpose as promoting the Kurdish nations unity,

promoting Kurdish nations self-democratic administration, providing a democratic solution

to the Kurdish Question, influencing the sovereign states in Kurdistan by causing

democratization, and providing freedom to women by removal of the feudal society

structure.112 According to calan, Turkey could manage its sovereignty over the region by

using the feudal lords as collaborators.113 In the beginning, the most important objectives of

the PKK were showing the local population Turkeys inability to challenge with itself,

destruction of tribal system, abolishing female slavery, and lastly, to establish an independent

Kurdistan from Turkey.114

The PKK formed its structure based on trilogy; these were the Party, the Front and the

Army. The Party was responsible for decision making and to force other bodies to carry out

the decisions; the Front was responsible for propaganda and providing logistics for the Army;

111 Trial Records Abdullah calan, Preamble, 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya ,Turkey112 PKK Charter Article 3113 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) pp.13-18114 Nihat Ali zcan, PKK,tarihi ideolojisi ve Yntemi, pp.63- 78


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the Army had the responsibility to operate against the specified targets and to liberate all the

territories it could.115

Nihat Ali zcan in his b

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