Headed for the Exits AnEmpiricalAssessmentoftheKeyFactorsDrivingHonduranEmigration

Ryan C. Williams

ABSTRACT With the surge in Central American families and unaccompanied children arriving at the United States’ southern border, there has been renewed interest and debate about why people are leaving the region in such great numbers. Despite the increased attention being paid to this phenomenon, there is a disconnect in the literature about what is driving individuals to leave their homes. While some researchers point to clear economic underpinnings of the mass emigration, others claim that the majority of people are fleeing violence and insecurity. By analyzing survey data from Honduras, I measure the relationship between economic and security factors and the individual decision to emigrate. My analysis reveals that in the aggregate, Hondurans are more likely to express an intention to emigrate due to insecurity than they are as a result of economic distress.

University of San Diego | MAIR

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Table of Contents

Introduction 3

CountryConditions 3

MassEmigration 5

RelevantTheoreticalFramework 7

KeyDrivers:Securityvs.Economics 8 Security 8 Economics 9

ResearchGoalsandMethodology 10 DependentVariable 10 IndependentVariables–Cross-Tabulation 10 IndependentVariables–LogisticRegression 11

Results 12 Cross-Tabulation 12 LogisticRegression 15

SummaryandConclusions 16

Acknowledgements 16

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IntroductionInrecentyearstherehasbeenwidespreadrenewedinterestinCentralAmericanmigration,startingin2014withasignificantsurgeinunaccompaniedCentralAmericanminorsarrivingattheUnitedStates’southernborder,andcontinuingthroughtodaywiththearrivalof“caravans”ofmigrantsandrefugeestravellingfromthe“NorthernTriangle”countriesofElSalvador,Honduras,andGuatemala.TherearecompellingreasonstolookattheseeventsthrougharegionallensandindeedreportingontheuptickinCentralAmericanmigrationhasfrequentlyemployedbroadcharacterizationsofregionalconditions.However,inordertodevelopadeeperandbetterunderstandingofthecircumstancessurroundingtheselarge-scalemigrationevents,itisusefultonarrowourfocustoasinglecountry,andtoconsiderfactorsatthesubnationalandindividualhouseholdlevel.ThispaperendeavorstomapoutabetterunderstandingofwhatcausespeopletoemigratefromHonduras.ThereareseveralreasonsfortheselectionofHondurasasmycountryoffocus:(1)thecountryhasbeenthestartingpointforrecentmigrantcaravanstravellingfromCentralAmericatotheUnitedStates,makingitanintriguingsamplepopulationtostudybroaderfactorsofemigrationfromtheregion;1(2)thepopulationofimmigrantsfromHonduranslivingintheUnitedStateshasrisenmoresharplyinthepastdecadethanthatfromGuatemalaandElSalvador;2and(3)HondurasholdsthetwindistinctionsofbeingbothoneofthepoorestandoneofthemostviolentcountriesinallofLatinAmerica,3allowingmetoanalyzewhichfactorisagreaterdeterminantofthedecisiontoemigrate.

CountryConditionsHondurasisoneofthemostviolentcountriesinLatinAmerica.Drugtraffickingnetworks,streetgangs(ormaras),andcartelsfromMexicoandColombiaalladdtotheextremelevelsofviolence.Criminalgroupsareemboldenedduetohighlevelsofcorruptionwithinthecountry'ssecurityforcesandeliteclass.Thecountry’smurderrateisastronomicallyhigh-43.6per100,000residentsin2017–whichwasdownsignificantlyfromitspeakof86.5per100,000in2011,4butstilloneofthehighestratesintheentireworld.Figure1providesavisualizationofhomicidesatthesubnationalstate(departamento)level,whichrevealsthatmurderratesremainhighinthenorthofthecountryalongtheAtlantic 1ElColegioDeLaFronteraNorte.LaCaravanadeMigrantesCentroamericanosenTijuana2018:DiagnosticoyPropuestasdeAccion.Tijuana:2018.AccessedFebruary21,2019.https://www.colef.mx/estudiosdeelcolef/la-caravana-de-migrantes-centroamericanos-en-tijuana-2018-diagnostico-y-propuestas-de-accion/2D’VeraCohn,JeffreyS.Passel,AnaGonzalez-Barrera,“ImmigrationfromGuatemala,Honduras,ElSalvadorUp,”PewResearchCenter,June04,2018,http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/.3“HondurasProfile,”InSightCrime,lastmodifiedAugust29,2018,https://www.insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/.4“Honduras2018Crime&SafetyReport,”OverseasSecurityAdvisoryCouncil,lastmodifiedApril3,2018,https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=23798.

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coastlineandwherethecountrybordersGuatemala.ThisislargelyattributabletothefactthatdrugtraffickingorganizationstakeadvantageofHonduras’unprotectednortherncoasttolandnarcoticsbyboatandplanebeforemovingthemacrosstheborderintoGuatemalaandultimatelytoNorthAmerica.5Whilethemurderratehasbeentrendinglower,thepercentageofHonduransreportingthattheywerevictimsofcrimehasgoneup,accordingtonationalsurveysconductedbytheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject.

Figure1-2017HomicideDatabyDepartment.

DataSource:LaUniversidadNacionalAutónomadeHonduras,ObservatorioNacionaldelaViolencia

Economicconditionsarealsodire.HondurasranksasoneofthepoorestcountriesintheWesternHemisphereandmorethan60%ofresidentsliveinpoverty.6HondurasalsosuffersfromthehighestlevelofeconomicinequalityinLatinAmerica.7Roughlyathirdofthecountry’sresidentsareunderemployed,andtheeconomyreliesonremittancesfromothercountries(primarilyfromtheUnitedStates).In2017,thegrossdomesticproduct(atpurchasingpowerparity)percapitawas$5,600,rankingHondurasasthe170thwealthiestcountryglobally,justaheadofPakistan.8

5CrisisWorkingGroup.CorridorofViolence:TheGuatemala-HondurasBorder.Belgium:2014.AccessedMay01,2019.https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/corridor-violence-guatemala-honduras-border6“TheWorldFactbook:Honduras,”CentralIntelligenceAgency,lastmodifiedFebruary1,2018,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html7“HondurasOverview,”TheWorldBank,lastmodifiedOctober4,2018,https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/honduras/overview.8CentralIntelligenceAgency,“TheWorldFactbook:Honduras.”

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Beyondthekeyeconomicandsecurityfactors,therearesignificantissueswithgovernance,majorflawsinthejusticesystem,rampantcorruptionandhighlevelsofimpunity,widespreadsocialinequality,9andseriousenvironmentalrisksduetoclimatechange.10

MassEmigrationHondurashasservedasanet“sending”countryformanyyears,meaningtherearemoreemigrantsleavingthecountryonanannualbasisthantherearenewimmigrantscomingin.AccordingtotheMigrationPolicyInstitute(2018),722,000migrantsfromHonduraslivedinothercountriesaroundtheworldin2017,whileonly39,000migrantsfromothercountrieswereresidinginHonduras.However,beginningwiththemassmovementofunaccompaniedchildrenoutoftheregionin2014,therehasbeenasignificantuptickinthenumberofpeopleleavingHonduras.Reportsindicatethatsomewherebetween200-400peopleleavethecountryeachday11andagrowingportionofthesemigrantsareunaccompaniedminorchildrenandfamilies.FromaUnitedStatesperspective,thismassexodusseemedtolullfollowingthe2014surgebuthasagainpickedupin2018and2019.InFiscalYear(FY)2017,U.S.BorderPatrolapprehended47,260HonduransalongtheSouthwestborder,ofwhichnearly64%wereunaccompaniedminors(7,784)orfamilymembers(22,366).InFY2018,thetotalnumberofHonduransapprehendedroseto76,513,66%ofwhichwereeitherunaccompaniedminors(10,913)orfamilymembers(39,439).InthefirsthalfofFY2019(OctoberthroughMarch)alone,thenumberofborderapprehensionsofHonduransjumpedto102,449,and80%wereunaccompaniedchildren(9,138)orfamilymembers(72,728).12Recently,largecaravansofmigrantshavebandedtogethertomakethejourneyfromtheNorthernTriangletotheUnitedStates.ManyoftheCentralAmericansarrivingattheSouthernU.S.borderoverthepastyearmadetheirwaynorthwithoneofthesecaravans.Thelargestcaravantodate,estimatedatitspeaktobearound7,000migrants,setoutfromHondurasinOctober2018.13Threesimilarconvoyshavesetoutinsubsequentmonths,includingagroupofnearlyathousandtravelingnorthfromSanPedroSula,Hondurasatthetimeofwriting.14 9“WorldReport2019:RightsTrendsinHonduras,”HumanRightsWatch,lastmodifiedJanuary17,2019,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/honduras.10MuzaffarChishtiandFayeHipsman,“IncreasedCentralAmericanMigrationtotheUnitedStatesMayProveanEnduringPhenomenon,”MigrationPolicyInstitute,February18,2016,https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/increased-central-american-migration-united-states-may-prove-enduring-phenomenon.11AzamAhmed,KatieRogersandJeffErnst.“HowtheMigrantCaravanBecameaTrumpElectionStrategy.”NewYorkTimes,October25,2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/world/americas/migrant-caravan-trump.html.12“U.S.BorderPatrolSouthwestBorderApprehensionsbySectorFiscalYear2019,”U.S.CustomsandBorderProtection,accessedApril24,2019,https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.13ElColegioDeLaFronteraNorte.“LaCaravana.”14NoeLeiva,“HonduransdefyTrumptoheadnorthforUSborder,”YahooNews,April10,2019,https://news.yahoo.com/hondurans-defy-trump-head-north-us-border-224745018.html.

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Clearly,manymoreHonduransaredecidingtoleavetheircountryandheadfortheUnitedStates,butthosestartlingstatisticsdon’ttellthewholestory.ChishtiandHipsman(2016)pointoutthatwetendtoviewtheflowofmigrantsandrefugeesthroughthelensofthosethatarriveontheSouthwestU.S.border,butdoingsofailstoproperlyacknowledgetheconsistencyofCentralAmericansfleeingtheNorthernTrianglecountries.MexicoestablishedtheSouthernBorderPlan(ProgramaFronteraSur),atthebehestoftheUnitedStatesgovernment,andindoingsobegantointerrupttheflowofmigrantsandrefugeesboundfortheUnitedStates.Figure2showsthepopulationofpeopleofconcern(whichincludesrefugees,asylees,andinternallydisplacedindividuals)intheUnitedStatesandthoseinothercountriesaroundtheworld.Thischartillustratestwoimportantpoints,1)thatthenumberofvulnerablepeopleleavingtheirhomesinHondurashasexplodedoverthepastfiveyears,and2)thatonlyamoderateportionofthoseindividualsweredestinedfortheUnitedStates.

Figure2-PeopleofConcernfromHonduras

AccordingtotheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)thenumberofpeopleofconcernfromHondurashascontinuedtoriseunabatedsince2010.In2017,themostrecentyearforwhichdataisavailable,morethan177,000Honduransweredisplacedwithintheirowncountry.ThousandsmorehavesoughtasylumorbeenadmittedasrefugeesincountriesaroundtheworldincludinginCanada,Spain,Italy,Mexico,CostaRica,andBelize.ThisdatarevealsthemassivemovementofHonduranindividualsandfamilieswhohavelefthomewhilealsohighlightingthefactthattheUnitedStatesisnottheonlycountryaffectedbythisflowofpeople.

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RelevantTheoreticalFrameworkInordertobetterunderstandwhyHonduransdecidetoemigrate,weneedtostartwithatheoreticalframeworkformigration.Ravenstein's(1889)"push-pull"theoryofmigrationiswidelyseenasformingthebasisofmostcontemporaryscholarshipontheissue.Accordingtohistheory,unfavorableconditionsinoneplace(suchas"badoroppressivelaws,heavytaxation,anunattractiveclimate,uncongenialsocialsurroundings,andevencompulsion"[p.286])pushpeopletoemigrate,whilefavorableconditionselsewherehavetheeffectofpullingthemin.Therearetheoristswhocriticizethesimplicityofpush-pullanalysis,sayingitoverlooksimportantfactorsthatinfluencemovement(seeforexampleO’Reilly[2015]).Despitetherelevantconcernssuchcritiquesraise,Ichoosetousethepush-pulldichotomyasthefoundationofmyresearchforthereasonsoutlinedbyKivistoandFaist(2010),because“itoffersaremarkablyintuitiveandparsimoniousaccountofthe(migration)process”(p.35).BuildingoffofRavenstein’sbaseunderstandingofmigration,Lee(1966)iscreditedwithgiving"expression"tothepush-pulltheoryofmigration,assertingthatwhenthefactorspushingapersonoutofaplacearestrongerthanthefactorskeepingthemthere,migrationwilloccur.ThereisdebateintheUnitedStatesaboutwhetherpushfactorsinCentralAmericaorpullfactorsintheUnitedStatesaremoreresponsiblefortheincreasingnumberofindividualsmakingthejourneynorth.TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesreportedthatbetween2008and2015,countriessurroundingtheNorthernTriangle(includingMexico,Belize,CostaRica,Nicaragua,andPanama)receiveda13-foldincreaseinthenumberofasylumclaimscomingfromHonduras,ElSalvador,andGuatemala.15Thisfact,MusaloandLee(2017)argue,suggeststhatCentralAmericansaremorelikelyleavingtheirhomesbehindasaresultofworseningcountryconditionsratherthanasaresultofpullfactorsinothercountries.Ifweadjustourscopetoinvestigatejustthepushfactorsthatleadtomigration,wefindarangeofpotentialexplanatoryfactors.O'Reilly(2015)pointsoutthatRavenstein'sconceptofpushfactorswasprimarilyconcernedwitheconomicsandlabormigration,andthatlesshasbeenwrittenaboutindividualsfleeingviolenceandinsecurity.16,17Morerecenttheoristshaveappliedthepush-pulldynamictoclassifyotherfactorsthatcompelpeopletoleavetheirhomecountries.UNHCRdefinespushfactorsofmigrationtoincludeunemployment,conflict,threatstolifeandliberty,alackofeducationalopportunities, 15UNHCR,WomenontheRun:First-HandAccountsofRefugeesFleeingElSalvador,Guatemala,Honduras,andMexico,Washington,DC:UNCHR,2015.AccessedFebruary21,2019.https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html.16MichaelClemens,“Violence,DevelopmentandMigrationWaves:EvidencefromCentralAmericanChildMigrantApprehensions,”Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment(2017).AccessedMarch11,2019.https://www.cgdev.org/publication/violence-development-and-migration-waves-evidence-central-american-child-migrant.17DavidScottFitzgerald,RawanArar,“TheSociologyofRefugeeMigration,”AnnualReviewofSociology44,no.1(2018):387-406,doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073117-041204

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poverty,famine,andenvironmentalfactors.MusaloandLeeciteCentralAmerica’shighhomiciderates,violenceagainstwomenandchildren,gender-motivatedmurders,householdviolence,andextremepovertyasprimarypushfactorsfromtheregion.Inadditiontothewell-definedpushfactorsofviolenceandpoverty,ChishtiandHipsman(2016)pointoutthatCentralAmericaisexperiencingaterribledrought,whichisalsocontributingtopeople'sdecisiontoemigrate.Somearguethatpeopleescapingviolenceorpersecutionarenotmigrantsatall,andthattheymustbeunderstoodandtreatedasrefugees,distinctly.18However,FitzGeraldandArar(2018)worrythatclassifyingindividualsaseitherrefugeesoreconomicmigrantsdoesnotcapturethecomplexityofindividualcircumstances.AccordingtoClemens(2017),thethreefactorsthatinfluencemigration(violence,economicconditions,andsocialnetworks)areallsignificantlyinterrelatedanddifficulttofullydistinguishfromoneanother.Seelke(2014)andJaitmanetal.(2017)provideusefulillustrationsofthiscomplexity.Seelkenotesthateconomicfactorsstrainsocialcohesionandlimitindividualopportunity,causingyoungpeopletoturntogangsandviolence.Jaitmanetal.establishthatviolentcommunitiessuffereconomicallyasaresultofthatviolence.InCentralAmerica,thisexacerbatestheeconomicdepressioncommunitiesalreadyfaceduetostructural,social,andgovernanceproblems.Despitethecomplexityandinter-relatednessofpushfactorsdrivingmigrationfromCentralAmerica,observersandanalystsoftentrytoboildowntheissuetoonesinglepredominantfactor.Therearefrequentlyattemptstoproveapointbycharacterizingthe“mostimportant”pushfactorofmigration.IntheUnitedStates,debateoverwhichfactorismostimportanthasevolvedintoapoliticaldispute,withanti-immigrationcommentatorspointingtothecleareconomicunderpinningsofthemassemigration(makingmigrantseasiertoturnaway),andpro-immigrationvoicesarguingthattheflowcanonlybecharacterizedasrefugeesfleeingtheregionduetoviolenceandinsecurity(makingthemthusdeservingofhumanitarianprotection).

KeyDrivers:Securityvs.EconomicsThedebateaboutwhethereconomicsorsecurityisthekeyfactordrivingHonduranemigrationhasbynowbecomewellestablished.However,thereislittleconsensusamongobserversaboutwhichisthemoresignificantcause.SecurityHiskeyetal.(2018)analyzeddatafromVanderbilt’sLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP)2014AmericasBarometersurveytodeterminewhetherviolenceandinsecurityhaveameasurableinfluenceonthedecisionofCentralAmericanstoemigrate.TheyfoundthatinHondurasandElSalvador,concernsaboutpersonalsecurityaremoreclosely 18ErikaFeller,“RefugeesarenotMigrants,”RefugeeSurveyQuarterly24no.4(2005):27-35,doi:10.1093/rsq/hdi077

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relatedtoemigrationintentionsthaneconomicfactors.Orozco(2018)assertsthatrecentmigrationtrendsfromtheregionarebeingspurredbyviolenceandinsecuritybroughtaboutbyorganizedcrimenetworks.HisresearchshowsthatinHonduras,a1%increaseinhomicidesdrivesmigrationby120%.AsurveyofCentralAmericanmigrantsbyMédecinsSansFrontièresshowedpersonalexperiencewithviolenceasthemostimportanttriggeringfactorinaperson’sdecisiontoleavetheircountryoforigin.19Inthesurvey,50.3%ofCentralAmericanscitedviolenceasatleastpartofthereasontheylefthome.Severalauthorshavefocusedtheirresearchspecificallyontheemigrationofchildren.Forinstance,Clemensdeterminesthattheimpactofashort-termincreaseinviolenceonunaccompaniedchildmigrationisroughlyequivalenttolong-termeconomiccharacteristicslikeincomeandpovertylevels,andismuchgreaterthanshort-termeconomicchangessuchasarapidriseinunemployment.Ameudo-Dorantesetal.(2016)findthatahighhomiciderateinthecountryoforiginishighlycorrelatedtothedecisionofunaccompaniedchildrentoemigrate.CarlsonandGallagher(2015)surveytheliteraturetoassesstheimpactofviolenceonthedecisionbychildrentoemigrate,andtheyultimatelymakethecasethatviolenceisaprimarycauseforrecentsurgesofunaccompaniedchildrenarrivingattheSouthwestU.S.border.EconomicsOntheothersideofthedebate,Luna(2018)usesasurveyconductedbytheHondurannonprofitCompanyofJesus(ERIC-SJ),toarguethatHonduransemigrateprimarilyforeconomicreasonsandnot,asmanysuggest,toescapeviolenceandinsecurity.Lunaclaimsthatoftherespondentswhohadafamilymemberemigratewithinthepreviousfouryears,82.9%reportedthatthefamilymemberemigratedduetolackofemploymentortogenerateincome.Only11.3%reportedtheirfamilymemberhadmigratedduetoviolenceandinsecurity.QuijadaandSierra(2018)conductamixedmethodsstudyintothecausesofemigrationfromHonduras.Theauthorsstateverydirectlythat"theprevalenceofviolenceinareaswherepotentialmigrantsliveisunrelatedtotheirmigrationdecisions".Instead,theyfindthatthepropensitytomigrateisincreasedforindividualsinlow-incomehouseholdswholackaccesstobasicservicesormeansofself-improvement.Likewise,manyconservativepoliticalfiguresintheUnitedStateshavestatedincleartermsthattheyseetheCentralAmericanexodusasbeingeconomicinnature.InJune2018,speakingonNBC’sMeetthePress,OklahomaSenatorJamesLankfordsaid,“thevastmajorityof[CentralAmericans]arecomingforeconomicreasons…notjustasylum,they’retryingtocomeforeconomicgains."20AreportissuedbythePewResearchCentersupports

19MSF,ForcedtoFleeCentralAmerica’sNorthernTriangle:ANeglectedHumanitarianCrisis,NewYork:MedecinsSansFrontieres,2017.AccessedonMarch17,2019.https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/msf_forced-to-flee-central-americas-northern-triangle.pdf.20JamesLankford,InterviewwithChuckTodd,MeetthePress,NBC,June24,2018.

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thisassessment,findingthat96%ofHonduransdeportedfromtheUnitedStatesin2016citedworkasamainreasonfortheirinitialmigration.21

ResearchGoalsandMethodologyInlightofthispuzzlingdisconnectintheliteratureaboutwhatisdrivingrecentmigrationfromCentralAmerica,andgiventhelackofquantitativeempiricalanalysisoftherootcausespushingHonduranemigration,Iendeavortomeasureandcomparetheinfluenceofeconomicandsecurityfactorsontheindividualdecisiontoemigrate.Toaccomplishthis,Ianalyzedatafromthe2016AmericasBarometerSurveyfromtheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP).AmericasBarometerisamulti-countrysurveywhichfocusesonpolitical,economic,andquality-of-lifeissuesincountriesthroughoutLatinAmerica.Themostrecentroundofsurveystookplacein2016and2017,andincludedsurveystakenin29countriesandtotalingmorethan43,000interviews.The2016surveyinHonduraswasconductedamonganationallyrepresentativesampleof1,560votingageadultsthroughface-to-faceinterviews.Toanalyzethesurveydata,Ifirstcross-tabulatedanumberofvariablestodeterminetheirbivariaterelationshiptotheintentiontoemigrate.Secondly,Iusedabinarylogisticregressionmodeltorunapredictiveanalysisthatexplainstherelationshipbetweeneconomicandsecurityfactorsandtheintentiontoemigrate.DependentVariableMydependentvariableisthedichotomousquestionofwhetheranindividualhasanyintentionofgoingtoliveorworkabroadinthenextthreeyears.Theresponsetothisquestionisrepresentativeofanindividual’sintentiontoemigrate,andresearchhasshownthatintentionstomigrateareastatisticallysignificantpredictorofaperson’sdecisiontodoso(see,forexample,CreightonandDeJong).Foreaseofstatisticalinterpretation,Irecodedthisvariablefrom(1=yes,2=no)to(0=no,1=yes).IndependentVariables–Cross-Tabulation• CRIMEVICTIMIZATION–Respondentswereaskediftheyhavebeenavictimofanytypeof

crime(robbery,burglary,assault,fraud,blackmail,extortion,violentthreats,oranyothertypeofcrime)inthepast12months.

• CRIMEVICTIMIZATION-OTHERHOUSEHOLDMEMBER–Respondentswereaskedifanyother

memberoftheirhouseholdwasavictimofcrimeinthepast12months?

21Cohnetal.,“ImmigrationfromGuatemala,Honduras,ElSalvadorUp.”

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• LEVELOFFEAROFBEINGAVICTIMOFHOMICIDE–Respondentswereaskedwhatleveloffeartheyhaveofbeingadirectvictimofhomicide.Responseoptionsincludealotoffear,somefear,alittlefear,ornofearatall.

• PERCEPTIONOFNEIGHBORHOODINSECURITY–Respondentswereaskedhowsafetheyfeel

intheneighborhoodwheretheylive,consideringthepossibilityofbeingassaultedorrobbed.Responseoptionsincludeverysafe,somewhatsafe,somewhatunsafe,andveryunsafe.

• PERCEPTIONOFPERSONALECONOMICSITUATION–Respondentswereaskediftheythink

thattheirpersonaleconomicsituationisbetterthan,thesameas,orworsethanitwas12monthsago.

• HOUSEHOLDMONTHLYINCOME–Respondentswereaskedwhichincomerangetheirtotal

monthlyhouseholdincomefitsinto,includingremittancesfromabroadandincomefromallworkingadultsandchildren.

• PERSONALMONTHLYINCOME-Respondentswereaskedwhichofaseriesofrangestheir

personalmonthlyincomefallsinto,withouttakingintoaccountotherhouseholdmembers.

IndependentVariables–LogisticRegression• HOUSEHOLDMONTHLYINCOME–Respondentswereaskedwhichincomerangetheirtotal

monthlyhouseholdincomefitsinto,includingremittancesfromabroadandincomefromallworkingadultsandchildren.Thisisascalevariableconsistingof16rangesofincome.

• FREQUENCYOFCRIMEVICTIMIZATION-Tocreatethisvariable,Icombineddatafromtwo

questions“Haveyoubeenavictimofanytypeofcrimeinthepast12months?Thatis,haveyoubeenavictimofrobbery,burglary,assault,fraud,blackmail,extortion,violentthreats,oranyothertypeofcrimeinthepast12months?”,and“Howmanytimeshaveyoubeenacrimevictimduringthelast12months?”.Thisrequiredrecodingthefirstquestionfrom(1=yes,2=no)intoascalethatincorporatesfrequencyofvictimization.

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ResultsCross-TabulationEmigrationIntention*CrimeVictimization

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoVictimofCrimeintheLast12Months

Yes 58.8% 41.2% 100.0% (197) (138) (335)

No 35.5% 64.5% 100.0% (428) (779) (1207)

Total 40.5% 59.5% 100.0% 625 917 1542

Chi(df)=59.295(1),p=0.000;Phi=0.196Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandcrimevictimizationwasverysignificant,χ²(1,N=1542)=59.295,p=0.000.Victimsofcrimeweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadnotbeenvictimized.Thisresultsuggeststhatcrimevictimizationisasignificantindicatorofaperson’sintentiontoleaveHonduras.EmigrationIntention*CrimeVictimization-OtherHouseholdMember

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoOtherHouseholdMemberWasa

VictimofCrimeYes 53.3% 46.7% 100.0%

(209) (183) (392)

No 36.0% 64.0% 100.0% (413) (733) (1146)

Total 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% (622) (916) (1538)

Chi(df)=36.201(1),p=0.000;Phi=0.153Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandvictimizationofanothermemberofthehouseholdwasverysignificant,χ²(1,N=1538)=36.201,p=0.000.Individualswholivedinahomewhereanotherhouseholdmemberwasavictimofacrimeweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadnotbeenvictimized.Similartoindividualswhohadbeenthevictimofcrimethemselves,victimizationofanotherhouseholdmemberledtohigherratesofemigrationintentions.

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EmigrationIntention*LevelofFearofBeingaVictimofHomicide

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoLevelofFearofBeingaVictimof

HomicideALotof

Fear 49.7% 50.3% 100.0% (249) (252) (501)

SomeFear 38.1% 61.9% 100.0% (119) (193) (312)

LittleFear 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% (117) (226) (343)

NoFearatAll

36.9% 63.1% 100.0% (142) (243) (385)

Total 40.7% 59.3% 100.0% (627) (914) (1541)

Chi(df)=26.160(3),p=0.000;Phi=0.130Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandfearofhomicidevictimizationwasverysignificant,χ²(3,N=1541)=26.160,p=0.000.Thosewithahigherleveloffearofbeingavictimofhomicideweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadlessfear.Thisrevealsthatinadditiontotheexperienceofcrimevictimization,thefeelingofinsecurityalsoledahighernumberofpeopletoexpresstheirintentionstoemigrate.EmigrationIntention*PerceptionofNeighborhoodInsecurity

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoPerceptionofNeighborhood

InsecurityVerySafe 32.9% 67.1% 100.0%

(143) (292) (435)

SomewhatSafe 42.6% 57.4% 100.0% (186) (251) (437)

SomewhatUnsafe

43.8% 56.2% 100.0% (173) (222) (395)

VeryUnsafe 46.3% 53.7% 100.0% (120) (139) (259)

Total 40.8% 59.2% 100.0%

(622) (904) (1526)Chi(df)=16.633(3),p=0.001;Cramer'sV=0.104Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandperceivedinsecuritywassignificant,χ²(3,N=1526)=16.633,p=0.001.Individualswhoperceivedtheir

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EmigrationIntention*PerceptionofPersonalEconomicSituation

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoPerceptionofPersonalEconomic

SituationBetter 35.5% 64.5% 100.0%

(99) (180) (279)

Same 38.9% 61.1% 100.0% (223) (350) (573)

Worse 44.0% 56.0% 100.0% (303) (385) (688)

Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0%

(625) (915) (1540)Chi(df)=7.078(2),p=0.029;Cramer'sV=0.068Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandperceivedpersonaleconomicsituationwassignificant,χ²(2,N=1540)=7.078,p=0.029.Individualswithaworseperceptionoftheirpersonaleconomicsituationweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadabetterperception.Thisistheonlyeconomicquestionthatshowedaworseeconomicsituationleadingtohigherlevelsofemigrationintentions.It’sinterestingtonoteherethatthisquestionisbasedonperceptionofeconomiccircumstances,notmeasuredincome.ThisraisesaninterestingquestionwhichIdonotexplorehere,andthatiswhetherthereisadifferenceinthedecisiontoemigratebasedonperceivedratherthanmeasuredeconomicconditions.

Chi(df)=7.717(2),p=0.021;Cramer'sV=0.077

neighborhoodasunsafeweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhoperceivedtheirneighborhoodassafe.TheperceptionofneighborhoodsecurityisanotherimportantfactorinwhetherornotsomeoneexpressedanintentiontoleaveHonduras.

EmigrationIntention*HouseholdMonthlyIncome

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoHouseholdMonthlyIncome

Low 36.4% 63.6% 100.0% (164) (287) (451)

Medium 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% (173) (255) (428)

High 45.6% 54.4% 100.0% (195) (233) (428)

Total 40.7% 59.3% 100.0%

(532) (775) (1307)

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Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandhouseholdincomewassignificant,χ²(2,N=1307)=7.717,p=0.021.Membersofahouseholdwithahighermonthlyincomeweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewithalowerhouseholdincome.Perhapsthemostsurprisingfindinginmyanalysis,thistablerevealsthathouseholdswithhigherincomelevelsaremorelikelytohaveanintentiontoleavethanthosewithlowerincomelevels.Thissuggeststhatfamiliesaremorelikelytoleavewhentheyhavethemeanstodoso.

EmigrationIntention*PersonalMonthlyIncome

IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad

TotalYes NoPersonalMonthlyIncome Low 39.4% 60.6% 100.0%

(82) (126) (208)Medium 40.6% 59.4% 100.0%

(82) (120) (202)High 45.0% 55.0% 100.0%

(103) (126) (229)Total 41.8% 58.2% 100.0%

(267) (372) (639)Chi(df)=1.555(2),p=0.460;Cramer'sV=0.049Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandpersonalincomewasnotsignificant,χ²(2,N=639)=1.555,p=0.460.However,thosewithahigherpersonalmonthlyincomedidexpressaslightlyhigherinterestinemigrating.Thefactthatthisrelationshipwasinsignificantisinandofitselfquitesignificant.Icertainlyexpectedtoseeaclearrelationshipbetweenpersonalincomeandthedecisiontoemigrate,andwassurprisedtolearntherewasnotone.LogisticRegression

B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)MonthlyHouseholdIncome

.024 .011 4.694 1 .030 1.024

NumberofVictimizations

.251 .054 21.284 1 .000 1.286

Figure3-BinaryLogisticRegression(Y=IntentiontoEmigrate)

• Foreachadditionalstepupinreportedmonthlyhouseholdincome,theoddsofanindividualexpressinganemigrationintentionishigherby2.4%.

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• Foreachadditionalreportedcrimevictimization,theoddsofanindividualexpressinganemigrationintentionishigherby28.6%

SummaryandConclusionsMyanalysisrevealsthatintheaggregate,Honduransaremorelikelytoexpressanintentiontoemigrateiftheyhavebeenavictimofcrime.Thislikelihoodincreasesby28.6percentforeachadditionalcrimevictimizationsurveyrespondentsreported.Ontheotherhand,thereappearstobeaweakrelationshipbetweenindividualorhouseholdeconomicconditionsandtheintentiontoemigrate.Moreover,contrarytowhatmightbeexpected,thelikelihoodofanindividualexpressingtheirintentiontoemigrateactuallyincreasesby2.4percentforeachstepupinreportedmonthlyhouseholdincome.Myresultswereslightlydifferentwhenconsideringindividuals’perceptionoftheirpersonaleconomicsituation.Inthatcase,thosewithaperceptionofbeingworseoffweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewithamorepositiveperception.Baseduponthesefindings,policymakersintheUnitedStatesandelsewherelookingforwaystostabilizeHondurasshouldlookfirstatwaystoreducecrimeandenhancesecurity.SimilarresearchshouldbeconductedusingsurveydatafromneighboringElSalvadorandGuatemalatodeterminewhatfactorsaremostinfluentialinthedecisiontoleavethosecountries.

AcknowledgementsIwouldliketothanktheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP)anditsmajorsupporters(theUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,andVanderbiltUniversity)formakingthedataavailable.IwouldalsoliketothanktheDr.MichaelPfauandDr.DavidShirkattheUniversityofSanDiego,aswellasDr.AndrewSeleeandArielG.RuizSotofromtheMigrationPolicyInstitute.

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